The Constitutional Court found no 86 / 2005 Coll.

1. The proposal to repeal the provisions of § 20 paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 to 11 of Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll., on association in political parties and in political movements, as amended, is rejected.

2. The proposal to abolish the provisions of § 20 paragraph 4 and § 20 paragraph 6 of Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll., on association in political parties and political movements, as amended, is rejected.

The Constitutional Complaints, alleging infringement of Article 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as "the Charter ') and Article 5 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as" the Constitution'), call for the Constitutional Court to issue a finding prohibiting the Ministry of Finance from continuing to violate its right to make a permanent contribution under Article 20 of the Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll., on association in political parties and political movements, as amended (hereinafter referred to as "Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll. ') amounting to CZK 200 000 for each of 0,1% of the votes obtained in the elections to the Parliament of the Czech Republic of Deputies.

In his constitutional complaint, the appellant stated that in the elections to the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Parliament in June 2002 he obtained a total of 2.78% of the votes in force. On 20 November 2002, he therefore submitted a request to the Ministry of Finance for a permanent contribution within the meaning of Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll., which, however, was rejected by the Act No. 143 / 133437 / 2002 of 9.12.2002 by the Ministry of Finance, stating that the legal condition for the payment of the permanent contribution to the activity under § 20 (4) and (6) of that Act was not met, i.e. the political movement of the Independent Association did not receive at least 3% of the votes in the elections to the Chamber of Deputies. In the appellant's view, the refusal to pay this permanent contribution constitutes a so-called other intervention by the public authority which infringed its quoted fundamental rights; on the question of its active legitimacy for the submission of a constitutional complaint and the general conditions for its submission referred to the alleged analogous situation, dealt with by the Constitutional Court finding No 243 / 1999 Coll. (sp. zn.

The appellant considers that the limit for the payment of a permanent contribution of 3% of the votes obtained in the elections to the Chamber of Deputies is discriminatory against the smaller political parties (if the term "political party 'is hereinafter referred to as" political party', that is to say the political movement, unless there is something else in the context), although he said that he does not assess whether the amount of the contribution is appropriate. However, it considers it constitutionally unconformal in particular that the permanent contribution is paid only to parties who have been relatively successful in the political competition for mandates in the Chamber of Deputies, but are no longer paid to those who are successful in the Senate, Regional or Municipal elections. The alleged inequality in the conditions of political competition has been demonstrated by the appellant by comparing the election results of his and the political party of the Union of Freedom-Democratic Union. In this respect, he stated, inter alia, that in the elections to the Chamber of Deputies, the US- DEU received 14,41% of the votes and 9 mandates in the KDU- ČSL coalition, but in the Senate elections, the US- DEU obtained a single mandate, while the draftsman received two; in the local elections, the US- DEU has obtained 617 mandates in all councils, while the promoter has received 3,131 mandates. Compared to these results, it is said that the US- DEU receives CZK 10 million per year on a permanent contribution, while the promoter gets nothing. The total state contribution in 2003 is allegedly CZK 6 300 000 and CZK 42 million for the US-DEU, which in his view is in gross proportion to the election results. The appellant does not hide that the payment of a permanent contribution of CZK 200,000 for every 0,1% of the votes would significantly improve its financial situation (since the amount of CZK 5.6 million per year for 2,78% of the votes won is close to the national contribution of CZK 6.3 million, which the appellant receives for 2 Senate mandates and 18 regional councils' mandates), but the main motive of the proposal is to change the existing legislation on financing of political parties, which, in his view, provides too much of the taxpayer's money to parliamentary parties and to little or nothing else (non-parliamentary) parties and movements.

For the reasons set out above, the appellant combined - in accordance with Article 74 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as "the Law on the Constitutional Court") its constitutional complaint with the proposal to abolish certain provisions of Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll., namely paragraphs 20 (4), (5) and (6), and paragraphs 7 in the words "for the mandate of a Member or Senator," each year is CZK 900 000 a. "Alternatively, it proposed that the Constitutional Court annul the entire provision of Paragraph 20 of the Law in question; He stated that by worshipping such a broad petition," he wants to create room for the Constitutional Court to abolish, according to his consideration, either the various provisions of Paragraph 20 or the entire regulation of the financing of political parties "and" believes that the Constitutional Court will make a sensitive choice of the effectiveness of its derogatory decision, "in particular because several parties and movements not represented in the Chamber of Deputies are said to be financially dependent on state contributions for the mandates of regional councils.

