Communication from the Constitutional Court No 57 / 2023 Coll.
Communication from the Constitutional Court on the adoption of the Opinion of the plenary of the Constitutional Court of 7 February 2023 sp. zn.
Valid
57
COMMUNICATION
The Constitutional Court
The Plenum of the Constitutional Court was adopted on 7 February 2023 under sp. zn. Pl. ÚS- st. 58 / 23 by the President of the Court of First Instance Pavel Rychetský and the Judges Ludvík David, Jaroslav Fenyk, Josef Fiala, Jan Filip, Jaromir Jirsa, Tomáš Licenčník, Vladimir Sládeček, Pavel Šámal, Vojtěch Šimek (Judge of the Rapporteur), Milada Tomková, David Uhlář and Jiří Zemánek, on the proposal of the III. Chamber of the Constitutional Court of the Constitutional Court of the Constitutional Court of the Constitutional Court of the Constitutional Court of the Constitutional Court of 2. 8. 2021 sp.
the following opinion:
A constitutional complaint against a court order which has been decided that a judge is not excluded from the hearing and decision of the case on which he is to take a decision or act according to the schedule of proceedings and which has been rejected by an appeal against that order is inadmissible (Section 75 (1) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended).
Reasons
Reasons for submitting an opinion
1. The complainant seeks the annulment of the order of the Supreme Court in Olomouc ("the Supreme Court") of 10.11.2022 No. 12 VSOL 334 / 2022- 136, which was decided by the Judge of the Regional Court in Brno ("the Regional Court") JUDr. Jaroslav Pospíchal is not excluded from hearing and decision of the case taken at the Regional Court under sp. zn. 32 ICm 358 / 2022 (KSBR 31 INS 25648 / 2014). According to the Supreme Court, no facts are given in the case at hand that give rise to any reason to doubt the integrity of the appointed judge or that give rise to his exclusion. The proceedings may therefore be continued with the appointment of a Judge to take appropriate action and decisions. However, the complainant considers that the decision of the Supreme Court infringes his fundamental rights to a legal judge and to a fair trial.
2. In examining this constitutional complaint, the Third Chamber of the Constitutional Court found that the earlier caselaw of the local court concerning the admissibility of the constitutional complaint lodged against the order of the court which decided not to exclude a judge for bias was inconsistent. There are dozens of resolutions rejecting similar constitutional complaints for inadmissibility pursuant to § 43 (1) (e) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Law No. 77 / 1998 Coll., which is contrary to the procedure to which the Constitutional Court adopted, in its judgment of 2.8.2021 sp. zn. II. ÚS 741 / 21 (all decisions of the Constitutional Court are available under https: / / nalus.ujud.cz), the constitutional complaints lodged against the decision on the insubordination of the Court of First Instance in Brno and the Regional Court of First Instance in Brno were annulled as nonconstitutional. The III Chamber of the Constitutional Court is bound by this finding pursuant to Article 89 (2) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution).
3. Therefore, the Third Chamber of the Constitutional Court followed the procedure under Article 23 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the proceedings for a constitutional complaint brought under sp. zn. III. The ÚS 3576 / 22 suspended and referred the application to the full court for an opinion on a legal opinion derogating from the legal opinion (implicitly) contained in the decision of 2.8.2021 sp. zn. II. ÚS 741 / 21.
The prevailing decision-making practice of the Constitutional Court and the finding of sp. zn. II. ÚS 741 / 21
4. The Constitutional Court, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity in its numerous caselaw [cf. order of 4.1.2023 sp. zn. IV. ÚS 3409 / 22; order of 11.10.2022 sp. zn. I. ÚS 2646 / 22; order of 4.10.2022 sp. zn. III. ÚS 2373 / 22; order of 13.9.2022 sp. zn. II. ÚS 2312 / 22; order of 16.1.2020 sp. zn. IV. ÚS 4037 / 19 (U 1 / 98 SbNU 381); Resolution of 18.1.2017 sp. zn. I. ÚS 359 / 16; Resolution of 20.2.2018 sp. zn. I. ÚS 4079 / 17; Resolution of 17.9.2019 sp. zn. II. ÚS 2946 / 19; Resolution of 15.6.2016 sp. zn. IV. ÚS 587 / 16; Resolution of 10.5.2016 sp. zn. IV. ÚS 3117 / 15; Resolution of 30.9.2016 sp. zn. I. ÚS 2625 / 16; Resolution of 2.1.2018 sp. zn. II. ÚS 4040 / 17; Resolution of 23.3.2020 sp. zn. II. ÚS 4042 / 19 and others], the subject of its decision on a complaint may be an assessment of the understatement of the subject of the question justifying of the judge of the question.
