The Constitutional Court found No 256 / 2025 Coll.
Findings of the Constitutional Court sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 11 / 25 concerning the application for annulment of Act No. 417 / 2024 Coll., amending Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., on Pension Insurance, as amended, and other related laws, and in eventum on the abolition of certain provisions of Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., on Pension Insurance, as amended
Valid
256
FIND
The Constitutional Court
of 25 June 2025
sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 11 / 25 concerning the proposal to repeal Act No. 417 / 2024 Coll., amending Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., on Pension Insurance, as amended, and other related laws, and in eventum to repeal certain provisions of Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., on Pension Insurance, as amended
On behalf of the Republic
The Constitutional Court decided under sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 11 / 25 on 25 June 2025 in plenary composed of the President of the Court of Josef Baxy and judges and judges of Lucie Dolanská Bányai, Milan Hulmák, Jaromír Jirsy, Veronica Christian, Zdeněk Kühn, Tomáš Langáš, Jiří Nábán (Judge of the Rapporteur), Katřina Ronovské, Jan Svatona, Pavel Šámal, Jan Winter and Daniela Zeman as a member of the group of Members, for which she is acting on the annulment of Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., on the pension insurance, as amended by the laws, and in the event of the annulment of the members of the Act No. 155 / 1995 Svělátělátětětěměláláměláměmělál.
as follows:
Motion denied.
Reasons
Subject matter and content of the application submitted
1. In the present case, the Constitutional Court dealt with the abstract control of the constitutionality of the so-called second phase of pension reform, following a constitutional review of the so-called first stage of pension reform [cf. the findings of the plenary of the Constitutional Court sp. zn.
2. By a proposal pursuant to Article 87 (1) (a) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as "the Constitution") and Article 64 (1) (b) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, a group of 71 Members (hereinafter referred to as "the draftsman") first seeks the annulment of Act No. 417 / 2024 Coll., amending Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., on Pension Insurance, as amended, and other related laws. In the first and main line of argument, the appellant contests the unconstitutionality of the entire contested law as an amendment and not merely amended provisions as part of Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., on Pension Insurance, as amended. It considers that there has been an unconstitutional breach of the rules of the legislative process in the Chamber of Deputies when discussing and approving it.
3. In the second and supportive line of reasoning, applied in event, if the Constitutional Court did not find the proposal justified already as a result of the contested defects of the legislative process, the appellant opposed Act No. 417 / 2024 Coll. supplemented by the provision of Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., on Pension Insurance, as amended. In particular, in the sentence of Section 32 (2) of the First Pension Insurance Act, it proposes the abolition of the number "1973 'and the words" No 1', in Section 32 (3), the cancellation of the whole sentence of the first sentence, as amended by: "For insured persons born between 1974 and 1988, the retirement age is determined by adding to the age of 65 years and 8 months the number of calendar months to be determined as the difference between the number of years between the year of the insured's birth and 1973; the provisions of paragraph 2 of the second sentence shall apply mutatis mutandis. ';
Arguments of the appellant
Procedural objections - shortcomings in the legislative process
4. The appellant describes in detail the way in which the second stage of pension reform (House Press No. 696) is prepared, discussed and approved, including the executive phase, i.e. the interministerial comment procedure. It states that the discussion of the contested law took place factually and culturally, but considers that, in all three readings, Paragraph 66 (1) of Act No. 90 / 1995 Coll., on the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies (hereinafter referred to as the Rules of Procedure) has been infringed. It states that the President has repeatedly closed the debate, although other speakers were enrolled in it at first, second and third readings. The appellant adds that at the second reading, Ms A. Schiller, President of the 2011 MEP, opposed this procedure, which supported the position of the Legislative Department of the Chamber of Deputies.
5. The appellant further draws attention to the disregard of Ms A. Schiller's proposal of 1 November 2024 for the postponement of the hearing on the item in question until 30 June 2025. It does not agree with the designation of this proposal as unfit for vote. It considers that this proposal should have been debated and put to the vote, either directly under the procedure of Rule 54 (8) of the Rules of Procedure or at the latest after the third reading debate pursuant to Rule 72 (1) (1) of the Rules of Procedure. In the process of the coalition majority, the appellant sees the arbitrage that led to a fundamental violation of the rules of the Rules of Procedure and to the denial of the rights of opposition Members in the legislative process enshrined at constitutional level and thus to the irreparable unconstitutional state.
