Decree No. 21 / 2017 Coll.
Ordinance on the Nuclear Safety of Nuclear Equipment
Valid
Effective from 15.02.2017
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21
DECLARATION
of 23 January 2017
on the safety of nuclear installations
The State Nuclear Safety Authority shall determine, pursuant to Section 236 of Act No. 263 / 2016 Coll., the Atomic Act, for the implementation of Sections 24 (7), 25 (2) (a) to (c), 44 (4) (c), 49 (2), 50 (4), 51 (6) (a) and (b), 52 (2), 53 (2) and 54 (4) (a), (c) and (d):
Subject matter
This decree implements the relevant regulations of the Euraton1) and provides for:
(a) deadlines for notification of an operational event to the Office;
(b) the range of information used by the feedback system;
(c) the procedure for investigating an operational event;
(d) criteria for categorising an operational event;
(e) requirements for the content of limits and conditions;
(f) a list of the quantities and facts relevant to the nuclear safety of the nuclear installation;
(g) the extent, manner and duration of the monitoring, measurement, evaluation, verification and recording of the quantities and facts relevant to the nuclear safety of nuclear installations and the retention of information on them;
(h) the extent, manner and time limits for the transmission of information on quantities and facts relevant to the nuclear safety of the Office's nuclear equipment;
(i) a list of other changes in the use of nuclear energy and changes with a potential impact on nuclear safety, technical safety and security of nuclear equipment;
(j) the extent and manner of documenting other changes in the use of nuclear energy and their notification to the Authority;
(k) procedures for implementing the process of controlled ageing and ageing;
(l) requirements for a programme of controlled ageing and ageing;
(m) rules to prevent and document the fissile chain reaction and environmental leakage in the handling of nuclear material and radioactive waste;
(n) the method of carrying out the inactive testing of nuclear installations;
(o) the way in which the first physical launch of a nuclear installation with a nuclear reactor is carried out;
(p) the extent and method of documenting the facts under Paragraph 51 (1) (b) (1) to (3) of the Atomic Act;
(q) the way in which the first energy launch of a nuclear installation with a nuclear reactor is carried out;
(r) the extent and method of documenting the facts under Article 52 (1) (a) and (b) and (c) (1) to (3) of the Atomic Act;
(s) rules for ensuring nuclear safety when putting into service a nuclear installation without a nuclear reactor;
(t) the scope and method of documenting the preparedness check of a nuclear device to initiate active testing;
(u) rules on the continuous provision, verification and documentation of the capability of stable and safe operation of nuclear installations;
(v) the deadlines for the submission of documentation for the reintroduction of the nuclear reactor into critical condition following the replacement of nuclear fuel by the Authority and its content requirements;
(w) the way in which the nuclear reactor has long been shut down in the case of a research nuclear installation; and
(x) procedures for the introduction of processes and activities under Paragraph 49 (1) (u) of the Atomic Act and their documentation and ongoing updates.
Terms
For the purposes of this decree:
(a) the limit condition of the requirement of the limits and conditions to be met is a prerequisite for ensuring nuclear safety;
(b) drawing on the limit condition the state of failure to comply with the limit condition in which the corrective measures provided for in the limits and conditions are implemented for the period of the limits and conditions set;
(c) root cause of a particular operational event which is a prerequisite for the occurrence of such an operational event;
(d) by violating the limits and conditions of non-compliance with the requirement laid down in the limits and conditions, including the non-compliance condition, the limit condition in which the corrective measures set out in the limits and conditions are not implemented or the time set for its implementation is exceeded;
(e) the direct cause of the circumstances which caused or directly led to an operational event;
(f) a clear cause for a specific operational event which can be determined on the basis of the information available without further examination.
Time limits for notification of an operational event
[Paragraph 49 (2) (a) of the Atomic Act]
An operational event must be notified to the Office
(a) immediately if there is a radiation accident;
(b) within 4 hours of the occurrence of a radiation accident,
(c) within 8 hours if
1. infringement of limits and conditions;
2. unplanned rapid shut-down of the nuclear reactor;
3. unplanned activation of security systems,
4. an event provisionally evaluated at least step 2 on the international scale for the assessment of the severity of nuclear events;
5. loss of heat input from the core of the nuclear reactor (hereinafter referred to as the "active zone") at the weaned nuclear reactor and not recovery within 30 minutes;
6. the detection of an uncontrolled presence of a radioactive substance, excluding natural radionuclides, outside the controlled zone to a dose equivalent rate greater than 0,25 μSv / h at a distance of 0,1 m from the surface of the product;
7. fire in a protected area of a nuclear facility under fire prevention legislation;
8. Detection of a fatal injury to a natural person,
9. Detection of a breach of the conditions for the operation of nuclear-based equipment by the International Atomic Energy Agency;
10. Detection of an event that reduces the effectiveness of nuclear equipment security,
11. finding that an effective dose of 20 mS is exceeded due to unplanned single external exposure,
12. finding that an effective dose of 6 mS is exceeded due to internal contamination; or
13. Detection of uncontrolled refrigerant leakage from the primary circuit of the nuclear reactor or other technological media contaminated by radionuclides outside the controlled zone with a volume greater than 1 m3;
(d) within 24 hours of origin if
1. radiation emergency first degree,
2. an event of preliminary grade 1 on the international scale for assessing the severity of nuclear events;
3. Uncontrolled leakage of refrigerant from the primary circuit of a nuclear reactor or other technological media contaminated by radionuclides within a controlled zone of more than 1 m3;
4. an unplanned decrease in nuclear equipment performance by more than 50% of the nominal nuclear reactor performance of more than 72 hours; or
5. loss of ability to control the source of ionising radiation consisting of loss of control over a simple, significant and very significant source of ionising radiation; and
(e) the following working day, if applicable
1. drawing the limit conditions;
2. the operation of the nuclear reactor performance limitation system;
