Communication from the Constitutional Court No 40 / 2014 Coll.
Communication from the Constitutional Court of the adoption of the Opinion of the plenary of the Constitutional Court of 4 March 2014, sp. zn. Pl. ÚS- st. 38 / 14 on the inadmissibility of a constitutional complaint, if the complainant does not submit a legal application in criminal proceedings
Valid
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COMMUNICATION
The Constitutional Court
On 4 March 2014 Stanislav Balík, Ludvík David, Jaroslav Fenyk (Judge of the Constitutional Court), Jan Filip, Vlasta Formánková, Ivana Janů, Vladimir Krórek, Jan Musil, Pavel Rychetský, Vladimir Sládeček, Radvan Sukánek, Kateřina Šitáková, Milada Tomková, Jiří Zemánek and Michaela Židlická on the motion of the First Chamber of the Constitutional Court under Article 23 of Law No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court of the Constitutional Court of the Constitutional Court of the Constitutional Court of the Constitutional Court of the Constitutional Court of the Constitutional Court of the Constitutional Court of the Constitutional Court of the Constitutional Court of 2 March 2004.
the following opinion:
The constitutional complaint is inadmissible if the complainant in criminal proceedings does not file a legal notice (§ 75 (1) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended).
Reasons
Reasons for submitting an opinion
1. At present, the Judge-Rapporteur has three constitutional complaints in the idea that the complainants consider that there is no ground of appeal under Article 265b of the Code of Criminal Procedure in their case and therefore file a constitutional complaint directly against the previous decisions without having previously exhausted the exceptional appeal in the form of an appeal. In all three cases, the two-month period for lodging the complaint has already elapsed.
2. On 22 May 2013, the Constitutional Court received a constitutional complaint from the complainants L. V. and J. V., under sp. zn. I. ÚS 1662 / 13. In a constitutional complaint, the complainants argue that the courts did not take account of their proposals for evidence, in particular to carry out a local examination already proposed in the preparatory procedure, as only insufficient photographs were taken from the crime scene. According to the complainants, there was no evidence from the witness testimony that the complainants had committed those offences. According to the complainants, the Court of Appeal did not deal with the assessment of the evidence individually and in a reciprocal context, and the courts did not deal with the reasons for which the evidence proposed by the defendants had not been carried out. The complainants are of the opinion that in their case the right to a fair trial and the right to equal treatment of participants has been infringed.
3. On 23 May 2013, the Constitutional Court received a constitutional complaint from the complainant J. V., under sp. zn. I. ÚS 1677 / 13. The complainant contends, in principle, that there is a flawed and unconvincing finding of the facts in the existence of which a judgmental judgment based on the identification of the perpetrators and the determination of their role in the facts is based in principle on a single evidence, on the testimony of the witness, which is objectively based on the evidence of inapplicable and contrary to the lawful recovery. According to the complainant, based on the theory of the fruits of the poisoned tree, this statement is also inapplicable. As a result of the insolence of the courts in determining the facts of the case and in view of the perfectly formal refusal of the defence, the right to a fair trial was infringed by the complainant and the principle of presumption of innocence contained in Article 40 (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as "the Charter ') was not respected.
4. On 12 July 2013, the Constitutional Court received a constitutional complaint from the complainant, P. O. S., led under sp. zn. I. ÚS 2164 / 13. The complainant objects to a violation of the principle of equality of arms, as the courts did not, in its view, allow the execution of the key evidence of the defence and, on the contrary, opted for the dubious evidence of a clearly unfaithful witness. Furthermore, according to the complainant, there was also a breach of the right to properly justify the decision and a violation of the prohibition of libel in the decision of the courts. The complainant also sees the unconstitutionality and unexamination of the decisions in neglected evidence. According to the complainant, it is clear from the judgment of the Court of Appeal that it did not react to its objections or to the evidence proposed by it. The complainant considers that the courts of both stages have infringed its constitutionally guaranteed rights enshrined in Article 8 (1), (2) and (5) of the Charter and the right to a fair trial.
5. Under Articles 72 (3) and 75 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as the Law on the Constitutional Court), a constitutional complaint is inadmissible if the complainant has not exhausted all the procedural means provided by the law to protect his right; This also applies to an exceptional appeal which may be rejected by the decision-making authority as inadmissible for reasons dependent on its discretion (version effective as of 1.1.2013).
