The Constitutional Court found No 9 / 2010 Coll.

Paragraph 32 (2) (a) of Act No. 325 / 1999 Coll., on Asylum and amending Act No. 283 / 1991 Coll., on the Police of the Czech Republic, as amended, (Act on Asylum), as amended, shall be deleted from the date of the declaration of findings in the Collection of Acts.

1. On 1 July 2009, the Constitutional Court received an application for annulment of part of Act No. 325 / 1999 Coll., on Asylum and Amendment to Act No. 283 / 1991 Coll., on the Police of the Czech Republic, as amended, (Act on Asylum), as amended, ("the Act on Asylum '), namely Article 32 (2) (a), setting a seven-day deadline for bringing an administrative action against a decision by the Ministry of the Interior on an application for international protection for those cases where the application was rejected as manifestly unfounded.

2. The appellant stated that under the file number 1 Azs 72 / 2008, the appeal procedure for a Ukrainian national against the order of the Regional Court in Prague was pending by which his action against the decision of the Ministry of the Interior to reject the application for international protection was manifestly unfounded. The decision of the Ministry was notified to the complainant on 3 March 2008. On 5 March 2008, he challenged them by an action in which he stated, inter alia, that he was unable to properly compile it himself, and therefore asks for the provision of a procedural representative to supplement it. The Regional Court complied with the order of 1 April 2008 and appointed a representative to the complainant; The two then called on them to complete the application properly within 5 days of receipt of the invitation and to inform them of the consequences of failure to comply with the call. This order was delivered to the complainant's representative on 3 April 2008. On 10 April 2008, the action was completed. On 23 April 2008, the Regional Court dismissed the action, stating that the five-day period already expired on 8 April 2008. In the subsequent complaint, the complainant argued that, if the call was received by his representative on Thursday, 3 April 2008, the five-day period ended on Tuesday, 8 April 2008. Since the designated representative could not meet with the complainant in person during such a short period of time nor could it have known the content of the file, the court's time limit for completing the action was impossible.

3. Since the Supreme Administrative Court has concluded that Paragraph 32 (2) (a) cannot be interpreted in a constitutional manner so that the complainant is not reduced to the right of judicial protection, it has referred to the Constitutional Court with a motion for its annulment.

4. Although the Asylum Act does not contain a competent lockout which the judicial review of the decision to reject an application for international protection would exclude for obvious unfounded reasons, that provision makes the judicial protection of unsuccessful applicants ineffective due to a very short period of time for bringing an action under the Supreme Administrative Court. The fundamental right guaranteed by Article 36 (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as "the Charter ') is then granted only illusorily. Although the deadline itself may not appear to be constitutionally unconformal, its constitutionality must be assessed in the process of its application, in the context of standards underlying it, as well as the social context in which it is set.

5. The Supreme Administrative Court points out that the administrative judiciary under whose regime the judicial review of applications for international protection takes place controls the principle of disposition and concentration of proceedings. This means, inter alia, that it may only extend the action to the pending statements of the decision or extend it to include further points of action of the applicant within the time limit for bringing the action (Paragraph 71 (2) of the Administrative Rules of Procedure). It cannot be waived (§ 72 (4) of the Administrative Rules). The existence of such a strictly accepted concentration of proceedings is compensated by a general two-month period for bringing an action against an administrative decision in the administrative judiciary. The applicant also regularly went through a two-instance administrative procedure and challenged the decision of the appellate administrative authority. However, the Asylum Act interferes with the system so designed by a special regulation which creates a one-stop administrative procedure for an application for international protection and establishes significantly shorter time limits for bringing actions against decisions in these cases. It is the combination of this short period and general rules of the administrative justice that ultimately results in the restriction of the right to judicial protection.

6. The Supreme Administrative Court also points to the position in which most applicants are located. These are usually persons without knowledge, or with minimal knowledge of the Czech language and the Czech cultural and legal environment. If their request is rejected as manifestly unfounded, the Ministry of the Interior shall take a decision within 30 days of the initiation of the procedure. They only have 7 days to file an action after it's delivered. In such a short period of time, it is very difficult to handle the suit in a qualified manner. In addition, applicants are generally dependent on the assistance of NGOs or ex-offo legal representatives. In any event, the designated representative has only as many days left to extend the action as there are of the statutory seven-day period which began to run by the delivery of the administrative decision. So in a specific case now solved by the Supreme Administrative Court, it was only 5 days, of which three working days, but in other cases it may be even less days. In doing so, consideration should be given to the time needed to contact the applicant, possibly to obtain the interpreter, study the case and prepare the argument. The consequences for practice are such that, in many cases within the prescribed time limit, applicants are not sufficient to bring a proper action, possibly yes, but the lack of time for processing is necessarily reflected in its quality.

7. The situation cannot be remedied in the light of the strict concentration principle mentioned above by an interpretation that the court has the possibility or even the obligation to set a longer period for the extension of the action. In its caselaw, however benevolently it interprets the concept of "plea point ', its existence cannot, for example, be taken from blunt actions which are not exceptional in the case of unsuccessful applicants for international protection.

