What is The Constitutional Court found No 81 / 2021 Coll.?

The Constitutional Court found No 81 / 2021 Coll., on the application for annulment of Section 16 paragraph 1 of Act No. 229 / 1991 Coll., on the modification of property relations with land and other agricultural property, as amended — The Constitutional Court found of 12 January 2021 sp. zn..

When it became The Constitutional Court found No 81 / 2021 Coll. effectiveness?

The Constitutional Court found No 81 / 2021 Coll. became effective date not available.

Is The Constitutional Court found No 81 / 2021 Coll. still valid?

Yes, The Constitutional Court found No 81 / 2021 Coll. is still valid and effective.

The Constitutional Court found No 81 / 2021 Coll.

The Constitutional Court found of 12 January 2021 sp. zn.

Valid The Constitutional Tribunal found

Text versions: 23.02.2021

I. II. „§ 16 § 28a III. IV. IV.a IV.b IV.c IV.d IV.e IV.f IV.g V. VI. VII. VII.a VII.a/1 VII.a/2 VII.a/3 VII.b VIII.

FIND

The Constitutional Court

On behalf of the Republic

On 12 January 2021, the Constitutional Court decided under point Pl.

as follows:

Motion denied.

Reasons

I.

Definition of the case

1. On 22 October 2019, the Constitutional Court received the application of the Supreme Court, for which the President of Chamber 28 Cdo JUDr. Jan Eliáš, Ph.D. (hereinafter referred to as "the applicant ') to abolish Article 16 (1) of Act No. 229 / 1991 Coll., on the treatment of property relations with land and other agricultural property, as amended (hereinafter referred to as" the Land Act'), in the words "laid down in accordance with § 28a '(hereinafter referred to as" the contested provision'). The Supreme Court is in charge of the appeal proceedings against part I of the judgment of the Municipal Court in Prague ("the Municipal Court ') of 3.11.2017 No. 69 Co. 279 / 2017- 103, which confirmed the judgment of the District Court for Prague 3 (" the Circumstantial Court') of 3.11.2017 No. 4 C 100 / 2016- 64, imposed by the Czech Republic - State Land Office ("the Office '), in the procedural capacity of the defendant, to pay the applicant, Ing. Zdeňka Bartošk (" the Prosecutor'), in the amount of CZK 44 083 680, with a financial compensation for the property withdrawn and not paid for the land under Paragraph 16 of the Land; the rest of the case was dismissed.

2. The Circuit Court concluded that the claimant is the holder of a restitution claim under the Land Act for which he has already received partial transactions in the form of replacement land. The extent of the still unsatisfied part of this claim was determined by the court on the basis that all the land withdrawn from the applicant's legal predecessors was of a construction nature at the time of the transfer to the State. When quantifying their value, the Court derogated from Decree No. 182 / 1988 Coll., on the prices of buildings, land, permanent crops, remuneration for the establishment of the right of personal land use and compensation for temporary land use, as amended by Decree No. 316 / 1990 Coll. (Decree No. 182 / 1988 Coll., as amended by Decree No. 316 / 1990 Coll., hereinafter referred to as "the Order '), according to which it provided for the calculation of Paragraph 28a of the Land Act, since it considered, in the spirit of the Constitutional Court's review case, the compensation provided for under that regulation to be unduly low. The Court therefore came from the present value of the land valued by the expert on the basis of Decree No. 441 / 2013 Coll., to implement the law on the valuation of assets (the valuation decree), as effective at the time of the court's decision. If the legislature was based on an effective pricing regulation when the Land Act was drawn up, it should have been logical to rely on a valuation decree to determine the amount of the compensation, the amount of which had been modified in relation to the text of the relevant legislation.

3. After the application of the Circular Court procedure by the Municipal Court, the Office, in its request to the Supreme Court, referred the question of the possibility of deviating from the provisions of Sections 16 (1) and 28 (a) of the Land Act, in accordance with which the land which is not issued under this Law and for which no other land can be granted, is subject to compensation in cash in accordance with the Order.

4. The Supreme Court is faced with the question of how to deal with a situation in which, according to the case law of the Constitutional Court, the interpretation of the Land Act is that the determination of the amount of compensation is merely an infringement of Articles 11 (1) and 36 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as "the Charter '), but the text of the Law itself does not give room for determining the amount of compensation exceeding the quantification under the Decree.

II.

Text of relevant provisions of the Soil Act, including the contested provision

5. The Supreme Court concluded that, in accordance with the constitutional procedure of dealing with the above situation, the annulment of that part of Paragraph 16 (1) of the Soil Act, which refers to the determination of the amount of compensation under Section 28a of the same Act and thus to the quantification under the Decree. The key provisions of the Soil Act (with the contested provision marked in bold) are:

„§ 16

(1) For land not issued under this Act and for which no other land can be granted, a cash refund equal to the price of the withdrawn land determined in accordance with § 28a, unless otherwise provided for in this Act (§ 14 (8)) shall apply. [...]

§ 28a

Save as otherwise provided in this Act, refunds under this Act shall be granted at the prices in force on 24 June 1991, for goods immovable at prices under Decree No. 182 / 1988 Coll., as amended by Decree No. 316 / 1990 Coll., and for goods movable at residual accounting prices, for goods movable at zero residual cost of 10% of the purchase price. '

III.

Arguments of the appellant

6. When the Constitutional Court, in its decision of 18 July 2017, sp. zn. II. ÚS 4139 / 16 (N 129 / 86 SbNU 205), concluded that the financial compensation paid under the Land Act could be increased accordingly, it raised the outstanding issues, according to the Supreme Court, in particular: how to achieve the proportionality of the compensation; whether another price regulation is to be the basis for its determination; whether an unequal position is established between beneficiaries who have received compensation according to the literal interpretation of Section 28a of the Soil Act and those to whom compensation should be granted according to current prices.

7. First of all, the Supreme Court considers that the simple wording of the above-mentioned provisions of the Land Act does not allow for the conclusion of a claim for compensation exceeding the valuation laid down in the Decree. The right to compensation exceeding the valuation on the date of application of the Soil Act is possible not by interpretation, but by the judicial completion of the legislation, namely by the use of analogy, i.e. by the construction of a standard establishing a claim for cash performance by a praeter legem ("besides the law '). The Supreme Court is aware that modern legal methodology generally admits such a process of judicial completion. Therefore, even though it does not have the right to compensation in a constitutionally consistent level of support, as set out in Sections 16 (1) and 28 (a) of the Soil Act, even in the broadest possible language interpretation, this is not an insurmountable obstacle to the completion of relevant standards in the interests of constitutionally protected values.

8. According to the Supreme Court, however, it cannot be overlooked that the judgment is too broad for the amount of the cash compensation. The lack of legal determination of the calculation of a fair refund results in a significant variation in the judicial practice of granting amounts to beneficiaries. The Supreme Court admits that, over time, the case-law of the Supreme Courts will perhaps be able to define the desirable interval within which the compensation granted should move. He believes, however, that such a definition is not a judicial power, but a legislative one. The implementation of property restitutions is a good thing for the State, but the courts do not have a reliable legal instrument leading to a sufficiently specific outcome when assessing claims going beyond § 28a of the Land Act. The repeal of the contested provision would not remove the difficulty of finding itself outside the area of law, but could be an incentive for legislators to try to grasp the problem in a new, constitutionally consistent way.

