The Constitutional Court found No 325 / 2020 Coll.

Paragraph 112 (2) of Act No. 250 / 2016 Coll., on Liability for Infringements and Proceedings, as amended by the Constitutional Court's finding of 4 February 2020, sp. zn.

1. The applicant - Regional Court in Prague ("Regional Court"), pursuant to Article 95 (2) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic ("the Constitution") and § 64 et seq. of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, ("the Law on the Constitutional Court"), requests that the Constitutional Court annul § 112 (2) of Act No. 250 / 2016 Coll., on Liability for Infringements and Proceedings, as amended, as amended, as amended by the Constitutional Court Act of 4.2.2020 sp. The contested provision is included in the fourth part of the law entitled "Common, transitional and final provisions' and contains a transitional provision of the following wording:" Liability for an offence and the current other administrative offence shall not, however, cease before any of the time limits laid down in the first sentence have elapsed if the act establishing liability took place before the date of entry into force of the law. '

2. Paragraph 112 (2) of Act No. 250 / 2016 Coll., on Liability for Infringements and Proceedings, as amended by 25.2.2020, (hereinafter referred to as the "Liability Act"), laid down: "The provisions of the existing laws on time limits for dealing with an offence or other administrative offence, time limits for imposing a fine on an offence or other administrative offence and time limits for the cessation of liability for an offence or other administrative offence shall not apply from the date of entry into force of this Act. However, liability for the offence and the previous administrative offence shall not cease before any of the time limits laid down in the first sentence have elapsed, provided that the conduct establishing the liability took place before the date of entry into force of this law. 'The Constitutional Court found sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 15 / 19 of 4.2.2020 [(54 / 2020 Coll.), all decisions of the Constitutional Court are available at http: / / nalus.ujud.cz] by the decision that § 112 (2) of the First Act on Liability for Infringements and Proceedings is repealed on the date of the publication of this finding in the Collection of Laws. Therefore, with effect from 26 February 2020, the contested provision reads as indicated in sub 1. The Constitutional Court, in its annulment finding in question, has held that the turnover of the" first sentence' period, as applied in the contested provision, must be understood in the original meaning of the legislature, that is to say that it is the time limit for dealing with an offence or other administrative offence, the time limit for imposing a fine for an offence or other administrative offence and the time limit for the cessation of liability for an offence or other administrative offence.

3. The applicant submits that an administrative action has been brought before him by the applicant seeking annulment of the decision of the Regional Authority of the Central Bohemian Region, which was in conjunction with the decision of the Municipality of Kladna, the Department of Administrative Affairs, the plaintiff found guilty of committing an administrative offence on the part of the vehicle operator pursuant to Section 125f (1) of Act No. 361 / 2000 Coll., on road traffic traffic traffic traffic traffic traffic traffic traffic traffic traffic and changes of certain laws (Road traffic law), as amended on 31 March 2015 ("Road Traffic Act '), i.e. on the date of the administrative offence, for which the claimant was fined at the amount of CZK 1 500, and with which he was obliged to pay the costs of CZK 1 000.

4. In the action brought, the applicant stated, inter alia, that in his view his responsibility for committing the administrative offence in question had ceased to exist. Therefore, the new legislation - Paragraph 29 et seq. of the Act on Liability for Infringements concerning the very end of liability for the offence - should have been applied to it. This is because this legislation came into force on 1 July 2017, i.e. at a time when the appeal proceedings were still pending before the appeal authority. The applicant's view is therefore based on the fact that, in the context of the adoption of the Act on Liability for Infringements on 1 July 2017, there was also a change in the Road Traffic Act consisting not only of the use of a new terminology ("offence 'instead of" administrative offence'), but also that the provision on the abolition of liability for (present) administrative offence was deleted from the Road Traffic Act without compensation, with the application of the law on the Liability for Infringements Act from that date. In so doing, the applicant considers that the new legislation is more favourable to it.

5. The Regional Court states that the administrative offence in question should have been committed on 31 March 2015, the initiation of the procedure by service of the order as the first act in the administrative offence proceedings of the vehicle operator took place on 1 July 2015 and the contested decision was served on the applicant's representative on 14 September 2017. The suspension of liability for that administrative offence in application of § 125e (3) and (5) of the Road Traffic Act, as effective from 7.11.2014 until 30.6.2017, could not have occurred because both the subjective two-year period for initiating the procedure and the objective four-year period within which the decision on an administrative offence must become final.