8. Furthermore, the Supreme Administrative Court notes that the current seven-day period in question has been introduced into the asylum law by an amendment effective since 1 January 2003. The incentive to introduce a restrictive adjustment, as shown in the explanatory memorandum, was to accelerate the asylum procedure in cases where the applicant clearly does not meet the conditions, as well as financial and security reasons; The Supreme Administrative Court considers that another reason was the need to respond to a significant increase in the number of applicants for international protection in the years of the turn of the century, causing concern about the congestion of the authorities concerned. In any event, in his view, the procedure cannot be accelerated at the expense of the procedural rights of the participants. Moreover, there is no particular interest in shortening the deadline, as is the case, for example, in the judicial review of electoral matters. The reason for shortening cannot certainly be financial aspects, nor can the applicant be generally perceived as a security threat. Moreover, since 2001, the number of applicants has fallen steadily, and the situation today is comparable to those of the early 1990s. The Supreme Administrative Court considers that the streamlining of asylum procedures can also be achieved by other means; As an example, it sets out the practice of certain countries which address the need for a remedy by means of special quasi-judicial tribunals consisting of immigration experts. However, if the Czech legislature opted for a review of these decisions under the administrative rule of law, in which the defence of rights and interests is largely dependent on the activity of the party at the time of the action, it cannot, at the same time, deprive it of its right to defend effectively by setting such a short deadline.

9. The Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic stated in its observations on the content of the proposal that the period under examination was introduced into the asylum law by the Government and that the proposal is fully in line with international obligations, in particular the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees (ref.: published under No. 208 / 1993 Coll.), and the rapporteur also stated the relevant press that the proposed regulation complies with EU law. The Committee on Defence and Security dealt with the matter and adopted a number of amendments, but the deadline was not contested. The law was then duly passed and declared. The Chamber of Deputies has addressed this deadline again in the context of the discussion of a government bill amending certain laws in the context of the adoption of the administrative order. It was noted that the press in question, which brought in the new version of Section 32 of the Asylum Act, is in line with the Resolution on minimum guarantees for asylum procedures and respects the requirements of the ratified and declared international treaties on human rights and fundamental freedoms by which the Czech Republic is bound within the meaning of Article 10 of the Constitution. The Constitutional Committee adopted a comprehensive amendment, but it did not take over the new text of Paragraph 32 of the Asylum Act. This part of the amendment to the Asylum Act was then presented in its original version in the framework of the parliamentary amendment to another law and was thus adopted and declared. The legislature acted in the belief that the laws adopted were in accordance with constitutional order. The assessment of the constitutionality of the regulation leaves the consideration of the Constitutional Court.

10. The Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic is of the same belief, namely that the part of the asylum law concerned is in line with the constitutional order and international obligations. In its observations on the content of the proposal, it states that the amendment to the Asylum Act, mentioned several times, should have been aimed at tightening up the conditions for granting asylum in the sense of a more effective exclusion of cases of abuse of that right. The procedural instruments (inter alia) should therefore be adapted to reflect the various behaviour of the applicants and lead to rapid processing. A more effective approach, according to the promoter, was dictated by a steep increase in the number of applications (8,788 cases already in 2000, the development of 2001 even indicated 20,000 cases). Therefore, the number of reasons for "obvious unfounded" was extended, the administrative decision period (90 to 30 days) was reduced or the correction process was reduced by deleting the possibility of decomposition. After referral of the Senate amendment, its committees discussed it; While some have recommended returning the bill with amendments aimed at mitigating some of the unnecessarily strict conditions of the asylum law, none of these proposals were directly concerned with the time limit currently under review. The Senate also leaves the final decision to the Constitutional Court.

11. In the light of the material of the proposal, the Constitutional Court considered it appropriate to request, moreover, an opinion on the content of the proposal from the Ministry of Interior, which in the given section of the state administration exercises its competence.

12. The Minister of the Interior responded to the call with detailed comments. In particular, since the very introduction of the contested provision into the law of the Czech Republic, the Ministry has taken a view on its compliance with the constitutional order and does not agree with the appellant's argument that it cannot be interpreted in a constitutional manner. The case from which the Supreme Administrative Court's proposal has come is not the first case dealing with the time limits under the Asylum Act; the appellant has only now taken a different view. For example in decision sp. zn. 2 Azs 117 / 2004 of 26.10.2004 The Supreme Administrative Court found that the refusal of the application by the Regional Court had already been incorrect, unless the Supreme Administrative Court took the view that it had been completed after the deadline. This is a judicial deadline, and therefore, from the expiry of the period in vain, the obligation not to take into account any subsequent additions cannot be automatically imported. Similarly, in Decision sp. zn. 9 Azs 1 / 2009 of 12 February 2009 assessed The Supreme Administrative Court, as a denial of justice, was in the process of a regional court which refused to file for its deficiencies, without taking into account that the time limit for its removal was unrealistic in view of the particular obstacles to the applicant's person. Thus, according to the Ministry, it found a constitutional conformal solution even without the need to interfere with the contested provision. It cannot be inferred from the proposal why the appellant had to deviate from this solution.