9. The application for annulment of the contested provision was brought by the Supreme Court to maintain the consistency of the case law in restitution cases. The creation of restitution facts, the determination of the extent of the issue of property and the provision of compensation for property not issued are to be the supranational tasks of legislative (possibly executive), not a judicial one, which is not to exceed the statutory limits of the relief of property injustices, to change the scope of the property issued and to adapt the political representation of the chosen concept of rectification of property injustices to own ideas of the desired level of compensation. The above-mentioned completion procedure in this case is contrary to the principle of consistent respect for the legal limits of the restitution process. In the event of the annulment of the contested provision, the beneficiaries would be entitled to compensation equal to the "price of the land withdrawn 'without limitation by the amounts resulting from the price regulation in force on 24 June 1991.

10. Furthermore, the Supreme Court was led to a draft of the facts also found in the finding of 19 June 2018 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 35 / 17 (N 112 / 89 SbNU 655; 135 / 2018 Coll.), namely that if the Authority is not forced to implement an enforceable judicial decision on the case-law of the land valuation procedure, it is likely that it is not entitled to "voluntarily" adequate financial compensation for the beneficiaries in force. However strict procedure under the applicable wording of the contested provision and Section 28a of the Land Act may be found to be constitutionally unsustainable, it is, of course, entirely apparent from its text. Although the situation in which the Office provides compensation at a constitutional level only after a final judicial decision to do so is, on the one hand, understandable, is at the same time unfair to the beneficiaries, who are forced to spend time and resources to conduct a dispute with a State which could be avoided. The situation also bursts the judicial system with a large number of cases that could be dealt with out of court in a constitutional context.

IV.

Proceedings before the Constitutional Court

11. The Judge-Rapporteur referred to in Article 42 (4), in conjunction with Article 69 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as "the Law on the Constitutional Court"), sent a motion for observations to Parliament's chambers, and to the Government and the Ombudsman as the authorities entitled to intervene as interveners, and in view of the subject matter of the proceedings also to the Office.

IV.a

Observations of the Chamber of Deputies

12. The Chamber of Deputies has limited itself to a brief summary of the legislative process of adoption and amendment of the contested provision (see paragraph 44 below).

IV.b

Statement by the Senate

13. In its observations, the Senate stated that it had not yet been established for the matter at the time of the creation of the Soil Act and at the time of its relevant amendment, so that it could not inform the progress of the legislative process. However, the amount of the cash compensation for land not issued under the Land Act and for which no other land can be granted was discussed in the Senate in the context of the so-called second restitution period, which was inserted into the Land Act by Act No. 185 / 2016 Coll.

14. In the general debate, Senator Veronica Vrecion expressed an understanding for the need for a so-called restitution dot, but refused to take place in a situation where the land is valued at 1990 prices. The senator said that the outstanding beneficiaries should be compensated at today's prices. Although, as the then Minister for Agriculture, Marian Jurečka pointed out, the indexation of cash compensation to the current market value of the land would lead to inequality between the new restituents and restituents to which the cash compensation was paid in the past according to the prices set for 1991.

15. Senator JUDr. Eliška Wagner, Ph.D. marked the intention to pay for the land which was not compensated for by the replacement land, the cash compensation calculated according to the 1991 prices as an outrage. In this context, it referred to the contradiction of this intention with the case law of both the Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR ') and recalled that it referred to the Land Act because there were no market prices at the time. Since there is a market today, there is no reason why prices for the land withdrawn should not be close to market prices.

16. In conclusion, the Senate stated that "it is entirely up to the Constitutional Court to examine the constitutionality of the draft contested provisions."

IV.c

Observation by the intervener

17. The Government, as an intervener, expressed itself through the Minister of Justice, Mgr. Marie Benešová, in such a way that the application for annulment of the contested provision should be rejected, in particular in order to give priority to its constitutionally consistent interpretation, including by a praeter legem. The Government recalled certain parts of the finding, sp. zn. II. ÚS 4139 / 16, on the basis of which it concluded that it could not stand the alleged ground for the annulment of the contested provision - the language limits of the contested regulation, excluding a constitutionally consistent interpretation. This interpretation, according to the Government, does not constitute a breach of the legal limit on the mitigation of property injustices, nor a modification of the scope of the property issued, nor an adaptation by the legislator of the chosen concept of rectification of property injustices to its own ideas of the desired level of compensation. The new, unforeseen restitution facts are not constructed, but only the legal rules are interpreted.

18. According to the Government, the Constitutional Court, in its decision of 23 April 2013 in sp. zn. In order to maintain the consistency of the case law, it is not necessary to amend the Soil Act, as the Constitutional Court has already laid down the scope for individual access by courts to assess restitution claims in the form of cash compensation. The individual approach is designed to take into account the circumstances of the case, including the restituent procedure. Contrary to any increase in compensation or market price determination, it appears less burdensome for the state budget in terms of the cost of settling the remaining claims.

19. In addition, the Government pointed out that, following hypothetical depreciation, the use of Paragraph 16 (1) of the Soil Act would be crucial for determining "the amount of the value of the land withdrawn '. However, it would not be clear at what point the price should be assessed - whether on the date of the transfer to the State, the grant of a restitution claim or the exercise of the right to financial compensation at the Office, or the judgment of the court. Therefore, the level of compensation itself would not be evident. The initial refund values would be removed, which would make it impossible to adapt them to a reasonable and fair level. Nor would the possible abolition of the contested provision provide clear guidance for determining the amount of compensation left to the discretion of the person who decides on the refund. Although the plenary decision of the Constitutional Court or subsequent findings could specify other criteria for determining the amount of compensation, there would be no fundamental change in the current situation, which is characterised precisely by the caselaw of the guideline. The Government does not agree with the appellant that, by abolishing the contested provision, the scope of the discrepancy would be narrowed as the relatively precise guidance for determining the amount of compensation would continue to be lacking. The principle of a full list of public powers requires the law to determine the aspects for decision-making and that the court should exercise discretion only in the exceptional cases provided for by law. It would hardly fulfil this principle, essentially, a blank rule of law, which leaves the determination of the relevant aspects for the decision-making of the executive bodies or courts. According to the Government, it cannot be omitted that the tension between the legal rules for determining the amount of compensation under the Land Act and the case law of the Constitutional Court is sufficiently obvious, but the legislator did not react, although it could.

20. It follows from the general nature of Section 28a of the Land Act, according to the Government, that even without an explicit reference to it, the compensation under Section 16 of the same Act would be granted at the level of the Decree, since neither the contested nor any other provision of the Law itself provides otherwise for such cases. The possible annulment of the contested provision is without prejudice to the application for annulment of Paragraph 28a of the Land Act.

21. The Government also considers that an adequate compensation for the land not issued under the Land Act is meant to be a compensation derived from the prices under the Decree, increased accordingly in the light of certain criteria. However, these criteria derived from the case-law of the Constitutional Court cannot provide a reliable, generally applicable guidance, as their fulfilment is a matter for the general court to consider (or, at the first stage of the procedure, it is a matter for the Authority to consider). Even after the intervention of the Constitutional Court, the amount of compensation would remain uncertain. It would be possible to consider the current price of the usual (market), which, according to the case law of the Constitutional Court, is not necessarily granted.

