Found No 317 / 2022 Sb.
The Constitutional Court found of 13 September 2022 sp. zn.
Valid
The Constitutional Tribunal found
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317
FIND
The Constitutional Court
On behalf of the Republic
On 13 September 2022, the Constitutional Court decided under sp. zn. JUDr. Zdeněk Koudelkou, Ph.D., a lawyer, based in Brno, Optatova 46, for the abolition of § 2 (2) (b) and (c) (d) in the words "an indoor sport site, an outdoor sport site," (e) and (f), (k) in the words "or the setting of conditions," (m) to (v), § 8a, § 10 (1) in the words "or under § 69 (1) (b) or (i) of the Act on the protection of public health and emergency measures for the disease of COVID-19 and the amendment of certain related laws," as amended by the Constitutional Court, published under No 4 / 2022 Sb., and Act No. 39 / 2022 Sb.
as follows:
Motion denied.
Reasons
Definition of the case
1. A group of 57 Members, acting in conjunction with Article 64 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as "Law on the Constitutional Court"), seeks to be repealed in the heading of the above-mentioned parts of Act No. 94 / 2021 Coll., on emergency measures in relation to the disease of COVID-19 and on the amendment of certain related laws, as amended by the Constitutional Court Act No. 4 / 2022 Coll., and Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll., [hereinafter referred to as "Pandemic Act", "i.e. the designation of both the civil and professional public, to which the Constitutional Court of the Constitutional Court of the Constitutional Court of the Constitutional Court of the Constitutional Court of the Constitutional Court of First Instance," (hereinafter referred to). All decisions of the Constitutional Court are available at https: / / nalus.ujud.cz], also collectively as "the contested provisions'.
2. The appellant proposes to abolish only the parts added to the Pandemic Act by amendment of Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll., amending Act No. 94 / 2021 Coll., on the Exceptional Measures for the Disease of COVID-19 and on the Amendment of Certain Related Laws, as amended by the Constitutional Court Act No. 4 / 2022 Coll., and Act No. 520 / 2021 Coll., on the further arrangements for the provision of medical care in connection with the Exceptional Measures for the Disease of CoVID-19 (hereinafter referred to as "Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll."), although it imposes the unconstitutional nature of its proceedings in the Chamber of Deputies as a whole, and is therefore justified for the annulment of all amendments to Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll. The reason for this procedure according to the author is that some of the amendments made by Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll. are of a legislative-technical nature or are more favourable to the addressees (e.g. the amount of fines).
3. At the same time, the appellant asked for a preliminary examination of the proposal under Paragraph 39 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll., since the efficiency itself (footnote (ref.: substantial part) of the Pandemic Act is limited until the end of November 2022.
Arguments of the appellant
4. In particular, the appellant contests infringement of the rules of the legislative process in the negotiation and adoption of Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll. (II. 1), and continues to oppose Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll. supplemented by § 8a (II. 2) and § 2 (2) (b) of the Pandemic Act (II. 3). The appellant's argument can therefore be divided into three headings and its substance can be summarised as follows:
Opposition of constitutional deficits in the legislative process
Illegitimate state of legislative emergency
5. According to the appellant, Law No 39 / 2022 was approved in a state of legislative emergency for which the material conditions were not met, resulting in the unconstitutional nature of the amended parts of the Pandemic Act for the Conflict with Article 1 of the Constitution, which states that the Czech Republic is a democratic state, Article 2 (3) of the Constitution and Article 2 (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter "the Charter '), according to which state power can be exercised only in cases, within the limits and in the ways laid down by the law, and in accordance with Article 6 of the Constitution, under which the majority is responsible for the protection of minorities, and with Article 21 (1) of the Charter, under which citizens have the right to participate in the administration of public affairs through their Members, and by virtue of the law.
6. The fact that the pandemic law (in the unamended version) has limited efficiency until 28 February 2022 has been known throughout the year, thus not an unexpected and surprising fact to which the state of legislative emergency would have to respond. Even if this were the case, the Government could only present an amendment concerning efficiency and other changes concerning the rights and obligations of all persons in the Czech Republic to discuss in the normal approval process.
7. At the time when Law 39 / 2022 Coll. was approved in a state of legislative emergency, the epidemic of COVID-19 disease was (and continues to be) on the retreat and justification of the government that it was an insurance policy in the event of an outbreak of another wave of epidemic in the autumn, proving that it was not an actual need. In addition, the appellant also refers to the statement by the Minister for Health and the Prime Minister that the law is not needed, in fact confirmed by the Senate when it rejected the draft law in question.
8. Another flaw, according to the author, is that the President of the Assembly of Deputies did not let the Senate vote after the Senate bill was returned to the Chamber of Deputies on whether the state of legislative emergency persists. The state of legislative emergency is an extraordinary legislative process in which the rights of individual Members to speak and debate are restricted. Those rights are restricted to the government's proposal in fact in relation to the opposition, which affects the essence of democratic parliamentary (parliamentary pluralism) and therefore the essential importance of democratic rule of law; In addition, the appellant cites extracts from the case law of the Constitutional Court concerning the constitutional conformity requirements of the legislative process.
9. The purpose of a legislative emergency is to prevent irreversible or difficult-to-replace harm to people and the state. It is an institution that shortens the procedure for adopting government bills, which are strictly limited by the author of the quoted rights of the parliamentary opposition, and ultimately violated or relativated democratic principles controlling the legislative process. Because of the speed in which government bills are being adopted, it is impossible to prepare and get acquainted with the material in question and, overall, to limit and shorten parliamentary procedures and debates.
10. The Constitution allows for a short discussion of the draft law only at the time of the war and state threat under Constitutional Act No. 110 / 1998 Coll., on the Security of the Czech Republic, as amended by Constitutional Act No. 300 / 2000 Coll., hereinafter referred to as the Constitutional Act on Security. The state of legislative emergency has been confirmed by the Chamber of Deputies only by the votes of the majority by vote 4 at the 8th meeting of 1 February 2022; Only 81 Members, less than half of the Chamber of Deputies, voted in favour and none of the opposition parties voted in favour - so it is not a convincing majority or broad consensus.
11. The Senate rejected draft law No. 39 / 2022 Coll. on 10.2.2022; the Senate resolution was delivered to Members on 11.2.2022. Pursuant to Article 97 (3) of the Act No. 90 / 1995 Coll., on the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, as amended by Act No. 265 / 2011 Coll., the proposal was to be submitted for a new vote to Members in 10 days, at the earliest 21 February 2022, but the Chamber of Deputies had already discussed it at the meeting of 16 February 2022 and the vote was held on 18 February 2022. The state of legislative emergency has not been confirmed, as the chairmanship of the government meetings did not allow it to be voted on, even though the opposition Members have pointed out it.
Interruption of the speaker and illegal approval of negotiations and voting after 21: 00
12. The applicant further contends that, pursuant to Article 53 of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, the proceedings of the Chamber of Deputies are closed at 21 o'clock and draft laws may be put to the vote only within 19 o'clock; However, the Chamber of Deputies may decide otherwise. At the meeting on 15 February 2022, an extension of the negotiations was voted with the possibility of voting after 21 p.m., but this decision was reached by the "treacherous" meeting of Jan Skopek, who suspended the speech of opposition Member Tomia Okamura at 7: 53 a.m., with no member of the government in the Chamber. The appellant considers that this was a prearranged ministerial meeting. Following the opening of the suspended negotiations, the President first read the procedural proposal to be held after the 19th, 21st and 24th hours, although it was already after the 20th, and thus the proposal was retroactive. The purpose of that procedure was to achieve a suspension of the proper conclusion of the meeting and to physically exhaust the members of the opposition at night and to bring about the conclusion of the debate; The government majority then voted to vote on the bill on Friday, 18 February 2022 at 13: 00. The President of the meeting, Jan Skopeček, held a firm vote and saw any interruption in the speech of Mr Tomio Okamura, contrary to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies.
13. At the same time, according to the appellant, the situation of the infringement of Act No. 90 / 1995 Coll., on the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as "JŘPS ') should be distinguished from the case of Act No. 112 / 2016 Coll., on the registration of sales which the Constitutional Court dealt with in the decision of the sp. zn. The government majority must have now been known to be in violation of the JSPS by the procedure. Even if the Constitutional Court is still benevolent, the more likely the JJPS will be violated by the government majority, because this illegality, which cannot be sanctioned by the repeal of the adopted law, will not bother it; Law No 112 / 2016 Coll., on the registration of sales, was also discussed for a longer period. The Government submitted draft Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll. up to 20.1.2022, although it knew from the outset about limiting the effectiveness of the Pandemic Act until the end of February 2022; It could therefore be presented more in advance.
