The Constitutional Court found no 71 / 2016 Coll.
The Constitutional Court found on 26 January 2016 sp. zn.
Valid
71
FIND
The Constitutional Court
On behalf of the Republic
On 26 January 2016, the Constitutional Court decided under sp. zn.
as follows:
The application for annulment of the provision of § 264 (1) of Act No. 141 / 1961 Coll., on criminal proceedings of the Court (Criminal Code) is rejected.
Reasons
Definition and recap of the proposal
1. By a proposal delivered to the Constitutional Court on 24 June 2014, the Circular Court for Prague 8, under which the President of the Chamber, Mr Petr Novák, (hereinafter referred to as "the appellant"), referred to Article 95 (2) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as "the Constitution") and Article 64 (3) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, requested the annulment of the provisions of Article 264 (1) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as "the Constitution") of the Criminal Procedure (the Code of Criminal Procedure), for its conflict with the Constitutional Order.
2. The present proposal was made in connection with the appellant's ruling on the indictment of the Prosecutor of the District Attorney for Prague 8 of 11 February 2009 on the defendant Jaroslav Hlaváček for the offence of usury pursuant to § 253 (1) alinea 2, par. 2 of Act No. 140 / 1961 Coll., penal law, as amended by 31 December 2009, held with him under sp. T 23 / 2009. The accused was accused of causing damage to ACM Money, the Czech Republic, a. s., to a total amount of at least CZK 29284 456, by the actions described in the indictment, including 46 individual partial attacks.
3. On 31 May 2010, the Prosecutor of the District Attorney for Prague 8 submitted to the accused Jaroslav Hlaváček essentially the same indictment for the offence of usury pursuant to § 253 (1) alinea 2, paragraph 2 of the Criminal Act, which included a description of 12 partial attacks by which the accused Hlaváček in favour of the previous paragraph of the said company caused damage of at least CZK 6 064 716. This indictment was accepted by the District Court for Prague 8 under sp. p. 5 T 35 / 2010.
4. In its submission, the appellant pointed out that, from the point of view of legal qualifications, the conduct of the defendant Hlaváček in both indictments was seen as a single offence of usury pursuant to § 253 (1) (2) (2) of the criminal law, which was committed by 58 partial attacks (46 partial attacks on indictment 1T 23 / 2009 and 12 partial attacks on indictment 5 T 35 / 2010), i.e. as a so-called ongoing criminal offence.
5. By judgment of the District Court of Prague 8 sp. zn. 5 T 35 / 2010 of 12 October 2011, the defendant Hlaváček was acquitted of the prosecution pursuant to Paragraph 226 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that is, on the ground that the action marked is not a criminal offence in the application, and all the damage was linked with its claims for compensation in civil proceedings. By order of the Municipal Court in Prague sp. zn. 6 To 69 / 2012 of 7 March 2012, the appeal of the prosecutor and one of the victims was rejected, so the judgment of the District Court for Prague 8 sp. zn. 5 T 35 / 2010 of 12 October 2011 became final. No special appeal has been brought in the case.
6. In the proceedings under sp. zn. 1 T 23 / 2009, the appellant decided by judgment of 22 March 2012, by which he also acquitted the defendant Hlaváček of the indictment under § 226 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. She brought an appeal against this decision by the prosecutor and one of the victims, after which by order of the Municipal Court in Prague sp. zn. 61 The judgment under appeal was annulled in its entirety and the case was referred back to the appellant for a new decision.
7. By judgment of the District Court of Prague 8 sp. zn. 1 T 23 / 2009 of 21 March 2013, the defendant Hlaváček was subsequently recognised as guilty by 46 partial attacks on the continuing offence of usury pursuant to § 253 (1) (2) (2) of the Criminal Act, for which he was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of six months for which he was suspended for a trial period of one year. The damage was linked to civil proceedings with their claims for compensation. In the statement in the preamble to the judgment, the appellant stated that he had no choice but to recognise the defendant as guilty, as stated above, since he was bound by the legal opinion of the appellate court, as set out in its resolution in footnote 61 to 335 / 2012 of 27 September 2012, according to which the defendant fulfilled all the characteristics of the facts of the offence of usury in accordance with § 253 (1), (2) of the criminal law. At the same time, the appellant recalled the existence of the decisions taken in the criminal case under point 5 T 35 / 2010, in which the defendant was deemed to have been legally acquitted for the conduct which is considered to be a continuation of the proceedings in question. Namely justified by the decision of the Municipal Court in Prague sp. zn. 6 This 69 / 2012 of 7 March 2012 was inspired by the appellant, in his own words, when issuing his previous court of appeal annulled, in its judgment of 22 March 2012, considering that, in the same case, the same decision must be taken, since the opposite procedure is contrary to the constitutional principle of the right to a fair trial.
