Communication from the Constitutional Court No 97 / 2025 Coll.

Communication from the Constitutional Court on the adoption of the Opinion of the Plenary Pl.

Valid
Contents
97
COMMUNICATION
The Constitutional Court
of 5 March 2025
on the adoption of the Opinion of plenary sp. zn.
On 5 March 2025, the Constitutional Court adopted, on 5 March 2025, under sp. zn. Pl.
the following opinion:
If the Court of Appeal changes the ruling of the Court of First Instance on the costs of civil proceedings to the detriment of the appellant, it shall not infringe its rights guaranteed by Articles 36 (1) and 37 (3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.
Reasons

I.

Definition of the case
1. In the proceedings for a constitutional complaint brought under point IV of the ÚS 610 / 24, the complainant Dana Holická seeks the annulment of the order of the Regional Court in Ústí nad Labem ("the Regional Court ') of 28.11.2023 No. j. 84 Co 124 / 2023- 410 and statements III and VII of the Regional Court in Chomutov (" the District Court') of 30.3.2023 No. j. 23 C 195 / 2019-374. The contested statements were brought by the courts to decide on the reimbursement of the costs of a cross-claim by the complainant on the abolition and settlement of joint ownership in the narrower sense and on the settlement of joint ownership in the wider sense.
2. In the judgment under appeal, III, the District Court held that none of the parties had the right to pay the costs of winding-up and settlement of joint ownership in the narrowest sense and, by the judgment under appeal, VII of the judgment, the complainant was entitled to pay the costs of settling the joint ownership in the wider sense of CZK 90 905. Only the complainant lodged an appeal against the statements of III and VII of the judgment of the District Court. By the contested order, the Regional Court amended the two contested statements in such a way that none of the parties had the right to pay the costs (a) of cancelling and settling the joint ownership, (b) to pay for the exploitation of the joint ownership. In the preamble to the order under appeal, the Court referred to the opinion of the plenary of the Constitutional Court of 13.9.2023 sp. zn.
3. The Constitutional Complaints, which were notified to the Constitutional Court on 4 March 2024, seeks the annulment of the contested decisions of the General Courts, since they believe that their right to judicial protection guaranteed by Article 36 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as "the Charter") has been infringed, as well as the right to own the property referred to in Article 11 (1) of the Charter. In a constitutional complaint, it argues, inter alia, that the conclusions of the Supreme Court judgment of 26.1.2023 sp. zn. 22 Cdo 2258 / 2021, which concluded that, in civil proceedings, except for exceptions, there is a ban on change to the worse (reformatio in peius) which the appellate courts are obliged to respect, since the opposite conclusion would be contrary to the principle of disposition and also the purpose of remedies. The complainant is of the opinion that, although the decision on costs is based on an official obligation, it should therefore not be subject to the prohibition of a change to the worse, given the individual circumstances of the case under consideration (in particular the liability of the intervener), it is contrary to the principle of vigilantibus iura scripta sunt (the laws are written for the vigilante) in order for the county court to amend the judgment under appeal and not to grant it any compensation of the costs.
4. The Fourth Chamber of the Constitutional Court, responsible for the hearing and the judgment in the case referred to in sp. zn. IV. It cannot also be overlooked that the application of the principle of prohibition of change to the worse for decisions by the appellate civil courts on costs was often different (both in the past and after the above findings) by both the Constitutional Court and the General Courts. Therefore, the Fourth Chamber of the Constitutional Court suspended, in the interest of legal certainty, by order of 18.9.2024 sp. zn. IV. ÚS 610 / 24 proceedings on constitutional complaints and in accordance with the procedure laid down in § 23 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, submitted a draft opinion to the plenary.

II.

Existing practice of the Constitutional Court and General Courts

A.

