The Constitutional Court found no 36 / 2024 Coll.
Findings of the Constitutional Court sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 30 / 23 concerning the application for annulment of § 67ca of Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., on Pension Insurance, as amended, § 8a of Act No. 198 / 1993 Coll., on the illegality and resistance of the Communist regime, as amended, and § 2a of Act No. 357 / 2005 Coll., on the award of participants in the national struggle for the creation and liberation of Czechoslovakia and of certain survivors after them, on the special contribution to the pension of certain persons, on a lump sum of certain participants in the national liberation between 1939 and 1945, and on the amendment of certain laws, as amended by the legislation
Valid
The Constitutional Tribunal found
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36
FIND
The Constitutional Court
of 17 January 2024
sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 30 / 23 in the case of the application for annulment of § 67ca of Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., on Pension Insurance, as amended, § 8a of Act No. 198 / 1993 Coll., on the illegality and resistance of the Communist regime, as amended, and § 2a of Act No. 357 / 2005 Coll., on the award of participants in the national struggle for the creation and liberation of Czechoslovakia and certain survivors thereof, on the special contribution to the pension of certain persons, on the lump sum of certain participants in the national struggle for liberation between 1939 and 1945 and on the amendment of certain laws, as amended by the legislation
On behalf of the Republic
On 17 January 2024, the Constitutional Court decided on the plenary, composed of the President of the Court of Josef Boxy and judges and judges of Lucie Dolanská Bányai, Josef Fiala, Jaromír Jirsy, Veronica Christian, Zdeněk Kühn, Tomáš Lichovník, Kateřina Ronovska, Jan Svatona, Pavel Šámal, Vojtěho Šimíček (Judge of the Rapporteur), David Uhlík, Jan Winter, Daniela Zeman and Jiří Zemánek, on the proposal of the group of Members, acting on the annulment of § 67ca of Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll.
as follows:
Motion denied.
Reasons
Subject matter of the procedure and text of the legal provisions contested
1. By a proposal pursuant to Article 64 (1) (b) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as "the Law on the Constitutional Court"), the Group of 71 Members (hereinafter referred to as "the draftsman") requests the Constitutional Court, in proceedings under Article 87 (1) (a) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as "the Constitution"), to abolish § 67ca of the Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., on the Law No 71 / 2023 Coll., hereinafter referred to as "Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll.," (hereinafter referred to as "Act No. 198 / 1993 Coll.") and § 2a of the Act No. 357 of the Law No. 357 / 1993 Coll., on the Infringment of the Czech Republic and Others, as regards the Act No. 71 / 2023 Coll.
2. In view of the gravity of the case, its social impact and interest in the restoration of constitutionality and legal certainty, the appellant asked the Constitutional Court to take a preliminary ruling under Paragraph 39 of the Law on the Constitutional Court on the urgency of the case and to consider its proposal as a matter of priority. However, the Constitutional Court did not decide on this proposal separately, as it began to deal with the proposal immediately after it had received it and decided on it in the near future.
3. Paragraph 67ca of Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll. reads as follows:
"(1) Section 67 (10) and (16) shall not apply to the increase of pensions by an exceptional date in June 2023; with this increase, the percentage of pensions paid shall be increased by increasing the percentage of pensions
(a) by 2,3% of the percentage rate of the pension due on the date on which the percentage rate increases; and
(b) 400 CZK; if the conditions for entitlement to multiple pensions are met, this amount shall be increased by the full amount of the pension (first sentence of Paragraph 4 (2)).
(2) Where the pension is adjusted for coexistence with another pension or is paid at half or is not paid for coexistence with a gainful activity, the increase in the percentage of the pension referred to in paragraph 1 shall be adjusted, depending on the date of the change or renewal of the pension. The percentage rates of widower's, widower's and orphan's pensions shall be increased only if they have not been calculated from the percentage rates of pensions raised in accordance with paragraph 1. ';
4. Paragraph 8a of Act No. 198 / 1993 Coll. reads as follows:
"(1) Paragraph 8 (2) shall not apply in the event of an increase in pension payments by an exceptional date in June 2023.
(2) The pension supplements belonging to the Government Regulation No. 622 / 2004 Coll., on the grant of a supplement to the pension to alleviate certain injustices caused by the Communist regime in the social field, as amended by Government Regulation No. 405 / 2005 Coll. and Government Regulation No. 369 / 2007 Coll., hereinafter referred to as "the supplement" and awarded before 1 June 2023, are increased by 11,5% of the amount of the supplement due on the date on which the supplement increases. The allowances shall be increased from the payment of the pension with which they are paid due after 31 May 2023.
(3) For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions apply:
(4) After the increase referred to in paragraph 2 or paragraph 3, the amount of the premium shall be rounded up to the whole crown. "
5. Paragraph 2a of Law No 357 / 2005 Coll. reads as follows:
"(1) The fourth sentence of Paragraph 2 (8) shall not apply in the event of an increase in pension payments by an exceptional date in June 2023.
(2) The premium granted before 1 June 2023 shall be increased by 11,5% of the amount of the premium due on the date on which the premium is increased. The allowances shall be increased from the payment of the pension with which they are paid due after 31 May 2023.
(3) For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions apply:
(4) After the increase referred to in paragraph 2 or paragraph 3, the amount of the premium shall be rounded up to the whole crown. "
Arguments of the appellant
6. The appellant submits that the essence of the contested provisions is that the standard mechanism with which, at the time of the fulfilment of the assumptions for the indexation of pensions in June 2023, the relevant laws (in § 67 of Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., as amended, Section 8 (2) of Act No. 198 / 1993 Coll., as amended, and § 2 (8) of Act No. 357 / 2005 Coll., as amended) are not applicable to the extraordinary increase in pensions (indexation), but a one-off different mechanism which will lead to lower indexation. For the reasons of their non-constitutionality, and hence the non-constitutionality of the entire Act No. 71 / 2023 Coll., amending Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., on Pension Insurance, as amended, and certain other laws, hereinafter referred to as "Act No. 71 / 2023 Coll. ', the applicant refers to:
(a) abuse of the state of legislative emergency, because it considers that the conditions for its publication under Article 99 of Act No. 90 / 1995 Coll., on the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as the Rules of Procedure) have not been fulfilled and that its use was contrary to the constitutional order (see paragraphs 7-11 of this Decision);
(b) repeated infringement of the Rules of Procedure in the hearing of House Press No. 392 in the 9th parliamentary term, containing a draft law, which was subsequently published under No. 71 / 2023 Coll. (hereinafter referred to as "draft law ') (see paragraphs 12-13 of this Decision), and
(c) inadmissible retroactivity resulting in a breach of the legitimate expectations of the pension beneficiaries (see paragraphs 14-19 of this finding).
Objection to abuse of a state of legislative emergency
7. In the context of the preparation, discussion and approval of Act No. 71 / 2023 Coll. the appellant states that the Government submitted the draft law to the Chamber of Deputies on 20 February 2023, i.e. 20 days after the pension recipients were entitled to an extraordinary indexation pursuant to § 67 of Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., as amended. It considers that the government was aware, at the latest at the end of 2022, of the need to allocate funds for the extraordinary indexation of pensions in 2023, which it did not do. It should not have been a major problem to cover this expenditure. If, in the explanatory memorandum to draft Act No 71 / 2023 Coll., it is a "unexpected matter," this description of the situation does not correspond to reality. According to the appellant, the government solved the problem which it created, but this only after the legal right to the indexation of the pension recipients was established.
8. This claim is based on (a) the draft Act on State Budget for 2023 in the version of 8.9.2022 (or the "Journal of the D. Macroeconomic Framework and fiscal policy") and of 30.9.2022, which implies that it is likely that an extraordinary indexation is to be made in the amount of around 20 billion, which is not possible from April 2023, (b) the materials "Fiscal Perspective of the Czech Republic - November 2022" and "Macroeconomic Prediction of the Czech Republic - November 2022" of 9 November 2022, published by the Ministry of Finance, (c) the opinion of the Office of the National Budget Council of 8 / 2022 of 8% of the consumer prices in January 2023 (d), where the expression of the higher deficit and the Minister of the budget of 25. At the same time, the appellant points out that, contrary to the statement of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs of 2 November 2022 for ČTK, according to which it is not known at the moment whether extraordinary indexation will be necessary and the content of the explanatory memorandum to the draft law, according to which it is intended to be a response to rapid price developments in the second half of 2022 and in particular in January 2023, and points out that Act No. 449 / 2022 Coll., on the State Budget of the Czech Republic for 2023, no longer provided for any funds for extraordinary indexation in 2023.
9. In view of these developments, the appellant considers that it has been misused by the state of legislative emergency, or that the conditions for its announcement by the President of the Chamber of Deputies under Rule 99 of the Rules of Procedure have not been fulfilled. First of all, this was not an exceptional situation, as the government was already aware from 8 September 2022 that there would be an extraordinary indexation of pensions in 2023 with a high degree of probability. Furthermore, the appellant considers that the need for extraordinary indexation of pensions did not pose a major threat, which is to be demonstrated by the Minister of Finance's observations of 25.12.2022, but also by his observations of 26.2.2023, in which he took the view that exceptional indexation could be carried out, or that it is not necessary to amend it because of exceptional expenditure of 1% of State budget expenditure. According to the appellant, the exceptional indexation of pensions does not pose a threat to the values set out in the Rules of Procedure, i.e. to the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens or to the security of the state, nor does it threaten significant economic damage. The Rules of Procedure require compliance with all three of these conditions, namely the exceptional nature of the situation and the essential intensity of the threat concerned, cumulatively, and none of these conditions has been met.
