The Constitutional Court found no 272 / 2025 Coll.
Findings of the Constitutional Court sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 47 / 23 concerning the application for annulment of Act No. 270 / 2023 Coll., amending Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., on Pension Insurance, as amended, and Article III of Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., on Pension Insurance, as amended
Valid
The Constitutional Tribunal found
Text versions:
05.08.2025
Zobrazeno prvních 200 z celkem 289 ustanovení tohoto předpisu.
Zobrazit celý předpis →
Pro stažení celého znění použijte tlačítko Stáhnout výše.
272
FIND
The Constitutional Court
of 4 June 2025
sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 47 / 23 in the case of the application for annulment of Act No. 270 / 2023 Coll., amending Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., on Pension Insurance, as amended, and Article III of Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., on Pension Insurance, as amended
On behalf of the Republic
The Constitutional Court decided on page Pl. ÚS 47 / 23 on 4 June 2025 in plenary composed of the President of the Court of Josef Boxy and judges and judges of Lucie Dolanská Bányai, Josef Fiala, Milan Hulmák, Veronica Christian, Zdeňka Kühn, Tomáš Langášek, Jiří Nábán, Katřina Ronovské, Dita Řepková, Jan Svatona, Pavel Šámal, Jan Wintra (Judge of the Rapporteur) and Daniela Zeman on the proposal of the Group of 71 Members of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, for which she is acting as a Member of the JUDr. Alena Schiller, Ph.D., and is represented by Mgr. David Rašovský, the lawyer, as a Member of the Czech Republic.
as follows:
Motion denied.
Reasons
Brief definition of the case
1. Under Article 87 (1) (a) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution) and Article 64 (1) (b) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, the Group of 71 Members (the applicant) seeks the annulment of Act No. 270 / 2023 Coll., amending Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., on Pension Insurance, as amended (hereinafter referred to as the Amendment Act). The appellant argues that there were unconstitutional defects during the legislative process.
2. In substance, the appellant claims that Article 31 (1) of Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., on Pension Insurance, as amended, in conjunction with Article III of the Amendment Act. Paragraph 31 (1) of the Pension Insurance Act introduced, with effect from 1.10.2023, the possibility of early retirement not earlier than three years before the normal retirement age, instead of the previous five years. However, the appellant does not dispute this change as such, but only its temporal effects resulting from Article III of the Amendment Act, which set the date of application of the amendment. The appellant submits that the legislation has intervened in the legitimate expectations of insured persons, in particular those who, before the date of the amendment, had already met the conditions for early retirement but had not yet applied for it, with the effectiveness of the amendment having ceased to meet the conditions.
3. In the first part of the finding, the Constitutional Court deals with the constitutional conformity of the legislative process, which led to the adoption of the amendment. Subsequently, Article 31 (1) of the Pension Insurance Act in conjunction with Article III of the Amendment Act undergoes a substantive review.
4. The contested provision of the Pension Insurance Act reads as follows:
(1) An insured person shall be entitled to an old-age pension before he reaches retirement age if he has obtained an insurance period of 40 years and until he reaches retirement age from the date on which the old-age pension is granted to him no more than 3 years. Until the period of insurance required for entitlement to an old-age pension under the previous sentence, the replacement periods of insurance shall be counted to the extent provided for in Paragraph 29 (5).
5. The contested provision of the Amendment Act reads:
Efficacy
That law shall take effect on the first day of the calendar month following its publication, with the exception of Article 5 (1) (a) (ii) thereof. I, point 2, which shall take effect on the first day of the thirteenth calendar month following its publication.
Arguments of the appellant
6. The appellant's argument can be divided into two planes. Firstly, it objects to the unconstitutional way of discussing and adopting the Amendment Act. Secondly, in relation to Article 31 (1) of the Pension Insurance Act, in conjunction with Article III of the Amendment Act, the appellant contends that the content of the contested provision itself is unconstitutional or that the legislation has changed without any transitional period.
7. In the course of the legislative process, the appellant states that it considers (to) the final phase of the third reading to be unconstitutional. The government majority restricted the rights of opposition Members during the third reading, which took place on 19 July, 21 July and 26 July 2023. On the second day of the proceedings, that is to say 21 July 2023, the time of the individual Members' speeches on the proposal of Prime Minister Jan Jakob has been shortened to twice ten minutes on the grounds that 'the opposition wants to speak for a relatively long time and it is obvious that it does not want to end today'. Although this procedure may be formally consistent with Article 59 (1) of Act No. 90 / 1995 Coll., on the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies (hereinafter referred to as the "JRPS 'or" Rules of Procedure'), according to the appellant, the importance of the Amendment Act is "wholly inadequate '. This is all the more true because on the first day of the meeting, the debate started at 12.40 p.m. with the long speech of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, Mariana Jurečka, with other Members being able to speak only within the remaining 50 minutes.
8. From the appellant's point of view, it is also essential that on 26 July 2023, in the context of the third day of the third reading, the debate was closed at a fixed time of 12: 30, on the basis of a proposal from Mr Jan Jakob, even though 36 Members were registered at that time. These Members have thus been deprived of the possibility of speaking in the debate on the draft law, contrary to Article 66 (1) of the JRC, which states that the President can end the debate only if there are no other speakers. The appellant sees the intervention described in the opposition's rights as a serious breach of Article 6 of the Constitution, according to which "political decisions are based on the will of the majority expressed by free voting ', which must respect the protection of minorities. The coalition majority abused its superiority over the opposition and interpreted the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies for a purpose and arbitrarily. The contested provisions were therefore not adopted in a manner consistent with the principles of the democratic rule of law and the free competition of political forces.
9. Furthermore, the appellant refers in detail to the material unconstitutionality of Paragraph 31 (1) of the Pension Insurance Act in conjunction with the Amendment Act. It is the only contested provision whose substance and content the appellant considers to be unconstitutional, regardless of the possible unconstitutional nature of the legislative process. Paragraph 31 (1) of the Pension Insurance Act reintroduces the possibility of early retirement not earlier than 3 years before the normal retirement age, instead of 5 years earlier. However, the appellant submits that this provision does not, in terms of possible unconstitutionality, affect the same age. It sees that the change took place without any transitional period which would protect the rights of persons who already fulfil the conditions for early retirement but who have not yet applied for it. In doing so, the claims already established, individualised, were withdrawn, while the principle of protecting legitimate expectations, legal certainty and the prohibition of retroactivity were violated. Although the insured had not yet applied for an early pension, the appellant had a legitimate expectation that, if necessary, it would be able to take advantage of this possibility as a result of a certain life event. It was appropriate at least to follow the then effective Act No. 309 / 1999 Coll., on the Collection of Laws and on the Collection of International Treaties, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as the "Collective Act ') and thus to determine the effectiveness to 1 January 2024. The appellant considers that, in particular, the findings of the sp. zn. III. ÚS 3493 / 15 of 29.11.2016 (N 225 / 83 SbNU 507) and Pl. ÚS 1 / 20 of 7.12.2021 (N 214 / 109 SbNU 305; 14 / 2022 Sb.) are relevant to the case under consideration.
10. However, also in the context of the alleged unconstitutionality of Article 31 (1) of the Pension Insurance Act in conjunction with the Amendment Act, the appellant points out the shortcomings of the legislative process. It notes that the original government proposal, discussed and approved by Government Resolution 385 of 24 May 2023, envisaged maintaining the transitional period as a means of protecting the legitimate expectations of those who had already met the conditions for early retirement but have not yet used it. However, the transitional period removed the amendment of the Coalition Member and the Chairman of the Committee on Social Policy by Vít Kanykovsky, lodged during the 34th meeting of the Committee on 21 June 2023. The appellant, referring to this Member's public observations, submits that the amendment was initiated by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs ("MPSV '), despite the fact that the Government had formally approved the reverse procedure. According to the appellant, this' lenient amendment to the proposal by MPSV 'completely denies the transparency and logic of the legislative process and contradicts the legislative rules of the government. This infringed the principle of predictability of law, thereby" gaining a clearly unconstitutional dimension'.
11. The appellant also contends that the manner in which the Amendment Act was declared and entered into force was contrary to Article 3 (3) of Act No. 309 / 1999 Coll., on the Collection of Laws and on the Collection of International Contracts, as effective by 31 December 2023. The Amendment Act was published in the Collection of Laws under No. 270 / 2023 Coll. The amended provision of Paragraph 31 (1) of the Pension Insurance Act became effective on 1 October 2023 pursuant to Article III of the Amendment Act. However, according to the Law on the Collection of Laws and the Collection of International Contracts, the legislation was to become effective as of 1 January or 1 July of the calendar year, unless otherwise provided for by the law; In exceptional cases, where an urgent general interest so requires, an earlier date of entry into force of the legislation may be fixed (§ 3 (3) and (4) of the Act cited). However, according to the appellant, the circumstances in order to determine the earlier date of entry into force of the amendment act were neither granted nor claimed.
Proceedings
12. The Constitutional Court has examined the procedural assumptions of the proceedings and found that the application was made by an authorised appellant, a group of 71 Members [Paragraph 64 (1) (b) of the Law on the Constitutional Court]. The Constitutional Court shall have jurisdiction to discuss it, the application containing the legally required formalities. The Constitutional Court found no grounds for inadmissibility under Paragraph 66 of the same Law. Although the appellant initially challenged the specific amended provisions of the Pension Insurance Act in the petition. However, at the request of the Constitutional Court, the petition was made clear by requesting the annulment of the amending Act, i.e. Act No. 270 / 2023 Coll. (Amendment Act), because of the alleged defects of the legislative process. It is at the time of the adoption of this law that, according to the appellant, there were unconstitutional defects.
Proceedings before the Constitutional Court
13. The Constitutional Court pursuant to Article 69 (1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 18 / 2000 Coll., has sent a proposal to the chambers of Parliament which are entitled to act on its behalf (§ 9 of Act No. 300 / 2017 Coll., on the principles of conduct and contact between the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate and on the amendment of Act No. 90 / 1995 Coll., on the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, as amended). At the same time, pursuant to Article 69 (2) and (3) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended, it sent it to the Government and the Ombudsman, namely to the bodies entitled to intervene as interveners.
