The Constitutional Court found No 347 / 2020 Coll.
Judgment of 14 July 2020 in Case 25 / 19 Pl.
Valid
The Constitutional Tribunal found
Text versions:
20.08.2020
347
FIND
The Constitutional Court
On behalf of the Republic
On 14 July 2020, the Constitutional Court decided, under point Pl.
as follows:
Motion denied.
Reasons
Definition of the case
1. The Constitutional Court was served on 3 December 2019 with a motion by the Supreme Administrative Court to annul Article 80 (1) and (2) of Act No. 150 / 2002 Coll., the Administrative Rules. The appellant submitted this proposal pursuant to Article 95 (2) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution) after having concluded, in the context of its decision-making activities, that the contested provision is contrary to the constitutional order.
2. In a case brought before the appellant under sp. zn. 2 As 300 / 2018, the complainant seeks the annulment of the order of the Municipal Court in Prague ("the Municipal Court ') No 3 A 82 / 2018- 21 of 7 September 2018, which, due to delay, rejected its action against the inaction of the Ministry of Interior (in proceedings before the courts in the capacity of the defendant).
3. The defendant was to be dormant in proceedings concerning the complainant's application for a temporary residence permit for a member of the family of a citizen of the European Union pursuant to § 87b of Act No. 326 / 1999 Coll., on the residence of foreigners in the Czech Republic and on the amendment of certain laws, as amended, by the complainant on 4 February 2016. On 5 February 2018, the complainant submitted a request to the Commission for decision-making on the residence of foreigners for the application of measures against inaction. On 7 February 2018, the Commission set a 30-day deadline for the decision. Within that period, the defendant did not rule.
4. On 28 March 2018, the complainant brought the action in question, which the municipal court found to be late. According to the Municipal Court, the one-year period for bringing an action under § 80 (1) of the Administrative Code began to run 60 days after the application for a temporary residence permit was lodged and therefore expired on 8 April 2017.
Arguments of the appellant
5. First of all, the appellant notes that there has been a situation in the complainant's case where, despite the continued inactivity of the administration, it has been denied effective protection independent of the administration system. The expiry of the deadline for bringing an action against inaction allegedly "directly led to the timeless exclusion of [the complainant] access to judicial protection not only in the matter of inaction by the administrative authority, but as a result also in the substantive question of a temporary residence permit in the Czech Republic '.
6. Although the appellant's existing case-law relies on a starting point, according to which the legislator has limited the judicial review of administrative inaction by a certain deadline in order to maintain legal certainty, there is no legitimate reason, in his view, for a permanent refusal of access to judicial protection against administrative inaction at the time when the deadline has expired. The appellant therefore attempted to find a constitutionally conformal interpretation of the contested provision, which it allegedly failed to do.
7. In accordance with the case law of the Constitutional Court, the appellant considers that the period cannot be unconstitutional in itself, but it may appear so in the light of specific circumstances, and it is alleged that it is necessary to examine whether "after assessing specific contextual circumstances it can be concluded that it adequately pursues a legitimate objective of limiting uncertainty in legal relations'. According to the appellant, in the case from which the application came, the complainant's right of access to the court was limited to the extent that the relationship between the funds used and the objective pursued could not be considered reasonable. It is alleged that this restriction" aims at absolute legal certainty, without, however, establishing it or at least strengthening it in any way after the failure of the complainant's one-year period. "
8. According to the appellant, legal certainty does not only strengthen the complainant, but makes her position legally uncertain by the fact that the outcome of the procedure for her application becomes unattainable and unenforceable. It is alleged that only "legal certainty" on the part of the supreme decision-making public authorities is strengthened, namely that their actions cannot be corrected in court after the one-year period has expired. However, according to the appellant, the continuing illegality or the maintenance of the illegality cannot become untouchable by the mere passing of time. The "Absurdity 'of the described situation is supposed to stand out in comparison to the rules governing the proceedings before the courts, since it can hardly be imagined that any pending legal proceedings could be completed, while the use of legal instruments to deal with such a situation would be limited by time. On the other hand, there is nothing to prevent public administration from relying on the passivity of the addressees of its activities with the prospect of an absolute" amnesty "for its illegal abandonment, if this condition persists long enough.
