The Constitutional Court found no 69 / 2018 Coll.
The Constitutional Court found of 27 February 2018 sp. zn.
Valid
69
FIND
The Constitutional Court
On behalf of the Republic
On 27 February 2018, the Constitutional Court decided under sp. z. pl. ÚS 15 / 17 in plenary composed of the President of the Court of Pavel Rychetský and the judges of Josef Fiala (Judge of the Czech Republic), Jan Filip, Jaromír Jirsa, Tomáš Lichovník, Jan Musil, Vladimir Sládek, Radovan Suchánek, Kateřina Šimatková, Vojtěho Šimíček, Milady Tomková, David Uhlíř and Jiří Zemáří Zemánek, represented by Mgr. Jan Aulický, a lawyer, with the participation in the Chamber of the Parliament of the Czech Republic as a party to the proceedings and the Government of the Czech Republic as a party to proceedings,
as follows:
I. Application of Article 35ca of Act No. 586 / 1992 Coll., on Income Taxes, as effective until 30 June 2017, in the words "If the taxpayer applies to the sub-base of the tax pursuant to § 7, expenditure pursuant to § 7, paragraph 7, or to the sub-base of the tax pursuant to § 9, paragraph 4, and the sum of the sub-bases for which the expenditure has been applied in this way, is higher than 50% of the total base of the tax, the [...] b) tax advantage cannot be claimed."
II. The proposal to declare the inconstitutionality of § 35ca of Act No. 586 / 1992 Coll., on Income Taxes, as effective until 30 June 2017, in the words "If the taxpayer applies to the sub-base of the tax pursuant to § 7, expenditure pursuant to § 7, paragraph 7 or to the sub-base of the tax pursuant to § 9, paragraph 4 and the sum of the sub-bases for which expenditure has been applied in this way, is higher than 50% of the total base of the tax, cannot (a) reduce the tax pursuant to § 35ba (1)," is rejected.
Reasons
Recap of the complainant's proposal and recap of the present proceedings
1. The Constitutional Complaints pursuant to Article 87 (1) (d) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as "the Constitution") and Article 72 et seq. of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, seek the annulment of the Decision of the Appellate Financial Directorate of 13.2.2017 No 6976 / 17 / 5200- 10424- 709923, as it infringes its right of property protection under Article 11 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as "the Charter") and, as a consequence, the principle of equality under Article 1 of the Charter. The complainant also linked its constitutional complaint to a proposal pursuant to Article 74 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll., namely the proposal to abolish § 35ca of Act No. 586 / 1992 Coll., on Income Taxes, as amended ("Act No. 586 / 1992 Coll. 'or" the Income Tax Act').
2. It follows from the constitutional complaint as well as from the documents annexed thereto that the contested decision rejected the appeal of the complainant against the payment notice issued by the Financial Office for the Central Bohemia Region, whereby the complainant was charged a personal income tax of CZK 6,045 for the year 2015, although the complainant in its tax return showed an excess of CZK 43 995. The reason for this difference was the legal impossibility of applying a tax advantage to children by a taxpayer who applied to income pursuant to § 7 or § 9 of Act No. 586 / 1992 Coll. of spending so called flat rate.
3. In the constitutional complaint of the contested decision, the Appellate Financial Directorate stated in particular that the setting of the conditions for the application of tax rebates and the right to a tax advantage is merely a matter for the legislator, who alone decides the subject matter, the extent and scope of the taxes and the conditions for their collection. It is necessary to take into account in the calculation of the income tax on natural persons in the return submitted by the legislature the clear criteria under which it is possible or impossible to claim a tax advantage. On the contrary, deciding whether to use the possibility of applying flat-rate or actual expenditure to income from a self-employed activity or rental is an exclusive matter for a tax entity. Consequently, the tax entity had the legal right to choose whether to use a percentage of income for income from a self-employed activity and subsequently may not, in accordance with § 35ca of the Income Tax Act, claim a tax advantage on dependent children, or apply to such income the costs evidently incurred to achieve them and may then benefit the dependent children. If a tax entity decides to apply expenditure in a certain way, it cannot only view them in isolation, but is obliged to respect all the tax consequences that such a choice brings. On the basis of the above, the complainant's objection to a breach of the principle of equality cannot be attested, since the taxpayers who have voluntarily decided to apply the expenditure as a percentage of the revenue are not in a completely comparable situation to those who apply and demonstrate the expenditure actually incurred. The Appellate Body agreed with the conclusions of the first-stage tax administrator, which, in accordance with the dictation of the then applicable and effective Section 35ca of the Income Tax Act, did not recognise the complainant's claim for a tax advantage for dependent children. The complainant, as a tax entity for the sub-tax base provided for in Section 7 of the Income Tax Act, applied the expenditure by a percentage of the income under Section 7 (7) of the Income Tax Act and the tax sub-base under Section 7 of the last cited Act was higher than 50% of the total tax base.
4. The complainant states in the constitutional complaint that it is aware that a constitutional complaint can in principle only be lodged after all the procedural means provided by the law to protect its right have been exhausted. However, it considers that in the present case the condition laid down in Section 75 (2) (a) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, is fulfilled for the non-rejection of a constitutional complaint against non-enforcement. The impossibility of applying a tax advantage to children falls not only on the complainant, but also on hundreds of thousands of other persons, if they apply expenditure at a flat rate in accordance with § 7 or § 9 of the Income Tax Act. Therefore, the complainant asks the Constitutional Court to accept its constitutional complaint, even if it has not exhausted all the remedies which, moreover, could not ensure effective protection of its rights. In the present case, the administrative courts could not proceed otherwise than to stay the appeal proceedings of the complainant and submit a motion to the Constitutional Court for annulment of Paragraph 35ca of the Income Tax Act. The only difference would be that the whole thing could last a few years longer, which is not socially desirable.