5. This conclusion, as well as the resulting consequence of the inadmissibility of the constitutional complaint pursuant to Article 75 (1) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as "the Constitutional Court Act '), was applied by the local court to cases where, as is the case with the complainant, the constitutional complaint was challenged by a resolution that the judge was not excluded from hearing and ruling the case. It was based on the fact that any defective assessment of such an objection could be rectified by the competent authorities during the procedure and the logical consequence of this legal opinion is that the Constitutional Court can only be called upon to check their procedure after the completion of the procedure. By issuing a decision on the objection of bias, the procedure on the substance of the case is not terminated and the complainant remains at the disposal of the procedural means by which the alleged misconduct can be remedied.
6. The Constitutional Court, however, diverted from these conclusions in the decision of page II of the ÚS 741 / 21 of 2.8.2021. In the present proceedings, a constitutional complaint was challenged by the order of the City Court in Brno, which was decided on the unbiased nature of the ruling judge and the Regional Court in Brno, which rejected the complainant's subsequent complaint. The Constitutional Court upheld this constitutional complaint and annulled the contested decisions, with the general courts failing to adequately assess the objective impartiality of the judge, whose complainant considered him prejudiced.
7. The question of admissibility, as well as other conditions of the constitutional complaint procedure, was not explicitly addressed by the Constitutional Court in this finding. However, from the fact that the constitutional complaint was not rejected in the purposes of the caselaw cited above for inadmissibility but was assessed in substance and was even granted, it is sufficiently clear that the constitutional complaint was found admissible and that this implicit and factual conclusion is therefore binding in the above sense on the decision of the Constitutional Court in similar cases, i.e. where the decision that the judge is not prejudiced is contested. The Constitutional Court has in the past accepted a substantive review of the decisions which decided not to exclude a judge, also in the judgment of 7.3.2007 sp. zn. I. ÚS 722 / 05 (N 42 / 44 CollNU 533) and in the criminal case in the judgment of 6.12.2016 sp. zn. III. ÚS 2759 / 16 (N 236 / 83 SbNU 667) and in the judgment of 25.4.2017 sp. zn. IV. ÚS 2213 / 16 (N 65 / 85 SbNU 159).
8. For the sake of completeness, it should be added that the Constitutional Court, in a number of cases, rejected constitutional complaints against decisions which were decided on the unbiased nature of the ruling judge, also in the form of resolutions rejecting constitutional complaints for their apparent unfounded reasons under Paragraph 43 (2) (a) of the Constitutional Court Act (cf. Resolution of 15.11.2022 sp. zn. II. ÚS 2843 / 22; of 27.4.2021 sp. zn. II. ÚS 960 / 21 or of 5.9.2017 sp. It is thus clear that the inconsistency of the Constitutional Court's action on this procedural issue is not only based on the finding in point II.II of the ÚS 741 / 21, but also on a number of Senate resolutions.
9. Finally, the Constitutional Court states that it has different approaches to decisions by which the court will comply with the objection of bias; a constitutional complaint against such a decision is not admissible [cf. e.g. resolution of 15.4.2014 sp. zn. II. ÚS 594 / 14 or the finding of 4.8.2020 sp. zn. I. ÚS 629 / 20 (N 158 / 101 SbNU 105)]. Therefore, if the complainant wishes to annul the decision to exclude a judge for the purpose of contradicting his right to a legal judge, it must be assumed that the complainant has already exhausted all procedural means to protect his right, since any constitutional deficit cannot be effectively remedied in the ongoing (judicial) proceedings (cf. paragraph 13 of the Resolution of 13 November 2018 sp. zn. IV ÚS 3169 / 18).