9. The appellant considers inaction to be an "ongoing situation 'and points out, in this context, the approach of the European Court of Human Rights in relation to cases where an individual is a victim of ongoing state activities against which no national remedies are available.
10. The applicant also points to the finding of the Constitutional Court, sp. zn. II. ÚS 635 / 18 of 15.5.2018 (N 94 / 89 SbNU 387), in the light of which the case-law of the Supreme Administrative Court is allegedly no longer valid. The limitation of the right of access to the court resulting from the contested provision allegedly interferes with its very nature. According to the appellant, the failure to act by an administrative authority should be seen as a specific type of unlawful conduct by the public administration, i.e. an act other than a decision. In so doing, the finding, sp. zn. II. ÚS 635 / 18 allegedly admits an action involving unlawful inaction other than a delay in issuing a decision or certificate open to the defence period for the entire duration of the decision. In the paraphrase of this finding, it could be said that the complainant, after the futile expiry of the one-year period, "again every day," is aware of the maintenance of the illegal situation on the part of the administrative authorities without having any possibility of initiating proceedings before an independent court.
11. In the light of the appellant's view, the restriction of the right of access to the court under the contested provision "is clearly in line with the principle of unity and inconsistency of the rule of law '. Paragraph 80 (1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Administrative Office or of the legislature's intention to adopt it does not provide any clear reason for which the standard of judicial protection should differ in situations where the public authority imposes a failure to take a decision of an administrative authority or a certificate and where the failure to act of an administrative authority causing the absence of an act other than a decision (or certificate), where the time limit for bringing an action does not run out until such time as the action continues.
12. The appellant considers that the contested provision "transfers responsibility for the supervision of the proper procedural procedure and its timely termination from public authority... to individuals'. It is, in principle, for the party concerned to" keep an active eye on 'whether the proceedings are proceeding reasonably quickly, since otherwise, in fact, he will lose his right to be brought into the decision-making phase'. Such a concept of the principle that only the vigilant is entitled to rights is allegedly "unbearably strict and completely overlooked by the exclusive, superior role played by the public authorities in administrative proceedings."
13. Moreover, as a result of the litispendency barrier, an individual would not be able to claim his or her public subjective rights or to make a new application in the same case unless he or she withdraws the original application, in which case the new application would be assessed on the basis of a different legal and factual situation. Moreover, the contested provision also affects procedures initiated ex officio, which also distort legal certainty. According to the appellant, one of the consequences of the contested provision is the need to "judge and challenge the inaction of the administrative authorities not only in cases where the reason for this has not yet been strongly felt on the part of the individual, but also in such time as it becomes clear, when the action is brought, that it will be done in a timely manner by means of the protection provided for by the relevant procedural regulation to protect the individual against the inaction of the administrative authority '.
14. In conclusion, the appellant points out that the futile expiry of the period for bringing an action for protection against inaction differs from the futile expiry of the period for bringing an action against a decision of an administrative authority, since in the event of a decision being given, the individual has a comprehensive view of his legal status. In addition, actions against decisions are set out more clearly the beginning of a period which may depend on action against inaction in certain cases from the time when the last action was taken. However, according to the appellant, it is sometimes difficult to determine what the "last act" was. Moreover, the beginning of the period may be influenced by, for example, how complicated the matter was. All this is allegedly to be assessed by the parties to the administrative procedure before they bring the action.
Proceedings before the Constitutional Court
15. The Constitutional Court called on the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic and the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic as parties to the proceedings to comment on the proposal.
16. In the observations of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic sent by its President Mgr. Radek Vondráček, the procedure for the adoption of the administrative order was briefly described.
