The Constitutional Court found no 94 / 2011 Coll.
The Constitutional Court found of 22 March 2011 sp. zn.
Valid
Contents
I.
I. A) Shromažďování údajů o komunikaci jako zásah do soukromého života
I. B) Závažnost a rozsah zásahu do práva na soukromí
I. C) Legitimita cíle a přínos zásahu do základních práv
I. D) Nebezpečí zneužití uchovávaných údajů
I. E) Předběžná otázka k Evropskému soudnímu dvoru
II.
III.
IV.
V.
㤠97
§ 1
§ 2
§ 3
§ 4
§ 5
VI.
VII.
VII. A) Právo na respekt k soukromému životu a právo na informační sebeurčení
VII. B) Přípustnost zásahu do práva na informační sebeurčení
VIII.
VIII. A) Tzv. data retention
VIII. B) Posouzení napadené právní úpravy z hlediska ústavněprávních požadavků
VIII. C) Obiter dictum
94
FIND
The Constitutional Court
On behalf of the Republic
Constitutional Court under sp. zn. Pl. Pl. ÚS 24 / 10 decided on 22 March 2011 in plenary composed of Stanislav Balík, František Duchoň, Vlasta Formánková, Vojen Güttler, Pavel Holländer, Vladimir Křírka, Dagmar Lastovecká, Jan Musil, Jiří Nykodém, Pavel Rychetský, Miloslav Excellent and Eliška Wagner (Judge's Rapporteur) on the proposal of the Group of Members of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, represented by Mr Mark Bendou, with its registered office No. 485 / 2005 Coll., on the scope of operation and location, the period of their preservation and the form and the form of their transmission to the authorities authorised to participate in the Chamber, and to change of certain related laws (Act on electronic communications), in the version of the Act No 485 / 2005 Coll.
as follows:
Paragraph 97 (3) and (4) of the Act No. 127 / 2005 Coll., on electronic communications and on the amendment of certain related laws (the Act on electronic communications), as amended, and Decree No. 485 / 2005 Coll., on the scope of the traffic and location data, the retention period and the form and manner of their transmission to the authorities authorised to use them, shall be deleted from the date of the publication of this finding in the Collection of Acts.
Reasons
Recital of the proposal
1. Group 51 Members The Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, with a proposal received by the Constitutional Court on 26 March 2010, sought the annulment of the provisions of Sections 97 (3) and (4) of Act No. 127 / 2005 Coll., on electronic communications and on the amendment of certain related laws (the Act on Electronic Communications), as amended, (hereinafter referred to as "the contested provisions') and Decree No. 485 / 2005 Coll., on the scope of the operating and localisation data, the period of their retention and the form and manner of their transmission to the authorities entitled to their use (hereinafter referred to as" the contested Decree 'or collectively referred to as "the contested legislation').
2. Although the proposal complied with the formal requirements laid down in Article 87 (1) (a) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic and Article 64 (1) (b) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as the "Law on the Constitutional Court"), the Constitutional Court considers it necessary to emphasise that the Institute of the Application for the Repeal of the Law or its Individual Provisions pursuant to Article 87 (1) (b). (a) The Constitution of the Czech Republic (Article 6 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic) and primarily serves as one of the instruments of protection of the parliamentary minority (opposition) against possible arbitrage (or wilful) in decisions taken by a parliamentary majority in the legislative process based on the principle of majority decision (cf. Article 6 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic), which includes the report of the Venice Commission of the CDL-AD (2010) 025 "Report on the role of the opinion in a representative parliament" of 15 November 2010, which gives the right to the parliamentary opposition to seek the majority of decisions taken (laws). In other words, qualified submissions to an impartial and independent Constitutional Court are often the last option for a parliamentary minority to oppose the decision-making of a parliamentary majority, as representatives of the parliamentary opposition usually find themselves in a numerical minority in Parliament, and do not have the means of making such a decision (by issuing a legislative act) as part of the legislative process. On the contrary, representatives of the parliamentary majority generally have such effective means and, if they have doubts about the correctness, timeliness or even the constitutionality of the decisions taken (or previously adopted), it is not only their right but their duty to use them directly (see the promise under Article 23 (3) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic). In any event, the Institute of Appeal for the repeal of a law or its individual provisions pursuant to Article 87 (1) (a) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic to the Constitutional Court does not serve as a means of obtaining any "good 'or expert opinion from the Constitutional Court on a parliamentary majority adopted by a decision, or as an instrument for the application of which it is a manifestation of a political or even pre-election struggle transferred from parliamentary soil to the Constitutional Court. In the case under consideration, not only is the group of petitioners composed mainly of representatives of political parties that are currently involved and also at the time of the proposal, they were involved in the exercise of government power, and in the Parliament of the Czech Republic they had the majority needed to amend the contested legislation, but moreover, and this cannot be left to the Constitutional Court without a critical remark, they directly participated in the vote by their consent (!) in the legislative process of adopting the contested legislation. In such cases, the Constitutional Court would be obliged to refuse such proposals in future.
3. The nature of the objections was summarised by the appellants themselves by the fact that the collection and use of operational and localisation data on telecommunications operations to the extent that it is defined by the contested provisions and the contested decree constitute non-discriminatory interference with the fundamental rights set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms ("the Charter ') and the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (" the Convention'), namely the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 7 (1), 10 (2) and (3) and 13 of the Charter and Article 8 of the Convention. Moreover, according to the appellants, this intervention can be regarded as a breach of the essential requirements of the democratic rule of law, to which the principle of proportionality within the meaning of Article 4 (4) of the Charter can be attached. The applicants supported their claims by the following arguments.
4. The content of the contested provisions is the imposition of an obligation on natural and legal persons providing a public communications network or providing a publicly available electronic communications service (namely telephone operators and providers of Internet connection), for a period of 6 to 12 months to store operational and localisation data (tens of data) on all telephone and fax communications, e-mail and SMS communications, visits to websites and the use of certain Internet services specified in the contested decree, and are required to provide them to the competent authorities upon request. According to the appellants, the above data, their collection, storage and transmission to the State authorities are undoubtedly covered by the protection of Article 8 of the Convention. In this context, they referred to a number of decisions by the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as "the ECHR ') and the Constitutional Court.
5. The appellants also consider that interference with fundamental rights is not only an immediate intervention (e.g. familiarisation with stored data), but also measures by state authorities that contain a significant risk of limiting fundamental rights that may occur at any time. The storage of traffic and location data cannot be considered as such, since such data is kept continuously and is available to state authorities and can be requested and used in the future by the relevant regulations. Therefore, the retention of the above set of data entails a latent risk of further immediate intervention by state authorities. Moreover, it cannot be overlooked that the State does not store operational and localisation data itself, but uses private persons providing telecommunications services to do so, with the risk of potential misuse of stored data by a large number of private persons moving in the field of telecommunications services being higher than when stored by the State. One of the fundamental requirements of the ESLP developed by the interpretation of the legal basis for State interference in private life is the predictability and availability of this legal basis. The reason for this is a legitimate and logical requirement for individuals to be aware of the circumstances in which the State can, exceptionally, intervene in their private life and to adapt their actions to avoid such intervention. However, the level of storage of operational and localisation data limits this possibility to exclusion.
6. According to the applicants, the objectives, as well as the likely and foreseeable benefits resulting from the obligation to store operational and localisation data as compared to the interference in the fundamental rights of the persons concerned, are gross. Therefore, in accordance with Article 8 (2) of the Convention, they acceded to the assessment of the proportionality of the measure, which they assessed both in terms of the gravity and extent of the interference in the fundamental rights of individuals, in the present case the right to privacy, in terms of the legitimacy of the objective to which the limitation of fundamental rights is intended to serve and in terms of the benefit of those interventions. Last but not least, its use was confronted with the dangerous aspects associated with it, especially the risk of misuse of stored data.
7. First, the appellants stated that the introduction of an obligation to store operational and localisation data constitutes a serious interference with privacy, since these data open wide possibilities for their use and combining them with other data can cause very sensitive consequences for the private life of the persons concerned. The obligation to store operational and localisation data to such an extent results in the exclusion of the existence of uncontrolled and unmonitored telecommunications, which must be regarded as a particularly intense interference in the privacy of all persons using telecommunications (telephony, use of Internet services), which are no longer used only for communication between people, but which affect a wide range of daily activities (shopping, banking operations, education, medicine, etc.). A number of other (in many cases very sensitive) data and information about the person and his privacy can be derived from the stored data. In a number of cases, sensitive sender information (e.g. if it is a medical specialist) can be detected from the identity of the addressee of the phone or e-mail, similarly information about the opinion, health status or sexual orientation of the person can be found from the visited website. A large amount of information can also be obtained from localisation data on mobile phone movements (respectively its holder), in particular in combination with localisation data on other mobile phones (an indication of who met where and when, etc.). On the basis of stored data, a communication and movement profile of an individual can be compiled, from which not only data on its past activities can be obtained, but with a high degree of probability and properly predicted its activities in the future, which also constitutes a significant interference with the right to privacy and correspondence of individuals.