6. The appellant further submits that the second reading unconstitutional burden was placed on the submission of amendments having the character of stickers (Amendment 5064) or amendments which substantially changed the draft law under consideration and which, in view of the fixed time for the conclusion of the general debate, did not allow Members to react in substance. It refers to Amendment 5098, submitted by Members J. Jakob and M. Bendou to the House of Deputies just before the end of the general debate at the second reading at 10.41 p.m. on 4 October 2024. This amendment has deleted more favourable rules for early retirement for the so-called third category of work. In particular, the appellant states that the amendment "has resulted in the elimination of approximately 90% of the workers originally proposed in the most demanding jobs from the benefit of reducing the age limit for retirement in a situation where the general age limit has been increased from 65 to 67 years'. This lack, i.e. the inability to comment on the amendment, was not resolved even at third reading in view of the end of the debate. In this context, the appellant also refers to the opinion of the Senate Guarantee Committee, the Social Policy Committee, which recommended the Senate to approve the draft law, but stated that" the evaluation and evaluation of the selected risks in category III in the context of previous retirement leave is under-taken. "
7. The appellant further submits that the draft law was not ordered to be discussed by the Constitutional, Health, Economic and Budget Committee, which in its view excluded a substantive debate on pension reform. It argues that the debate in committees is at the heart of the legislative process in the Chamber of Deputies. In her view, this procedure contradicts the need for a rational legislative process.
8. The appellant points out that the opposition Members did not use obstruction in the case of the contested law, even if, according to the case law of the Constitutional Court, they constitute a legitimate instrument of parliamentary opposition or minority. He points out that even representatives of the government majority (e.g. Mr Benda) have called the debate substantive and cultured.
9. Overall, the appellant assesses the way in which the bill is adopted as grossly contradictory with binding rules of the legislative process. It states that in the parliamentary majority procedure it finds a contradiction with the fundamental values of the rule of law, such as the predictability and familiarity of law, the prohibition of arbitrary or legal certainty.
10. The appellant considers that the above-mentioned way of examining and approving Act No. 417 / 2024 Coll. shows constitutional defects, alleging infringement of Articles 1 (1) and (2), Article 2 (1) and (3), Articles 5 and 6 and Article 9 (2) of the Constitution and Articles 2 (2) and 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms ("the Charter"). It complements its argument with extensive citations of the precaselaw of the Constitutional Court concerning the constitutionality of the legislative process.
Material objections
11. In the second and supporting line of argument, the appellant challenges the constitutionality of the abovementioned amended provisions of the Pension Insurance Act.
12. The appellant recalls that "in terms of increasing the retirement age, she had a different view from the politicians of the government majority, seeing time relief for those working in the most demanding professions as a minimum compensation for the general tightening of conditions for receiving an old-age pension '. It already considers the increase in the age limit for retirement over 65 to 67 to be unconstitutional. It considers this legal arrangement to be inconsistent with international obligations [specifically Article 15 (2) of the Convention on Invalidity, Old-age and Survivor Benefits (No 128) The International Labour Organisation (" the Convention on Benefits'), established under No 416 / 1991 Coll., provides that the prescribed age (for the provision of an old-age pension) may not exceed 65 years; the competent authorities may determine a higher age with regard to demographic, economic and social aspects, supported by statistical evidence], and thus ultimately conflict with the constitutional principle enshrined in Article 1 (2) of the Constitution. According to the appellant, the amendment of the rules on the establishment of the pension age limit was not sufficiently justified or supported by clear analyses and supporting documents, as required by the international treaty. In this case, the appellant sees a contradiction with the principles of the material rule of law, which, like when the legislative process is contradicted, includes legitimate expectations, predictability of law, legal certainty and a ban on insolence.
13. It also criticises that the relief from this increase was granted only to persons who perform risky work in the fourth category of risky work under Act No. 258 / 2000 Coll., on the Protection of Public Health and on the amendment of certain related laws, as amended, ("the Act on the Protection of Public Health '). The appellant considers the amendment limiting the relief of an increase in retirement age precisely to the risk-free work of the fourth category, in which it finds a contradiction not only with Article 94 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, but in particular with Article 15 (3) of the Convention on Benefits and Article 1 (2) of the Constitution. The exclusion of a third category of high-risk employment from the benefit of a possible early retirement, foreseen in the original government bill, shall be deemed arbitrary and unfounded and shall be contradictory to the above-mentioned principles of the material rule of law guaranteed by Article 1 (1) of the Constitution.
14. The appellant considers that the contested provisions of the Pension Insurance Act are contrary to constitutional law, alleging infringement of Article 1 (1) and (2) of the Constitution, Articles 1 and 3 (1) of the Charter and Article 15 (2) of the Convention on Benefits.
Observations of the parties, the intervener and the appellant's reply
15. The Constitutional Court has sent a motion to open proceedings to the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, the Government and the Ombudsman.