17. In the opinion of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic sent by President Jaroslav Kubra, the procedure for adopting the administrative order was also described, and the proposal was adopted within the limits of the Constitution laid down by competence and in a constitutional manner. As part of the debate, no subject has been linked to the possible constitutional issue of the regulation currently under consideration. At the same time, the Senate pointed out that, from a legislative point of view, Article 80 (1) and (2) of the Administrative Rules may not be limited to such a derogation, but the heading of Article 80 of the Administrative Rules and the description of paragraph 3 thereof should also be deleted.
18. In accordance with Article 69 (2) and (3) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as the Law on the Constitutional Court), the proposal was sent to the Government of the Czech Republic and to the Ombudsman by the fact that they can inform the Constitutional Court that they are entering the proceedings in the capacity of interveners. By a communication of 7 January 2020, the Government announced that it had not entered the proceedings. By a communication of the same day, the Ombudsman also announced that he had not entered the proceedings.
19. The Constitutional Court did not expect further clarification of the case from the oral hearing, therefore it abandoned it under Paragraph 44 of the Constitutional Court Act.
Derogation of the contested provision
20. Paragraph 80 (1) and (2) of Act No. 150 / 2002 Coll., the Administrative Rules, reads:
Time limit for bringing the action and its formalities
(1) An action may be brought no later than one year from the date on which the action in which the applicant seeks protection was in vain, the time limit laid down in a separate law for the decision or certificate, and, in the absence of such a period, the date on which the applicant's last action against the applicant was taken against the administrative authority or administrative authority.
(2) The delay cannot be forgiven.
Presumption of a formal assessment of the proposal
21. The Constitutional Court shall have jurisdiction to hear the application in question, which shall be admissible and shall comply with all the statutory requirements.
22. If there is an active legitimacy of the appellant under Article 64 (3) of the Law on the Constitutional Court and Article 95 (2) of the Constitution, the direct application of the contested provision is a consequence which the appellant finds to be unconstitutional in proceedings brought before administrative courts. Repeal of that provision would allow the appellant to take a different decision on the matter. The appellant is thus actively authorised to submit an application for annulment of the contested provision.
Review of the procedure for the adoption of the contested provisions
23. The Constitutional Court carried out a check of the constitutionality of the procedure for the adoption of the Administrative Rules in the sp. zn.
Assessment of the constitutionality of the contested provision
24. The motion is not justified.
25. The Administrative Rules provide for a number of types of action (listed in Paragraph 4 (1)), of which an action against a decision, an action against unlawful interference and an action for annulment may be referred to as three. The action against failure to act is governed by Paragraph 79 et seq. of the Administrative Rules of Procedure, which implies that failure to act is not meant by any liability of the administrative authority, but by failure to act in the decision on the substance or certificate. An action for annulment can therefore only be decided in substance by rejecting the action or by the court imposing an obligation on the administrative authority to issue a decision or certificate and setting a reasonable time limit (Paragraph 81 of the Administrative Code).
26. As is the case with other basic types of action, the application against failure to act is limited by time. It is now governed by the contested provision that the action may be brought no later than one year after the date on which the case in which the applicant seeks protection has been brought in vain by the time limit laid down by the special law for the issue of the decision or certificate and, in the absence of such a time limit, from the date on which the applicant has taken the last action against the applicant against the administrative authority or administrative authority (Paragraph 80 (1) of the Administrative Code). Again, as is the case with other basic types of action, the time-limit for bringing an action for action cannot be waived (Paragraph 80 (2) of the Administrative Rules).