Decision of the Constitutional Court
5. The Constitutional Court, in its decision of 8.7.1999 sp. zn. III. ÚS 87 / 99 (N 100 / 15 SbNU 31), found that the Court of Appeal in the contested decision had infringed § 224 (1) and (2) of Act No. 99 / 1963 Coll., the Civil Code, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as "S. S.") by changing the decision of the Court of First Instance on costs without amending the appeal of the contested decision. Infringement of the provisions of the Civil Code, which, contrary to the simple law, extends the application of the principle of official status to the detriment of the principle of disposition, is contrary to the principles of sound procedure, which is based on the fundamental right under Article 36 (1) of the Charter.
6. In the finding of 24.2.2004 sp. zn. I. ÚS 654 / 03 (N 27 / 32 SbNU 255) The Constitutional Court stated that "the obligation to pay costs is decided by the Court of First Instance ex officio and that the reimbursement of costs is regulated in accordance with the provisions of § 142-150 o. s. s. 'and therefore" the review activity of the Court of Appeal applies to the whole of the contested decision on costs, irrespective of the extent to which the judgment was challenged by the appeal, or as justified by the appeal'.
7. In the judgment in sp. zn. I. ÚS 1238 / 23, paragraphs 36, 39, 40 and 58, the Constitutional Court concluded that even if the appellant challenged only the statement on the costs of the first stage proceedings, the Court of Appeal may, after examination, change that statement only for the benefit of the appellant if it finds that the appeal is justified. Otherwise, the statement on costs of the first stage procedure must be confirmed. As a result of the effect of the prohibition on a change to the worse of the costs of the first stage procedure, the appellant cannot decide against the appeal only on the basis of the appeal lodged by the appellant. If the appellant only attacks the operative part of the case which the appellate court confirms, there is no longer any reason to examine the cost statement as a dependent opinion. It follows from the nature of the case that the Court of Appeal should no longer deal with the correctness of the cost statement of the first stage decision if the counterparty has not exercised its will by its disposition. Therefore, in the spirit of the principle of the prohibition of change to the worse, the Court of Appeal will examine the cost statement as an independent statement, although it has not been challenged by the appeal, but can only change it for the benefit of the appellant together with the statement on the substance (Sections 212 and 224 (2) CS). Failure to respect this requirement constitutes a breach of the complainant's right to judicial protection under Article 36 (1) of the Charter, in conjunction with his right to equality between the parties in the proceedings under Article 37 (3) of the Charter, since there has been an unjustified advantage to the parties who have not shown the will to do so by means of a proper disposition. These conclusions were subsequently applied in the finding of 10.7.2024 sp. zn. II. ÚS 1145 / 24.
8. For the sake of completeness, it can be noted that the Constitutional Court, in the judgment in Case 1238 / 23 ÚS 1238 / 23, assessed the case in which the action for the compensation of social difficulties resulting from an accident at work was decided. An appeal against the statement in the substance of the case was brought by a complainant who sought higher compensation. The Court of First Instance upheld the judgment of the Court of First Instance in the substance of the case, but, having found that the Court of First Instance had been wrong in its pricing value, it reduced the reimbursement of costs (ex officio) to the detriment of the complainant by more than half. The General Court decided on the application for divorce, the complainant was partially (to the extent of 25%) exempted from payment of legal fees and was appointed a lawyer. The Court of First Instance held that the Czech Republic - the Municipal Court had no right against the participants to pay the costs incurred for the remuneration of the complainant's representative. However, the Court of Appeal, which is responsible for the appeal of the complainant against the operative statement, changed the decision on costs ex officio. It was based on a partial exemption from the legal fees and failure of the complainant and required the complainant to pay an amount of CZK 8 100 representing 75% of the costs incurred by the State for its legal representation in the proceedings.
9. The indicated "inconsistency" in the approach of the Constitutional Court to applying a ban on change to the worse when deciding on costs by civil courts is evident from the relatively recent finding of 22.5.2024 sp. zn. II. ÚS 3192 / 23 (paragraph 21). The Constitutional Court stated in it - the complainant's objection to the breach of the principle of the prohibition of change to the worse - that this principle - generally applicable in criminal proceedings - does not result in any consequence from the civil law and does not apply within its jurisdiction. The main issue of this finding is the incorrect determination of the amount of compensation for costs in view of the inadequately chosen tariff value in relation to the subject matter of the dispute.
10. The decision of the Constitutional Court to reach a similar conclusion was further referred to in paragraph 21. For example, the resolution of 16.5.2017 sp. zn. IV ÚS 727 / 17, of 17.8.2005 sp. zn. IV. ÚS 14 / 04, of 29.11.2007 sp. zn. III. ÚS 596 / 07, of 12.8.2009 sp. zn. III. ÚS 1691 / 09 or of 12.8.2004 sp. zn. III. ÚS 230 / 04, of 15.9.2004 sp. zn. I. ÚS 380 / 04, of 25.6.2007 sp. zn. IV. ÚS 603 / 06. Specifically, in the resolution sp. zn. III. ÚS 596 / 07 The Constitutional Court also stated that the Court of Appeal was entitled to amend or increase the costs to the detriment of the party who was the sole appellant [reference to § 212 (b) o. s., as amended by 31.12.2013]. In resolution sp. zn. I. ÚS 380 / 04 The Constitutional Court pointed out that, in the past, it accepted that the obligation to pay costs was decided by the Court of First Instance ex officio and that the reimbursement of costs was regulated in paragraphs 142 to 150 of the Official Journal, namely that the principle of formal and lawfulness was applied in the event of a decision on reimbursement of costs, the principle of the prohibition of change to the worse is not applicable in that case (he reached similar conclusions by reference to § 151 of the Constitutional Court in its resolution sp. v. IV ÚS 603 / 06).
11. In general, the Constitutional Court, when reviewing the decisions of the General Courts on costs of proceedings (as in the judgment in the so-called baggatory disputes), is restrained. As a rule, constitutional complaints against such decisions are manifestly unfounded unless the case under consideration is accompanied by such (exceptional) circumstances as make it important in the constitutional context. For example, the findings of 15.10.2012 sp. zn. IV ÚS 777 / 12 (N 173 / 67 SbNU 111), of 10.6.2014 sp. zn. III. ÚS 1862 / 13 (N 118 / 73 SbNU 821), Resolution of 5.6.2024 sp. zn. II. ÚS 1078 / 24, of 17.7.2024 sp. zn. IV. ÚS 356 / 24, of 31.7.2023 sp. zn. I. ÚS 1332 / 23 or a recent finding of 9.10.2024 sp. I. ÚS 3241 / 23 (paragraphs 19 et seq.).