Observation of Parliament's chambers
16. The Chamber of Deputies (through the President) described the course of discussion and approval of the contested law. It reiterated that the bill was submitted to the Government of the Chamber of Deputies in the 9th parliamentary term on 7 May 2024 as House Press No. 696. The first reading took place at the 104th meeting of 28 to 30 May 2024, in which the press was ordered to discuss the Committee on Social Policy as a committee of guarantee. On 19 June 2024, 11 July 2024 and 5 September 2024, the Social Policy Committee discussed the draft law when it issued a resolution with amendments to the amendments delivered to Members as press 696 / 3. The second reading took place at the 113th meeting of 2 to 4 October 2024, when the general debate was held. A detailed debate took place on 4 October 2024 and all amendments tabled were processed as press 696 / 5. The third reading took place at the 117th session of the Chamber of Deputies on 1 November 2024 and continued on 6 and 8 November 2024. Of the 188 Members present, there were 103 in favour of the bill and 85 against it. The bill was adopted and transferred to the Senate on 12 November 2024, which it included at its 4th meeting on 4 December 2024. The Senate approved the bill as referred to by the Chamber of Deputies. The bill was delivered to the President for signature on 6 December 2024. The president signed the bill on 13 December 2024. The law was declared 18. 12. 2024 in the Collection of Laws and International Treaties under the number 417 / 2024 Coll.
17. It is further submitted from the Chamber of Deputies that the cumulative length of the first reading was about 33 hours, in which there were approximately 250 opposition members. The second reading lasted about 20 hours and involved about 150 opposition speeches. The third reading took about 14 hours, with opposition Members speaking with some 180 contributions.
18. In relation to the amendment by Members J. Jakob and M. Benda, the Chamber of Deputies stated that this proposal was inserted into the system at 10: 41 p.m. on 4 October 2024, at a time when a general debate was held at the second reading, followed by a detailed debate held between 11: 48 and 12: 22 p.m. The Chamber of Deputies referred to paragraph 2 of Parliamentary Document No 5098, which contains the justification for the amendment.
19. In relation to the objection to the notation of the bill to other committees, the Chamber of Deputies referred to Paragraph 91 (4) of the Rules of Procedure, which states that committees which have not been ordered directly by the Chamber of Deputies may give their opinion to the Chamber of Deputies and to the committee which is discussing the draft law. It has also expressed its objection to the alleged disregard of Ms A. Schiller's proposal. It explained that the possible vote and approval of this proposal would not be in line with the resolution of the Chamber of Deputies on the continuation of negotiations on 6 November 2024, adopted on the proposal of Mr Dufk (1 November 2024).
20. In conclusion, the Chamber of Deputies stated that it had acted in the belief that the law adopted had complied with the Constitution, leaving the decision on this issue to the Constitutional Court.
21. The Senate summed up the appellant's argument, the content of the contested law and the conduct of the Senate discussion of his proposal. It stated that in a debate lasting more than six hours, the performance of the members of the Senate Club ANO 2011 was mainly heard. He stated that in the debate, the number of insured persons whose retirement age is reduced when working out a specified number of shifts in risk employment was most thematic. At the end of the debate, the Senate adopted Resolution 55 which approved the bill as referred to by the Chamber of Deputies. 48 senators out of 66 were in favour, 15 senators opposed and three abstentions. In the context of the examination of the draft law, the Senate adopted Resolution No 56, in which it noted that the evaluation and evaluation of selected risks in the third category was under-taken into account in relation to earlier retirement periods, and called on the Government to address the need for earlier retirement periods of workers working at workplaces with these risks through the employer's mandatory above-standard contribution to their private pension financial products and to specify the real date for the implementation of this measure.
22. The Senate concluded that it acted within the limits of the Constitution and the constitutional procedure when discussing the draft law.
Government observations
23. On 16 April 2025, the Government adopted Resolution 266, which approved its entry into the proceedings before the Constitutional Court, proposed that the Constitutional Court reject or reject the application, and authorised the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs to represent the Government and the Minister of Justice in cooperation with the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Defence to make comments to the Government on the proposal.
24. First of all, the Government took the view that the proposal - particularly in relation to its first line of reasoning - understood the proposal as a purposeful transfer of political struggle to the ground of the Constitutional Court, which it opposed.
25. It stated that the reason for drafting the bill was the current need to respond adequately to the demographic development of the company and to the increasing difference between income from pension insurance premiums and expenditure on pension insurance benefits. The government stressed that if there were no changes, the difference between insurance income and pension expenditure over 35 years would already be almost 3% of GDP according to a qualified estimate, i.e. about CZK 300 billion in current values. This deficit would seriously jeopardise the sustainability of public finances in the Czech Republic. The Government therefore considered it necessary to implement measures to stabilise the pension system and to approve these measures in this parliamentary term. It emphasised that the legal regulation now under appeal needs to be seen and evaluated in a broader context of government efforts to restore public finances in terms of their sustainability and long-term balance between public budgets. It referred to the obligation of the State provided for in Article 2 of Act No. 23 / 2017 Coll., on the Rules of Budgetary Responsibility and the current interministerial comment procedure concerning the legislative proposal for the constitutional establishment of the principle of budgetary responsibility. The government also mentioned the solidarity between generations, which it referred primarily to as an economic and political issue. It highlighted the social interest in the balance, fairness and sustainability of the pension scheme, also accentuated in the introductory part of the explanatory memorandum of Act No. 417 / 2024 Coll.