22. According to the Government, the impact of possible compliance with the proposal would be minimal in relation to the number of restitution claims outstanding as against the total number of restituents. Uncompleted legal proceedings allegedly cover a maximum of hundreds of persons. Authorised persons whose outstanding claim amounts to more than CZK 1 million (97 persons in 2018) are often seeking a transfer of lucrative land in court (that is why they do not participate in public tenders). The total number of restituents includes 139 279 persons, of whom for the vast majority the claims have been settled. According to the Government, the potential deregation intervention of the Constitutional Court would create an unequal status of beneficiaries who have received compensation under the literal interpretation of § 28a of the Land Act or under the current judicial interpretation and those to whom compensation should be paid at the level of current prices. Paradoxically, for example, those who did not participate in public tenders by choice would be favoured. The Government pointed out the view of the ESLP that previous injustices should be mitigated without causing new undue injustices. However, should the removal of the contested provision result in a certain, albeit minimal, part of the beneficiaries being favoured by restituents whose claims have been settled under the current legislation, they could rightly feel another unjustified wrong. The possible abolition of the reference to § 28a of the Land Act would not lead to a reduction in the judicial idea of restitution cases, since neither the Office nor the courts would be given more clear guidance to determine the amount of compensation. On the contrary, there would be an increase in disputes over the increase of compensation granted to date under the new rules.

23. The Government pointed out that restitution laws should not only lay down conditions for partial removal of past damage to the rights of individuals, but should also take into account the existence of others in conflict of standing interests. In addition, it referred to the ECHR case-law that, in cases relating to the disposal of assets, anyone who has been deprived of his property must in principle be able to obtain a reasonable compensation equivalent to his value, but legitimate public interest objectives may require less than the full market price (recital 53 to the judgment of 5 November 2002 in Pinco and Pinc v Czech Republic, No 36548 / 97). The annulment of the contested provision would be against this public interest and the disproportionate burden on the state budget, which would therefore have a long-term effect on the Czech Republic's indebtedness and economy, as legislation would allow for close-to-short financial settlement if the proposal was granted.

24. In addition, the Government pointed out that, because of the link between the legislation of the Land Act and Act No. 87 / 1991 Coll., on extrajudicial rehabilitation, as amended, ("the Law on extrajudicial rehabilitation ') [in particular following the finding of the Constitutional Court of 13 August 2015 sp. zn. In the reference case, the Constitutional Court discussed the assessment of the case by the Supreme Court in a procedure in which the determination of the compensation for the property was made to a beneficiary under Paragraph 13 of the Law on extrajudicial rehabilitation as a result of obstacles to its publication. According to the Government, the Supreme Court addressed the conclusion of lower courts determining compensation at prices" (essentially) currently market'. The Constitutional Court rejected the constitutional complaint of the Czech Republic - Ministry of Finance.

IV.d

Communication from the Ombudsman

25. The Ombudsman has informed the Constitutional Court that she will not enter the proceedings.

IV.e

State Land Authority's observations

26. The Office proposed the rejection of the proposal. In addition to the observations made by the Government, it considers, in particular, that the Supreme Court is most likely to take action for an increasing number of actions to determine the amount of the financial compensation for the land not issued and the non-uniform procedure of the General Court in determining it and, at the same time, to remove the departure of the general courts from the legislation on the method of determining the amount of the financial compensation for the land not issued. The General Courts, which, when deciding on this type of action, deviate from the legal regulation, refer to the finding of the Constitutional Court, sp. zn. II. However, the Constitutional Court took only a general view of the procedure leading to the determination of the amount of the financial contribution as compensation of reasonable and reasonable, thereby creating scope for free interpretation for the general courts.

27. According to the Authority, the general courts have resigned from the assessment of the proportionality and rationality of the amount of the financial compensation and are normally based on proposals from beneficiaries which import the mechanism for determining the amount of compensation mainly from their own interests, not in view of the economic capacity and the reasonable burden on the company. The Appellate Courts then elect to increase the legal financial compensation, which, although based on price regulations, is no longer based on the effective date of the law as the operative date for the application of the price regulation. It shall be freely transferred by the courts of appeal at the due date of the financial compensation, which shall, however, be derived from the will of the beneficiary. The Authority considers that the courts have not yet addressed the issue of the design of the mechanism for determining adequate and reasonable financial compensation under Sections 16 (1) and 28a of the Soil Act. Although the courts are obliged to take into account the circumstances of the cases under consideration, it is appropriate to provide for a method of an appropriate increase in compensation which would not be discriminatory and would be applicable when the conditions for all restituents are met. If, in other cases, there are grounds for considering a reasonable increase in the financial compensation, then, according to the Authority, a method should be chosen in all similar cases, which will be non-discriminatory, fair, predictable and not be an unacceptable burden on the state budget.

28. Another question is whether or not the refund is to be increased on a flat-rate basis and on the basis of which criteria legal compensation is to be individually increased. For the assessment of this case, the principal determination of the operative text of the valuation regulation, which should be laid down in principle in all cases. To date, all financial compensation has been paid to the restituents at prices as at 24.6.1991. The legislature did not consider taking into account the length of the restitution process, not even the maturing period of the claim up to its maturity, nor the period during which the restituent is passively considering or actively attempting to satisfy his claim in a different form. According to the Authority, the link between the relevant moment and the legal power of the "restitution 'decision (or a judgment replacing the administrative decision) seems acceptable. This takes into account the rise in real estate prices during the administrative process, the speed of which is not normally dependent on the beneficiary and seems relatively fair to those who received financial compensation in historical prices already in the early 1990s.

29. The Authority contends that the previously compensated beneficiaries would, after the annulment of the contested provision, take account of the fact that the newly satisfied restituents claim multiple-higher compensation, i.e. at current prices. While the Office is currently paying financial compensation at administrative historical prices (because it is bound not only by the Land Act, but also by Act No. 219 / 2000 Coll., on the assets of the Czech Republic and its presentation in legal relations, as amended), those who can and want to claim the claim will be compensated at current prices which, according to the Office, may be higher by ten times. Such an increase in entitlement cannot be seen as fair and non-discriminatory. The purpose of the restitution legislature should be for everyone to receive the performance that has been derived from the same and predictable rules.

30. According to the Authority, due to the passage of time, there was an increase in the market value of the land and thus a decrease in the real value of the relay performance, which could generally be the reason for the increase in the compensation. However, it argues that the mere passage of time cannot justify a different approach to the restituents who are compensated by the Land Office at historical prices and those who turn to the court by an action for an appropriate increase in entitlement. Because they all have the same time, and they should be given the same performance. The Office is convinced that increasing restitution compensation in the manner chosen by the appellate courts does not result in the legislator's objective being met, nor does it lead to the second objective - helping to restore small businesses in agriculture; It is generally known that neither natural restitution led to this objective. On the contrary, the Authority considers that the chosen method of compensation can significantly affect the state budget and affect the debt and long-term management of the Czech Republic. The Court of First Instance found that the value of the compensation was increased between eight and thirty-seven times the value of the entitlement for natural restitution. The Authority points out that if the remaining claims increase in prices at their due date, they will increase multiple times and their total volume may represent an extreme burden on the state budget.

IV.f

Replication of the applicant

31. The Judge-Rapporteur sent the observations of the parties, the intervener and the Office to the appellant in his knowledge and, if appropriate, a reply.

32. The Supreme Court, having received the observations sent, has maintained its application. In its reply, it stated in particular that the Authority's argument partially supports the considerations in the application for annulment of the contested provision. If the Office contends that there is an inequality between eligible persons satisfied outside the courts and those willing to claim a claim before the courts, an appropriate compensation reflecting the evolution of market conditions could be paid when the application for annulment of the contested provision has been granted to the out-of-court restituents not yet satisfied.