8. The above judgment of the appellant, sp. zn. 1 T 23 / 2009 of 21 March 2013, however, was annulled on the basis of the appeal of the prosecutor, the defendant Hlaváček and several victims by order of the Municipal Court in Prague sp. zn. 61 To 211 / 2013 of 24 September 2013 and the case was referred back to the appellant for reconsideration. The Court of Appeal concluded that the findings of the Court of First Instance are still incomplete, do not support the evidence carried out and are contrary to the legal qualifications used. The Court of Appeal also criticised, inter alia, the unfounded amendment of the operative sentence by the Court of First Instance and the reasoning for the judgment under appeal, which, in its view, does not meet the requirements laid down in Paragraph 125 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as a result of which that decision is unrevisable.
9. The appellant, as stated in his submission to the Constitutional Court, made legal arguments by the Municipal Court in Prague in its resolutions sp. zn. 61 To 335 / 2012 of 27 September 2012 and sp. zn. 61 This 211 / 2013 of 24 September 2013 did not convince the legality of the legal opinion that the 46 partial attacks of 58 partial attacks on a single crime of usury committed by the defendant, Hlaváček, were a criminal offence. On the contrary, it finds the argument used by the Municipal Court in Prague in resolution sp. zn. 6 To 69 / 2012 of 7 March 2012. In the cited decision, expressed by the legal opinion that the 12 partial attacks on the crime of usury committed by the defendant Hlaváček are not a criminal offence, the appellant considers it correct.
10. For this reason, by order of 1 T 23 / 2003 of 20 March 2014, the appellant suspended the prosecution of the defendant, Hlaváček, pursuant to Article 224 (5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and submitted the case to the Constitutional Court, since he considers that the provision of Paragraph 264 (1) of the Criminal Code on the binding of the Court of First Instance is in breach of Article 82 (1) of the Constitution, which lays down the independence of the Judge in the performance of his duties. The appellant based his criticism on the fact that "if the judge is to be independent, he must decide independently and should not be bound by legal opinions with which he does not reasonably agree because he should be bound only by law '.
11. The appellant pointed out the practice of the appellants, which the concept of "legal opinion" enshrined in the provision of Paragraph 264 (1) of the Criminal Code is very often understood and applied too widely, not only as matters of substantive and procedural law, but also as regards the carrying out of the evidence and its assessment, ordering first-degree courts how individual evidence is to be assessed and to what conclusions they are to reach on their basis, without the appellants having themselves carried out the evidence. In accordance with the procedure described by the appellate courts, they replace the decision-making power of the Court of First Instance, whose activity becomes completely superfluous, while at the same time jeopardising their independence, since "only an independent court which has carried out the evidence has the right to assess the evidence and draw conclusions from it and its impartiality must not be jeopardised by the need to recognise the guilty or to exonerate the defendant when assessing the evidence in accordance with its internal beliefs'.
12. Furthermore, the appellant took the view that Paragraph 264 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure had lost its basis over time. The provision cited is an integral part of the Code of Criminal Procedure from the beginning of its effectiveness (i.e. 1 January 1962) and has never been amended until today, although social, political and legal circumstances have changed radically in the meantime. At the time of totalitarianism, the judiciary did not exercise independent courts, but the leading role of the KSČ, as expressed in Article 4 of the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic of 1960, was fully applied. In the present situation, it was therefore desirable that the appellants in criminal matters should have such power over the entire criminal proceedings by virtue of the provisions of Paragraph 264 (1) of the Criminal Code, while it is generally known that at that time, loyal members of the KSČ were placed in higher places, not only in the judiciary.
13. The appellant also drew attention to changes that took place in the judicial system, when in the past the Supreme Court decided directly on appeals against decisions of the Regional Court as a court of first instance. This role is currently being played by the supreme courts. According to the appellant's view, it lacks the logic to give binding legal opinions to a relatively large number of appeals courts, which cannot unify the decisions of the courts in criminal proceedings reserved for the Supreme Court.