Independence of the judicial authority and impartiality of the Judge and his procedural guarantees
10. The Constitutional Court states that the impartiality (independence) of the Court cannot be seen only by a person of a particular judge, but it also has its unforgivable basis of the system. This is already due to the establishment of a judicial authority in the Constitution (cf. Article 81 et seq.), which in a way balances the influence of legislative and executive power. In view of the constitutional provisions, there is also a basic scheme of the system of general courts, which cannot be changed in any way, neither can it be supplemented by extraordinary courts, thus influencing decisions in certain cases. Thus, it is not only the basic characteristics of the function of a judge and the manner in which it is carried out that the Constitution determines the characteristics of the court itself and its links with the courts of others, as well as other elements of the State which are also entrusted with the exercise of public authority.
11. If the Constitution provides that the judicial authority is exercised by impartial and independent courts, or by impartial and independent judges, who, in their activities, must follow the rules of a fair trial [cf. Article 1 (1) of the Constitution, or by virtue of the fifth Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as "the Charter")], it thus defines the guarantees of the materially understood exercise of the judicial authority [cf. Section V of the Found of 26.4.2005 sp. zn. ÚS 11 / 04 (N 89 / 37 SbNU 207; 220 / 2005 Sb.)]. Such interpretation shall also correspond to the interpretation of the term "court 'within the meaning of Article 6 (1) of the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (" the Convention'); As a court, an authority established by law ("established by law ') carrying out its activities in accordance with the law (" on the basis of rules of law') may therefore be accepted when proceedings before such an authority are conducted in the prescribed manner (see, for example, paragraph 36 of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 22.10.1984 in Case No 8790 / 79 Sramek v Austria).
12. Only in the context of such a court and the entire judicial system can it be considered an independent and impartial judge. In this context, according to the Constitutional Court, it is necessary to mention in particular his personality and psychological integrity as an unconditional precondition for the fulfillment of impartiality and independence envisaged by the Constitution as far as possible. The personal characteristics referred to, as well as expertise, shall be examined for individual applicants for a judicial function by means of a system of selection procedures, preparatory practice and professional examinations.
13. The fact that no one must be a judge in his own cause (nemo iudex in causa sua) has already considered Aristotle to be a notoriet when he pointed out that everyone judges from his own perspective: "For example, the law is considered equality, and it is, but not for all, but only for equals; Thus inequality is regarded as a right, and it is indeed a right, but not for all, but only for the unequal. But it is left out for whom the right is due, and they judge falsely. That's because the court is dealing with the judge himself; and most people in their own affairs are bad judges." (Politics. 3. Vyd. Praha: Petr Rezek, 2009, p. 113). At another point the same author recalls that "even doctors, when they are sick themselves, call on other doctors, and gym teachers, if they want to practice themselves, other teachers, in the knowledge that they cannot judge properly because they judge about their own affairs and excited" (there, p. 131).
14. The exclusion of judges for their bias therefore constitutes one of the fundamental attributes of the status of judicial authority under the conditions of the rule of law, which has a direct impact on the equal status of the parties to the proceedings (e.g. Jirsa, J. et al. The key to the courtroom. Issue 2. Praha: Wolters Kluwer ČR, 2018, p. 45). It is clear that if a judge were to decide in any way interested in the outcome of the proceedings, it would not be independent and impartial.
15. The Constitutional Court therefore consistently judges [cf.
16. This principle, that no one must be a judge in their case, is expressly regulated by all the procedural rules of the courts, in the same way. The law distinguishes cases of exclusion for bias by law (iudex inhabilis) and on the basis of the objection of bias (iudex suspectus). Therefore, the arrangements contained in the various procedural rules recognise the situation where the judge for his relationship with the case, the participants or their representatives, the relationship with the defenders and the other persons directly concerned by the action, the relationship with the other authorities is for a reason to doubt his bias or whether he can make an impartial decision or act in which proceedings. Judges shall also be excluded if they have previously participated in or otherwise have been involved in the decision-making of the case and should, in such a situation - in a simplified manner - assess the accuracy of their own considerations which they have made in the case as a judge (or other public authority). The procedure for deciding whether, in a particular case, the grounds for the exclusion of a judge may then differ partially depending on who proposes the exclusion of a judge, i.e. whether a party to the proceedings or the judge himself [in addition to this, it is possible to distinguish whether a particular judge is excluded from hearing (decision) a case directly from the law or to object to his own or a party to the proceedings - see also point 50 of the judgment of 11 July 2017 sp. zn.