6. However, according to the new legislation [Paragraph 29 (a) of the Liability Act], liability for the offence shall cease to exist at the end of the limitation period and according to Paragraph 30 (a) of the Liability Act, the limitation period shall be one year (in this case the upper limit of the fine rate under Section 125f (3) of the Road Traffic Act shall not exceed CZK 10,000 today). When applying the above provisions and Article 31 (1) of the First Act on Liability for Infringements, and Article 32 (2) and (3) of the Act on Liability for Infringements, it must be concluded that liability for the administrative offence in question would have ceased to exist under the new legislation before the contested decision was issued and could not therefore have been resumed for the time of its service, i.e. that the administrative offence would have been suspended for the application of the new legislation.

7. It follows from the above, according to the Regional Court, that, in the present case, the new legislation is clearly more favourable to the applicants than the historical legislation. Thus, the Regional Court considers that Section 112 (2) of the Act on Liability for Infringements (even after the Constitutional Court's finding sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 15 / 19) expressly imposes a less favourable limitation period on the perpetrators. However, it is in the light of the arguments put forward by the Constitutional Court in the cited finding that the principle of Article 40 (6), second sentence, of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as the Charter) directly denies the principle of the second Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as the "Charter '), according to which the criminal offence is assessed and the sentence is imposed under the law effective at the time the offence was committed, and the later law applies, if this is more favourable to the perpetrator, namely, that legislation should always be applied to the perpetrators.

8. In accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 69 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the Judge-Rapporteur sent a proposal to the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as "the Senate ') and to the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as" the Chamber of Deputies') as parties to the proceedings, to the Government and to the Ombudsman as public authorities, which are entitled to intervene under Article 69 (2) and (3) of the same law.

9. In its observations, the Chamber of Deputies stated that the Government had submitted a draft law on liability for misdemeanors to the Chamber of Deputies on 16 July 2015 and the proposal was circulated to Members on the same day as the House of Deputies, with the contested provision already in the draft law submitted by the Government (Press 555 / 0). The first reading of the draft law was carried out on 16 December 2015, when the draft law was ordered to be discussed by the constitutional legal committee as the guarantee committee and the public administration and regional development committee as the next committee. The Constitutional Legal Committee discussed the press at its meetings of 11.2.2016 and 23.3.2016, when it recommended in its resolution the adoption of a draft law as amended by its adopted amendments (Press 555 / 3). The Committee on Public Administration and Regional Development discussed the press at meetings of 5 February 2016 and 1 April 2016 and recommended its approval. At the second reading of the draft law, which took place on 12 April 2016, several amendments were tabled in the framework of a detailed debate, but they did not concern the contested provision. The third reading of the draft law was carried out on 6 May 2016 when the draft law, as amended, was approved (out of 157 Members present, 121 Members voted in favour of the draft and 15 Members opposed the draft). The bill was passed on to the Senate Chamber of Deputies on 19 May 2016. After being returned to it by the Senate (see Sub-10), the bill as amended by the Senate was voted on on 12 July 2016 and the bill was adopted.

10. The Senate stated in its observations that the Chamber of Deputies passed the bill on 19 May 2016 on responsibility for the offences of the Senate. The deadline of 30 days for the draft law and the resolution to be heard by the Senate pursuant to Article 46 (1) of the Constitution therefore expired on 18 June 2016. The bill was designated Senate Press 280 in its 10th term. The Constitutional Legal Committee, which was ordered to negotiate the Bill as a guarantee, recommended the Senate to approve the Bill as referred to by the Chamber of Deputies (Resolution No 128 of 1 June 2016). In addition, the bill was ordered to discuss the Committee on Territorial Development, Public Administration and the Environment, which, by Resolution 124 of 8 June 2016, recommended the Senate to return the bill to the Chamber of Deputies with an amendment (adding administrative penalties on a residence ban). The Bill on Liability for Infringements was most positively assessed by the Senate as a modern regulation at a higher quality level. The Senate's examination of the Bill on Liability for Infringements did not explicitly affect the incriminated issue of the transitional adjustment to the deadlines for the termination of Liability for Infringements under the proposed contested provision. A new comprehensive regulation of the limitation period, differentiated according to the seriousness of the infringement (Sections 30 to 32 of the Act on Liability for Infringements), was mentioned in the committee proceedings. The transitional arrangements in the Act on Liability for Infringements excelled above all by their admission (Section 112 (1) of the Act on Liability for Infringements), which explicitly recites the constitutional rule on the prohibition of the retroactivity of a stricter law. The promoter of the draft law stated that Article 112 (2) of the Act on Liability for Infringements should be understood only as a policy in case the so-called Amendment Act (Act No. 183 / 2017 Coll., which amends certain laws in connection with the adoption of the Act on Liability for Infringements and Proceedings and the Act on Certain Infringements), including the conversion of numerous and diverse arrangements of existing administrative offences, was not adopted in time (i.e. into the effectiveness of the Act on Liability for Infringements). The concept of transitional arrangements did not draw the critical (evaluation) attention of the Senate authorities. The Senate has returned the bill on liability for infractions to the Chamber of Deputies. It did so properly within the constitutional deadline at its 25th session (10th term) by Resolution No 469 of 15 June 2016, when in vote No 17 in the presence of 62 Senators, 45 Senators voted in favour of this resolution, against them 2 and 15 Senators abstained.