14. The proposed proposal, as the appellant has stated, is not directed against the provisions of § 265s (1) of the Criminal Code and § 270 (4) of the Criminal Code, since binding legal opinions pursuant to those provisions are adopted by the Supreme Court as the supreme judicial authority which ensures the unity and legality of the decision-making process of the courts [see § 14 of Act No. 6 / 2002 Coll., the courts, the courts and the state administration of the courts and amending certain other laws (Law on Courts and Judges), as amended by Act No. 151 / 2002 Coll.]. However, the Regional Courts, the Municipal Court in Prague, and the Supreme Courts as appellate courts do not perform this function.
15. Nor is this proposal contrary to Article 2 of Protocol No 7 to the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention"), i.e. the right of the defendant to appeal against a judgment which has been recognised by the Court of First Instance as a criminal offence, should not be affected by this proposal under the Circular for Prague 8.
16. In conclusion, the appellant expressed the belief that compliance with the application would result in a substantial change in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, the centre of gravity of the criminal proceedings would indeed move to the main trial before the Court of First Instance, where evidence is being carried out, the decentralisation of the criminal judicial authority and its acceleration, as delays in criminal proceedings are often due to the overhaul of the Court of First Instance with the appellate courts, when certain criminal cases are repeatedly annulled and ordered by the courts of the first instance to a new decision, precisely according to the provisions of Section 264 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Moreover, there would be a "menacing of criminal judicial power," since, in the media, referred criminal matters are often intermittently decided at different levels of justice, which fellow citizens do not understand without legal education and judicial practice.
Observations of the parties and the intervener
17. The Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic ("the Chamber of Deputies") stated in its observations that the contested provision had not been amended once since the adoption of the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1961. Act No. 141 / 1961 Coll. was discussed by the National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in the 3rd parliamentary term (12 June 1960 to 12 June 1964) as House Press No. 66. On 29 November 1961, the draft law was unanimously approved as a written report to the Constitutional Legal Committee. The explanatory memorandum to the bill was significantly shorter compared to today's situation. A specific part of the explanatory memorandum did not contain a justification for the individual sections but related to the individual heads. Therefore, the explicit justification for the provision of Paragraph 264 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not contain a statement of reasons. Finally, the Chamber of Deputies stated that it left it to the Constitutional Court to examine the constitutionality of the contested provision and to give a decision in connection with the proposal submitted by the District Court for Prague 8.
18. The Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as "the Senate"), as party to the proceedings, stated that the draft contested provision of Paragraph 264 (1) was part of the criminal order from the date of the adoption of this law by the National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, i.e. from 29 November 1961. This provision has been maintained in subsequent extensive review of procedural criminal law and has never been amended by law (amended). A statement on a matter which would be based on a direct hearing and the adoption of the provision in question of Paragraph 264 (1) of the Penal Code or its subsequent amendments could not be provided by the Senate to the Constitutional Court, according to its words, since the legislative act took place before its establishment, which took place at the end of 1996. Unfortunately, it is not available (except perhaps to discuss the continued existence of supreme courts) or an adequate presentation of current views in some relevant Senate debate concerning the area of jurisdiction and jurisdiction of the courts in the hierarchy of the judicial system. As well as the above-mentioned participant, the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate therefore left the decision to the Constitutional Court.
19. The Government of the Czech Republic ("the Government") entered into proceedings before the Constitutional Court as an intervener and submitted its observations. In its introduction, it noted that the proposal submitted lacked relevant constitutional legal arguments, or completely overlooked the fundamental postulates of legal teaching, as well as the conclusions resulting from the case law of the Constitutional Court.
20. By proposing the contested authority of the Court of Appeal to give a binding legal opinion to the Court of First Instance, and also to order that court to carry out acts and additions (Section 264 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure), the Government has identified it as one of the fundamental principles of criminal proceedings. This principle is regarded as a guarantee of the exercise of the right to a fair trial (see, for example, the Constitutional Court's finding of sp. zn. I. ÚS 615 / 01 of 20 March 2002 (N 35 / 25 of the SbNU 273)) and as a guarantee of the exercise of the right to a fair trial (see Article 36 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms) and, on the contrary, of the legal opinion of the Court of Appeal as a breach of the principle of bilingual decision, resulting in a breach of constitutional order [see, for example, Resolution of the Constitutional Court of sp. zn. II. ÚS 3316. The Constitutional Court also expressed its opinion on the limits of the powers of the Supreme Court, stating that from the point of view of constitutional guarantees, the exercise of an administrative power must not conflict with any of the principles of a fair trial and the Court of Appeal is not entitled to order a change in the assessment of evidence. It is not possible to impose on the lower court its own assessment of the evidence [see in particular the finding of the Constitutional Court sp. zn. I. ÚS 608 / 06 of 29 April 2008 (N 79 / 49 of SbNU 153), paragraph 14 and the caselaw cited therein, mutatis mutandis the finding of sp. zn. II. ÚS 254 / 08 of 18 November 2008 (N 197 / 51 of SbNU 393) or the finding of sp. zn. III. ÚS 1104 / 08 of 19 March 2009 (N 65 / 52 of SbNU 635)].