3. the fall of a foreign object into the primary nuclear reactor circuit,
4. loss of operation of the teledosimetric system at the nuclear site; or
5. Unplanned excess of the level of intervention of the monitored item specified in the monitoring programme.
A range of information used by the feedback system
[Paragraph 49 (2) (c) of the Atomic Act]
The feedback system shall use information on:
(a) operational events;
(b) experience from other nuclear installations, including abroad; and
(c) experience from other technical and technological fields.
Operational incident investigation procedure
[Paragraph 49 (2) (b) of the Atomic Act]
(1) When investigating an operational event, it shall be carried out in such a way as to reveal:
(a) causes and circumstances of an operational event;
(b) the development of a deterioration of nuclear safety in the operation of a nuclear installation; and
(c) the degree of reduction of security reserves and the effect of the level of protection to the depth.
(2) The authorisation holder must, in the context of an operational investigation:
(a) assess the importance of an operational event in terms of nuclear safety, radiation protection, technical safety, monitoring of the radiation situation, management of the radiological emergency and the security of nuclear equipment and its consequences;
(b) determine the course of the operational event, including the determination of any deviation or failure;
(c) evaluate the activities of workers by methods for assessing the impact of human and organisational factors;
(d) assess the impact of the safety culture and the security culture on the operational event;
(e) analyse the direct causes and root causes of the operational event; in the case of a minor operational event, only analyse apparent causes;
(f) identify any negative trend relevant to nuclear safety, radiation protection, technical safety, monitoring of the radiation situation, management of radiological emergencies and security; and
(g) identify any reduction in the level of security reserves and increase the risk of an associated operational event.
(3) An investigation of an operational event must be carried out without delay. A major operational event must be investigated as a priority.
(4) A minor operational event of low safety significance shall be recorded and not be analysed for its apparent causes if:
(a) not repeated; or
(b) it was not possible to establish a clear cause for the previous investigation.
Criteria for classification of an operational event
[Paragraph 44 (4) (c) of the Atomic Act]
(1) An important operational event is an operational event which:
(a) leads to activation or failure
1. security system,
2. the power supply system,
3. a system for limiting the performance of a nuclear reactor; or
4. the pressure relief system, which is a selected device,
(b) lead to infringements of the limits and conditions;
(c) consists of a failure on the selected device
1. resulting in drawing a limit of more than 20% of the authorised period; or
2. related to ensuring the performance of the safety function;
(d) involves the failure to perform the test or check of the selected equipment according to the limits and conditions;
(e) include the failure of the equipment necessary for the safe exchange of nuclear fuel at the time of the exchange of nuclear fuel;
(f) leads to unplanned loss or disruption of the residual heat discharge from the active zone;
(g) leads to a failure on the system intended for the storage of irradiated nuclear fuel;
(h) affects the management of active zone reactivity;
(i) constitutes a breach of the physical safety barrier against the leakage of fissile products or radioactive substances;
(j) involves the fall of the regulatory authority or its unplanned fall of more than 50 cm;
(k) involves the forced interruption of tests on the physical launch or energy launch of a nuclear installation; or
(l) deficiencies in the safety assessment or in the documentation of the management system are caused and lead to a breach of the parameter of critical nuclear safety.
(2) An important operational event is an operational event which
(a) is caused by an error of the worker leading to non-compliance with the project documentation or exceeding the parameter important to the nuclear safety of the selected installation;
(b) lead to the level of intervention of the monitored item specified in the monitoring programme being exceeded;
(c) results in a loss of operation of the teledosimetric system intended for the nuclear site;
(d) leads to an error in handling
1. irradiated nuclear fuel, fresh nuclear fuel or nuclear material; or
2. a container containing fresh nuclear fuel or irradiated nuclear fuel;
(e) involves the loss, theft or unauthorised transfer of a radioactive source, nuclear material or radioactive waste;
(f) includes damage to nuclear material or to the nuclear packaging;
(g) infringes the conditions for ensuring the function of the equipment of the International Atomic Energy Agency installed on a nuclear installation;
(h) reduces the effectiveness of the security of nuclear installations;
(i) involves the unauthorised crossing or attempted breach of the border of the demarcated area of a nuclear installation;
(j) include the announcement of a radiological emergency and the call of emergency staff;
(k) involves multiple human factor failures;
(l) include the conscious disclosure of false information in the documentation;
(m) involves the presence of a foreign object in the primary nuclear reactor circuit technology; or
(n) it fulfils the condition set out in paragraph 1 or points (a) to (k), is established on another nuclear installation and is classified by the feedback system as applicable to the nuclear installation.