10. The appellant contends that exceptional indexation serves to fulfil a constitutionally guaranteed right under Article 30 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as "the Charter") and cannot constitute a threat to it or a threat to the security of the State, since the organisation of a pension scheme is a task of the State. To this end, the State shall collect funds for this purpose through compulsory insurance or from other sources; It does not have its "means" and therefore no damage can arise to it. In addition, the State's task is to comply with the law in its entirety, including the so-called extraordinary indexation of pensions, and the fulfilment of this obligation cannot mean "the creation of damage," but rather its task is to manage properly and predictably, not to create situations which it will later call "unexpected." The appellant therefore considers the declaration of a state of legislative emergency to be a breach of constitutional order [paragraph 74 of the Constitutional Court's finding of 13.9.2022 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 7 / 22 (317 / 2022 Coll.); All decisions of the Constitutional Court are available at https: / / nalus.ujud.cz]. According to the Government, the whole situation was triggered by the need for extraordinary indexation, but ignored it, which cannot be described as a "normal political process' within the meaning of that finding, but as a procedure in line with Articles 1 (1) and 2 (3) of the Constitution and Article 2 (2) of the Charter, as well as the rules protected by Article 9 (2) of the Constitution.
11. The appellant's argument is supplemented by references to the finding of 1.3.2011 sp. zn. Moreover, according to the Minister of Finance, the state budget could handle extraordinary indexation. The Chamber of Deputies for the use of the Institute of Legislative Emergency did not find a significant majority to legitimise such a procedure (point 80 of the sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 55 / 10).
Objection of infringement of the Rules of Procedure in the proceedings
12.
(a) the failure to accept the procedural proposals of the opposition Members during the discussion of whether the conditions for declaring a state of legislative emergency are met;
(b) limiting the length of speaking time during the examination of whether the state of legislative emergency continues and whether the Chamber of Deputies will approve the draft law in an abridged manner;
(c) the failure to accept counter-proposals concerning the voting deadline for confirmation of whether the state of the legislative emergency continues;
(d) the firm inclusion of a vote to confirm that the conditions for the proposal to be dealt with are laid down in the abridged negotiations;
(e) limitation of the priority rights to speak in the debate;
(f) limitation of the number of factual remarks.
13. The appellant claims that during the 55th session of the Chamber of Deputies in the 9th parliamentary term, the rights of the House minority resulting from the Rules of Procedure and the existing practice were violated repeatedly, intensively and arbitrarily during the negotiations of the draft law, and that the Members of the Government majority had thereby infringed Article 5 of the Constitution and the related Article 22 of the Charter. Parliament is bound by the Rules of Procedure, regardless of the will of the present majority, which the rule respects and which it does not, questioning the legitimacy of the legislative process (as a matter of substance of the rule of law) and the law itself [cf. Lawyer, No 6 / 2005; and point 38 of the Found of 15.2.2007 sp. zn. With reference to paragraph 155 of the decision of 30 June 2015 sp. zn. Members of the government majority also violated Article 6 of the Constitution [point 207 of the Found of 27.11.2012 sp. zn. According to the appellant, there is also obstruction among the legitimate instruments of the parliamentary minority (point 73 of the decision on page 55 / 10), with the practice of "governmental 'Members characterised by the term" repeated insolence', and recalls that it was the government that created the situation.
Objection of inadmissible retroactivity and breach of legitimate expectations
14. The appellant contests the inconstitutionality of the contested provisions also because of their one-off nature and because they show signs of prohibited retroactivity. The "one-off '(and apparent purpose) is intended to apply only to extraordinary increases in pensions in June 2023 and, at later dates, to any indexation is foreseen on the basis of standard legal rules. Retroactivity is that the exclusion of standard mechanisms for the indexation of pensions by an exceptional deadline takes place only after a legal claim has been made" to apply them "to pension recipients. According to the appellant, their legitimate expectations under Article 11 of the Charter and Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (" the Convention') were violated and the principle of legal certainty referred to in Article 1 (1) of the Constitution was violated.
15. The appellant points out that the contested provisions were prepared by the Government, although it was aware that a given legal claim would arise at the end of January 2023. The members of the Government have always been aware of this obligation, as is the result of their observations and, for example, from the explanatory report on Government Decree No. 35 / 2022 Coll., on the second increase in pensions in 2022, where it is stated that "[from] the Act does not give the Government any authorisation to provide for an increase in pensions in a different amount or form '. Both chambers of Parliament were aware of this. But the government acted as if the law, but the government's decree, were not the decisive factor in creating a" right to be validated. "However, the right to an extraordinary increase in pensions, according to the appellant, arose directly from the law, which also laid down the date from which the ad valorem pension is to be paid and the way in which the indexation amount is to be determined. If the law provides that an implementing act is to be adopted in order to carry out extraordinary indexation, then entitlement to the indexation of pensions does not arise by issuing a government regulation, but directly from the law, by fulfilling the conditions laid down, when a government regulation only outsiders the legal parameters of indexation.
16. The appellant argues that the entitlement to extraordinary indexation pursuant to § 67 of Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., as amended, was established at the end of January 2023 when the price increase exceeded the statutory threshold of 5% since the last date of the increase in the percentage rate of pensions, which occurred in September 2022, and the government's obligation under § 67 (16) of the Act cited was to issue within 50 days (i.e. until 22.3.2023) of the Regulation to "technically implement" the statutory obligation to increase the pensions payable. The government acted in violation of the law and constitutional order when it did not issue a regulation pursuant to § 67 (16) of Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., as amended, and when it began to take steps in February 2023 to amend the law to exclude the standard mechanism for the indexation of pensions, or not to issue such regulation. She argued that until it was issued, there was no claim to extraordinary indexation. However, the appellant considers that both Articles 2 (3) and 78 of the Constitution and Article 2 (2) The Charter implies that a procedure is possible for state power within the limits of the law and, therefore, the government can proceed secundum et intra legem, not praeter legem or even contra legem, i.e. in the conduct of indexation there is a legal obligation in the position of executor.
17. In this context, the appellant argues the legal conclusions concerning Article 78 of the Constitution, or the limits of secondary (substatutory) standards reached by the Constitutional Court in the judgments of 25.10.1995 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 17 / 95 (N 67 / 4 SbNU 157; 271 / 1995 Coll.), of 10.7.1996 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 35 / 95 (N 64 / 5 SbNU 487; 206 / 1996 Sb.) and of 14.2.2001 sp. Pl. ÚS 45 / 2000 (N 30 / 21 SbNU 261; 96 / 2001 Sb.), as well as well as professional literature (e.g. Hendrych, D. and law. General section, 5th edition, Prague: C. H. Beck, 2003, p. 67). According to the case-law, a government regulation must be issued by a legitimate body, cannot interfere in matters reserved for the law (it cannot lay down primary rights and obligations) and there must be a clear will of the legislator to regulate above the legal standard (it must be open to the scope of the regulation). The second criterion completely excludes the possibility that the conditions for extraordinary indexation could be considered by the Government. Furthermore, the appellant invokes the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 25.2.2010 sp. zn. 4 Ads 120 / 2009 and the finding of the Constitutional Court of 23.7.2013 sp. zn. Therefore, the right to extraordinary indexation could not arise only by issuing government regulations, but by law.
18. Claim of breach of legitimate expectations and thus interference in the principles of the rule of law within the meaning of Article 1 (1) of the Constitution and, ultimately, infringement of the principle specifically protected by Article 9 (2) of the Constitution, the appellant relies on the established case law of the Constitutional Court [for example, the findings of 2.2.2005 sp. zn. II. ÚS 528 / 02 (N 23 / 36 SbNU 287) or of 28.2.2006 sp. pl. Pl. ÚS 20 / 05 (N 47 / 40 SbNU 389; 252 / 2006 Sb.), of 24.6.2009 sp. zn. I. ÚS 663 / 06 (N 149 / 53 SbNU 811), of 1.7.2010 sp. They claim that the legitimate expectations of pension recipients have been established by law and that all governments have so far followed long-term practice in accordance with Section 67 of Act 155 / 1995 Coll., as amended.
19. At the same time, according to the appellant, there was illegal retroactivity and, consequently, undue interference with the rule of law (Article 1 (1) of the Constitution). In this respect, the Constitutional Court considers that the finding of sp. zn. It also points to the finding of 10.9.2009 sp. zn. According to the appellant, an extraordinary indexation mechanism could have been modified, but it would have had to happen before the legal entitlement to it was established, but it was created here not only before the approval of Act No. 71 / 2023 Coll., but even before the submission of the bill to the Chamber of Deputies.
Observation of the party and the intervener
20. The Constitutional Court, pursuant to Paragraph 69 (1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, has called on the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, acting on behalf of Parliament as a party to the proceedings, to comment on the application to initiate proceedings.
21. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 69 (2) and (3) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, he called on the Government and the Ombudsman to state within the statutory deadline whether they were entering the proceedings (as interveners) and, where appropriate, to comment on the proposal.