33. The Supreme Court does not deny the validity of the claim that the abolition of the reference to Section 28a of the Land Act would not fully address the problem of the need to determine financial compensation at prices under the Decree. The Supreme Court also considered proposing the abolition of Paragraph 28a of the Land Act, but it did not consider it appropriate because it found its application in other cases, in particular in the issue of replacement land, where the fixation of the price of those land at 24 June 1991 was highly rational. The repeal of Paragraph 28a of the Land Act, without undue disruption to other functions that it fulfils, would be difficult, according to the Supreme Court, to implement. If the contested provision is annulled, the Supreme Court shall consider it sufficient. It may be considered that, if the Constitutional Court had complied with the application, the argument would have been given to the conclusion that Paragraph 16 (1) of the Soil Act, as amended after the derogation of the reference to § 28a of the same Law, constitutes a special provision in relation to § 28a; Therefore, it is in § 16 (1) that the law "provides otherwise" and the restriction of prices of June 1991 would not apply.

34. The Government's emphasis on the individual approach to satisfying restituent claims by means of a cash refund and taking into account the circumstances of the case into account appears to be "somewhat self-righteous' if the Office has stated that" it is currently paying financial compensation at administrative historical prices' because it is "bound by the Land Act '. It follows that there is no individual examination of individual cases outside the legal proceedings and that compensation under the Order is paid on a flat-rate basis. If the Government, as it seems, has accepted that the provision of compensation in prices under the Order is not constitutionally consistent, the Supreme Court assumes that in this spirit it will guide the administration under the authority of the Ministry of Agriculture. That is so that reasonable and proportionate compensation is also given to those who apply their right to compensation to the Office, not just to those who are willing to apply it in court.

35. The Supreme Court does not expect interpretation ambiguities to be removed from the proposed annulment of the contested provision; The courts would be forced to resolve them. Above all, initiatives should seize legislative and executive power. According to the Supreme Court in the past, the Constitutional Court has several times opted for the repeal of certain legislation in order to compel the legislator to re-modify the material, even though the derogation itself did not lead to the removal of the unconstitutional state [most importantly, it should have been found on 27 June 2001 sp. zn.

36. The objection to the potential inequality of beneficiaries in the event of annulment of the contested provision is not convincing, according to the Supreme Court, as the inequality already exists and results from the possibility of increasing the financial compensation as compared to the valuation under the Order. The annulment of the contested provision would not deepen the inequality, but would allow it at least partially to be removed by making the payment of compensation at the "decree" level inadmissible. The Supreme Court notes that those who managed to settle the restitution claim in the 1990s, for example, and those who are still waiting for compensation are not in the same position. The cash compensation under the Order was not fundamentally contrary to the value of the goods withdrawn in the 1990s, while it is now. The Government's objection is also to be odd that, by abolishing the contested provision, those who did not participate in public tenders could benefit. In public tenders, land with real market value is provided to eligible persons but is "undervalued" by a valuation according to the decree, according to which the restitution claims are valued (both withdrawn property and replacement land are thus valued according to the same price standards).

IV.g

Oral proceedings

37. In accordance with Article 44 of the Constitutional Court Act, the Constitutional Court decided without holding an oral hearing as it could not be expected to further clarify the case.

V.

Active procedural legitimacy and conditions of proceedings before the Constitutional Court

38. Pursuant to Article 64 (3) of the Constitutional Court Act, the Court is also entitled to file an application for annulment of the law or its individual provisions in the context of its decision-making activities under Article 95 (2) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution). According to this Article, if the Court concludes that the law to be applied in the resolution of the case is contrary to the constitutional order, it shall bring the matter before the Constitutional Court. That condition of the design authorisation is fulfilled if it is a law (its provision), the application of which is immediate and unavoidable in the present case and which simultaneously prevents the achievement of the desired (constitutionally consistent) result (see e.g. the findings of 3.11.2020 sp. zn.

39. The Supreme Court has brought an application for annulment of the contested provision because it considers that it is to be used in the appeal proceedings brought by it under sp. cdo. 28 Cdo. 3772 / 2018. The Constitutional Court has examined whether the Supreme Court fulfils the condition of active legitimacy, i.e. whether the contested provision is actually to be used in the proceedings before that Court.

40. The review of the proceedings before the Supreme Court shall include, inter alia, an assessment of the admissibility of the application by which the Office was challenged by the judgment of the Municipal Court confirming the judgment of the Circular Court. By the latter judgment, the Authority was required to pay a financial compensation to the beneficiary for the land withdrawn and not issued under the Land Act, at an amount set not under the Decree but in the spirit of the Constitutional Court's review case-law (see Section I of this Decision). The Office saw the admissibility of the appeal in breach of the judgment of the Municipal Court against certain decisions of the Supreme Court, according to which the financial compensation for the land withdrawn and not issued under the Land Act should have been determined in accordance with the Decree. The Supreme Court should therefore also examine the compliance of the question of determining the amount of the financial compensation with its decision-making practice, the legal basis of which is inter alia Article 16 (1) of the Soil Act. Therefore, the Supreme Court would examine the legal assessment of the case by the municipal court by taking the view of that provision.

41. In the event of the non-constitutional nature of the contested provision, the special assumption of valuation of the land under the Order would be waived as the applicable legal standard would cease to be in force on the basis of which the interpretation of the present valuation takes place. The assessment of the question of the method of determining the financial compensation for the land withdrawn (at least in accordance with the case law of the Supreme Court) was thus necessary and directly dependent on the application of the contested provision from which the practice of calculating the compensation was based at the time of the application. The Constitutional Court therefore concludes that the Supreme Court is actively legitimate in bringing an application for annulment of the contested provision.

42. The application submitted to the Constitutional Court in the case under title contains all the legal requirements required, is not inadmissible under Section 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll., and there is no reason to terminate the procedure under Section 67 of the Law. The Constitutional Court therefore assessed the proposal on the substance of the case.

VI.

Assessment of the competence and constitutional consistency of the procedure for the adoption of the contested provision

43. According to Article 68 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll., the assessment of the compliance of the Act with the constitutional order consists of answering three questions: firstly, whether it was accepted and issued within the limits of the Constitution by the established competence; Secondly, whether it was adopted in a constitutional manner; Third, whether its content complies with constitutional law.

44. Paragraph 16 (1) of the Soil Act first included the words "at prices according to § 28a" by Law 183 / 1993 Coll. first. Consequently, Paragraph 16 (1) was amended by Law No 178 / 2006 Coll. by making the wording "established pursuant to Paragraph 28a '. The Constitutional Court, in accordance with § 68 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll., first examined whether the Act No. 183 / 1993 Coll. and No. 178 / 2006 Coll., by which the contested provision was inserted into the Law on Soil, were adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution established competence and in a constitutional manner. In the case at hand, the Constitutional Court, on the basis of the observations of the parties and of publicly available parliamentary and senate information (https: / / www.psp.cz and https: / / www.senat.cz), found, and for short, that, for example, the finding of 24.11.2020 sp. zn. In this respect, no objections were raised by the applicant or any other party or intervener.

VII.