6. Thus, according to the opinion of the First Chamber of the Constitutional Court, the definition of the relevant provision of the Law on the Constitutional Court shows quite clearly the obligation for complainants to use up all the procedural means which the law provides for the protection of their rights, that is to say, the obligation to use up exceptional redress in criminal matters in the form of an appeal, if this is admissible.
The Constitutional Court's current decision-making practice in criminal proceedings
7. It is clear from the present case-law that the Constitutional Court has in the past not treated the issue of the obligation of exhaustion of appeals in criminal matters quite uniformly. I. ÚS 180 / 03 of 2.3.2004 (N 32 / 32 of SbNU 293) The Constitutional Court stated the following. "In its case, the complainant did not invoke [§ 265a et seq. of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as" Tr.3 ')], and thus had to be put out of reasonable doubt as to whether it had exhausted all procedural means to protect its rights, since, according to the Constitutional Court's conviction, the objections contained in the constitutional complaint could have been effectively invoked in the context of one of the pleas in law under § 265b (1). In this situation, taking into account the content of the contested decisions and the arguments contained in the constitutional complaint, the Constitutional Court could not conclude with the desired certainty that the complainant did not use up all the procedural means to protect his rights, as it meant by Article 75 (1) of Law No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, because it considers that such means are exclusively means of effective defence against interference with the constitutional rights and freedoms. The current decision-making practice on criminal offences does not provide a guarantee that all cases pending by the Supreme Court on the initiative of appeals brought by the accused are assessed in the light of the maintenance of constitutionally guaranteed rights to a fair trial, as the Supreme Court does not explicitly accept, in certain decisions, a substantive review of the objections relating to the alleged infringement of the procedural procedure prescribed for the examination of the facts and the assessment of the evidence (Sections 2 (5) and (6) (3)), irrespective of the seriousness of the consequences of a fair decision of the case (Article 36 (1) of the Charter and Article 6 (1) of the Convention on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms).' In principle, the Constitutional Court also used the same reasoning in the finding in the sp. zn. I. ÚS 864 / 11 of 16.6.2011 (N 116 / 61 of SbNU 695). In both cases, the Constitutional Court has thus considered a constitutional complaint admissible even if the complainant has not exhausted all available means of protecting its rights.
8. Similarly, the Constitutional Court expressed itself in several resolutions. For example, in Resolution sp. zn. IV. ÚS 3407 / 11 of 5.12.2011 [also resolution sp. zn. IV. ÚS 430 / 11 of 2.3.2011 (available as well as all other decisions of the Constitutional Court at http: / / nalus.ujud.cz)] The Constitutional Court stated that "In its decision-making practice, the Constitutional Court does not insist that, in criminal matters, a second-degree court's decision should always be brought against a decision of a court before the appeal of a decision of a constitutional complaint of appeal, unless there are objections in a constitutional complaint which are prima facie to one of the pleas in law. This is because, both from the point of view of the legal regulation of the pleas in law and from the point of view of the case-law of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the requirement of the Constitutional Court to have a prior compulsory review would, in the majority, be a formalistic clinging to the use of a generally ineffective remedy. Moreover, such a request would unduly delay the possibility of a constitutional review of the decisions of the general courts in those cases where the complainant feels that the guarantor of the constitutionality is in breach without, at the same time, considering that there is any ground of order enshrined in Article 265b of the Penal Code in his case. '
9. The admissibility of the constitutional complaint with regard to the exhaustion of criminal proceedings was also dealt with by the Constitutional Court in its Resolution sp. zn. IV. ÚS 851 / 11 of 18 April 2011, where it was stated: "It should be noted that criminal proceedings constitute an exceptional remedy which the complainant is not necessarily obliged to use up before a constitutional complaint is lodged, having regard to the limited range of grounds of appeal." This issue is also covered by Resolution sp. zn. II. ÚS 1707 / 09 of 6 April 2012, where the Constitutional Court expressed the following view: "In the context of proceedings on a constitutional complaint, the authorisation must therefore be regarded as the last procedural means of protection of rights only if, in its context, it is possible to raise objections which could be placed under so-called grounds."