5. The focus of the complainant's argument is that the legislator has decided to support families with children or persons with dependent children. However, with effect from 1 January 2013, the possibility of applying this advantage has been denied to those who apply expenditure by a percentage of income and the tax base thus determined amounts to more than 50% of the total income tax base. However, according to the complainant, it is not clear why the way in which expenditure is used by some parents should have an impact on whether or not their children will be supported by the State. The second reason for the inconstitutionality of Section 35ca of the Income Tax Act is, according to the complainant, the absurd condition of the 50% ratio between the total tax base and the partial tax base for which expenditure was applied at a flat rate. If the taxpayer has only income for which he has applied the flat rate, he is not entitled to the tax advantage. However, if, in addition to these revenues, there is sufficient revenue, for example from dependent activities, it is entitled to this advantage. In fact, the State is more supportive of children of those with higher total income than those with less total income. However, according to the complainant, this is contrary to elementary justice. Finally, the third reason for the inconstitutionality of § 35ca of the Income Tax Act is that the mechanism thus established for obtaining a tax advantage or tax rebate is based on a "sharp 50% limit '. In practice, according to the complainant, a family with a sub-base on dependent activity tax of just over 50% compared to the total tax base (the rest of the tax base, for example, comes from self-employment) has a higher net income of tens of percent. Such a situation is, according to the complainant, unsustainable, as it significantly affects the standard of living of persons, even if their level of income is virtually the same.
6. At the end of the constitutional complaint, the complainant further points out that, according to her information, a law has recently been adopted which should abolish the contested provision of the Income Tax Act. The complainant therefore proposes that "the Constitutional Court should state that the provisions of Section 35ca of the Income Tax Act, as amended by 31 December 2017, are unconstitutional '. As the Constitutional Court found from the database of House Prints available at http: / / www.psp.cz, the complainant refers to a law signed by the President of the Republic on 28 April 2017 (cf. House Prints No. 873 / 4), it was declared in the Collection of Laws under No. 170 / 2017 and, in accordance with Article 3 (3) of Act No. 309 / 1999 Coll., on the Collection of Laws and on the Collection of International Contracts, became effective on the 15th day following its publication. By this Act - i.e. Act No. 170 / 2017 Coll., amending certain laws in the field of taxation - Paragraph 142 repeals Paragraph 35ca of the Income Tax Act. In addition, according to Article II (13) of Act No. 170 / 2017 Coll.," [j] in the case of the tax period 2017, if the taxpayer has fulfilled the conditions for the application of Section 35ca of Act No. 586 / 1992 Coll., as effective before the date of entry into force of this Act, this provision shall not apply if the taxpayer is applying for this tax period pursuant to Sections 7 (7) and 9 (4) of Act No. 586 / 1992 Coll., as effective from the date of entry into force of this Act'. However, as already mentioned, this transitional provision does not concern the complainant's situation as it has been taxed for the 2015 tax period.
Conditions for referral of a motion to declare inconstitutionality § 35ca of the Income Tax Act, as amended by 30 June 2017, to the plenary of the Constitutional Court
7. The third Chamber of the Constitutional Court concluded that the application of Paragraph 35ca of the Income Tax Act, as amended by 30 June 2017, in the section "If the taxpayer applies the expenditure referred to in § 7 (7) or the expenditure referred to in § 9 (4) to the sub-base, and the sum of the sub-bases for which expenditure has been applied in this way is higher than 50% of the total tax base, it cannot [...] (b) claim a tax advantage '. For this reason, the III Chamber of the Constitutional Court, by order of 4 July 2017 No III of the ÚS 1221 / 17-16 (note: the decision of the Constitutional Court, including those not published in the Collection of Finances and Resolutions, is available at http: / / nalus.ujud.cz), the complainant's proposal to declare the inconstitutionality of that provision to the decision of the Constitutional Court in accordance with Article 87 (1) (a) of the Constitution.
8. By its proposal, the complainant opposed the whole of Section 35ca of the Income Tax Act, although, as is apparent from the recap made above, in the procedure in which the tax authorities charged the complainant a tax on the income of individuals for 2015, the complainant claimed entitlement to a benefit for a dependent child under Section 35c of the Income Tax Act, i.e. only part of its now contested provision should have been applied in its case, part of Section 35ca (b).
9. Paragraph 64 (1) (e) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 83 / 2004 Coll., provides that the application for annulment of the Act or its individual provisions is also entitled to be made by the person who lodged a constitutional complaint under the conditions set out in Section 74 of the Act. In the present case, as has just been pointed out, only a partial application of the contested provision took place. In accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure of the Constitutional Court, only the part of the contested provision which states: "If the taxpayer applies the expenditure referred to in § 7 (7) or the expenditure referred to in § 9 (4) to the sub-base, and the sum of the sub-bases for which the expenditure has been applied in this way is higher than 50% of the total tax base, the [...] b) cannot benefit from the tax advantage. 'Only this part of the proposal is satisfied with the requirement that the alleged violation of the constitutional rights has occurred as a result of the application of the unconstitutional law or its individual provision. On the contrary, in the part where the complainant opposes:" If the taxpayer applies the expenditure referred to in Article 7 (7) or the expenditure referred to in Article 9 (4), and the sum of the sub-bases for which the expenditure has been applied in this way, it is higher than 50% of the total tax base, it cannot (a) reduce the tax pursuant to Article 35ba (1) (b), "the application is made by a person manifestly unjustified and therefore rejected by the plenary of the Constitutional Court [cf.].
10. As the Third Chamber of the Constitutional Court also stated in Resolution No III. ÚS 1221 / 17-16, according to the caselaw, it follows from the present case that, in cases where a constitutional complaint is accompanied by an application for annulment of a law pursuant to Article 74 of Law No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Law No 48 / 2002 Coll., the application of which took place in the issuing of the contested decisions, the conditions for the admissibility of a constitutional complaint laid down in Article 75 (2) (a) of Law No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, i.e. that the complaint is substantially beyond the complainant's own interests; the decision of the Constitutional Court will therefore have a general scope [cf.