27. For the purposes of the fundamental familiarity with the issue in question, it should also be noted that, as is the case with other fundamental types of action, the Institute of Inactive Action respects the principle of subsidiarity of the administrative justice, which is reflected in Section 79 of the Administrative Rules, according to which the action may be brought by those who have exhausted the means of protection laid down in the procedural regulation applicable to proceedings before the administrative authority. Therefore, a party to an administrative procedure in which an administrative authority is inoperative in relation to a decision has one year to defend itself against failure to act in a court, but before the expiry of that period it still has to use up the means of protection in the context of an administrative procedure without consequence. These funds may be enshrined in specific regulations or, where appropriate, in Act No. 500 / 2004 Coll., the Administrative Regulations, as amended, as a general regulation. Pursuant to Paragraph 80 (3) of the Administrative Regulation, a party to the administrative procedure may, after the expiry of the time limit for the decision, apply to the superior administrative authority for action to be taken against inaction. This means of protection is unsuccessfully exhausted if the request is not complied with or if it is not decided within 30 days (Section 71 (3) of the Administrative Regulation). Therefore, although the legal period for bringing an action for nullity is one year, a party to the administrative procedure must, as a rule, start to deal (out of court) with the situation in advance.
28. The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as "the Charter") does not expressly guarantee the right to judicial review of the inaction of administrative bodies, since Article 36 (2) of the Charter provides only for the right to judicial review of decisions of public authorities, from which the law may also exclude certain decisions [see, for example, the Constitutional Court's finding, sp. zl. However, in some specific cases, the Constitutional Court found a contradiction with Article 36 (2) (and Article 36 (1)) of the Charter as well as a legal regulation, which did not exclude a judicial review of an administrative decision (concerning fundamental rights), but prevented the administrative authority from issuing a decision at all [see sp. zn.
29. The contested provision does not, of course, make it impossible to make an administrative decision. The expiry of the time limit laid down in Section 80 of the Administrative Rules does not alter the administrative authority's obligation to issue a decision. It is true, however, that the addressee of an administrative decision, if any, cannot, after missing the time limit for the decision to be taken, even though the decision to be taken may have an impact on its fundamental rights. In other words, the addressee of an administrative decision, if any, may find itself without judicial protection (Article 4 of the Constitution, Article 36 (1) of the Charter) on the question of whether or not the administrative authority issues a decision concerning fundamental rights.
30. However, it cannot be argued that judicial protection would be denied directly by the contested Section 80 of the Administrative Rules. This provision does not deny judicial protection against failure to act by administrative authorities, but merely sets out the conditions under which it can be obtained (without the conditions for any unattainable, or which would exclude a certain group of persons and priori from the possibility of meeting them). The determination of the legal conditions under which judicial protection may be sought is not only fully in accordance with Article 36 (4) of the Charter but is even a prerequisite for the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Article 36 et seq. Without a legal definition of what court, when and how judicial protection can be sought, such protection would be unthinkable. This was clearly known to the legislator, who, in addition to the adoption of Article 36 (4), immediately defined in Article 36 (1) of the Charter that judicial protection could be sought in accordance with the procedure laid down.
31. Thus, even in the existence of Article 80 of the Administrative Rules, anyone may seek protection from the administrative authority's inaction in a court, only in accordance with Article 36 (4) of the Charter must fulfil the conditions laid down therein. The fact that, under Article 36 (4) of the Charter, conditions and details of judicial protection are laid down by law does not mean, of course, that these conditions and details could be entirely arbitrary, or that the Constitutional Court could never find them unconstitutional. However, the condition laid down in the contested provision constitutes a period of time, so it is perhaps the most basic condition at all and the most common for judicial proceedings.
32. The Institute of Deadline has several thousand years of history and is contained in the vast majority of procedural regulations [it is so natural that the applicant himself considers its absence unconstitutional in other cases; See the finding of the Constitutional Court sp. zn. It is thus no wonder that the Constitutional Court consistently assumes that the time limit in itself cannot be unconstitutional [see the caselaw set out in points 59 et seq. At the same time, the Constitutional Court observed in the caselaw referred to it that the period may be unconstitutional in the light of specific circumstances, such as, in particular, its inadequacy with respect to it, limited in time, the possibility of applying a constitutionally guaranteed right or, where appropriate, the limited period of limitation of subjective law, and the legislature's indiscretions when setting the time limit. However, these circumstances are clearly not given in the case currently under consideration, nor is the appellant asserting that.