11. The President of the Republic signed the Act was delivered to the Chamber of Deputies on 27 July 2016. After signature by the relevant constitutional authorities, the Act was sent on 28 July 2016 for publication in the Collection of Laws and on 3 August 2016 for publication in the Collection of Laws under No. 250 / 2016 Coll.

12. The Government, through the Minister of Justice and the Ombudsman, has indicated that they will not exercise their right to intervene.

13. Since the observations of the parties did not contain any new facts or conclusions which would affect the present application of the Regional Court, their observations were no longer sent to the appellant for a possible reply.

14. The Constitutional Court concluded that further clarification of the case could not be expected from oral proceedings and therefore, in accordance with Paragraph 44 of the Constitutional Court Act, it decided on the case without its regulation.

15. Pursuant to Article 95 (2) of the Constitution, if the court concludes that the law to be applied in the resolution of the case is contrary to constitutional order, it shall bring the matter before the Constitutional Court. The General Court is entitled to make a proposal when proposing the repeal of the law or of its individual provision, the application of which is to be immediate or necessary, is not sufficient only for hypothetical use or other broader context [Order of the Constitutional Court of 23.10.2000 sp. zn. It follows from the purpose and purpose of the specific control of the constitutionality of legislation that the law (or its individual provisions) to be applied in the resolution of the case is only one which obstructs the achievement of the desired, i.e. a constitutional consensus; If it had not been removed, the outcome of the ongoing proceedings would have been different, namely unconstitutional [see the finding of 6 March 2007 sp. zl. ÚS 3 / 06 (N 41 / 44 SbNU 517; 149 / 2007 Sb.), recital 26].

16. The Constitutional Court has found that the Regional Court is testifying to the active procedural legitimacy of the application for annulment of Paragraph 112 (2) of the Act on Liability for Infringements, as amended by the Constitutional Court's finding of 4 February 2020 in Case 15 / 19 Pl. As the Constitutional Court has verified, in an administrative action to be decided by the Regional Court, the applicant contends (sub-4) that his responsibility for the administrative offence has ceased to exist before he was finally punished for it. The Regional Court will thus examine in the proceedings the issue of the disappearance of liability for the offence, which it is necessary to apply also the transitional provision in the contested Section 112 (2) of the Act on Liability for Infringements, as amended by the Constitutional Court's finding of 4 February 2020, sp. zn.

17. The Constitutional Court has dealt with the course of the legislative process and found that the data provided in the statements of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate (sub-paragraphs 9 to 11) demonstrate that the law of which the contested provision is part was adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution established competence and in a constitutional manner. This is also not disputed by the appellant.

18. Article 40 (6) The acts of the offence shall be assessed and the sentence shall be imposed in accordance with the law effective at the time the offence was committed. The later law will apply if it is more favourable to the perpetrators.

19. In the past, the Constitutional Court concluded that Article 40 (6) of the Charter also affects administrative punishment, see the findings of 13.6.2002 sp. zn. III. ÚS 611 / 01 (N 75 / 26 SbNU 253) and of 11.7.2007 sp. zn. II. ÚS 192 / 05 (N 110 / 46 SbNU 11). The Supreme Administrative Court of 27 October 2004, no. 6 A 126 / 2002-27 (No 461 / 2005 Coll. NSS), also stated that the decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court are available at http: / / www.nsjud.cz.

20. Article 89 (2) The Constitution is enforceable by decisions of the Constitutional Court binding on all the institutions and persons. The Constitutional Court consistently points out that this order also applies to it [cf. e.g. the finding of 12 June 1997 sp. zn. IV. ÚS 197 / 96 (N 77 / 8 SbNU 243)].