11. The Constitutional Court did not fail to see that in the past, both in fact and in fact a constitutional complaint was rejected by the Judge-Rapporteur as inadmissible pursuant to Article 43 (1) (e) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No 77 / 1998 Coll. Even then, the complainant did not contest the decision of the tax authorities on the means of defence provided by it in the context of the administrative judiciary and turned to the alleged overlap of its own interests pursuant to Article 75 (2) (a) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, directly to the Constitutional Court with a constitutional complaint related to the proposal under Article 74 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll., on the abolition of the then effective Article 35ca of the Law on Income Tax [cf. Resolution of the Constitutional Court of 16 December 2014 sp. In the present decision, the Judge-Rapporteur did not dispute that the restriction under Section 35ca of the Income Tax Act concerned a large number of entities (a statement of about thirty thousand taxpayers appears in the resolution itself), but at the time the Constitutional Court was not aware of any other case of proceedings for the control of the constitutionality of that provision, with the fact that even in other available resources the alleged non-constitutionality of that provision was not identified.
12. However, according to the Constitutional Court, these circumstances have changed in the meantime (cf. In addition to the fact that the proposal to abolish § 35ca of the Income Tax Act (or the proposal to establish its inconstitutionality), with an alleged overlap of its own interests, already appeared before the Constitutional Court [almost identical proposals in addition to the procedure in point II.II of the ÚS 3592 / 14 The Constitutional Court dealt, for example, under sp. zn. The Constitutional Court therefore considers that, in the present case, the conditions of a substantial overlapping of the complainant's own interests (on the date on which her application was lodged) are fulfilled.
13. The Constitutional Court also dealt in the past with the possibility of reviewing legislation which expired (Sections 66 and 67 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll.). As a general rule, this possibility was allowed in the decision of 10.1.2001 sp. zn. However, if it is concluded that the law to be applied in the resolution of the case (i.e. not only at that time valid but also at that time no longer valid but still applicable law) is contrary to constitutional law, it is obliged to bring the case before the Constitutional Court (Article 95 (2) of the Constitution). From that provision, the Constitutional Court added its obligation to decide on the application '.
14. The complainant can also, pursuant to Article 74 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll., propose only such legislation or its provision, the application of which was the subject of a constitutional complaint, i.e. on the basis of which the contested decision of the public authority was issued (which is fulfilled in the present case). This is therefore a similar condition to that of the court's application for annulment under Article 95 (2) of the Constitution. Therefore, there must be a close link between the constitutional complaint contested by the decision and the legislation (its individual provisions) proposed for annulment in the sense that, if it were not for the contested provision of the law, the contested decision would not have been issued.
15. The terms of the review of legislation which expired later specified the decision of the Constitutional Court, namely the finding of 28.3.2006 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 42 / 03 (N 72 / 40 SbNU 703; 280 / 2006 Sb.), the finding of 6.2.2007 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 38 / 06 as amended by the amending resolution of 3.4.2007 sp. zn. Pl. Pl. ÚS 38 / 06 (N 23 / 44 SbNU 279; 84 / 2007 Sb.), the finding of 25.10.2011 sp. Pl. ÚS 14 / 09 (N 183 / 63 SbNU 117; 22 / 2012 Sb.), the resolution of 9.2.2011 sp. In vertical relations, priority should be given to the protection of fundamental rights over legal certainty and trust in law; For these relations, the Constitutional Court has therefore made clear that the declaration of inconstitutionality will also have an impact on rights based on non-constitutional legislation.
16. The contested Section 35ca of the Income Tax Act (its above-defined relevant part) - in the context of the criterion of the vertical relationship - regulates the situation in which the addressee of the alleged inconstitutionality is public authority and not a private law body. In the case at hand, the conditions for the procedure for the specific control of standards pursuant to § 64 (1) (e) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 83 / 2004 Coll., or under § 74 of Law No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll., and in accordance with the legal opinion of the Constitutional Court expressed in the decisions cited, are therefore not justified in bringing the procedure under § 67 (1) of the Constitutional Court.
Observations of the parties and the intervener
17. The Constitutional Court, pursuant to Article 69 (1) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 18 / 2000 Coll., requested the observations of the parties to the proceedings of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic.
18. The Constitutional Court sent the application pursuant to § 69 (2) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, also to the Government of the Czech Republic ("the Government") and § 69 (3) of the same Law to the Ombudsman.
19. By letter dated 14 September 2017, the Ombudsman informed the Constitutional Court that she would not use the right to intervene.
20. The Chamber of Deputies, through its President, merely briefly summarized the content of the constitutional complaint and, consequently, the course of the legislative process, with the conclusion that Article 35ca of the Income Tax Act was eventually repealed by Act No. 170 / 2017 Coll., with effect from 1 July 2017.
21. The Senate's observations signed by its President Milan Štěm state, inter alia, that the provision was inserted into the Income Tax Act by Act No 500 / 2012 Coll., on the amendment of tax, insurance and other laws in connection with the reduction of public budget deficits. The Senate had already dealt with a similar draft law or similar provision before that Act (cf. Senate Document No 396). But both of these almost identical bills were rejected by the Senate, for discrimination against "married and people with children," and for "legislative and technical processing." The position of the Senate is thus consistent with that of the President. It is, however, entirely up to the Constitutional Court to assess autonomously the constitutionality of the contested legislative provision.
22. In its observations, the Government particularly stressed that this is as a result of the assessment of the political issue and that the Constitutional Court should always be restrained. According to the Government, the restriction laid down in the provision currently under consideration met both the formal and material aspects of legality and clearly followed the general (public) interest. According to the Government, the legislature did not do anything to please the legislature, as it sought to offset, inter alia, the tax burden on taxpayers who use the percentage equivalent of their spending and those who do not do so at all or to a lesser extent, and are thus taxpayers who, by their nature, have income mainly as employees from dependent activities. The complainant itself, according to the Government, does not claim that the restriction under Section 35ca of the Income Tax Act would have a suffocating effect. Finally, the Government stated that, in its view, the complainant's proposal should be rejected.
Replication of the complainant
23. In her reply, the complainant, in particular responding to the Government's observations, stated, inter alia, that the tax advantage on children is not only a tax institution, but an instrument of social policy. In assessing the constitutionality of the tax advantage reduction, the complainant considers it fairer if, for example, the legislature would withdraw a basic discount on the taxpayer from all spending by flat rate. In view of the legitimate objective (horizontal fairness) of the tax advantage, the legislator's withdrawal of only certain parts of the beneficiaries so far infringed the principle of equality of treatment, according to the complainant. In its reply, the complainant also considers that the quantitative limit (income level) can be a constitutional criterion only if the difference in treatment (tax rate) applies only to the amount by which the income exceeds the threshold but will not (at least generally) be constitutional if the crossing of the threshold results in other taxation of all income or income below that threshold.