14. Both the constitutional order and the subjective constitutional rights of Members to the proper and unhindered exercise of their public office have been violated in accordance with the procedure of the President's meeting. The ruling majority has the power to amend the Rules of Procedure according to a predetermined procedure, particularly the constitutional rules. The laws are adopted by Parliament and the Government has no legal right to adopt the law at its appointed time. Parliament is not just an emptied democratic pendant of government power, which is politely approving government bills, as is typical of the parliaments of totalitarian states; we are no longer in the 1948- 1989 period and cannot be intimidated by the government of disobedient Members from a vote. The appellant draws attention to the finding of sp. zn. If the rights of Mr Milos Melčák have been respected, the rights of the opposition Members must also be respected. The position of a government majority cannot be accepted by law at the cost of violating the legal procedure for its adoption. The essence of legislative action is that the adoption of laws should not be hasty and that Parliament's approval as democratically elected bodies must be obtained for people, as a source of all power in the state. The ruling majority returns to practices before November 1989, when many constitutional principles and procedural rules formally complied with democratic standards, but the state's power authorities themselves violated the law they created with impunity.
15. In conclusion of this part of the table of objections, the appellant quotes the passages of the finding sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 55 / 10 of 1 March 2011 (N 27 / 60 of SbNU 279; 80 / 2011 Coll.) concerning the rights of the parliamentary minority.
Opposition against the possibility of restricting personal freedom by remote means
16. The appellant is opposed to § 8a of the Pandemic Law, which according to it violates personal freedom (Article 8 of the Charter) and freedom of movement and residence (Article 14 of the Charter) in conjunction with the principle that no one is obliged to do what the law does not impose (Article 2 (4) of the Constitution and Article 2 (3) of the Charter). Until now, legal arrangements have allowed that, in order to quarantine a person suspected of being infected or isolated, the decision of the public authority (hygiene) is fully subject to administrative rules; Now, however, the pandemic law revolutionises the reduction of fundamental human rights and means of distance communication. The introduction of this method into the rule of law at the moment that the COVID-19 epidemic is receding is no longer material. The legal regulation is brief and transmits a significant limitation of constitutional rights to a mere Decree of the Ministry of Health, that is, the statutory legislation.
17. The view of the rule of law does not correspond to the fact that constitutional law can be restricted orally without proof of delivery (at least by fiction). The law does not at all discuss teaching the addressee about the possibility of lodging an appeal, nor does it specify how the identity of the person speaking over the mobile can be verified. The mobile phone is normally available to persons different from the owner of the provider of the communication service (e.g. family members, employees, etc.) and thus the verification itself with whom it has been spoken is inconclusive.
18. The Pandemic Law allows for an investigation of this procedure within three days, but does not comment on whether this investigation is a proper remedy and the decision does not acquire legal authority, which has a fundamental effect on judicial protection or on the calculation of the time limit for bringing an administrative action. By effectively excluding the administrative order from the applicability of the regulation of isolation and quarantine, the Act created a procedural vacuum; it is not possible to adapt the basic procedural rules only at a substatutory level.
Opposition against the possibility of restricting the freedom of enterprise
19. The appellant also objects to Paragraph 2 (2) (b) of the Pandemic Act, which included a number of new restrictions and obligations for entrepreneurs, thereby affecting the freedom of business guaranteed by Article 26 of the Charter. The Government came out of the judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court and added what the original wording of the pandemic law did not allow it to do. Legitimacy, from a material point of view, calls into question that the epidemic is essentially becoming a common viral disease and that the State has managed it under the rule of law less affecting the rights of an individual.
20. The basic change is the possibility to limit not only commercial and production establishments, but in principle all the business activities listed in point (b), whereas such a broad definition is unjustified. There are a number of business activities that are done by a person himself and do not come into contact with the public above the level of ordinary social contact (e.g. computer programming, accounting documents processing, etc.). The contested provision also fails to take account of certain specific business activities which ensure the implementation of fundamental rights and freedoms. In this way, lawyers implementing the right of clients to legal protection and assistance may be restricted. The contested provision is so general that the failure of the legislator to regulate the link of this restriction to the possibilities for the transmission of the disease and to ensure the integrity of the business activities necessary for the exercise of fundamental rights is so serious that it justifies the repeal of this provision as a whole, with the possibility of the legislator better adjusting its wording to the possible autumn wave.
21. The government has tools to solve even outside the Pandemic Law in the form of the possibility of declaring an emergency state under the Constitutional Security Act. The pandemic law and the state of the pandemic emergency do not have a constitutional basis, and it cannot be made a substitute emergency by introducing the same possibilities of the government to impose obligations as under the ordinary law alone.
22. The applicant also points out that the original limited effectiveness of the Pandemic Act until 28. 2. 2022 was extended until 30. 11. 2022; The law is thus formally temporary, but its temporary nature is "the nature of the temporary residence of Soviet troops."
Compliance with procedural management conditions
23. Pursuant to Article 88 (1) of the Constitution, in conjunction with Article 64 (1) (b) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, a group of at least 41 Members has the right to apply for annulment of the law or its individual provisions. The proposal in this case was made by a group of 57 Members and, in accordance with Article 64 (5) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 320 / 2002 Coll., it was accompanied by a signature document to which each of them individually confirmed that it was attached to the proposal. The applicant therefore fulfils the condition of active legitimacy.
24. The proposal also contains other legal requirements, it is admissible within the meaning of Section 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court and negotiable (a contrario § 67 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll.).
Proceedings before the Constitutional Court
25. The Constitutional Court, pursuant to Article 69 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, has called on the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate as parties to the proceedings and the Government, together with the Ombudsman, as potential interveners of the proceedings for observations. The Ombudsman informed the Constitutional Court that he did not intervene.
Observations of the Chamber of Deputies
26. The Chamber of Deputies (through its President) first analysed the progress of the legislative process. The Government of the Chamber of Deputies submitted a draft law later published under No 39 / 2022 Coll. on 20 January 2022 and was sent to Members as Parliament Press 127 / 0 on the same day; The President of the Chamber of Deputies declared a legislative emergency on a proposal from the Government and decided, at the request of the Government on 20 January 2022, that the bill submitted would be discussed in a brief hearing with the omission of first reading. The bill was ordered to the Health Committee, which discussed it on 25 January 2022 and adopted an amendment concerning the amendment to the effectiveness of the law.
27. The second reading took place on 2 February 2022, when the Chamber of Deputies decided, before discussing the draft agenda, that the state of legislative emergency would continue. In the framework of a detailed debate, a number of amendments were tabled to the draft law and, among them, only the proposals of Mr Jan Hrnčír and Mrs Eva Decroix concerned the contested provisions. However, these proposals mainly included, in their majority, a reduction in the upper limit of the fines for infringements specified in the law, only if the provisions of § 2 (2) (e) and § 8a proposed their new wording. In the third reading vote, all the amendments by Mrs Eva Decroix were adopted. The Chamber of Deputies has given its assent to the bill, as amended by the amendments adopted, of the total number of 122 Members present, with 70 votes in favour and 52 votes against.
28. The bill was passed by the Chamber of Deputies of the Senate on 4 February 2022, which discussed and rejected it at its meeting on 10 February 2022. The bill was re-voted in the Chamber of Deputies on 16 and 18 February 2022, when the Chamber of Deputies of the 187 Members present remained 104 votes in favour and 82 votes against. The law was delivered to the President of the Republic for signature on 18 February 2022. The President signed the law and it was declared in the Collection of Laws on 25 February 2022 under number 39 / 2022.
29. Finally, the Chamber of Deputies states that it leaves it to the Constitutional Court to examine the question of the unconstitutional objection by proposing the contested provisions.
Statement by the Senate
30. In its observations (made via the President of the Senate), the Senate primarily recaptures the course of the legislative process. Bill No. 39 / 2022 Coll. was referred by the Chamber of Deputies to the Senate on 4 February 2022. The Senate Organizing Committee ordered this proposal as Senate Press No. 198 to discuss the Health Committee and the Constitutional Law Committee. The Committee on Health recommended that the Senate be approved by Resolution No 77 of 9 February 2022 in the version referred to the Chamber of Deputies. On the same day, the draft law was also discussed by the constitutional legal committee, which, by its resolution No 120, recommended rejecting it. The Senate discussed the legal outline at the 20th meeting of the 13th term of office on 10.2.2022; on the Prime Minister's proposal in vote 9, he decided to discuss the law in abridged negotiations.
31. A broad discussion was held when the bill was discussed at the Senate plenary. Some senators criticised the rejection of the bill, which largely corresponded to some reasons for the constitutional legal committee, which recorded the parties' doubts regarding compliance with the conditions for a legislative emergency. On the subject of substantive law, he referred, inter alia, to provisions ordering quarantine even in the case of an antigenic test and previous residence in risk countries, and the functionality of certain provisions, in particular the possibility of ordering quarantine by other means of distance communication, was also discussed. The Senate's observations also contain extracts from the statements of some senators, both for and against the bill.
32. Following the debate, the proposal to approve the draft law submitted by the Health Committee was not adopted. The Senate accepted the draft constitutional legal committee and adopted Resolution 377 on 10 February 2022 by which it rejected the draft law. 32 of the 61 senators were present in vote 14 and 22 were opposed. The Senate leaves the Constitutional Court to examine and rule on the application for annulment of the contested legal provisions.
Government observations
33. The Government approved its entry into proceedings within the meaning of Article 69 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court by Decree No 245 of 30 March 2022 and submitted a comprehensive statement to the present proposal, drawn up by the Minister for Legislation in cooperation with the Minister for Health.