13. With regard to the right to judicial protection, the Ministry considers it appropriate to raise as a basic premise that the contested provision of the Asylum Act does not exclude judicial review of the designated decisions in the case of international protection by an independent court and that even most of the actions brought grant suspensive effect.

14. Referring to the conclusion of the Constitutional Court, presented in the decision of page IV of the ÚS 553 / 06 of 30.1.2007 (N 17 / 44 of the SbNU 217), and the views of the Legal Theory of the Ministry deny the opinion expressed in the proposal that it constitutes a decision on requests for international protection regarding fundamental rights and freedoms.

15. The Ministry denies that the seven-day period means the illusory of the right to judicial protection. This deadline does not cover all actions relating to international protection, but only those where the speed of the procedure is aimed at eliminating cases which clearly do not have asylum grounds. These are cases which are not related to international protection and only abuse asylum facilities for other purposes, in particular legalization of residence, for which the mechanisms provided for in Act No. 326 / 1999 Coll., on the residence of foreigners in the Czech Republic and on the amendment of certain laws are used. They are therefore only burdening the system, and a short period is therefore appropriate. Similar arrangements based on different periods of time for individual asylum procedures are common in other EU countries, such as Germany, France, the UK, Belgium, etc.; in some countries the time limit is even shorter. Otherwise, the length of the period falls within the context of the specially defined time limits in foreign law; The Ministry refers to the resolution sp. zn. I. ÚS 609 / 01 of 5.3.2002 (in SbNU unpublished) in which the Constitutional Court dealt with the constitutionality of the shortened 30-day time limit for bringing an administrative action against a decision under Act No. 326 / 1999 Coll. Similarly, the Supreme Administrative Court, in its decision sp. zn. 5 As 7 / 2009 of 16 April 2009, found that the legal 10-day period for bringing an action against a decision by an administrative authority to expel a stranger, even if it is significantly shorter than the general time limit, does not make the exercise of the right of judicial review of such a decision extremely difficult, since the time limit compensates for the granting of suspensive effect by the action. In addition, the establishment of a shorter period of time pursues a legitimate objective in the form of restrictions on the residence of the deported person only for the period strictly necessary. It is therefore not contrary to Article 36 (2) of the Charter or Article 1 of Protocol 7 to the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as "the Convention '). As regards the appellant's argument, the impact of the principle of concentration of proceedings on the position of the applicant, the Ministry points out that the solution is an extensive interpretation of the concept of an action point in the light of the conclusions of the Constitutional Court, sp. zn. IV. Moreover, the concept of the principle of concentration of proceedings, as presented in the proposal by the Supreme Administrative Court, that the legal representative can only be granted as many days as the remainder of the seven-day period for its submission is, in the opinion of the Ministry, too restrictive. Furthermore, the Ministry does not agree with the view that the adjustment already under assessment is unnecessary at the moment when the number of applicants is falling. The legislative change in question was not motivated by a sharp increase in the agenda, but by an attempt to streamline the procedure and rule out cases where the asylum system is merely being abused.

16. The annulment of the contested provision would, according to the Ministry, contrary to the meaning and purpose of the legislation, result in the unintended elimination of the difference between the rejection of the application as manifestly unfounded and the classic procedure. It would also be contrary to the current trend of European law, which is in line with the current asylum procedure. The Ministry therefore recommends rejecting the proposal.

17. Paragraph 32 (2) (a) of the Asylum Act reads: "Within 7 days of the date of service of the decision, an action may be brought against a decision on an application for international protection which is rejected as manifestly unfounded."

18. The application was lodged by the Supreme Administrative Court in connection with the proceedings pending before it, and one of those which must be applied to abolish the proposed procedural provisions of the Asylum Act. Its active legitimacy is therefore based on the provisions of § 64 (3) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as the Law on the Constitutional Court).

19. The Constitutional Court, within the meaning of Article 68 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, has dealt with the manner in which Act No. 2 / 2002 Coll., amending the Act on Asylum and certain other laws by which the contested provision was inserted into the Act on Asylum. It follows from the observations of both participants as well as the relevant website (www.psp.cz) that the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic has discussed the proposal as Press No. 921. The first reading took place on 16 May 2001, the second on 19 September 2001 and the third reading on 21 September 2001, when the bill was approved and referred to the Senate. He returned it at his 10th meeting on 25 October 2001 (Resolution No 189) with amendments, with 60 of the 66 senators present voting for repayment, 3 opposed and 3 abstained. On 27 November 2001, at its 43rd session, the Chamber of Deputies renegotiated the proposal and approved it as approved by the Senate (Resolution No 1866); in favour of the 168 Members present, 110 voted against the proposal. The President of the Republic signed the Act on 14 December 2001 and on 7 January 2002 the Act was duly declared in the Collection of Laws.