21. In this context, it is important that, in the above-mentioned finding, Pl. ÚS 15 / 19, which repealed Article 112 (2) of the First Act on Liability for Infringements, the Constitutional Court has dealt with the interpretation of the concept of "criminal offence 'in Article 40 (6) of the First Charter. He concluded here that, at the heart of the Institute of Limitation of Criminal Liability or Liability for Infringement, the idea lies that the end of time is weakening, when the need for a criminal response to an act both in terms of general prevention and in terms of individual. The new legislation, which may cause limitation to take place only after a longer period of time compared to the previous one, necessarily provides the view that the legislator is now taking the action more seriously, if it has laid down an arrangement which will allow the end of a longer period of time to be eliminated, compared to the previous one. In general, constitutional regulations do not hinder the tightening of crime, if it is still about adjusting the sentence appropriate to the crime committed. This can only be done for acts committed after the effectiveness of the regulation, which has brought about a tightening of the crime, not for acts committed before its effectiveness. Article 40 (6), first sentence, of the Charter affects any regulation which provides for the limitation of criminal liability or liability for the offence of the tightening of criminal offences. In that finding, point Pl. ÚS 15 / 19, the legal opinion was therefore expressed that the first sentence of Article 112 (2) of the Act on Liability for Infringements requires the use of the limitation of liability for offences under the Act on Liability for Infringements as well as of acts committed before the effectiveness of that Act, since the limitation of liability for offences is part of the definition of a criminal offence within the meaning of Article 40 (6) of the Charter with which the law was contested in that case, as it leads to the application of a later criminal offence which is against the defendant. For this reason, the Constitutional Court annulled the sentence of Paragraph 112 (2) of the First Act on Liability for Infringements for its contradiction with Article 40 (6) of the First Charter. With this annulled provision closely related to the now contested provision § 112 (2) of the Second Law on Liability for Infringements, the Constitutional Court could not assess it from the point of view of its constitutional conformity, as it was bound by the petition of the then motion in the case sp. zn.

22. The Constitutional Court has already in the past also concluded [e.g. the finding of 22.1.2001 sp. zn. IV. ÚS 158 / 2000 (N 12 / 21 SbNU 91)] that, pursuant to Article 40 (6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Court of First Instance has also concluded that the Court of First Instance has not complied with the provisions of Article 40 (2) of the Treaty. The acts of the offence shall be assessed and the sentence shall be imposed in accordance with the law effective at the time the offence was committed. The later law applies if it is more favourable to the perpetrators. The decisive criterion for assessing whether the application of a later law would be more favourable to the perpetrator is the overall result in terms of the crime that would be achieved in the application of one or another law, taking into account all the legal circumstances of a particular case. The application of the new legislation is therefore more favourable to the perpetrators when their provisions, as a whole, offer a better result than the earlier law.

23. It is clear that in the present case and in the type-like cases concerning (not only) the disappearance of liability for administrative offences under the Road Traffic Act in connection with the new legislation in the Act on Liability for Infringements, there may be a situation that liability for administrative offences would have ceased under the new legislation before the contested decision was issued, i.e. that the administrative offence would have been suspended for the application of the new legislation. In that case, therefore, the new legislation provided for in the Liability Act, assessed as a whole, is undeniably more favourable to applicants than the previous legislation laid down in the Road Traffic Act (cf. also sub 5 to 7). However, the transitional provision of Paragraph 112 (2) of the Act on Liability for Infringements, as amended by the Constitutional Court, sp. v. Pl. ÚS 15 / 19 expressly requires that less favourable legislation be applied to the perpetrators. Therefore, it will always be necessary to compare, in any particular case, the law on criminal law effective by 30 June 2017, not only under § 29 et seq. of the Act on Liability for Infringements, but also under the special limitation periods in special laws (see in particular the so-called Amendment Act No. 183 / 2017 Coll.), and under the general rules of § 2 (1) and § 112 (1) of the Act on Liability for Infringements, to determine which regulation is more favourable to the perpetrator (now) of the offence committed by 30 June 2017.

24. It follows from the above that, if the Constitutional Court has reached a legal view in the light of Article 40 (6) of the Charter (in detail, the legal conclusions set out in the cited finding), it cannot be held, for the reasons set out above, that the application of Paragraph 112 (2) of the Act on the Liability for Offences (as amended by that finding) may also lead to a deterioration of the status of the offender. In other words, an infringement of Article 40 (6) of the second Charter will occur even if the perpetrator is punished for committing an offence, even if the liability for the offence under the new legislation would cease to exist before the decision on the infringement is taken, that is to say, that the offence would be suspended for the application of the new legislation. The Constitutional Court therefore concludes that Paragraph 112 (2) of the Act on Liability for Infringements, as amended by the Constitutional Court's finding of 4 February 2020, sp. zn. It should be noted that, in this situation, in an incident (see Sub-3 to 7), a constitutional conformal interpretation of § 112 (2) of the Act on Liability for Infringements, as amended by the Constitutional Court's finding of 4 February 2020, sp. zn.

25. For the reasons set out above, the Constitutional Court has concluded that Article 112 (2) of the Act on Liability for Infringements, as amended by the Constitutional Court of 4 February 2020 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 15 / 19, is contrary to Article 40 (6) of the Second Charter and is therefore annulled by the date of the publication of that finding in the Collection of Laws, pursuant to Article 70 (1) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Law No 48 / 2002 Coll.