Observation of Parliament's chambers
14. The Chamber of Deputies first summed up some aspects of the legislative process. The draft Amendment Act was submitted to the Government of the Chamber of Deputies in the 9th parliamentary term on 25 May 2023 and was distributed on the same day to Members as House Press No. 458 / 0. The first reading took place on 8 and 9 June 2023, when the deadline for committee discussions was reduced to 30 days. The second reading of the draft law took place on 11 July 2023, when six additional amendments were tabled in the detailed debate. At the same time, the deadline between the second and third reading of the proposal was reduced to 7 days. A summary of the amendments and other proposals was circulated to Members as House Press No. 458 / 2. The third reading of the bill took place on 19 July, 21 July and 26 July 2023. If there are amendments tabled, only the amendments of the Social Policy Committee have been adopted. The bill was approved in vote 55, in which 86 of the 155 Members present voted in favour and 69 opposed. The Chamber of Deputies stated that the bill was approved by a constitutional procedure, signed by the relevant constitutional authorities and duly declared.
15. In addition to this, the President of the Chamber of Deputies expressed her personal observations (which, according to her, cannot be considered as the Chamber's observations). It emphasised that the parliamentary opposition was "required to fulfil the role of responsible and constructive opposition," but instead the parliamentary majority faced the opposition with a "obstructive to destructive nature." Nor does the appellant itself question the regularity of the first and second reading of the draft law, in which a detailed examination of the draft law is to take place, while the appellant also explicitly stated that all Members who had expressed an interest in it had spoken. However, the content of the debate at the 3rd reading of the draft law is to be only possible correction of the effective date of the draft law, legislative errors, grammatical errors, etc. Even so, the third reading took place in three days, approximately 13 hours in total, with members of the opposition performing for approximately 10 hours. In the vast majority of cases, they spoke about issues not to be the subject of a third reading of the draft law. The House's opposition had sufficient time to express its views and opinions when discussing the draft law, with no violation of its rights. In order to preserve the principles of parliamentary democracy and the legitimate interests of the ruling majority, there was no choice but to set a specific time for voting on amendments and draft laws as a whole.
16. In its observations, the Senate limited itself to a summary of the appellant's arguments and a description of the course of the legislative process which led to the adoption of the contested provisions. He also referred to several senators and senators when discussing the bill. The Senate stated that it was entirely up to the Constitutional Court to examine the case.
Government observations
17. By order No 5 of 3. 1. 2024, the Government approved the application and proposed the rejection of the application. In the course of the whole legislative process, it stated that "with regard to the principle of division of power, the autonomy of Parliament and the free exercise of the mandate of all its members, the government does not feel called upon to assess the constitutional relevance of the appellant's objections to the legislative process'. It only briefly summarized that, from her point of view, there was no constitutional legal breach of the rules of the legislative procedure, because Members had sufficient scope to familiarise themselves with the draft law.
18. However, the Government has expressed more detail on the way in which Mr Vít Kanykovsky's amendment was adopted. It was a proposal that was consistent with the government's bill (and the aim of the new legislation), as evidenced by the Government's favourable position on it. The government stressed that Parliament is a sovereign in the area of legislative power, not bound by the will of the government. The fact that a government bill will undergo substantial changes in the course of the legislative process is not exceptional; it is a constitutionally consistent expression of legislative power. The amendment was duly tabled at the meeting of the Social Policy Committee and adopted by Resolution 111 of 21.6.2023.
19. In addition, the Government expressed its views on the nature of economic, social and cultural rights, which also includes the issue under consideration here, and it concludes from the case law of the Constitutional Court that the legislator has wide scope to determine the specific conditions and the implementation of these rights.
20. According to the Government, the reason for accepting the contested scheme was the overall unsustainability of the pension scheme. The amendment directly responds to the adverse effects that had indexisation in exceptional times during 2022, when the rapid increase in percentage rates of pensions led to the situation that the amount of early pensions granted in 2022 significantly exceeded the level of ordinary pensions granted in 2023. According to the Government, early retirement should not be considered as a "standard procedure ', as it is a phenomenon socially and economically undesirable. Early retirement should be an exceptional solution for persons who, shortly before they reach retirement age, suddenly experience circumstances which do not allow them to continue their economic activities.
21. The Government also stressed that the restrictive measures introduced were designed to affect only those persons to whom early retirement will be granted from the date of application of the new scheme. As the objective of the Act was, among other things, to rapidly avoid early retirement with a very long period of premature retirement, it is logical, according to the Government, that the legislation had to be effective as soon as possible after publication. It is necessary to reject the appellant's view that the amendment has withdrawn already individual legal claims. The appellant forgoes the wording of Paragraph 31 (2) of the Pension Insurance Act, according to which the early pension will be granted at the earliest from the date of the application for the pension. Of course, it cannot be ruled out that the contested adjustment has thwarted someone's plans for early retirement, but, in view of the purpose of this benefit, something like this cannot be considered to exceed the legitimate expectations of the mandinels. From the point of view of transparency and predictability of the new legislation, the Government argues that the law was declared less than one month before it was effective, but the whole issue was also widely meditated. Therefore, each potential applicant had the possibility to reflect the change in legislation and many of them also benefited from this. The appellant's reference to the sp. zn. III. ÚS 3493 / 15 is considered by the Government (for reasons detailed) to be non-compliant.
22. In conclusion, the Government pointed out that, should the proposal be complied with, it would not be possible to use the early retirement institution, since it would be de facto abolished, nor would it be possible to access an increase in pensions.
Replication of the appellant
23. The author replied briefly to the observations of the Chamber of Deputies or its President. It expressed its opposition to the argument based on a list of hours devoted to discussing the bill. In the context of the material rule of law, it is primarily necessary to comply with the rules laid down. However, it has been repeatedly infringed in the course of the proceedings of the law, in a manner which gives rise to the annulment of the contested provisions. In detail, the appellant referred to her proposal. In response to the Senate's observations, it stated that, in view of its purely formal nature, it had nothing to react to in this section.
24. In more detail, the appellant responded to the Government's comments. The core of the problem remains to be seen in the fact that the amendment that has been omitted from the deferred effectiveness (transitional period) has been unlawfully tabled. It was submitted by MPSV in contravention of the original Government Resolution, which, according to the appellant, is bound by the entire executive power.
25. The appellant further stated that the analysis of the character of social rights by the Government was unnecessary as the appellant did not argue with them at all in its proposal. This is about protecting the fundamental principles of the rule of law. The appellant insists that it has been affected by the legitimate expectations of insured persons. The legislation of one month is insufficient. There was a specific entitlement to early retirement in the case of persons who met the conditions of the Pension Insurance Act by the effective date of the amendment.
Communication from the Ombudsman
26. The Ombudsman informed the Constitutional Court by means of a notice of 20 December 2023 that he would not use his procedural right under Article 69 (3) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended, and would not intervene in the proceedings. At the same time, it stated that it considered it appropriate for the Constitutional Court to be familiar with its publicly available views on changes in early retirement.
Amendment of the Judge-Rapporteur
27. Josef Fiala was designated by the Judge-Rapporteur in the case under examination in accordance with the current schedule of work. After his proposal for a finding was not accepted at the plenary meeting, the President of the Constitutional Court, Josef Baxter, was appointed by the President of the Constitutional Court on 30 April 2025 as Judge to the Rapporteur Jan Winter.
Abandonment of oral proceedings
28. The Constitutional Court did not expect further clarification of the case from the oral hearing, which is why it waived the first sentence of Paragraph 44 of the Constitutional Court Act, as amended.
Progress of the legislative process and assessment of its constitutional conformity
Progress of the legislative process
29. The Constitutional Court, on the basis of the observations of the chambers of Parliament, the public press of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, as well as the stenograms of their proceedings (all available at www.pspp.cz and www.senat.cz), has established the following.
30. The government bill was distributed to Members on 25 May 2023 as the House Press 458 / 0. The Organising Committee recommended the discussion of the draft law on 31 May 2023 (Resolution 161) and proposed the Social Policy Committee as a guarantee committee. The bill was debated at the plenary of the Chamber of Deputies at the first reading of 8 June 2023 from 12: 00 to 1: 27 on the following day. The Chamber of Deputies has ordered the bill to be debated by the Social Policy Committee and has shortened the time limit for discussion in the Committee for 30 days.
31. The Committee on Social Policy discussed the draft law and issued on 21 June 2023 a resolution delivered to Members as press 458 / 1, which recommended approving the draft law as amended by the amendment proposed by Mr Vít Kanykovsky. In the second reading, the bill for the plenary of the Chamber of Deputies was discussed on 11 July 2023 from 10: 00 to 21: 59; the bill was discussed in general and in detail. The deadline for initiating the third reading was reduced to 7 days (Section 95 (1), second sentence, of the JJPS). The amendments tabled were processed as House Press 458 / 2, sent to Members on 11.7.2023 at 23.37 p.m. The opinion (resolution) of the Social Policy Guarantee Committee was delivered to Members on 13.7.2023 as House Press 458 / 3. The Guarantee Committee recommended agreeing to a government bill as amended by that committee.
32. The third reading of the draft law took place on three working days: (a) 19.7.2023 from 9.00 to 13.57 hours, (b) 21.7.2023 from 9.00 to 14.01 hours; and (c) 26.7.2023 from 9.00 to 13.09 hours (always including the phase from the beginning of the meeting to the start of the discussion of this single point). According to Section 95a of the JJPS, for the third reading of the draft laws, the period from 9 am to 14 hours shall be set aside on the scheduled working days for Wednesday and Friday; the separation of other hours for the third reading of draft laws may be decided by the House, unless at least two parliamentary clubs object to such a proposal.
33. On the second day of the third reading (21 July 2023) at approximately 10: 45 pm, Mr Jan Jakob, President of TOP 09, submitted two procedural proposals:... "the discussion is rather goaty. Clearly, the opposition wants to speak for quite a long time and it is obvious that it does not want to end today. Therefore, I would like to make a proposal in accordance with Rule 95a of the Rules of Procedure, which states that, for third reading, Wednesday and Friday are reserved between 9: 00 and 14: 00, but it allows the House to set aside another time by decision. I therefore propose that we decide, for the third reading of this item by voting, that it is possible to negotiate today after 14: 00 until the end of the day. However, should opposition clubs veto this proposal, I would like to put an additional procedural proposal in accordance with the Rules of Procedure to limit speaking time to twice 10 minutes..." In response to his speech, Mrs Alena Schiller, president of Club YES, "I give veto on behalf of two parliamentary clubs, the YES movement and the SPD movement, on the proposal that it be held after 14 o'clock..." Subsequently, the Chamber of Deputies adopted a proposal to limit the debate to twice 10 minutes (vote with order number 34; 142 Members were registered, 76 against proposal 65).