Own review

VII.a

General considerations

45. The contested provision was also constitutionally interpreted in the context of § 28a of the Land Act in the context of the Act on Soil. Therefore, the purpose of the current review of the contested provision is not to re-interpret the contested provision, but to assess whether its interpretation is no longer outside the constitutional limits, i.e. whether it is not necessary to derogate from it, or whether it is at all sufficient and not necessary to exclude it for the inconstitutionality of the contested provision. In other words, if the earlier interpretation of the contested provision persists within the constitutional limits and if there are no other reasons for amending it, that is to say, if, in view of all the circumstances, it is considered to be constitutionally consistent, there is no reason to repeal the contested provision. It is also necessary to take into account the potential consequences of the annulment of the contested provision, in the event of its inconstitutionality, for the current decision-making practice which interprets and applies the contested provision. In particular, the relevant case-law, by following the interpretation of the contested provision, created the preconditions for its application and therefore established a certain degree of expectation of its interpretation and application.

46. In the further review, the Constitutional Court takes the view that the payment of a financial compensation of an amount only under the Decree, namely the literal interpretation of the contested provision and Section 28a of the Land Act, is merely the basis for the resulting determination of the amount of compensation. In particular, since the amount of the compensation under the Decree currently amounts to a fraction of the present value and is of only symbolic importance. The Constitutional Court therefore does not provide (in accordance with the case-law of the Court of First Instance) with the possibility that the literal interpretation of the contested provision might be preferred, but considers the conformity of the e ratione legis interpretation of the imported teleological interpretation with the constitutional order. In particular, with the constitutional rights to judicial protection and the protection of property under Articles 36 (1) and 11 (1) of the Charter.

VII.a/1

Core thesis of relevant case law

47. The Constitutional Court concluded, inter alia, that adherence to the literal interpretation of the contested provision is a sign of overstretched formalism, which must give way to the meaning and purpose of the financial compensation (see recital 52). In paragraph 32 of the preamble to that finding, the Constitutional Court, referring to the finding of 10.12.2008 sp. zn. I. ÚS 755 / 06 (N 219 / 51 CollNU 725), stated that "[...] legislative, inconsistency 'of different kinds, as well as unpredictability in the process of various state bodies or persons acting essentially as a State, cannot be interpreted against the benefit of the beneficiaries, but with regard to the constitutional values and principles of the democratic rule of law in force, expressed in constitutional order'. The principle of interpretation of the law in favour of beneficiaries results in, in the context of the reasoning of the finding cited, that special - restitution - legislation also requires a sensitive and prudent approach by the courts regarding the determination of the amount of financial compensation in the light of changing external circumstances.

48. In paragraph 46 of the Recital cited above, it was stated that "the Constitutional Court considers that the judicial departure is constitutional in conformity [cf. sp. zn. In the judgment in paragraph III (see above), the ÚS 130 / 14 stated that the interpretation in question was in full line with the fundamental constitutional bases relating to the interpretation and application of the restitution rules (point 36 of the cited finding). The Constitutional Court could not ignore the consequences to which, in altered social and economic circumstances, the continuation of the general courts could lead to a prior interpretation of the law. This would result in a significant disproportion between eligible persons under the Law on non-judicial rehabilitation, by those to whom the assets withdrawn could have been returned and those to whom they could not have been recovered, thereby giving rise to the right to financial compensation '.

49. The tenor of the finding, sp. zn. II. [...] This financial compensation may not necessarily be equivalent to the current market price of the property in question, but it is intended to allow its granting to eliminate or mitigate the injustices caused by the Communist regime in a comparable manner as if it were the case when the case was issued. [...] In a situation where the difference between the price applicable on 24 June 1991 and the current market price has increased over time to such an extent that the granting of the refund of the first of them is of no other significance than symbolic to the beneficiary today, but it cannot be insisted on the literal interpretation of this provision. Paragraph 28a of the Land Act is to be interpreted as providing the basis for a financial compensation which may be increased [...] in order to be proportionate and reasonable in view of the purpose of the restitution laws, depending on the specific circumstances. 'On the one hand, the purpose of granting the financial compensation, which corresponds to the main objective of the restitution laws (see below), and on the other hand, the amount of the compensation, which may not generally be at market price, is evident, but it is nevertheless desirable that the symbolic amount of the compensation under the Order be increased accordingly.

50. Similarly, the Constitutional Court dealt with financial compensation, pursuant to Section 11 of the Act on extrajudicial rehabilitation, in the sp. zn. The contested provision provided for the right of the owner of the property to the State, if he had bought the property from him and had to issue it to a person authorised under the restitution law. This claim was expressly set out in Section 11 at the amount of the purchase price paid for the purchase of the case. Of course, the purchase price could also have lost value over time due to rising property prices. Following the relevant decision of the ESLP, the Constitutional Court concluded that the purpose of the restitution law "cannot consist of a return of an untimely and inadequate purchase price, but, as the Strasbourg Court reminded the Czech Republic, in the payment of such an amount by the State, which is proportionate and reasonable under the relevant (and exceptional) restitution circumstances. Therefore, the interpretation that the concept of purchase price within the meaning of Article 11 of Law No 87 / 1991 Coll. can also be considered to include other transactions which reflect the value of the property '. The Constitutional Court referred, for a substantial part, to its decisions, the ECHR and the Supreme Court; By giving priority to the interpretation allowing payment higher than the legal compensation expressly provided for, he rejected the proposal to abolish Article 11 of the Law on extrajudicial rehabilitation.

51. The Constitutional Court, in a situation analogous to the present case, opted for the interpretation of Article 13 (4) of the Act on extrajudicial rehabilitation, as amended by Act No. 115 / 1994 Coll., that the restituents (again following the conclusions of the ECHR and the Supreme Court) could not be granted financial compensation only at a period of time according to the simple version of the Act. This interpretation is referred to by the courts as extending, while the wording of Paragraph 13 (4) of the Act on Exjudicial Rehabilitation, as amended by Act No. 115 / 1994 Coll., considered the Constitutional Court as "legislative inconsistency 'as well as the adjustment of the financial compensation under the Land Act.

52. Recall also the judgment of the Supreme Court of 16 May 2012, sp. zn. 28 Cdo. 1603 / 2011, according to which "if, in exceptional cases, the inadequacy of the compensation granted at purchase prices is increased for those persons who, as a compulsory and once favoured person, have lost their real estate in restitution [...], then it is all the more fair (and minor ad maius) to proceed mutatis mutandis in cases of legitimate restituents to which the property could not be returned and must be granted financial compensation."

53. It can be summarised that recent case-law concludes that the financial compensation under the restitution rules is not to be determined in the historical amount, which today amounts to a fraction of the property price. That interpretation is considered desirable by the Constitutional Court and refers, in the rest, to those decisions and related decisions in particular to its own and the ECHR (in particular the judgment of 5.11.2002 in the Pinco and Pinc cases against the Czech Republic, No 36548 / 97).

VII.a/2

Purpose of the law and interpretation of the law praeter legem and contra legem

54. The Constitutional Court considers that an objection according to which the right to financial compensation in excess of the valuation at the date of application of the Soil Act is not an interpretation, but rather a judicial extension of the legal standard - by analogy establishing a claim for cash performance by a praeter legem. In addition, the Supreme Court added that such completion is in principle possible, but is not appropriate for the reasons set out above.