20. The Constitutional Court has stated that the law under review has been adopted by a constitutional legislative procedure.

21. The Constitutional Court has examined the proposal and, for the following reasons, concluded that the annulment of the contested provision of the Asylum Act is justified.

22. First of all, it should be recalled that the Constitutional Court is an institution for the protection of constitutionality (Article 83 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic). In its proceedings for the repeal of laws and other legislation, it acts as a so-called negative legislator and its task is to assess the constitutionality of the contested legislation or its defined parts, possibly to assess whether the contested legislation can be interpreted and applied in a constitutional manner. At the same time, the Constitutional Court is not entitled to assess the appropriateness, effectiveness or doctrine of the rule of law, since this competence is always for legislators.

23. Therefore, as was apparent from the narrative part of the reasoning, the Constitutional Court is faced with the task of assessing whether the seven-day period still gives the applicant a real opportunity to make the decision to reject an application for international protection as a manifestly unfounded control of the administrative court, or whether the duration of the period for initiating proceedings makes the right to judicial review an empty declaration.

24. The issue of time limits and their connection with constitutional guarantees has been dealt with more than once by the Constitutional Court in its case law.

25. For example, in the sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 33 / 97 of 17.12.1997 (N 163 / 9 SbNU 399; 30 / 1998 Coll.) The Constitutional Court noted on a general basis the concept of a time limit: "The purpose of the legal institution of the time limit is to reduce entropy (uncertainty) in the application of rights or powers, the time limit on the state of uncertainty in legal relations (which plays, in particular, an important role in proving matters of dispute), to speed up the decision-making process with a view to realising the intended objectives. These reasons led to the introduction of deadlines thousands of years ago."

26. The scope of the constitutional review of the legal provisions which lay down the time limits was defined by the Constitutional Court in the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 6 June 2001 (N 84 / 22 SbNU 205; 279 / 2001 Coll.), which stated: "The mission of the Constitutional Court lies in the control of constitutionality. In this context, this court can only abolish non-constitutional provisions or parts of them, but it is not its task to reparate the consequences of the failure by the appellant to exercise his right within the prescribed period. The abolition of time limits violates the rule of law, as it significantly interferes with the principle of legal certainty, which is one of the fundamental essentials of the current democratic legal systems. The deadline itself cannot be unconstitutional. However, it may appear this way in the light of specific circumstances. '

27. The Constitutional Court then followed the above conclusions in the decision of page Pl ÚS 6 / 05 of 13.12.2005 (N 226 / 39 SbNU 389; 531 / 2005 Coll.). It again stated that "the prima facie period cannot, without further ado, show signs of unconstitutionality 'and that" the unconstitutional nature of the period can only be found in dialogue with the specific circumstances of the case under consideration'. In particular circumstances, or in the context of a contextual assessment of the constitutionality of the deadline, the Constitutional Court has indicated:

"1. the inadequacy of the time limit in relation to the time limit for the application of the constitutionally guaranteed right (s) and, where appropriate, the time limit for the limitation of subjective right." It referred to the finding sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 5 / 03 of 9.7.2003 (N 109 / 30 SbNU 499; 211 / 2003 Sb.) of the abolishing provisions of § 3 and § 6 of Act No. 290 / 2002 Coll., which constituted a disproportionate restriction on property law, a breach of Article 11 (1) in conjunction with Article 4 (4) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (the constitutionally conformal court considered, in the context of which the restriction would be based only to the extent strictly necessary, which is understood only by a minimum time, and clearly prima facie, "temporary ', but not a period of ten years);

'2. Respectfully the legislature in setting a time limit (its anchoring or cancellation) '. In this sense, the Court of First Instance referred to the Constitutional Court in Case No 2 / 02 Pl ÚS - the finding of 9 March 2004 (N 35 / 32 CollNU 331; 278 / 2004 Coll.), in which it referred to the annulment of the provisions of Sections 879c to 879e of the Civil Code implemented by Act No. 229 / 2001 Coll., by which the legislator intervened in the legitimate expectation of a well-defined circle of entities only one day before the expiry of the period in which the acquisition of property law would have taken place, as a result of which the bodies having acted in confidence in pre-specified conditions, were confronted with arbitrary procedure by the State on the day before the expiry of that period;

'3. The constitutionally unacceptable inequality of two groups of entities resulting from the abolition of a certain legal condition for the exercise of the right for its unconstitutionality, with this abolition for the group of entities concerned no longer opening up as a result of the expiry of the time limits as a result of the deregulation without further possibility of the exercise of the right '. Here reference was made to the finding of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 3 / 94 of 12.7.1994 (N 38 / 1 SbNU 279; 164 / 1994 Coll.) and to the finding of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 24 / 97 of 3.6.1998 (N 62 / 11 SbNU 111; 153 / 1998 Coll.), which repealed the provision setting out the starting date for the application of the restitution entitlement, opened the possibility of applying them also to those beneficiaries who were unable to apply them successfully as a result of the condition of permanent residence in the original entitlements.