Observations of the Chamber of Deputies
22. The Chamber of Deputies stated that the bill was submitted to it by the Government in the 9th parliamentary term on 20 February 2023, as the House Press 392, to the request of the Government of the President of the House, decided to be discussed in a brief hearing with the omission of reading 1 and ordered it to be discussed by the Social Policy Committee as a guarantee committee. This committee recommended approving the bill (recommendation of 22.2.2023, House Press 392 / 1). 2 March 2023 The Chamber of Deputies stated that there were still conditions for discussing the bill in the abridged negotiations, when out of 171 Members present, 97 voted in favour, 1 abstained and 73 voted against it. Subsequently, it decided that a general debate would not succeed when, of the 163 present, the 70, 18 abstained and 75 opposed. The second reading took place at the 55th meeting on 3 and 4 March 2023, in a detailed debate, amendments were tabled to House Press No. 392, which were circulated to Members as Parliament Document No 2367, the third reading took place at the same meeting, namely on 4 March 2023, no amendment was accepted and the proposal was agreed when the 169 were 95 to and 74 against. The bill was referred to the Senate on 6 March 2023, which approved it at its 8th meeting on 8 March 2023. The law was delivered to the President of the Republic for signature on 9.3.2023, which he signed on 16.3.2023. The Act was published in the Collection of Laws on 20 March 2023 in the amount of 42 under No 71 / 2023 Coll.
23. In the light of the legal considerations contained in the decision of 31 January 2008 sp. zn. The Chamber of Deputies may abolish or limit the duration of a legislative emergency. He points out that if the President had not done so, he would have replaced, by his own subjective decision, the decision which, pursuant to Rule 99 (1) and (4) of the Rules of Procedure, is for the entire Chamber of Deputies and that it has also been done in the past, so it is a steady practice. The President also stated that it was aware of the case law of the Constitutional Court concerning the declaration of a state of legislative emergency, but that it was convinced that its procedure was in line with it.
24. The Chamber of Deputies stated that the hearing of the bill was initiated in the Chamber of Deputies on 28 February 2023 at 10 a.m. and was closed with limited breaks on 4 March 2023 at 11 a.m., so it took approximately 95 hours, or after deduction of breaks of about 67 hours "clean time." All along, only representatives of the House of Opposition have spoken and therefore had sufficient time to express their views. After a few days of negotiations, however, it was clear that the objective of the opposition was to block the adoption of the law completely, and therefore the majority of the House had to take measures limiting speaking time in the debates to twice five minutes, including factual remarks by that time, and that this period would also apply to the speeches of Members with priority rights (Section 67 of the Rules of Procedure). These persons were not denied the opportunity to speak at any time and to do anything but to have the same speaking time as others and, moreover, they had the opportunity to speak for a few hours before and therefore had sufficient time to present their views and opinions. The obstruction then culminated in the unacceptable occupancy of the speaker's counter, which, according to the President, runs counter to the principles of parliamentary democracy.
25. The President stated that it had done so in order to preserve the principles of parliamentary democracy, as it was clear that other proposals were a manifest abuse of opposition rights. In order to limit the time in the debates conducted under Rule 99 (4) and (5) of the Rules of Procedure to twice five minutes, the President stated that the Rules of Procedure do not explicitly regulate the conduct of debates, the debates on the state of legislative emergency and the abbreviated negotiations have been conducted in accordance with practice, with the opposition having sufficient time in this respect to express its views and views and only when there was undue obstruction, the measure was adopted.
26. The President considers that the aim of the measures taken was to rationalise the conduct of the Chamber of Deputies, to face undue obstruction and to ensure the adoption of the draft law, otherwise there would be a denial of the meaning of parliamentary democracy and a lack of effective exercise of power by a governmental majority. It adds that, on the basis of these, negotiations took place between representatives of the House and the opposition, after which the majority decided that the limitation of speaking time to twice five minutes did not apply to persons with a preferential right to speak. The opposition agreed to vote on both amendments and bills on 4 March 2023 in the morning. The House of Opposition had sufficient time to express its views and opinions when discussing the draft law, and therefore there was no breach of its rights from that point of view. The legislature acted in the belief that the law adopted was in accordance with the Constitution and the rule of law.
Statement by the Senate
27. In his observations of 27. 6. 2023, the Senate stated that the bill was passed on to the Senate by the Chamber of Deputies on 6. 3. 2023 and was assigned a press number 59 (14th term of office). The Organising Committee ordered the proposal to be discussed by the Committee on Social Policy (as a guarantee) and the Constitutional-Legal Committee which dealt with it on 7 March 2023. The first committee did not adopt any resolution, the constitutional legal committee proposed to reject the proposal. Plenum discussed it in a brief meeting at the 8th meeting of 8 March 2023 in an extensive debate on both the content of the legislation and the constitutional conformity of its adoption. After the debate, Resolution 125 was adopted by which the Senate approved the bill in the version referred to by the Chamber of Deputies. 48 out of 72 were voted in favour of this motion, 12 were opposed and 12 abstained.
Government observations
28. The Government, through its authorised Minister of Legislation and the Chairman of the Legislative Council of the Government, stated in its letter of 28.6.2023 that it carefully considered the need and intensity of measures to prevent the immediate destabilisation of the pension system, acting in a transparent manner. It rejects the absolute integrity of the legislation, brings about the functioning and financing of the pension system and points out that if there was no change, its balance in 2023 would have reached a record amount of almost CZK 92 billion. In December 2022, inflation was 3.1% for the relevant period, and in January 2023 it was 11.5%, and this price development was unexpectedly rapid and surprising, as is also stated in the explanatory report of the draft law. It merely modified the parameters of the indexation to a proportional level, respecting the meaning, substance and purpose of the constitutional right to adequate security. The Government further explains the parameters of the increase in pensions under Act No. 71 / 2023 Coll. and adds that by submitting the draft law, it initiated its efforts to ensure the long-term sustainability of the pension system, since already on 25.5.2023 (House Press 458 / 0) it submitted a draft amendment to Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., as amended, containing part of the reform measures and the overall complex of measures previously presented to the public on 11.5.2023.
29. The Government rejects the appellant's assertion of an unconstitutional conscious inaction consisting of the purposeful failure to issue a government regulation within the statutory deadline. The binding period under Section 67 (16) of Act 155 / 1995 Coll. (as effective until 19.3.2023) would expire only on 22.3.2023. There is no question of inaction, since the legislator had withdrawn its power before the expiry of that period, with effect from 20 March 2023, and the parameters of the increase were set directly by law. The Government also points to Article 2 of Act No. 23 / 2017 Coll., on the Rules of Budgetary Responsibility, Article 41 (2) of the Constitution and Article 24 of Act No. 2 / 1969 Coll., on the establishment of ministries and other central government bodies of the Czech Republic, as amended. As regards the alleged breach of the principle of legal certainty, the Government states that this principle cannot be reconciled with the requirement for absolute continuity of legislation [see, for example, point 85 of the decision of 15.5.2012 sp. zn. ÚS 17 / 11 (N 102 / 65 SbNU 367; 220 / 2012 Coll.)].
30. On the issue of the state of legislative emergency, the Government recalls the case-law of the Constitutional Court, according to which its role is not to protect the legality of the parliamentary procedure. Formal defects in the legislative process may establish the inconstitutionality of the law under consideration, if it is a direct and substantial breach of the procedural rules, while at the same time reaching a constitutional legal dimension. The justification for declaring a state of legislative emergency must be assessed in the light of the decision-making period and the extent of the information available at that time. It is therefore primarily the responsibility of the Chamber of Deputies to assess the rationality of the circumstances justifying the Government's request to discuss the bill in a state of legislative emergency. The decision of the President of the Chamber of Deputies to declare a legislative emergency must be examined by the Chamber of Deputies and, if necessary, cancel or limit the period for which it has been declared (paragraphs 1 and 4 of Section 99 of the Rules of Procedure). According to the Government, the question is whether the Constitutional Court has the power to review such a decision of the President of the Chamber of Deputies, as it is an act of a political nature, like the Constitutional Court is not competent to review the Government resolution on the declaration of an emergency situation.
31. The Government refuses to take advantage of its right to propose a draft law in a state of legislative emergency or in an abridged act. After assessing the severity of the impact of the jump and unexpected growth of inflation rates in January 2023 on the fiscal sustainability of the pension system, it acted with the maximum possible rationality and responsibility, as imposed by Section 2 of Act No. 23 / 2017 Coll., on the Rules of Budgetary Responsibility. In June 2023, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs concluded that an extraordinary indexation would be necessary only on the basis of the statistics published by the Czech Statistical Office on 10 February 2023. The need to adopt the law in an accelerated regime has created an extraordinary and unexpected situation that would lead to a deepening of the pension system deficit by about CZK 34 billion, only in 2023, with an impact of approximately twice that in the following years. In order to fulfil the objective of the Act, which was to avert the threat of significant economic damage to the State, it had to be declared in the Collection of Laws by 22.3.2023, which was the last day of the deadline for the issue of the implementing legislation setting out the specific parameters of the indexation. The opposition rejected the motion to agree to the proposal at first reading (Paragraph 90 (2) of the Rules of Procedure), and therefore there was no choice but to discuss it under Section 99 of the Rules of Procedure. The government underlines that the high increase in inflation in January 2023 was not a result of its sluggishness or malpractice. It was precisely the negative impact of this fact on public finances, along with a time-frame, because it was necessary to adopt legislation within a given period (until 22 March 2023), that was the reason for the proposal to discuss the bill in a state of legislative emergency. It concludes that the reason and objective of the regulation are legitimate, not arbitrary, but based on a rational basis and based on concrete facts such as unexpected inflation growth, the need for saturation of additional expenditure from the state budget related to, for example, the influx of refugees or the energy crisis.