17. This categorisation is followed by the division of the impartiality of the judge - viewed from a subjective and objective point of view. It is assumed that impartiality is primarily a subjective psychological category expressing the judge's psychological relationship to the case in a broader sense (i.e. to the subject matter of the proceedings, to its participants or their representatives), which only he is able to report most accurately about. However, only an internal category of impartiality would be insufficient in a democratic rule of law to guarantee fair legal proceedings, and therefore it is also accompanied by an objective criterion of impartiality. For its assessment, it is not only an external observer's assessment (e.g. a party to the proceedings) that is relevant, but also whether there are objective circumstances that might lead to doubts as to whether the judge is genuinely unbiased in relation to the matter in the wider sense [cf., e.g. the finding of 31.8.2004 sp. zn. I. ÚS 371 / 04 (N 121 / 34 SbNU 255)]. In fact, according to the Constitutional Court, the Court of First Instance also states that "the Court must not only be done: it must also be seen to be done '. Thus, when assessing judicial impartiality, it must be based not only on the conviction of a particular judge, but also on that sufficiently objective and visible guarantees to exclude reasonable doubt about its impartiality. While the question of impartiality can never be fully established (in relation to subjective impartiality, this is assumed until proven otherwise), the answer to which can be brought by analysing objective facts that might call into question impartiality in a particular judge. However, the assessment of these objective facts must be carried out with particular prudence and knowledge that the exclusion of a judge constitutes an intervention in the constitutional right to a legal judge (Article 38 (1) of the Charter).
18. The various procedural rules lay down the procedure for the exclusion (bias) of a particular judge. Exclusion of a judge in specified cases under Act No. 99 / 1963 Coll., Civil Code, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as "o.s.) '; § 14 et seq.) shall be decided by the judge himself or, where appropriate, by the President of the court whose judge is to be excluded from the decision. If the President of the Court does not himself find any grounds for expulsion of the Judge, the Board of Appeal shall decide on the exclusion. Any exclusion of Supreme Court Judges shall then be decided by another Supreme Court Chamber. Pursuant to Article 8 of Act No. 150 / 2002 Coll., the Administrative Rules, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as" p.'), are decided by the President of the Court of First Instance, whose judge is to be biased and, failing the grounds for bias itself, by the Supreme Administrative Court or by another Chamber of the Supreme Administrative Court, if it is precisely the bias of one of the Judges of the Supreme Administrative Court. The decision to exclude is somewhat different in criminal proceedings. In criminal proceedings on any grounds of exclusion, the authority to which the grounds of exclusion apply shall decide; the exclusion of a judge or adjudicator in the Chamber shall be decided by that Chamber (cf. paragraphs 30 and 31 of Act No. 141 / 1961 Coll., the criminal proceedings of the judicial (criminal), as amended). The exclusion of a Supreme Court Judge shall be decided by another Chamber of the same court in criminal proceedings. A complaint under Paragraph 141 et seq. of the Code of Criminal Procedure is admissible against decisions of this kind, decided by the authority directly superior to the authority which issued the decision (or another Senate of the Supreme Court).
19. In addition to the sub-procedures so indicated under the various procedural rules, the impartiality of the judge may also be challenged by ordinary and exceptional remedies. An objection to the ruling of an excluded judge may be invoked in the context of an appeal under Article 205 (2) (a) and (2) (a) (c), and that fact also constitutes a separate ground for which a court's decision may be challenged by an action for confusion pursuant to Article 229 (1) (e) (c) (k) of the Rules of Procedure, if the appeal is admissible. An argument of impartiality (unbiased) may also be made as part of an appeal and an appeal in criminal proceedings (if the decision has been taken by the excluded authority, the plea may be relied on against a judge of the Court of First and Second Instance). On the contrary, such a plea of appeal is not an acceptable ground of order, if the appellant uses it only in the appeal, even though the circumstances relating to doubts as to the impartiality of the judge were already known at the previous stages of the proceedings.
20. Such a restriction also corresponds to the interpretation held by the European Court of Human Rights. In his view, it is not possible to rely effectively on an infringement of the right to a fair trial consisting of the fact that the case was not decided by an impartial judge, if the complainant could already challenge the impartiality of the judge in proceedings before national courts, but did not do so (see, for example, paragraph 34 of the judgment of 22.2.1996 in Bulut v Austria, complaint No 17358 / 90). The reasons for the appeal (cf. § 103 pp.) then the fact that the judge who was dismissed had taken a decision in the case undermines (among other defects) the confusion of the proceedings before the court when, also to the extent of that defect, the Supreme Administrative Court is not bound by the grounds of the appeal and must take account of it even if the complainant itself does not object to it in the context of the complaints (§ 109 (4) ECR).