Abandonment of oral proceedings
24. The Constitutional Court did not expect further clarification of the case from the oral hearing, therefore it abandoned it pursuant to § 44 of the First Law No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended.
Progress of the legislative process and assessment of its constitutional conformity
25. According to Article 68 (2) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll., the assessment of the constitutionality of the Act with a constitutional order consists of answering three questions: whether it was adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution, whether it was adopted in a constitutionally prescribed manner and whether its content complies with the constitutional laws.
26. The Constitutional Court, based on publicly available press releases from the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate (all available at www.psp.cz, www.senat.cz), found the following facts.
27. The government bill on the amendment of tax, insurance and other laws in connection with the reduction of government deficits, with which the government joined the request for a vote of confidence, was distributed to Members as press number 801 / 0 on 6 September 2012. The President of the Chamber of Deputies recommended, on 6 September 2012, as rapporteur of Ing. Pavel Suchanek, that he further propose that the bill be discussed by the Budget Committee. The first reading of the bill took place on 18 September 2012 at the 46th meeting and the bill was ordered to the committees (resolution 1267). The Committee on Budgets debated the bill on 12 October 2012 and its resolution was delivered to Members as Parliament Press 801 / 1 (amendments). The second reading took place on 24 October 2012 at the 47th meeting when the draft law passed a general and detailed debate. The amendments tabled were incorporated as press number 801 / 2. The third reading took place during the 47th meeting of 7 November 2012, with the bill being approved (vote 144, resolution 1354).
28. The bill was subsequently passed on to the Senate by the Chamber of Deputies on 8 November 2012, with the Senate registration number 442 / 0. The Committee on Economy, Agriculture and Transport (the rapporteur of which was Senator Jiří Lajtoch) was designated as the Guarantee Committee. In addition, the draft law cited was directed to the Constitutional and Regional Development, Public Administration and the Environment Committee. In doing so, the three committees appointed recommended the Senate to reject the bill. The Senate subsequently addressed the bill at its second meeting on 5 December 2012 and rejected the bill by its resolution 32.
29. The Chamber of Deputies then voted at its 49th meeting on the draft law, as returned by the Senate, but maintained the original text of the draft law (Resolution 1444).
30. The law was delivered to the President of the Republic on 19 December 2012 and it was signed. The Act in the Collection of Laws took effect on 27 December 2012 in the amount of 187, under the number 500 / 2012 Coll. and the Act became effective on 1 January 2013 with the exception of Part Eight, which entered into force on 1 January 2014, and Part 13, which entered into force on 1 January 2016.
31. On the basis of that Constitutional Court, it notes that Act No. 500 / 2012 Coll., including Section 35ca of the Income Tax Act, was adopted in compliance with the quorum and the majority of the votes set out in Article 39 (1) and (2) of the Constitution, duly signed and declared in the Collection of Laws; It was therefore issued by the Constitution in the prescribed manner and within the limits of the Constitution provided for in the competence.
Derogation of the contested provision
32. As mentioned above, the complainant linked its constitutional complaint to the proposal to repeal Section 35ca of the Income Tax Act, as amended by 30 June 2017. In this version, the provision cited was as follows:
"Where the taxpayer applies the expenditure referred to in Article 7 (7) or the expenditure referred to in Article 9 (4) for the sub-base, and the sum of the sub-bases for which the expenditure has been applied in this way is higher than 50% of the total tax base, he may not:
(a) reduce tax pursuant to Article 35ba (1) (b);
(b) apply a tax advantage. "
General bases of the constitutional review of tax legislation
33. The Constitutional Court has repeatedly dealt with the constitutionality of tax legislation in the procedure for checking standards. It takes the view that it cannot assess the optimity of the tax system, or it cannot assess tax laws from the point of view of fulfilling the basic functions of taxation, i.e. the functions of allocation, distribution and stabilisation. As stated in the finding of 21 April 2009, Pl. ÚS 29 / 08 (N 89 / 53 SbNU 125; 181 / 2009 Coll.), "the assessment of taxes on these criteria falls within the competence of the democratically elected legislator. If the Constitutional Court had acceded to it, it would have entered into the field of individual policies whose rationality cannot be well assessed from a constitutional point of view" (paragraph 58). Thus, the Constitutional Court does not intend to examine the consistency of tax policy with other policies of the State, as it would find itself "on a thin ice 'of not always conclusive analyses, the results of which are based to assess and derive from them political contexts to the democratic legislator, who must consider whether the tax regulation is appropriate and necessary (sp. zn.
34. However, the above-mentioned restraint does not mean the absolute exclusion of tax issues from the powers of the Constitutional Court or the resignation of the Constitutional Court of the review of tax laws from the point of view of their constitutional conformity, but only the maintenance of the necessary degree of restraint or judicial self-restraint in this review, precisely in order to maintain the principle of State power division (Article 2 (1) of the Constitution).
35. Article 11 (5) of the Charter provides for the possibility of constitutionally acceptable interference with property law on grounds of public interest, which is interested in collecting funds for the provision of various types of public goods (Ref. The assessment of the suitability and necessity of the various components of tax policy is left to the discretion of the democratically elected legislator if the impact of the tax on persons does not have a "suffocating effect '(not extremely disproportional) and does not further violate the principle of Accesoric and Non-Accessible Equality (sp. v. Pl. ÚS 29 / 08, paragraph 49). Thus, any public-law mandatory cash performance (tax, fee, financial penalties) cannot, in consequence, have a confiscation effect on the property of the individual [finding of 18.8.2004 sp. zn. ÚS 7 / 03 (N 113 / 34 CollNU 165; 512 / 2004 Coll.), Part VIII]. Therefore, the legislator must not intervene in property rights in such a way as to undermine the substance of the property itself or to destroy the taxpayer's property base [cf. also the finding of 13.8.2002 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 3 / 02 (N 105 / 27 SbNU 177; 405 / 2002 Coll.) or the finding of Pl. ÚS 29 / 08 (see above), paragraph 53].