26. On the objection concerning the infringement of the legislative procedure, the Government expressed itself only in general on the grounds that "Parliament, or its two chambers as main parties, is called on to give an opinion on the matter for the purposes of the proceedings before the Constitutional Court '. It referred to the finding case law of the plenary Constitutional Court [cf. Findings sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 7 / 03 of 18.8.2004 (N 113 / 34 CollU 165; 512 / 2004 Coll.), sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 21 / 14 of 30.6.2015 (N 122 / 77 SbNU 759; 199 / 2015 Sb.), sp. zn. Pl. According to this case-law, it is apparent from the Government that a defect in the legislative process causes the unconstitutional nature of an approved law, contrary directly to a standard expressly enshrined in the constitutional order, or that it violates the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate or any other sub-constitutional standard governing the legislative process, with the consequence that one of the constitutional standards will be affected and, at the same time, the conflicting constitutional standards do not prevail over the constitutional standard that is affected.
27. According to the Government, the former variant of the unconstitutionality of the law caused by a defect in the legislative process in the case submitted by the appellant did not occur. It therefore assessed the possible implementation in the order of the second variant, specifying, with reference to the case law of the Constitutional Court, that a breach of the Rules of Procedure may take place in three types of situations: infringement of the rules on the state of legislative emergency, stickage and limitation of parliamentary debate by merging the debate to unrelated bills or by terminating the debate in a situation where speakers are still involved. The latter situation was noted by the Government that, in the case at hand, there was no unconstitutional restriction on the parliamentary debate, since, in line with the conclusions drawn from the above-mentioned case-law of the Constitutional Court, the opposition representatives were not, from a constitutional point of view, deprived of the possibility of realising the draft law and expressing their position on it.
28. The Government described in detail the progress of the bill in the Chamber of Deputies. It has expressed itself similarly to the Chamber of Deputies. It stated that the government bill under House Press No. 696 was circulated to Members on 7 May 2024 and was discussed in three readings at the 104, 113 and 117 session of the Chamber of Deputies. The bill was approved on 8.11.2024, i.e. six months in the Chamber of Deputies (from 9.00 to 18.15), 2.10 (from 9.00 to 22.00), 3.10 (from 9.00 to 20.30), 4.10 (from 9.00 to 12.30), 30.10 (from 12.00 to 15.30), 1.11 (from 9.00 to 13.50), 6.11 (from 9.00 to 14.00) and 8.11. The Guarantee Committee, i.e. the Social Policy Committee, discussed the draft law five times at its meetings held on 19 June, 11 July, 5 September, 9 September and 25 October 2024. The Government took the view that the time to study and prepare for the debate on the bill, to address Members in the debates in individual readings and committees and to apply amendments and to deliver an opinion was sufficient.
29. The Government recalled that the speeches of opposition Members were often very long (many hours) and a number of speeches, at least in part, did not even have a rational relationship with the proposed bill, i.e. pension reform. She stressed that many of the opposition Members' speeches were aimed at obstruction (citing, for example, Mr Babiš's observations), which do not enjoy constitutional protection.
30. The Government pointed out that, if the Constitutional Court had nevertheless found a defect in the legislative procedure consisting of a breach of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, which resulted in a breach of one of the constitutional standards, it should, in accordance with its settled case-law, consider whether the conflicting constitutional standards outweigh the constitutional standard which is affected in the present case. For example in the sp. zn. Although the Constitutional Court found a defect in the legislative process, it further considered whether any deregulation of the contested law would not be contrary to the values of the material rule of law, legal certainty and effective protection of constitutionality (Article 1 (1), Article 83 of the Constitution), while concluding that the protection of those values outweighs the interest in the deregation of the contested law in the case under consideration.
31. In relation to the objection of Mrs Schiller's unvoted procedural proposal, which, in the context of the third reading on 1 November 2024, submitted, pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure, a motion to postpone the negotiations on this House's press until 30 June 2025, the Government stated that such a proposal was, in its view, untenable. The Chamber of Deputies has already voted before that the third reading of the 696 press will continue on 6.11.2024 from 9.00. This resolution would therefore have to be revised first. Only if the revocation takes place could Mrs A. Schiller's motion be put to the vote.