28. Consequently, following these earlier arguments, which are still applicable now, the Constitutional Court notes that the contested period as such cannot be unconstitutional. It is up to the legislator to decide whether and what time limit it provides for the implementation of the law. Indeed, this is not even called into question, as the inconstitutionality of the deadline is seen by the appellant exclusively in its length or in the fact that it is too short. However, even the length of the time limit cannot in itself constitute a ground for its annulment. The conclusion on its (not) constitutionality can only be reached after an assessment of other contextual circumstances. To that effect, the appellant points out the principles governing the administrative judiciary, namely the principle of disposition and the principle of concentration of proceedings, which, in conjunction with a short period of time, make it very difficult for an applicant for international protection to carry out judicial review and even make it impossible in some cases. Nor can the specific life situation in which most applicants for international protection are located be omitted.

29. The Constitutional Court carefully considered these reservations when assessing the deadline in the light of the above-mentioned considerations, that is to say, whether it is unacceptable to favour a group of applicants for international protection, whether the legislator has set it arbitrarily and is not disproportionate.

30. It remains to be added that the question of the constitutionality of the specific deadline has already been dealt with by the Constitutional Court in resolution sp. zn. I. ÚS 609 / 01 (available at http: / / nalus.ujud.cz /). It decided on a constitutional complaint relating to the application for annulment of the provision of § 172 paragraph 1 of Act No. 326 / 1999 Coll., on the residence of foreigners in the Czech Republic and on the amendment of certain laws under which "An action against an administrative decision must be brought within 30 days of the receipt of a decision by an administrative authority at the last stage or from the date of communication of another decision by an administrative authority, unless otherwise specified. The delay cannot be forgiven. 'The complainant argued that, as a result of this regulation, discrimination against foreigners is taking place in respect of their right to judicial protection, since the 30-day period for bringing an action is - precisely because they are foreigners often not familiar with the Czech language - excessively short. The Constitutional Court rejected the proposal as manifestly unfounded, stating that the contested provision does not contradict any of the constitutional courts. It stated in the preamble that" from a constitutional point of view, it is essential for the legislator to determine whether, and in what areas of administrative regulation, a specific law provides for a period of time for bringing an administrative action, i.e. a period different from a general period of two months from the service of a decision of an administrative authority at the last stage, which is enshrined in the provisions of § 250b (1), the first sentence of the first o. s. §.. The Constitutional Court considers that the special legal period provided for by the different (30 days) does not prevent the implementation of the fundamental right to judicial protection in accordance with Article 36 of the Charter. Even from a constitutional point of view, it is not possible to guarantee only a general deadline for bringing an administrative action, as it would be a denial of the right of the State to adjust the special time limit in special law No 326 / 1999, which, in terms of the subject matter of the legislation (and the personal competence), concerns (stay) foreigners in the Czech Republic. Indeed, in a constitutional complaint, the complainants associate alleged discrimination against foreigners - in relation to their right to judicial protection - with an allegedly excessively short 30-day deadline for bringing an administrative action by those who are often ignorant of the Czech language. However, the Constitutional Court considers that, by providing for a special 30-day period for the submission of an administrative action, public authority does not save a constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right to judicial protection for a stranger, since that period does not abolish, alter or render that fundamental right unaccessible to foreigners. On the contrary, from a constitutional point of view, it creates equal conditions for the implementation of this fundamental right in respect of all (the legal persons concerned) natural persons without discrimination. The Constitutional Court therefore concludes that the provision of Paragraph 172 (1) on the time limit for bringing an administrative action is constitutionally manifestly conformal and there is no reason to interrupt it.' The argument that the constitutional guarantee of the general deadline for bringing an administrative action cannot be relied upon and that it is merely determining whether the special period respects the constitutional guaranteed fundamental rights is without further prejudice to the proposal currently under consideration. On the other hand, however, the Constitutional Court responded by that resolution to the specific context of the special provisions of the Foreign residence law; In particular, the resolution concerned a 30-day period, which is now under review of the constitutionality of the seven-day period, which is significantly shorter. Moreover, the procedure under the Act on the residence of foreigners is not strictly one-stop shop, as is the case with the asylum administrative procedure, which makes it possible to assess the tightening of the conditions of access to the administrative court compared to the standard regulation to a certain extent more benevolently.