36. Thus, when assessing the degree of intervention in the property rights of taxable entities, the abstention of the Constitutional Court in the area of tax laws is manifested in the lower intensity of the review of tax laws in the form of examination of only extreme disproportionality of tax burden (or impact of tax) instead of the application of proportionality in the form of an order for optimisation. Thus, the interference with property law on the basis of Article 11 (5) of the Charter in the form of a statutory tax will constitute an unconstitutional interference with property law only if its intensity is achieved by the so-called choking effect, i.e. if it has its extremely disproportionate amount of confiscation effects.
37. At the same time, however, the tax legislation must not be contradictory to the principle of equality, whether in the form of a prohibition of indiscretions in the determination of obligations or in the differentiation of entities and rights under Article 1 of the Charter or in the form of equality in the application of fundamental rights and freedoms under Article 3 (1) of the Charter.
Assessment by the Constitutional Court
38. As mentioned above, the complainant is of the opinion that there is no justifiable reason why some children should be deprived of State support only because their parent (one of the parents) does not apply the cost of production of income evidently incurred but uses the legal option of deducting expenditure at a percentage (flat rate). The entire scheme limiting the possibility of applying a discount on a spouse under § 35ba (1) (b) of the Income Tax Act, or tax advantage on a dependent child under § 35c of the Income Tax Act, is regarded as incompatible with constitutional principles, inter alia, for an absurd 50% threshold distinguishing the types of tax bases. This does not take into account the actual amount of the taxpayer's income - a high-income taxpayer, albeit not from self-employment - the advantage is conferred on him, but a much lower-income taxpayer cannot benefit from any of these benefits simply because his sub-base on the self-employment tax is too high, even if it is not nominally high. Finally, this is based on a difficult-to-tolerate inequality, where taxpayers in a comparable social situation have a lower income structure, in some cases even tens of percent, because of the excessively strained income structure.
39. In the light of these claims by the complainant, which are currently indicated by the general considerations, the Constitutional Court has examined the contested legal provision from the point of view of the intensity of the intervention in the right to the protection of property or property (Part IX / 1) and from the point of view of the right to equal treatment (Part IX / 2) and has reached the following conclusions:
On the matter of infringement of the fundamental right to the protection of property pursuant to Article 11 (1) and (5) of the Charter or Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
Assessment of the statutory tax base
40. Article 11 (5) of the Charter states: "Taxes and charges may be imposed only by law." Similarly, Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention ') provides for the treatment of the use of property as follows:" The previous provision does not prevent States from adopting laws which they consider necessary to regulate the use of property in accordance with the general interest and to ensure the payment of taxes and other charges or fines'.
41. In the present case, there is no dispute that tax regulation is established by law and this aspect is not even contested.
42. At the same time, however, it is necessary that the law also meets material criteria. In general, the decision-making practice of the European Court of Human Rights requires that the legislation (law) affecting the rights guaranteed by the Convention be clear, accessible and predictable (cf., for example, Spacek, s. r. o., against the Czech Republic, Case 26449 / 95 [1999] ECR 54, available in the same way as the other decisions cited by the European Court of Human Rights at http: / / hudoc.echr.coe.int).
43. It follows from the publicly available parliaments that Act No 500 / 2012 Coll., on the amendment of tax, insurance and other laws in the context of the reduction of public budget deficits, by which Section 35ca - as mentioned above - was inserted into the Income Tax Act, became applicable on 27 December 2012 and entered into force on 1 January 2013. Article II of Part One provides, inter alia, that "[p] ro tax liability on income taxes for the tax period before the date of entry into force of this Act, as well as on the rights and obligations relating thereto, Act No. 586 / 1992 Coll., as effective before the date of entry into force of this Act '. This means that the restrictions currently under assessment limiting the entitlement to a tax advantage were initially applied in 2014 to income tax for the 2013 tax period. On the basis of that, the Constitutional Court considers that the contested legislation is a clear, admissible and predictable rule of conduct in which the imposition of tax obligations took place under the law, as required by Article 11 (5) of the Charter. It also meets the material aspect of legality.
Assessment of the existence of a legitimate objective or of the general interest pursued by the tax obligation
44. In addition to the above aspects of legality, the Constitutional Court also deals with the existence of public (general) interest in assessing the constitutionality of tax rules. Even the European Court of Human Rights recognises that Member States have a wide margin of discretion in defining the general interest as a reason for intervening in the right to the protection of property, which is reflected in the considerable restraint in the eventual judicial review of the existence of the public interest (cf. Pinco and Pinca against the Czech Republic, judgment of 5.11.2002, Case No 36548 / 97, paragraphs 47 and 48). According to the explanatory memorandum (cf. House Press No. 801 / 0, Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, 6th term, 2010- 2013), the measure was intended to lead to an increase in revenue in particular from the state budget and to make public budget spending more effective. The limitation of the possibility of benefiting from an advantage under Section 35c of the Income Tax Act was part of a series of partial parametric adjustments in both the tax and social benefit payments, cf. (The scope of the law defines, inter alia, the explanatory memorandum by means of a solidarity increase in income tax, an increase in withholding tax, an increase in value added tax, an adjustment in the possibility of a refund of excise duty, an increase in real estate transfer tax, a unification of social benefits in housing, etc.). The limitation under consideration was to bring about CZK 7 billion for the years 2014 and 2015 to the state budget and the budgets of the municipalities and regions, in summary terms - that is to say, both for the benefit of the dependent child and for the discount on the spouse.
45. In its comments on the complainant's proposal, the Government added that the initial intention of introducing "spending flat rates" consisting in simplifying administration, in particular for taxpayers, began to disappear together with the way in which spending flat rates were increased and they started to serve as an unwanted instrument of tax optimisation. The legislator has therefore agreed to introduce an upper limit on expenditure against which the percentage equivalent of expenditure can be applied. According to the Government, the relevance of the legitimate objective (general interest) was not disputed either by the legislator, with effect from 1 July 2017 (Act No. 170 / 2017 Coll.), having decided to abolish the restrictive § 35ca of the Income Tax Act, because it decided to replace the effects of the restriction by further reducing the upper limits of expenditure against which the percentage equivalent of expenditure can be applied (the maximum amount of expenditure of CZK 1 200 000 could be used, after the mentioned amendment the expenditure can reach a maximum of CZK 600 000). The restriction under Section 35ca of the Income Tax Act, according to the Government, also resulted in some compensation between taxpayers who could not use the flat rates (for example because they only had income from dependent activities) and those who used them on the contrary.