B.

Decision-making of general courts
12. The decision of the General Courts shall also indicate a not entirely uniform approach to the application of a ban on change to the worse in appeal civil proceedings when deciding on costs. However, it was largely followed by the conclusion that the prohibition of a change to a worse case is not applied in the decisions of the appellate civil courts on costs.
13. The Supreme Court in Prague, in its judgment of 9.11.2021 sp. zn. 7 Cmo 266 / 2020, stated that there is no prohibition of any change to the worse when deciding on costs, since the Court of First Instance decides on the costs (§ 151 (1) (a)) and is thus not bound by the scope of the appeal request. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Prague in the judgment of 21.5.2021 sp. zn. 7 Cmo 164 / 2019 or the Municipal Court of Prague in the order of 24.6.2015 sp. zn. 22 Co. 39 / 2015 published in the Collection of Judgments and Opinions under No 51 / 2016. The conclusion that the principle prohibiting the deterioration of the position of the appellant in the appeal proceedings did not apply in the decision on costs was also followed by the Regional Court in České Budějovice in judgment of 22.7.2019 No 19 of the Co 934 / 2019-95.
14. On the contrary, the Municipal Court in Prague, in its judgment of 22 January 2016, sp. zn. 91 Co. 369 / 2015, concluded that, in order to appeal a party against the statement on costs, the decision on costs could not be made worse by the Court of Appeal because such a decision of the Court of Appeal goes beyond the limits of the appeal, i.e. outside the scope of the appellate subject-matter of the appeal proceedings (§ 212 o. s.).
15. The judgment of the Supreme Court, sp. zn. 22 Cdo. 2258 / 2021, on which is based the finding of sp. zn. I. ÚS 1238 / 23, cannot be ignored. The Supreme Court concluded in it that in civil proceedings, except for exceptions, there is a ban on the change to the worse that the appellate courts are obliged to respect, since the opposite conclusion would be contrary to the disposing principle and also to the sense and purpose of appeals. At the same time, however, he acknowledged that one of the exceptions to the ban on change to the worse are procedures governed by the principle of official competence (similarly, the resolution of the Supreme Court of 23.1.2024 sp. zn. 22 Cdo 1082 / 2023). This judgment was not adopted for publication in the Reports of Judgments and Opinions. The publication of the decision in question was rejected with the conclusion that its conclusions did not correspond to the present state of procedural law (§ 153, § 206, par. 2, § 212a o.s.) (Vojtek, P. Overview of NS decisions not adopted in 2023 to the Reports of Judgments and Opinions. The Court's views, 2024, No 2, p. 45).
16. in the resolution of 3.6.2024 sp. zn. 24 Cdo. 697 / 2024 The Supreme Court concluded that the principle of banning change to the worse is traditionally applied (although it is not expressly regulated by law) in the civil process. However, it does not apply in proceedings which could also be initiated on their own initiative, since the court is not bound by the limits in which the appellant seeks a review of the judgment of the Court of First Instance, since such review cannot prevent the application of the prohibition of change to the worse (cf. § 28 (2) of Act No 292 / 2013 Coll., on special legal proceedings). Although custody proceedings may be initiated only on application, the remuneration of a guardian appointed by one of the parties shall be decided on its own motion; Therefore, the prohibition of change to worse cannot be applied in such decisions. Moreover, the view expressed in the judgment of 26.1.2023 sp. zn. 22 Cdo 2258 / 2021 does not constitute settled caselaw, according to the Supreme Court.