31. Time limit for individual asylum groups.

32. The Act on Asylum also covers, inter alia, the provision of procedures for granting international protection in the form of asylum or supplementary protection and procedures for withdrawing asylum or supplementary protection [Paragraph 1 (b) of the Asylum Act]. Asylum management is an administrative procedure in which the Ministry of the Interior decides. If the Ministry finds in its decision that the grounds for granting asylum, international protection in the form of asylum or supplementary protection are fulfilled, it shall grant (Paragraph 28 (1)). Otherwise, if they do not find the grounds for granting any of the forms of international protection, they will reject the application (Paragraph 28 (2)). The negative decisions can be divided into two categories. On the one hand, it may be cases where the complainant states the reasons for which asylum is granted, but are not identified and confirmed in his particular case. Or the Ministry may reject the request as manifestly unfounded in the cases listed in Section 16 of the Asylum Act. This is the case where the applicant seeks to circumvent or abuse asylum law for the purpose of legalisation of residence on the territory of the Republic or for other reasons. In relation to the qualitatively completely different nature of the grounds for refusal of the application, a different period of time for bringing an administrative action is laid down. In general, it is 15 days, but if the application was rejected as manifestly unfounded, the action may be brought only within 7 days of the date of service of the decision; the same regime applies in cases where an application has been made in an establishment for the protection of foreigners or where the procedure has been terminated because of the inadmissibility of the application for international protection.

33. In view of the conditions for the use of judicial protection, applicants are therefore divided into two categories. In view of the general requirement of a fundamentally equal approach to constitutional guarantees, it is therefore necessary to address the necessity and justification of such division. According to the Ministry, the purpose of this deadline is to eliminate cases that "clearly do not have asylum grounds." They burden the system and the rate of execution is an important aspect for this type of case. However, the Constitutional Court does not see an immediate link between these arguments and the length of the deadline. The speed perspective is significant and was reflected in asylum law, inter alia, by shortening the general two-month period of application to 15 days. The category of clearly unfounded applications is certainly different from those of others, and certain procedural specialities, such as a closed list of the reasons for which the application can be so decided and a reduction of the time limit for an administrative decision to be taken to 30 days from the date of the initiation of the international protection procedure, are therefore justified. A closed list of reasons then leads to fewer claims for evidence and justification of the decision. These are the acceptable consequences of the said categorisation of applications, which in essence speed up and facilitate procedures in cases lacking asylum; This is also how elimination of these cases occurs. However, if the judicial review itself is to conclude that the asylum nature of a particular case is indeed lacking, access to the court alone for this group of applicants cannot be limited by further shortening the deadline.

34. The Ministry states in its opinion that the practice of different deadlines for so-called standard asylum procedures and accelerated procedures is entirely common in other EU Member States, while shorter deadlines can be found. In addition, the Constitutional Court notes that it left aside the comparative argument of foreign legislation, since, as has been said, the assessment of the constitutionality of the deadline is a contextual assessment. Other legal rules that affect the submission of a case to a court are of fundamental importance, and thus the way in which the time limit is reflected in our Czech realms, where administrative procedures in asylum matters are governed by the principle of disposition and concentration of proceedings, which places specific claims on the action. For example, the relevant parts of the arrangements for asylum procedures and subsequent judicial review in the Federal Republic of Germany (see the State of Petr Lavický and Sylva Šisková: Above the reorganisation of the appeal procedure in asylum cases, Legal Perspective 19 / 2005) are mentioned in this context. The material in question is covered by the Asylum Procedure Act (Asylverfahrensgesetz, BGBI. I 1992.1126). The procedure is a one-step procedure, conducted before the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. His decision may be challenged by an action brought before the administrative court. The time limit shall be two weeks after service of the decision, stating the facts and suggesting the evidence may be made within one month; the court does not have to carry out the evidence and take into account the claims made after the expiry of that period, but only on condition that their acceptance would cause delays in the proceedings, the delay was not sufficiently excused and the participant was informed of the consequences of the delay.

35. The question of the legislature's insolence in setting a deadline.

36. The regulation of judicial review of asylum decisions is continuous. Pursuant to Act No. 498 / 1990 Coll., on Refugees, effective from 1.1.1991, the procedure for granting refugee status was led by the Ministry of Interior and against its decisions was initially admitted in all matters of decomposition, after 31.12.1993 only in the case of listed types of decisions. The law allowed an application for review to be made by a court, but only against decisions of the Minister of the Interior in the procedure of decomposition. On 1 January 2000 the current Asylum Act came into force. The procedure for granting asylum under this Regulation was initially two-stage in the cases of a decision not to grant asylum and a decision to reject the application to initiate an asylum procedure as manifestly unfounded, when the law allowed the submission of decomposition. In the event that the degradation was allowed, that is to say, statistically in most cases, the submission of an administrative action was admissible only against its decision; However, the application was no longer dependent on the operative part of the decision, contrary to previous rules, and the action could be challenged by any decision. The action brought has been granted suspensive effect. By the adoption of Act No. 2 / 2002 Coll. with effect from 1 February 2002, the possibility of reviewing the decision of the Ministry of the Interior in a breakdown procedure was completely removed. The applicants continued to refer to the court, not with an action, but with an appeal against the wrongful decision of the administrative authority. The time limit for the lodging of an appeal was reduced to 15 days from the date of receipt of the decision and, inter alia, to 7 days if the asylum application was rejected as manifestly unfounded. As of 1 January 2003, when Act No. 217 / 2002 Coll., came into force, the legislator returned to the model of reviewing the final decision of the Ministry by the court on the basis of an action.