10. According to Resolution sp. zn. III. ÚS 3394 / 10 of 14.2.2011, it is primarily the complainant's case to assess whether the objections which he has to the previous decisions of the General Courts can be effectively applied in the appeal procedure or whether he can contact the Constitutional Court directly. "First of all, it should be pointed out that Article 265a (1) and (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as" the Rules of Procedure ') implies that an appeal is admissible in such cases by an exceptional remedy, but, in view of the exhaustive list of pleas in law (Section 265b (1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court), it may not always be the last procedural instrument which the law provides to the complainant for the protection of his right' (§ 72 (3), § 75 (1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court. It is primarily a matter for the defendant himself to assess whether the objections which he has to the decision of the Court of Appeal (and, consequently, the Court of First Instance) can, effectively, be relied on in the appeal or whether he can turn himself in, directly 'to the Constitutional Court (if the question is answered incorrectly, the Constitutional Court may find its procedure to be, in accordance with Paragraph 75 (1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court and reject the constitutional complaint).' Similarly, the Constitutional Court also expressed its views in resolution sp. zn. II. ÚS 1157 / 11 of 17 May 2011.
11. The substitutability of the complaints raised by the complainant under the legal grounds was dealt with by the Constitutional Court, for example, in Resolution sp. zn. III. ÚS 3242 / 07 of 28 February 2008, where it states the following: "Since it set up a constitutional complaint for the most part on objections which are not prima facie inferior to the legal pleas referred to in § 265b of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is not appropriate to insist on the exhaustion of the appeal if a similar submission would not lead to a formal appeal; The Constitutional Court therefore considered the constitutional complaint admissible (e.g. resolution sp. zn. II. ÚS 405 / 03). 'In resolution sp. zn. II. ÚS 405 / 03 of 5.5.2004 The Constitutional Court states that" it has repeatedly stated in its caselaw that an appeal is an exceptional remedy intended to remedy expressly defined procedural and substantive defects, but is not intended to revise the factual and legal findings made before the courts of the first and second instance. Since the complainant builds his argument in a constitutional complaint against objections which are not substitutable to the legal grounds set out in § 265b of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is not appropriate to insist that this appeal be exhausted, since its submission would obviously not lead to a meritorious review. In the present case, the Constitutional Court concluded that a constitutional complaint was admissible.'
12. On the other hand, the substitutability of the complaints raised by the complainant under the legal pleas in law was dealt with by the Constitutional Court, for example, in Resolution sp. zn. IV. ÚS 400 / 05 of 7 November 2005, when the Constitutional Court concluded, after examining the complainant of the objections raised, that those objections could, in the view of the Constitutional Court, be subordinated to the ground of order set out in § 265b (1) (g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the complainant therefore had a further appeal in the form of appeal and his constitutional complaint was deemed inadmissible. Similarly, the Constitutional Court was also acting in resolution sp. zn. II. ÚS 1707 / 09 of 6 April 2010. The Constitutional Court also insisted on the exhaustion of a right before the filing of a constitutional complaint in the event of the fulfilment of other pleas in law - for example, in Resolution sp. zn. IV. ÚS 2 / 05 of 11.4.2005 [§ 265b (1) (h) of the Code of Criminal Procedure], Resolution sp. zn. I. ÚS 99 / 06 of 19.4.2006 [U. 265b (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure] or Resolution sp. v. III. ÚS 3507 / 10 of 12.9.2012 [§ 265b (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure].
13. The Constitutional Court has therefore, in the resolutions referred to in paragraphs 11 and 12, in fact dealt with the substitutability of the complainant of the objections raised under the legal pleas in law and, on the basis of its own conclusion on the non-classifiability of those objections under the pleas in law under Article 265b of the Code of Criminal Procedure, stated that it was not appropriate to insist on the exhaustion of the appeal and the constitutional complaint was considered admissible (e.g., the abovementioned resolutions sp. zn. II. ÚS 405 / 03 or sp. On the contrary, in other resolutions (e.g. resolution sp. zn. IV. ÚS 400 / 05 and others, see above), the Constitutional Court stated that the complainant's objections raised could, in the view of the Constitutional Court, be placed under the pleas in law under Article 265b of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the complainants had a further appeal and their constitutional complaint was therefore considered inadmissible. However, such a decision-making practice, whereby the Constitutional Court itself assesses the existence of pleas in law and thus replaces the decision-making activities of the Supreme Court, appears to be contrary to the principle of subsidiarity of the constitutional complaint.