In its comprehensive proposal, the appellant sees the inconstitutionality of the legal arrangements for the financing of political parties in particular in the following statements, in which he has divided his specific objections:

1. The contributions to the mandate of a Member or Senator (amount of CZK 900 000) are said to be unjustifiably high; it also considers the limit for entitlement to the "vote" in the elections to the Chamber of Deputies under § 85 of Act No. 247 / 1995 Coll., on elections to the Parliament of the Czech Republic and amending and supplementing certain other laws, as amended, (in these cases it referred in its argument to the findings of the Constitutional Court No. 243 / 1999 Coll., No. 64 / 2001 Coll. and No. 98 / 2001 Coll.).

2. Also, the 3% threshold for entitlement to a permanent contribution pursuant to § 20 (4) and (6) of Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll. is unjustifiably high and considers its inference to be unconstitutional only from the outcome of the elections to the Chamber of Deputies; Both parliamentary chambers have legislative power. In this respect, he mentioned a hypothetical example where a party that would receive 2.9% of the votes in the elections to the Chamber of Deputies, but would fill the entire Senate and obtain the largest number of mandates in regional and municipal councils, would not be entitled to any contribution. A number of political parties gain no support from the state at all, but are not only parties of negligible importance, but also parties of long-term interest, albeit unsuccessfully in national elections, or parties that see their role only at municipal or regional level, where they also have considerable success (such as the Open Society Party, the City Election, the Democratic Regional Party, the Movement of Independent for the Harmonious Development of Cities and Cities, etc.). These parties are not even covered by the State's own costs, such as the preparation of the annual financial report and the statutory audit of the accounts. The appellant concluded that the solution to the issue was not seen in the mere reduction of the threshold for entitlement to a permanent contribution, but in the "creation of a completely different structure ', which would ensure an adequate contribution to the activities of all parties, regardless of whether they participate in a political competition at parliamentary, regional or municipal level.

3. In the appellant's view, it is also an unconstitutional condition to make the contribution for the term of office of a regional councillor a Member's or a Senator's term of office profitable. A party that obtains a number of mandates in the councils of the regions but has no Member or Senator, is not entitled to a contribution to the mandate of a member of the county councillor (note: although, in fact, the Ministry of Finance pays these contributions to parties that have no Member or Senator).

4. Finally, the appellant also objects to the fact that the State pays contributions for the votes obtained only in the elections to the Chamber of Deputies (100 CZK per vote) and also in the new elections to the European Parliament. However, no contributions shall be paid for votes received in the Senate elections, regional councils and municipal councils. Once again, this gives a significant advantage to the successful parties in the elections to the Chamber of Deputies, while the new parties or parties limiting themselves to regional policy are disadvantaged.

The appellant further stated that the allocation of state contributions between political parties did not correspond to the aid that these parties have in society; State contributions to political parties represented in the Chamber of Deputies are said to exceed 95% in 2003, while the contribution to other parties is only 4.6%. Thus, parties not represented in the Chamber of Deputies must raise money from virtually exclusively private sources, "in a situation where the parliamentary parties alone... have caused the sponsorship of political parties, which is considered to be... a socially beneficial activity in the advanced democratic states... to have gained a hallmark of questionable activity in the Czech Republic. The total amount of state contributions to the appellant appears to be unjustified and significantly above the costs of the parties' participation in the electoral competition as well as the need to finance their core activities; the promoter finds no reason for even the most successful political party to acquire over CZK 100 million each year for its activities. According to the appellant, the entire legal arrangements for the funding of political parties are thus aimed at the full financial security of parliamentary political parties from the state budget and at least at a significant reduction in access to state contributions to non-parliamentary political parties.

The proposal also considers the wording of Paragraph 20 (8) of Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll., according to which the mandate allowance for the entire term belongs only to the party on whose candidate list the Member, Senator or member of the council of the county was elected. While the legislator's intention was, according to the appellant, a legitimate attempt to prevent a Member, a senator or a member of the council who would go to another party during the parliamentary term, from going to a state contribution; However, it has been omitted that a change of party jurisdiction may occur not only individually but also collectively, by the merger of parties. The legislation affecting those political parties or movements that have decided to take an integration step therefore limits the free competition of political forces.