21. On the basis of the above, it can be concluded that an integral part of the right to a fair trial (or to judicial protection) is a guarantee that an impartial and independent judge should decide on the matter, since this aspect is one of the most important factors of fair judicial decision-making and is one of the building blocks of the trust of individuals and other entities in law and the rule of law (Article 1 (1) of the Constitution). In view of this, the unbiased and independent judge (court) is guaranteed in several levels. It is, on the one hand, the plane of the institutional (constitutional) establishment of an independent judicial authority, and, on the other hand, the independence and unbiased character of the judges is also based on high demands on candidates for this post, both professionally and personally. The integrity of the judge is also supported by the fact that the performance of his duties is without time limit. The fact that judges are irrevocable and irrevocable and an exception to this rule must define the law itself and can clearly only happen for serious reasons comparable to a disciplinary measure (cf. Article 82 (2) of the Constitution) cannot be seen as protecting the judge himself but also as one of the methods of implementing the right to a legal judge. Of course, material protection of judges is also important.
22. It is submitted from the above that, in order to assess the impartiality (unbiased) of the judges, the rule of law foresees, at the legal level, defined procedures by which, according to subjective and objective criteria, it is possible to assess whether individual acts and decisions of the judge can be assessed as impartial in a particular case. In addition to these special procedures, doubt about the impartiality of the judge may be objected to, together with other defects, in proper and exceptional remedies.
Principle of subsidiarity of a constitutional complaint
23. The concept of a constitutional complaint is its subsidiarity, which is manifested formally in the requirement that all the procedural means provided to the complainant for the protection of his right be used in advance (Paragraph 75 (1) of the Constitutional Court Act) and in the material aspect of the requirement that the Constitutional Court intervene to protect the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights and freedoms only when the other public authorities no longer have the means to remedy the unconstitutional situation (the case is definitively "closed '). It follows from the above that if the law provides that a court is competent to decide on the rights and obligations of individuals in a procedural situation, the Constitutional Court cannot intervene in its position by taking its own decision on the matter before the establishment of the general courts can do so. The principle of the rule of law and subsidiarity does not allow such codecision.
24. The procedure provided for in Article 87 (1) (d) of the Constitution on a constitutional complaint against a final decision and other intervention by a public authority in the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights and freedoms is essentially based on the principle of review of the final cases [cf. Resolution of 19.12.1997 sp. zn. II. ÚS 293 / 97 (U 22 / 9 SbNU 467), Resolution of 9.2.2011 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 38 / 10 (U 1 / 60 SbNU 759), Resolution of 3.6.2010 sp. zn. III. ÚS 1336 / 10 (U 7 / 57 SbNU 621), or the finding of 30.11.1995 sp. ÚS.
25. It follows that the Constitutional Court is in principle not entitled to intervene in proceedings pending, in which the complainant has not yet exhausted all the possibilities to obtain protection of his constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights and freedoms [cf. Resolution of 30.3.2006 sp. zn. IV. ÚS 125 / 06 (U 4 / 40 CollNU 781)]. The task of protecting the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental human rights and freedoms is not just to the Constitutional Court, but to all public authorities, in particular to the general courts, since, pursuant to Article 4, The Constitution is the fundamental rights and freedoms under the protection of the judicial authority as a whole [cf. The Constitutional complaint therefore constitutes an ultima ratio [see, for example, the finding of 13.7.2000 sp. zn. III. ÚS 117 / 2000 (N 111 / 19 SbNU 79)] and is an instrument for the protection of fundamental rights starting only after the exhaustion of all available effective means to protect the rights applicable in accordance with the law in the system of public authorities (Resolution of 3.4.2009 sp. zn. IV. ÚS 2891 / 08).
26. However, by issuing a judgment in the case of the unbiased nature of the judge, the legal proceedings are not terminated and the complainant remains in possession of procedural means of protection (see above). Only after these remedies had been exhausted, if the complainant continued to believe that it had not been corrected through the alleged state of unconstitutionality, would it have opened the way for him to lodge a substantive constitutional complaint. According to the Constitutional Court, it should therefore be based on the principle that final and final decisions should be challenged by constitutional complaints, not partial decisions, even if they are in themselves final, even though all available remedies have been exhausted against them [cf. Resolution of the Constitutional Court of 29.9.2005 sp. zn. III. ÚS 292 / 05 (U 23 / 38 SbNU 587)].