55. In the procedure for the control of standards, the Constitutional Court, according to the principle of the primacy of constitutionally consistent interpretation, shall proceed before the derogation. According to this principle, in a situation in which a provision of legislation allows for two different interpretations, one being in accordance with the constitutional order and the other being in conflict, there is no reason to repeal that provision. This method is based on the principle of separation of power and the associated principle of restraint, according to which, if compliance with constitutional limits can be achieved by alternative means, the Constitutional Court elects one which limits legislative power to the lowest degree [see, for example, the finding of 29.1.2008 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 69 / 06 (N 22 / 48 SbNU 243; 269 / 2008 Sb.)], and the constitutionally consonant interpretation can be evidenced by an interpretation extending [see, for example, the findings of 22.6.2005 sp. Pl. ÚS 13 / 05 (N 127 / 37 SbNU 593; 283 / 2005 Sb.) or of 7.4.2005 sp.

56. In the past, the Constitutional Court has stressed more than once that general courts are absolutely not bound by the verbatim text of the law, but may derogate from it if the purpose of the law, the history of its formation, the systematic link or any of the principles underlying it in a constitutionally consistent legal order as a significant whole so require. The obligation of the courts to find the right is not only to seek direct and explicit instructions in the legal text, but also to ascertain and formulate what is a specific right where the interpretation of abstract standards and constitutional principles [cf., in addition to the above, for example the findings of 4.2.1997 sp. zn. ÚS 21 / 96 (N 13 / 7 SbNU 87; 63 / 1997 Coll.) and of 7.9.2010 sp. zn. ÚS 34 / 09 (N 187 / 58 SbNU 647)]. The question is therefore how far can it be to deviate from the text of the provision of legislation in order to fulfil its purpose.

57. In its Opinion in plenary of 21.5.1996 in sp. zn. Pl. ÚS-st. 1 / 96 (ST 1 / 9 SbNU 471), the Constitutional Court concluded that "binding by law does not necessarily mean the need for a literal interpretation of the provisions applied, but also for the purpose and purpose of the law. In the event of a conflict between the literal text of the law and its purpose and the purpose of the law, it is important to lay down the conditions for the interpretation of e ratione legis prior to the interpretation of the language, conditions which should constitute a barrier to the possible libel in the application of the law '. In addition, the Constitutional Court stated that even in" contrary to the verbatim wording of that provision to its purpose and purpose, the clarity and exclusivity of which there is no doubt, the interpretation of e ratione legis may be preferred to the interpretation of language'. In the decision of 4.2.1997 sp. zn. The Constitutional Court further stated that, in such a case, it is necessary to avoid libel and that the relevant decision must be based on a reasonable argument. In general, interpretation according to the purpose of the law can therefore be preferred to its literal interpretation (if the purpose and language are clear), but this is an exceptional situation, which must be thoroughly justified.

58. The finding of 17. 12. 1997 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 33 / 97 (N 163 / 9 SbNU 399; 30 / 1998 Coll.) took the central position of the Constitutional Court: "Another completely unsustainable moment of application is its application based solely on its language interpretation. Language interpretation is merely an initial approach to the applied legal standard. It is only a starting point for clarifying and clarifying its meaning and purpose (for which there are a number of other procedures, such as logical and systematic interpretation, the interpretation of e ratione legis, etc.). A mechanical application that is abstract or unaware, either intentionally or as a result of ignorance, meaning and purpose of the rule of law, makes law an instrument of alienation and absurdity."

59. For the sake of completeness, it is worthy to add that this has also been reflected in § 2 (1) and (2) of Act No. 89 / 2012 Coll., Civil Code: "Any provision of private law can only be interpreted in accordance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and the constitutional order of [...] at all, as well as with a constant regard to the values which it protects. If the interpretation of an individual provision is broken down only by its words with this command, it must give in. [...] The legal provision cannot be attached to any other meaning than that of its own words in their context and the legislator's clear intention; However, no one may invoke the words of the law against its meaning. '

60. The Constitutional Court does not question the importance of the language method of interpretation of the law, it points only to the contours of its possible exclusion in justified cases. Such an exceptionally necessary priority for interpretation according to the purpose of the standard is the so-called teleological reduction; in the case of a number of interpretative alternatives, one that leads to unacceptable consequences from the point of view of the meaning and purpose of the rule of law [cf. e.g. the finding of 28.1.2004 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 41 / 02 (N 10 / 32 SbNU 61; 98 / 2004 Coll.)].

61. It is clear from the above that, in line with the conclusions of both case-law and expert literature, there is a constitutionally consistent interpretation rule of priority according to which the interpretation of the legal standard contra verba legis can be sought, thus contrary to its text (verbatim interpretation), if the grammatical meaning and purpose of the standard are no doubt [see the finding of 28 July 2009 sp. zl. ÚS 9 / 09 (N 166 / 54 SbNU 117); cf. WINTR, J. Methods and principles of interpretation of law. 2.

62. The purpose of the contested provision is to be imported for the purpose of the Land Act and its restitution substance. According to the preamble to the Land Act, the law was adopted, inter alia, in an attempt to mitigate the consequences of certain property injustices that occurred against owners of agricultural and forestry assets between 1948 and 1989. The same purpose is set out by other restitution regulations, and they are wide-ranging and (also referred to above) caselaw of the Supreme Courts. To this end, the Constitutional Court measured the simple wording of the contested and related provisions in the decision in point II.II of the ÚS 4139 / 16, in which it found that the beneficiary was to receive adequate financial compensation, the amount of which according to the Order is merely the basis for increasing the compensation, which is of only symbolic importance today.

63. On the basis of the above and in the previous section submitted, it can be summarised that the purpose of Section 16 (1) and Section 28a of the Land Act is undoubted and corresponds to an attempt to mitigate certain property injustices. The mitigation, not necessarily full atonement, of property injustices (which, according to the ECHR case-law, is the legislator's case law), concludes that financial compensation does not necessarily have to reach today's market prices for unissued real estate. In other words, it cannot be inferred from these plausible postulates, following in particular the finding of sp. zn. II. ÚS 4139 / 16, that the intention (reasonable and consistent) of the legislator was to provide financial compensation at market prices. This is also because § 28a refers to the prices valid on 24.6.1991, by valuation under the Decree effective on 1.1.1989. However, it is also clear that the desired reduction of the injustices nearly 30 years later does not, in principle, correspond in terms of today's prices to the fraction of the financial compensation determined in accordance with the Decree.

VII.a/3

Change of circumstances, legitimate expectations and current practice

64. As is apparent from the proposal, the case law of both the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, the practice of the Court is now established at the conclusion that the financial compensation for the land not issued under the Land Act should be paid to beneficiaries in excess of the valuation under the Order and not necessarily at market prices for real estate. In order to be reasonable and reasonable, given the individual circumstances of the case. Having regard to the fact that, in the case of a previous application by the Supreme Court for annulment of the contested provision, the starting point was to determine the amount of the financial compensation for the expert's assessment under the valuation decree (effective at the date of the court's decision, see above).

65. Of course, in the case of a proposal to abolish a provision of legislation, it is necessary to consider whether, even if the constitutionality of the provision in question may be borderline, such abolition could at all lead to a solution to the alleged difficulties of application practice. These problems are clearly at the forefront when a legal provision of the same original purpose has been interpreted and applied for almost 30 years, but social circumstances, including property prices and purchasing power, have changed rapidly. In principle, there is a conflict of law vs. judicial resolution of the incompatibility of the relevant part of the law with today's reality. In so doing, it is up to the legislator to determine the conditions, facts and other assumptions for mitigating the injustices caused under the previous regime. In other words, it is also a question of whether, in the absence of action by the legislator, the judicial authority has no longer exhausted the limits of its powers to find fair solutions to cases by applying an unchanged legal standard.