32. In relation to the amendment by Members J. Jakob and M. Benda, the Government stated that it had been registered in the Chamber of Deputies (including with justification) under No 5098 on 4 October 2024. The amendment was read in a detailed second reading debate on 4 October 2024 in accordance with Rule 94 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, and was briefly justified by Mr Jakob. According to the Government, the legislation on the submission of amendments in § 94 (1) of the Rules of Procedure provides that the parliamentary amendment is presented only during the second reading. The evaluation of the amendments tabled then serves a guaranteed time-out before the third reading and the institutions are discussed by the Guarantee Committee. The Guarantee Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, i.e. the Social Policy Committee, has repeatedly discussed the amendments tabled on 9 and 25 October 2024. The third reading of House Press No. 696 was then opened on 10 October 2024, continued on 1, 6 and 8 November 2024, when the House Press was approved by the Chamber of Deputies in the third reading. The opposition repeated the amendment during the third reading, which shows that it did not only have but also made use of the opportunity to comment.
33. In relation to the notation of the bill to other committees, the Government noted that the decision by which the bill will be ordered by the committees is an autonomous right of the Chamber of Deputies under Rule 90 (7) of the Rules of Procedure. However, the draft law must always be ordered by the guarantee committee, which has happened in the case at hand. The Government, like the Chamber of Deputies, referred to the amendment contained in Rule 91 (4) of the Rules of Procedure.
34. In the light of the foregoing, the Government stated a partial conclusion that the conduct of the hearing and approval of Law No 417 / 2024 Coll. did not show any constitutional deficit which should initiate the exercise of the powers of appeal by the Constitutional Court.
35. The Government also commented on the second (material) line of reasoning of the appellant, consisting of the alleged inconstitutionality of the above mentioned provisions of the Pension Insurance Act. In the reference to the case law of the Constitutional Court, it first defined the fundamental bases of the limited review of the constitutionality of social rights.
36. In the light of the reasons for the contested legislation, the Government reiterated that there were serious factual reasons for submitting the draft law, in particular the unsustainability of the previous pension scheme, which in the future aimed at high pension account deficits. The government outlined the adverse predictions of demographic development of the Czech Republic and its impact on the pension system. It referred to the Report on the state of the pension system of the Czech Republic and its anticipated development, taking into account the demographic situation of the Czech Republic and the expected population and economic development ("Report on the state of the pension system"), which is part of the House Press No. 696 [cf.] Final report on regulatory impact assessment under the guidelines (RIA) ("RIA Final report").
37. The Government has pointed out that compliance with the commitments under the Convention on Benefits is also supervised by the bodies of the International Labour Organisation, which - to put it simply - has never, ever, before, contravened the conclusions reported by the Czech Republic concerning the fulfilment of commitments under this international agreement. The objection to a breach of the State's international obligations, namely Article 15 (3) of the Convention on Benefits, and transferred also to Article 1 (2) The Constitution has been stated by the Government that it is up to every Contracting Party to that international agreement which gives the profession the privilege of reducing the retirement age. The finding of agreement on the content of this definition is a task of legislative power, which may or may not be agreed with the proposal put forward by the government as an executive authority in its legislative initiative. The Government stressed that a group of employees performing third and fourth categories of work under the Public Health Protection Act had no special status in terms of determining retirement age until the end of 2024. The status of these persons was therefore entirely identical to that of the other insured persons. The preferred treatment was proposed only in the context of the pension reform, and it was necessary to define the beneficiary group in a way that would find a social consensus expressed by the democratically set ratio of forces in the Chamber of Deputies. The Government has accentuated the nature of the fundamental right to adequate physical protection in the old age as a social right for which the legislator is obliged to adapt it by implementing law. However, it is, in principle, a matter of his discretion as to how the relevant material will be adjusted.
38. The Government stated that the contested amendment was sufficiently justified. The work included only in the fourth category was selected mainly because it is the most dangerous category for health, where the hygiene limits are exceeded, therefore there is a high risk of health risks which cannot be excluded even when using available and applicable protective measures. The proposed amendment also took into account the fiscal implications, which the Government agreed to in its observations, since it considers it appropriate to first assess the effects of extending the group of pensioners with reduced retirement age working in the fourth category of work, and then, where appropriate, to further adjust the group of persons who would be subject to a reduction in retirement age. In addition, the Government added that the third category had been set aside on the basis of the parliamentary amendment because it had chosen a different solution which, in terms of the financial impact on the insured person, led to a very similar result to that which would have been included in the preferred group within the meaning of the Pension Insurance Act (this solution falls within the sphere of the so-called third pension pillar and includes the employer's compulsory contribution to the products saving for old age). The draft legislation has already been submitted to the Chamber of Deputies and is being discussed as House Press No. 894.