The appellant concluded his broad argument with his own specific proposal on how the financing of political parties and movements should be regulated, if it is to be in accordance with Article 5 of the Constitution and Article 22 of the Charter. This would be best matched by a system in which the contribution for votes obtained in the elections to the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, the European Parliament, regional and municipal councils would be given to parties that are seriously participating in the electoral competition, i.e. they will receive more than a minimum percentage of votes (for example, the Chamber of Deputies proposes 0.5 to 1% of votes, 4 to 6% of votes in the constituency); the minimum contribution would be paid to those parties who have demonstrated their importance as an organised political force and an extended contribution to those parties who have adequately succeeded in elections to all representative bodies in at least some regions by participating in the electoral competition (regardless of the outcome). The total amount of government contributions to political parties should then not exceed CZK 100 to CZK 150 million per year, because the applicant considers that the largest political party must be sufficient to cover all normal activities.

By order of the First Chamber of the Constitutional Court of 5.5.2003 sp. zn. I. ÚS 59 / 03, the proceedings for a constitutional complaint under § 78 of the Law on the Constitutional Court were suspended and the application for annulment of the above paragraphs of the provisions of § 20 of Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll., or the whole of that provision, was referred to the plenary of the Constitutional Court for a decision under Article 87 (1) (a) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic.

The Constitutional Court sent a motion to initiate proceedings in accordance with the provisions of Section 69 of the Law on the Constitutional Court to the parties - Chamber of Deputies and Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic.

In the observations of the Chamber of Deputies, signed by its President PhDr. Lubomír Zaorálk, on the point of the proposal requesting the annulment of Article 20 (4) to (6) of Law No 424 / 1991 Coll. the restriction of political parties to participate in elections, access to the media, freedom of expression, the right of assembly and the like would certainly be contrary to Article 22 of the Charter. However, there are no such restrictions in the dictation of paragraphs 4 to 6 of the Act cited. On the next item of the proposal requesting cancellation in § 20 paragraph 7 of the sentence concerning the amount of the mandate allowance (900 000 CZK) The Chamber of Deputies stated that it was entirely within the jurisdiction of the legislature to determine its amount. Before the amendment of Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll., implemented by Act No. 170 / 2001 Coll., the amount of the contribution was CZK 1 000 000; by reducing it, the legislator responded to the finding of the Constitutional Court published under No 98 / 2001 Coll. If the amount of this contribution was already set at CZK 500,000 in 1991, the present amount of the contribution is nothing with a 12-year interval that violates the constitutional criteria of free competition between political parties and what could generally be considered disproportionate. According to the Chamber of Deputies, by complying with the alternative proposal to abolish the entire provision of Paragraph 20 of the Act, political parties would be essentially placed at the same level as civil associations established under the Civil Association Act. State participation in the financing of political parties is, however, a standard in European democratic states' law. Any repeal of that provision would trigger the need for immediate amendment of the law; It is hard to imagine that "the exact and fair criterion of a dividing political party would not be taken into account again for those who are of real importance to political events in the state, thanks to the electoral base, and for those who represent virtually no one and are therefore, often repeatedly, unsuccessful in elections." In the Chamber of Deputies' view, the basic rules of free competition for political forces are in practice truly secure, with the rule of law in no way preventing the emergence of new political bodies and their penetration into Parliament, which depends solely on the ability of these groupings to address the necessary number of voters. This ability, or vice versa, cannot ever replace any State contribution. The regulation of the method of financing political parties is also necessary in the legal order to prevent the existence of such entities, which would focus primarily on obtaining state contributions without real influence on political life in the Czech Republic. The Chamber of Deputies concluded that the whole draft of the political movement of the Independent Association was based on a simplified thesis - which essentially has nothing to do with Article 22 of the Charter - that without the existence of financial collateral for all parties and the movement by the State, it cannot be talked about their free and free competition.

The Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, signed by its President, Dr. Petr Pithart, stated in particular that, for the present proceedings on the application for annulment of Paragraph 20 of Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll., the most important negotiations on the draft Act No. 170 / 2001 Coll., on the State bond programme to cover liabilities arising from the Treaty between the Government of the Czech Republic, the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the termination of mutual settlement in transferable rubles and the settlement of mutual liabilities and claims incurred as a balance in the Transferable rubles in favour of the Federal Republic of Germany, on the amendment of Act No. 407 / 2000 Coll., on the State bond programme for partial damages to agricultural operators affected by suche in 2000, and on the amendment of Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll. the proposal included, inter alia, a new legal solution to the state contribution to the activities of political parties and movement in response to the finding of the Constitutional Court published under No. 98 / 2001 Coll., in which the Constitutional Court annulled part of the provisions of § 20 paragraphs 4 and 7 of Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll. Once approved by the Chamber of Deputies, the bill was passed to the Senate. Already in the negotiations on the draft law in the committees it was noted that this amendment to Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll. was unsystemically attached to the material relating to the state bond programme, where the delay in its approval could have an adverse economic and political impact. The Senate Constitutional Committee therefore recommended that the bill be returned to the Chamber of Deputies with an amendment which limited the validity of the proposed amendment only to the end of 2001. The intention was to create sufficient time for Parliament to be able, in the meantime, with knowledge of the conclusions contained in the Constitutional Court's finding, to prepare an amendment to the financing of political parties, which would deal with the matter in a comprehensive manner, including a contribution to the electoral costs provided for in Section 85 of the Election Act to the Parliament of the Czech Republic. On the contrary, another committee, which was ordered - the Committee on Economic, Agriculture and Transport - recommended the Senate not to deal with the proposal, particularly in view of the gravity and timeliness of the existence of legislation on the government bond programme. Finally, the Senate expressed the will not to deal with the bill. The opinion of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic is concluded by stating that it leaves the decision on the constitutionality of the contested legal provisions to the consideration of the Constitutional Court.

The opinion of the Ministry of the Interior, which was also requested by the Constitutional Court on the case, briefly states that the contested law does not infringe in any way the equal conditions of free competition between political parties within the meaning of Article 5 of the Constitution and Article 22 of the Charter; the success of political entities is decided primarily by voters' votes and not by financial contributions from the state. The Ministry stated that the complainant's reservations concerned the scope of the legislation which was reflected in the law on the basis of a proposal from Members, since the original wording of the provision in question only envisaged a State contribution to the remuneration for the election results.

The Constitutional Court always examines, first and foremost, whether all the procedural requirements required are met in order to be able to deal with the proposal to abolish the law or its individual provisions in a meritative manner. In the present case, it is clear from the submitted proposal that the appellant essentially seeks revision of the entire current system of financing of political parties not only at parliamentary level, but also at regional and municipal level, and that it does not only consider the comprehensive provision of Section 20 of Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll., but also that in the justification of the proposal (not in its petition) it also objects to the adjustment of the contribution to the electoral costs under Act No. 247 / 1995 Coll., as amended. The same statement also applies to the content of the extensive presentation by the appellant at the oral hearing (which was also submitted to the Constitutional Court in writing). However, it follows from the contested letter of 9 December 2002 of the Ministry of Finance No 143 / 133437 / 2002 that the Ministry refused to pay a permanent contribution to the appellant by reference to the provisions of § 20 (4) and (6) of Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll., which attaches entitlement to a permanent contribution to those parties who received 3% of the votes in the elections to the Chamber of Deputies. The other provisions under appeal, i.e. paragraphs 1 to 3, 5, 7 to 11 of Section 20, were therefore not directly applied in any proceedings prior to the lodging of a constitutional complaint, so that the conditions under which the application for annulment of the law (Section 74 of the Constitutional Court Act) can be lodged are not met. The Constitutional Court therefore had no choice but to reject the proposal as an application made by a person manifestly unjustified [Paragraph 43 (1) (c) of the Constitutional Court Act], which also concerns an alternative proposal to abolish the entire provision of Paragraph 20 of the Law in question.

The Constitutional Court, in accordance with Article 68 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, also dealt with the question of whether a law, the unconstitutional nature of which is contested, was adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution laid down by competence and by a constitutional procedure.

With regard to Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll. (in its original version), the Constitutional Court did not establish whether it had been adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution by the established competence and by the constitutionally prescribed manner, since, for legislation issued before the Constitution of the Czech Republic came into force, it was entitled to review only their content compliance with the current constitutional order, but not the constitutionality of the procedure of their formation and observance of the standard powers (cf. In the present case, the Constitutional Court therefore concentrated on the amendment to Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll., which concerned the contested provision § 20.