Current decision of the Constitutional Court on legal proceedings
14. At present, the Constitutional Court has dealt with the condition of the exhaustion of the rights in criminal matters in Resolution sp. zn. I. ÚS 3315 / 13 of 6 November 2013, where the Constitutional Court, on condition of the exhaustion of the rights in criminal matters, persists and states that... "the appeal procedure, at no stage can be found outside the constitutional framework of the protection of fundamental rights. If there is a restriction in the law on the right of access to a court in the context of the proceedings on this exceptional remedy, the court is obliged to interpret and apply the conditions for the admission to respect the maximum right to a fair trial defined by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Charter. In other words, when deciding on appeals in the context of criminal proceedings, the criminal rules must be interpreted in a constitutional manner and the conditions for admission under Article 265b of the penal rules must be interpreted in such a way as to fulfil the constitutional obligation of the courts to protect the individual's fundamental rights.... It follows from the above that the Supreme Court is obliged, in the course of the appeal, to assess whether, in the previous stages of the proceedings, the appellant's fundamental rights, including his right to a fair trial have been infringed.... In other words, the objections to the infringement of the right to a fair trial are always an eligible ground of appeal under § 265b (1) (g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see, mutatis mutandis, mutatis mutandis for civil proceedings, Resolution sp. zn. III. ÚS 772 / 13 of 28.3.2013, paragraph 11).... The Constitutional Court would therefore have exceeded its powers if it had dealt with the constitutional complaint submitted without having the opportunity to express its views on the alleged infringement of the right to a fair trial first. 'The Judge-Rapporteur also states in the resolution that she does not share the views expressed in the resolutions sp. zn. III. ÚS 3050 / 09 of 17.12.2009 and sp. zn. IV. ÚS 3407 / 11 of 5.12.2011, but considers them to have been overcome even in the light of the new wording of § 75 (1) of the Constitutional Court Act effective since 1.1.2013. In the context of the resolution, it should also be noted that this decision did not prevent the complainant from accessing the Constitutional Court, given that, at the time of the decision, the complainant was still in a two-month period of time to lodge an appeal to the Supreme Court.
Principle of subsidiarity of a constitutional complaint
15. In Article 75 (1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the principle of subsidiarity of a constitutional complaint has its legal basis, which also implies the principle of minimising the intervention of the Constitutional Court in the activities of public authorities, which means that a constitutional complaint is the ultimate means of protecting the law, starting when redress before those authorities is no longer possible by standard procedure. In particular, the Constitutional judiciary is based on the principle of a review of cases of final termination, in which the possible unconstitutionality is no longer remediable by other means, i.e. procedural means, which are provided by the legislation governing the relevant (judicial) proceedings. It is not for the Constitutional Court to circumvent the law because it is not part of the system of general courts (Resolution sp. zn. III. ÚS 3507 / 10 of 12.9.2012). In particular, the general courts and priori are addressed by the imperative formulated in Article 4 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution). Thus, the protection of constitutionality in the rule of law cannot only be the task of the Constitutional Court, but must be the task of the whole judiciary. The Constitutional complaint therefore constitutes an ultima ratio [see, for example, the finding of sp. zn. III.
16. The purpose and function of a constitutional complaint is to remedy a decision or other intervention by a public authority in the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the complainant. However, this correction cannot be made without any appeal before the law enforcement authorities available to the complainant being exhausted. If the Constitutional Court itself, contrary to the principle of subsidiarity, had not previously exhausted all the possibilities of attaining a remedy for the unlawful situation, it could have inadvertently intervened in the competence of other state bodies (here general courts) and undermined the principle of division of competences. Therefore, in cases where the complainant does not use all available means of redress, the Constitutional Court considers the constitutional complaint inadmissible (Resolution sp. zn. III. ÚS 3507 / 10 of 12.9.2012).
The decision-making activities of the Supreme Court
17. The procedure is not at any stage outside the constitutional framework of the rules of a fair process as defined by the Charter of Fundamental Rights and by the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as "the Convention ') and decision-making practice must not undermine the constitutional principle of equality of parties. Similarly, the decision-making practice of the general courts must interpret domestic law consistently with the obligations arising for the Czech Republic from relevant international treaties (Article 1 (2) of the Constitution). The Constitutional Court recalls that Article 6 (1) of the Convention (the right to a fair trial) contains provisions with which the provisions of legal procedural law must be interpreted consistently, including those of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which define the pleas in law set out in Section 265b of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Clause sp. zn. I. ÚS 55 / 04 of 18.8.2004 (N 114 / 34 of SbNU 187), mutatis mutandis, that of Sp. zn. II. ÚS 669 / 05 of 5.9.2006 (N 156 / 42 of SbNU 275)).