39. Finally, the Government expressed its views on the consequences of the proposed repeal. Its abolition as a whole would eliminate virtually the entire reform efforts of the government in the area of pension insurance. The Government pointed out that not only measures aimed at ensuring the future stability of the pension system and a more balanced balance sheet of the pension account would be removed from the legal system, but also measures aimed at strengthening the individual rights of insured persons in the context of social cohesion. Among other things, the legislation introducing a right to reduce the pension age threshold for workers performing fourth-category work would be abolished, but this was not criticised by the opposition during the legislative process. According to the Government, the repeal of the partial provisions would result in the incompleteness, incomprehensiveness and illogical nature of the legislation contained in the Pension Insurance Act.
Replication of the appellant
40. In the reply, the appellant maintained its argument, to which it referred, in particular in the part concerning the constitutionality of the procedure for the adoption of the contested law. In relation to the part of the Government's observations on material objections, it stated that it did not affect the specific character of economic, social and cultural rights which can only be invoked within the limits of implementing laws (Article 41 (1) of the Charter). It stated that the substance of its argument is based on the non-compliance of the contested law with the State's international obligations, referring to the principle of pacta sunt servanda, which it refers to as a cornerstone of the system of public international law. It emphasised that it did not argue in the proposal by intervening in social rights in the sense of the scope of the performance provided, thus "going beyond Article 41 (1) of the Charter and [does not] put forward a question of purely political discretion subject, if necessary, to the so-called rationality test '. The appellant also defined itself in relation to the Government's statement that it is a matter of political discretion whether a third category of staff will be taken into account. This position has been repeatedly described by the Government as a manifestation of the insolence of public power.
41. The appellant also disagreed with the opinion of the Chamber of Deputies that the amendment by Members M. Benda and J. Jakob contained a justification. It stressed that the passage referred to by the Chamber of Deputies did not comply with the requirements of the Convention on Benefits. Finally, it responded to the Senate's observations, confirming its response to the deletion of more favourable rules for early retirement for the entire third category of persons (cf. Resolution 56).
Communication from the Ombudsman
42. The Ombudsman informed the Constitutional Court that he would not exercise his right under Paragraph 69 (3) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended, and would not intervene in the proceedings.
Abandonment of oral proceedings
43. The Constitutional Court concluded that further clarification of the case could not be expected from oral proceedings and therefore, in accordance with Article 44 of the Constitutional Court Act, as amended, it decided without its regulation.
Management conditions
44. The Constitutional Court is responsible for discussing the application for annulment of Act No. 417 / 2024 Coll., or in event for the annulment of the amended provisions of the Pension Insurance Act. The appellant is actively authorised to submit the proposal. Although, according to settled case-law of the Constitutional Court (cf. Case 41 / 23 ÚS P, paragraphs 37 and 39), amending legislation and its individual provisions generally do not have a separate legislative existence, as they are part of the amended legislation, if the absence of standard competence or breach of the constitutionally prescribed way of adopting the law is contested, the constitutionality of the amending regulation can be assessed from these points of view (i.e. Act No 417 / 2024 Coll.). The contested provisions of the Pension Insurance Act are a valid part of the legal order. The Constitutional Court was therefore able to proceed to a substantive examination of the application.
Review of the procedure for the adoption of the contested law
45. In accordance with Article 68 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll., the Constitutional Court was primarily concerned with whether the contested Act (No 417 / 2024 Coll.) was adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution established competence and in a constitutional manner. It then assessed whether the contested legislation (amended provisions of the Pension Insurance Act) was in line with the constitutional rules in substance.
46. The Constitutional Court found that Law No. 417 / 2024 Coll. was adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution of the established competence. Moreover, the appellant raised no objections to this. Its argument - as is apparent from the abovementioned recap - focuses mainly on the shortcomings of the legislative process. The Constitutional Court therefore addressed whether Law 417 / 2024 Coll. was adopted in a constitutional manner.
General constitutional bases and principles of the legislative process and assessment of its defects
47. The Constitutional Court has already expressed many times on the assessment of the constitutionality of the legislative process in the proceedings for the annulment of laws and other legislation under § 64 et seq. of the Constitutional Court Act, as amended.
48. The Constitutional Court stresses that the Constitution defines only the basic framework of the legislative process. The legislative process is governed in particular by the Rules of Procedure of the two chambers of Parliament. Furthermore, the source of so-called parliamentary law is the autonomous resolutions of the individual chambers of Parliament issued pursuant to Rule 1 (2) of their Rules of Procedure. The consistent and constitutionally consistent practice of the Parliamentary Chamber and its bodies is also significant (e.g. the findings of the SPR 30 / 23, paragraph 76, and the SPR 47 / 23, paragraph 40). In particular, Parliament's rules of procedure thus guarantee and bring into practice the various constitutional principles of the legislative process. The constitutional principles and values are also governed by the interpretation and application of the individual provisions of the Rules of Procedure [cf. sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 1 / 12 of 27.11.2012 (N 195 / 67 CollNU 333; 437 / 2012 Coll.), paragraph 205].