III.

Own justification of the opinion
17. The reason for the adoption of the opinion is to clarify the position of the Constitutional Court on the application of a ban on change to the worse when the appellate courts decide on costs in civil proceedings. At the same time, the Constitutional Court will create scope to resolve this issue at the level of sub-constitutional law and to unify the practice of the general courts, the fragmentation of which also the case law of the Constitutional Court has contributed little.
18. The Constitutional Court's legal opinion expressed in this Opinion can then be summarised in such a way that the constitutional order does not prohibit the change to the worse when the appellate courts decide on costs. It is therefore a question whose solution belongs to the general courts. At the same time, the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Civil Code, according to which the prohibition of a change to the worse in the decisions of the appellate courts on costs does not apply, cannot be regarded as arbitrary within the meaning of the Constitutional Court's case law and therefore infringes the right of judicial protection guaranteed by Article 36 (1) of the Charter.
19. It is clear that the constitutional order does not explicitly prohibit changes to the worse when deciding on costs. Findings of the Constitutional Court sp. zn. I. ÚS 1238 / 23 and sp. zn. II. ÚS 1145 / 24 import this prohibition from the disposition principle, namely from its speech in the form of the binding nature of the Court of Appeal by the scope of the appeal (I. ÚS 1238 / 23, paragraphs 21 et seq.). Although the disposing principle is one of the basic procedural principles of civil proceedings, its specific speech in the form of a ban on change to worse in civil proceedings cannot be inferred from constitutional order. The application of this prohibition depends on the specific arrangements for individual proceedings in the sub-constitutional rules. Indeed, the finding of sp. zn. I. ÚS 1238 / 23 expressly admits that "the prohibition of reformation in peius does not apply in proceedings governed by the principle of official law, since the court is not bound by the parties' proposals'.
20. The Constitutional Court respects the fact that it is a solution to private law (this is a horizontal relationship), where it has a disposition principle in the constitutional guarantee of the autonomy of the parties (Article 2 (3) of the Charter), and limited possibilities of public authority (e.g. Article 36 of the Charter, Article 11 of the Charter) [cf. finds of 21.4.2009 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 42 / 08 as amended by the amending resolution of 27.5.2009 (N 90 / 53 of the SbNU 159; 163 / 2009 Sb.), point 20 of 29.9.2005 sp. zn. III. ÚS 38 / 05 (N 187 / 38 SbNU 511), finding of 24.10.2024 sp. On the other hand, there are arguments against the application of a ban on change to the worse in civil proceedings, an interest in the correctness of decisions - a clearly incorrect first instance decision would stand, and a proper second instance should be abolished, an interest in the speed and economy of proceedings - the so-called ban on change to the worse would encourage redress rather than discouraging. In this concept - in application of the ban on change to the worse - the participant would also be forced to appeal, which would otherwise be "satisfied" with the outcome of the dispute and the cost statement. Otherwise, the appellate court would be in danger of taking a "new 'decision against the opposing party, even if it was the ex officio decision. It is up to the legislator to consider, when adjusting the decision on costs, which of these conflicting interests will give priority to and which legal structure it will choose.
21. Although the principle of banning change to the worse does not result directly from constitutional order, in theory, its failure to respect it could constitute a breach of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of participants (in particular the right to judicial protection under Article 36 (1) of the Charter). This could typically be the case if the court did not respect the mandatory standard, or would interpret and apply legal terms in a different legal and legal sense from the consensual accepted meaning (cf., for example, the finding of the Constitutional Court of 19.9.2024 sp. zn. III. ÚS 1951 / 21, paragraph 36).