34. On the last day of the third reading (26.7.2023), vote number 36 at 9: 21 p.m. (out of 149 Members present voted 86 to 63 against), the procedural proposal by Mr Jan Jakob, which was: "The Chamber of Deputies states that the vote on the proposed proposals and draft law as a whole in the case of House Press No. 458 will take place on Wednesday, 26 July 2023 at 12.30." The President of the Chamber of Deputies ended the debate at 12: 30 a.m., saying that this was approved by vote number 36. From the video from the Chamber of Deputies meeting of 26 July 2023 The Constitutional Court found that 36 Members were actually enrolled in the debate at 12: 30 a.m. (34 + 2 with a point of order). The vote on the amendments followed, with the adoption of a single - above-mentioned amendment to the Social Policy Committee. The bill was approved on the same day (vote 55, resolution 712), 155 Members were applied for, 86 of which voted in favour of, 69 against.
35. Negotiating a bill at a meeting The Chamber of Deputies, in all five working days, accompanied long speeches by speakers with priority rights under Section 67 of the JRC, both at the stage before and within the debate. On 8 June 2023, the president of ANO Alena Schiller spoke first about 40 minutes and later 30 minutes, the chairman of the SPD Tomio Okamura 60 minutes and later 100 minutes, the chairman of ANO Andrej Babiš 210 minutes, Prime Minister Petr Fiala 30 minutes and Deputy Prime Minister Marian Jurečka 30 minutes, then 10 minutes and he made a larger number of approximately two-minute factual remarks. On 11 July 2023, Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies Karel Havlíček spoke for about 35 minutes, Chairman of SPD Tomio Okamura 55 minutes and later 40 minutes, Chairman of YES Andrej Babiš 65 minutes and Deputy Prime Minister Marian Jurečka about 10 minutes and again he made more or less two-minute factual remarks. On 19 July 2023, the President of the ANO movement Andrej Babiš spoke for about 100 minutes, the President of the SPD movement Tomio Okamura 70 minutes and later 30 minutes and the Deputy Prime Minister Marian Jurečka 30 minutes. On 21 July 2023, the President of the ANO movement Andrej Babiš spoke for about 45 minutes, the Chairman of SPD Radim Fiala 45 minutes, Mr Aleš Juchelka, in charge of presenting the opinion of the ANO, 45 minutes and the Deputy Prime Minister Marian Jurečka 20 minutes. On 26 July 2023, the President of the ANO movement Andrej Babiš spoke for about 65 minutes, the President of the SPD movement Tomio Okamura 75 minutes and Mr Pavel Belobradek, in charge of presenting the opinion of the KDU- ČSL Club, about 15 minutes.
36. As a result of the excessive use of priority rights under Section 67 of the JSPS, other Members were only able to speak at a meeting of the Chamber of Deputies in the form of factual remarks of a maximum of two minutes, which was also happening to a large extent. Only speakers with priority rights may speak at the stage from the beginning of the meeting to the beginning of the meeting. In three days' time, as part of the third reading of the bill, no Member with a proper application for the debate has spoken.
37. Two months have passed since the submission of the bill to the Chamber of Deputies until its adoption, in which the draft law was discussed in five days at the meeting of the Chamber of Deputies, a total of 39 and a half hours (counting the stage from the start of the meeting to the start of this single item), and two meetings of the Social Policy Committee.
38. The Chamber of Deputies passed the Senate Bill on 28 July 2023 (Senate Press 137). On 31 July 2023, the Organising Committee set up a Social Policy Committee by the Guarantee Committee, which discussed the proposal on 22 August 2023 and adopted Resolution No 34, which was distributed as press 137 / 1. The bill was discussed at the 16th Senate meeting on 23 August 2023 and was approved in vote 12 (resolution 262) - out of 62 senators present, 51 voted in favour of the motion, 6 against and 5 abstained. The law was delivered to the President of the Republic for signature on 24 August 2023. The President signed it on 1 September 2023. It was published in the Collection of Laws on 7. 9. 2023, in the amount of 125 under No. 270 / 2023 Coll.
General considerations
Deficiencies in the legislative process and their assessment
39. The Constitutional Court first examines, in the review of the legislation or its contested provisions, pursuant to § 68 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll., whether it was adopted in a constitutional manner. In order to review the constitutionally prescribed procedure for the adoption and publication of the law (or its contested provisions), it is necessary to assess the progress of the legislative process which preceded the adoption and promotion of the law [the finding of sp. zn.
40. The Constitution defines only the basic framework of the legislative process. In particular, the Rules of Procedure of the two chambers of Parliament shall be further detailed in the legislative procedure. Another source of so-called parliamentary law is the resolutions of the individual chambers of Parliament issued pursuant to Rule 1 (2) of their Rules of Procedure (so-called autonomous resolution). The established (and constitutionally consistent) practice of the Parliamentary Chamber and its bodies [see the findings of the sp. zn. These are, in particular, the Rules of Procedure of the individual chambers of Parliament, by which the various constitutional principles of the legislative process are effectively guaranteed and projected into practice, which determine the interpretation and application of the individual provisions of the Rules of Procedure [Findings sp. zn. ÚS 77 / 06, paragraph 38.
41. However, defects in the legislative process can only establish the unconstitutional nature of the law under consideration if it contravenes a standard resulting from constitutional order. The role of the Constitutional Court cannot apply to the examination of hundreds of procedural errors of both chambers and their bodies, without having any impact on the assessment of the material constitutionality of the rule of law [FR 21 / 14 of 30 June 2015 (N 122 / 77 CollNU 759; 199 / 2015 Coll.), paragraph 142; ÚS 7 / 22 of 13.9.2022 (N 110 / 114 CollNU 17; 317 / 2022 Coll.), paragraph 118. The Constitutional Court has therefore repeatedly mentioned that it must be a 'direct and substantial breach' of the rules of the legislative process, which also "reaches the constitutional legal dimension '. It is not the role of the Constitutional Court to protect the mere legality of parliamentary procedure [cf. the findings of the sp. zn. Pl ÚS 30 / 16 of 7.4.2020 (N 67 / 99 SbNU 258; 254 / 2020 Sb.), paragraph 40; Pl. ÚS 55 / 10 or Pl. ÚS 7 / 03 of 18.8.2004 (N 113 / 34 SbNU 165; 512 / 2004 Sb.)]. In the find sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 6 / 21 (point 45) The Constitutional Court summarized that" it adheres to the principle of restraint and abolishes legislation exceptionally, unless its essential rules have been complied with in the legislative process and the errors reach constitutional legal dimensions'. On this restraint, the Constitutional Court also applied in the recent, albeit eventually cancelling, finding sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 41 / 23 of 4.12.2024 (427 / 2024 Coll.), paragraph 81.
42. As clearly summarised by the Slovak Constitutional Court in the finds sp. zn. PL. ÚS 18 / 2022, paragraphs 26 to 29, and PL. ÚS 3 / 2024, paragraphs 246 and 247, and as is apparent from the decision-making practice of the Czech Constitutional Court, not every defect in the legislative process is therefore eligible to justify the repeal of the law. A defect in the legislative process is unconstitutional if:
1. Conflicts directly with the rule expressly enshrined in the constitutional order;
2. Infringes the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate and, as a result of this defect, any constitutional standards or principles have been affected; and at the same time the conflicting constitutional principles do not prevail in the present case over the constitutional standard or principle that has been affected; or
3. the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate have been formally observed, but there will still be a particularly serious breach of a constitutional standard or principle in the process of Parliament; and at the same time the conflicting constitutional principles do not outweigh the constitutional standard or principle that has been hit.
43. The Constitutional Court most strictly assesses the conflict with the rule which is directly enshrined in the constitutional order, less strictly assessing the violation of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate, while the third situation described can only exceptionally lead to intervention by the Constitutional Court.
44. The defect in the legislative process, which directly contradicted the standard expressly enshrined in the constitutional order, has been found by the Constitutional Court in the following three situations: not taking into account the timely application of the President's theorem [finding sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 33 / 97 of 17.12.1997 (N 163 / 9 SbNU 399; 30 / 1998 Sb.)], with the conscious referral of the Senate Bill in a version other than that adopted by the Chamber of Deputies [finding sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 5 / 02 of 2.10.2002 (N 117 / 28 SbNU 25; 476 / 2002 Sb.)] and the lack of approval of the Senate in the Act referred to in Article 40 of the Constitution [find spl. On the other hand, the absence of the signatures of the President and the President of the Chamber of Deputies in a situation where the law in question corresponds to its wording of the law adopted, the Constitutional Court considered it merely a formal defect which was not a reason for the annulment of the contested law (Ref.
45. As regards the second of the options referred to in paragraph 42, the Constitutional Court concluded in its previous case-law that a breach of the Rules of Procedure may also lead to a breach of constitutionality in particular in three types of situations:
(a) infringement of legislative emergency rules [Findings sp. zn.
(b) approval of the so-called adhesive (findings sp. zn.
(c) limitation of parliamentary debate by merging the debate to unrelated bills (finding sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 1 / 12, but in which there was no repeal of the law for that reason), or termination of the debate in a situation where speakers (finding sp. zn. Pl.
46. In a number of cases of the second variant, the Constitutional Court noted a breach of the Rules of Procedure and further considered whether this defect in the legislative process reached a constitutional legal dimension. In other words, it considered it necessary to examine whether, as a result of this defect, one of the constitutional standards or principles was also affected. Thus, for example, for the so-called stickers in the sp. zn. In other cases, in violation of the rules on the state of legislative emergency, the Constitutional Court found in sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 55 / 10 stressed the principle of majority decision and the inseparable principle of the protection of minorities (Article 6 of the Constitution), which is represented by the parliamentary opposition on parliamentary ground, "its fundamental functions include, in particular, the articulation of minority views, the submission of alternative proposals to majority opinions and decisions and the control of the ruling majority, all in the public's eyes, i.e. civil society, which also forms and specifies its views in this way '. This is linked to the principle of pluralism, which he concluded from the principle of free competition of political forces (Article 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, hereinafter referred to as the Charter).