8. Furthermore, in their proposal, the appellants disputed the legitimate objective of adopting the contested scheme. The Government's explanatory report on the provision of Section 97 of the Electronic Communications Act shows that the purpose of the provision of Section 97 is to face increasing security risks and to ensure the security and defence of the Czech Republic, with no further justification. The appellants consider that, pursuant to Article 8 (2): The Convention is permissible to intervene in privacy in relation to the fight against crime only if it serves to prevent crime. "Preventive, general storage of telecommunications data without any particular reason is mainly directed towards the past and can thus serve mainly to clarify the crimes already committed '(p. 13). Thus, the interference in privacy in order to clarify the crime already committed is, according to the applicants, contrary to Article 8 of the Convention. In addition, data shall be stored without any specific suspicion. Thus, any person is deemed to be a suspect without the existence of specific circumstances to justify such suspicion, which is inadmissible in the rule of law. The applicants also drew attention (referring to specific cases from abroad) to the fact that the evaluation of telecommunications data also carries the risk of misinterpreting and suspecting or accusing an innocent person. It is possible to confuse the person who actually made the communication with the person who, for example, concluded a contract with a telephone operator or an Internet provider.
9. According to the appellants, neither the legislature nor the factually relevant administration department provided information on how and in what cases, before the implementation of the contested legislation, which entails a huge quantitative increase in and possible access to retained data, the investigation, detection and prosecution of serious offences failed to obtain the required data on the grounds that such data were no longer available. It is also not demonstrated whether laying down the obligation to store all data on telephone and electronic communications (or already resulting) will indeed lead to an improvement of investigations, detection and prosecution of serious crimes and threat avoidance, an increase in the percentage of the clarity of offences or a reduction in crime, etc. It is also a question of how old data are required by the competent authorities and how long operational and localisation data must be stored for 6 months and longer. Moreover, paradoxically, private intervention may involve persons who are not involved in serious crime rather than persons committing it and therefore have an increased interest in carrying out anonymous communications. According to the applicants, data retention can be expected to help achieve the objectives set to a rather small extent and in less significant cases, and therefore a long-term and positive impact cannot be expected on reducing crime and increasing security in relation to the use of telecommunications.
10. Similarly, according to the applicants, the risk of illegal use and misuse of stored data should also be assumed, as with such a large number of companies providing telecommunications (especially in the case of mobile communications and the Internet), adequate provision of such traffic and location data cannot be expected. Therefore, real and technically existing possibilities for their use should also be examined. According to the appellants, the contested legislation does not lay down the conditions on the basis of which the data are to be stored, nor the conditions for their use by the competent authorities, nor does it guarantee individuals any guarantees against their misuse. The contested legislation thus records the extensive use of the relevant databases, both in terms of the amount of data that will be collected from them and in terms of the number of entities that will be authorised to do so, as well as the extension of the purposes for which the data will be used. According to the applicants, the risk of misuse of traffic and location data by third parties is also very real. Persons who may abuse this personal data are very often employees of companies or public authorities that process the data, but also other persons (e.g. so-called hackers).
11. At the end of their proposal, the appellants expressed the belief that, although the contested legislation is a national regulation to which the criteria arising from the constitutional order of the Czech Republic should be extended, these are at the same time issues the origin of which stems from Community law, namely the transposition of Directive 2006 / 24 / EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (hereinafter referred to as the Data Retention Directive) into the legal order of the Czech Republic. For the same reasons as set out above, the appellants therefore gave the Constitutional Court, for consideration, the possibility to refer the question referred for a preliminary ruling to the European Court of Justice in accordance with Article 234 of the EC Treaty concerning (no) the validity of the Data Retention Directive itself, since there is a significant risk that the Directive in question, which was transposed into the Czech legal order by the contested provisions and the contested decree, is contrary to EC law.
Recital of the observations of the parties
12. The Constitutional Court pursuant to the provisions of Sections 42 (4) and 69 of the Law on the Constitutional Court has sent the present application for the annulment of the contested provisions and the contested decree to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic and also to the Ombudsman.
13. The Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, represented by President Ing. M. Vlček, described in detail the procedure for adopting the Government Bill amending Act No. 127 / 2005 Coll., on Electronic Communications and on the amendment of certain related laws (the Act on Electronic Communications), as amended, on the basis of which the contested provisions became part of the Act on Electronic Communications No. 127 / 2005 Coll. (see Part IV of the Found). On the content of the government bill, it also stated that in the explanatory memorandum, the government explicitly stated that the proposed bill was in accordance with the constitutional order and legal order of the Czech Republic and does not contradict the international treaties by which the Czech Republic is bound. The Chamber of Deputies was based on the same conviction in its deliberations. It is therefore up to the Constitutional Court to assess the constitutionality of the contested provisions.
14. The Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, represented by the President of MUDr. P. Sobotka, in its observations of 28 April 2010, after a comprehensive recap of the arguments put forward by the appellants in the proposal under consideration, also described the procedure for accepting the government bill in question by the Senate (see Part IV of the decision). In the course of his discussion, he further stated that both in the Committee on Economic, Agriculture and Transport and in the Standing Commission of the Senate on the Media and later in the Senate plenary, the draft law was presented as another amendment responding to the obligation of the Czech Republic to transpose the relevant EC directive into our legal order. The obligation of telecommunications operators, Internet providers and others operating in the electronic communications sector to store localisation and traffic data for at least 6 months has been stressed by the promoter that "in no case is it anything comparable to listening, just because they do not retain the contents of individual calls or mail messages and because they are also Internet services (...), only localisation and traffic data, i.e. technical data, are stored '. The Senate accepted this fact when discussing the draft amendment in question and approved the draft act as adopted by the Chamber of Deputies, following recommendations from the Committee and the Standing Commission of the Senate on the Media. It is therefore only up to the Constitutional Court to examine and make a final decision on the proposal to repeal the provisions of the Electronic Communications Act.
15. Ombudsman JUDr. Otakar By his observations of 12 April 2010, he stated that he did not agree with the arguments put forward and therefore did not intervene in the proceedings for annulment of the contested order before the Constitutional Court.
Abandonment of oral proceedings
16. According to the provisions of Paragraph 44 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court may, with the consent of the parties, refrain from oral proceedings if it is not possible to expect further clarification of the case. The Constitutional Court therefore requested, in accordance with that provision, from the parties to the proceedings whether they agreed to waive the oral procedure. Both the draftsmen and the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic agreed, the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic did not respond to the call within the time limit specified by it. Thus, the oral hearing could be abandoned in the present case.
Constitutional conformity of the procedure for the adoption of the contested provisions of the law and the legal conditions for the adoption of the contested decree
17. The Constitutional Court must first examine whether the law in question has been adopted and issued in a constitutionally prescribed manner [for the review algorithm in the standard control procedure, see point 61 of the FTC No 77 / 06 of 15.2.2007 (N 30 / 44 of SbNU 349; 37 / 2007 Coll.)]. In the case of sublegal legislation, namely ministerial decrees, the Constitutional Court pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court assesses whether they have been adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution of the Czech Republic a given authorisation (Article 79 (3) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic), i.e. whether they have not been issued "ultra vires'.
18. From the observations of the two chambers of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, attached annexes and documents available by electronic means (resolutions and prints available in the digital library on the website of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, on www.psp.cz and www.senat.cz) The Constitutional Court found the following: The contested provisions of § 97 paragraphs 3 and 4 became part of Act No. 127 / 2005 Coll. on the basis of Act No. 247 / 2008 Coll., amending Act No. 127 / 2005 Coll., on Electronic Communications and amending certain related laws (Act on Electronic Communications), as amended. The draft law was submitted to the Chamber of Deputies by the Government of the Czech Republic on 16 January 2008, proposing its consideration so that the Chamber of Deputies could give its consent at first reading. The proposal was circulated to Members on 18 January 2008 as House Press No. 398 / 0 - Amendment to the Electronic Communications Act - EU. In the first reading, which took place at the 27th meeting on 30 January 2008, the Chamber of Deputies did not agree to the discussion so that it could agree to the draft law at the first reading. The bill was subsequently ordered to discuss the Economic Committee, the Constitutional Law Committee and the Security Committee (Resolution 593). The relevant committees have discussed it and their resolution with amendments has been delivered to Members as prints Nos 398 / 1, 398 / 2 and 398 / 3. Only the amendments of the Security Committee concerned the contested provision of Paragraph 97 (3) (third and fifth sentences). At the 28th meeting of the Chamber of Deputies on 20 March 2008 and 25 March 2008, a second reading took place, the draft law went through a general and detailed debate during which amendments were tabled to the contested provisions (§ 97 (3), third and fifth sentences, and § 97 (4) by individual Members (amendments Z. Bebarov-Rujborová, K. Jacques and J. Klas). The amendments tabled were drafted as press 398 / 4, sent to Members on 25 March 2008. The third reading took place on 23 April 2008 at the 30th meeting of the Chamber of Deputies. The proposed amendments to the contested provisions of § 97 (3) and (4) were not adopted. The bill was adopted in the text of the other amendments approved (Resolution 736) after the Chamber of Deputies agreed with it, when 89 of the 176 Members in favour of the proposal voted against 21 abstained (vote 44).