34. First, the government briefly comments on the epidemiological situation at the time of the adoption of Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll. It underlines that, in the period considered, the disease pandemic COVID-19 caused by the spread of the Coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 (also called "the pandemic") was not only in decline, but, on the contrary, in the context of the spread of the new infectious variant of the SARS-CoV-2- omicron virus, it significantly deteriorated (on 2 February 2022 the number of ongoing cases of the disease reached its maximum), which it attaches graphs and refers to other publicly available data. The appellant's fundamental assertion of the illegality of the hearing of Law No 39 / 2022 Coll. in a state of legislative emergency is therefore manifestly false.
35. The government recaptures the historical background of the preparation of Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll. It points out that it was the Government of President Andrei Babiš, which initiated and effectively implemented the drafting of Bill No. 39 / 2022 Coll. including the wording of the request for its discussion in the abbreviated negotiations in the context of the declared state of legislative emergency. The House expressed its trust in the current government on 13 January 2022; In so doing, the draft Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll. was submitted by the Ministry of Health to the shortened comment procedure on 15.12.2021 and was sent to the Government on 13.1.2022. In view of the need for the adoption of the proposed legislation in the shortest possible time, the petitioner proposed to use the abbreviated discussion in a state of legislative emergency pursuant to § 99 of the JŘPS and § 118 of Act No. 107 / 1999 Coll., on the Rules of Procedure of the Senate, as amended by Act No. 172 / 2004 Coll. On 19 January 2022, the current Government adopted Resolution 32 approving the draft contested law. The Government of Andrei Babiš, while aware of the need for an accelerated amendment to the pandemic law (at least in terms of the necessity to extend its period of validity and to take account of the case law of the administrative courts), launched the necessary legislative steps in autumn 2021. In view of the lack of political consensus on the extension of the emergency situation and the impending end of the pandemic law, the current government adopted a draft amendment to the pandemic law drawn up by Andrei Babiš, including a proposal for a short hearing. It could not have presented the bill earlier, as the appellant states.
36. Finally, the Government describes the course of the legislative process in Parliament, devoting its attention to the constitutionality of the legislative process and the individual objections of the author. It sets out general grounds for assessing the shortcomings of the legislative process, which the Constitutional Court summarised in the review finding of the PSC 20 / 21 in paragraphs 89 to 93, and analyses the role of parliamentary opposition in the legislative process, using the related case law of the Constitutional Court.
The non / justified declaration of a state of legislative emergency
37. According to the Government, material conditions have been given to declare a state of legislative emergency under Section 99 (1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies. In a situation where (a) the number of persons with current disease COVID-19 has increased exponentially, (b) the new variant of the SARS-CoV-2-omiron virus, which is transmitted with order higher efficiency than the previous variants, has become a dominant variant in the Czech Republic, (c) the effectiveness of the pandemic law has ended, and (d) the public and political consensus of the parties to the extension of the emergency situation has not been reached, the discussion of the draft of the contested law in a state of legislative emergency appears not only to be rational and necessary, but also to the constitutional conformal procedure.
38. The existence of a pandemic as a legitimate reason for dealing with the law in a state of legislative emergency has already implicitly been confirmed by the Constitutional Court in the decision of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 21 / 20 of 8.12.2020 (29 / 2021 Coll.) and also by the Supreme Administrative Court in judgment No. 8 Ao 1 / 2021-133 of 14.4.2021 (available at https: / / www.nsjud.cz).
39. In particular, the existence of an objective serious situation that needs to be addressed immediately is a condition of a constitutionally and addressed state of legislative emergency. The highest epidemic of COVID-19 and associated major threats to the health and life of persons throughout the country, including a reasonable fear of worsening the situation, if not dealt with with with adequate instruments, the government considers it an exceptional circumstance, which is a legitimate reason for applying the Institute for a short hearing.
40. Although the procedural vote on the confirmation of a legislative emergency did not reach a majority consensus that is comparable to the majority required for the adoption of the constitutional law (in the sense of the Sp. (Pl. ÚS 55 / 10), the vote reached almost three-fifths of the Members present (81 out of 138 were against the proposal).
41. The appellant's argument cannot be accepted that the adoption of the contested law was not necessary if the emergency situation brings sufficient tools for the government, since it should only be declared for a period of time at the highest risk to public health and not for the entire duration of the pandemic. The Government also does not agree with the claim that sufficient instruments are included in Act No. 258 / 2000 Coll., on the Protection of Public Health and on the amendment of certain related laws, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as "the Act on the Protection of Public Health '), since, as confirmed by the judicial practice, the application of the Act is limited.
Deficiencies of the legislative process
42. In its observations, the Government is further concerned with the various objections to the legislative process, for which it states in summary that no constitutional right of any particular Member of Parliament has been infringed during the approval of Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll. and the individual errors raised do not in themselves constitute a cumulative breach of the Constitution, constitutional principle or value; In addition, it outlines the conclusions of the selected case law of the Constitutional Court concerning the scope of the parliamentary discourse.
43. The government does not consider the time of 30 days to discuss the draft of the contested law from the point of view of constitutionality problematic. With reference to the stenographer from the meeting of the 8th Chamber of Deputies meeting on 1 and 2 February 2022, the Government notes that the opposition was not denied the use of competitive views, the conduct of rational discourse, the discussion of amendments or the right of obstruction during the hearing. An even wider margin was exercised by the opposition in the vote on the draft contested law, as referred to by the Senate, which took place at the 9th session of the Chamber of Deputies on 15 and 16 February 2022.
44. In the absence of formal confirmation of the existence of a legislative emergency after the Senate's return of the draft contested law, the Government states that it is not an illegal or even an anti-constitutional procedure, as it does not result from the jurisdiction of the JŘPS nor is it based on established parliamentary practice. The duration of the legislative emergency was confirmed by vote 4 at the 8th session of the Chamber of Deputies; the request for reaffirmation of the state of legislative emergency by the Chamber of Deputies after the Senate rejected the draft law No 39 / 2022 Coll. and referred back to the Chamber of Deputies, the Government considers it a manifestation of overstretched formalism, inter alia because the majority of governments had the necessary absolute majority. Although it was not a vote on the procedural proposal of Mr Radek Vondráček, it was not a deliberate meeting of the Presidents of the meeting, but a result of the obstructive action of the opposition and the chaotic and emotional course of the 9th meeting of the Chamber of Deputies.
45. The opposition to the interruption of the speech of Mr Tomio Okamura by the Government states that it took place at a time when that Member had spoken for more than 5 hours, and this was done on the basis of the notice of the President of the SPD SPD Club, Radima Fiala; The President of the meeting of Jan Skopek was not violated by the JSPS or by any autonomous resolution of the Chamber of Deputies.
46. On the timing of the adoption of the procedural resolution on the approval of the negotiations and the vote after 21: 00, the Government states that it was decided immediately after the President of the meeting had interrupted more than a five-hour obstructive statement by Mr Tomio Okamura, in accordance with the requirements of Rule 53 (1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies.
47. The Government concludes on the constitutionality of the legislative process that it met all the criteria laid down by the Constitutional Order and the case law of the Constitutional Court. Derogation of Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll. on account of the defective legislative procedure, the government would not only consider it a denial of the will of the majority of Members, but also an unjustifiable step from the point of view of material view of law and common sense. In the event that the Constitutional Court would nevertheless repeal Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll. as a whole, the Government proposes to postpone the enforceability of the Derogation finding at the date of expiry of the Pandemic Act in the amended version (i.e. the expiry date of 30.11.2022).
The application for annulment of the various contested provisions
48. The Government considers it undeniable that the pandemic law has become an effective legal basis for issuing a substantial part of the emergency measures to combat the disease epidemic COVID-19. The basic principle of the measures taken is to prevent the spread of the disease and to minimise damage and loss, particularly to the lives and health of individuals. The draft contested law responded to the findings of the application practice and the relevant case law of the Supreme Administrative Court.
49. As regards the proposal to abolish § 8a of the Pandemic Law, the Government states that, given the high number of quarantine measures imposed and the isolation that can reach thousands of cases per day, it is inconceivable that they should be ordered in administrative procedures under the Public Health Protection Act. The purpose of the contested arrangements is to lay down legal rules on situations where a significant number of persons have a reasonable presumption that they fulfil the statutory conditions for the imposition of isolation / quarantine, while it is clear that other than the non-formalised way of ordering quarantine measures and isolation (while maintaining the possibility of defending themselves against such a regulation in a legally regulated manner) would not lead to effective fulfilment of their objectives. The intended purpose cannot be achieved by alternative regulatory means.
50. The procedure whereby the regulation of the quarantine measure or isolation may be followed by a factual instruction is inspired by similar adaptations in other laws, e.g. in § 7b of the Act No. 64 / 1986 Coll., on the Czech Trade Inspection Agency, as amended ("the Act on the Czech Trade Inspection) or in § 44 et seq. of the Act No. 273 / 2008 Coll., on the Police of the Czech Republic, as amended, (" the Act on the Police of the Czech Republic ").