33. Instead, the appellant sees the inconstitutionality of the time limit contained in the contested provision as being, in short, the fact that, after the expiry of the period, the addressee of a possible administrative decision finds itself without the possibility of judicial enforcement. In particular, the appellant contends that the failure to act by the administrative authorities after a futile expiry of the deadline cannot be "corrected ', that the illegality by the passage of time becomes" untouchable' or that the party to the administrative proceedings loses the "opportunity to take the administrative decision '. However, in the view of the Constitutional Court, the consequences of the delay of the deadline with the Institute are inherent and constitute its substance. If they were indeed to decide on the constitutionality of the contested provision, the Constitutional Court would deny that the deadline in itself could not be unconstitutional. It cannot, on the one hand, be argued that the time limit in court cannot in itself be unconstitutional and, at the same time, find that, after its futile expiry, it is no longer possible to achieve what is prescribed.
34. The appellant's pleading consequences are fully in line with the consequences of missing other time limits applied in the proceedings. If, for example, a party to proceedings against a decision of an administrative authority falls short of the deadline, the decision cannot be "corrected" by a court, that illegality from the point of view of judicial protection will "become untouchable" and that the party to administrative proceedings loses the possibility of judicial redress of an unlawful decision. Nor does the appellant's remark change the comparability of these consequences that a party has a comprehensive view of its legal status in an action against a decision. Indeed, in many cases - including the complainant's case in the proceedings before the appellant - this "inequality" can be removed simply by withdrawing the application. According to the appellant, the applicants would, however, deteriorate their position, indicating that this position is still better than that of the party who missed the time limit for bringing an action against a decision, even after the time limit for bringing an action against an action for failure to act. Moreover, the issuing of an illegal administrative decision may have long-standing consequences and may, for example, be approved or be allowed to act permanently in the rights of a person who has missed the deadline for bringing an administrative action.
35. If there are other arguments put forward by the appellant, it is not true that the expiry of the time limit for bringing an action against inaction leads simultaneously to the exclusion of access to the court and the substance of the case. The absence of a substantive decision is the essence of inaction, not a separate, additional consequence. If, as has already been said, the administrative authority decides on the matter (and as has already been stated, the obligation to decide, if any, on the grounds of duration), the delay in bringing an action for failure to act will have no effect on the possibility of judicial protection against such a decision within the meaning of Article 36 (2) of the Charter.
36. The appellant also noted that the contested provision only strengthens the "legal certainty 'on the part of the overriding public authorities whose actions cannot be corrected after the time limit has expired. This argument omits the repeatedly and discussed meaning of time limits by the Constitutional Court (see, for example, the finding of the sp. zn. Indeed, in the appellant's judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Manževich v Croatia (of 16.11.2006 No 39299 / 02, paragraph 77), that court stated that the period did not serve only the interests of the person to whom the instrument of limitation is directed (that is, in the case of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the interests of the States), but rather the legal certainty as such, which is of itself a value. Accordingly, the rule of law takes into account the possible existence of defects in both application and normative acts, taking into account that these defects are healed (possibly considered to be healed) if they are not established by the procedure laid down [see Fehlerkalkül; it is not without interest that in the past the time limit was limited even the possibility of attacking laws for their conflict with the Constitution (see Section 12 of Act No. 162 / 1920 Coll., on Constitutional Court).
37. The appellant is based on an unjustifiable assumption that the period for bringing an action for nullity is only protected by the administrative authorities which have committed something that needs to be "corrected ', which they will avoid (that is to say, on the assumption that the action is always justified). That is not the case. At the same time, the contested provision is an assurance that, for example, after 50 years, there will be no litigation over alleged inaction in proceedings that are (no longer) available to any records or that have never existed (and were merely a fabrication or error of the plaintiff). Moreover, this may also be of relevance to private persons, to whom an administrative decision, which the applicant suddenly seeks to issue, can be directly affected by the applicant, at a time of many years, and who could have expected that such a decision would no longer be given (and would not have been given without the action). Similarly, the contested provision is of relevance in cases where the administrative authority considers that it is not entitled to take any decision, and that is why, not for delays in the traditional sense, it is dormant. Therefore, although the contested provision does not always, and in all circumstances, lead to an immediate (at the time of the expiry of the deadline) establishment of legal certainty, since administrative proceedings may continue and decisions may continue to be given, it nevertheless contributes significantly to the elimination of entropy.