19. The bill in question was referred to the Senate by the Chamber of Deputies on 19 May 2008. The Senate Organizing Committee designated it as Senate Press No. 247 to discuss the Committee on Economy, Agriculture and Transport. In addition, the Senate Permanent Commission on the Media has also discussed the bill. At its meeting on 28 May 2008, the Committee adopted Resolution No 270 recommending the Senate to approve the bill. The Standing Commission of the Senate on Media also recommended that the Senate approve the bill (Resolution No 22 of 4 June 2008). The Senate discussed the draft law at its 14th meeting (6th term) on 5 June 2008 and adopted resolution 402 on the motion for a bill approved by the Chamber of Deputies. 38 senators and senators from 52 present, against 2, abstained 12 (vote 29).
20. The Act was delivered on 11 June 2008 to sign the President of the Republic, who signed it on 25 June 2008. The approved law was then delivered to the Prime Minister for signature on 30 June 2008. The Act was published on 4 July 2008 in the Collection of Laws in the amount of 78 under No. 247 / 2008 Coll. with effect from 1 September 2008.
21. The contested Decree No. 485 / 2005 Coll., on the scope of traffic and location data, the time of their retention and the form and manner of their transmission to the authorities entitled to use them, was issued by the Ministry of Informatics of the Czech Republic. Article 79 (3) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic establishes the powers of ministries to legislate for the implementation of the Act. However, it is materially conditional on the existence of explicit legal authorisation and its limits. In the present case, the contested provision of § 97 (4) of Act No. 127 / 2005 Coll., on Electronic Communications and on the amendment of certain related laws (Act on Electronic Communications) is hereby authorised. The decree was signed by the Minister for Informatics and properly published in 169 under No 485 / 2005 Collections of laws with effect from the date of its publication, i.e. 15 December 2005.
22. The Constitutional Court notes that both Act No. 247 / 2008 Coll., which incorporated the contested provisions into Act No. 127 / 2005 Coll. and the contested Decree No. 485 / 2005 Coll. were adopted by the Constitution in a foreseeable manner.
Derogation of the contested provisions of the law and the contested decree
23. The contested provisions of § 97 paragraphs 3 and 4 of Act No. 127 / 2005 Coll., on Electronic Communications and on the amendment of certain related laws (Act on Electronic Communications), as amended, read:
(3) The legal or natural person providing a public communications network or providing a publicly available electronic communications service shall retain the operational and localisation data generated or processed in the provision of its public communications networks and in the provision of its publicly available electronic communications services (37b). Operational and localisation data relating to unsuccessful call attempts shall be kept by a legal or natural person providing a public communications network or providing a publicly available electronic communications service only if such data are generated or processed while being stored or recorded. The legal or natural person who stores the operational and localisation data in accordance with the first and second sentences shall, on request, be required to provide them without delay to the authorities authorised to request them under a specific legislation. At the same time, that person shall ensure that the content of the messages is not retained with the data referred to in the first and second sentences. The storage period for such traffic and location data shall not be less than 6 months and shall not exceed 12 months. At the end of that period, the person who retains the data under the first and second sentences is obliged to dispose of them unless they have been provided to the authorities authorised to request them under a special rule or otherwise provided for by this law (§ 90).
(4) The scope of the operational and localisation data retained in accordance with paragraph 3, the retention period referred to in paragraph 3 and the form and manner of transmission thereof to the authorities authorised to use them and the storage period and the manner in which the data were disposed of and provided to the authorities authorised to request them under a specific legislation shall be laid down in implementing legislation.
37b) Directive 2006 / 24 / EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the storage of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or public communications networks and amending Directive 2002 / 58 / EC. ';
24. The contested Decree No. 485 / 2005 Coll., on the scope of the operating and localisation data, the time of their retention and the form and manner of their transmission to the authorities authorised to use them, reads:
"485 / 2005 Coll.
DECLARATION
of 7 December 2005
on the scope of the operational and localisation data, their storage times and their form and their transmission to the authorities authorised to use them
The Ministry of Informatics, in cooperation with the Ministry of Interior, provides pursuant to Section 150 (3) of Act No. 127 / 2005 Coll., on Electronic Communications and on the amendment of certain related laws (Act on Electronic Communications), as amended by Act No. 290 / 2005 Coll. and Act No. 361 / 2005 Coll., ("the Act ') for the implementation of Section 97 (3) of the Act:
For the purposes of this decree:
(a) BTS base station of the public mobile telephone network,
b) the StartBTS base station of the public mobile telephone network to which the participant is allocated at the start of the communication,
(c) StopBTS base station of the public mobile telephone network to which the participant is allocated at the end of the communication,
(d) IMEI number of the international mobile telephone device identifier,
(e) the number of the MSISDN participating number in the public mobile telephone network;
(f) IMSI number of the international identifier of the participant in the public mobile telephone network,
(g) destinations for the destination of the external operator's network;
(h) the URI identifier of the single source identifier;
(i) the code of the legal or natural person providing the public communications network or providing a publicly available electronic communications service shall be understood as the serial number of the certificate in the business register provided for in Article 14 of the Act.
Scope of storage of traffic and location data
(1) A legal or natural person providing a public communications network or providing a publicly available electronic communications service (hereinafter referred to as "operator") shall provide the authority entitled to request it (hereinafter referred to as "authorised authority") by this decree with defined operational and localisation data (hereinafter referred to as "data").
(2) For electronic communications networks with circuit switching and fixed connections, the following shall be retained:
(a) details of the communication carried out, indicating the type of communication, the telephone number of the subscriber of the call and call card or the telephone card identifier for use in a public telephone machine, the date and time of commencing the communication, the length of the communication and, where appropriate, the state of communication;
(b) details of all public telephone machines, indicating their telephone number, registration number, geographical coordinates and verbal description of the location.
(3) In the case of public mobile electronic communications networks, storage
(a) details of the communication carried out, indicating the type of communication, the telephone number of the subscriber calling and calling, the date and time of commencing the communication, the length of communication, the IMEI number, the StopBTS station number and, where applicable, the StopBTS station number, the destination and additional information;
(b) data on the links between the MSISDN numbers and the IMEI numbers jointly used in the network, BTS identification and IMEI numbers which facilitated calls without a SIM card to the "112" alarm number, the IP addresses of the terminals which facilitated the sending of SMS messages to Internet networks, the date and time of credit recharging for pre-paid services, the number of recharging coupons to a specific subscribers telephone number, the participant's telephone number to a particular recharging coupon,
(c) details of all BTS stations, indicating their number, geographical coordinates, antenna routing azimuth and verbal description of the location of BTS.
(4) For electronic communications networks with packet switching, data on the communication carried out shall be kept
(a) for network access services with an indication of the connection type, user account identifier, service user device identifier, date and time of start of connection, date and time of termination of connection, interest identifiers (e.g. IP address, port number), event status (e.g. success, failure, orderly or exceptional termination of connection), amount of data transferred (in incoming / outgoing direction),
(b) for access services to e-mail boxes with an indication of the user's interest device identifier, user account, message identifier on the postal server, date and time of start of communication, e-mail address of the sender, e-mail address of the recipients, e-mail log identifier, amount of data transferred, information on the use of secure communication,
(c) for e-mail messaging services with an indication of the user-interest device identifier, the e-mail server identifier, the date and time of commencing of the communication, the e-mail address of the sender, the e-mail address of the recipients, the e-mail log identifier, the amount of data transferred, information on the use of the secure communication,
(d) in the case of server services with an indication of the user's interest device identifier, the user account identifier, the date and time of the service requirement, any server identifiers (in particular the IP address, the full domain name of the FQDN), the required URI identifiers or the type of service, additional URI or service identifiers, the services used, the amount of data transferred, the methods and status of the service requirement;
(e) for other electronic communications services (in particular, chat, usenet, instant messaging and IP telephony services), indicating any identifying of the communicating parties, the transport protocol, the date and time of commencing the communication, the date and time of termination of the communication, the services used, the amount of data transferred.
Transmission of data
(1) The competent authority requests the provision of stored data through its designated contact point. The operator shall transmit the requested data without delay through its designated contact point. The data referred to in Article 2 (3) (c) shall be transmitted on an aggregated basis on a monthly basis in the current state at the date of transmission.
(2) Communication between the operator's contact points and the authorised authority shall take place in a way that allows remote access as a priority. Applications and data shall be transmitted preferably in electronic form of data files. Only generally available technologies and communication protocols are used in communication of contact centres so that the solution is not linked to a particular manufacturer or supplier.
(3) If it is not possible to use a means of remote access for communication or if the use of such a method would be ineffective, the application or requested data may be transmitted in paper form or in the form of data files on a portable medium.
(4) In order to demonstrate the authenticity of the application and the data transmitted, it should be used:
(a) a guaranteed electronic signature based on a qualified certificate issued by an accredited certification service provider (1); the cryptographic standard format with public key PKCS # 7 shall be used to create the signature and its verification;
(b) an accompanying letter in paper form containing the reference number or serial number of the application, the name of the file, the date, time and method of transmission and, where appropriate, the control sum or standard hash file (e.g. SHA-1) and the signature of the authorised person,
(c) a letter in paper form containing the reference number and the signature of the authorised person; or
(d) in the case of applications or data already transmitted electronically for a given period, usually one week, for which no other means of proof of authenticity has been used, a letter in paper form containing the reference number and the signature of the authorised person, which shall be sent retrospectively.
(5) The communication data carried out under a specific identifier over a given period of time shall be transmitted by the operator to the competent authority as:
(a) an extract of the communication from the fixed line, if the data referred to in Article 2 (2) (a) are concerned,
(b) a statement of mobile communications, if the data referred to in Article 2 (3) (a) are concerned,
(c) a statement of the data communication if the data referred to in Article 2 (4) are concerned.