47. In other cases, however, the Constitutional Court concluded that the breach of the Rules of Procedure did not reach the constitutional legal dimension. In this way in the find sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 1 / 12 The Constitutional Court noted that the merger of the debate to the unrelated draft laws returned by the Senate, although the Rules of Procedure had been infringed, was not an error of intensity which, in view of the overall way in which the contested laws were adopted, would have been able to base their inconsistency with the constitutional order. In fact, all interested parties had the opportunity to become aware of the content of the draft laws, to take their views on them and to make this opinion publicly (not only) on parliamentary ground, or to propose amendments thereto, and the laws adopted cannot be ruled out as being unpredictable or surprising in relation to their addressees, or in relation to the wider public. Although the Constitutional Court noted in the sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 30 / 16 on the so-called stickers that the content of the proposed amendment was not the content of the original government bill, it did not find that the amendment was surprising, since the Members had it already two and a half months before the third reading of the draft law and it was adopted by a large majority. In the case in point Pl. ÚS 87 / 20, which is one of the findings in which the Constitutional Court assessed the termination of the debate in a situation where speakers are still involved, the Rules of Procedure were infringed when the draft law was discussed, but according to the Constitutional Court, "the entire course of the legislative process did not lead to the limitation of the rights of the parliamentary opposition consisting of the possibility of participating in the legislative procedure as a fully-fledged participant, or that the representatives of the opposition were not, from a constitutional point of view, deprived of the possibility of actually becoming aware of the draft law and expressing their position on it '. In the find sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 7 / 22 The Constitutional Court has assessed that, despite the shortcomings of the legislative process, the control (legitimacy) function of the parliamentary process was not affected not only in the internal direction (towards the players of the legislative process) but also externally (towards the public). In the legislative process as a whole, opponents of the bill were not denied the possibility of parliamentary debate or the right of individual Members (members of the parliamentary opposition) to present their views, competitive views and positions. The content of their speeches showed that they were sufficiently familiar with the content of the draft law, since there was a serious criticism against it, including the potential impact of its individual provisions. The Laic and the professional public had sufficient time and information space to learn both the content of the draft law and the views of the political bodies involved, whether political groups, individual Members or committees, so it was not possible to conclude on surprise or unpredictability in relation to the addressees of the law under discussion.
48. Even if one of the constitutional standards or principles has been affected at the same time in the case of a breach of the Rules of Procedure, the Constitutional Court further considers whether, at the same time, conflicting constitutional standards or principles outweigh the constitutional standard that is affected in this case. In this way, in the finding of sp. zn.
Constitutional principles key to assessing the constitutionality of the legislative process
49. The Constitutional Court's review of the legislative process is based on the principle of parliamentary autonomy (findings sp. zn. Pl ÚS 30 / 23, paragraph 76; cf. The principle of Parliament's autonomy arises from the constitutional principle of the division of power (Article 2 (1) of the Constitution) and from the democratic principle (Article 1, 2 and 6 of the Constitution). Parliament, as the directly elected representative body of the people, has the highest degree of democratic legitimacy, and as such it primarily sets its own rules of conduct. Parliamentary autonomy also serves to enable Parliament to exercise its powers and functions properly and effectively (the finding of the Slovak Constitutional Court sp. zn. PL. ÚS 6 / 2017, paragraph 40; the importance of parliamentary autonomy for Parliament's capacity to act, even the finding of the Czech Constitutional Court sp. zl. ÚS 55 / 10, paragraph 64).
50. However, Parliament's autonomy is not without banks. The case law of the Constitutional Court (the findings of the sp. zn. The addressees of legal standards may undoubtedly expect that any restrictions on their fundamental rights by law are the result of a discourse conducted across the political spectrum, namely a discourse in which all the participants have been given the opportunity to get to know the material in question in detail and to be informed. Therefore, a process that allows for an open debate between competitors, including minority views, is appropriate. Therefore, they are at the forefront of procedures ensuring both the hearing of the parties and the formal quality of the legislative work (page 5 of the ÚS 77 / 06, paragraph 38).
51. The principle of the public goes both inside and outside the parliamentary chamber. Intra-directional action serves the freedom of expression of members of the parliamentary chamber, outsourcing activities serve to inform the public. Although the literature has been brought to the attention of the infertility of parliamentary debates, these debates need to be protected already because public awareness is being achieved through them (point 55 of the Pol. The rules of parliamentary conduct and their interpretation and use must respect the need to maintain the public's control of Parliament (paragraph 76 of the Rules of Procedure, paragraph 30 / 23), which serves both to prevent abuse of power and to create a free and informed political opinion of voters.
52. The constitutional principle of representative democracy (Article 2 (1) of the Constitution), based on the free exercise of the mandate of Members of Parliament (the principle of free mandate, Article 26 of the Constitution), on the equality of Members of Parliament as representatives of the people, on their freedom of expression of the Parliament (Article 27 (2) of the Constitution) and on the free exercise of the mandate of Members of Parliament (the principle of free mandate, Article 26 of the Constitution), on the equality of Members of Parliament as representatives of the people, on their freedom of expression of Parliament (Article 27 (2) of the Constitution) and on the free parliamentary debate (page 55 / 10, paragraph 66).
53. The Constitutional Court has also identified as a fundamental principle of parliamentary decision-making the principle of pluralism, which is based on the principle of free competition between political parties and political forces (Article 5 of the Constitution and Article 22 of the Charter; cf. Findings sp. zl. ÚS 77 / 06, paragraph 56; Pl. ÚS 55 / 10, paragraph 67; Pl. ÚS 7 / 22, paragraph 70; Pl. ÚS 30 / 23, paragraph 77). This is closely related to the protection of minorities (Article 6, sentence of the second Constitution), which manifests itself mainly in the protection of the rights of the parliamentary minority (the find sp. zn.
54. As the Constitutional Court summed up in the finding that the Pl. ÚS 30 / 23 (paragraph 78) is a fundamental right of a parliamentary minority or its members, the rights guaranteeing participation in parliamentary procedures and allowing the parliamentary opposition to exercise control over the ruling majority, which can be seen as one of the fundamental characteristics of the rule of law (paragraph 77 / 06, Part III). In particular, the legislative process must enable the persons involved to make a realistic assessment and discussion of the draft including - and above all - representatives of the parliamentary minority [finding sp. zn. Individual Members or Senators must have the real opportunity to become familiar with the content of the draft law, to examine it and to take an opinion on it in the context of its deliberations in the relevant chamber of Parliament or in its institutions. To do this, they must have a sufficient time space (finding sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 53 / 10, paragraph 108). Those requirements for parliamentary debate should also apply to the wider public, who should not be denied the possibility of monitoring and critical evaluation of the legislative proposal under discussion. The public debate can take all kinds of imaginable forms; This ultimately fulfils the legitimate function of the legislative process (finding sp. zn.
55. The Constitutional Court, in the decision of the sp. zn. The importance of the parliamentary debate lies in the possibility of confronting views across the political spectrum, which is a guarantee of free competition between political parties and political forces under Article 5 of the Constitution and Article 22 of the Charter (point Pol. It is also important at what stage of the legislative process the rights of the parliamentary opposition were restricted and whether or not these restrictions could have been remedied at another stage (the finding of the Pr. First of all, it is necessary to seek and assess the balance between the legitimate interests of the ruling majority and the parliamentary opposition or minority (the find sp. zn.
56. Time is a rare farm in Parliament. The Paralyzed Parliament cannot perform its legislative function properly, nor serve the public as a forum for arguments and counter-arguments, which, according to the German Federal Constitutional Court, is the fundamental role of Parliament (grundsätzliche Aufgabe des Parlaments, Forum für Rede und Gegenrede zu sein; BVerfGE 10, 4 of 14.7.1959). The practice of the Chamber of Deputies has shown, at the latest since 2016, that there is no effective tool against obstruction in the form of long and repeated speakers, long procedural discussions in particular on the agenda, chains of factual remarks, requests for breaks and blocking third reading on Wednesday and Friday, in the Rules of Procedure, which would prevent the obstructing minority from blocking the House negotiations, for example, until the end of the parliamentary term. As a result, the majority of the House has resorted since 2016 to an end to the debate even though speakers are still in the debate, which is contrary to the text of Section 66 (1) of the JRC. However, the Rules of Procedure do not explicitly provide the House with the most effective tools to assert its legitimate majority will against determined obstruction by other means (point 202).
57. The parliamentary opposition may delay or block decisions taken by a majority to achieve its own political objectives, but abuse of this right is not intended to weaken or prevent the effective exercise of power by the ruling majority. The purpose of the legislative process is to discuss and approve (or reject) the draft law, not to delay its adoption and obstruction leading to the paralysis of legislative activity. The Constitutional Court therefore does not provide political minority protection where it uses its rights under the Rules of Procedure for a purpose other than that for which it was enshrined (the finding of the sp. zl. ÚS 41 / 23, paragraph 177). As the Constitutional Court has already stated, the obstruction can qualify as abuse of law and parliamentary procedures (sp. zn.
Own review of the constitutionality of the legislative process
58. The Constitutional Court had no doubt about Parliament's competence to adopt a law amending the Pension Insurance Act (Article 15 (1) and Article 41 of the Constitution), which led to a review of the procedure for the adoption of the contested Act.
59. As has already been said, the appellant basically objects to the three headings of the shortcomings of the legislative process, namely the limitation of speaking time and the number of speeches (cf. paragraph 7), the conclusion of the debate at third reading, although 36 Members have still been registered (paragraph 8), and the way in which the amendment was tabled (paragraph 10).
Limitation of speaking time and number of speeches
60. The appellant argues that already on the second day of the third reading of the Bill, 21 July 2023, on the proposal of Prime Minister Jan Jakob, the time of the speeches of individual Members has been reduced to twice 10 minutes, and although this procedure may be formally consistent with Paragraph 59 (1) of the JøPS, according to the appellant, due to the importance of the law, it is "wholly inadequate," all the more so, since the first day of the hearing did not start until 12: 40 p.m. by the lengthy presentation of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs by Mariana Jurečka, while other Members were able to speak only during the remaining 50 minutes.