66. The principle of legal certainty and its element in the form of predictability of acts of public authorities are among the principles of the democratic rule of law under Article 1 (1) of the Constitution [cf., for example, the finding of 11.2.2004 sp. zn. In particular, as one of the essentials of the democratic rule of law, it includes the requirement to preserve acquired rights as well as the protection of everyone's trust in law, which also implies effective protection of the rights of individuals [cf. find of 13.6.2006 sp. zn. I. ÚS 50 / 03 (N 120 / 41 CollNU 499)].

67. It follows from this, in accordance with the finding in section II.II of the ÚS 4139 / 16, that the beneficiaries are entitled to both adequate financial compensation and to the protection of their claims by the public authorities and to the foreseeable way in which the authorities of the State decide on restitution claims. The current decision-making activity concludes that the restituents are entitled to financial compensation at a reasonable and reasonable rate, and its precise determination is a matter for individual cases. The applicant and the Authority shall call for an approximation of the mechanism for calculating the refund amount; According to the Supreme Court, the annulment of the contested provision would allegedly help to maintain the consistency of the caselaw, since the courts would not be restricted by a decree.

68. However, it follows from the observations of the Office and the relevant Supreme Court voucher that the practice of the Office is not entirely consistent with the caselaw highlighted, according to which courts grant increased financial compensation compared to the Order, for example under the Valuation Order. The Supreme Court stated that the Office is not strictly obliged (in the words of the Supreme Court "entitled") to respect the judicial interpretation of the key provisions of the Soil Act and can thus provide financial compensation at historical level. This practice was subsequently criticised by the Supreme Court in its reply. The legal persons who are not satisfied with the amount of such compensation shall then have no choice but to refer to the courts; Such a procedure is both time-consuming and burdensome state apparatus. According to the Office, the financial compensation was still paid at 1991 prices and the courts of appeal have effectively increased the financial compensation. The Office also considers that the courts designated may be higher by 10 times. Moreover, the procedure for determining the amount of the financial compensation before the general courts on which the application for annulment of the contested provision arose is proof. The Constitutional Court therefore bases its further review on the assumption that the judicial practice is uniform in the approach to determining the amount of compensation not only under the Order, but is not entirely uniform in the specific way in which the amount of compensation is determined in individual cases. On the contrary, the Office is clearly reluctant to provide compensation in accordance with the procedure in which the courts do so, and rather inclined to determine the compensation under the Decree, i.e. at historical prices (see its observations above).

VII.b

Application of general considerations to the present case

69. On the basis of the above considerations, the Constitutional Court has concluded that the interpretation of the contested provision made by the judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case C-4139 / 16 is sufficient as the opposite interpretation leads to unacceptable conclusions. The restitution rules were adopted for a specific purpose, and after some claims have not been settled almost 30 years after the validity of the Land Act, the legislative inconsistency in question cannot be placed at the expense of the restituents, with the determination of the amount of compensation in the 1991 prices being unfair. In such a case, it is appropriate to give priority to the teleological interpretation of the contested and related provisions and to limit the literal interpretation leading to unacceptable and unconstitutional consequences. The answer to the question of the annulment of the contested provision lies in the relationship of the chosen interpretation to legal certainty and legitimate expectations based on current practice and the likely effect on subsequent decision-making activities. In fact, even if the interpretation of the law so designed was not sufficient to mitigate certain property injustices from the period of infreedom, the provisions of the Soil Act could not be regarded as constitutionally consistent.

70. The parties to the interpretation of the law by praeter legem or contra verba legis agree with the Supreme Court that such interpretation is desirable in justified cases and by practice and teaching generally accepted. However, it can no longer identify with the reasons for which the applicant considers the present interpretation of the contested provision to be unsustainable overall. The Constitutional Court considers that the problems raised, some of which are likely to still be present when deciding on restitution claims because of the time elapsed since the adoption of the restitution laws, would not resolve the annulment of the contested provision. On the contrary, it would involve additional risks linked to the settlement of decision-making practice by applying a very vague legal standard. In the event of the annulment of the contested provision, the first sentence of Paragraph 16 (1) of the Land Act would be: "For land not issued under that Law and for which no other land can be granted, the cash compensation equal to the price of the land withdrawn... unless otherwise provided for by that law (Paragraph 14 (8)). 'In fact, in the event of a deregulation, the point of determining the price of the land of which the government expressed ambiguity and the determination of which would be a further task of the State authorities would be the subject of dispute. With the fact that it has already been (and is now repeatedly) imported that the provision of financial compensation" mechanically "at the prices under the Order does not comply with the constitutional order. Therefore, according to the hypothetical wording of Paragraph 16 (1) of the First Land Act, the determining authority would not be bound by any precondition for determining at least the basis of the amount of the financial compensation.

71. One of the motives of the application was to give the Supreme Court the impetus of the legislator to adopt clear and fair arrangements for determining the amount of the financial compensation. Following the finding of page II of the ÚS 4139 / 16, the contested provision was constitutionally interpreted, the legislator did not amend the relevant legislation. Although it seems possible to imagine a more appropriate version of the law, given the advanced decision-making on restitution claims, the large majority of which are already settled, it does not seem very likely that the legislator would renegotiate the issue. This marginal possibility cannot be sufficient to abolish the contested provision. The case under examination is incomparable to the issue raised in the Supreme Court of the found sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 16 / 99, by which the Constitutional Court annulled the entire part of the fifth Act No. 99 / 1963 Coll., the Civil Code, as amended, governing the so-called administrative judiciary. In that case, the legislature amended the new area of the rule of law in an unconstitutional way, in view of the time distribution and the objective need to adopt certain legislation being a completely different situation.

72. On the contrary, when the contested provision was repealed, it would open up the possibility for the entire range of interpretative alternatives § 16 (1) of the First Land Act. The decision-making practice would probably once again have to be united by the activities of the supreme courts, potentially even by carrying out a constitutionally consistent interpretation. However, this interpretation is already available to public authorities. Moreover, the Government attaches itself to the fact that, when determining the amount of the financial compensation, the conflicts of interest, such as the burden of compensation paid for the State budget, should be weighed, etc. Although such a public interest of prima facie cannot be preferred to the claims of individual restituents, it must be granted relevance. If the courts are already united to pay financial compensation, not according to the Order, but also to market prices, they would open up the scope for granting compensation throughout this range by abolishing the contested provision. The law would lose at least a partial (albeit inappropriate) approach to the time to which the refunds relate as a basis for determining the refund base. The risk of inequality in the mitigation of property injustices (where applicable, the occurrence of further injustices) would not be ruled out by the annulment of the contested provision.

73. The Supreme Court also concluded that, in the event of compliance with the proposal, Paragraph 16 (1) of the Soil Act could be regarded as a special provision against Paragraph 28a of the same Act; i.e., in order to determine the amount of compensation under the Decree, it would "provide otherwise '. However, after the hypothetical annulment of the contested provision, it would not have laid down in any particular way, given the above-mentioned law. It would not be possible to conclude from the mere deletion of the reference to § 28a of the Land Act that the Act excludes the determination of the amount of the compensation of unissued properties according to their historical price or the extent to which any compensation may or should be close to market prices.