46. On the basis of that, the Constitutional Court considers that the legitimate objective, or general interest, pursued by the contested legislation, is demonstrated here, whether it is an interest in increasing the revenue of the state budget or local public budgets or an interest in increasing the level of tax burden. Although the objectives are relatively general, the legislator has a relatively wide margin of discretion in this respect in order to implement its economic and social policy. The other question, however, is to assess how these objectives are to be achieved, both from the point of view of the intensity of intervention in property rights and from the point of view of the possible assessment of non-discrimination.
Assessment of the intensity of the intervention in property rights
47. In the light of the assessment of the intensity of the intervention in property rights in the field of the review of tax legislation, the Constitutional Court does not fundamentally examine the appropriateness and necessity of the various components of the tax policy, but only its possible choking (strangling) effect or possible confiscation effects in relation to the property nature of the taxpayer. Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights generally grants States wide discretion when intervening in property rights in order to seek a fair balance between the needs of the general interest of society and the protection of property rights, and its review is therefore limited to the requirement of a reasonable (rational) basis of intervention or the absence of obvious inadequacy (cf. Benet Czech, spol. s r. o., v., v., v.
48. None of these consequences is claimed by the complainant in its submissions, nor has the Constitutional Court noticed that the legislation under review is directed or even directed towards a "choking effect." Although the tax advantage is intended to improve the financial situation of families with a dependent child, it can therefore be included in a wider system of support to families (as pointed out by the complainant itself, if the tax advantage in question is an effective social benefit for persons with an annual income greater than six times the minimum wage), on the other hand, this benefit is not linked, for example, to an institution of living minima to ensure self-sufficiency, economic certainty and livelihood to an acceptable extent (cf. The Act on aid in material distress. The Law of Life and Existence. Praha: Wolters Kluwer, 2016, p. 237). The contested restriction of the advantage, which is the very essence of the complainant's proposal, is not in itself derived from the life minimum (which does not apply, for example, to the child allowance) and, in contrast to the tax rebate on the taxpayer under Section 35ba of the Income Tax Act, does not constitute a guarantee of the minimum tax-free amount [cf. paragraphs 52 et seq., of the Constitutional Court's finding of 10.7.2014 sp. (Pl. ÚS 31 / 13 (N 138 / 74 SbNU 141; 162 / 2014 Coll.); This aspect is ignored by the complainant in its reply, stating that the withdrawal of the taxpayer discount would not be discriminatory as it would apply to all]. Finally, the application of flat-rate payments does not (nor does it) exclude the use of other social aid benefits. Moreover, the provision under review is neutral to the extent that it does not distinguish between taxpayers - natural persons - primarily and exclusively according to the type or structure of their income, but the choice of the type of taxation that taxpayers have made for themselves is decisive. Thus, the taxpayers themselves were able to consider whether it constituted a greater financial advantage for them to apply unspecified expenditure or whether it was more advantageous for them to specify (prove) their expenditure and thus obtain a tax advantage. Moreover, if the restriction under the relevant wording of Section 35ca of the Income Tax Act is to lead to a "stifling effect ', it would have to mean that only a combination of flat-rate application of expenditure and tax advantages under Section 35c of the Income Tax Act ensures that families with children dependent on self-sufficiency, livelihood and economic security are still in acceptable scope. This is certainly not the case, because the acceptable level of living is provided by a much wider range of measures. Nor does the complainant itself - as has already been pointed out - argue the opposite in its constitutional complaint or in the reply, but notes itself that the restriction on her and her family's" choking effect "and other extremely severe effects do not have. In addition, according to the Constitutional Court, the contested legislation does not constitute a disproportionate burden for the taxpayers to whom it falls, having a" choking effect' on their property or income base. On the other hand, the aspect of respect for non-discrimination is essential, which the complainant in the constitutional complaint refers both to individuals whose real level of income may not correlate with the possibility (not) to claim a tax advantage for itself, and to more than 50% of the tax base for which expenditure has been set at a percentage rate.
The infringement of the fundamental right to equal treatment (prohibition of discrimination) guaranteed by Articles 1 and 3 (1) of the Charter and Article 14 of the Convention
General basis for the review
49. The Constitutional Court, following the complainant's argument and its previous case-law, states that the constitutional right to equal treatment or non-discrimination is guaranteed, on the one hand, in Article 1 of the Charter as a separate fundamental right, which can be sought directly and without further action (equality non-accesoric, autonomous) and, on the other hand, as a fundamental right conditional on which it can be sought pursuant to Article 3 (1) of the Charter or Article 14 of the Convention, only in conjunction with the alleged interference with another fundamental right or freedom protected by the Charter or by the Convention (equality, non-autonomous).
50. Having regard to the fact that, in its caselaw, the Constitutional Court gradually admitted, in addition to the constitutional protection of equality in fundamental rights, in accordance with Article 3 (1) The Charter also provides for the constitutional protection of equality in all rights, or the general prohibition of arbitrariness in accordance with Article 1 of the Charter, as the distinction between accessorial or non-accesorial equality in law-control proceedings before the Constitutional Court is not of fundamental importance, since all possible objections relied on by a breach of accesoric equality are always covered by the protection of non-accesoric equality.
51. The review itself is not primarily dependent on whether or not unequal treatment takes place in relation to another constitutionally guaranteed law. However, the reason for the different treatment and, at the same time, the specific right or the good in respect of which it is treated differently is crucial. This must be in line with the claims made by the Constitutional Court to justify the legitimacy of the different treatment (cf. below).
52. In the case of distinct treatment for so-called suspicious classification, or those relating to the personal characteristics of an individual having a close relationship with the protection of human dignity, it is necessary to make very strict claims to justify the different treatment. On the contrary, if different treatment (distinguishing character) is a criterion normally and strictly applied in a particular area of legal regulation (e.g. the amount or structure of income in tax legislation), even if different treatment would affect another fundamental right, as in the case at hand, the intensity of the constitutional review will be low.