61. According to the Constitutional Court, this procedure of the Chamber of Deputies does not infringe either the Law on the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, nor does it deviate from established parliamentary practice or from any constitutional principles.
62. The legal regulation of the debate in the Chamber of Deputies is as follows: According to Paragraph 58 (3) of the JRC, the debate on the item is being held by the President giving the floor in the order in which the speakers applied in writing and then by the other speakers. The rapporteur shall give the floor during the debate whenever he so requests. The speaker in charge of the matter shall be given the floor at any time until the end of the debate. (c) to the President and Vice-Presidents of the House; In addition, a word on the point of order referred to in Article 60 of the JSPS shall be given priority; its length shall not exceed two minutes. According to Paragraph 66 (1) of the JJPS, 'the President will close the debate if other speakers are not put in the debate'.
63. According to Section 59 (1) of the JJPS, "The House may, without debate, decide on a time limit which may not be less than 10 minutes'," the limitation of speaking time shall not apply to Members responsible for bringing the opinion of the Members' club to the matter '. In addition, "The House may decide, without debate, that a Member may speak no more than twice on the same subject' (Paragraph 59 (2) of the JJPS). Paragraph 59 (4) of the JRC reads:" (4) The Member is to speak on the subject. If it deviates or exceeds the speaking time, the President may draw the attention of the Member and call him to the matter. If a Member deviates from the limits of decency, the President may call him to order. If there is no double warning to remedy, the word may be withdrawn. Members' objections to the decision to withdraw shall be decided by the House without debate. '
64. The procedural proposal adopted to limit speaking time to twice 10 minutes is in accordance with the law, namely Article 59 (1) and (2) of the JJPS. It also corresponds to established parliamentary practice. Such a procedure was also used during previous electoral periods, for example at meetings of the Chamber of Deputies on 3 March 2021 (by voting number 62 when discussing the draft law on measures to move the Czech Republic to low carbon energy), 12 May 2021 (by voting number 4 when discussing the draft building law) or 17 September 2021 (by voting number 158 when discussing the appeal point of Hannah Lipovská from the Council of Czech Television).
65. Comparatively, the rule that any Member may, in principle, speak unrestricted to each item under discussion is highly unusual, as is apparent from comparison with neighbouring states. Under Section 57 of the Law on Rules of Procedure of the Austrian National Council, any Member may speak for a maximum of 20 minutes in one debate, which may shorten the resolution of the National Council or the decision of the President to up to 5 minutes; a resolution can also be reached on the overall duration of the debate. Under Article 56 of the same law, the end of the debate may be voted on; then one more speaker of each club can perform. Similar rules include the Rules of Procedure of the German Federal Assembly. According to its § 35, it determines the form and length of the debate by the Federal Assembly on a proposal from the Elder Council (Ältestenrat); If no agreement is reached, the speaker may speak for a maximum of 15 minutes and at the request of the faction one speaker may speak for up to 45 minutes. Under Rule 25 of the Rules of Procedure of the Federal Assembly, the end of the debate may be voted on if at least one member of each faction has spoken. Similarly, pursuant to Rule 180 of the Rules of Procedure of the Polish Sejm, the speeches of Members in the debate may not last more than 10 minutes, except on behalf of a club of no more than 20 minutes; The marshal can decide otherwise. In one debate, the Member may speak no more than twice, the second speech being no more than five minutes. According to the Rules of Procedure of the Slovak National Council, the general speaking time of a Member in writing is 20 minutes, 10 minutes orally, and 30 minutes for the speaker in charge of the club, the National Council being able to extend that period (§ 30), and, on a proposal from the President of the National Council, it is possible to vote to close the debate (§ 35 (7)), after which only representatives of clubs with two-minute opinions can speak. Instead, the National Council may determine in advance the length of the debate (not less than 12 hours), with time divided between clubs according to size (§ 29a).
66. The comparison shows that the limitation of the speaking time and the number of speeches at which the Czech Chamber of Deputies may act pursuant to Paragraph 59 (1) and (2) of the JJPS is in principle in line with what applies as the starting rules in the parliaments or lower parliamentary chambers of Austria, Germany, Poland and Slovakia. It can be added that the Slovak Constitutional Court found that the ÚS 6 / 2019 found such a comprehensive limitation of speaking time to 20 minutes constitutionally consistent.
67. The limitation of speaking time to 10 minutes and the limitation of the number of speeches made by a Member in the debate on one item to two is in accordance with the law, namely Article 59 (1) and (2) of the JRC, and does not raise doubts as to compliance with the constitutional order or the law, while giving the Member sufficient opportunity to comment on the matter. In addition, each parliamentary club has the opportunity to present an unlimited speech by the speaker in charge of presenting the view of the club, which YES has also done in the case under consideration.
68. The representatives of ANO also took advantage of other opportunities to comment. Even before the adoption of the procedural proposal to limit speaking time and the number of speeches, the President of the ANO movement Andrej Babiš spoke about 100 minutes on 19.7.2023 and about 45 minutes on 21.7.2023 (see paragraph 35 above).
69. It cannot be overlooked that, in the present case as a result of the excessive use of the priority rights under Section 67 of the JRC, there was not a number of proper applications from other Members at all, so three days in the framework of the third reading of the draft law, no Member, except in the case of priority speakers, has taken the floor (except for factual remarks). According to settled House practice, any limitation of speaking time and the number of speeches (§ 59 (1) and (2) of the JJPS) does not apply to speakers with priority rights under § 67 of the JJRC (and has not been applied in the present case), which is confirmed by a single comment on the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies ("If those persons make use of their priority rights during the debate, under which they have been limited in accordance with § 59 (1) and (2) of the JRC, this limitation does not apply to them and can therefore speak without any limits of the number of speeches and their length." Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies. Comment. Praha: Wolters Kluwer, 2021, p. 381). In addition, speakers with priority rights under Section 67 of the JRC shall speak without limitation at any time outside the debate, which is confirmed again by the comment cited ["The right to speak is not limited to the debate... but may be exercised at any time during the House's negotiations (including the vote) and for any reason." Ibid., p. 380. The same comment even states that the obligation to speak to the matter and within the limits of decency (Section 59 (4) of the JRC) does not apply to members of the Government and that the restriction provided for in Section 59 (4) of the JRC "does not apply in practice to other persons having priority rights' (also, p. 382).
70. However, the interpretation and application of Section 67 of the JSPS should also take into account the purpose of these priority rights, which is certainly neither the personal privilege of the selected speakers nor the opportunity to obstruct them. For members of the Government this right arises from Article 38 (1) of the Constitution and its purpose is undoubtedly the possibility to effectively implement the right of the Government to express itself on the draft laws (Article 44 (1) of the Constitution) and on other proposals (cf. Rychetský, P. et al. Constitution of the Czech Republic. Constitutional law on security of the Czech Republic. Comment. Praha: Wolters Kluwer, 2015, p. 379), possibly have room to present the positions of the Government and to inform the Members and the public about matters of public interest in the spirit of the so-called separate declarations of the Government pursuant to § 64 of Act No. 325 / 1920 Coll. and n., of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of Deputies; However, a government statement was foreseen to open the debate. Even the constitutionally guaranteed priority right of members of the government is subject to a prohibition of abuse. The judgment already cited by the German Federal Constitutional Court of BVerfGE 10, 4 out of 14.7.1959 in relation to the right of members of the Government to be heard at any time in the Federal Assembly states: "Although, in parliamentary democracy, the views of the Government are generally in line with the views of the parliamentary majority... there is still tension between Parliament as a legislative and supervisory body and the Government as a supreme executive body. This tension justifies an unlimited and, in principle, unlimited right of the government to present and defend its position in Parliament. The exercise of that right shall, however, be subject to the ultimate prohibition of abuse. '
71. However, for the President and Vice-Presidents of the House, the chairmen of the clubs and the chairmen of the political parties, priority law does not result from the Constitution. It is enshrined in Section 67 of the JSPS, which only implies the right to speak whenever they so request, but not the time and content of their speeches. The purpose is to respond directly to the course of the debate or, more generally, to the course of the House's deliberations and to speak, for example, with a procedural proposal, with representatives of the opposition or, where appropriate, with the possibility of responding to the speeches of the members of the government; In order to express its position in substance on the present case, the President of the club or the President of a political party may also be the sole speaker in charge of submitting the opinion of the club pursuant to Articles 58 (3) and 59 (1) of the JRC. However, the interpretation of Article 67 of the JRC in the sense that the speeches of those preferred speakers whose preferential rights do not derive from the Constitution are unrestricted both in time and content, cannot be attributed to any reasonable purpose. By contrast, the conflict of this interpretation with the principle of equality between Members as representatives of the people is obvious. In particular, this collision is obvious at a time outside the debate on a point, because at this time they are, in addition to the time and de facto, not limited in substance, exclusively by speakers with priority rights, even for a very long time, which was criticised in the past by Mr Patrick Nacher (see the stenoprotocol of the meeting of the Chamber of Deputies, 27.5.2020, https: / / www.psp.cz / eknih / 2017ps / stenprot / 049schuz / s049054.htm # r6). The practice of the time, number and de facto as well as the content of the unrestricted language of the speakers with priority rights is widely misused for obstruction, as can be seen from both the present case and the previous cases discussed by the Constitutional Court in the proceedings sp. zl. ÚS 26 / 16, Pl. ÚS 87 / 20, Pl. ÚS 7 / 22, Pl. ÚS 30 / 23 and Pl. ÚS 41 / 23 (see relevant stenoprotocols of the meetings of the Chamber of Deputies, www.psp.cz).
72. The interpretation of the valid and effective wording of Section 67 of the JSPS in the sense that the speech of the preferred speakers, whose priority right does not derive from the Constitution, is unrestricted both in time and content, is contradictory with the constitutional principle of equality of Members as representatives of the people and as such is not constitutionally conformal. The principle of equality of Members as representatives of the people certainly does not apply absolutely and, in the context of its autonomy, Parliament can reduce it accordingly by laying down rules of parliamentary conduct (some possible forms of such limitation are summarised in paragraph 65). However, in Paragraph 67 of the JRC, Parliament has explicitly guaranteed certain speakers whose priority right does not stem from the Constitution only the right to speak whenever they so request (with an implicit limit on the prohibition of abuse of law), but not the time and content of an unlimited opportunity to speak. It is therefore constitutionally not permissible to add these speakers' preferential rights by simply parliamentary practice to the form of a de facto unlimited personal privilege at the expense of other Members.