49. The Constitutional Court has repeatedly held that, when reviewing the legislative process, it respects in particular the general principle of constitutional division of power, which consists in its distribution among the various constitutional institutions and, together with the principle of a representative democratic government, is enshrined in Article 2 (1) of the Constitution. This includes, inter alia, the specific principle of Parliament's autonomy in the sense of an independent institution representing the free democratic will, which itself lays down the rules and procedures of its internal organisation and functioning [cf. Therefore, the specific principle of self-restraint and restraint of the Constitutional Court in relation to the freely elected Parliament, which is the basis of a representative democratic government, is also essential for the constitutional division of power (cf. paragraph 54 below).
50. Parliament represents the democratic will of the people, but the exercise of its power, as well as internal organisation, rules and procedures, must be subordinate to the Constitution and to constitutional principles and values. Even in this modern principle of constitutionally representative government, the classic idea of Aristotle's rule of law over the political will, according to which "in democracies governed by the law, demagogues cannot be created, but leaders are the best citizens; But where laws do not decide, demagogues" (Aristotle. Politics. Publishing plant Petr Rezek, 1998, p. 157). Parliament's autonomy as a representative of democratic will is therefore not absolute and unlimited. The rich case-law of the Constitutional Court (most recently found on the part of Pl. ÚS 47 / 23, paragraph 50) repeatedly underlines that the legislative process must guarantee sufficient scope for parliamentary and public debate, as well as its appropriate level, in which government and opposition rights are guaranteed and which ensures an open exchange of majority and minority views across the political spectrum. Only a legislative process in which all participants have the opportunity to obtain appropriate information on the legislation under discussion, on the basis of which they can also express themselves and form an opinion, can be regarded as constitutionally conformist and democratically legitimate.
51. Parliament is not simply a place of exchange of specific and often conflicting views and interests of various social groups, but of institutions in which the general interest of the whole political society is born and formed. Members and Senators are not hostages to their constituents and their specific interests, objectives or prejudices. On the contrary, their joint task is to find and enforce the general interest of political society in all areas of life, including economic and social rights. This, moreover, is the meaning and essence of a representative democracy based on free and fair elections and political and party pluralism. Parliament, as its key institution, must therefore also base its internal organisation and procedures on the principles laid down by the Constitution, namely the principle of a free mandate guaranteeing the freedom and independence of Members of Parliament (Article 26 of the Constitution), their equality as representatives of the people, the freedom of parliamentary expression (Article 27 (2) of the Constitution) and the freedom of parliamentary debate in general (page 55 / 10, paragraph 66). In close context, the Constitutional Court also referred to the principle of pluralism and free competition of political parties and political forces [Article 5 of the Constitution and Article 22 of the Charter; cf. Findings sp. zn. However, the principle of the protection of minorities (Article 6, second sentence of the Constitution), which manifests itself primarily in the protection of the rights of the parliamentary minority, is considered to be primarily the parliamentary opposition (cf. sp. zn.
52. Parliament shall decide by majority on the basis of an open debate. The level of this debate may be different and closely related to the general cultural maturity of society, including the strength of its democratic traditions and values, but Parliament is certainly not just 'babbling'. Parliamentary debate envisages the principle of free competition between political parties and political forces, which is the cornerstone of modern representative democracy, guaranteed by Article 5 of the Constitution and Article 22 of the Charter. In such a competition, they can choose freely and independently not only voters, but also their representatives in Parliament, from different views, aspects and interests. It is in this context that the above-mentioned freedom of Members of Parliament should also be seen as an important right to present views and opinions on parliamentary ground, but which is neither unlimited nor self-useful, as the Constitutional Court has also ruled in the decision of the Pol. As regards the limitation of this right in the legislative process, it is essential at what stage of the process the restriction took place and whether or not those restrictions could have been healed at another stage of the procedure (the finding of the sp. zn.
53. Laws are legitimate in a democratic rule of law if they are the result of public consultation, open discussion ensuring pluralism and majority decision-making. On parliamentary ground, the principle of free competition between political parties and political forces is measured, inter alia, by the balance between the legitimate interests of the ruling majority and parliamentary minorities or opposition (point 76). While the majority of governments must not be prevented from ruling themselves, the minority must not be completely silenced or overlooked in the legislative process. This balance is closely linked to the practice of parliamentary obstruction, which is one of the means of political competition. The parliamentary opposition may delay or block decisions taken by a majority to achieve its own political objectives, but abuse of this right is not intended to weaken or prevent the effective exercise of power by the ruling majority. The purpose of the legislative process is to discuss and approve (or reject) the draft law, not to delay its adoption and obstruction leading to the paralysis of the legislative activity (the finding of the sp. zn. The Constitutional Court therefore does not provide political minority protection where it uses its rights under the Rules of Procedure for a purpose other than that for which it was enshrined (the finding of the sp. zl. ÚS 41 / 23, paragraph 177).