32. The Government does not agree that it has abused the state of legislative emergency or that the conditions for its publication have not been fulfilled. It does not hide that reaching the 5% inflation threshold was expected, but a crucial moment was its jump rise. It was still 3,1% in December 2022. The applicable 5% threshold for inflation was therefore not met in December 2022, and if this threshold were to be slightly exceeded in January 2023, the Minister of Finance's statement that exceptional indexation expenditure could be covered by the State budget would be valid and no action would need to be taken. The appellant completely ignores that additional expenditure on indexation goes far beyond one financial year, as the increase becomes a solid part of each pension. This refutes the claim of "one-off character 'of the contested provisions. The cost of indexation in June 2023 in the amount of CZK 34.3 billion (instead of CZK 14.9 billion) would then amount to only about half of the costs that would have to be borne in the following years, i.e. CZK 58.8 billion. In the medium term (until 2026), spending on pensions would amount to CZK 30 billion per year and in the long term (about 30 years) it would be necessary to issue an estimated CZK 500 billion in addition. This is supposed to mean that a reduction in extraordinary indexation was necessary to stabilise public finances, which were also burdened by compensation for energy prices, which rose globally.
33. According to the Government, the second condition is that there is a threat of significant economic damage. This damage may also be the real risk of the State's mandatorial performance, which may immediately seriously and potentially damage (deteriorating) its management over a long period of time. In the context of the overall situation and the potential costs that would be generated under the original text of the law, not only in 2023 but also in the future, and in the context of the economic crisis affecting other groups of inhabitants, the conclusion that there is a constitutionally acceptable reason seems justified. Social security is the income of the state budget and the expenditure of the State is also the expenditure of pensions. Increasing these expenditure has a direct impact on the state budget, which creates the need to obtain the necessary funds in another way and will then be lacking in other areas of public expenditure. It also refuses to raise the situation and then to call it unexpected.
34. As regards the alleged breaches of the Rules of Procedure, the Government stated that the draft law contained only a supplement to the legislation in force and was set out in detail in the explanatory memorandum, which was not a complex material or lacking a rational justification, the time for study and preparation (from 20 to 28 February 2023) was sufficient. The 55th meeting of the Chamber of Deputies itself lasted from 28. 2. to 4. 3. 2023, i.e. 5 days of proceedings, the days of proceedings continued (even in evening and night hours) and only the House Press 392 was the subject of the hearing. The draft law was discussed by the Guarantee Committee, second and third readings were carried out, no Member was excluded from the process, or he could comment on the proposal, to make his own proposals (amendments or procedural amendments), and the written amendments were 422, and he could vote on the proposal. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the opposition tried to complicate and prolong the negotiations, so the bill was discussed in a tense atmosphere. No constructive discussion was conducted by the opposition, and the actions of its representatives showed signs of political abuse of an emergency. The Government considers that the legislative process performed its function, which is a real assessment and discussion of the draft law.
35. The government referred to the third part of the explanatory memorandum in relation to the material infringement of the contested provisions and at the same time stated that this objection was based on a partially correct premission, for example, that the right to indexation would arise directly on the basis of compliance with the conditions laid down by the law, but that its intrusion is misleading. It argues that Article 30 (3) and Article 41 (1) of the Charter, according to which the subjective right (to adequate material security in old age and incapacity for work and loss of livelihood) will result only from the text of the implementing act and therefore the legal right is based only on the fulfilment of all the conditions laid down by the hypothesis of the legal standard. According to the case law of the Constitutional Court, the principle of legal certainty cannot be attributed to the requirement of absolute continuity of the legislation. It considers it undeniable that the legislator has, in the future, ruled out one of the conditions, namely the adoption of a government regulation, whose cumulative fulfilment can be derived from the creation of a "right of indexation 'by an exceptional deadline, and has completed this" gap' by providing for an increase in pensions by an exceptional deadline in June 2023 in the form of a law. The establishment of a legal right - subjective public law and individual legitimate expectation of an increase in pensions - can only be derived according to the Government from the time of the entry into force of Act No. 71 / 2023 Coll. The specific parameters of the indexation, i.e. the specific increase in the base area and the percentage area, are not included in Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., as amended, and their determination is delegated to the government, because they depend on the statistical data collected for the relevant period separately for each indexation of pensions. Although these parameters are deductible from the data published by the Czech Statistical Office (hereinafter referred to as the "CSU '), it is clear that the Act provides for a specific procedure for determining specific parameters, in order to maintain legal certainty for the addressees of legal standards. Therefore, Paragraph 67 (16) explicitly states that" an increase in pensions is provided for in implementing legislation'. Otherwise, the mere publication of the relevant data of the CSU would de facto have the nature of a binding and enforceable source of law and would thus reach the level of legislation declared in the Collection of Laws. The acquisition of individual claims for an increase in their pension will take place only at the maturity date of the pension in the fifth calendar month following the month in which inflation reaches the applicable level of 5%, which is merely a material assumption that, at the end of the four months, an individual (legally enforceable) entitlement to an increase in pensions will arise.
36. The Government recalls the case law of the Constitutional Court and the ECHR on legitimate expectations in the case of social rights, according to which intervention by a public authority in the peaceful use of "property" is justified if it serves a legitimate public (or general) interest. The reduction of pension or related benefits is not a violation of Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention. This was also the case when pensions were reduced by up to 20%. In the present case, the intensity of the intervention was significantly lower, since exceptional indexation had indeed taken place, albeit not as much as the law originally provided for. The government refuses that this would be a case of false, let alone genuine retroactivity, since Act No. 71 / 2023 Coll. the subjective public right to valorisation of pensions was not affected, but the only potential individual claims which had yet to arise under the general arrangements were affected, as far as their size and not their existence. It adds that it was possible to conclude on the need for extraordinary indexation only on the basis of the statistics published by the CSU on 10.2.2023, the time of publication and evaluation may vary at different times. The legal expectations of extraordinary indexation are only raised by the public on the date on which the relevant government regulation is published in the Collection of Laws. By that date, the public may, on the basis of the CSU data, have the greatest idea that the conditions for extraordinary indexation are met.
37. The objection to a procedure contrary to Article 78 The Constitution states that the binding deadline for the issue of the Government Decree pursuant to § 67 (16) of Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., as amended by 19.3.2023, would expire only on 22.3.2023, but the legislator had withdrawn that power from the Government before the expiry of that period. With regard to the envisaged approval of the draft law, it was not appropriate to issue a regulation until then, since, after the approval of the law, the government's decree would have been in conflict with the law.
38. In conclusion, the Government states that the Constitutional Court uses the so-called "reasonable test" to review the interference of the legislator in the field of social rights. It is of the opinion that the contested legislation will undoubtedly stand in this test. It refers to the definition of the meaning and substance of the law referred to in Article 30 (1) of the Charter in the case-law of the Constitutional Court and notes that the proposed legislation does not affect the essential content of the fundamental right in question, since the "minimum material standard sufficient to lead a decent life 'remains maintained, it also refers to the average amount of pension after extraordinary indexation and the percentage of so-called replacement ratio. It considers the objective of the regulation to be legitimate and reasonable. Therefore, the Government proposes that the Constitutional Court reject the proposal.
The Ombudsman's observations
39. On 15.6.2023, the Ombudsman stated that he would not use the rights under Paragraph 69 (3) of the Constitutional Court Act and would not enter the proceedings.
Replication of the appellant
40. In order to express the House of Deputies, the appellant states that it is not important how many hours the draft law has been discussed, since it is necessary to comply with the rules, meaning and purpose laid down in the conditions of the material rule of law, which have been repeatedly violated in an unconstitutional intensity. Members with a right of priority were limited to 2 × 5 minutes in their speeches, which included factual remarks, which is contrary to § 59 (1) and (2) in conjunction with § 67 of the Rules of Procedure. This does not change the fact that the government's majority ultimately revocated its decision, because it is this limitation that has contributed to the escalation of the situation.
41. In response to the Government's observations, the appellant states that the change in legislation must take place in a constitutional manner. The principles of the rule of law include the principle of legal certainty, clarity and certainty of law. In particular, there has been a breach of the predictability of the law, and thus a breach of citizens' trust in the law, through government procedures. At the latest from 8.9.2022, the government was aware that there would be extraordinary indexation due to high inflation, but it did not take any fiscal or indexation measures to change the indexation mechanism before the pension beneficiaries were entitled to an indexation that occurred at the end of January 2023. The beneficiaries of pensions thus had legitimate expectations confirmed by the statements of individual members of the government.
42. The appellant also draws attention to the internal contradiction of the government's claims, which, on the one hand, claimed that price developments were unexpectedly "fast, very surprising," and at the same time that reaching the 5% inflation threshold was not unexpected. The imposition of mandatorial costs cannot be regarded as damage, because such an interpretation would open the door to the use of the Institute of Legislative Emergency for a change essentially of any law. The focus and level of public spending are a political issue. The appellant also rejects the fact that the complexity of the material and the subsequent need for an appropriate area of discussion would be given by the length of the normative text. The complexity of the impact of the relevant legal standard on the company or its non-negligible segment is crucial, in the present case, it concerned millions of pension recipients of various kinds. Moreover, the indexation mechanism is linked to the indexation of the compensation for loss of earnings after the cessation of incapacity for work and the cost of feeding the survivors, but the government majority did not have any parliamentary discussion on this socially sensitive subject.