73. The Constitutional Court summarises that the resolution under examination by the Chamber of Deputies on the limitation of speaking time to 10 minutes and the number of speeches in the debate to two is in line with both the law and the Constitution and therefore does not constitute a defect in the legislative process.
Closure of the debate at third reading
74. The applicant further contends that on 26 July 2023, in the context of the third day of the third reading, the debate was closed at a fixed time of 12: 30, on the basis of a proposal by Mr Jan Jakob, adopted on the same day in vote 36, although 36 Members were registered at the time. These Members have thus been deprived of the opportunity to speak in the debate on the bill. According to the appellant, it infringed Paragraph 66 (1) of the JSPS, which states that the President can end the debate only if there are no other speakers. The appellant sees the intervention described in the opposition's rights as a serious violation of Article 6 of the Constitution, according to which "political decisions are based on the will of the majority expressed by free vote, which must respect the protection of minorities'. The coalition majority abused its superiority over the opposition and interpreted the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies for a purpose and arbitrarily. The contested provisions were therefore not adopted in a manner consistent with the principles of the democratic rule of law and the free competition of political forces, which should therefore be abolished.
75. As mentioned above (paragraph 34), the Chamber of Deputies of 26 July 2023 at 9: 21 p.m. adopted the procedural proposal of Mr Jan Jakob, which was: "The Chamber of Deputies states that the vote on the proposed proposals and draft law as a whole in the case of House Press No. 458 will take place on Wednesday, 26 July 2023 at 12.30. 'The President of the Chamber of Deputies ended the debate at 12: 30 a.m., saying that this was approved by vote number 36, even though 36 Members were still in the debate.
76. Member Jan Jakob supported his procedural proposal on the resolution of the Chamber of Deputies No 248 of the 9th meeting of 26 February 1997 by which, pursuant to Article 1 (2) of the JJPS, The Chamber of Deputies is regulating its internal circumstances and more detailed rules of procedure. According to Rule 1 of the Chamber of Deputies, it may decide not to vote at a certain time and the vote on the proposals submitted shall take place at a specified time. However, as the Constitutional Court pointed out in the finding in paragraph 4 of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, paragraph 172, it is clear that, by this autonomous resolution of the Chamber of Deputies, no exceptions can be made to the clear and unambiguous provision of Section 66 (1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies ("The President shall terminate the debate if no other speakers are put in the debate '). The conclusion of the debate in a situation where 36 Members have yet to be entered in the debate has infringed Article 66 (1) of the JRC, according to which the President will close the debate if other speakers are not put in the debate. The same conclusion was reached by the Constitutional Court in all five cases in which it dealt with the conclusion of the debate in this way (cf. the findings of Pl. ÚS 26 / 16, Pl. ÚS 87 / 20, Pl. ÚS 7 / 22, Pl. ÚS 30 / 23 and Pl. ÚS 41 / 23).
77. As described above, the infringement itself, namely the law, does not yet constitute an unconstitutional act. The Constitutional Court must now assess whether, as a result of the defects described, one of the constitutional standards or principles has been affected and whether, at the same time, the conflicting constitutional standards or principles do not prevail over the constitutional standard or principle that has been affected (see paragraph 42 above).
78. Paragraph 66 (1) of the JJPS is one of the possible clarifications of the equality of Members of Parliament as representatives of the people, their freedom of parliamentary speech (Article 27 (2) of the Constitution) and the power of Members to participate in the parliamentary debate (Ref.
79. The constitutional principles of equality between Members of Parliament as representatives of the people and their entitlement to participate in the House's debate may be implemented in different ways, see, for example, above (paragraph 65), Austrian, German, Polish and Slovak examples enabling the debate to be terminated or its maximum length to be set, with speaking time being divided in advance among the parliamentary clubs. Such restrictions do not raise constitutional doubts, as the German Federal Constitutional Court already stated in BVerfGE 10, 4 out of 14.7.1959: "The limitation of the debate of the Federal Assembly on a matter for a given period of time does not raise constitutional doubts. The possibility of such a restriction arises from Parliament's right to decide to terminate the debate. Without this right, no parliament can function in the long term, because otherwise it would be given to the obstruction of every minority or even individual Members... Although such a decision constitutes a significant interference with the rights of the parliamentary speech of individual Members, it is permissible. The right of parliamentary speech stems from the constitutional status of a Member. However, its performance is subject to the limits set by Parliament by the powers of its autonomy... Such measures find their limits essentially and the fundamental role of Parliament - to be a forum for arguments and counter-arguments."
80. However, the Parliament of the Czech Republic stated clearly in Paragraph 66 (1) of the JRC that the President would end the debate if there were no other speakers. On the contrary, he did not join the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies or the Institute for the End of the debate by voting, nor did he set the length of the debate in advance. He therefore defined the constitutional principles of the equality of Members of Parliament as representatives of the people and their right to participate in the House debate in this way, and thus, together with the violation of Article 66 (1) of the JRC, by adopting the procedural proposal and subsequently terminating the debate by the President of the Chamber of Deputies, these constitutional principles were also affected.
81. It remains to be assessed whether conflicting constitutional standards or principles prevail over a constitutional standard or principle that has been affected.
82. The opposite constitutional principle to be taken into account is the principle of political decision-making based on the will of the majority expressed by free voting (Article 6 of the Constitution). The device used is, according to the finding, sp. zn.
83. The Constitutional Court traditionally uses the proportionality test when assessing the conflict of constitutional principles, starting with the finding of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 4 / 94 of 12.10.1994 (N 46 / 2 SbNU 57; 214 / 1994 Coll.). The proportionality test is three-stage and looks like this: The first criterion is the suitability criterion, i.e. the answer to the question of whether a device used, limiting a certain constitutional principle (P1), makes it possible at all to achieve the legitimate objective pursued (typically protecting another constitutional principle - P2). The second criterion of measuring constitutional principles is the necessity criterion, consisting of comparing the used device, limiting the constitutional principle P1, with other measures to achieve the same objective (protection of constitutional principle P2) but not affecting the constitutional principle P1. In other words, only a measure which, compared to other measures capable of protecting the constitutional principle of P2, can be capable of standing up is a minimum intervention in the constitutional principle of P1 (the principle of minimising intervention). The third criterion is the proportionality criterion in the narrower sense, namely the comparison of the gravity of both in the conflict of standing constitutional principles (P1 and P2), including the consideration of whether the device used does not affect the very substance of the constitutional principle P1 concerned, whereas the non-use of the device would have less serious consequences for maintaining the constitutional principle P2.
84. In the first step, it is necessary to assess whether the means used, namely the adoption of a procedural proposal on a fixed time vote and the subsequent termination of the debate by the President of the Chamber of Deputies, was at all a response to the obstructive behaviour of the parliamentary minority and whether it was capable of achieving the objective pursued, namely the protection of the constitutional principle of political decision-making based on the will of the majority expressed by free vote.
85. The appellant states in point 66 of her motion to repeal the law that, in the present case, "in the light of the extent of the opposition Members' speeches, there is no question of obstruction." However, a different conclusion is drawn from the above-mentioned findings of the Constitutional Court on the course of the legislative process in the Chamber of Deputies (paragraphs 30 to 37). The clubs YES and SPD applied their veto to the procedural proposal of the Chairman of the Jan Jakob Group, so that the third reading of the bill could take place at a different time than Wednesday and Friday between 9: 00 and 14: 00 (see paragraph 33). These five-hour periods of time were blocked by the opposition Members by the long speeches of the preferred speakers (as summarised in paragraph 35) and by a chain of factual remarks to the extent that, in three days' time in the third reading of the draft law, no Member with a proper application for debate came to the floor (see paragraph 36). Member Jan Jakob justified his procedural proposal to set firm voting time by obstructive behaviour of the opposition (cf. stenoprotocol 71. meeting of the Chamber of Deputies, 26.7.2023, www.psp.cz).
86. The means used, namely the adoption of a procedural proposal on a fixed time vote and the subsequent conclusion of the debate by the President of the Chamber of Deputies, was therefore a response to the obstructive behaviour of the parliamentary minority. At the same time, it is evident that he was able to achieve the objective pursued, namely to enforce the constitutional principle of political decision-making based on the will of the majority expressed by free vote.
87. The second step must be to assess whether, compared with other measures capable of protecting the constitutional principle of political decision-making based on the will of the majority expressed by free voting, the means used is a minimal intervention in the constitutional principles of equality between Members of Parliament as representatives of the people and their entitlement to participate in the House debate.
88. The Law on the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies provides a single other means against obstruction consisting of long speeches by representatives of the House of Minorities, namely the limitation of speaking time to 10 minutes and the number of speeches by Members in the debate on one item to two (Article 59 (1) and (2) of the JRC). However, as shown above (paragraphs 35, 36 and 85), the device was neither, nor could it be, effective. In the case under consideration, there have been repeated requests for long speeches by senior speakers and, as a result of their obstructive behaviour over three days in the framework of the third reading of the draft law, no Member has removed from the list of registered speakers without a preferential right.
89. The alternative means is to change the approach The Chamber of Deputies or the Presidents of its meetings against the speakers with priority rights pursuant to Article 67 of the JRC, whose priority right does not derive from the Constitution, in the sense that their speeches are not time and substance-proof and that they are also subject to the prohibition of abuse (see paragraphs 69-72 above). However, in the present case, the Chamber of Deputies or the chairmen of its meetings cannot be held liable for the fact that they have so far been guided by established application practice supported by commentary literature. Thus, the change in the approach of the presiding speakers to the present case could not be regarded as a milder alternative in the sense of the second step of the proportionality test.
90. The device used was therefore a minimal interference in the constitutional principles of equality between Members of Parliament as representatives of the people and their entitlement to participate in the House debate. The Constitutional Court comes to the same conclusion as in the sp. zn. Without a resolution on a firm voting time, a majority of the House would not be able to assert its majority will, contrary to Article 6 of the Constitution.