It was Act No. 117 / 1994 Coll., amending and supplementing Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll., on association in political parties and political movements, as amended, Act No. 99 / 1963 Coll., on the Civil Code, as amended, supplements Act No. 166 / 1993 Coll., on the Supreme Audit Office, as amended by Act No. 331 / 1993 Coll., and Act No. 328 / 1991 Coll., on bankruptcy and settlement, as amended, as amended, Act No. 122 / 1993 Coll., and amending Act No. 563 / 1991 Coll., on Accounting, which introduced a 3% threshold for a permanent contribution in elections to the Chamber of Deputies. In this regard, the Constitutional Court found that the Chamber of Deputies approved the draft of this Act at its meeting on 29 April 1994 from the relevant Parliament's press, shorthand reports and voting data. After the signature of the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister, the law was duly declared in the Collection of Laws in the amount of 37 under the number 117 / 1994 Coll. Thus, the law in question was adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution laid down by competence and in a constitutional manner.

In its previous case-law, the Constitutional Court has made a fundamental statement on the constitutional courts of democratic forming of Parliament. In the relevant context, the finding of the sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 25 / 96 (Collection of finds and resolutions of the Constitutional Court, Volume 7, Found No 37; published under No. 88 / 1997 Coll.), which assessed the constitutionality of the so-called closing clause for elections to the Chamber of Deputies. The Court of First Instance defined a fundamental framework for the application of the elements integrating the political arrangements of the Chamber of Deputies in a proportional electoral system: "In terms of the principle of representative democracy, it is permissible to include in the electoral mechanism itself certain integration stimuli where there are serious reasons for doing so, in particular provided that an unlimited proportional system separates the votes between a large number of political parties, the unrivalled, the overgrowth of political parties, thereby endangering the functionality and the ability of action, as well as the continuity of the parliamentary system." In assessing the limits on the acceptability of integration stimuli, the Constitutional Court consistently relied on the principle of proportionality: "However, increasing the limit clause must not jeopardise the democratic substance of elections. It is also always necessary to measure whether this restriction on the equality of electoral law is the minimum measure necessary for the majority needed to form in the House to take decisions and to form a government. Therefore, the principle of minimising State intervention in relation to the objective set also applies to the limitation clause. '

The above legal opinion was then confirmed by other decisions, in particular the finding of the sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 42 / 2000 (Collection of finds and orders of the Constitutional Court, Volume 21, Found No 16; published under No 64 / 2001 Coll.).

The fundamental feature of a democratic pluralistic political system is not only pluralism itself, but also the openness of the system, i.e. the possibility of new players entering the political scene, the possibility of establishing political parties and political movements, i.e. the free and voluntary creation and free competition of political parties (Article 5 of the Constitution, Article 20 of the Charter, Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll.). Real, i.e. not only fictitious, the openness of a pluralistic political system is then linked, among other things, to the creation of an adequate system of funding for political parties and movements.

To form such a system, a number of bail-outs emerge from constitutional order. The Constitutional Court has interpreted these coutels in many of its decisions.

In the judgment in Case 26 / 94 Pl. ÚS 26 / 94 (Collection of finds and orders of the Constitutional Court, Volume 4, Found No 62; published under No. 296 / 1995 Coll.) defined the most general principles in this connection. Although, in constitutional order, there is no support for the principle of refusal by the State of financial support for political parties, "this does not mean that the funding of political parties and political movements by the State has no limits... the financial support of political parties and of the movement must not exceed the measure respecting the general border of Article 20 (4) of the Charter, according to which political parties and political movements are separated from the State."

He then interpreted these boundaries from the perspective of two principles: the principle of integration and the principle of representativeness [which was formulated in the find sp. zn. However, it also contains a requirement for the minimum representativeness of the subjects (political parties and movements) involved in the political competition. '] In the find sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 30 / 98 The Constitutional Court annulled the condition of at least 3% of the total number of valid votes obtained in the elections to the Chamber of Deputies for the purpose of contributing to the payment of electoral costs, and gave priority to the other in matters of State funding for political parties in conflict of the principle of integration and pluralism of democratic society (Article 5 of the Constitution and Article 22 of the Charter). The criterion for limiting the contribution to the cost of voting was then formulated by the point of view of "the seriousness of the efforts of the competing parties' or" the seriousness of the party's electoral intentions', which expressed their degree of representativeness. The legal opinion expressed in this way was subsequently confirmed in the find of the sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 42 / 2000.