43. The appellant considers that there is a difference between the emergence of legitimate expectations that the indexation will take place under the law and the payment in a particular case. The issue of the Government's implementing regulation is a technical precondition for a comprehensive uniform procedure, the right to ad valorem and the obligation to implement it is, however, the law itself. If the obligation to valorise and claim it were bound to issue or not to issue government regulations, its role as implementing legislation would be denied, as well as the meaning of the relevant legal provisions. The finding of 9.5.2023 sp. zn.
44. The appellant refuses to act unconstructively and to take advantage of the exceptional situation, as it was expected, and even according to the Constitutional Court, obstruction is a legitimate instrument of the opposition, its task is not to cooperate constructively in solving the problems that the government itself has caused. It points out that the situation has been escalated by the government majority by repeated violations of the Rules of Procedure, in particular by restricting the presence of persons with priority rights.
45. If the Government has stated that the duty of indexation could not have arisen on 31 January 2023 because the relevant statistical data had not yet been known at that date, the appellant contends that a number of claims and obligations arise at a certain date and are subsequently fulfilled. The government itself confirmed that it acted knowingly with the aim of failing to comply. The appellant considers the argument put forward by the Government that the contested provision will stand in the rationality test. For the reasons set out above, the appellant refers to the Government's argument as unfounded.
Proceedings before the Constitutional Court and its procedural assumptions
46. The Constitutional Court first examined whether the procedural conditions of the proceedings were fulfilled. The application was submitted by an actively legitimate appellant, i.e. by a group of 71 Members [Paragraph 64 (1) (b) of the Law on the Constitutional Court] and the Constitutional Court is competent to discuss it [Article 87 (1) (a) of the Constitution].
47. The Constitutional Court has therefore taken action to assess whether the contested legal provisions comply with the constitutional rules, namely: (a) the contested legislation was adopted and issued within the limits of the constitutional jurisdiction laid down; (b) the constitutional procedure for their adoption or extradition has been complied with; and (c) the contested legislation is in accordance with the constitutional rules in terms of content (§ 68 (2) of the Constitutional Court Act, as amended by Act No 48 / 2002 Coll.).
48. In view of the content of the observations made by the appellant, the Constitutional Court considered that, in order to clarify the case and to establish the facts (in particular in relation to the alleged abuse of the state of the legislative emergency), evidence had to be carried out and, to that end, requested written observations (see below) and ordered oral proceedings (Sections 44 and 48 (1) of the Constitutional Court Act).
Collection of documentary evidence
Observation of the National Budget Board
49.
1. On the basis of what information on economic developments, the state of public budgets, the consumer price index and the expected fulfilment of legal entitlements from so-called mandatorial spending by the payment of pensions, and at what point in time could the relevant ministries and government have sufficient information on price increases, significantly above 5% in the second half of 2022 and early 2023, and at what level?
2. What direct budgetary costs not foreseen in the state budget would arise in the short term (i.e. up to 31.12.2023) as a result of the decision on extraordinary indexation of pensions and what effects could occur in the medium term over the next few years if Law No 71 / 2023 Coll. were not adopted?
50. The NRR stated that price developments since mid-2021 have been very hectic, essentially unprecedented. The period of high price growth is usually volatile (fluctuating, unstable, volatile) price dynamics and thus their estimate is complicated and all macroeconomic predictions show high error rates. The increase in prices in 2022 was reflected in two waves of extraordinary indexations (June and September), which together with proper indexations in January 2022 and January 2023 and with the impact of the introduction of the so-called educational fee meant additional expenditure of the pension system almost CZK 100 billion. The unforeseeable and high price increase between 2022 and 2023 resulted in an increase in the replacement ratio, i.e. the share of the average income and the average wage from 40,2% from the end of 2021 to 45,8%.
(51) The NRR also referred to the "Price evolution (June 2022 = 100)" graph, containing a comparison of the actual price level (both the consumer price index and the pensioner cost index) with the projected consumer price level calculated according to the Ministry of Finance's August and November macroeconomic forecasts, the August prediction being the basis for establishing the state budget, whether it is realistic, is assessed by the Committee on Budgetary Forecasts. It is clear from this chart that August's macroeconomic forecast assumed that the consumer price growth threshold of 5% had already been exceeded in November 2022, i.e. even before it had actually occurred. If this were to happen, it would mean an extraordinary indexation of pensions already in April 2023 with additional pension expenses for 2023 of about CZK 20 billion. However, there was a one-off price decrease in October 2022 which was not expected by this macroeconomic forecast and which was linked to the introduction of the so-called energy saving tariff. The price development was reflected in the macroeconomic forecast of November 2022, which, after its completion in January 2023, again assumed that the 5% threshold of price increases (price increases by 6.2 p. b.) from June 2022, which would mean additional pension expenses of about CZK 19 billion for 2023. It can therefore be concluded that the Ministry of Finance could expect additional expenditure on extraordinary pension indexation of CZK 19 to 20 billion based on these macroeconomic forecasts.
52. At the same time, however, the NRR pointed out that price developments in January 2023 were largely surprising, as the actual growth of the consumer price index exceeded the assumptions of the Ministry of Finance by 2.2% and, at the same time, the increase in the price index (cost of living) of pensioners' households compared to the increase in the consumer price index by a further 3.1%, thus reaching 11.5% from June 2022. In doing so, the relevant institutions predict only the dynamics of the consumer price index, none of the institutions performing the cost-of-living index of pensioners' households. Therefore, the Ministry of Finance could not well have anticipated higher growth of this index. If the text of Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll. was in force before the contested amendment, the additional expenditure for extraordinary indexation would amount to about CZK 35.2 billion for 2023, i.e. compared to the "foreseeable" additional expenditure of another CZK 16 billion.
53. On the second question, the NRR stated that the application of § 67ca of Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll. meant a significant reduction in pension expenditure in both 2023 and subsequent years. Additional expenditure on pensions in 2023 will amount to CZK 15.4 billion, in the case of the application of the unchanged indexation mechanism, the additional expenditure would amount to CZK 35.2 billion, so that the reduction in national budget expenditure in 2023 amounted to almost CZK 20 billion (i.e. 0.3% of GDP), all in a situation where the pension account falls into a significant deficit, mainly due to the automatic indexation of pensions mechanism, which leads to an increase in replacement conditions during the period of high price increases (real wages).
54. The reduction in pension expenditure is not only related to 2023, but also to subsequent years. The reduction in expenditure for the year 2024 of 0.5% of GDP and 36 billion CZK is higher than for the year 2023 because it covers the whole year, not just part of it as in 2023. Since 2025, there will be a gradual reduction in these additional costs, as new pensioners will come up with a pension ratio that will not take into account the exceptional indexation discussed above, and on the contrary, some of the pensions already paid will cease due to the death of their beneficiaries. However, this process will be relatively slow and the differences between the two scenarios in old-age pensions expenditure will continue until 2035. In sum, for the years 2023 to 2035, the difference in pension expenditure will be 4.6% of GDP, i.e. about CZK 337 billion at constant prices. In the absence of the adoption of Act No. 71 / 2023 Coll., this additional expenditure would be reflected in higher government deficits under otherwise unchanged circumstances and thus probably also in higher government debt dynamics.
Statement of the Czech National Bank
55. The Constitutional Court called on the Czech National Bank (hereinafter referred to as "CNB") to answer the following questions:
1. What was the predicted (foreseeable) evolution of inflation and price stability in the second half of 2022 and early 2023?
2. What was the real trend in inflation and price stability over this period and whether this development was expected compared to the forecasts of the CNB?
3. Whether from the information and data resulting from this activity and from its provision of the CNB, the authorities of the Czech Republic and, above all, the government of the Czech Republic could have predicted the development of the CNB and, in reality, also investigated it?
56. On question 1 of the CNB stated that in the second half of 2022 and at the beginning of 2023 it developed three quarterly macroeconomic forecasts containing a forecast of inflation, which served as a basis for the monetary meetings of the Bank Board held on 4.8.2022, 3.11.2022 and 2.2.2023 and which were publicly communicated at the post-meeting press conferences, one day later as part of the publication of the selected sections of the "Monetary Policy Report 'and the presentation for analysts and finally a week later as part of the full edition of the relevant quarterly" Monetary Policy Report'. This report is received for information or discussion by the Government and the budget committee of the Chamber of Deputies. During the processing and publication of macroeconomic forecasts within the quarter, monthly inflation values from the currently ongoing quarters are not available. The forecast of August and November 2022 expected further acceleration of inflation (annual price growth) in the second half of 2022 and its noticeable slowdown only during 2023, with inflation still reaching double figures in the first half of 2023. The February 2023 forecast also expected inflation in the first quarter of 2023 at around 16%, roughly similar to the previous two forecasts. This forecast, too, expected inflation to decline during the first half of the year, but will remain at double-digit levels and only decrease to one-digit values in the second half of 2023.
57. On question 2 of the CNB stated that the fact that in the last quarter of 2022 inflation was lower than forecast, the adoption of the so-called government saving tariff for the electricity price for October to December 2022 and its inclusion in the calculation of the consumer price index of the CSU with a contribution of -2,7 percentage points in year-to-year inflation, which the forecasts did not foresee, or in November forecast, was already communicated as a short-term forecast risk. All three forecasts for the first half of 2023 were met relatively precisely with a deviation of one percentage point. The projected return to price stability was expected in 2024.