(6) The extracts referred to in paragraph 5 shall be transmitted to the competent authority in a structured text file, preferably encoding according to the CP-1250, UTF-8 or ISO 8859-2 character set. The files shall be processed separately for each individual telephone number or other identifier specified in the application. The names of the transferred files shall be structured according to the nominal convention set out in the Annex.
(7) The file is given with a single header and has a fixed structure for the type of network or service or requirement type. The individual lines shall be chronological in the file unless another gear parameter is specified in the application. The extract referred to in paragraph 5 shall be completed on the last line by the word "End."
(8) In the row, the individual data are separated by a semicolon (code 0059 character set) or a tabular (code 0009 character set), the last data is terminated by CRLF (code 0013 and 0010 character set). If any of the data is not required or demonstrably identifiable from the technology used, its location in the structure shall be left blank.
(9) For data consisting of multiple values, the individual values are separated by the symbol "ZV124;" (code 0166 character set). If a character is identical to one of the above separators or "\ '(code 0092 character sets), the character"\' (for example "\; ',"\ CR\ LF', "\\ ') shall be assigned to it.
(10) In justified cases and with the agreement of the authorised authority and the operator, the format, structure and name of the file may be used different from those defined in paragraphs 6 to 9.
Storage period
(1) Data shall be kept for a period of 6 months, unless otherwise specified in paragraph 2.
(2) The data referred to in points 3.3.4.5 and 3.3.4.6 of Part 3 of the Annex shall be kept for 3 months.
Efficacy
This Decree shall take effect on the date of its publication, with the exception of the provisions of Paragraph 4 (2) and Part 3 of the Annex, which shall take effect on 1 December 2006.
Minister:
Ing. Bérová v. r.
1) § 11 of Act No. 227 / 2000 Coll., on Electronic Signature, as amended "
Preliminary question
25. First, the Constitutional Court had to consider the proposal put forward by the appellant to present to the European Court of Justice, in accordance with Article 234 of the EC Treaty, a question referred for a preliminary ruling by the parties (not) on the validity of the Data Retention Directive, since there is a significant risk that the Data Retention Directive itself, which has been transposed into the Czech legal order by the contested provisions and the contested decree, is contrary to EC law. In this context, the Constitutional Court points out that even after the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU (from 1 May 2004), the reference framework of the review of the Constitutional Court remains the standard of the constitutional order of the Czech Republic, since the Constitutional Court's task is the protection of constitutionality (Article 83 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic) in both its aspects, i.e. the protection of objective constitutional law and subjective, i.e. fundamental rights. Community law is not part of constitutional order and therefore the Constitutional Court is not competent to interpret it. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court cannot completely ignore the impact of Community law on the creation, application and interpretation of national law, in the field of legislation, the creation, operation and purpose of which is directly linked to Community law [cf., the findings of the Constitutional Court sp. zn. Pl. Pl. ÚS 50 / 04 of 8.3.2006 (N 50 / 40 SbNU 443; 154 / 2006 Coll.), sp. zn. Pl. Pl. ÚS 36 / 05 of 16.1.2007 (N 8 / 44 SbNU 83; 57 / 2007 Coll.) or sp. However, the content of the Data Retenion Directive leaves the Czech Republic sufficient space for its constitutionally conformal transposition into the domestic legal order, as its individual provisions merely define the obligation to store the data. The purpose set out in the Directive must be respected during transposition, but in the legal and statutory specific arrangements for the storage and handling of data, including measures to prevent their misuse, the constitutional standard resulting from the Czech constitutional order, as interpreted by the Czech Constitutional Court, must be respected. This is because the specific form of transposition - i.e. the contested legal and statutory provisions - is a manifestation of the will of the Czech legislator, which, while respecting the purpose of the Directive, could vary in terms of the choice of funds, but at the same time was bound by constitutional order in this choice.
Reference aspects for the assessment of the proposal
26. Article 1 (1) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic contains the normative principle of a democratic rule of law. The basic attribute of the constitutional concept of the rule of law and the condition of its functioning is respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, which, as the attribute of the chosen constitutional concept of the rule of law, is explicitly expressed in the quoted constitutional provision. This constitutional provision is the basis of materially understood legal status, which characterises the respect of the public authority for the free (autonomous) sphere of an individual defined by fundamental rights and freedoms, and does not fundamentally interfere with or interfere with the public power in this sphere only in cases which are justified by conflicts with other fundamental rights, or by the constitutionally challenged and legally clearly defined public interest, and provided that the legal intervention is proportionate both to the objectives to be achieved and to the extent of the reduction of limited fundamental law or freedom.
27. The concept of privacy is often associated with Western culture and even more precisely with the Anglo-American cultural idea embedded in the political philosophy of liberalism. It is a concept that is clearly not generally fully shared in both the accent on the importance of privacy and the extent to which privacy is to be protected. In different cultures, there are various ideas about how much privacy individuals are entitled to and in what context. However, already in 1928 Judge Brandeis wrote in a widely quoted dissent (on the Olmstead v. U. 438, 478, 1928) the following assessment of privacy: "Our Constitution's creators took responsibility to create favourable conditions for seeking happiness (...) They have admitted the right (against the state) to be left" to themselves "- which is the most complex or comprehensive right of all and, at the same time, the right that is the rarest of civilised humanity." Thus, an explicit constitutional right to privacy has become the basic structural element of the U. S. Constitution, which ensures the autonomy of the individual, even if the application of the right is constantly and repeatedly seduced inside the U. S. Supreme Court.
28. The requirement of respect for the self-governing order of life has become, in addition to the requirement of respect for its own life, physical, psychological and spiritual integrity, personal freedom and ownership, a central human rights claim on the autonomy of an individual who is of formal importance for European national human rights catalogues as well as for their later regional and universal pandas. However, even in the European original national catalogues of fundamental rights, the right to privacy or private life as such was not explicitly mentioned, as evidenced by the texts of the national institutes from the 1940s and 1950s (e.g. the Constitution of Germany, not to mention Austria, the Constitution of Denmark, Finland, of course, France and Ireland, but also Italy and other states). The requirements of respect for and protection of privacy are closely linked to the development of technical and technological possibilities, which, of course, also increase freedom threatening the potential of the state.
29. As stated by the Constitutional Court in its Opinion in sp. zn. II. ÚS 2048 / 09 of 2.11.2009 (available in the electronic database of Decision http: / / nalus.ujud.cz): "full special respect and protection enjoy in liberal democratic states the fundamental right to the uninterrupted private life of a person (Article 10 (2) of the Charter)." The primary function of the right to respect for private life is to provide space for the development and self-realization of individual personality. In addition to the traditional definition of privacy in its spatial dimension (protection of dwellings in the wider sense of the word) and in the context of autonomous existence and public power, the creation of social relations (in marriage, family, society), the right to respect for private life includes a guarantee of self-determination in the sense of the fundamental decision-making of the individual himself. In other words, the right to privacy also guarantees the right of an individual to decide at his or her discretion whether, or to what extent, the facts and information of his or her personal privacy are to be made available to other bodies. It is an aspect of the right to privacy in the form of the right to information self-determination, expressly guaranteed by Article 10 (3) of the Charter [cf. the findings of the Constitutional Court sp. zn. IV. ÚS 23 / 05 of 17.7.2007 (N 111 / 46 of the SbNU 41) or sp. zn. I. ÚS 705 / 06 of 1.12.2008 (N 207 / 51 of the SbNU 577), or the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany of September 1983, BVerfGE 65, 1 (Volkszählungsurteil) or of 4.4.4.2006, BVerfGE 115, 320 (Rasterfahndungurteil II)].
30. In its cited decision BVerfGE 65, 1, the German Federal Constitutional Court, when assessing the constitutionality of the legal regulation of the data collection and storage process for the census (Volkszählung), noted, inter alia, that, in a modern society, characterised by a huge increase in information and data, the protection of individuals from unlimited collection, storage, use and publication of data on their / their person and privacy must be provided within the framework of a more general, constitutionally guaranteed individual privacy right. If individuals are not guaranteed the possibility to monitor and control the content and extent of the personal data and information provided by them to be published, stored or used for purposes other than original, if they do not have the opportunity to recognise and evaluate the credibility of their potential communication partner and, where appropriate, to adapt their actions, then there is necessarily a restriction on the suppression of their rights and freedoms, and this is no longer an option for a free and democratic society. The right to information self-determination (informationelle Selbstbestimmung) is thus an essential condition not only for the free development and self-integration of an individual in society, but also for the establishment of a free and democratic communication order. Simply put, under the conditions of an all-knowing and omnipresent state and public power, freedom of expression, the right to privacy and the right to free choice of conduct and conduct have become virtually non-existent and illusory.