51. It is clear from the classification of the contested provision that a written record of such communication must be made without delay and that written objections addressed to the competent public health authority may be raised against the regulation of the quarantine measure or isolation. The objections are also considered as a non-formalised procedure, as their primary purpose is that the justification of the quarantine measures ordered or isolation should be reviewed as soon as possible. The way in which they are dealt with can be opposed to an action in the administrative justice (according to the Government, an action for intervention). Part Four of the Administrative Regulation shall be used retrospectively to order quarantine measures or isolation and to deal with objections. The State, under Act No. 82 / 1998 Coll., on liability for damage caused in the exercise of public authority by decision or by maladministration and amending Act No. 358 / 1992 Coll., on notaries and their activities (notarial order), as amended, is responsible for the maladministration of the measures and for the damage caused by them.
52. Nor will the appellant's argument of limiting constitutional rights be upheld by a mere decree, since it can only be issued on the basis and within the limits of the law provided for in § 8a of the pandemic law. It is also a short-sighted argument that the introduction of the institutes referred to in the contested provision at the time of the receding pandemic loses material merit. It is impossible to rule out another massive spread of COVID-19 disease, which, after all, the whole world has witnessed (and still is).
53. With regard to the proposal to abolish § 2 (2) (b) and (c) of the Pandemic Act, the Government, after a brief exchange into the history of the creation of the Pandemic Act, states that the exceptional measures which proved necessary in practice to be adopted by the public health authorities under § 69 of the Public Health Protection Act were inserted into § 2. The limitation of population mobility and the possibility of meeting is one of the pillars in combating COVID-19. The Government considers it essential that the classification of these provisions implies that the pursuit of activities in the establishments, buildings or premises listed there can only be limited or conditions laid down for it and not completely prohibited.
54. Since some activities may not be carried out in premises or other similar premises (but for example directly with a customer or other places) which are not, the government has proposed to establish an authorisation to regulate these other activities, provided that they involve direct personal contact between two or more natural persons (e.g. hairdressing services, cosmetics, taxis, etc.), in order to ensure the protection of the health of those natural persons at the same level as would be the case if the activity were carried out in an establishment.
55. In relation to the other contested provisions, the Government notes that no reason for their depreciation is available from the author's text. The Government therefore refers only to the various provisions for the reasons which led it to propose them and proposes that the Constitutional Court reject the proposal.
Replication of the appellant
56. The author states in her reply that she has no comments on the Senate's observations and on the technical part of the Chamber of Deputies' observations. However, it also disputes some of the arguments put forward by the Government, which first states that it has been developed in cooperation with the Ministry of Health, the Ministry, which is associated with, for example, a misleading advertising for the disposal of vaccines under the false slogan "Period for Coronavirus." According to the author, it is not true that the pandemic was on the rise at the time of the adoption of Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll. because the numbers of positive and antigenic PCR tests continued to decline during February.
57. If, according to the Government, there was no consensus to declare an emergency situation, it confirms that even the government parties did not see the situation materially as significantly serious. Moreover, the government was unable to convince government senators, and not even senators - ministers. If the Government transfers responsibility for Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll. to the previous Government of Andrei Babiš, it attacks the right of opposition Members to file a motion to repeal the Law to the Constitutional Court. The Government of Andrei Babiš ended in December 2021 and was therefore not in office at the time of the significant decline in the COVID-19 epidemic in mid-February 2022.
58. The rejection of the bill by the Senate of a legislative act is such a crucial matter that the Chamber of Deputies should once again be concerned with whether this situation continues. According to the author, it was pure arrogance of power that had no rational reason. If the Government has stated that the proposal by Mr Radek Vondráček to abolish the state of legislative emergency has not been decided on because of the obstructive conduct of the opposition, it is clear from this that the government and the government majority are "trying to throw" the violation of the rights of the opposition Member into the opposition, which the appellant says is the same as when the victim of the crime is said to be "responsible for it."
59. The appellant is opposed to the Government's argument on the need for a pandemic law, since nothing would have happened in the event of the annulment of its contested parts. The Pandemic Act is not used too much and possible regulation is possible under the Public Health Protection Act. The government is unnecessarily saying how badly the health service needs the power to order quarantine or isolation in a new way away from administrative procedures. It refers only to the draft implementing decree - more than two months after the adoption of Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll. the decree is not yet in force, thereby confirming, by its own indifference, that this institute does not need a legislative emergency for a month after the adoption of the law. To the Government's objection that some of the contested parts of the law are not justified in the proposal, the appellant states that since the amendment has become part of the pandemic law as such, it is not only possible to challenge the amendment but must propose the repeal of the amended provisions in the original law.
60. In its additional communication, the appellant submitted to the Constitutional Court an SMS message from the Regional Sanitary Station, which is sent to them by a positive test for COVID-19 disease, without an effective implementing decree on § 8a of the pandemic law. The report shall be marked only by the initials of the person concerned and the year of birth. It gives instructions to maintain the insulation, but the conditions (length, range) are not in the SMS itself, which only contains a link to the website. If someone doesn't have a modern phone, the SMS itself will not know what duties to perform. There is also no information on the possibility of objecting. The actual implementation of SMS exceeded all the appellant's dark expectations and only underlines the unsustainability of the contested § 8a pandemic law.
Abandonment of oral proceedings
61. After the above recap of the proceedings, the Constitutional Court concluded that there was no need for oral hearing in the case, as it would not have brought any further clarification of the case than from the written acts of the appellant, the parties and the Government; Having regard to the wording of Article 44 of the Constitutional Court Act, it therefore decided without a hearing.
Review of the procedure for the adoption of the contested provisions
62. The Constitutional Court first examined, in the terms of Paragraph 68 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll., whether the contested provisions were adopted within the limits of the Constitution laid down by competence and by the constitutional procedure. This was based on further publicly available stenographic entries, which depict parliamentary proceedings and the statements of both chambers of Parliament.
63. The appellant challenges the individual provisions of the Pandemic Act to the extent that it was amended by Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll. (except for some of the appellant's provisions for individuals more favourable). The appellant's procedure corresponds to the decision-making practice of the Constitutional Court, according to which the amendment of the law does not have a separate existence, as its content becomes part of the text of the amended law; In the proceedings referred to in Article 87 (1) (a) of the Constitution, only the amended law can be challenged in principle [e.g. Resolution sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 25 / 2000 of 15.8.2000 (U 27 / 19 SbNU 271) or point 57 of the found sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 5 / 19 of 1.10.2019 (N 168 / 96 SbNU 144; 303 / 2019 Coll.)].
64. In order to examine the constitutional conformity of the legislative process leading to the adoption of the contested provisions, the Constitutional Court had to examine the way in which the amendment of Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll., by which the provisions in question were inserted into the Pandemic Act, possibly by which the relevant provisions were amended, although the appellant had not challenged it separately (nor in eventum) [mutatis mutandis, e.g. the finding of page 55 / 13 of 12 May 2015 (N 93 / 77 of the CollNU 339; 170 / 2015 Coll.)].
65. The Constitutional Court notes that Law No 39 / 2022 Coll. was adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution of the given powers and powers, and moreover the appellant does not object. Its argument focuses on constitutional deficits during the legislative process; contends that its constitutional coutels, which must be distinguished from the constitutional definition of competence [cf.
66. To that end, the Constitutional Court will first (briefly) summarise the underlying bases for examining the procedure for the adoption of the law (V. 1), which subsequently applies to the circumstances of the present case (V. 2).
General considerations
Legislative process in general
67. The Constitutional Court has already expressed its views many times on the assessment of the constitutionality of the legislative process in the proceedings for the annulment of laws and other laws pursuant to § 64 et seq. In the author of the quoted finding sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 5 / 02 of 2.10.2002 (N 117 / 28 SbNU 25; 476 / 2002 Coll.) he expressed requirements for compliance with procedural rules in order to achieve a proper (constitutional) decision. However, the Constitutional Court points out in its decision-making practice that formal defects in the legislative process can only establish the unconstitutionality of the Law under consideration if it is a direct and substantial breach of its rules (whether in the level of the Constitution and of the constitutional order or the level of sub-constitutional law), and at the same time, such failure reaches a constitutional legal dimension [cf. It is not the role of the Constitutional Court to protect the "mere" legality of the parliamentary procedure [cf. sp. zn.
68. The involvement of the Constitutional Court in the legislative process is justified in particular by the protection of free competition between political parties and minorities, in particular the parliamentary opposition [cf. Any action by the Constitutional Court should also be measured in relation to the principle of legitimate trust of citizens in law, principle of legal certainty and protection of acquired rights [cf. sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 77 / 06 of 15.2.2007 (N 30 / 44 SbNU 349; 37 / 2007 Sb.) or the finding of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 21 / 14 of 30.6.2015 (N 122 / 77 SbNU 759; 199 / 2015 Sb.), especially if it is possible to expect that after the deregation of the law would be adopted by the same procedure [cf. The defect of the legislative process already having the character of unconstitutionality can be given by the accumulation of several partial formal errors [cf. the finding sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 1 / 12 of 27.11.2012 (N 195 / 67 CollNU 333; 437 / 2012 Coll.)].