58. If question 3 is concerned, the CNB answered it positively ("Yes.").
Expression of the CSU
59. The Constitutional Court called on the CSU to answer the following questions:
1. Which statistical information (data) on the economic development, state of public budgets, price increases and expected fulfilment of legal entitlements from so-called mandatorial spending by paying pensions for the period of the second half of 2022 and early 2023 and at what time were they provided to the relevant ministries and government of the Czech Republic?
2. Whether, when and where the statistical information was published and, where appropriate, corrected?
3. Whether an analysis of the development of the budget and pension account has been drawn up in the area in question (including with regard to the possibility of extraordinary indexation) and with what data?
60. On the first question, the CSU replied that it publishes statistics in accordance with the applicable legislation and in order to ensure equal access to information on its website. Outputs are planned and publication dates for the following year are published in December. The latest information is published in the form of "Quick Information," which is usually based on monthly or quarterly periodicity. In the period from 1.7.2022 to 31.3.2023 it was the index of consumer prices with monthly periodicity on the 10th calendar day following the end of the month. In the area of national accounts, an estimate of gross domestic product (GDP), GDP production and use, quarterly sector accounts, government deficit and debt, and the notification of government deficit and debt was issued. Data on average wages with quarterly periodicity were also published on the 65th calendar day following the period. The employment rate, unemployment rate and economic activity, as well as the employment and unemployment figures, were published in the employment sector, according to the results of the labour force sample survey.
61. CSU provides information services at the request of individual applicants, providing approximately 10 000 such information in 2022 and does not have special government requirements in the register. In addition, it is assumed that users from the relevant institutions approach the data themselves in a web environment. It mentioned that it was only one of the subjects of the statistical service and that the services were carried out by ministries and other central authorities under the law. Any of the workplaces of this service could provide the ministries or government with statistical information regarding economic developments, etc. The ministries are not obliged to inform the CSU of this information. In order to communicate with the CSU ministries, he stated that he provides annual data on average wages calculated in a comparable methodology in 1995 and that, on the basis of a request from the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, statistical data were provided by letter dated 5.9.2022 for the purpose of preparing a government regulation setting, pursuant to Article 17 of Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., as amended, the general assessment basis for the calendar year 2021 and the conversion rate for the adjustment of this assessment basis.
62. On the second question, the CSU stated that statistical information is and has been published on the website according to the terms set out in the Product Catalogue and that the revision of statistical data is a completely standard part of the production process of statistics following the objective development of the level of knowledge of social and economic phenomena and is governed by the published "Policy of revision of the CSU '.
63. On the third question, the CSU stated that it has neither prepared nor currently processed any analysis of the development of the budgetary and pension accounts.
Comments from CERGE- EI
64. Another call was made by the Constitutional Court at the CERGE- EI (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute). However, the Institute of National Economic Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, v. v. i., stated that it was unable to answer the questions asked within the prescribed time limit.
Oral hearing and amendment of the Judge-Rapporteur
65. The Constitutional Court, at the mandated oral hearing held on 10 January 2024, heard as witnesses the Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of Labour and Social Affairs Mariana Jurečka, Minister of Finance Zbyňek Stanjuru, employee of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of Jan Píb and Ministry of Finance of David Prusvice, and, in accordance with Section 49 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, heard the processors of the above-requested statements of the National Budget Council of Jedřímímík Hampla Michal Hlaváček, Czech National Bank of Peter Králová and Czech Statistical Office of Jan Sixta. The evidence concerned clarifying the situation in which the government was in the relevant period when it weighed whether and how it would react to adverse developments in the area.
66. The statement by the chairman of NRR M. Hample and others showed that already in the autumn of 2022, the government had clear signals that inflation would reach such a level that another extraordinary indexation of pensions would be needed. In this context, however, the ordinary legislative process was not initiated and exceptional indexation was not foreseen in the State Budget Act. From the statements of Ministers Z. Stanjury and M. Jurečka, it was found that the government planned to address the expected extraordinary indexation in 2023, as well as two extraordinary indexations in 2022, by transferring funds from the government budget reserve (planned for 2023 in excess of CZK 10 billion) and by moving from the budgets of other ministries. The evidence also showed that the government took other measures in the second half of 2022, in particular for a limited period of time introduced the so-called "energy saving tariff," which resulted in a more marked price increase on time.
67. The period of the end of 2022 and in particular the beginning of 2023 was very turbulent and historically unprecedented in terms of inflation, which was demonstrated in particular by the interview of D. Purusvice. The answer from M. Hample and Minister Z. Stanjury was also shown that it was not possible to predict that the index of living costs of pensioners would reach the level at which it "jumped" in January 2023, i.e. 11.6% per month. As Z. Stanjur testified, it was six times the previous month; In December 2022, even the month-to-month increase in inflation was zero and around 3% year-on-year. Such a step-by-step increase in inflation was seen by the government as a signal of imminent significant economic damage, which may justify a state of legislative emergency.
68. The Constitutional Court also found that the indexation of pensions had in the past been calculated on the basis of normal inflation, not the index of pensioners' living costs, which had not previously been followed up or predicted in a particular way since no more serious reason had been given. For the first time, this consumer price index for pensioners' households deviated more significantly from the general consumer price index of households only in January 2023.
69. The testimonials (especially M. Hampl, Z. Stanjury, M. Jurečka and D. Purusvice) also showed that it was not even close to one-off CZK 35 billion. In the longer term, there would be a cumulative impact exceeding several hundred billion CZK. There was a major economic and social problem and a significant conflict between generations, which the government considered to be an extraordinary fact sufficient to declare a state of legislative emergency. The forthcoming legislation would probably not have been able to pass the standard legislative process in time, even if it had started in the autumn of 2022. According to the Government, it was better to validate less in a state of legislative emergency than to reduce the amount of pension in the future.
70. The Court of First Instance assessed the evidence made individually and in summary, taking into account the facts and arguments contained in the file. The factual findings made in this way are contained in a further part of the statement of reasons for this finding.
71. The Judge-Rapporteur in the case under examination was appointed by Jan Svatonín in accordance with the current schedule of work. After his proposal for a finding was not accepted at the plenary meeting, the President of the Constitutional Court, Josef Baxter, appointed Josef Baxter, under Article 55 of the Law on the Constitutional Court on 11 January 2024, as Judge of the Rapporteur Vojtěv Šimík.
Review of the procedure for the adoption of the contested legal provisions
72. If the procedure for approving Act No. 71 / 2023 Coll., which introduced the contested provisions into the heading of those laws, the Constitutional Court came mainly from the observations submitted by the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, as well as from publicly available electronic sources (stenograms from meetings of the two chambers of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, resolutions and parliamentary and Senate press, freely available at http: / / www.psp.cz and http: / / www.senat.cz). The appellant does not define itself in relation to the facts set out therein.
73. The Constitutional Court notes that Law No 71 / 2023 Coll. was adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution of the established competence. On this point, the appellant does not object to any reservations, its argument focuses on the alleged constitutional deficits of the legislative process, arguing that its constitutional courts [which should be distinguished from the constitutional definition of competence - cf. the finding of 18.8.2004 sp. zl. ÚS 7 / 03 (N 113 / 34 SbNU 165; 512 / 2004 Sb.)].
74. In that regard, the appellant contends that there is an unconstitutional declaration of a state of legislative emergency (Section 99 (1) of the Rules of Procedure) or that the draft law should be dealt with in an abridged manner (Section 99 (2) of the Rules of Procedure) and that the rights of a parliamentary minority should be reduced. Since the appellant did not raise any other reservations, and even the Constitutional Court prima facie did not find that the legislative process could be affected by another defect, it took the view, after clarifying the facts of the case (see above), that its objections were justified.
General considerations
1.
Legislative process
75. In order to assess the constitutionality of the legislative process in the procedure for the annulment of laws and other legislation pursuant to § 64 et seq. of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the numerous caselaw of the Constitutional Court, which summarises the finding of 13.9.2022 sp. zn. The Constitutional Court, based on this finding, recalls that, on the one hand, the requirement to comply with the procedural rules in order to achieve a proper (constitutionally consistent) decision [finding of 2.10.2002 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 5 / 02 (N 117 / 28 SbNU 25; 476 / 2002 Coll.)], on the other hand, that formal defects in the legislative process can only be established by the unconstitutional nature of the Act under consideration if it is directly and substantially infringed by its rules (whether in the Constitution and the Constitutional Order or in the Underconstitutional law) and at the same time such doubts are reached by the constitutional dimension [finding sp. It is not the role of the Constitutional Court to protect the "mere" legality of parliamentary procedure [cf. the finding of 7.4.2020 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 30 / 16 (N 67 / 99 CollNU 258; 254 / 2020 Coll.)]; the independence of the Constitutional Court in the legislative process is justified in particular by the protection of free competition between political parties and minorities, in particular the parliamentary opposition [finding of 18.5.2021 sp. zn. A defect in the legislative process already having the character of unconstitutionality can be given by the accumulation of several partial formal errors (cf. the finding of 27 November 2012 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 1 / 12).