31. In the Charter, the right to respect for private life is not guaranteed in one all-inclusive article (as is the case with Article 8 of the Convention). On the contrary, the protection of the private sphere of an individual is distributed and supplemented in the Charter by other aspects of the right to privacy, declared at different places in the Charter (e.g. Articles 7 (1), 10, 12 and 13 of the Charter). Similarly, the right to information self-determination may be derived from Article 10 (3) of the Charter, guaranteeing an individual the right to protection against unauthorised collection, publication or other abuse of data relating to his or her person, in conjunction with Article 13 of the Charter, the protection of letters and the secrets of messages carried, whether stored in private or sent by mail, by telephone, telegraph or other similar devices or by other means. However, the "fragmentation" of the legislation on aspects of the private sphere of the individual cannot be overestimated, and the list in the Charter of what needs to be placed under the "umbrella" of the right to privacy or to private life cannot be considered exhaustive and final. In interpreting individual fundamental rights, which are the recognition of the right to privacy in its various dimensions, as stated in the Charter, it is necessary to respect the purpose of the generally understood and dynamically evolving right to privacy as such, or to consider the right to private life in its period-wide integrity. Therefore, the right to information self-determination guaranteed by Articles 10 (3) and 13 The instruments must be interpreted in particular in connection with the rights guaranteed by Articles 7, 8, 10 and 12 of the Charter. Thus, by its nature and importance, the right to information self-determination is among the fundamental human rights and freedoms, as, together with the freedom of the personal, freedom in the spatial dimension (home), freedom of communication and certainly other constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights, it completes the individual's personality, whose individual integrity as a completely necessary condition of the dignity of the individual and the development of human life must be respected and consistently protected; That is why the respect and protection of this sphere are guaranteed by constitutional order, because - only from a slightly different angle - it is an expression of respect for the rights and freedoms of man and citizen (Article 1 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic).
32. It is clear from the settled case-law of the Constitutional Court, in particular in relation to the issue of telephone wiretap, that the protection of the right to respect for private life in the form of a right to information self-determination within the meaning of Articles 10 (3) and 13 The documents relate not only to the actual content of the messages submitted by the telephone, but also to the call numbers, the date and time of the call, the duration of the call, in the case of mobile telephony about the base stations providing the call [cf. "The privacy of each person is worthy of fundamental (constitutional) protection not only in relation to the content of reports submitted but also in relation to the above mentioned data. It can therefore be concluded that Article 13 The Charter also provides for the protection of the secrets of dialed numbers and other related data such as the date and time of the call, the duration of the call, in the case of mobile phone calls and the designation of base stations providing the call. (...) these data are an integral part of the communication carried out by the phone. '- or similarly the findings sp. zn. IV. ÚS 78 / 01 of 27.8.2001 (N 123 / 23 SbNU 197), sp. zn. I. ÚS 191 / 05 of 13.9.2006 (N 161 / 42 SbNU 327) or sp. zn. II. ÚS 789 / 06 of 27.9.2007 (N 150 / 46 SbNU 489)].
33. The Constitutional Court based its findings on the ECHR's case-law (in particular the Malone case-law against the UK (no. 8691 / 79 of 2.8.1984)), which, from Article 8 of the Convention, guaranteed the right to respect for private and family life, as well as housing and correspondence, provided the right to information self-determination when he pointed out several times that the collection and retention of data relating to the private life of an individual falls within the scope of Article 8 of the Convention, since the term "private life" must not be interpreted strictly. The right to privacy is thus consumed by the right to protection against surveillance, surveillance and persecution by public authorities, including in public space or in public places. Moreover, no fundamental reason makes it possible to exclude from the concept of private life professional, commercial or social activities [cf. Niemietz's decision against Germany (no. 13710 / 88) of 16.12.1992]. As stated by the ECHR, this extensive interpretation of the concept of "private life 'is in conformity with the Convention on the Protection of Persons with a view to the Automated Processing of Personal Data (drawn up by the Council of Europe on 28.1.1981, in the Czech Republic since 1.11.2001, publ. under No. 115 / 2001 Coll. p.), which aims to" guarantee in the territory of each Contracting Party to any natural person (...) respect for his rights and fundamental freedoms, and in particular his right to private life, in connection with the automated processing of personal data relating to him (Article 1), which are defined as any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (Article 2). "[cf. Decision in the Amman / Switzerland (no. 27798 / 95) of 16.2.2000 and the caselaw cited there].
34. In its case-law on the right to respect for private life pursuant to Article 8 of the Convention, the ECHR referred to as interference in the privacy of individuals, inter alia, the interference in the form of data checks, mail content and phone calls [cf. Decision in the case of Klass and Others against Germany (no. 5029 / 71) of 6.9.1978, the Leander decision in the case of Sweden (no. 9248 / 81) of 26.3.1987, the decision in the case of Kruslin against France (no. 11801 / 85) of 24.4.1990 or the decision in the case in the case of Kopp against Switzerland (no. 23224 / 94) of 25.3.1998], the survey of telephone numbers of persons [cf. Decision in the case in the case of the individuals in the case of the complaint [cf. In the Rotar decision against Romania (no. 28341 / 95) of 4.5.2000, ESLP transferred from the right to private life manifested in the form of the right to information self-determination and the positive obligation of the State to dispose of data collected and processed by the State on the person in its private sphere.
35. The case-law of foreign constitutional courts takes a similar approach. For example, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, through the right to information self-determination, guarantees protection not only of the content of the information transmitted, but also protects the external circumstances under which it takes place - i.e. place, time, participants, type and manner of communication, since knowledge of the circumstances of the communication carried out can, in conjunction with other data, indicate the content of the communication itself and, by means of examining the data and their analysis, produce individual profiles of the participants in the communication. [cf. Decision of 27.7.2005, BVerfGE 113, 348 (Vorbeugende Telekommunikationsüberwachung) or of 27.2.2008, BVerfGE 120, 274 (Grundrecht auf Computerschutz)].
36. The primary objective of the legal regulation of general and preventive collection and storage of operational and localisation data on electronic communications is generally to protect against security threats and the need to ensure the availability of such data for the purposes of preventing, detecting, investigating and prosecuting serious crimes by public authorities. As the Constitutional Court has pointed out several times in the past, the prosecution of crimes and the fair punishment of their perpetrators is a constitutionally and insurmountable public interest, the essence of which is to delegate responsibility for penalising the most serious violations of fundamental rights and freedoms by natural and legal persons to the State. If the criminal law allows the pursuit of public interest in the prosecution of crime by means of robust instruments, the use of which results in serious restrictions on the personal integrity and fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, the constitutional limits must be respected when applying them. Thus, the limitation of the personal integrity and privacy of persons (i.e. the breach of respect for them) can only exceptionally occur on the part of the public authority if it is necessary in a democratic society, if the purpose pursued by the public interest cannot be achieved otherwise and if it is acceptable from the point of view of legal existence and compliance with effective and concrete safeguards against libel. The essential assumptions of a fair process require an individual to be provided with sufficient guarantees and guarantees against possible misuse of power by public authorities. The necessary guarantees consist of the appropriate legislation and the existence of effective control of their compliance, which is primarily the control of the most intense interference in the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals by an independent and impartial court, as it is the duty of the courts to provide protection for fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals (Article 4 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic) [cf. Sv.sp. z. sp. sp. sp. sp. sp. sp. z. z. sp. z. z. z. zn. I. ÚS 631 / 05 of 7.11.2006 2006 (N 205 / 43 SbNU 289) and sp. Z. ÚS 3 / 09 of 8.6.2010 (219 / 2010 Coll., available in the electronic database of Decision http: / nalus.ujud.cz)].
37. In its case-law, the Constitutional Court further specified in the assessment of the admissibility of public intervention in the privacy of individuals in the form of the use of telecommunications wiretaps [cf., cited findings sp. zn. Therefore, interference with the fundamental right of an individual to privacy in the form of a right of information self-determination within the meaning of Articles 10 (3) and 13 of the Charter for the purpose of preventing and protecting against criminal activity is only possible through an imperative legal regulation, which must, in particular, meet the requirements of the principle of the rule of law and which meets the requirements of the proportionality test, where, in cases of conflicts of fundamental rights or freedoms of public interest, or with other fundamental rights or freedoms, the purpose (objective) of such intervention must be assessed in relation to the resources used, the principle of proportionality (in general sense). Such legislation must be precise and clear in its wording and sufficiently predictable to provide the potentially affected individuals with sufficient information on the circumstances and conditions under which the public authority is entitled to intervene in their privacy so that they can, where appropriate, adjust their behaviour so as not to conflict with the restrictive standard. The powers conferred on the competent authorities, the manner and rules for their implementation must also be strictly defined in order to protect individuals against arbitrary interference. The assessment of the admissibility of the intervention in view of the principle of proportionality (in the wider sense) then includes three criteria. The first is an assessment of the eligibility of the purpose (or suitability), whether a specific measure is capable of achieving the intended objective of protecting another fundamental right or public good at all. It is also a question of assessing the necessity in which it is examined whether the most respectful means of basic law has been used in the selection of funds. Finally, proportionality (in the narrower sense) is examined, i.e. whether the damage to the fundamental right is disproportionate in relation to the intended objective, i.e. that measures restricting fundamental human rights and freedoms must not exceed, if there is a conflict of fundamental right or freedom with the public interest, the positive effects of such measures. [cf. finding sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 3 / 02 of 13.8.2002 (N 105 / 27 SbNU 177; 405 / 2002 Coll.)].