18. Therefore, there is no objection to the lack of competence of the Court of Appeal to deal with appeals lodged for reasons other than those arising from the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 4, 90 and 95 of the Constitution obliging the judicial authority to protect fundamental rights are also binding standards of competence for the Supreme Court. In this spirit, it is also necessary to interpret the legal definition of the pleas in law for which a decision-making procedure cannot be established which would give rise to differences in the possibilities for different groups of parties to have access to the Supreme Court (I. ÚS 55 / 04 of 18.8.2004, mutatis mutandis that of page 669 / 05 of 5.9.2006).
19. If an appeal is an exceptional remedy, the purpose of which is, in addition to the harmonisation of the case law, to protect rights, in particular fundamental rights, then a constitutional complaint from the point of view of its constitutional definition cannot be built up in addition to the claim that defects which are excluded by interpretation from any review in the context of an appeal procedure may be remedied in a constitutional complaint procedure. This would turn a constitutional complaint into a specialised extraordinary remedy to remedy the procedural and factual errors of the general courts, but this cannot be allowed in view of the constitutional definition of the role of the Constitutional Court (Article 83 of the Constitution). On the contrary, the Supreme Court may be required, by interpretation of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to ensure that the two purposes of the appeal procedure are fulfilled (Ref.
20. The grounds of the appeal are specified in a taxative manner in § 265b (1) (a) to (l) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The pleas are so detailed that there is no doubt in the decision-making activities of the Supreme Court. In some cases, however, doubts arise in the application of the ground of appeal pursuant to Article 265b (1) (g) of the criminal law under which an appeal may be lodged if "the decision is based on an error of law in the act or other incorrect substantive assessment '. The interpretation of this plea was carried out very strictly by the Supreme Court shortly after its introduction by law 265 / 2001 Coll., and the Constitutional Court has repeatedly expressed its views on this approach in the control of constitutionality. It adopted an opinion that the overrestrictive interpretation of the reasoning of the notice is constitutionally unsustainable. In this context, the Constitutional Court recalled that the appeal procedure is at no stage outside the constitutional framework of the rules of the fair process (Constitutional Court finding sp. zn. II. ÚS 669 / 05 of 5.9.2006).
21. Article 6 (1) of the Convention guarantees the right to a fair trial and Article 6 (2) The Convention guarantees that the defendant's guilt must be proved legally. The fundamental principles of governance, in particular the principles of equality of arms and complementarity, necessarily also apply to the taking of evidence, in particular the way in which the evidence is carried out. The European Court of Human Rights applies in its practice a doctrine according to which the proceedings as a whole must have the fair character required by Article 6 of the Convention, including the manner in which the evidence is made to the detriment of the defendant (cf. Barberà et al. v Spain of 6.12.1988, A146, § 68, or Schenk v Switzerland of 12.7.1988, A140, § 46n, or Tseber v Czech Republic of 22.11.2012, No 46203 / 08). Compliance with the rules of proof, including the provision of evidence, guarantees the credibility of the evidence, acts in a preventive manner against violations of the law by law enforcement authorities, guarantees that the rights and freedoms of a citizen are affected only within the limits of the law, thereby guaranteeing the legitimacy of the State's right to punish (Repik, B. European Convention on Human Rights and Criminal Law. Praha: Orac, 2002, str. 194-195). It is not only the Constitutional Court to check compliance with these rules from the point of view of the right to a fair trial, but also the ordinary courts.
22. The Constitutional Court takes the view that even an individual means of proof (such as witness examination, examination of the scene of the crime, recovery, etc.) and the manner of its action (wiretap and recording of telecommunications traffic, home search and inspection of other premises, monitoring of the consignment, etc.), or omission of it may have a significant impact on the decision itself and its unconstitutional nature may infringe the right to a fair trial (Article 6 of the Convention) or other Convention guaranteed law (Article 8 (2) of the Convention).