22. Consideration on the application of the prohibition of a change to the worse in the event of a review of the decision on costs is based on § 151, 212, 212a, 224 o. s. s., § 151 (1) of the sentence before the semicolon o.s., it follows that the court decides on the costs of the proceedings on its own motion. It shall not be bound by the proposal of the parties when deciding on the reimbursement of costs. The Court of First Instance, in accordance with the law, also where the costs are dormant, that is to say, even if they are not quantified, did not directly propose payment of the costs or did not object to the quantification of the second party (if, however, the party requests reimbursement of the costs to a lesser extent than the general rules would confer on him or even renounces the costs, the latter must be respected; cf. the order of 19 October 2010 sp. zn. I. ÚS 1147 / 10).
23. Under Paragraph 212 (a) CS, the Court of Appeal is not bound by the scope of the appeal in cases where the decision on the contested statement is subject to an opinion which was not affected by the appeal. The operative statement is precisely the statement on costs. The dependent opinion does not stand alone in law. It may be affected by a decision of the appellate court even if it has not been expressly challenged.
24. Therefore, the relationship between the ban on change to the worse on decisions of the appeal civil courts on costs in professional literature is rejected [e.g. Voluntary, E., Kolář, D. Prohibition of reformation in peius in civil proceedings. Legal outlooks, 2023, No 22, p. 775; Šebek, R. In: Freedom, K., Smolík, P., Left, J., Dolílek, J. et al. Comment. 3rd edition (3rd update). Beck-online. Beck, 2024 (comment on § 212, paragraphs 11 and 12)). The same principles are based on the case-law of the General Courts for the review of decisions on costs (cf. Resolution of the Supreme Court of 19.7.2020 sp. zn. 33 Cdo. 3332 / 2021).
25.In the find sp. zn. I. ÚS 1238 / 23 The Constitutional Court relied on the general application of the principle of prohibition of change to worse in civil proceedings and on the substantive intention of the civil order of the judicial and comparison of related foreign legislation. However, future legislation (all the more so its mere intention) does not have a current influence on the constitutionality of the interpretation of the legislation. The argument of foreign law cannot be accepted unconditionally. This is due to the different legal principles and principles on which often foreign legislation is based. In some countries, the ban on change to the worse part of the rule of law (for example, Slovak and Spanish legislation) or the exceptions (for example, German legislation) is permitted, but it is not enshrined in other legal regulations (French legislation). It is also always necessary to take account of the differences in the decisions on the substance of the case and the costs. This is demonstrated by examples of Austrian and German regulations.
26. In Germany (the legislation contained in Zivilprozessordnung, hereinafter referred to as "the ZPO '), the costs of the proceedings are determined in two stages. The first decision is the Kostengrundentscheidung (base decision; the decision on the obligation to bear the costs) pursuant to § 308 (2) of the ZPO, which the court issues for reasons of public interest ex officio, in accordance with the rules contained in § 91 et seq. ZPO, as a general rule, in the context of the case-law. Kostengrundentscheidung does not determine the amount of the claim to pay the costs, but only determines which of the parties are entitled to pay the costs (or in what proportion, etc.). The review and amendment of the basic decision on costs may be made by the courts only if the appeal is admissible. However, it no longer matters whether a party with an appeal is successful in the matter itself. The calculation of costs takes place only in the separate second procedure for determining costs pursuant to § 103 et seq. ZPO (Kostenfestsetzungsverfahren; cf. Baumbach, A., Lauterbach, W., Albers, J., Hartmann, P. Zivilprozessordnung: mit FamFG, GVG und anderen Nebengesetzen. 75th edition. München: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2017, p. 318, m. No 35), which can be essentially initiated only on a proposal (except as provided in § 105). Decision on the determination of costs pursuant to § 103 et seq. On the contrary, ZPO falls under the scheme § 308 (1) ZPO (Baumbach, A., Lauterbach, W., Albers, J., Hartmann, P. Zivilprozessordnung: mit FamFG, GVG und anderen Nebengesetzen. 