(3) A minor operational event is an operational event that is not a significant operational event.
Limits and conditions
(Paragraph 24 (7) of the Atomic Act)
(1) The limits and conditions shall include:
(a) safety limits;
(b) setting of protective systems;
(c) limit conditions;
(d) control requirements; and
(e) organisational measures.
(2) Safety limits must set limits for physical and technological parameters directly affecting the state of physical safety barriers which must not be exceeded. The safety limits shall be determined by a conservative approach.
(3) The setting of protection systems shall determine the values of physical and technological parameters relevant to nuclear safety and radiation protection, which automatically activate protection and safety systems. These values shall be determined in such a way that physical and technological parameters do not exceed safety limits in the subsequent transition process.
(4) The limit conditions should be laid down in:
(a) requirements to maintain safety-relevant physical and technological parameters in accordance with the nuclear installation project; and
(b) functional requirements for the operability of security systems.
(5) The control requirements must be established by:
(a) the scope of regular checks on the setting and compliance with the parameters and conditions of operation of systems, structures and components; and
(b) the frequency of the checks referred to in (a) taking into account:
1. reliability of systems, structures and components,
2. the requirements of legislation and technical standards; and
3. operational experience.
(6) Organisational measures should be provided for
(a) measures for cases where:
1. the limit conditions or infringements of the limits and conditions take place;
2. the performance requirements of systems, structures and components are not met;
3. one of the conditions for setting systems, structures and components is not fulfilled; or
4. the condition of activation of the protection systems is not fulfilled;
(b) the time limits for implementing the measures referred to in (a);
(c) the responsibilities of the management staff;
(d) requirements for the specific competence of selected staff;
(e) minimum cast requirements;
(f) requirements for internal and external control of compliance with limits and conditions; and
(g) the extent and manner of transmission of information to the Office.
(7) The content of the limits and conditions must be consistent with the results of the safety analyses.
Quantities and facts relevant to nuclear safety of nuclear installations
[Paragraph 25 (2) (a) to (c) of the Atomic Act]
(1) In the case of nuclear installations with a nuclear reactor, the sizes and facts relevant to nuclear safety are:
(a) the values of physical quantities and parameters which provide comprehensive information on the status of the active zone and other downstream systems, structures and components having an effect on nuclear safety that are not selected equipment and selected installations or on nuclear material or radioactive waste found in the nuclear installation;
(b) non-compliance with nuclear safety, technical safety, radiation protection, radiation monitoring, radiological emergency management and security and its consequences, analysis of this non-compliance and measures taken following this non-compliance;
(c) the operability of systems, structures and components having an impact on nuclear safety, which are not selected equipment, and of selected equipment and handling, and the work orders concerning them;
(d) drawing information on the limit conditions and infringement of the limits and conditions;
(e) the results of the tests, inspections, maintenance and repair of selected equipment and systems, structures and components having an impact on nuclear safety that are not selected equipment and records thereof;
(f) data relevant to the monitoring and evaluation of the ageing of nuclear safety-related systems, structures and components which are not selected installations and of selected installations;
(g) the parameters of the systems, structures and components having an impact on nuclear safety, which are not selected equipment, and of the selected equipment, providing an overview of the state of the nuclear installation, including information on their development and their records;
(h) the values of surface contamination of systems, structures and components;
(i) notification of the operational event, its description and other documents relating to it;
(j) the result of the verification of the medical fitness of a nuclear operator;
(k) the result of the verification of the personality of the selected worker;
(l) the information contained in the alert on compliance with the qualification requirements laid down for a nuclear plant worker;
(m) an indication of the form and quantity of radioactive discharges;
(n) data on batch power in the nuclear installation's monitored area;
(o) an indication of the change made on selected installations and systems, structures and components with nuclear safety implications that are not selected equipment;
(p) an indication of the quantity of nuclear material and the items selected, including handling;
(q) indication of the generation and handling of radioactive waste;
(r) an indication of the control carried out under the limits and conditions and the operational control programme;
(s) an indication of a change in security which is no other change in the use of nuclear energy;
(t) a report on the testing of systems, structures and components during the construction, physical start and energy start of nuclear installations;
(u) the information contained in the voice recording of a telephone call from an workplace where a particularly important nuclear safety activity is carried out, the technical support centre and the emergency control centre;
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Regulation Information
| Citation | Decree No. 21 / 2017 Coll., on Nuclear Safety of Nuclear Equipment |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | - |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 03.02.2017 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | 15.02.2017 |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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