The Constitutional Court has then directly assessed the constitutionality of the part of the existing text of Paragraph 20 (4) of the Law on political parties, namely the amendment of the provision according to which the party which has already been entitled to a permanent contribution but does not exceed the closing clause for entering the Chamber of Deputies laid down by the Election Act. The Court therefore considered it contradictory to the constitutional order of making the provision of a permanent contribution to a political party (movement) conditional on the conclusion of a clause in the subsequent elections. In other words, the openness of the political system was linked to a consistently lower limit for the provision of the contribution than the statutory and already mentioned finding of the Constitutional Court as a constitutionally conformal, confirmed limit of the closing clause. Since the 3% threshold was not contested in the present case, it was not dealt with by the court in the context of the rationis decidendi, but it did not dispute its amount or any consideration of the obiter dictum.

The contradiction of the provisions of § 20 paragraphs 4 and 6 of Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll. with the constitutional order concerning the establishment of a threshold of 3% in the elections to the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Parliament of the submitted valid votes for the payment of a permanent contribution to political parties is, in the view of the appellant, given its unjustified amount, as well as the unfounded inference of a permanent contribution only from the outcome of the elections to the Chamber of Deputies, as the legislative power is represented by a Parliament composed of two chambers - the Chamber of Deputies and Senate.

The basic criterion of constitutional conformity of setting a minimum threshold for the payment of a permanent contribution to the political party's activities is to ensure the openness of the political system - this threshold must therefore be significantly lower than the closure clause of a proportionate system.

The funding of political parties by the State covers only part of the income of political parties (§ 17 (4) of Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll.). This section is represented by a contribution to the payment of electoral costs (§ 85 of Act No. 247 / 1995 Coll., as amended, § 65 of Act No. 62 / 2003 Coll., on elections to the European Parliament and amending certain laws) and a contribution to the activity of a political party, which then includes a permanent contribution and a contribution to the mandate (§ 20 of Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll.). There is also indirect funding for parliamentary political parties, in the form of payment of parliamentary compensation, support for parliamentary clubs of the parties, free provision of material resources for parliamentary clubs of the parties, etc.

The purpose of State funding for political parties is to promote equality of opportunity to participate in a pluralistic democratic political system. The different forms of this funding pursue different purposes, i.e. promote different activities of the parties. The objective of the remuneration of electoral costs is to enable political parties fulfilling the condition of "the seriousness of the efforts of the competing parties' or" the seriousness of the electoral intentions of the parties' to participate in the electoral competition. If the Constitutional Court saw, in the decision sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 30 / 98, the limit of that "seriousness" in profit "of around 1%" of the total number of votes in force, the legislator set in the legislation in force a threshold of 1,5%. The mandate contribution reflects the tasks of political parties related to their legislative activities. It is subject to the election in elections to the Chamber of Deputies or to the Senate (§ 20 (5) of Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll.), i.e. it only affects the political parties of the Parliament.

The permanent contribution is a form of funding for both parliamentary and non-parliamentary political parties. For this reason, it is subject to constitutional conformity to ensure the openness of a pluralistic political system, so the limits for its provision must be significantly lower than the level of the closure clause of a proportional electoral system. Such a significantly lower limit can be considered as a 3% threshold in the elections of valid votes, i.e. a 40% threshold below the closing clause. If the legal regulation of the permanent contribution complies with the constitutional requirement to guarantee the openness of the political system, then given the different function of the permanent contribution to the activity and reimbursement of the electoral costs of the political parties, there is no reason for the equivalence of their amount.

That finding does not alter the general position of the Constitutional Court on the constitutionality of the entire system of financing of political parties as set out in the sp. zn. The Court stated: "If the free competition of political parties is not respected under balanced conditions and if there is an effort to create different conditions for parties large or larger and thus to shape directly or indirectly political parties with a better or worse status and therefore citizens with different conditions of movement in the political system, such action cannot be regarded as constitutional. It cannot be forgotten that democratic society is characterised by the free competition of political parties whose public governance activities derive from the free choice made by voters." The maximum equality of political parties, ensuring their freedom and fair competition, as well as the openness of the political system, was measured by the Constitutional Court by the value of the seriousness of the parties' electoral intentions, "measured 'by their minimum representativeness (sp. zn.