76. The Constitutional Court also notes that the rules of the legislative process are contained in various sources (parliamentary) of law, which include, in particular, the Constitution, the Rules of Procedure of the two chambers of Parliament (in addition to the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, Act No. 107 / 1999 Coll., the Rules of Procedure of the Senate, as amended) and individual resolutions of the individual chambers of Parliament issued pursuant to Rule 1 (2) of their Rules of Procedure (so-called autonomous resolution); The established practice of the parliamentary chamber and its bodies is also important if it can be considered consistent with the principles of law-making, democratic political system, etc. (point 38 of the sp. zn. The Constitutional Court considers these sources of parliamentary law to be an expression of parliamentary autonomy (point 63 of the sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 55 / 10). Therefore, the requirements for the legislative process are not only relatively certain procedural rules laid down by the Constitution, but also some constitutional principles, which only take place at the level of the law, i.e. the Rules of Procedure of the two chambers. In addition to the democratic principle arising from Article 1 (1) of the Constitution, which constitutes one of the essential elements of the democratic rule of law and which does not apply to the mere majority decision of the democratically elected Members or Senators, but also to the way in which the draft law is to be dealt with, constitutional relevance may also be recognised to other principles, in particular the prohibition of arbitrage, the principle of the protection of minorities in political decisions, the requirement of democratic control, both by Members and Senators, as well as the principle of free competition of political forces.
2.
Protection of the parliamentary minority
77. As the Constitutional Court has stated in the finding of the sp. zn.
78. In doing so, the fundamental rights of a parliamentary minority or its members may be considered primarily rights guaranteeing participation in parliamentary procedures and enabling the parliamentary opposition to exercise control over the ruling majority, which can be seen as one of the fundamental characteristics of the rule of law [see Part III (A) of the decision sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 77 / 06]. In particular, the legislative process must enable those involved in it to make a realistic assessment and discussion of the draft, including - and above all - representatives of the parliamentary minority (see Part X / and the finding of 31 January 2008, sp. zn. Individual Members or Senators must have the real opportunity to become familiar with the content of the proposed bill, to examine it and to take an opinion on it in the context of its deliberations in the relevant chamber of Parliament or in its institutions. To do this, they must have sufficient time (point 108 of the sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 53 / 10). Those requirements for parliamentary debate should also apply to the wider public, who should not be denied the possibility of monitoring and critical evaluation of the legislative proposal in question. The public debate can take all sorts of imaginable forms; This ultimately fulfils the legitimate function of the legislative process (points 206 to 208 of the sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 1 / 12).
79. However, the right of Members (or Senators) to present an opinion on parliamentary ground is not of any use, as the importance of the parliamentary debate lies in the possibility of confronting views across the political spectrum, guaranteed by the free competition of political forces under Article 5 of the Constitution (point 155 of the decision sp. zn. It is also essential at what stage of the legislative process the rights of the parliamentary opposition have been restricted and whether or not these restrictions could have been healed at another stage (cf. First of all, it is necessary to seek and assess the balance between the legitimate interests of the ruling majority and the parliamentary opposition or minorities (see paragraph 76 of the decision of the sp. zn.
3.
The state of legislative emergency and discussion of the draft law in the abridged negotiations
80. The Constitutional Court in the sp. zn. It is regulated at the legal level in Section 99 of the Rules of Procedure. Its use effectively limits certain democratic principles of the legislative process, in particular the rights of the parliamentary opposition; Therefore, it constitutes an exception to the rule for which, in a particular case, sufficient grounds must always be given based on a rational basis and supported by specific facts which outweigh the interest in discussing the draft law in a standard manner (the findings of the sp. zn.
81. At the same time, the Constitutional Court pointed out that it is not a "notice of appeal" in relation to the assessment of the rationality of the declaration of a state of legislative emergency, but rather as a defender of constitutional principles relating to the legislative process prior to the possible abuse of that institute to circumvent the proper legislative procedure (point 115 of the decision in point 115 of the sp. zn. The policy before possible abuse is a legal definition of the grounds for declaring a state of legislative emergency which can be considered legitimate, constitutionally and discussed and reachable (cf. point 86 of the decision sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 55 / 10).
82. The constitutional consistency of the legislative emergency will be determined by the Constitutional Court if there is a significant reason which has the potential to jeopardise fundamental rights and freedoms in a fundamental manner, or if there is a threat of significant economic damage to the State (Paragraph 99 (1) of the Act on the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies) [see, to this concept, the finding of page 12 / 10 of the Convention of 7 September 2010 (N 188 / 58 CollU 663; 269 / 2010 Coll.)] or, in the case of a broad consensus in Parliament (cf. These must be exceptional circumstances which are manifestly out of the ordinary course of political processes [e.g. threat of legislative "vacuum" - cf. the finding of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 28 / 13 of 10.7.2014 (N 137 / 74 CollNU 93; 161 / 2014 Coll.)] and which pose the risk of the above-mentioned qualified injury, or of the circumstances such as natural disasters or other unforeseen events [see point 84 of the finding sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 55 / 10 or point 93 of the finding of 7.12.2021 sp. sp. pl. ÚS 20 / 21 (4 / 2022 Coll.)]. The state of legislative emergency (and the related abbreviated discussion of the draft law) is therefore conditional on the existence of an exceptional circumstance and its intensity in view of its possible negative effect on one of the generally defined protected values, such as the rights and freedoms of citizens, the security of the state or the protection of property (point 114 of the decision sp. zn.
83. The constitutional requirements for parliamentary debate, i.e. in particular in relation to the role of the parliamentary opposition (cf. sp. zn. The intervention of the Constitutional Court is justified in particular if the core of the democratic parliamentary debate is affected, which can only be seen in relation to the positions of the parliamentary (parliamentary) debate actors themselves (cf.
84. The Constitutional Court also states that the declaration of a state of legislative emergency and the decision to discuss the draft law in the abridged hearing sets out a procedural framework for the negotiation and approval of draft laws which is substantially different from the standard procedure allowing the full application of democratic principles, in particular the rights of the parliamentary minority. However, it should be stressed that protection is not only worthy of the rights of this minority, but of the democratic process of discussing and approving laws as such. The Constitutional Court has repeatedly judged that the adoption of laws should take place within such a time frame as to make the draft law known for a certain period of time, to be subject to public debate, and to exclude the adoption of laws "cabinet ', outside public control. It is at the parliamentary opposition, but also at any other person (whether from the professional or lay public), to make use of this time space and to make public any deficiencies in the draft law or the risks associated with its adoption (see point 206 of the sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 1 / 12). This request is all the more urgent where the adopted law will have a significant social impact.
85. Not every malfeasance of the legislator against the Rules of Procedure (as a sub-constitutional law) carries with it a breach of constitutionality. However, in view of the consequences that may be associated with a flawed assessment of the existence of the conditions laid down in Rule 99 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, it is necessary to insist consistently on the requirement of constitutionally conformal intextation and application of this provision. The Constitutional Court also leads to this conclusion by the fact that any errors made by the legislator in this consideration "contaminate 'the whole other legislative process, since the procedures contained in the Rules of Procedure used therein will not be legally relevant and the review of the legislator's procedure on their basis makes no sense.
86. In the find sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 55 / 10 The Constitutional Court outlined the interpretation of the terms contained in Paragraph 99 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, in particular the term "exceptional circumstances', as a separate ground for declaring a state of legislative emergency or as a primary condition thereof. However, the Constitutional Court now considers it necessary to clarify that the legally relevant circumstances (facts) in that provision are those which fulfil the condition of" exceptional ', while at the same time threatening the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens or the security of the State or the threat of significant economic damage to the State. The two conditions must therefore be met cumulatively, and the state of the threat is generally not the result of normal events, but not any exceptional situation necessarily involves the risk of serious consequences. The use of the term "extraordinary' indicates that these must be circumstances (events) that are out of the ordinary course of things and are therefore unexpected or difficult to predict (e.g. natural disaster such as earthquakes, floods, storms, droughts or epidemics, particularly serious accidents or" shock 'disturbances of the state's economic or financial situation). On the contrary, it cannot be considered to be legally relevant to the deterioration resulting from upward or downward movements within the economic cycle, or from a crisis that has been foreseeable for a long time. At the same time, from the use of the words "serious' or" significant ', the Constitutional Court concludes that the possible consequences (in terms of their intensity) need to be considered in the event that the legislator's intervention is not in time. The threat or threat cannot be merely hypothetical, but its existence must be real and immediate.
87. In the view of the Constitutional Court, the concept of "damage ', expressed in point 17 of the judgment of 7 September 2010, sp. zn. Thus, a significant deterioration in the state of public finances, i.e. one which the State is unable to deal with by normal means (e.g. using reserves, budget cuts or transfers) can also be considered as economic damage, without at the same time jeopardising the performance of other socially important tasks.
88. The reasons for declaring a legislative emergency are expressly (and taxiously) set out in Section 99 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, but it follows from the nature of the case that, in addition to one of the legal reasons (again cumulatively), the condition of urgency must be fulfilled in the sense that, due to the time constraints, it is not possible to avert the negative effects already mentioned by the "standard 'legislative procedure (according to the finding of 10 July 2014 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 28 / 13, a certain" time distress' may also be such a reason; cf. point 99 of the decision sp. Moreover, if there was no risk of delay, there would be no reason to shorten the legislative process.
89. The condition of urgency cannot be examined only in the light of (not) the adequacy of the time limit for the consideration of the government bill after its submission to the Chamber of Deputies, but it is also necessary to do so from the point of view of the time between the creation (finding) of objective facts on the basis of which the need for new legislation can be considered and the submission of a draft law. The government's question of submitting such a proposal calls into question the seriousness of the threat and / or the intensity of its possible consequences as relevant grounds for declaring a state of legislative emergency. It would then have to be considered as totally unacceptable a procedure whereby the government knowingly waits with its proposal, thereby causing the state of legislative emergency itself to discuss it in an abridged manner, as such conduct bears signs of abuse of law or insolence.