27. The Constitutional Court makes exceptions from this rule which make it possible to challenge a final decision, which merely concludes a part of the procedure or which addresses a procedural question, although the procedure on the substance has not yet ended. However, two conditions must be cumulatively met: (1) the decision must be capable of intervening immediately and sensitively in the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights or freedoms, and (2) the objection to a breach of fundamental rights or freedoms must be limited to the relevant stage of the procedure at which such a question has been decided so that it can no longer be effectively applied in the context of further proceedings (e.g. in the application of appeals against a substantive decision) [see, for example, the finding of sp. zn. III. ÚS 341 / 04 of 12.1.2005 (N 6 / 36 SbNU 53)].
28. Neither of the above conditions is met in the case of a court's judgment on the unbiased nature of the judge, since (1) the judgment itself is not yet capable of showing in any way negative in the legal sphere of the complainant (this can only be affected by a meritor or quasi-meritorial decision, which will result in, for example, a conviction in criminal proceedings or a final decision, or a quasi-meritor decision - e.g. detention, interim measures, etc.).
Self-examination of the question put to plenary by the Constitutional Court for a ruling
29. In view of the stated multi-level guarantee of impartiality, the Court of First Instance notes that there is no reason to deviate from the principle of subsidiarity described by the principle of constitutional complaint and make it an exception, since the reverse procedure would, without any further reason, create de facto only scope for the Constitutional Court to intervene in the proceedings before the general courts at the very moment when they are required to decide on the matter. Moreover, according to the Constitutional Court, this can be supported by the fact that the legislature clearly offers to remedy a lack of impartiality or doubt about the unfairness of more remedies than is the case with any other defect (whether substantive or procedural).
30. The acceptability of that restraint under the Constitutional Court also stems to some extent from the above-mentioned case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, since the designated court itself clearly requires that such a type of objection should be brought before national courts and, if not, such an objection cannot be raised only in proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights, with the expectation that it itself would be a ground for finding a breach of the right to a fair trial under Article 6 (1) of the Convention.
31. In doing so, if the Constitutional Court admits, in its caselaw, an exception to the fact that a constitutional complaint may also be challenged in the context of a procedure which has not yet been completed to the extent of the substance of the case, these are decisions which are capable of directly intervening in the fundamental rights of the complainants and which constitute a separate, closed part of the procedure. However, that is not the nature of the decision not to exclude a judge in general, and that is because the possible breach of the constitutional fundamental rights or freedoms which may be linked to such a decision is not concentrated only at a certain stage of the proceedings, and that it could not be responded to in the context of further proceedings (for example, in the application of procedural means against decisions, see above).
32. On the basis of the above, it can be concluded that Article 75 (1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court gives rise to the obligation for complainants to use up all the procedural means provided by the law to protect their rights before a constitutional complaint is lodged. The constitutional complaint constitutes a subsidiary of standard means of law protection. This conclusion also applies to cases where a constitutional complaint is directed against a partial procedural order which has been decided that a Judge of the General Court is not excluded from hearing and deciding the case to be decided on.
33. For the sake of completeness, the Constitutional Court states that even in these cases the exception contained in Paragraph 75 (2) (a) of the Constitutional Court Act may apply, according to which the Constitutional Court does not refuse to accept a constitutional complaint, even if the complainant has not exhausted all the procedural means provided by the law to protect his right if the complaint is substantially above the complainant's own interests. However, it is for the complainant himself to interpret this "overthrow of his own interests" properly, convincingly and using the case law of the present court in a constitutional complaint.
Conclusion
34. For the reasons set out above, the Constitutional Court has concluded that a constitutional complaint against a resolution which has been decided that a judge is not excluded from hearing and ruling a case for bias, or that an appeal against such a resolution has been dismissed, is inadmissible under Paragraph 75 (1) of the Constitutional Court Act.
President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr. Rychetský v. r.
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Regulation Information
| Citation | Notice from the Constitutional Court No 57 / 2023 Coll., on the adoption of the Opinion of the plenary of the Constitutional Court of 7 February 2023 sp. zn. |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | - |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 08.03.2023 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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