38. Nor can it be accepted with the appellant's claim that the contested provision "transfers responsibility for the supervision of the proper procedural procedure and its timely termination from public authority... to individuals'. The contested clause doesn't transmit anything to anyone. Its annulment would not mean that the courts would initiate proceedings to assess the inactivity of the administration ex offo. The party to the administrative proceedings would continue to have to seek judicial protection by bringing an action. According to the appellant's logic, for example, Paragraph 72 (3) of the Law on the Constitutional Court setting a deadline for lodging a constitutional complaint would" transfer responsibility for the supervision of respect for fundamental rights and freedoms from public authority to individuals'.
39. Not only do the provisions governing the time limits for the submission of applications by an individual not affect the possibility (or even obligation) of courts to initiate an ex offo procedure (which would not only be the appellant referred to as "transfer of liability to individuals'), it would deny the very nature of the functioning of the judiciary in the Czech Republic at all. Except for exceptions, courts rule on a proposal, which is reflected in Article 36 of the Charter, which combines judicial protection with the activity of an individual (according to paragraph 1, everyone may" seek "judicial or other protection, according to paragraph 2, a person shortened on his rights by administrative decision may" refer to the court ").
40. The applicant repeatedly refers to the (Senate) finding of the Constitutional Court, sp. zn. II. ÚS 635 / 18, which annulled the judgment (extended Chamber) of the Supreme Administrative Court No 7 As 155 / 2015-160 of 21.11.2017. In view of the requirement for the rule of law to be uncontradictory, it should be noted, in accordance with this finding, that the participant learns of inaction again every day. The above-mentioned Senate finding - in which the Constitutional Court, in a simplified manner, stated that the ongoing intervention was repeatedly "learned" and "happens" every day - nevertheless concerned a different type of action and interpreted other legal provisions (§ 84 of the Administrative Rules).
41. The Constitutional Court argued in it, inter alia, the requirement that the rule of law be uncontradictory, without mentioning in this context the deadline for bringing an action against inaction. It can be concluded from this that he distinguished between the action for intervention and the action for action and considered them to be different concepts which cannot be compared. Otherwise, the difference between the "new 'interpretation of § 84 of the Administrative Rules and the wording of its § 80 would have to be settled at the time. It is not possible to overcome, on the basis of a requirement for the legal order to be indisputable, the interpretation of the time limit for an action for intervention brought by the designated judicial authority (Article 92 of the Constitution) and subsequently, once again on the basis of the requirement for the legal order to be uncontradictory, the legal regulation of the time limit for bringing an action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for action for a new duration.
42. It is also appropriate to add to the principle of the rule of law that it does not imply the requirement of a perfect harmony of legislation. It does not mean that, if the laws regulate certain, even if similar, issues differently, they do them in contradictory ways. It is the deadlines that are typical of the fact that different legislation of similar institutions does not give rise to internal discrepancies in the rule of law, even if there is no reason for partial differences at first sight. A view across procedural rules thus reveals, for example, that there are deadlines for appeals of different lengths without a clear system for determining them and without therefore raising doubts about their constitutionality.