69. The rules of the legislative process are contained in the various sources (parliamentary) of law, which include, in particular, the Constitution, the Rules of Procedure of the two chambers of Parliament [Act No. 90 / 1995 Coll., on the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, as amended, and Act No. 172 / 2004 Coll., on the Rules of Procedure of the Senate, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as the JRC)] and individual resolutions of each chambers of Parliament issued pursuant to § 1 (2) of their Rules of Procedure (so-called autonomous resolution); The established practice of the parliamentary chamber and its bodies is also important if it can be considered consistent with the principles of law-making, democratic political system, etc. (see paragraph 38 of the sp. zn. These are, in particular, the Rules of Procedure of the individual chambers of Parliament, by which the various constitutional principles of the legislative process are effectively guaranteed and projected into practice (point 205 of the decision on page 1 of the ÚS 1 / 12), which are decisive in the interpretation and application of the various provisions of the Rules of Procedure (point 38 of the decision on page 77 / 06).
Rights of the parliamentary minority
70. One of the principles of parliamentary decision-making is the principle of pluralism, based on the principle of free competition between political parties and political forces (Article 5 of the Constitution and Article 22 of the Charter), which, as the characteristics and characteristics of each free society, constitutes one of the essential elements of the democratic rule of law within the meaning of Article 9 (2) of the Constitution (see paragraph 67 of the Found sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 55 / 10 and referred to there). Furthermore, the democratic principles of the legislative process include the principle of majority decision-making and the separable principle of protection of the minority (Article 6 of the Constitution) [cf. point 107 of the sp. zn.
71. The fundamental rights of a parliamentary minority or its members may be regarded primarily as rights guaranteeing participation in parliamentary procedures and allowing the parliamentary opposition to exercise supervision and control over the ruling majority, which can be seen as one of the fundamental characteristics of the rule of law [see Part III (A) of the decision on sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 77 / 06]. The rights of the parliamentary minority include the right to block or delay decisions taken by the majority (point 73 of the decision sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 55 / 10).
72. The legislative process must, in particular, enable the persons involved to make a real assessment and discussion of the draft including, in particular, representatives of the parliamentary minority [see part X / a of the finding sp. zn. Individual Members or Senators must have a real opportunity to become familiar with the content of the proposed bill, to examine it and to take an opinion on it in the context of its deliberations in the relevant chamber of Parliament or in its institutions, for which sufficient time must be provided for them (point 108 of the decision on point 108 of the Rules of Procedure). Those requirements for parliamentary debate should also apply to the wider public, who should not be denied the possibility of monitoring and critical evaluation of the legislative proposal in question. The public debate can take all kinds of imaginable forms; This ultimately fulfils the legitimate function of the legislative process (points 206 to 208 of the sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 1 / 12).
73. The right of Members (or Senators) to present an opinion on parliamentary grounds is, however, not self-useful, since the importance of parliamentary debate must be seen in the possibility of confronting views across the political spectrum (which is a guarantee of free competition for political forces under Article 5 of the Constitution, see point 155 of the decision on the sp. zl. ÚS 21 / 14), not in the unlimited exercise of the right of each individual Member (or Senator) to comment on it; It is also essential at what stage of the legislative process the rights of the parliamentary opposition have been restricted and whether or not these restrictions could have been healed at another stage (cf. First of all, it is necessary to seek and assess the balance between the legitimate interests of the ruling majority and the parliamentary opposition or minorities (see paragraph 76 of the decision of the sp. zn.
The state of legislative emergency and a brief discussion of the bill
74. The Institute of Legislative Absence is one of the special parliamentary procedures enabling the legislative process to be shortened or simplified and is regulated at the legal level in Section 99 of the JŘPS. Its use effectively limits certain democratic principles of the legislative process, in particular the rights of the parliamentary opposition; Therefore, it constitutes an exception to the rule for which, in a particular case, a sufficiently serious reason must always be given, based on a rational basis and supported by specific facts, which outweigh the interest in discussing the draft law in a standard manner (see more closely the findings already cited, sp. zn.
75. The constitutionally challenged state of legislative emergency will be the case if there is a significant reason comparable to that for the procedure under Article 8 of the Constitutional Law on Security, which has the potential to threaten fundamental rights and freedoms in a fundamental manner, or where the State is in danger of significant economic damage [see, to this concept, the opinion of the Chamber of Deputies, Pl. It must be such exceptional circumstances that are clearly outside the normal course of political processes [e.g. the threat of legislative "vacuum" viv. The state of legislative emergency (and the related abbreviated discussion of the draft law) is therefore conditional on the existence of an exceptional circumstance and its intensity in view of its possible negative effect on one of the generally defined protected values, such as the rights and freedoms of citizens, the security of the state or the protection of property (point 114 of the decision sp. zn.
76. The Constitutional Court is not a "notice of appeal" in relation to the assessment of the rationality of the Institute's declaration of legislative emergency, but rather as a defender of the constitutional principles relating to the legislative process prior to the possible abuse of the Institute to circumvent the proper legislative procedure (point 115 of the decision of the sp. zn. The policy before possible abuse is a legal definition of the grounds for declaring a state of legislative emergency which can be considered legitimate, constitutionally and discussed and reachable (cf. point 86 of the decision sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 55 / 10).
77. The constitutional requirements for parliamentary debate, i.e. in particular in relation to the role of the parliamentary opposition (cf. sp. zn. The independence of the Constitutional Court is justified in particular when the core of the democratic parliamentary debate is affected, which can only be seen in relation to the positions of the parliamentary (parliamentary) debate [cf. sp. zn.
Application of general considerations to the present case
78. The Constitutional Court is based on the course of the legislative process as described in Part IV above and therefore does not recap it at this point as a whole, merely complements it further.
Reason for declaring a state of legislative emergency
79. The main objection and major part of the appellant's derogatory argument is that material conditions were not met in a state of legislative emergency under Section 99 of the JŘPS for a brief discussion of Bill No. 39 / 2022. The Constitutional Court therefore first examined whether there was a legitimate reason for declaring a state of legislative emergency and the subsequent shortened discussion of Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll., which outweighs the interest in maintaining a proper legislative procedure.
80. The circumstances of the present case are similar, however, not entirely identical to those which the Constitutional Court considered in the decision on page Pl. ÚS 20 / 21. It stated, inter alia, that the very existence of a pandemic is not in itself a legitimate reason for a shorter discussion of the law (see paragraphs 97-99 of the cited finding). However, it came to the conclusion that, in the impending legal vacuum in dealing with a pandemic (with the aim of the pandemic law being addressed, provision of a legal framework is an exceptional measure to combat it), taking into account the political situation at the time (lack of political consensus on the duration of the emergency situation), a legitimate reason has been given for shortening the law in a state of legislative emergency (paragraphs 102-107).
81. The Constitutional Court considered whether, in the present case, the alleged exceptional circumstances could be considered to be those which correspond to the above-mentioned bases and concluded that this was the case.
82. On 22.11.2021, the President of the Chamber of Deputies declared a legislative emergency for the period from 25.11.2021 to 7.1.2022 (at the request of the Prime Minister Andrei Babiš at the time), which was subsequently extended by Decision No 10 of 5.1.2022 (at the request of Prime Minister Petr Fiala) and No 12 of 20.1.2022 (at the request of the Government) until 18.2.2022. It was further decided by the President of the Chamber of Deputies No 13 of 20 January 2022 that draft law No 39 / 2022 Coll. would be discussed in an abridged hearing (Paragraph 99 (2) of the Act on the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies), the proposal was ordered to discuss the Committee on Health and, at the same time, an inexcusable deadline for the submission of a resolution (Paragraph 99 (3) of the Act on the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies). The state of the legislative emergency was confirmed by the Chamber of Deputies No 4 at the 8th meeting of 1 February 2022 (Paragraph 99 (4) of the Chamber of Deputies Act), on which the Chamber of Deputies gave its consent to the bill. Voting No 44 at the 8th meeting of 2 February 2022 confirmed that the conditions for the negotiation of the contested act were laid down in the abbreviated act (Section 99 (5) of the Chamber of Deputies' Rules of Procedure). It can therefore be concluded that, in this part, the procedure in the legislative process complies with the formal requirements of Article 99 of the JRC.
83. According to the Government, the primary reason for the short discussion of draft Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll. was the need to extend the effectiveness of an effective pandemic management tool in the form of a pandemic law (see also sections 18 and 19 of the explanatory notes to Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll.). Providing the legal framework with exceptional measures to combat a pandemic as the main (and legitimate) purpose of the pandemic law has already been addressed by the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 101 of the finding in sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 20 / 21). It is therefore a legitimate tool to address an existing crisis that threatens the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens or a situation where the state is facing significant economic damage. At the same time, a causal link can be found between the need to respond effectively to the crisis and the shortened negotiation.
84. According to the Constitutional Court, even in the present case, there is a legitimate reason for discussing draft law No 39 / 2022 Coll. in a state of legislative emergency which has its material justification.
85. The Government, at the time of the submission of draft Law No. 39 / 2022 Coll., was based on technical evidence and publicly available data, showing, inter alia, that the number of confirmed cases of COVID-19 disease at the time of the draft Act from 20.1.2022 to 18.2.2022 increased exponentially (as stated by the Government, ranged between 176 363 and 188 568 persons, at most on 2.2.2022 in the number of 373 402 persons; i.e. more confirmed cases than in the course of negotiations of the pandemic law; See https: / / institute.mostcr.cz / covid-19), the virus has become a dominant variant, which is transmitted with order of higher effectiveness than the previous variants (cf. p. 13 of the explanatory note to Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll.). Therefore, there was an objective serious situation at the time considered which had to be addressed in a timely manner.