21. The Government, on the basis of the above-mentioned brief summary of the relevant decisions of the Constitutional Court, stated that it had no doubt as to the constitutionality of the principle set out in Article 264 (1) of the Penal Code, and that its application had to comply with the constitutional limits. The provision itself is therefore not a violation of the right to a fair trial, but a statement thereof. Any breach of the procedural rights of the parties to proceedings, for example, is precisely a failure to comply with the constitutional limits of the application of the principle under Paragraph 264 (1) of the Criminal Code in a specific court proceedings, and does not justify the annulment of that provision. The Government therefore proposed that the Constitutional Court should consider the proposal as manifestly unfounded or reject it.
Replication of the applicant
22. In its reply to the Government's observations, the appellant agreed that the power of the Court of Appeal to review the decision of the court found is part of the right to a fair trial. In its view, it does not seek the annulment of that authorisation, but rather to avoid situations in which the Court of Appeal, after returning the case to a renegotiation and judgment, forces the court finding, which had previously assessed the evidence to the best of its convictions, its own assessment of the evidence and its underlying legal views, contrary to the right to a fair trial.
23. The appellant claimed that the centre of gravity of the decision on guilt and punishment should be in the main trial, not in a public or private session held for the purpose of hearing the appeal. He argued that it was the main case in which the fundamental principles of criminal proceedings, namely public policy, oral procedure, immediate and free evaluation of evidence, which constitute the starting attributes of a fair trial, were fully applied. For the main trial, it is natural that the public is present that the court of inquiry decides on the basis of oral submissions by the parties and oral evidence, that is to say, the evidence that he has immediately become acquainted with, which gives him the best conditions for their evaluation. On the other hand, the Appellate Courts often rule in a private sitting (Section 263 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), i.e. outside the control of the company over the performance of the judiciary in the form of the so-called cabinet of justice, and assess the evidence without having been informed orally and immediately, which cannot be described as a fair trial.
24. According to the appellant, the possible repeal of Paragraph 264 (1) of the Criminal Code would result in the strengthening of the appeal element. Although, following the 2001 amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act No. 265 / 2001 Coll.), the appeal procedure is based on a combination of the principle of appeal and appeal, with the emphasis on the principle of appeal, the practice of the appellate courts is different. It favours an increasing number of appeals before the appeal principle, which means that if the appellate courts find that the contested decision is incorrect, they shall repeal the case and refer it to a reexamination and to a decision stating that the addition of the evidence which they have ruled out is extensive and difficult to implement in the appeal proceedings. Only in isolated cases do the courts of appeal supplement the taking of evidence, although they may do so more frequently (see Section 259 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Therefore, the possible annulment of the contested provision would force the appellate courts to "think more about how to rule the case '. At the same time, the appellant indicated a possible procedure by the appellate court in the event that the misconduct of the court seised justified a new decision in the case, in particular the situation where the court seised the defendant incorrectly, although he should have been found guilty. The opposite is out of the question because even the court of appeal can exonerate the defendant. According to the appellant, the appellate court should, in its reasoning for its decision, justify in a non-imperative but explanatory manner why the decision of the appellant is defective and outline other considerations regarding the possibility of evaluating evidence. If the Court of Appeal had maintained its assessment of the evidence after that, either the Court of Appeal would have convinced the Court of Appeal of the accuracy of its view or the Court of Appeal would have taken action to order, pursuant to Section 262 of the Penal Code, that the case be dealt with in a new composition of the Chamber, which would have carried out its own assessment of the evidence after the reproof.
Abandonment of oral proceedings
25. The Constitutional Court noted that oral hearing could not have brought a significant step forward in clarifying the case than the written acts of the parties. In the light of the provisions of Article 44 of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No 404 / 2012 Coll., there is no need to ask the parties about their position on this issue, therefore it was possible to decide without the oral hearing.