43. The Constitutional Court considers it irrelevant whether a party to the administrative proceedings is "learning again every day." Even if that were the case, it would not mean that the deadline would have to depend again from a constitutional point of view on any new day when it was to learn about inaction. The fact that a participant would allegedly learn about inaction every day would not change the fact that it had been known about it for about a year at the end of the deadline and could defend itself against it during that year. An assessment of whether an applicant is "constantly learning about something 'may be relevant to the interpretation of a law which, from the moment of knowledge, depends on the course of the time limit, not on the abolition of a law which does not do so. Moreover, the Constitutional Court is of the opinion that the fact in the outside world that can be learned is that the administrative authority did not issue a decision at the time when it should have been issued and became dormant. Indeed, the new" learn "could only be about some new reality, i.e. that a decision was made. If the legal order is to be understood and its application predictable, the meaning of the words used therein must be respected. The opposite approach, whereby words, irrespective of their actual content, give meaning to the outcome of the proceedings which the interpreter wishes to achieve is an expression of insolence and, in certain cases, an instrument of circumventing the rules referred to in Article 95 (2) of the Constitution or Articles 78 (2) and 11 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court.
44. The conclusion that the deadline for bringing an action for nullification cannot begin again every day, after all, the Constitutional Court has repeatedly stated. For example, in Resolution sp. zn. I. ÚS 1169 / 08 of 15.8.2008, referring to Resolution sp. zn. IV. ÚS 578 / 06 of 8.8.2007 (not published in the SbNU, available at http: / / nalus.ujud.cz), it stated that "the time limit under Paragraph 80 (1) of the Administrative Code is an objective time limit, the beginning of which cannot be so far at the disposal of the claimant, to whom the time would start running again with each additional submission for the purpose of the administrative procedure, albeit supplemented by some other facts'.
45. If the appellant is referred to by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, it should be noted that the interpretation of Article 35 of the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (governing the presumption of acceptance of an individual complaint) by that court does not affect the assessment of the constitutionality of national procedural rules. The Contracting Parties to that provision merely laid down rules on proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights, without thereby expressing their willingness to commit themselves to any change in national procedural rules. This stems from the clear wording of Article 35 and its inclusion in Title II of the international agreement in question.
46. In addition, the appellant's caselaw presented relates to situations in which, in the words of the appellant, "the individual is a victim of the State's ongoing activities', thus not a failure to act. In fact, the European Court of Human Rights, in its failure to act, does not see any" never-ending intervention "allowing for an unlimited complaint. In its judgment of 26 March 2013 in Zorica Jovanović v Serbia (No 21794 / 28, paragraph 55), he noted, for example, that even a complaint alleging the absence of an effective investigation could be considered to be delayed if, from the moment when the complainant was able to identify the inaction of the institutions (without a vision of an immediate change), he did not proceed without undue delay (see, by analogy, the Bulut and Yavuz decisions against Turkey of 28 May 2002, No 73065 / 01).
47. The Constitutional Court finally admits that there may be isolated situations in which it will be difficult to determine the beginning of the period. However, this needs to be tackled individually, not by abolishing a law that generally does not suffer from constitutional deficits. On the contrary, the one-year period laid down in it provides sufficient scope to avoid the adverse effects of an error of assessment of its origin, even though it is necessary to use up the resources of the administrative procedure before its expiry and that it cannot be waived. Moreover, it cannot be overlooked that the law has been effective for almost two decades without causing insurmountable interpretative difficulties of constitutional legal relevance, which, for example, would be familiar with the decision-making activities of the Constitutional Court. In the event of a delay in bringing an action for nullity, the Constitutional Court has dealt with it in a very special way (these are case units), it is hardly possible to say now that the contested provision is inconstitutionally indeterminate, "absurdity" and other such fundamental shortcomings that the Supreme Administrative Court suddenly saw in it after about 20 years.
Conclusion
48. For the reasons stated, the Constitutional Court rejected the application under Paragraph 70 (2) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court.
President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr. Rychetský v. r.
Different opinions under Article 14 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, were taken by Judge Louis David and Jaromír Jirsa and Judge Kateřina Šimáková for a decision.
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Regulation Information
| Citation | The Constitutional Court found No. 347 / 2020 Coll., on the application for annulment § 80 paragraphs 1 and 2 of Act No. 150 / 2002 Coll., the Administrative Rules |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | The Constitutional Tribunal found |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 20.08.2020 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
Legal Areas:
Administrative law
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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