4.
Summary
90. On the basis of the above, the Constitutional Court concludes that, from the point of view of constitutionality, only one law whose proposal has been debated and approved in a proper legislative process which does not infringe constitutional principles can stand. This also implies compliance with the fundamental procedural rules set by the legislator at the level of sub-constitutional law. Such fundamental rules include those which lay down the conditions for the negotiation of a draft law in a state of legislative emergency in an abridged act, as their use determines the form of the legislative process given by the relevant "procedural" framework. The state of legislative emergency is exceptional in nature and therefore the conditions for its application (Section 99 (1) of the Rules of Procedure) must be interpreted strictly. Therefore, the condition (cumulatively) must be fulfilled that the circumstances which are the reason for its publication are of an exceptional nature and that, as a result, there is a fundamental threat to the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens or to the security of the state or to significant economic damage. The circumstances must be unexpected (difficult to predict) and the threat or threat must be real, immediate and intense. This is also related to the condition of a certain "urgency," which is that because of the time pressure, the draft law can no longer be discussed in a "standard" way. If there is a threat of significant economic damage to the state of legislative emergency, it is essential that the draft law is linked to and able to contribute to the problem (principle of potential and government responsibility). The notion of economic damage cannot be seen as damage in the "normal" civil sense, so it can also be seen as an unmanageable development of the government budget's mandatorial spending creating a threat of serious problems in public finances. At the same time, however, the Institute of Legislative Emergency does not derive directly from constitutional order and is regulated at the level of sub-constitutional law. Therefore, any infringement of this law does not necessarily trigger the unconstitutional nature of the law so negotiated and approved: an assessment of the intensity of the infringement in each individual case is important.
Application of general considerations to the case under assessment
1.
On the objection to the declaration of a state of legislative emergency and to the discussion of a bill in a brief hearing
91. In the present case, the government concludes that the inflation rate in January 2023 had unexpectedly reached the level that was set by the law of extraordinary indexation. According to the government, considerable economic damage was to consist in spending about CZK 20 billion "extra" (above the existing pensions).
92. According to Section 67 of Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., as amended, pensions paid are increased depending on the growth of the consumer price index and the increase in wages. The basic and percentage rates of pensions paid shall be increased as from 1 January of the calendar year in which the increase takes place. In this case it is a regular term (paragraph 2).
93. However, the case now decided concerns an exceptional deadline. This was the case when the percentage rates of pensions paid increased outside the regular deadline "if, during the period for the price increase determined in accordance with paragraph 4, the price increase reached at least 5%. In an exceptional period, the pensions paid shall be increased from the payment of the pension due in the fifth calendar month following the calendar month in which the price increase was at least 5%" (Section 67 (3) of Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., as amended by 30.9.2023). According to Paragraph 67 (4) (b) of the Act cited, the period for determining price increases is determined as follows: "the first month of that period is the calendar month following the last calendar month of the period for determining price increases used for the previous increase in the percentage rate of pensions, and the last month of that period is the calendar month in which the increase in pensions is at least 5% '. It is therefore clear that the key to the present case is to set a time (month) in which prices increase at least 5%.
94. The Constitutional Court notes, on the basis of the evidence carried out (and there is no dispute between the parties in this regard), that inflation in excess of the legal limit of 5% occurred only in January 2023 (in December at 3.1% and month-to-month growth was even zero), which was published by the CSU on 10.2.2023. The previous information (cf. CNB and NRR, as well as quarterly macroeconomic predictions) was indeed mere assumptions of expected economic and inflation developments, which were subsequently confirmed (albeit not entirely). It can, of course, be argued that the government should have worked much more closely with these predictions and taken them into account more when planning budget expenditure. On the other hand, however, in the present case, the Constitutional Court has not found that the Government has expressly infringed any of its legal obligations. The requested derogation of the contested legal provisions cannot be regarded as a "penalty 'for any slowness or lack of predictability of the government.
95. The two ministers at the Constitutional Court on 10 January 2024 stated that they were counting on the extraordinary indexation of pensions in the light of inflation forecasts, but were, however, surprised by its size ("exceptional exceptional"), as they expected an increase of around 6% (one percentage point above the five percentage point will decide on extraordinary indexation). They were equally surprised that the rise in the price index of pensioners' living costs had for the first time significantly detached from the consumer price index and was even more than 3% higher than the consumer index, with earlier standard differences in order of lower tenths of a percentage. If, therefore, their initial assumption were to be fulfilled, the situation would be resolved by the transfer of funds from the government budget reserve and from the budget chapters of other ministries, as happened in previous extraordinary valuations. This was confirmed (in particular) by the chairman of the NRR M. Hampl, who (before the hearing of the two ministers) stated that it was clear at the end of 2022 that a price increase of 5% in January 2023 would be exceeded, but no one could really estimate that such an increase would be so high (the circumstances that exceptional indexation in the state budget for 2023 had not been foreseen, but he said that he did not understand). As a result of the energy-saving tariff, the price increase was initially projected to be exceeded by several months, i.e. up to the beginning of 2023.
96. In the light of the reference framework of the review carried out by the Constitutional Court, it is, therefore, essential that the statutory fact (i.e. a 5% increase in prices) did not actually occur until January 2023 and that the government was informed of it only on 10 February 2023. If, therefore, the government submitted a contested draft law on 20 February 2023, this action cannot be considered to be inconvenient (witness Pøb explained in very detail under what time pressure the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs practically prepared the draft law in the order of several decades).
97. Therefore, if the Constitutional Court stated from above that the condition of urgency should be examined also in the light of the time-frame between the creation (finding) of objective facts on the basis of which it is possible to consider the need for new legislation and the submission of a draft law, and the Government's delay in submitting such a proposal would seriously call into question the seriousness of the threat and the intensity of its possible consequences as relevant grounds for declaring a legislative emergency, such a situation would not occur in this case. Indeed, the 10-day period cannot be considered to be excessively long, which could indicate that the government is not acceptable. Nor can it be argued that perhaps the government "deliberately" provoked "the need for an accelerated adoption of the law outside the proper legislative procedure, thereby abusing the legislative emergency institute. At the same time, it cannot be ignored that the prepared bill did not change the rate of increase in pensions across borders, but changed it in a differentiated manner in order to significantly increase low pensions. The combination of a percentage increase and a specific lump sum was a response to a particular price increase.
98. The described system of legal extraordinary indexation has, on the one hand, the advantage of relying on objective data and not dependent on (political) government decisions. On the other hand, however, the government cannot be required to rely solely on economic predictions of reputable institutions (albeit in the present case very alert) and not only on official and confirmed information, given the legitimate reasons given below.
99. As is stated above, the state of legislative emergency is exceptional in nature and, when activated, the condition (cumulatively) that the circumstances which justify its publication are exceptional in nature must be fulfilled and that, as a result, there is a significant economic damage (two other alternative conditions: a threat to the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens or to the security of the State were not considered by the nature of the case). It also follows from the earlier case law of the Constitutional Court that the circumstances must be difficult to predict and that the threat or threat must be real, immediate and intense (see paragraphs 85 and 89). Therefore, due to time constraints, the draft law can no longer be discussed in a "standard" way. The Constitutional Court also does not dispute the fact that the concept of "economic damage 'may include the unmanageable development of government budget mandatorial spending, which poses a threat of a negative impact on public finances (debt growth).
100. The Constitutional Court has held that the above conditions for declaring a state of legislative emergency have been fulfilled. As mentioned above, the government did not delay submitting the bill because it could not be charged with not following mere economic predictions, but only the official figures on price increases. It is clear from both the CNB and the NRR that, although inflation was expected to accelerate further in the forecasts in the second half of 2022, and that in the first half of 2023 inflation would reach double-digit values, inflation was lower in the last quarter of 2022 than in the forecast (which was mainly due to the adoption of an energy saving tariff for the period October to December 2022). In particular, the expression of the NRR indicates that price developments since mid-2021 have been very hectic and unprecedented in the history of three decades of the Czech Republic's existence. That is why, during 2022, two extraordinary valuations (June and September) took place (historically for the first time), which together with proper valuations and the impact of the introduction of the so-called "education" meant additional expenditure of the pension system by almost CZK 100 billion. This led to an increase in the replacement ratio (average income and average wages) from 40,2% from the end of 2021 to 45,8% in 2022.
101. Nor can it be overlooked that the government attempted to proceed first in accordance with Rule 90 (2) of the Rules of Procedure (giving its consent to the draft law at first reading), but, because of the rejection of this procedure by the opposition (two parliamentary clubs), it has taken action to activate the use of a state of legislative emergency.
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Regulation Information
| Citation | The Constitutional Court found no. 36 / 2024 Coll., sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 30 / 23 on the application for annulment of § 67ca of Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., on Pension Insurance, as amended, § 8a of Act No. 198 / 1993 Coll., on the illegality and resistance of the Communist regime, as amended, and § 2a of Act No. 357 / 2005 Coll., on the recognition of participants in the national struggle for the formation and liberation of Czechoslovakia and of certain survivors after them, on the special contribution to retirement of certain persons, on a single amount of money to certain participants in the national liberation between 1939 and 1945 and on the amendment of certain laws, as amended legislation |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | The Constitutional Tribunal found |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 22.02.2024 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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