Derogation of the contested provision
26. Paragraph 264 (1) of the Criminal Code reads:
Proceedings before the Court of First Instance following the annulment of the judgment
(1) The court to which the case was referred for reconsideration and judgment is bound by the legal opinion expressed by the appellate court in its decision and is obliged to carry out the acts and additions which the appellate court ordered to implement.
Active ID of the applicant
27. Pursuant to Article 95 (2) of the Constitution, if the court concludes that the law to be applied in the resolution of the case is contrary to constitutional order, it shall bring the matter before the Constitutional Court. This authorisation is further specified in § 64 (3) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, according to which the Constitutional Court may file an application for annulment of the Act or its individual provisions. The subject matter of a formal discussion of such a proposal shall be the fulfilment of Article 95 (2) The Constitution, in the sense that it must be a law to be applied in the resolution of the case, i.e. the law or its provision which is proposed for annulment, is to be applied directly by the appellant in the resolution of a particular dispute. The Constitutional Court found that this condition was fulfilled, since the application of the contested provision by the appellant is inevitable in the criminal case under point 1 T 23 / 2009 following the annulment of the judgment delivered by the appellate court and the refunding of the case for reconsideration, on the basis of an assessment of the constitutionality of that provision, the appellant's further action in that criminal proceedings depends.
Constitutional conformity of the legislative process of adopting the contested provision
28. The Constitutional Court has, in accordance with the provisions of § 68 (2) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll., in the proceedings for the annulment of laws and other legislation, the obligation to ascertain whether the contested law, or part thereof, has been adopted and issued within the limits of the constitutional competence and the constitutionally prescribed manner. As is apparent from the observations of the parties, Paragraph 264 (1) was part of the original 1961 Code of Criminal Procedure and was never affected by any amendments. The assessment of the legislative process would therefore mean assessing compliance with the existing constitutional provisions in force at the time of the adoption of the law. It is based on Article 66 (2) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No 48 / 2002 Coll., according to which it is inadmissible to consider a constitutional act with which, according to the proposal, the revised Act is contrary, it has ceased to be valid before the application of the Constitutional Court, so the Constitutional Court states that, in the case of legislation issued before the entry into force of the Constitution on 1 January 1993, it is entitled to review only its content compliance with the existing constitutional order, but not the constitutionality of the procedure of their formation and observance [cf. Therefore, the Constitutional Court did not assess the fulfilment of the above requirements.
Meritorious review of the proposal
29. First, it should be recalled that similar to almost identical proposals have already been dealt with by the Constitutional Court. By its finding sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 37 / 03 of 11 January 2005 (N 5 / 36 SbNU 35; 93 / 2005 Coll.) rejected the proposal of the District Court in Ústí nad Orlicí to repeal the provisions of § 226 paragraph 1 of Act No. 99 / 1963 Coll., Civil Code, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as "o.s. '). The District Court made this application at the initiative of the applicant. On the basis of the particular situation in the present case, the Court of First Instance argued that" if the Court of First Instance had acted according to that (pursuant to Paragraph 226 (1) EC) of the Rules of Procedure, it would have infringed Article 6 (1) of the Convention because it would not be a fair decision.' In the abovementioned finding, the Constitutional Court concluded that the contested provision "does not conflict with the constitutional order or international treaty provided for in Article 10 of the Constitution within the meaning of Articles 1 and 112 (1) of the Constitution. 'When adopting the conclusion cited above, the Constitutional Court did not" agree with the appellant's view that the provisions of Paragraph 226 (1) (a) should be deleted, which is a provision entirely corresponding to the principle of appeal governing the appeal procedure provided for in the ECR. "This is a provision that is applied without any problems throughout the existence of o. s.. In this context, it should be noted that the principle of appeal is a general principle of the civil process, which is also used in many other European countries. It is a traditional institute, it can be met in about today's form at the end of the 19th century and it was applied in around today's intentions and the 20th century. It can be added to the list of arguments in favour of maintaining the existing division of § 226 paragraph 1 o. s., that the described institute is also a traditional, practice proven and still constitutionally indisputable building block of the civil process. It follows from the above that the ties of the Court of Lower Degree are the legal opinion of the Supreme Court by implementing the constitutional principle of the right to judicial protection and a fair trial, an integral part of it, not an obstacle.'