23. The view of the Constitutional Court as set out in the judgment in Case 4 / 04 ÚS 4 / 04 (N 42 / 32 SbNU 405) of 23 March 2004 (according to which the incorrect finding of the facts cannot be strictly separated from the incorrect legal qualification of the offence, since these two categories are essentially inseparable) does not, however, mean that the Supreme Court, in any event where the appeal contains an argument in relation to the facts, would have to consider the plea under Article 265b (1) (g) of the Code as prima facie. When the appellant contests the infringement of the right to a fair trial in the field of proving [the plea under Article 265b (1) (g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure] or another of the pleas laid down in Article 265b (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is always the duty of the Supreme Court to give due consideration and to decide whether the appellant is, or is not, a ground of order. In fact, it is the only competent authority to assess at this stage the fulfilment of a specific plea (see Section 54 of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Janyr and Others against the Czech Republic of 13 October 2011, No 12579 / 06, 19007 / 10 and 34812 / 10), and this assessment is a mandatory condition for the submission of a constitutional complaint (Section 75 (1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court).
Justification for the opinion
24. Paragraph 75 (1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as effective from 1 January 2013, clearly shows the obligation for the complainants to use up all the procedural means provided by the law to protect their rights - that is to say, an exceptional appeal in the form of a complaint in criminal matters, if an appeal is admissible. The Court of Justice of the European Union has consistently held that the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Court of Justice of the European Union are bound by the law of the European Union.
25. A constitutional complaint is a means of protecting rights which is subsidiary to standard "non-constitutional" institutes. In particular, the General Courts are called upon to protect the rights of natural and legal persons and, in the absence of a remedy under the General Judicial Procedure, the protection provided by the Constitutional Court's review may apply to the extent of the limited constitutional aspect. Thus, the Constitutional Court itself cannot assess the fulfilment of the conditions which open up the scope for a formal appeal procedure. The question whether the complainant's objections fulfil any of the pleas must be examined by the Supreme Court, since, if the Constitutional Court had done so without such an assessment, it would have inadvertently interfered with the activities of the Supreme Court and, consequently, general justice.
26. Article 4, 90 and 95 of the Constitution obliging the judicial authority to protect fundamental rights are also binding standards of competence for the Supreme Court. The procedure cannot therefore be found outside the constitutional framework for the protection of fundamental rights and the rules of the fair process defined by the Convention and the Charter. The Supreme Court is therefore obliged, in the context of an appeal, to assess whether, in the previous stages of the proceedings, the appellant's fundamental rights, including his right to a fair trial, have been infringed. Any reasoned objection to a breach of constitutional rights shall be the basis for the annulment of the contested decision in the appeal proceedings. At this stage of the procedure, the Supreme Court is obliged to apply this rule without exception and not to delegate this responsibility to the Constitutional Court when assessing the relevant ground of order. It follows from the above that the complainant's objection to the inefficiencies of the use of the appeal in the form of an appeal cannot stand.
Conclusion
27. Since those conclusions deviate from the legal opinion of the Constitutional Court as set out in the judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case N 116 / 61 SbNU 695 (N 32 / 32 SbNU 293) and in the judgment of the Constitutional Court in Case C-864 / 11 of 16 June 2011 (N 116 / 61 SbNU 695), the First Chamber of the Constitutional Court, pursuant to Article 23 of Law No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, raised the question of the obligation of the complainant to use up, in criminal matters, an exceptional remedy in the form of an appeal in relation to the admissibility of a constitutional complaint for the assessment of the plenary of the Constitutional Court of First Instance, which was, in its entirety, and adopted a legal opinion in that judgment.
28. In the light of the parties' rights and in particular taking into account the principle of legal certainty, this opinion shall apply to constitutional complaints lodged with the Constitutional Court on the day following the publication of an opinion in the Collection of Laws.
President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr. Rychetský v. r.
In accordance with Article 14 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, the Judges Vladimir Sládeček and Radovan Sukánek took a separate opinion on the reasoning of the opinion.
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Regulation Information
| Citation | Notice of the Constitutional Court No 40 / 2014 Coll., on the adoption of the Opinion of the Full Court of 4 March 2014, sp. zn. Pl. ÚSN. 38 / 14 on the inadmissibility of a constitutional complaint if the complainant does not submit a legal application in criminal proceedings |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | - |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 17.03.2014 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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