86. The Constitutional Court is not called upon to assess the seriousness of the epidemiological situation at the time of the examination of the draft law No. 39 / 2022 Coll. and to examine the accuracy or completeness of the technical documents on which the Government relied, or else to determine the facts. It is essential for the Constitutional Court that the reasons put forward by the Government are neither fictitious nor arbitrary, based on the specific circumstances claimed and revisable. At the same time, there is a need to respond immediately to the situation of the ongoing pandemic as (objective) exceptional circumstances threatening the health and life of a large part of the population, its property sphere and the functioning of the state and society as a whole, the seriousness of which can be substitutable to § 99 (1) of the Code of Conduct of the Chamber of Deputies and Article 8 of the Constitutional Law on Security.
87. The effectiveness of the existing Pandemic Act ended on 28 February 2022 and the draft amendment (Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll.) was submitted on 20 January 2022. In view of the unpredictability of the ordinary legislative process (in particular its length), the use of a simplified legislative instrument to ensure continuity in the ability of the Ministry of Health and Regional Health and their ability to face a pandemic effectively seems rational.
88. According to the Constitutional Court, it will also prove that, in a state of legislative emergency, it has not only extended the validity and effectiveness of the pandemic law, but at the same time the law has been supplemented by provisions taking into account the existing application and decision-making practice, in particular the Supreme Administrative Court (when it comes to extending the possibility of issuing emergency measures and ordering isolation or quarantine by remote means, see, inter alia, p. 12 of the explanatory notes to Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll.). Without the Constitutional Court, at this stage, having assessed the constitutionality of the various contested provisions (see Section VI below), it is clear that they are not entirely (with the resolution of the crisis) unrelated legal instruments which would be discussed in short together with the main point of extending the effectiveness of the pandemic law only to circumvent a proper legislative procedure (thus not comparable to, for example, the so-called inadmissible legislative "stickers', together with the main point of finding sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 77 / 06).
89. The Constitutional Court therefore considers the reflection of existing practice and the extension of the possibilities of public authorities in the fight against the epidemic to be legitimate instruments to respond effectively to the crisis; at the same time found a causal nexus between the need to incorporate these instruments together with the extension of the effectiveness of the initial legal framework and the shortened discussion of the draft Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll.
90. If the appellant contends that the Government was able to submit draft law No 39 / 2022 Coll. in advance, which would allow it to be discussed in the ordinary legislative process, the Constitutional Court stresses that the elections to the Chamber of Deputies (9th Election) took place on 8 and 9 October 2021; the current government was appointed on 17.12.2021 and the trust was expressed by the Chamber of Deputies on 13.1.2022 (vote 47 at the 6th meeting). It is therefore not possible to place the burden on the Government that it has not developed more activity before those dates to submit draft law No 39 / 2022 Coll. in such a way that it is not necessary to use the abbreviated discussion in a state of legislative emergency.
91. The Constitutional Court has already held, in the case sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 20 / 21, that the need for a short discussion of the draft law may arise only later with time (paragraph 100); He also stated that such a reason could, if the other parameters of constitutional conformity had been fulfilled, also give rise to the sluggishness or malpractice of a government or other public authority (paragraph 104). It is not possible and priori to deny the use of this device in a situation where the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens are significantly threatened or there is a threat of significant economic damage to the State, only because the failure to deal with the law in the ordinary legislative procedure was due to the incompetence, political reluctance, or otherwise, even the fault. Therefore, (at least hypothetical) the possibility of legitimate use of simplified legislative mechanisms must always be maintained (with respect to the constitutional court), regardless of whether their use could have been prevented.
92. The Constitutional Court cannot assess the justification for the state of legislative emergency at the time of the adoption of Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll. by means of the primacy of subsequent epidemiological developments (and it is not for it to assess the correctness of the predictions on which the Government based its request for an extension of the state of legislative emergency), which subsequently showed a downward trend, on which the appellant demonstrates the lack of need for a short discussion of the law in question. For the Constitutional Court, the relevant situation (related circumstances and extent of information), as was the case at the time of the decision to declare (in this case extension) the state of legislative emergency (see point 115 of the finding sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 53 / 10 or point 85 of the finding sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 55 / 10). In this respect, the Government's conclusions on the culminating epidemic of COVID-19 at the time of the hearing of Law No 39 / 2022 Coll. and concerns about further deterioration do not appear arbitrary (see also paragraphs 85 and 86 above). The appellant's argument concerning the facts arising after the announcement (or extension) of the state of legislative emergency, and even more so after the adoption of Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll., is therefore irrelevant to the current constitutional assessment.
93. For the same reason, the Constitutional Court cannot attest to the appellant's argument that the pandemic law, including the amended provisions, was subsequently not widely used in the application practice, which is intended to show the inadequacy of its discussion and adoption in a state of legislative emergency.
94. Nor can it be said with the appellant's claim that the need for a lengthy discussion of Bill No. 39 / 2022 Coll. was confirmed by the Senate if rejected. That fact can only be seen as a result of the two-chamber structure of Parliament as a manifestation of the principle of division of power and within the legislative power, in which the Chamber of Deputies has a stronger position (e.g. part X / b of the decision sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 24 / 07). The discussion of the submitted bill by the Senate is governed by its own legislative procedure (according to its own Rules of Procedure), including by the individual Senate committees. It cannot be concluded from the outcome of this process whether the abbreviated discussion of the bill in the Chamber of Deputies, which is governed by different (own) rules, was constitutionally conformist.
95. If the Constitutional Committee of the Senate expressed its opposition to draft Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll. Among other things, because there are doubts about its adoption in a state of legislative emergency, it is also merely a manifestation of its role in the Senate phase of the legislative process. After all, the conclusions of the committee were taken into account (and thus to some extent "consumed") by the Senate's vote rejecting Bill 39 / 2022 Coll.. It was subsequently up to the Chamber of Deputies to vote again on the Senate rejected draft law, but with an absolute majority of all Members (Article 47 (1) of the Constitution and Article 97 (3) of the last sentence of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies).
96. The Constitutional Court summarises that the Government has relied on the need for the adoption of Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll. in a state of legislative emergency for reasons that are not manifestly arbitrary, have a ratio and are similar to those foreseen in Article 8 of the Constitutional Law on Security. It is sufficient to conclude that the reasons for the lengthy discussion of the draft law No. 39 / 2022 Coll. will stand up materially and can be considered to be constitutional conformance, even though there was insufficient political agreement on the declaration of a state of legislative emergency comparable to a "constitutional 'majority (such a consensus cannot be considered - as the Government presupposes - almost three-fifths of the consensus of the Members present), since the requirements for the legitimacy of the abbreviated discussion are designed alternatively (see also paragraph 113 of the decision sp.
97. In the light of the foregoing, it can be concluded that, in the present case, the state of legislative emergency has not been justified simply by opposition and has been used as an instrument for enforcing the will of a parliamentary majority, the purpose of which would be to circumvent the proper legislative procedure and the safeguards attached to it. Thus, the need to maintain the legal framework for the effective fight against the pandemic as well as the extension of the possibilities in the fight against it outweighs the need for a standard discussion of draft law No. 39 / 2022 Coll.
Defects of the legislative process and their impact on the rights of the parliamentary minority
98. In addition, the Constitutional Court dealt with the various objections to the legislative process and the assessment of whether they establish the unconstitutional status of Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll.
99. Another shortcoming concerning the abridged hearing of Bill No. 39 / 2022 Coll. (except for the alleged illegality of the state of legislative emergency), the appellant sees that, following the rejection of the Bill by the Chamber of Deputies on 10.2.2022 and the delivery by the Senate of the Senate resolution together with the Members of the Law of 11.2.2022, the proposal was to be submitted for a new vote to Members under Paragraph 97 (3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, as amended by Act No. 265 / 2011 Coll., 10 days, i.e. at the earliest 21. 2. 2022, but the Chamber of Deputies already voted on it. In addition, the Constitutional Court states that, according to § 99 (9) of the Act on Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, the provisions on 10 days in § 97 (3) of the Act on Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, as amended by Act No. 265 / 2011 Coll., are not applicable; The appellant's objection is therefore unfounded. Moreover, it would be contrary to the sense and purpose of the state of legislative emergency as an exceptional procedural institute which exceptionally shortens the legislative procedure if it was fully covered by the rules for ordinary legal proceedings. The context (s) in which the law is discussed can only be relevant in relation to the overall assessment of whether the rights of the parliamentary opposition have been maintained.
100. Once the bill was returned by the Senate, the appellant said that it should be put to a vote to confirm the state of legislative emergency. The procedure thus designed does not result explicitly from the JŘPS (nor from any other source of legislative procedural law). However, in accordance with Rule 99 (4) of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, the Chamber of Deputies shall, before discussing the draft agenda, assess whether the state of the legislative emergency continues; If it is concluded that the conditions for its publication have expired, the state of legislative emergency shall be lifted. The JJPS does not specify how the Chamber of Deputies is to assess the duration of these conditions, or what the procedural outcome of the assessment is to be. It is parliamentary practice that this is done in the form of a resolution and a vote on it (see POHL, M. In: SYLLK, J., KAZNA, M., TETOUR, E., GERMANY, J. et al. Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies. Comment. Praha: Wolters Kluwer ČR, 2021, str. 553); This was also the case in the deliberations of the pandemic law (see vote 12 at the 88th session of the Chamber of Deputies of the 8th parliamentary term following the Senate's return of the bill).