75th edition. München: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2017, p. 1271, m. No 16), in which the principle of disposition or one of its speeches is expressed. In the second instance, the prohibition of a change to a worse, expressly provided for in Section 528 and also imported from Section 577 (2) of the SPO applies in respect of the total amount, not individual items. However, the principle does not apply without exception. For example, the court ordered the contested order on the determination of costs may be annulled on the ground that the basic decision on the costs which served as the basis for the decision on the determination of costs will subsequently be annulled or absent from the outset (Baumbach, A., Lauterbach, W., Albers, J., Hartmann, P. Zivilprozessordnung: mit FamFG, GVG und anderen Nebengesetzen. 75th edition. München: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2017, p. 500, m. 64).
27. In Austria (the legislation contained in Zivilprozessordnung, hereinafter referred to as "Rak. ZPO") pursuant to § 52 (5) of the Rak. The ZPO shall decide on the right to reimbursement of costs on an ex officio basis, provided that the parties have submitted a list of costs (with appropriate documents). However, the appeal court is in accordance with § 462 (1) Rak. ZPO in the review strictly bound by the scope of the appeal, taking Rak. The ZPO does not contain the analogy of § 212 o. s. s. In the uncontested part of the decision, the court may not, on its own initiative, take account of any confusion (Rechberger, W. H., Klicka, T. Zivilprozessordnung: Kommentar. 5th edition. Wien: Verlag Österreich, 2019, p. 1708, m. 1). The principle of the ban on change to the worse in Austria comes from Paragraph 462 (1) of the Rak. ZPO, including decisions on costs. Moreover, the Court of First Instance is bound by the grounds of appeal. If the amount of the costs is contested, there is therefore no review of the basis of the claim. The cost statement remains unaffected not only in the case of confirmation of the judgment on the substance of the case, but also in the case of a mere minor change in the decision on the matter by the higher court itself. In the event of a substantial change in the decision on the substance of the case, the costs are re-determined on the grounds of the dependence of the statements, even if they were not contested, and can also be decided against the appellant (§ 50 (1) Rak. ZPO).
28. The Constitutional Court does not argue that the rule of law excludes the principle of the prohibition of a change to the worse when the appellate courts decide on costs. However, the interpretation of those legal provisions in that that principle is not applied in such cases (even if the cost statement is not challenged by appeal) cannot be regarded as arbitrary and as such requiring the independence of the Constitutional Court. In other words, the interpretation of Sections 151 and 212 CS, in which the prohibition of change to the worse is not respected, does not constitute a qualified defect in the interpretation of the sub-constitutional law which would constitute a contradiction with Article 36 (1) or Article 37 (3) of the Charter. It is not a non-constitutional procedure if, by reason of such a decision, there is a deterioration in the position of (even a single) appellant.
29. If there is an interpretation of the sub-constitutional law, the requirement of § 151 CS to decide on costs may certainly have different content, starting with the mere response to the need to submit a quantification of the costs in the original regulation and ending with the continued interest of the public authority in the correct quantification of the costs. The second approach was previously addressed by the Constitutional Court in its Resolution sp. zn. I. ÚS 1147 / 10, by the fact that it also appears to be of value contrary to the limitation of appeals against decisions on costs [§ 238 (1) (h)], including the above general approach in the case-law of the Constitutional Court to the inconstitutionality of the decision on costs.
30. The statement on costs of the first instance shall be reviewed by the Court of Appeal whenever an appeal is brought directly against it. However, if the statement on costs is not expressly contested, there is no need to amend the statement on costs (in favour or disadvantage of any party) when confirming the judgment of the Court of First Instance on the substance of the case, since nothing has changed from the point of view of the dependency of the decision on costs on the substance of the case. The obligation to rule on costs pursuant to § 151 o. s. The obligation to rule on costs under § 151 o. s. also does not justify, on its own motion, a change in the decision where no interested party is able to reach it.