37. The conditions of judicial review, including the time limits for bringing an action (application), have therefore changed over time, but continuously, without sudden reversal or shift to extreme positions, for example, from a wide review according to general rules to a complete exclusion. The legislature has now not intervened in some fundamental and unexpected way in the asylum review regime, and has not broken a proven and experienced model. The legislator argued with the need for the speed and effectiveness of the asylum procedure, referring to the (unspecified and undeveloped) practice of asylum legislation of the European Union states. It cannot be said that the period under examination is enshrined in the Asylum Act by a procedure showing the characteristics of the legislator's insolence. The regulation is neither incomprehensible nor intrinsically contradictory; the legislature did not act unexpectedly and undoubtedly by introducing a shorter deadline for the group of applicants under the pretext of streamlining and accelerating the asylum procedure did not follow primarily their de facto exclusion from the circle of those who could protect their rights in court. A complication in its application revealed only the practice (meant by the applicant's information that there are increasing cases such as the one that led him to submit the proposal under consideration, i.e. those where the applicant can only announce his intention to file a complaint within the time limit, but it is no longer sufficient to add any reasons).

38. Proportionality of the deadline.

39. The contested provision enshrined in the time limit for bringing an action is a legal period which cannot be changed by the court. Nor can it be forgiven for missing it, as this excludes the administrative order (§ 72 (4)). The adverse consequences of the delay in bringing the action cannot therefore be averted in any way. On the other hand, there are quite significant claims on processors; In addition to the general procedural requirements (§ 37 (2) and (3) of the Administrative Rules of Procedure), in particular the indication of what the action is relating to, against whom it is directed, and what it is proposed, the signature and the date of the application, must show the special requirements (§ 71 (1) of the Administrative Rules), namely the designation of the contested decision and the date of its notification or other notification to the applicant, the designation of the persons involved in the proceedings, if the applicants are known, the description of the statements of the decision which the applicant is challenging, the points on which the facts and legal grounds on which the applicant considers the contested decision to be unlawful or unfounded, and, finally, the draft judgment. The applicant may extend the action to the pending statements of the decision or extend it to further pleas in law only within the time limit for bringing the action (Paragraph 71 (2), third sentence of the Administrative Rules). Therefore, the principle of concentration is strictly applied. The Constitutional Court expressed its views on the principles governing the administrative justice system (even before the adoption of the Rules of Procedure) in the sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 12 / 99 of 27.6.2000 (N 98 / 18 CollNU 355; 232 / 2000 Coll.). He stated here that... "any provision which, by formalising the administrative procedure, sets de facto limits on access to the court, namely the limits of one of the fundamental constitutional rights - the right to judicial protection. All such provisions... it is therefore necessary to interpret in the spirit of Article 4 (4) of the Charter, namely, when applying such provisions, to examine the substance and meaning of fundamental rights and freedoms.... Thus, the Constitutional Court considers the contested provision as interpretable within the constitutional limits, it did not find the" disposition principle ', or the principle of concentration of proceedings in the administrative judiciary unconstitutional, since, although it may be criticised that it deviates from the principle of material truth, it cannot be seen that, above all and without doubt, it helps to fulfil the constitutional right to discuss and decide the matter within a reasonable period of time or without undue delay (Article 6 (1) of the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 38 (2) of the Charter). "At this conclusion, the Constitutional Court persists now. Thus, breaking the principle of concentration cannot solve the problem.

40. The applicant shall already, in the application, at the latest at the time of the application, define the extent to which the administrative decision is contested and, at least in a basic manner, define the reasons for the unlawful decision. As the applicants cannot, in principle, be expected to have practical difficulties in determining the extent of the assault, this is otherwise the case. It means the definition of the factual and legal reasons for which the applicant considers the decision to be unlawful and void. The first difficulty is the interpretation of this condition itself, as evidenced by the finding of page IV of ÚS 2170 / 08 (available at http: / / nalus.ujud.cz /), in which the Constitutional Court pointed out the differences in the interpretation of the concept of an action point in the decisions of the individual chambers of the Supreme Administrative Court. In any event, the agreement is that an administrative action must contain an action point within the time limit for bringing an action. If that is not the case, the submission is merely a notification of the intention to refer the application to the administrative court, which, however, does not have any relevant effects in the extensive interpretation of the concept of a point of law. As a result, the applicant's quality of argument has been required from the outset. Taking into account what the appellant points out, that the applicant, as an asylum seeker, is in a specific situation when he is not usually oriented in the local circumstances and the rule of law, does not know the language, has no background, contacts and is linked to external assistance, this formal requirement of the Rules of Procedure is not easily fulfilled. If a seven-day period, in fact necessarily reduced by at least two more non-working days of the weekend, in which the applicant must do so, is still being put under undue pressure. It is therefore quite understandable that the applicant's response to a short period of time is to bring a blank action in order to capture the legal deadline, which is linked to the expectation of a call to supplement the argument.