30. Thematic closer is the order of the Constitutional Court sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 41 / 2000 of 20.2.2001 (U 7 / 21 SbNU 493). With this resolution, the Constitutional Court rejected, for the apparent unfounded reasons, the application of the Regional Court in Pilsen to abolish the provisions of § 270 (4) of the Second Criminal Code, as amended, which is defined by the words "and is obliged to carry out the procedural acts which the Supreme Court ordered to implement." According to the proposed Chamber of the Regional Court in Pilsen, the contested provision "is contrary to the constitutional principle of the independence of the judiciary and, in the present case, probably to the principle of presumption of innocence, since the application of this provision in the cited judgment of the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic of 24.5.2000 does not allow a decision other than confirmation of the guilt, i.e. confirmation of the condemning judgment, perhaps with minor additions." The Constitutional Court concluded that... "the contested provision is entirely in line with the purpose of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The procedural rules, as they are - at least in their essence - equally embodied in all the present procedural rules, are historically the result of many experiences and represent, in their postulates, a uniform and essentially solid form of management, which, to no small extent, always significantly predetermines the legality of the final decision. In the light of the above, the Constitutional Court did not find the provisions of § 270 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is defined by the words, and is obliged to carry out the procedural acts which the Supreme Court ordered ', contrary to the constitutional order of the Czech Republic.'
31. The Constitutional Court considers it appropriate to recall that the principle of the binding principle of the lower instance court is also regularly recognised in the procedural arrangements of foreign democratic countries by the legal opinion of the Supreme Court after the appeal of the primordial judgment in criminal matters. The provision of § 358 (1) of the German Code of Criminal Procedure (dStPO) or § 293 (2) of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure (öStPO) may be indicated as an example. The case law of foreign constitutional courts also addressed this principle as constitutionally consistent [see, for example, the judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerf-GE 12, 67, 71)].
32. In its conclusions made in the decisions cited above, the Constitutional Court has no reason to change anything. The arguments used may also be fully linked to this proposal. As in the previous two cases, it also led to the submission of a motion for opposition by the General Court to the decision of the Court of Appeal. It was against the binding legal opinion of these courts and their guidelines for the proceeding. Also from the appellant's proposal - The District Court for Prague 8 clearly disagrees with the appellant's decision by the appellate court, which he refuses to submit to. It criticises this particular decision and, in general, the practice of the appellate courts. The contention of the contested provision with the constitutional order then concludes that it itself has to decide in a legal opinion with which it does not agree or which already interferes with its exclusive right to evaluate evidence.
33. In view of the above, it is appropriate to recall the role of the Constitutional Court. Article 83 The Constitutional Court is a judicial body for the protection of constitutionality. Its powers include deciding to repeal laws or their individual provisions if they are contrary to the constitutional order [Article 87 (1) (a) of the Constitution]. Article 95 (2) The Constitutional Tribunal shall bring the case before the Constitutional Court if it concludes that the law to be applied in the resolution of the case is contrary to the constitutional order.
34. The fact that the Court of Appeal fundamentally (and sometimes even reasonably) does not agree with the procedure and the conclusions of the Court of Appeal does not constitute the unconstitutional nature of the contested provision. This has already been sufficiently explained in the previous case-law cited above by the Constitutional Court. It cannot be excluded that the Court of Appeal goes beyond its powers and inappropriately intervenes in the jurisdiction of the court found. However, such a procedure must be corrected through extraordinary remedies. A constitutional complaint is also under consideration. However, these instruments shall be fully in the hands of the parties. The Constitutional Court has already outlined the limits of the Court of Appeal's instructions in the past. It is possible to refer here to the Government's very appropriate observations in paragraph 20 of this Decision and, in particular, to the finding of the Constitutional Court sp. zn. I. ÚS 608 / 06 (see above). It is not the task of the Constitutional Court to resolve disputes between the various courts.
35. The Constitutional Court has already dealt with virtually the same issue and the appellant has not put forward any new arguments on a constitutional basis. The Constitutional Court did not find the contested provision contrary to the constitutional law. Therefore, in accordance with Article 70 (2) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, he rejected the application.
President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr. Rychetský v. r.
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Regulation Information
| Citation | The Constitutional Court found no 71 / 2016 Coll., on the application for annulment of Article 264 (1) of Act No. 141 / 1961 Coll., on criminal proceedings of the judicial (criminal order) |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | - |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 07.03.2016 |
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| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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