Assessment of the alleged infringement of accesorial equality
53. According to Article 3 (1) of the Charter, "[from] the rights and freedoms of [...] shall be guaranteed to all without distinction between sex, race, colour, language, faith and religion, political or other thinking, national or social origin, membership of a national or ethnic minority, property, genus or other status'. Similarly, pursuant to Article 14: The Convention must be ensured that the rights and freedoms granted by the Convention are used without discrimination based on any reason such as sex, race, skin colour, language, religion, political or other thinking, national or social origin, membership of a national minority, property, family or other status.
54. In the present case, the alleged inequality affects another constitutionally guaranteed right, namely the protection of property rights. According to the complainant, inequality is to be based on a criterion derived from family status and parenthood, as the complainant considers that the State supports - as the complainant expressly states - only the children of those parents whose incomes are higher overall. In this context, the Constitutional Court first considered whether the complainant's claim for parental and family status criteria could be understated - in the context of the assessment of accesorial equality - under one of the grounds set out in Article 3 (1) of the Charter or Article 14 of the Convention. It took into account that, in its case-law, the European Court of Human Rights makes a distinction according to the criterion of parenthood or family status under the criterion of "other status', since it considers it to be similar to those expressly mentioned in Article 14 of the Convention (cf. Petrov v v v Bulgaria, 22.5.2008, complaint No 15197 / 02, or Sahin v Germany, judgment of 8.7.2003, complaint No 30943 / 96).
55. On the other hand, the Constitutional Court assessed whether the legislator had actually used the alleged - and suspected - grounds under Article 3 (1) of the Charter and Article 14 of the Convention. According to the Constitutional Court, this is not the case. In fact, the distinguishing criterion is the nature of the various tax bases and the method of determining the expenditure needed to achieve income. Nor is it, in substance, the complainant's claim that the arrangements laid down in Section 35ca of the Income Tax Act without further supporting the higher-income parents. It is possible, of course, that a parent who does not apply or cannot apply expenditure by reference to a legally determined percentage has higher income than a parent who makes use of the possibility of determining expenditure in percentage terms to the extent that he is not entitled to benefit under Section 35c of the Income Tax Act. This does not in itself indicate any constitutional discrepancy. The purpose of that provision was not to create a border from which taxpayers - parents have such high incomes that they should not benefit from the advantage. The provision under review was based only on the fact that the reporting of expenditure by a percentage equivalent is generally more advantageous to the taxpayer and therefore the tax advantage does not apply to the taxpayer from a certain proportion of tax bases (or from the application of different methods of application of expenditure). If the use of flat-rate expenditure in a particular case would not be advantageous to the taxpayer, the taxpayer could have used the expenditure actually incurred (proven). After all, neither does the complainant claim; In addition, only at the conclusion of the constitutional complaint states that, after the Income Tax Act was incorporated into Section 35ca, a number of taxpayers could not apply actual expenditure because they would have had to supply stocks and receivables, which would have been liquidation.
56. According to the Constitutional Court, it can therefore be concluded that the criterion of the tax base (or the method of calculating the expenditure thereof) is an element entirely neutral, in no way and primarily suspicious and normal for tax rules. According to the provision under review, the taxpayer has always been able to choose how to use his expenditure. In a situation where, for any reason, it decided on the percentage equivalent of expenditure, it could, if it met the conditions laid down, benefit from benefits provided by the social support and assistance system (cf., by analogy, point 48 of the decision to do so).
57. Since the legislature did not apply any suspicious criteria in § 35ca of the Income Tax Act (cf. As mentioned above, the measure under Section 35ca of the Income Tax Act was intended, on the one hand, to strengthen the state budget and local budgets, on the other hand, to offset certain disadvantages for those taxpayers who could not apply the percentage expenditure, on the other hand, compared with those who did. The Constitutional Court concludes that the alleged infringement of Article 3 (1) of the Charter and Article 14 of the Convention has not been found, since none of the reasons listed here, including "other status' in the case of the provision under assessment, has been applied.
Assessment of the alleged non-operational equality breach
58. According to the first sentence of Article 1 of the First Charter, "[l] even men are free and equal in dignity and in rights." The principle of equality thus enshrined excludes, inter alia, the choice of the legislature to distinguish the rights of certain groups of entities [cf., for example, the findings of 4.6.1997 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 33 / 96 (N 67 / 8 CollU 163; 185 / 1997 Coll.), of 25.6.2002 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 36 / 01 (N 80 / 26 SbNU 317; 403 / 2002 Sb.), sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 7 / 03 (see above) or of 15.5.2012 sp.
59. From the point of view of the applicability of equality in rights, or of the general prohibition of arbitrage in any distinction arising from Article 1 There is no doubt in the Charter that the principle is applicable to the case under examination, since the subject matter of the review is different treatment, namely the different treatment between two groups of taxpayers, where one of them was entitled to an advantage under Section 35c of the Income Tax Act and others were not, depending on how and to what extent they applied their expenditure necessary to achieve their income.
60. At the same time, the Constitutional Court consistently requires that the legislator, in any distinction between situations or entities (whether or not matters relating to fundamental rights are subject to legislation) avoid libel, i.e. unfounded discrimination. As the Constitutional Court has already stated many times, the State may decide to grant less benefits to one group than others, but it must not proceed arbitrarily and its decision must show that it does so in the public interest [cf., for example, the finding of 1.12.1999 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 17 / 99 (N 174 / 16 SbNU 267; 3 / 2000 Sb.), the finding of 9.3.2004 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 2 / 02 (N 35 / 32 SbNU 331; 278 / 2004 Sb.) or the already cited finding of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 31 / 13]. The case-law concluded that the principle of equal treatment was infringed when different entities in the same or comparable situation were treated differently without any objective and reasonable grounds for the different approach applied [see e.g. the finding of 21.1.2003 sp. zn. ÚS 15 / 02 (N 11 / 29 SbNU 79; 40 / 2003 Sb.)]. In addition, the Constitutional Court also requires [cf., for example, the finding of 28 June 2016 sp. zn. Therefore, the principle of horizontal justice, which can be interpreted as meaning that taxpayers with the same (similar) financial performance are also taxed in the same way.