101. At the beginning of the 9th session of the Chamber of Deputies, the duration of the legislative emergency meeting was not assessed and the duration was not formally decided; It is therefore a procedure that is inconsistent with the JŘPS and established parliamentary practice. However, it is not a defect which, in itself, is of such intensity as to justify the derogation of the contested provisions. First of all, it should be noted that, in the absence of a formalised confirmation of the existence of a legislative emergency, one cannot see a breach of one of the relevant constitutional principles in the field of parliamentary law. Indeed, the appellant does not itself argue how the alleged errors are reflected in the constitutional legal plane, particularly in the context of (primarily) the alleged violation of the rights of the parliamentary minority. It is not clear whether the position of members of the parliamentary opposition would improve or change significantly in the course of the legislative process if, before discussing the draft agenda of the 9th meeting, a vote on the duration of the legislative emergency could be made, especially if it is possible to assume that, given the distribution of forces in the Chamber of Deputies, the state of legislative emergency would be largely agreed and formally confirmed.
102. If the speaker is rejected, then it follows from the stenopis of the 9th meeting of the Chamber of Deputies of 15 February 2022 (the Constitutional Court is based on the transcription of the stenograms available on https: / / www.psp.cz and the indicative time blocks mentioned there) that Members with priority rights to Tomio Okamura were given the floor at around 14: 10 am to comment on the draft agenda. His subsequent speech lasted until 19: 53, when the President of the meeting Jan Skopecek interrupted the negotiations because of the absence of ministers (in his words: "Mr President, I will interrupt you for a moment. I'm reminded by your chairman of your P.P.D. There are no ministers in the Chamber of Deputies.") The meeting continued at 20: 03, with the President of the meeting of Jan Skopeček stating that he had received a procedural proposal signed by the President of the five parliamentary clubs in order for the Chamber of Deputies to act and vote meritantly and functionally on all proposals after 19, 21 and 24 hours within the meaning of Article 53 (1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, which must be put to the vote immediately. The proposal was adopted in the framework of (repeated) vote No 5, which entered 99 Members, for which it was 98 and abstained 1.
103. In this context, the Constitutional Court takes the view that, by Resolution 19 of the Chamber of Deputies of 23 November 2021, the resolutions by which the Chamber of Deputies amended its internal circumstances and more detailed rules for the negotiations between 1996 and 2021 (2 to 8 months), the authentic text of which is set out in the Annex to this resolution, remain in force during the 9th term. These include Resolution No 31 of the Chamber of Deputies of 23 July 1996, which provided, inter alia, for the Prime Minister or his authorised member of the Government to attend the entire meeting of the Chamber of Deputies. The Constitutional Court therefore does not see any violation of the rules governing the legislative process (including the resolution of the Chamber of Deputies) if the speaker from the same parliamentary club was interrupted at the attention of the President of the Opposition Club. However, it may be regarded as a violation of Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, if, after a break (and a subsequent procedural vote, which is decided without delay in accordance with settled practice), the word has not been returned to the intermittent speaker without giving reasons for such action to support the sources of parliamentary law. Whether this defect may have constitutional legal relevance will be further assessed when assessing the retention of the rights of a parliamentary minority (its member), which has been limited by that procedure.
104. On the basis of the contested vote, the extension of the negotiations and the possibility of voting after 21 p.m., in which the appellant sees a contradiction with Section 53 (1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, the Constitutional Court states that the appellant forgoes Section 99 (9) of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, according to which, inter alia, the provisions of Section 53 of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies will not be used in a state of legislative emergency. The negotiations of the Chamber of Deputies (which at the time was material) can therefore take place outside the normal days and hours of the proceedings without the Chamber of Deputies having to give a special ruling (cf. POHL, M., requoted, p. 555).
105. If the appellant contends that the interruption of the speaker and the vote of the extension of the hearing and the possibility of a vote after 21 o'clock were caused by the "treacherous' and the illegal conduct of Jan Skopek's sitting, stating that it was not for him to assess the political reasons (background) of the Parliament's procedure, or its Vice-President (cf. paragraph 62 of the decision). In addition, it can be noted that the ability to give individual Members (whether governmental or opposition) sufficient rest is, in principle, a matter of political culture [point 88 of the opinion of the Pl. ÚS 10 / 13 of 29.5.2013 (N 96 / 69 of SbNU 465; 177 / 2013 Coll.)].
106. If a fixed time of vote on the draft of the contested law was approved at 13: 00 (vote 87 at the 9th meeting of 17. 2. 2022), it is a procedure not foreseen by the JJPS or any other source of parliamentary law, as the Constitutional Court had already concluded in the past in the sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 26 / 16. In the latter case, however, the Constitutional Court concluded in the circumstances of the case under review that, although it identified procedural misconduct in the legislative process, it did not violate the rights of the opposition or the principles of the democratic rule of law in the field of 'parliamentary' law in general; On the contrary, the possible depreciation of the contested law would be contrary to the values of the rule of law (see paragraphs 57-63 of the cited finding).
107. If the appellant makes a distinction between the present case and the situation currently under assessment in the case at issue in the case at hand in point Pl. ÚS 26 / 16, it should be pointed out (repeatedly) that, as in the present case, the reference criterion for the examination of compliance with the constitutional courts, which must be assessed in relation to each individual case, taking into account the overall context and specific circumstances. The Constitutional Court must therefore reject the appellant's argument that each Constitutional Court has already established an infringement of the JŘPS in itself constitutes the illegality of the contested law. After all, similar restrictions on the speaking debate have been discussed by the Constitutional Court in the past and have been addressed in the sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 87 / 20.
108. If the appellant contends that, in accordance with the procedure of the President of the meeting, the subjective rights of Members to the proper and uninterrupted exercise of their public office under Article 21 (1) of the Charter have been infringed, the Constitutional Court has already stated in this context (paragraphs 51 to 52 of the decision of the Court of First Instance on the basis of Article 21 (1) of the Charter) that other bases are relevant in the proceedings for the control of the constitutional nature of the standards. The Constitutional Court therefore examined whether the rights of the parliamentary opposition and its members, or, in other words, whether, as a result of the actions of the parliamentary majority, had been unduly affected despite the errors of the legislative process found.
109. In particular, as is apparent from the recap of the legislative process, less than 30 days have passed since the submission of draft law No. 39 / 2022 Coll. (20. 1. 2022) until its approval after the rejection by the Senate (18. 2. 2022). The Constitutional Court does not consider the legislative procedure of prima facie to be short or disproportionate for such a period of time, as that period provides sufficient scope for familiarisation with the draft law, including its substantive assessment, as well as for presentation and confrontation of opposing views; All the more so, if the reason for the brief discussion was the time pressure associated with the end of the pandemic law on 28 February 2022.
110. The Constitutional Court has already admitted in the past that a constitutionally conformal shortened discussion of the law can take place even in a much shorter time. For example, in the finding of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 20 / 21, it stated that the discussion of a much more complex design of pandemic law in 12 days alone does not exclude the possibility of a real assessment and discussion of the draft law (see paragraphs 108 and 109 of the cited finding). Similarly, a short legislative process in the order of a few days continued to address, for example, the finding of Pl. ÚS 17 / 11, when the hearing time of one of the proposals examined in the Chamber of Deputies was only three days.
111. A number of Members of the Parliamentary Minority (i.e. the Members of Tomia Okamura, Jaroslav Basta, Radima Fiala, Jiří Kobzy, Radek Koten, Radek Zlínský, Jaroslav Černý, Marie Pošánová, Jana Síla, Jan Phrnčír, Karla Sládečka, Vladimir Zlínský, Jaroslav Foldyny, Zdenek Kettner, Lucie Šafranková, Radovanova, Radenková Síla for the movement of freedom and direct democracy (SPD) and the movement of SPD (SPD), and Alene Schilerova for the content of the bill of the bill of the bill. The debate on the draft law began on 2 February 2022 at 13: 04 a.m. to 7: 26 p.m. and continued from 21: 26 p.m. to 22: 03 p.m. During the debate, not only members of the parliamentary minority but also representatives of the parliamentary majority who responded to the statements and comments of opposition Members (see, in particular, the repeated speeches of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Health Vlastimil War).
112. The steno from the meeting of the 9th session of the Chamber of Deputies shows, inter alia, that Mr Tomio Okamura took the floor on the draft agenda of the meeting on 15 February 2022 at around 14: 10 and was not interrupted until 19: 53 (i.e. more than five hours). The debate on draft law No 39 / 2022 Coll. after its rejection by the Senate took place from 17.2.2022 from approximately 20.50 to 18.2.2022 at 3.31 when the meeting was suspended; In doing so, the opposition Members have mainly used that time.