74. Another objection from the Supreme Court and the Office is the alleged inspecificity of the requested procedure for determining the amount of the financial compensation. It is alleged that it is not clear at what time the real estate price is to be applied or by which procedure a reasonable and reasonable amount of financial compensation is to be determined. The Constitutional Court considers that the determination of the amount of compensation is a matter for individual cases on the basis of an assessment of all the relevant specific circumstances of the case. It is not for the Constitutional Court to determine the specific procedure for the General Court to conclude on the proportionality of the amount of compensation. This procedure, of the nature of the case, cannot be generally defined to be appropriate in each individual case. Moreover, the Constitutional Court has jurisdiction only to assess the constitutionality of the contested provision; However, the submission of instructions for the application of the rule in question in each hypothetical situation is not part of a constitutionally consistent interpretation. The Constitutional Court recognises the difficulty of determining the time at which the property price is to be anchored. In the past, the Constitutional Court has ruled that financial compensation may not necessarily be equivalent to the current market price, but it is nevertheless intended to allow atonement or reduction of injustices as would be the case when the case was issued. This idea of determining a reasonable and reasonable amount of compensation is sufficient to rule out violations of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of individuals. The closer form of determining the amount of compensation depends on the generalisation of the specifics of individual cases to which the Constitutional Court is not called at the level of the ordinary law. After all, neither the parties nor the interveners submitted to the Constitutional Court examples of decisions which would point to a substantially different determination of the amount of the claims on the basis of the different operative moments for the valuation of real estate.

75. Therefore, the inconstitutionality of the contested provision cannot cause the Supreme Court to open further questions when determining the amount of compensation by general courts, as allegedly caused by the finding of sp. zn. II. ÚS 4139 / 16. If the Supreme Court considered that the Constitutional Court should abolish the contested provision and, at the same time, by decision on the standard control procedure referred to in Article 87 (1) (b) of the Treaty, (a) The Constitution would propose specific rules and assumptions for calculating the amount of compensation, the Constitutional Court would act as a 'positive legislator' and would find itself outside the limits of the powers conferred on it by the Constitution. Needless to say, specifying general legal rules by interpretation or filling in loopholes in the law is, on the basis of individual cases at the level of ordinary law, the role of general courts. The foregoing was rejected by the Court of First Instance's objection that the interpretation of the contested provision was inadmissible by establishing a legal standard which allegedly results in a lack of determination of the calculation of a fair compensation. It is precisely the task of the supreme authority in matters falling within the jurisdiction of the courts (Article 92 of the Constitution) to unify the application of the contested provision.

76. The Constitutional Court strongly disagrees with the alleged illegality of the Authority in determining the amount of the financial compensation according to the judicial, constitutionally consistent interpretation of the contested provision, but according to the interpretation of the literal. The Office itself admits that those restituents who are willing to defend their claim before the courts (which interpret the provisions of the Soil Act in question in accordance with the above-mentioned provisions) are granted a series of higher financial compensation. Moreover, the Government is also aware, in its view, of the desirable way of determining the financial compensation, not only at historical prices under the Decree. The Office is subject to the Ministry of Agriculture (§ 1 (4) of Act No. 503 / 2012 Coll., on the State Land Office and on the amendment of certain related laws). Article 89 (2) The Constitution is enforceable by decisions of the Constitutional Court binding on all the institutions and persons. The finding of sp. zn. II. ÚS 4139 / 16 has been conducted by a constitutionally consistent interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Soil Act. As in the present case, this is a judgment on the substance of the case, which is clearly part of the substance of the finding. As in the current decision of the Constitutional Court, the ratio of the earlier finding is also made up of this interpretation of the contested provision, therefore there is no doubt that its Constitution is binding on all institutions and persons.

77. The authority's "voluntary" inability to provide higher financial compensation was imported by the Supreme Court from point 77 of the sp. zn. However, the Supreme Court's reference passage continues with the statement of the Constitutional Court that such an interpretation is constitutionally unsustainable and that it cannot be ignored that the practice upholds one of the criteria of the constitutional review of the so-called restitution dot. Therefore, even in this case, the Constitutional Court considers the practice of the Authority to be the most risky place in the current review. However, in view of the clear consequence of Article 89 (2) of the Constitution and the constitutionally consistent content of the contested provision, such undesirable practice does not in itself result in the annulment of the contested provision. On the other hand, it is the duty of the Office, the binding findings of the Constitutional Court, to decide in accordance with the Constitution.

78. In addition, the Constitutional Court, in its decision in sp. zn. II. It was also recalled that the situation in which the Authority "does not declare public offers in the long term or does so in insufficient quantities is no longer exceptional for many years'. Therefore, there is no possible argument by the Office that the courts would be granted overcompensation to the beneficiaries, as a result of their alleged passivity, in order to meet their claims in another form. Similarly, restituents cannot be charged with economically burdensome payments of financial compensation for unissued real estate.

79. Another objection is the alleged inequality of beneficiaries whose claims are, or will be settled at different times. The mitigation of certain property injustices has lasted for 30 years, on the basis of not always entirely appropriate legislation (but which cannot always be imposed on a democratic legislator). According to the Constitutional Court, it cannot in practice be fully expected that the decision to grant restitution rights will in any event be strictly consistent with the abstract principle of equality, the violation of which is a general serious constitutional deficiency. This is not the approval of the randomness of the state authorities' practice, but partly the result of the non-measurable speed of law making and the rise in real estate prices. Even in view of the complexity and time-consuming of the legislative process, especially on sensitive restitution issues, it cannot be expected that the beneficiaries will receive exactly the same equivalent compensation in 1991 and 2021. Although such a period is sufficiently long to adopt at least partially more appropriate legal arrangements, it is not within the jurisdiction of the courts to fully compensate for any deficiencies. If it is not clear that the annulment of the contested provision would lead to the elimination or at least to the mitigation of these possible inequalities and if it is not possible, after 30 years, to expect the adoption of new, practice and equality of restituents to clearly improve legislation, this objection is not sufficient to justify a derogatory intervention by the Constitutional Court.

80. It can be argued by the Government that, in the event of a substantive link between the present case and cases assessed under the Law on non-judicial rehabilitation, any discrepancy of interpretation could also be transferred to this other restitution area (see the findings above). At the time of the conclusion of the imminent atonement of the injunction caused by the previous scheme, such an act would be an undue interference with legal certainty and legitimate expectations of the legal entities. Even after the potential annulment of the contested provision, the legislator would not have been given guarantees to improve the current situation. That is why the Constitutional Court is inclined to maintain the State quo, which has been based on a general interpretation of the contested provision for more than three and a half years.

VIII.

Conclusion

81. The Constitutional Court found no grounds to depart from the conclusion already drawn on the constitutionally consistent interpretation of the contested provision which would require its proposed derogatory intervention. The Constitutional Court concluded that, contrary to the constitutional order, the interpretation of the contested provision is merely literal, albeit in a clear language, rather than an interpretation taking into account its purpose, which must therefore be given priority. This is particularly because there is already agreement in the decision-making process on the interpretation and application of the contested provision and every hypothetical intervention in this practice must be of a special nature and weighed particularly carefully. With this plenary finding as well as the earlier findings of the Constitutional Court, in particular sp. zn. II. The Constitutional Court therefore rejected the proposal of the Supreme Court for the reasons set out above under Paragraph 70 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court.

President of the Constitutional Court:

JUDr. Rychetský v. r.