91. In the third step, it is necessary to compare the gravity of both in the conflict of standing constitutional principles, including the consideration of whether the use of the device does not affect the very essence of the constitutional principles of equality of Members of Parliament as representatives of the people and their right to participate in the House debate, whereas failure to use it would have minor consequences for maintaining the constitutional principle of political decision-making based on the will of the majority expressed by free voting.
92. There is no doubt that the device used, which prevented at least 36 Members from speaking in the debate under examination on the third reading of the draft law, is a significant interference in the constitutional principles of equality between Members of Parliament as representatives of the people and their entitlement to participate in the House debate. While some of these Members have already spoken in the debate in the form of a point of order, this is not a full participation in the debate when, according to at least the third sentence of Paragraph 60 (1) of the JRC, the factual point cannot be used in the factual point of view on the question at issue.
93. Nor can it be agreed from the personal statement sent by the President of the Chamber of Deputies that the content of the debate at the third reading of the draft law should be only a possible correction of the effective date of the bill, legislative errors, grammatical errors, etc. The fact that a debate is held at the third reading, in which, pursuant to Paragraph 95 (2) of the JRC, it is only possible to propose that the date of effectiveness of the draft law, legislative errors, grammatical or written errors and modifications resulting from the amendments tabled or, where appropriate, to make a proposal to repeat the second reading, does not mean that the debate must be limited in substance to that. As has also emerged from the discussion of the subject matter sp. zn. However, the Constitutional Court recalls that the right of Members to present an opinion on parliamentary grounds is not self-purposeful, that the importance of parliamentary debate lies in the possibility of confronting views across the political spectrum and not in the unlimited exercise of the right of each individual Member to comment on it, and that it is also essential at what stage of the legislative process the rights of the parliamentary opposition were restricted and whether these restrictions could have been healed at a different stage (see paragraph 55 above).
94. Although the device used prevented at least 36 Members from speaking in the debate under consideration to read the third draft law, it cannot be concluded that it would intervene in the very essence of the constitutional principles of equality between Members of Parliament as representatives of the people and their entitlement to participate in the House debate. Although Members have a free mandate and exercise it personally in accordance with their promise and are not bound by any orders (Article 26 of the Constitution), the constitutional principle expressed in Article 5 of the Constitution, according to which the political system is based on the free and voluntary creation and free competition of political parties, cannot be ignored. Unlike the Senate elections in which the majority system is applied, the Chamber of Deputies is established as a representative of the candidate political parties, or their coalition [finding sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 44 / 17 of 2.2.2021 (N 20 / 104 SbNU 191; 49 / 2021 Coll.), paragraph 100], and voters decide on the representatives of a particular group, political parties (there). It is therefore essential whether there has been an open debate in the parliamentary debate between the advocates of competing views, including those of minority groups representing these groups.
95. The views of the ANO members, who, as a group of Members, submitted this motion for annulment to the Constitutional Court, were articulated in the debates for the first and second reading by all Members of the ANO, who joined these debates, and in the debates for the first, second and third reading (as well as in the stages of the proceedings before the beginning of the hearing of this item) by the President of the ANO movement, Andrej Babiš, in his speeches of a total duration of approximately eight hours, as well as by the other senior speakers of the MEP, including the five-minute speech of Mr Aleš Juchelka, expressly mandated to deliver the opinion of the ANO Club. The Constitutional Court is not aware of any fact which would suggest that the ANO had been divided in terms of the present case and that, therefore, in the parliamentary debate, any relevant stream of view would have been ignored.
96. The above conclusion is that, against the obstructive methods used, it was not possible in real time remaining until the end of the parliamentary term to close the debate by the exhaustion of the list of speakers applied for, as foreseen in Section 66 (1) of the JRC, and that, without the adoption of a resolution on a firm voting time, the majority of the House would therefore not be in breach of Article 6 The Constitution is capable of asserting its majority will, pointing to the imminent serious violation of the constitutional principle of political decision-making based on the will of the majority expressed by free vote. As the Constitutional Court has already ruled, obstruction should not result in paralysis of the legislative activity of the Chamber of Deputies, because then the majority - contrary to Article 6 of the first Constitution - would not be able to assert its will by free voting; While the parliamentary minority may declare its decisive opposition to the draft law by obstructing the functioning of the Chamber of Deputies, the parliamentary majority is entitled to take adequate measures to ensure its functioning (point sp. zn.
97. The act of a parliamentary majority would be unconstitutional only if the real possibility for Members and the public to become aware of the subject matter of the negotiations and respond adequately to it in order to fulfil the purpose and purpose of parliamentary discussion of draft laws, or if the violation of the Rules of Procedure were arbitrary. In doing so, the opposition, which must have, as mentioned above, the rights to participate in parliamentary procedures and enabling the parliamentary opposition to exercise control over the ruling majority and the real opportunity to learn the content of the draft law, to examine it and to take a position on it in the context of its deliberations in the relevant chamber of Parliament or in its institutions.
98. As the Constitutional Court summarised above (paragraphs 30 to 37), two months have elapsed since the submission of the draft law to the Chamber of Deputies until its adoption, in which the draft law was discussed in five days at the meeting of the Chamber of Deputies, a total of 39 and a half hours (counting the stage from the start of the meeting to the start of the discussion of this single point), and two meetings of the Social Policy Committee. The resolution of the Committee on Social Policy, containing the only amendment adopted later, was circulated to Members 35 days before the final vote in the Chamber of Deputies. This information was available to the public at the same time; The discussion of the bill was of great interest to the media.
99. Thus, as in previous similar cases, the Constitutional Court notes that the course of the legislative process as a whole did not result in the limitation of the rights of the parliamentary opposition consisting of the possibility of participating in the legislative procedure as its full participant and the representatives of the opposition were not, from a constitutional point of view, deprived of the possibility of actually getting to know the draft law and expressing their position on it (point (b) of paragraph 93).
100. The Constitutional Court concludes that the conclusion of the debate in a situation where 36 Members have still been entered into the debate has infringed Article 66 (1) of the JRC, according to which the President will close the debate if other speakers are not put in the debate. Together with the violation of Section 66 (1) of the JRC, constitutional principles of equality between Members of Parliament as representatives of the people and their entitlement to participate in the House debate were also affected. The contradictory constitutional principle of political decision-making based on the will of the majority expressed by the free vote (Article 6 of the Constitution), however, for the above reasons, prevailed over the constitutional principles affected. The process of the Chamber of Deputies in this matter was therefore in line with the Constitution.
101. However, the Constitutional Court adds that the apparent violation of the rule laid down in Section 66 (1) of the JRC is not desirable in a democratic rule of law and can only be seen as an absolute extreme resort to emergency. The need is not only created by the current course of the legislative process in a particular case, but also by the long-term improper state, in which the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies expressly do not give the House the most effective tools to enforce its legitimate majority will against determined obstruction. The Constitutional Court therefore reiterates that it considers the current state of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies (and its application) to be unsustainable in the long term and calls on all Members across the political spectrum to pursue the reform of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies in such a way as to ensure, in future, that the conduct of the Chamber of Deputies complies with both the principles of Article 6 of the Constitution, i.e. both the principle of decision-making based on the will of the majority expressed by free vote and the principle of the protection of minorities (cf. Reform of the Rules of Procedure is in the interest of any government majority and any opposition. As the Constitutional Court stated above, the paralyzed Parliament cannot properly fulfil its legislative function or serve the public as a forum for arguments and counter-arguments (paragraph 56). The good functioning of Parliament is essential for the good functioning of democracy.
Method of submission of the amendment adopted
102. The applicant further disputes the way in which the amendment was tabled. It notes that the original government bill, negotiated and approved by Government Resolution 385 of 24 May 2023, provided for the maintenance of a transitional period as a means of protecting the legitimate expectations of persons who had already met the conditions for early retirement but have not yet applied for it. The transitional period removed the amendment of the Coalition Member and the Chairman of the Social Policy Committee by Vít Kanykovsky, lodged during the 34th meeting of the Committee on 21 June 2023. The appellant, referring to Mr Vít Kanykovsky's public observations, notes that the amendment was initiated by the MPSV, despite the fact that the Government had formally approved the reverse procedure. According to the appellant, this' lenient amendment to the proposal by MPSV 'completely denies the transparency and logic of the legislative process and contradicts the legislative rules of the government. This infringed the principle of predictability of law, thereby "gaining a clearly unconstitutional dimension'.
103. The Constitutional Court found that this amendment, tabled by Mr Vít Kaňkovský to the Social Policy Committee, was adopted by the Committee on 21 June 2023; for there were 10 members of the committee, against 4 and 2 they abstained. On the same day, the resolution of the committee, including this amendment proposed by the committee, was circulated to all Members. The substance of the amendment is the unbundling of the original point 1 ("The insured person is entitled to an old-age pension before reaching retirement age if he has obtained an insurance period of 40 years and until the retirement age from the date on which the old-age pension is granted, no more than 3 years... ') within two points - in point 1 there will be 3 years until the retirement age, in point 2 the insurance period of 40 years. The purpose of this disconnection was obviously to distinguish the effective date.
104. According to the original government proposal, the whole bill was to become effective on the first day of the calendar month following the date of its publication, only a new rule on early retirement not earlier than 3 years before the retirement age for the 40-year insurance period was to become effective one year later; by amendment to the Social Committee, the insurance period of 40 years will not be effective until a year, but the rule of 3 years before the retirement age will be effective on the first day of the calendar month following the date of publication.
105. According to Article 63 (1) of the JRC, the amendments are to relate to a point under discussion and are to be made clear of what is to be decided by the House, with amendments being deleted, extended or amended by some parts of the original proposal. According to Article 92 (1) of the JRC, in its then wording, the Guarantee Committee, or any other committee or committees to which the draft law has been ordered, shall, after consulting the President of the House, submit a resolution recommending in particular to the House whether or not to approve the draft law. If the Committee recommends that amendments be adopted by the House to the draft law, it is precisely worded.
106. The amendment under examination was tabled and accepted in full compliance with Articles 63 (1) and 92 (1) of the JRC and thus does not raise doubts as to compliance with the law.