In its decisions, the Constitutional Court indicated an aspect of the measurement of the proportion of the State funding of political parties and the proportion of other forms of their financing independent of the State (sp. zn. In its decision to derogate from the principle of State-by-State separation (Article 20 (4) of the Charter), Mr Pl. ÚS 53 / 2000 took a critical position on the current level of state financial support to political parties and pointed out that the constitutional principle of separation between parties from the State was threatened.

According to the settled view of the Constitutional Court, when deciding on the scope of the application, that court is bound by its decision (ultra petitum) and cannot step forward from its borders (see, for example, the judgment in the case sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 16 / 94, sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 8 / 95, sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 5 / 01, sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 7 / 03 - Collection of finds and resolutions of the Constitutional Court, Volume 2, Resolution No 14; Volume 4, Found No. 83, No. 29 / 1996 Coll.; Volume 24, Found No. 410 / 2001 Coll.; published in Volume 34, published under Volume 512 / 2004 Coll.). For this reason, in the case at hand, it is not entitled to deal with the constitutionality of the entire system of state financing of political parties and, therefore, it has no choice but to appeal to the democratic legislator in the direction of the acceptance of the legal opinion contained in the above-mentioned findings, Pl. ÚS 26 / 94 and Pl. ÚS 53 / 2000.

However, the reduction in the threshold for providing a permanent contribution to the activities of political parties below the 3% threshold in the votes obtained does not only address the problem, but rather extends the scope of the addressees of that contribution and, in its consequences, implies a further increase in the state's participation in the financing of political parties, a shift in the direction that the Constitutional Court did not agree with in previous case-law. In addition to increasing the requirements for the state budget, such a shift would be contrary to the principle of the integrity of political parties in civil society, a principle that finds expression, in particular, in the voluntary support of political parties by citizens, on the basis of their discretion and choice according to the programme proximity of the parties.

If the appellant argues that it is unwarranted to derive a permanent contribution only from the outcome of the elections to the Chamber of Deputies, such an arrangement could only be regarded as constitutionally contradictory in the case of its insolence, i.e. the absence of a rational link between the legislation and the purpose pursued.

Neither the constitutional order of the Czech Republic nor its legal order contains an explicit legal definition of a political party (political movement). The constitutional nature, the nature of legal personality, the meaning and purpose of the political party must therefore be derived from its overall constitutional and general legislation.

Political parties are a key body of a democratic pluralistic political system, acting as a representative of pluralistic, differentiated interests. Their aim is to achieve these interests by means of a democratic constitutional system, i.e. representation in the representative corps, in particular in Parliament, as well as representatives of the municipalities and regions (Article 5 of the Constitution, Article 20 (2) and Article 22 of the Charter, Act No. 247 / 1995 Coll., as amended, Act No. 491 / 2001 Coll., on elections to municipal councils and on amendments to certain laws, as amended, Act No. 130 / 2000 Coll., on regional councils and on amendments to certain laws, as amended). It follows that the Czech constitutional and legal system does not know a special category of regional political parties; it combines their functioning with the formation of all representative bodies.

According to the constitutional system of the Czech Republic, both chambers of Parliament do not have the same powers and do not participate in the same degree of the legislative process, so they do not have a symmetrical position. The Chamber of Deputies exclusively protects the government and expresses its mistrust; in the field of legislative competence, it generally has final decision-making powers. In relation to the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate has the status of a control brake, a counterweight. If the legislation derives from the granting of a permanent contribution to action from the results of elections to the Chamber of Deputies, it reflects the real position of a political party in the constitutional system of the state, in particular its participation rate, or potential participation by non-parliamentary parties in legislative powers, as well as the formation of the executive authority. Unless further reference is made to the results of the elections to municipal or regional councils, this adjustment reflects the conceptual characteristics of the political party (movement) in the importance of a nationwide and not only a regionally relevant political entity.

For these circumstances, the Constitutional Court did not find a legal amendment of 3% of the limit in the elections to the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic obtained by valid votes when granting a permanent contribution to the activity of a political party, contained in the provisions of § 20 paragraphs 4 and 6 of Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll., in breach of Article 5 of the Constitution and Article 20 (2) and Article 22 of the Charter, therefore rejected the proposal to repeal those legal provisions.