38. The necessary requirement of the judicial protection of fundamental rights is reflected in particular in the issuing of a judicial order and in sufficient justification for the use of criminal instruments restricting the fundamental rights and freedoms of an individual. This must be in line with both the requirements of the law and, above all, the constitutional principles on which the legal provision is based or which limit its interpretation retroactively, since the application of such a provision constitutes a particularly serious interference with the fundamental rights and freedoms of each individual. "A judicial order for the interception and recording of telecommunications traffic may only be issued in a properly initiated criminal procedure for a legally qualified criminal activity and must be supported by relevant indications from which a reasonable suspicion of the commission of such an offence can be established. The command must be individualised in relation to the specific person who is the user of the telephone station. Finally, the order must, to a minimum, state specifically what facts relevant to criminal proceedings are to be so established and what this is derived from." (cf. the findings cited by the Constitutional Court sp. zn. II. ÚS 789 / 06 or sp. zn. I. ÚS 3038 / 07 - both see above).
39. The ECHR also takes a similar approach in its case-law. Thus, in accordance with Article 8 (2) of the Convention, which defines constitutional limits on restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals guaranteed by Article 8 (1) of the Convention, the ECHR first assesses in each individual case whether the alleged intervention or restriction of fundamental rights or freedoms is inferior to the scope of protection of Article 8 of the Convention. If so, if the alleged intervention in the right to privacy by the public authority was carried out in accordance with a law which must be available and sufficiently predictable, that is to say, expressed with a high degree of precision, so that individuals allow their behaviour to be regulated if necessary (cf. Malone against the UK, Amman against Switzerland or Rotar against Romania). The level of accuracy required by national legislation, which in no way can be counted on all eventualities, depends to a large extent on the content of the text under examination, on the area to be covered and the number and status of persons to whom it is addressed [Hassan and Tchaouch against Bulgaria (no. 30985 / 96, 39023 / 97) of 26.10.2000]. The review of interference with fundamental rights or freedoms guaranteed by Article 8 (1) of the Convention shall, within the meaning of Article 8 (2): The Convention also needs to be necessary in a democratic society, to monitor the Convention and the purpose to be addressed (e.g. the protection of the life or health of persons, national and public security, the protection of the rights and freedoms of others or of morality, the prevention of unrest and crime or the interest in the country's economic well-being), which must be relevant and duly justified. In order to be considered compatible with the Convention, the legislation must also provide adequate protection against indiscretions within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention and, as a result, define with sufficient clarity the scope and manner of exercise of the powers conferred on the competent authorities (cf. Kruslin against France or S. and Marper against the UK). In other words, acts constituting an obvious interference with the fundamental right to private life must not be found outside any immediate (preventive or subsequent) judicial control [cf., for example, the Camenzind decision against Switzerland (no. 21353 / 93) of 16.12.1997].
40. The ECHR further specified those regulatory requirements allowing interference with the right to private life in those above-mentioned decisions, in which it assessed the admissibility of such intervention by the public in the form of the use of telephone wiretap, secret surveillance, information collection and data from the private (personality) sphere of the individual. The ESLP stressed that it was necessary, first, to define clear and detailed rules governing the scope and application of such measures, to lay down minimum requirements for the length, manner in which information and data are stored, their use, access to them by third parties, and to establish procedures to protect the integrity and confidentiality of data, as well as to destroy them, in such a way that individuals have adequate safeguards against the risk of abuse and insolence. The need to have such safeguards is all the greater when it comes to the protection of personal data subject to automatic processing, especially when such data are used for police purposes and when available technologies become increasingly complicated. In particular, national law must ensure that the collected data are actually relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose for which they were secured and that they are kept in a form which allows the identification of persons during a period not exceeding the necessary level to achieve the purpose for which the preamble and Article 5 of the Convention on Data Protection and Principle No 7 of the Committee of Ministers No R (87) 15 of 17.9.1987 concerning the modification and use of personal data in the police sector, cited in the Weber and Saravia decision against Germany (No 54934 / 00) of 29.6.2006 or Liberta and Others against the UK (No 58243 / 00) of 1.7.2008).
Own review
41. As already mentioned by the Constitutional Court, the contested provisions of § 97 (3) and (4) have become part of Act No. 127 / 2005 Coll. on the basis of Act No. 247 / 2008 Coll., amending Act No. 127 / 2005 Coll., on Electronic Communications and amending certain related laws (Act on Electronic Communications), as amended. According to the explanatory report of the adoption of this amendment, it served to implement "certain articles' of Directive 2006 / 24 / EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15.3.2006 on the storage of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or public communications networks and amending Directive 2002 / 58 / EC" which are not yet implemented or are only partially implemented in our legal order (because) The Data Retention Directive is already transposed in the Czech Republic (...). The legislation in force is in some respects wider than that contained in the Data Retention Directive. 'The issue of the storage of traffic and location data in the Czech legal order in modified form has been regulated since the adoption of the Act on electronic communications No 127 / 2005 Coll. with effect from 1 May 2005 and from the adoption of the contested Decree of the Ministry of Informatics No. 485 / 2005 Coll., on the scope of operating and localisation data, the time of their retention and the form and manner of their transmission to the authorities entitled to use it, with effect from 15 December 2005. At the time, only the upcoming Data Retention Directive in the EU was actually implemented in the Czech Republic in advance, and the wording of the contested provisions itself already according to the requirements of the Data Retention Directive merely constitutes a specification of the obligation to store operational and localisation data and to provide such data without delay to the authorities entitled to request them. However, the contested Ministry of Informatics Decree was no longer amended in spite of this fact, resulting in the fact that the contested legislation continues to clearly extend the regulated scope of the stored data beyond the scope foreseen by the Data Retention Directive.
42. According to the contested provision of § 97 (3), first and second sentences of the Electronic Communications Act, a legal or natural person providing a public communications network or providing a publicly available electronic communications service is required to retain operational and localisation data that are generated or processed in the provision of its public communications networks and in the provision of its publicly available electronic communications services, including data on unsuccessful call attempts, provided that such data are also generated or processed and stored or recorded. According to Section 90 of the Electronic Communications Act, traffic data is "any data processed for the transmission of a message to electronic communications networks or for its accounting '. According to Section 91 of the same Act," any data processed in an electronic communications network which determines the geographical location of the end-use equipment of the user of publicly available electronic communications services shall be regarded as localisation data.'. The presentation and extent of the operational and localisation data itself, the retention period and the form and manner of transmission thereof to the authorities entitled to use them are, in accordance with the contested provision of Paragraph 97 (4), intended to define the implementing legislation which is the contested Decree No 485 / 2005 Coll.
43. In particular, for fixed telephone and mobile communications services, operators are required to collect virtually all available data on the calls made and (if recorded) their unsuccessful attempts (typically "invitations"). These include, in particular, data on the type of communication carried out, the telephone numbers of the caller and caller, the date and time of commencing and termination of the communication, the designation of the base station which provided the call at the time of the connection, the identification of the prepaid telephone card, the public telephone, the mobile communication in addition to the unique code used to identify each mobile phone used within the GSM network (IMEI), its location and movement, even if the communication does not take place (the mobile phone is enabled), the number of rechargeable coupons and their assignment to the rechargeable number, the link between the mobile device and all inserted SIM cards, etc. Even greater volumes and scope of data and data that must be stored under the contested legislation relate to so-called public networks operating on the principle of packet switching and their services, most typically the Internet. In the case of its use, the contested legislation requires the storage of data in particular on network access (e.g. time, location and length of connection, user and user account data, computer and server identifier, IP address, full domain name, volume of transferred data etc.), data relating to access to e-mail boxes and the transmission of e-mail messages (in this case, virtually all data are stored except the content of the messages themselves, i.e. including address identification, volume of transmitted data etc.), and, last but not least, data on server and other services [e.g. the specified URL addresses, type of request, data on the use of chat, usenet, instant messaging (e.g. ICQ) and IP telephony, including the identification of communicating parties, and used services (e.g. transfer of files or transactions)]. In addition to the Data Retention Directive in question, the Internet connection and services and e-mail communication are monitored and stored in terms of the amount of data transmitted, information on the use of encryption, the method and status of service requirements and their implementation, as well as information on the sending of SMS from the internet gates and other "interest identifiers'. For telephony beyond the framework of the Data Retention Directive, the contested regulation requires the retention of data on the identification of a prepaid telephone card, a public telephone machine, number of rechargeable coupons and their assignment to a rechargeable number, links between a mobile device and inserted SIM cards.
44. Although the obligation to store operational and localisation data does not apply to the contents of individual communications (see Article 1 (2) of the Data Retention Directive and the contested provision § 97 (3) fourth sentence), detailed information on social or political affiliation, as well as personal predilections, tendencies or weaknesses of individual persons may be compiled in combination if monitored over a longer period of time. In the above-mentioned opinion of the Senate, the presentator of the bill that "it is in no way comparable to listening, just because the contents of individual calls or e-mails are not kept ', it is entirely wrong, because even on their basis, sufficient content conclusions can be made within the private (personality) sphere of the individual. From the above data it is possible, for example with 90% certainty, to see who, how often and even at what time the individual meets, who are his closest friends, friends or colleagues from work, or what activities and what hours he operates [cf. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Relationship Inference, available at http: / / reality.media.mit.edu / dyads.php]. Therefore, the collection and storage of localisation and traffic data also constitutes a significant interference in the right to privacy, and it is therefore necessary to include, under the scope of protection of the fundamental right to respect for private life in the form of the right to information self-determination (within the meaning of Articles 10 (3) and 13 of the Charter), not only the protection of the content of the messages submitted by telephone or communication through so-called public networks, but also operational and localisation data on them.