31. A completely different situation arises if the Court of Appeal changes the judgment on the substance of the case. In such a case, the Court of First Instance's statement of costs will not be reviewed at all and then confirmed or amended. Such a statement of costs is, in fact, a change in the statement on the substance of the case being removed and the Court of Appeal is required to decide - on its own motion - again on the costs of the proceedings before the Court of First Instance (§ 224 (2) o. s. s.). If the Court of Appeal rescinds the operative part of the judgment, then again the costs of the proceedings before the Court of First Instance before the annulment, the Court of First Instance shall decide in a decision which shall bring the case to an end again (§ 224 (3) o. s. s.). The Court of Appeal or, where applicable, the Court of First Instance, then in its decision on costs, is in no way limited in that it could not rule against any party, that is to say, who appealed to the statement on the substance. However, if the change in the operative part is merely formal and does not affect in any way the reasons on which the Court of First Instance decided on the costs (for which it was dependent on the operative part), the court of appeal described above may, from a constitutional point of view, be consulted as if the operative part of the case had not been altered.
32. However, the role of the Constitutional Court should not be to replace the legislator or the interpretation of the activities of the general courts in establishing the rules of civil procedure. It is up to the general courts to interpret the relevant provisions of sub-constitutional law and to unify their practice.
33. For the reasons set out above, the plenary of the Constitutional Court differs from the legal opinion expressed in the finds sp. zn. I. ÚS 1238 / 23 and sp. zn. II. ÚS 1145 / 24. From the point of view of constitutional order, it can be concluded that if the appellate court changes the ruling of the Court of First Instance on costs to the detriment of the appellant, it does not infringe its constitutional rights under the current legislation, even if the statement of costs has not been expressly challenged by appeal.
34. At the same time, the Constitutional Court recalls that constitutional complaints against decisions of the General Courts on costs are, as a rule, manifestly unfounded, unless the case under examination is accompanied by circumstances (exceptional) which make it sufficiently relevant to the constitutional plane (see paragraph 11 above). All the more exceptional circumstances, typically in the form of a significant excess of the complainant's own interest, must be given in cases where the contested cost level does not exceed the bagging threshold; If the law makes appeals conditional on a certain minimum amount of the object of the dispute, the purpose of the law is certainly not to replace the role of another review instance by the Constitutional Court. That requirement of sufficient constitutional importance ensures that the Constitutional Court can fully concentrate on fulfilling its role as a constitutional body. If an exceptional circumstance of sufficient constitutional significance is present in a particular cost case and therefore a finding is issued, it cannot be concluded from this that the Constitutional Court will then automatically admit to the substantive review any similar complaints in which there is a conflict with that finding. The alleged contradiction must, as a general rule, be supplemented by other circumstances, typically exceeding the complainant's own interest, in order to be assessed by the Constitutional Court; as well as the conclusion on the infringement of Article 36 (1) of the Charter, the alleged infringement is not sufficient.
President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr.
In accordance with Article 14 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, the Judges Josef Baxter, Jaromír Jirsa, Jiří Píbán and Pavel Šámal took a different position on the opinion of the Judges.

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Regulation Information

CitationCommunication from the Constitutional Court No 97 / 2025 Coll., on the adoption of the Opinion of the Plenary of the Pl. ÚS- st. 60 / 24 on the amendment of the statement on costs of civil proceedings to the detriment of the appellant
Regulation Type-
Author-
CollectionCode of Laws
Date of Promulgation03.04.2025
Effective from-
Effective until-
Status Valid
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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