The Constitutional Court found no 84 / 1999 Coll.

The Constitutional Court's finding of 13 November 1997 on a constitutional complaint against the Supreme Court resolution of 20 August 1997 sp. zn. 2 Tvno 33 / 97 and the Supreme Court in Prague of 25 July 1997 sp. zn. 4 Ntv 28 / 97 concerning the extension of the detention

Valid The Constitutional Tribunal found
Text versions: 11.05.1999
84
FIND
The Constitutional Court
On behalf of the Czech Republic
The III Chamber of the Constitutional Court decided on 13 November 1997 on a constitutional complaint against the resolution of the Supreme Court of 20 August 1997 sp. zn. 2 Tvno 33 / 97 and the Supreme Court of Prague of 25 July 1997 sp. zn. 4 Ntv 28 / 97 on the extension of the binding as follows:
1. The Resolution of the Supreme Court of 20 August 1997, sp. zn. 2 Tvno 33 / 97, is hereby repealed.
2. The complainant's proposal to repeal the order of the Supreme Court in Prague of 25 July 1997 sp. zn. 4 Ntv 28 / 97 is rejected.
3. The position of the intervener is not admitted by J. Ch., no. Binding prison in České Budějovice.
Justification
(legal opinions expressed in a finding of general scope)
1. Pursuant to Article 8 (5) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, no one may be brought into custody except for the reasons and for the period laid down by law and by decision of the court. From that constitutional maximum, in conjunction with the legal condition for the duration of the binding only at the strictly necessary time, as well as in conjunction with the view of the Constitutional Court expressed in the case sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 4 / 94 (No 214 / 1994 Coll.), the timing of the binding or its extension in a particular case must also be specified and cannot result directly from the law, after due justification. The period laid down by law under that provision of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms constitutes the maximum legal limit of the duration of the detention (and therefore the restriction of personal freedom), but, in any event, the finding of the validity of the detention in a judicial decision is not an automatic definition of its duration. It is the duty of the courts to determine the duration of the detention or the extension of detention in a particular case. In this context, the Constitutional Court reiterates the fact that, when deciding to extend the term of custody, other than the existence of a legal detention ground, it is necessary to establish serious reasons for which the procedure could not be terminated within the time limit, and therefore the decision to extend the term of custody is a process to which higher requirements must be imposed than to decide on detention. For this reason, it is the duty of the courts to refer the case back to the public prosecutor and the related extension of the custody specifically to address the possible involvement of the defendant in his fundamental right arising from Article 38 (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, in conjunction with Article 8 (5) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, i.e. to address the question of the extent to which further extension of the detention may be justified, other than the existence of detention grounds, as well as the removal of serious defects in the preparatory proceedings [§ 188 (1) (e) of the Code]. In other words, to what extent a serious misconduct of the State can justify the continued duration of such a serious restriction on personal freedom as a link.
2. When the case is referred back to the court, it does not start a new preparatory procedure, but it goes back to the state of the preparatory procedure (Section 191 (2) of the Criminal Code). As the case goes back to the state of the preparatory procedure and does not start a new preparatory procedure, it follows that also in the case of the continued duration of the detention (which is decided in a binding manner in the case of a preliminary hearing of the prosecution - Paragraph 192 of the Penal Code), there is no doubt that the restriction of personal freedom which does not begin at the moment but continues at the stage of the preparatory procedure. For this reason, it is covered by the time-limit resulting from the relevant decisions of the courts on taking custody, or the extension of custody, in relation to the initial restriction of personal freedom. Where, in the context of the return of a case to the preparatory procedure, the courts have to examine the ways in which the preparatory procedure needs to be completed and which facts need to be clarified, or what actions need to be carried out (Article 191 (1) of the Criminal Code) and, in the case of detention, the continuation of the detention procedure is not possible from the point of view of Article 8 (5) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and Article 71 (2) of the Criminal Code without the concrete establishment of the necessary period of detention.
President of the III Chamber of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr. Holländer v. r.

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Regulation Information

CitationFound by the Constitutional Court No. 84 / 1999 Coll., concerning a constitutional complaint against the resolution of the Supreme Court of 20 August 1997 sp. zn. 2 Tvno 33 / 97 and the Supreme Court of Prague of 25 July 1997 sp. zn. 4 Ntv 28 / 97 on the extension of the detention
Regulation TypeThe Constitutional Tribunal found
Author-
CollectionCode of Laws
Date of Promulgation11.05.1999
Effective from-
Effective until-
Status Valid
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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