41. The Constitutional Court is aware of a possible objection that, even if the contested provision is repealed, the period of the appeal will be extended from seven to 15 days in the event of manifestly unfounded applications (Paragraph 32 (1) of the Asylum Act), a combination of social factors for asylum seekers and principles controlling the administrative justice system will continue to act as a result of the fact that a number of applicants do not achieve a substantive judicial review. In fact, it is still certain that the applicants will file their blanket actions at the very end of the legal period, so that the scope for possible completion of the necessary formalities remains minimal. However, the availability of judicial review will be higher for these applicants, while respecting the principle of vigilantibus iura. Without thereby declaring that the 15-day period itself is sufficient (this would go beyond the proposed subject matter of the procedure), the Constitutional Court notes that it is in the course of this (15-day) period to initiate a more realistic judicial review.

42. Furthermore, the argument that a shorter period of appeal compensates for the granting of suspensory effect by the action cannot be accepted. The administrative justice system is designed in such a way that it is precisely the initial stage of the procedure that the applicant must not only define the scope, but must also focus at least the fundamental direction of the argument itself. An applicant who has not properly sued (due to an excessively short period of time) will not benefit from the benefit of the suspensive effect.

43. Another circumstance that had to be taken into account in the assessment of the adequacy of the deadline is that the action is the sole consideration of the incoming procedural remedy for the unsuccessful applicant. Therefore, it is also necessary to exercise restraint when constructing formal barriers to its application.

44. Finally, the language problem needs to be mentioned. The applicant is granted the assistance of an interpreter in accordance with the provisions of Section 22 of the Asylum Act, but of course only in administrative proceedings, the administrative decision is then not translated, with the help of an interpreter is only familiar with its content. The administrative action must then be drawn up in Czech. This, too, necessarily complicates its process and makes it dependent on the professional assistance it needs to procure.

45. The Constitutional Court further had to consider whether the contested provision could not be interpreted in a constitutional manner. If it was concluded that the length of the period considered, combined with the revision of the decision to reject an application for international protection as manifestly unfounded, was so short that the action could not be considered an effective remedy, it would not cancel the contested provision only if the deficit could be bridged by interpretation. It would have to achieve a real extension of the period under examination.

46. Such an "extension" is technically taken into account only by the fact that the bringing of an action (namely any action, even a blank one) will mean maintaining the term of the application and requiring the court to call upon the appellant to remedy the defects or to supplement the application. The length of the period granted by the Court for such correction could not be limited for seven days, but the court would provide a period of 'reasonable', namely one in which, in its view and experience, the unsuccessful applicant could actually respond in a qualified manner. This, however, is considered by the Constitutional Court to be inadmissible and contrary to the generally accepted concept of the principle of concentration of proceedings. Even if such an option were to effectively extend the short legal period by limiting the judicial challenge to asylum cases (which is, in itself, difficult to defend and sustainable), this would substantially undermine the concept of administrative justice itself. However, this cannot be sacrificed in order to mitigate the effects of too short a deadline on participants in a single administrative procedure. Moreover, it would be disproportionate to mislead the principles of the administrative justice system as to how the annulment of the contested provision would result.

47. In its observations, the Ministry drew attention to the procedure chosen by the Supreme Administrative Court in its decision in sp. zn. 2 Azs 117 / 2004 of 26.10.2004; he criticised the Regional Court that, contrary to Article 37 (5) of the Administrative Rules of Procedure, he did not see a party's submission made after the court prescribed the time limit, but before the decision was given in the case and refused the submission. The Constitutional Court disagrees with that. The application of the provisions of Paragraph 37 (5), second sentence, of the Administrative Code provides for the consequences of failure to comply with the request for the removal of defects or to supplement the application. Even if such an interpretation had been accepted that administrative courts would have taken account of corrections and additions to submissions received after the deadline, but before the decision on it, the position of the applicant would have remained uncertain. Whether or not such a submission would be taken into account would depend only on how quickly the court decides after the expiry of the period.

48. The contested provision cannot be interpreted as guaranteeing an effective remedy to the unsuccessful applicant.

49. It can therefore be concluded that the provision under examination of the Asylum Act, by limiting the right of the applicant to seek the protection of his rights before the Court of First Instance by providing for an excessively short period of time for the bringing of the action, in essence makes the declared judicial protection merely illusory (by analogy to the decision of the sp. zn. It is therefore contrary to Article 36 (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, according to which anyone claiming to have been shortened on his rights by a decision of a public authority may refer to the court to examine the lawfulness of such a decision, unless otherwise provided for by the law, the review of decisions relating to fundamental rights and freedoms under the Charter, and Article 13 of the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms guaranteeing the effective remedy before a national authority for anyone affected by the law conferred by the Convention, must not be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court.

50. These reasons led the Constitutional Court to conclude that the application should be complied with under Paragraph 70 (1) of the Constitutional Court Act.

51. The oral hearing was abandoned under Paragraph 44 (2) of the Constitutional Court Act as it could not be expected to further clarify the case and all participants agreed to this procedure.