113. Although the Constitutional Court has in the past granted the parliamentary opposition the right to delay or block decisions taken by a parliamentary majority to achieve its political objectives, or to obstruct the political objectives of the ruling majority, the abuse of those rights cannot result in the weakening or the impossibility of effective exercise of the power of the ruling majority; In fact, the individual rights of the parliamentary opposition need to be in line with certain obligations and responsibilities for their performance, as they are required to fulfil the role of the so-called responsible and constructive opposition (see point 76 of the opinion of Pol. ÚS 55 / 10). The purpose of the legislative process is to adopt the law, not to delay its adoption and obstruction. In a situation in which some Members are expressly declared to be involved in the so-called obstructive proceedings (cf., for example, the speech of Mr Tomio Okamura: 'We said that we did not agree with your totalitarian pandemic law, and we legitimately announced that we would, of course, do political obstruction to prevent the law from passing'; a quote from the stenon of the Chamber of Deputies on 2 February 2022, a fact that needs to be taken into account when balancing the rights and legitimate interests of the parliamentary majority and the minority. If Mr Tomio Okamura was interrupted in his speech at a time when, on the proposal of Law No 39 / 2022 Coll. and its need to be accepted in a brief hearing, whether in a general debate earlier or in the agenda, he expressed several hours, the limitation of his speech does not appear to be in such a situation and in light of what was said as intense enough to prevent the proper and unimpeded exercise of the rights of the parliamentary opposition (a member of it). However, the appointed Member had room for both substantive expression and obstruction of that space, and it is up to the speaker to consider what his several-hour speech should serve primarily. If the only purpose of speaking is to delay the vote (not to decide), then it is merely abuse of law and parliamentary procedures, which can be tolerated to some extent in a democratic rule of law, but cannot become the sole purpose of parliamentary work.
114. The Constitutional Court notes that both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate have dealt with the draft law No 39 / 2022 Coll. both in substance and in the request for a shorter hearing, discussions were held on both of these planes, which also heard very critical views and on the basis of which the vote took place. The proposal was also submitted to the relevant committees of the two chambers represented by members of the opposition. It can thus be concluded that the possibility of confronting positions on parliamentary ground (as a guarantee of free competition from political forces) has been ensured.
115. It is also a well-known fact that the consideration of draft law No. 39 / 2022 Coll. significantly resonated even in the public area, in all the main public and private media. The Laic and the professional public had sufficient time and information (mainly due to the significant media of the legislative process) to learn both the content of the bill and the views of the political bodies involved, whether political groups, individual Members or committees. Consequently, the control (legitimacy) function of the parliamentary process was not affected not only by the internal (vis-à-vis the actors of the legislative process) but also by the outside (vis-à-vis the public).
116. It is therefore clear that, in the legislative process as a whole, the opposition to Bill No. 39 / 2022 Coll. was not denied the possibility of parliamentary discussion or the right of individual Members (members of the parliamentary opposition) to present their views, competitive views and positions. It is clear from the content of their speeches that they have become familiar with the content of the draft law, since there was a serious criticism against it, including the potential impact of its individual provisions. At the same time, the general public has been sufficiently informed of the legislative intention in question, as well as of the ongoing parliamentary debate, and in this context, it is not possible to conclude on surprise or unpredictability in relation to the addressees of the present law.
117. It cannot therefore be concluded that the limitation of the rights of a parliamentary minority would be of such an intensity as to undermine its substance of participation in the legislative process. The Constitutional Court therefore concludes that, although the process leading to the adoption of Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll. cannot be regarded as impeccable in the sub-constitutional level, measured by the prism outlined by the Constitutional Court, it did not find that the individual errors identified alone or in summary justified its exceptional interference in the legislative process. The finding of a formal defect in the legislative process does not automatically mean that it is necessary to derogate from the legislation resulting from such a defective legislative process. It is necessary to assess whether, from the point of view of the principle of proportionality, it is possible to give priority to the requirements of the principles of the material rule of law, legal certainty and effective protection of constitutionality, or to assess the possible effects on private individuals in terms of respect for the principle of legal certainty and good faith in the law (cf. sp. zn.
118. The Constitutional Court notes marginally that the legislative process now under review and its progress can be seen as a reflection of the current political culture, the state of which is characterised, inter alia, by numerous obstructive negotiations, chaotic order and conduct of meetings, as well as by the inflexibility of the legislative process (cf. WINTR, J. Transformation of parliamentary culture. Praha: Auditorium, 2021, str. 137 et seq.). The role of the Constitutional Court cannot then be reduced to a "review of hundreds of procedural misconduct by both the House and its governing bodies, without having any impact on the assessment of the material constitutionality of the rule of law '(point 142 of the decision in point 142 of the Pl. ÚS 21 / 14). At the same time, however, it should be borne in mind that" [r] the rationalisation of the House's conduct and the reduction of obstructive risks should not be adequately expressed and established on the subject-matter concerned at the expense of the rights of the House minority' (WINTR, J., requoted, p. 168).
Meritorious review of the proposal
119. After examining the formal elements of the proposal and the process of adopting the contested provisions of the Pandemic Law, the Constitutional Court examined it in substance and, on the basis of the considerations set out below, concluded that the proposal was not justified in this part.
Special measures under Paragraph 2 (2) (b) of the Pandemic Law
120. The distinction between the contested provision § 2 (2) (b) of the Pandemic Act is as follows:
"(2) The exceptional measure referred to in paragraph 1 shall be:
(b) restrictions on the performance of business or other activities at the establishment, business centre, market, market or other premises for business or similar activity, or laying down conditions for their pursuit, including restrictions on operating time; ';
121. The contested provision (as amended by Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll.) extends the range of possible restrictions on the performance of business or other activities to its original version, according to which: "The exceptional measure referred to in paragraph 1 is a restriction on the activities of a commercial or manufacturing establishment or the operation of a trading centre or laying down conditions for their operation."
Definition of the scope of the review
122. In connection with the contested § 2 (2) (b) of the Pandemic Law, the appellant contends that it is a legal act which contradicts the freedom of enterprise guaranteed by Article 26 (1) of the Charter.
123. A substantial part of the emergency measures under § 2 of the Pandemic Law has already been dealt with in detail by the Constitutional Court in the decision on page Pl. In doing so, it concluded that the contested provisions would stand up to the considerations of constitutionality examined (see points 194 to 217 of the cited finding). In view of the similarity of the issue, the Constitutional Court will base its conclusions and conclusions on the present case, as there is no reason to deviate from them.
124. The appellant of Paragraph 2 (2) (b) of the Pandemic Act first of all criticises that the fundamental change to the original text (before the Act No. 39 / 2022 Coll.) is the possibility of limiting not only commercial and manufacturing establishments but essentially all business activities, whereas such a broad definition is unfounded. The appellant contends that the contested provision is too general and ignores the link between possible restrictions on the possibility of transmission of the disease and ensuring the integrity of the business activities necessary for the implementation of fundamental rights.
125. The appellant can be testified that the wording of the exceptional measure under Paragraph 2 (2) (b) of the Pandemic Act (and the associated scope of possible restrictions) is wide. As the Constitutional Court has already pointed out in the finding in the sp. zn. The subject of a constitutional review is therefore whether the issuing of an emergency measure under Paragraph 2 (2) (b) of the pandemic law is subject to sufficient effective restrictions and guidelines required to protect fundamental human rights and freedoms (see paragraph 196 of the cited finding), as further developed in the proportionality test.
126. At the same time, it is clear from the established decision-making practice of the Constitutional Court that there is no prior anti-constitutional legal regulation on the basis of which fundamental rights and freedoms can be restricted, that a specific restriction is based only by this legally foreseen act (in this case an exceptional measure as a general measure). This is provided that the basis or the addition of the restriction is not delegated to the specifying authority and its limits are not set in such a general or vague manner that the determination of its content is actually left to the specific body; the specification of the obligation must then meet other constitutional requirements [cf., e.g. in points 191 and 192 of the sp. zn. Compare, for example, the finding of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 5 / 01 of 16.10.2001 (N 149 / 24 SbNU 79; 410 / 2001 Coll.)]. Even in this case, it is therefore necessary to examine whether the contested Paragraph 2 (2) (b) of the Pandemic Law provides sufficient guarantees of the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms.
127. The exceptional measures provided for in Article 2 (2) (b) of the Pandemic Act provide, in particular, for intervention in the freedom of business under Article 26 (1) of the Charter, the infringement of which is invoked by the appellant in connection with the contested provision.
128. Rights referred to, inter alia, in Article 26 (1) The Charter can only be invoked within the limits of the laws implementing those provisions (Article 41 (1) of the Charter). The Constitutional Court therefore assesses the effectiveness and appropriateness of the legal regulation in this area with restraint and leaves the legislature a wide (although not absolute) discretion for the specific definition of the content and manner of implementation of that right [cf. sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 24 / 99 of 23.5.2000 (N 73 / 18 SbNU 135; 167 / 2000 Coll.) or point 278 of the found sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 1 / 12].
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Regulation Information
| Citation | Found No. 317 / 2022 Coll., on the application for annulment of certain provisions of Act No. 94 / 2021 Coll., on emergency measures in the outbreak of COVID-19 disease and on the amendment of certain related acts, as amended |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | The Constitutional Tribunal found |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 31.10.2022 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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