107. The proposed amendment concerns only the timescale, otherwise it does not change anything on the draft law, so it does not give rise to any suspicion that it could be a so-called appendage in the spirit of the Constitutional Court's findings.
108. The proposed amendment could not be surprising or timely. The resolution of the Committee on Social Policy, containing this only amendment adopted later, was circulated to Members 20 days before the beginning of the second reading, 28 days before the beginning of the third reading and 35 days before the final vote in the Chamber of Deputies. This information was available to the public at the same time; The discussion of the bill was of great interest to the media. Moreover, the amendment was not in any way extensive or complicated.
109. Even the alleged cooperation of the referring Member with MPSV and the contradiction with the original government bill does not raise constitutional doubts. The right of Members and of the House Committees to submit amendments to the bills tabled and the power of the Chamber of Deputies to approve them is a obvious consequence of Parliament's legislative power under Article 15 of the Constitution.
110. Nor can a possible violation of the legislative rules of the Government establish the unconstitutional nature of the law, as already stated by the Constitutional Court in the finds sp. zn. The internal regulatory instructions, which are the legislative rules of the Government, cannot be the reference criterion of the constitutionality and legality of the law (point 56 of the page.
111. Thus, the way in which the proposed amendment is presented and adopted is in accordance with both the law and the Constitution and thus does not constitute a defect in the legislative process.
Summary of the review of the constitutional conformity of the legislative process
112. The Constitutional Court therefore concludes that the Act under examination was adopted in a constitutional manner. The resolution by the Chamber of Deputies on the limitation of speaking time to 10 minutes and the number of speeches in the debate to two, as well as the way in which the proposed amendment was tabled and adopted, were in line with the law and the Constitution, and therefore do not constitute a defect in the legislative process.
113. The conclusion of the debate in a situation where 36 Members have yet to be entered in the debate has infringed Article 66 (1) of the JRC, according to which the President will close the debate if other speakers are not put in the debate. Together with the violation of Section 66 (1) of the JRC, constitutional principles of equality between Members of Parliament as representatives of the people and their entitlement to participate in the House debate were also affected. The contradictory constitutional principle of political decision-making based on the will of the majority expressed by the free vote (Article 6 of the Constitution), however, for the above reasons, prevailed over the constitutional principles affected. Against the obstructive methods used, it was not possible, in the real time remaining until the end of the parliamentary term, to come closer to the end of the debate by completing the list of speakers applied for, as foreseen in Section 66 (1) of the JRC. Without a resolution on a firm voting time, a majority of the House would not be able to assert its majority will, contrary to Article 6 of the Constitution. There was no restriction on the rights of the parliamentary opposition, consisting of the possibility of participating in the legislative procedure as a fully-fledged participant, and the opposition's representatives were not deprived of the possibility of realising the draft law and expressing their position on it.
114. However, the Constitutional Court reiterates that the apparent violation of the rule enshrined in Article 66 (1) of the JRC is not desirable in a democratic rule of law and can only be seen as an absolute last resort, and reiterates its appeal to all Members across the political spectrum to pursue the reform of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies in order to ensure that the conduct of the Chamber of Deputies meets both the principles of Article 6 of the Constitution, namely the principle of decision-making based on the will of the majority expressed by free vote and the principle of the protection of minorities.
A substantive review of the constitutionality of the contested provisions
Nature and scope of the review
115. In paragraph 122 of the proposal, the appellant formulated a so-called possible petition in which it stated that if the Constitutional Court did not find the grounds for the annulment of the amendment law for procedural reasons (due to defects in the legislative process), it merely proposed the annulment of Article 31 (1) of the Pension Insurance Act in conjunction with Article III of the Amendment Act. The appellant does not oppose any other content changes to the Pension Insurance Act. Thus, the Constitutional Court has examined the provisions in question, or the concentration thereof, and does not, for example, deal with changes in the area of so-called "early termination 'under Section 36 (1) of the Pension Insurance Act or the amendment of the Valorisation Mechanism under Section 67 of the same Act.
116. In addition, it should be added that the Constitutional Court assesses the constitutional conformity of Section 31 (1) of the Pension Insurance Act in conjunction with Article III of the Amendment Act, which provided for the effectiveness of the new legislation (hereinafter jointly as the "contested regulation '). Paragraph 31 (1) of the Pension Insurance Act, with effect from 1.10.2023, amended the conditions for early retirement and newly stipulated that it could be entered not earlier than three years before the proper retirement age. Before this change, the law allowed some insured persons to retire early up to five years before reaching a proper retirement age. However, the appellant does not oppose this change as such. In paragraph 88 of the proposal, it explicitly stated that..." they do not challenge this change in terms of its possible unconstitutionality as to the same parameter. "The appellant only sees the impact of the contested regulation on the legitimate expectations of insured persons, particularly those who have fulfilled the age condition before it is effective, but have temporarily ceased to meet it from its effectiveness.
117. For the reasons set out above, the Constitutional Court does not carry out in the present case the so-called rationality test, which it formulated for the purposes of the constitutional legal review in the field of social rights [see, for example, the findings of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 1 / 08 of 20.5.2008 (N 91 / 49 SbNU 273; 251 / 2008 Coll.), paragraph 103; Col. ÚS 54 / 10 of 24.4.2012 (N 84 / 65 CollNU 121; 186 / 2012 Coll.), paragraph 48; Col. ÚS 15 / 24 of 2.4.2025 (132 / 2025 Coll.), paragraph 97. While the fundamental right to adequate material security in the old age referred to in Article 30 (1) of the Charter of which the contested regulation is part is social law, the appellant does not contest the contested regulation with Article 30 (1) of the Charter. Therefore, the Constitutional Court focused its attention solely on the question of the alleged intervention in the legitimate expectations of insured persons and their confidence in the legality of the rule of law.
Regulation of early retirement pensions and its purpose
118. The Constitutional Court considers it important for the context of the assessment of the proposal to first summarise the foundations of the legislation on early retirement pensions ("early retirement '). The purpose of early retirement is primarily to provide benefits to persons who lose their employment in the pre-retirement age and are difficult to find again (cf. Lang, R., Vořisek, V., Pelican, H., Picorová, G., Holečková, R. Pension Insurance Act. Comments. Wolters Kluwer, 2024, p. 206 and 266). It is for this reason that early retirement benefits are designed in such a way that, unlike a proper old-age pension, they cannot be paid in parallel to the work of a gainful activity; In fact, the main reason which led to early retirement (Section 37 (2) of the Pension Insurance Act) ceases to exist by starting a gainful activity.
119. In practice, there is a wide range of reasons and living circumstances that lead to early retirement. It may be a long-term fatigue or illness, care for a loved one, but also a desire to enjoy more leisure time in the old age. These reasons do not need to be demonstrated and it is up to each insured person to retire early after the legal conditions have been met. However, it cannot be ignored that the fundamental purpose of early retirement is to compensate for the reduction in the ability to pursue a continuous gainful activity and the difficult possibility of finding a job. While receiving a proper old-age pension is a normal consequence of fulfilling the conditions for its granting, the early retirement is an exception, the use of which depends on the individual decision of the insured person according to specific life circumstances. The early retirement is therefore not a standard and foreseeable extension of the term of the ordinary old-age pension (cf., sentence 2, paragraph 27 of the Supreme Administrative Court judgment of 21.2.2025 No 4 Ads 184 / 2024-20).
120. The same applies directly to the above-mentioned distinction between early and regular old-age pensions, which consists in the fact that entitlement to early retirement does not arise by merely fulfilling the conditions, but only on the date on which it is granted, at the request of the insured person (Section 31 (2), second sentence of the Pension Insurance Act). Submission of the application is therefore a substantive condition for entitlement to early retirement (legal sentence of the Supreme Administrative Court judgment of 21.2.2025 No 4 Ads 184 / 2024-20, commentary on the Pension Insurance Act, cited above, p. 208). The early pension can therefore be granted at the earliest from the date of the application; It may not be granted retroactively, in contrast to an ordinary old-age pension, for a period when the insured person did not submit a claim for a grant, even though he fulfilled the other conditions for a grant.
121. The conditions for early retirement benefits are laid down in Section 31 of the Pension Insurance Act. The law requires a gradual fulfilment of three conditions: first, it is necessary to obtain the required period of insurance and a certain age, and finally to apply for a pension itself. Until 30.9.2023, the law allowed early retirement up to five years in advance (depending on the age of the person concerned). The challenged modification of the age condition with effect from 1 October 2023 tightened and unified. In the new case, all insured persons who have not been entitled to early retirement before the end of September 2023 may retire at the earliest three years before reaching their normal retirement age.
122. With regard to the submission of applications for early retirement pension, pursuant to Section 81 (1) of Act No. 582 / 1991 Coll., on the organisation and implementation of social security, as effective until 30.11.2023, the date on which the beneficiary first contacted the competent authority with a claim for a benefit shall be deemed to be the date on which the entitlement to the pension benefit is claimed. With effect from 1.12.2023, there have been some changes aimed at simplifying the whole process (in particular by introducing an electronic application). However, it was already possible, before the contested regulation was effective, to submit simple blank applications which are not considered to be in the true sense of the word but merely to claim entitlement under Paragraph 81 (1) of the Act on the organisation and implementation of social security. The insurer who made the blank application shall subsequently have 90 days to attend the relevant branch of the OSSZ to make the formal application. During this period, retirement may change its mind. If the proper application has not been drawn up within 90 days, the blank application of the claim shall be deemed inefficient.
1 ePortal of ČSSZ. Application of entitlement to pension benefits. Available on the eportal page. cssz.cz / web / portal / - / forms / unddp.
123. Finally, the important circumstances associated with early retirement are that it deprives the insured person once and for all of the possibility to receive a full retirement pension (Section 31 (3) of the Pension Insurance Act). The effect of early retirement is therefore, in general, a permanent reduction in the benefit to be paid to the insured (so-called "early retirement ').
Definition of the model situations and effects of the contested scheme
Sign in for notes, favorites and notifications
Regulation Information
| Citation | Findings of the Constitutional Court No. 272 / 2025 Coll., sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 47 / 23 on the application for annulment of Act No. 270 / 2023 Coll., amending Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., on Pension Insurance, as amended, and Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., on Pension Insurance, as amended |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | The Constitutional Tribunal found |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 05.08.2025 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
Comments 0