45. The Constitutional Court thus had to assess whether the contested legislation, which is regulated by the issue of general and preventive collection and storage of established traffic and location data on electronic communications (so-called "data retention"), corresponds to the constitutional legal requirements laid down above to allow interference with the fundamental rights of individuals in the form of the right to information self-determination (within the meaning of Articles 10 (3) and 13 of the Charter). In addition, in view of the intensity of the intervention, which is highlighted in the present case by the fact that it affects a huge and unpredictable number of participants in the communication, since it is a comprehensive and preventive collection and storage of the data in question, it was necessary to lay down the highest possible standards to meet those requirements. The Constitutional Court concluded, however, that the contested legislation is far from in line with the constitutional requirements laid down above, for several reasons.
46. The contested provision of Paragraph 97 (3) of the Third Act on Electronic Communications contains only vague and completely indeterminate provisions for the obligation of legal or natural persons who retain operational and localisation data to the above extent, "to provide them, upon request, to the authorities entitled to request them under a specific legislation." Although the contested Decree in § 3 specifies the way in which the obligation to the competent authorities is fulfilled in individual cases, it sets out in relatively very much detail the way in which the data are transmitted, the way in which the communication (electronically), the format, the programmes used, the codes, etc., is carried out, although the actual wording of the contested provision of § 97 (3) of the Electronic Communications Act does not, in the view of the Constitutional Court, indicate clearly what competent authorities are and what specific legislation is concerned. In view of the wording of the provisions of Section 97 (1) of the Electronic Communications Act which provide legal or natural persons providing a public communications network or providing a publicly available electronic communications service, the obligation on the applicant to set up and secure at specified points of his network the interface for the connection of end-of-line telecommunications equipment to wiretap and record messages, can only be assumed that, even in the case of the obligation to transmit retained traffic and location data, the same authorised authorities and similar specific legislation, the addressees of which are the authorities active in criminal proceedings, probably under § 88a Criminal Code, the Security Information Service pursuant to § 6 to 8a of Act 154 / 1994 Coll., the Security Information Service, as amended, and Military Intelligence pursuant to § 9 and 10 of Act No. 289 / 2005 Coll., on Military Intelligence. The legislation thus defined allowing massive interference with fundamental rights does not meet the requirements laid down for certainty and clarity from the point of view of the rule of law (see paragraph 37).
47. Similarly, the purpose for which operational and localisation data are provided to the competent authorities is not clearly and accurately defined, which makes it impossible to assess the contested adjustment in terms of its actual need (if it is certainly capable of fulfilling the purpose or is capable of achieving the objective set by the Directive - see below). While the Directive cited on data retention in Article 1 (1) clearly states that it has been adopted for the purpose of harmonising the provisions of Member States concerning the obligations of providers of publicly available electronic communications services or public communications networks with regard to the storage of traffic and location data necessary to identify a participant or registered user, in order to "ensure the availability of such data for the purposes of investigating, detecting and prosecuting serious offences," (although it does not specify which offences are involved), the contested legislation does not contain any such restrictions, nor even the cited provisions of § 88a (1) of the criminal rules governing the use of stored data for criminal proceedings. The possibility of using retained data in criminal proceedings is thus, according to the legislation in question, not linked by the legislator to a reasonable suspicion of the commission of a serious criminal offence, nor is it regulated by the obligation of law enforcement authorities to inform the person (s) concerned, even if subsequently, that does not meet the requirements arising from the second step of the proportionality test, i.e. the need for the choice of funds, since it is clear from this that the means which is most sensitive to the fundamental right of information self-determination has not been used.
48. The method (not) of defining the spectrum of authorised public authorities, as well as (not) defining the purpose for which the stored data are entitled to be requested, is not considered sufficient and predictable by the Constitutional Court. Although Article 88a (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that the use of stored data is subject to judicial control, in the form of an authorisation by the President of the Chamber (and in the preparatory proceedings of the Judge), it was primarily the legislature's duty to establish more clearly and unequivocally, in the contested provisions or in the cited provision of § 88a (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the conditions for the use of stored data "on telecommunications traffic carried out 'in order to" clarify the facts relevant to criminal proceedings', both the preconditions and the extent of their use. In particular, in view of the gravity and degree of interference in the fundamental right of individuals to privacy in the form of the right to information self-determination (within the meaning of Articles 10 (3) and 13 of the Charter) which constitutes the use of stored data, the legislator should limit the possibility of using stored data only for criminal proceedings conducted for particularly serious offences and only in the event that the purpose pursued cannot be achieved otherwise. In addition, this implies not only the cited Data Retention Directive, but also the provisions of Paragraph 88 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure governing the conditions for the regulation of wiretaps and recording of telecommunications traffic ("where criminal proceedings are conducted for a particularly serious offence '), from which the legislation referred to in Section 88a of the Code as a whole (despite the constitutional court's legal opinions contained in the cited findings, section II of the ÚS 502 / 2000 or section IV of the Rules of Procedure 78 / 01 - both see above) completely unjustifiably deviate and standards which are in clear contradiction with the views of the Constitutional Court.
49. Absence of sound, in the sense of constitutionally conformal, legislation, as is apparent from statistical data, results in in practice that the instrument, in the form of the request and use of stored data (including data on calls not made by the criminal system at all) is used by law enforcement authorities for the purposes of both investigations and ordinary, i.e. minor, criminal activities. For example, according to the "2008 report on the security situation in the Czech Republic ', a total of 343 799 offences were detected in the territory of the Czech Republic, of which 127 906 offences were clarified, with a number of requests for the provision of operational and localisation data by authorised public authorities reaching 131 560 (cf. EU report -" The Evaluation of Directive 2006 / 24 / EC and National Measures to Combat criminal Misuse and Anonymous Use of Electronic Data', which requested official data from the Czech Republic, with a response to questions in the questionnaire of 30 September 2009 available at http: / www.dataretention2010.net / docs.jss). Subsequently, only during the period January to October 2009, according to unofficial data, an application for the provision of localisation and traffic data was made in 121 839 cases (cf. Herczeg, J.: Constitutional limits for the monitoring of telecommunications traffic: conflict between security and freedom, Bulletin of the Advocate General No 5 / 2010, p. 29).
50. In the opinion of the Constitutional Court, the appellants of the contested legislation also fails to provide clear and detailed rules containing minimum requirements for the protection of stored data, in particular in the form of a avoidance of third party access, a procedure to protect integrity and confidentiality of data and a procedure for their destruction. Furthermore, the contested regulation must be argued that the individuals concerned do not have sufficient safeguards against the risk of misuse of data and insolence. The need to have such safeguards becomes more urgent for individuals at the moment when, in the case of general and preventive collection and storage of data in electronic communications, there is inevitably a smooth shift between private and public space due to enormous development and the emergence of new and more complex information technologies, systems and means of communication, as well as the fact that thousands, even millions of data, and information, which also interfere in the private (personal) sphere of information technology and electronic communication (in cyberspace) are being recorded, collected and made available for every minute, in particular through the development of the Internet and mobile communication.
51. The Constitutional Court does not in any way consider that sufficient clear, detailed and adequate guarantees are sufficient to ensure that the mere imposition of an obligation imposed on legal or natural persons is "not to retain the content of the reports with the stored data defined" (Paragraph 97 (3), fourth sentence), or the obligation to dispose of them "after the expiry of the period, unless they have been provided to the authorities entitled to request them under a special law or that law provides otherwise (Paragraph 90)" (Paragraph 97 (3), sixth sentence). In view of the extent and sensitivity of the stored data, the definition of the actual storage period can already be described as being "not less than 6 months and longer than 12 months', since which the obligation to dispose of the data depends. None of the above obligations is described in more detail by the rules and specific procedures for their compliance, the requirements for the security of stored data are strictly not defined, the manner in which the data is handled, whether by the legal or natural persons themselves, which retain the operational and localisation data or, upon request, by the competent public authorities, as well as the manner in which they are disposed of. There is also no definition of liability and possible penalties for failure to fulfil such obligations, including the absence of a possibility for the individuals concerned to seek effective protection against possible abuse, insolence or failure to fulfil their obligations. The Act on Electronic Communications (§ 87 et seq.) foresees the supervision of the Office for the Protection of Personal Data" Compliance with Personal Data Processing Obligations "and the defined tools of its activities and controls cannot be considered as an adequate and effective means of protecting the fundamental rights of the individuals concerned, as they do not control this instrument themselves [see the adequate finding of SP.P.P.ÚS 15 / 01 of 31.10.2001 (N 164 / 24 SbNU 201; 424 / 2001 Coll.)]. Those acts, which constitute an obvious interference in the fundamental right of individuals to privacy in the form of a right to information self-determination (within the meaning of Articles 10 (3) and 13 of the Charter), are thus found to be insufficient and the aforementioned constitutional requirements of the relevant legislation outside any immediate, albeit subsequent, check, in particular a judicial check, to which the ECHR also expressed itself in the cited decision of Camenzind v Switzerland.