61. This principle, however, was maintained in the restriction laid down in Section 35ca of the Income Tax Act, according to the conviction of the Constitutional Court. This is indirectly apparent from the complainant's own argument, since, as has already been mentioned (albeit in another context), it admits that if some taxpayers should prove "only" their actual expenses, it would be liquidation for them. Without the Constitutional Court being responsible for defining itself against the telling value of such a statement by the complainant, it may at least assume that the complainant itself, albeit implicitly, admits that the possibility of applying expenditure in percentage equivalent, usually gives taxpayers a non-negligible administrative but also financial advantage. In fact, the context of the complainant's statement is based only on the law itself, where the highest benefit per child is currently CZK 24 204 per third and every other child per year, on the contrary, the equivalent of the expenses can be claimed by the taxpayer - in a simplified manner - in the range of CZK 800 000 (maximum limit) or CZK 300 000 (lowest limit) per year. At first sight, it is clear that the possibility of applying a percentage equivalent of expenditure is in different order from the potential benefit to the child (children). The general telling value of this is not even reduced by the fact that many of the taxpayers are far from achieving these limits - their (partial) tax base is much smaller - or their expenditure actually reaches those limits. In that case, however, they were able to make use of their actual costs and the benefit for the child belonged to them under Section 35ca of the Income Tax Act. In fact, the complainant itself does not bring anything in the constitutional complaint to question this consideration. Either the use of the percentage equivalent for taxpayers is advantageous either financially (when the second option could be useful for many taxpayers - in the words of the complainant - liquidation) or administratively, or it is not, and therefore it will not be used. While it is understandable that the complainant seeks to combine flat-rate expenses and benefits for the past tax period, it does not, in its constitutional complaint, provide any convincing argument as to why such a combination should be fairer (or generally) in its case, that is, why it should better comply with the above-defined principle of horizontal justice when imposing tax obligations. The complainant also does not explain (cf. its reply) in what way the proposed solution - that is, the withdrawal of the fee rebate from the taxpayer to those who apply their expenditure in the legal equivalent - should be fairer than the solution currently under review, except that it would clearly concern a much wider group of taxpayers. In addition, the Income Tax Act continues to limit the combination of an advantage under Section 35c of the Income Tax Act and certain investment incentives, for example, to the modernisation of production. In this case, too, the principle of balancing various tax advantages is applied, on which nothing unconstitutional can be found.
62. According to the Constitutional Court, the latter conclusion must also be applied to the fact that the provision under assessment for the activation of the restriction laid down therein used the criteria of the above-half partial tax base to which the percentage expenditure was related (as such). The complainant argues that, in its constitutional complaint, the "sharp 'limit of 50% - clearly inspired by the above-cited finding of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 18 / 15 - fails to see that in this finding the Constitutional Court did not define en bloc against the possibility of using" sharp borders' or tax zones in the tax legislation (e.g. point 131 of the sp. zl. ÚS 18 / 15), but whether and to what tax base or income the tax zone should apply. The case at hand with the situation of old-age pensioners with an additional income of more than CZK 840 000 per year is no longer comparable because these old-age pensioners were subject to taxation - that is, not to say that they would be denied any benefit as in the case at hand - with the fundamental difference that they could not have chosen another tax scheme in which their old-age pension - as in the case of other old-age pensioners with a lower income - they could not have neglected (for that reason only the complainant's proposals that the permissible "taxation" tax advantage "would have been only reduced by a certain part, for example, could not be relevant for the assessment of the constituency of the contested provision). At the time, the Constitutional Court held that the legislator decided to tax an old-age pension (which may not have been at all high) and not just the above-standard income (or part of it) that the old-age pensioner achieved. As you can see, the inconstitutionality of the case at the time was not solely that the legislator chose the" sharp limit "of additional income of CZK 840 000 per year, but in what tax mechanism, taking into account this amount for taxation of the above-standard income of old-age pensioners. Both cases cannot be compared according to the Constitutional Court. The complainant also ignores the fundamental circumstance in its entire argument: although the overall tax base for several taxpayers may be equal, income taxation will be different only according to the type of tax base itself. But even such a circumstance is not unconstitutional in itself.
63. Thus, even when assessing compliance with the principle of non-accesorial equality, the Constitutional Court did not conclude that the degree of different treatment between groups of taxpayers under Section 35ca of the Income Tax Act would be clearly disproportionate. According to the Constitutional Court, the contested provision does not constitute an arbitrary distinction and, on the contrary, according to the Constitutional Court, it can be accepted that it is justified in a factual and rational manner and does not infringe the prohibition on unequal treatment guaranteed by Article 1 of the Charter.
Conclusion
64. In the light of these considerations and in relation to the complainant's own proposal, the Constitutional Court concludes that there are no grounds for establishing the non-constitutionality of § 35ca of the Income Tax Act, as amended by 30 June 2017, in that part of it, which reads: "If the taxpayer applies to a partial tax base pursuant to § 7 (7) or to a partial tax base pursuant to § 9 (4) and the sum of the sub-bases for which the expenditure was thus applied is higher than 50% of the total tax base, he cannot [...] (b) claim a tax advantage ', since that part of the provision is not contrary to the constitutional order of the Czech Republic. Therefore, the complainant's proposal in this section under Paragraph 70 (2) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, was rejected. In the section which reads:" If the taxpayer applies the expenditure referred to in Article 7 (7) or the expenditure referred to in Article 9 (4), and the sum of the sub-bases for which the expenditure has been applied in this way is higher than 50% of the total tax base, it cannot (a) reduce the tax pursuant to Article 35ba (1) (b), "the complainant's proposal was then rejected as a person manifestly unjustified [Paragraph 43 (1) (c), in conjunction with Article 43 (2) (b) of the Act 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by the legislation].
President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr. Rychetský v. r.
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Regulation Information
| Citation | The Constitutional Court found no. 69 / 2018 Coll., on the application to declare the inconstitutionality of Section 35ca of Act No. 586 / 1992 Coll., on Income Tax, as effective until 30 June 2017 |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | - |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 27.04.2018 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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