52. Similar conclusions were reached by constitutional courts in other European states, which also examined the constitutionality of the legislation implementing the cited Data Retention Directive. For example, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany in its decision of 2 March 2010, 1 BvR 256 / 08, 1 BvR 263 / 08, 1 BvR 586 / 08, the contested legislation regulating the issue of preventive data retention (Vorratsdatenspeicherung) (pursuant to Article 113a, 113b Telekommunikationsgesetz) and their use in criminal proceedings (pursuant to Article 100g (1) Strafprozessordnung) found an unconstitutional dispute with Article 10 (1) of the Basic Law which guarantees the inviolability of persons, postal and telecommunications secrets. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany stated that the contested legislation did not comply with the requirements of the principle of proportionality, which requires, inter alia, that the legal data storage arrangements correspond to the specific gravity of this interference in the fundamental rights of individuals. In particular, the contested legislation did not sufficiently define the purpose of the use of these data, did not guarantee sufficient security and, last but not least, the individual did not sufficiently guarantee adequate and effective safeguards against the risk of abuse, in particular in the form of judicial control. In order to meet these requirements, the Federal legislature was called in accordance with Article 73 (1) (7) of the Basic Law. The Romanian Constitutional Court also reached similar conclusions in the decision of 8.10.2009 (No 1258), which it considered to be unconstitutional because it did not sufficiently define the purpose of the use of such an instrument, its wording was too vague without specifying the powers and responsibilities of the authorised public authorities in the decision of 2 / 2011, and it did not provide sufficient guarantees to the individuals concerned, owing to the absence of judicial control (decision in the unofficial English translation available at http: / / www.legio-internet.ro / english / jurisprudenta- it-romania / decision- it / edri.org / edri-gram / bulgarding-dataretention.html), and the Bulgarian Supreme Administrative Court in the decision of 11.12.2008 (information available at http: / www.edri.org / edri-gram / number6.24 / bullgarian-administration / administration). The legislation implementing the quoted Data Retention Directive is currently under review in Poland or Hungary, according to the Constitutional Court. The need to ensure the strictest possible safeguards and tools to protect the fundamental rights of individuals when handling their personal data from electronic communications was also highlighted by the European Court of Justice in its decision of 9 November 2010 in joined cases Volker und Markus Schecke GbR GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen (C-92 / 09 and C-93 / 09).
53. In the light of the foregoing, the Constitutional Court notes that the contested provisions of § 97 (3) and (4) of Act No. 127 / 2005 Coll., on electronic communications and on the amendment of certain related laws (the later Act on electronic communications), as amended, and of the contested Decree No. 485 / 2005 Coll., on the scope of the operating and localisation data, the retention period and the manner in which they are transferred to the authorities entitled to use them, cannot be regarded as being constitutionally conformal since they clearly infringe the aforementioned constitutional limits, as they do not meet the requirements of the rule of law and are in conflict with the requirements of limitation of the fundamental right to privacy in the form of information self-determination within the meaning of Article 10 (3) and Article 13 of the Charter, which are based on the principle of proportionality.
54. In addition, the Constitutional Court considers it necessary to emphasise that the deficiencies which led it to derogate from the contested legislation are not even respected by the specific provisions which the contested provision of Paragraph 97 (3) of the Electronic Communications Act indirectly provides for. In particular, the provision cited in Section 88a of the Code of Criminal Procedure governing the conditions for the use of stored data on telecommunications for the purposes of criminal proceedings, in the view of the Constitutional Court, does not respect the constitutional limits and requirements laid down above, and therefore the Constitutional Court also appears to be unconstitutional. However, in view of the fact that the appellant was not contested in the application, the Constitutional Court considers it necessary to appeal to the legislator to consider, as a result of the deregulation of the contested legislation, the amendment of the provision cited in Paragraph 88a of the Code of Criminal Procedure to become constitutional.
55. Only in the form of obiter dicta does the Constitutional Court state that it is aware, of course, of the fact that the development of modern information technologies and means of communication also involves new and more sophisticated methods of committing the crime that must be faced. However, the Constitutional Court has doubts as to whether the instrument itself, on the basis of the general and preventive storage of operational and localisation data, almost all electronic communications is a necessary and proportionate instrument in terms of the intensity of intervention in the private sphere of a large number of participants in electronic communications. This view is far from unique in the European area, since the Data Retention Directive itself has been faced with a huge wave of criticism by Member States (e.g. the governments of Ireland, the Netherlands, Austria or Sweden have long delayed or are still waiting to be implemented by the European Digital Rights or Arbeitskreitrekherung - with the Commission's public awareness of the opening of proceedings before the European Court of Justice), on the one hand, by legislators in the European Parliament, the European Data Protection Supervisor (see the conclusions from the conference on data retention organised by the Commission on 3.12.2010 in Brussels, see http: / / www.dataretention201.net / docs.jsp) or the Working Group on Data Protection established under Article 29 of Directive 95 / 46 / EC (see its Opinion available at http: / ec.europa.eu / justice / justice / documents / docs / docs / docs / docs / docs). All of the above requested either the complete repeal of the Data Retention Directive in question and the replacement of the instrument of area and preventive storage of traffic and location data by other, more appropriate instruments (e.g. the so-called freezing data, which allows the monitoring and storage of the necessary and selected data only for a specific, pre-determined communication participant), or requested its amendment, in particular by providing sufficient guarantees and means of protection to the individuals concerned and tightening the safety requirements of the stored data against the threat of their evasion and abuse by third parties.
56. The Constitutional Court also raised doubts as to whether the instrument of general and preventive storage of operational and localisation data is an effective instrument from the point of view of its original purpose (protection against security threats and prevention from committing particularly serious crime), in particular in the existence of so-called anonymous SIM cards, which are excluded from the contested legislation by the envisaged scope of the retained operational and localisation data and which, according to the Czech Police, are up to 70% used to communicate while committing crime (cf. "The Czech police want to ban anonymous prepaid cards, operators are resisting," idNES.cz, 18. 3. 2010). In this context, reference can be made to the analysis by the Federal Office of Investigation of Germany (Bundescriminamatt) of 26 January 2011, which, on the basis of a comparison of the statistics on serious crime committed on the territory of Germany for the period before and after the adoption of the relevant legislation on data retention, concluded that the use of the instrument for the general and preventive retention of operational and localisation data had almost no effect on the reduction of the number of serious offences committed or on the level of clarification (analysis itself and specific statistical data are available at http: / / www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de / content / view / 426 / 79 / lang, de /). Similar conclusions can also be drawn in the ordinary view of the statistical surveys of crime in the Czech Republic published by the Czech Police, e.g. a comparison of statistics for the period 2008 to 2010 (available at http: / / www.polee.cz / clanek / statistical-prehledy- criminality -650295.aspx).
57. Last but not least, the Constitutional Court considers it necessary to raise doubts as to whether private persons (providers of Internet services and telephone and mobile communications, including mobile operators and business companies providing internet connection) are at all desirable and free to retain all information about their communications and the customers to whom their services are provided (i.e. data that goes beyond the scope of the data which are required to be stored under the contested legislation) and freely with a view to recovering claims, developing business and marketing. This fact appears to be undesirable to the Constitutional Court in particular because, in the Electronic Communications Act and in other legislation, this authorisation and its purpose are not more closely and more closely regulated, the rights and obligations, the scope of the data retained, the duration and the method of retention, as well as the requirements for their security and control mechanisms are not further specified.
58. In the light of the foregoing, the Constitutional Court therefore decided, pursuant to Paragraph 70 (1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, on the annulment of the contested provisions of Sections 97 (3) and (4) of the Act No. 127 / 2005 Coll., on electronic communications and on the amendment of certain related laws (the Act on Electronic Communications), as amended, and the contested Decree No. 485 / 2005 Coll., on the scope of the operating and localisation data, the period of their retention and the manner in which they are to be transmitted to the authorities entitled to use them, on the date of the publication of this finding in the Collection of Acts (§ 58 (1).
59. The applicability of the data already requested for criminal proceedings will need to be examined by the general courts in terms of proportionality by intervening in the right to privacy in each individual individual case. In particular, the courts will have to weigh the seriousness of the offence, which should have been carried out by the offence for which the criminal proceedings are being conducted, in which the requested data are to be used.
President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr. Rychetský v. r.
Contents
I.
I. A) Shromažďování údajů o komunikaci jako zásah do soukromého života
I. B) Závažnost a rozsah zásahu do práva na soukromí
I. C) Legitimita cíle a přínos zásahu do základních práv
I. D) Nebezpečí zneužití uchovávaných údajů
I. E) Předběžná otázka k Evropskému soudnímu dvoru
II.
III.
IV.
V.
㤠97
§ 1
§ 2
§ 3
§ 4
§ 5
VI.
VII.
VII. A) Právo na respekt k soukromému životu a právo na informační sebeurčení
VII. B) Přípustnost zásahu do práva na informační sebeurčení
VIII.
VIII. A) Tzv. data retention
VIII. B) Posouzení napadené právní úpravy z hlediska ústavněprávních požadavků
VIII. C) Obiter dictum
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Regulation Information
| Citation | The Constitutional Court found no 94 / 2011 Coll., on the application for annulment of § 97 paragraphs 3 and 4 of Act No. 127 / 2005 Coll., on electronic communications and on the amendment of certain related laws (the Act on electronic communications), as amended, and on the repeal of Decree No. 485 / 2005 Coll., on the scope of operating and localisation data, the time of their retention and the form and manner of their transmission to the authorities entitled to use them |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | - |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 12.04.2011 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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