54. The case-law of the Constitutional Court is further based on the fundamental belief that a constitutionally defective legislative process cannot lead to a constitutionally consistent legislative act (cf. However, defects in the legislative process can only establish the unconstitutional nature of the law under consideration if it contravenes the constitutional rule. The Constitutional Court has therefore repeatedly emphasised that it cannot examine the numerous procedural errors of both the House and its governing bodies which have no impact on the assessment of the material constitutionality of the rule of law. It must be a 'direct and substantial breach' of the rules of the legislative process, which at the same time "reaches the constitutional legal dimension '. The Constitutional Court is not a protector of the mere legality of the parliamentary procedure [cf., e.g. the finding of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 15 / 22 of 15.5.2024 (208 / 2024 Coll.), paragraph 87]. Also in the finding sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 6 / 21 of 22.6.2021 (N 121 / 106 SbNU 312; 301 / 2021 Sb.), paragraph 45, the Constitutional Court points out that" it follows the principles of restraint and abolishes legislation exceptionally, if its essential rules have not been complied with in the legislative process and the errors reach constitutional legal dimensions'. These conclusions are already summarised in recent findings sp. zn.
55. The Constitutional Court therefore concludes that only such a defect in the legislative process, which reaches an unconstitutional level, can justify the repeal of the law adopted in that process. The assessment of such a level requires the creation of a clear typology similar to that of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic, for example, in its recent findings sp. zn. PL. ÚS 18 / 2022 (paragraphs 26-29) and PL. ÚS 3 / 2024 (paragraph 246). According to this typology, taken over by the Constitutional Court in the decision of the sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 47 / 23 (paragraph 42), the defect of the legislative process is unconstitutional if:
1. Conflicts directly with the rule expressly enshrined in the constitutional order;
2. Infringes the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate and, as a result of this defect, any constitutional standards or principles have been affected; while at the same time contradictory constitutional standards or principles do not prevail over the constitutional standard or principle that has been affected; or
3. the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate have been formally observed, but there will still be a particularly serious breach of a constitutional standard or principle in the process of Parliament; At the same time, conflicting constitutional standards or principles do not prevail over the constitutional standard or principle that has been affected.
56. According to the typology so drawn up, the Constitutional Court assesses the most strictly the contradiction with the rule which is directly enshrined in the constitutional order, and less strictly the violation of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies or of the Senate, whereas the third situation described may lead to the intervention of the Constitutional Court only exceptionally (cf.
57. As regards the second of the options referred to in paragraph 55, which relate to the case currently under consideration, infringement of the Rules of Procedure may also lead to a breach of constitutionality in particular in three types of situations:
1. infringement of legislative emergency rules [Findings sp. zn.
2. approval of the so-called adhesive (findings sp. zn.
3. limitation of parliamentary debate by merging the debate to unrelated bills (finding sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 1 / 12, but in which there was no repeal of the law for this reason), or termination of the debate in a situation where speakers (finding sp. zn.
58. The Constitutional Court also recalls that even if, in the case of a breach of the Rules of Procedure, one of the constitutional standards or principles has been affected at the same time, it is necessary to consider whether, at the same time, conflicting constitutional standards or principles outweigh the constitutional standard affected. In this way, in the sp. zn. Although the Constitutional Court found a defect in the legislative process, it considered whether the possible deregulation of the contested law would not be contrary to the values of the material rule of law, legal certainty and effective protection of constitutionality (Article 1 (1), Article 83 of the Constitution), it concluded that the protection of those values outweighs the interest in the deregation of the contested law in the present case.
Review of constitutional restrictions on debate in first, second and third reading
59. The Constitutional Court, following a brief summary and definition of the general bases of the review of the legislative process and its defects, has taken the view that the objections submitted by the appellant are justified.
60. First of all, the appellant contends that, when discussing draft law No. 417 / 2024 Coll., there was a limitation of the debate and a firm inclusion of the vote on the draft law in the first, second and third reading on a repeated violation of § 66 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, which, according to the appellant, constitutes "irreparable unconstitutionality."
61. The Constitutional Court has in the past repeatedly dealt with violations of the Rules of Procedure consisting in the conclusion of the debate before all the speakers have spoken. In accordance with the above-defined general bases of the review of the constitutionality of the legislative process, the Constitutional Court first assesses possible infringements of the Rules of Procedure and subsequently examines whether any defects may have a constitutional dimension (cf.
62. The Constitutional Court has stated that the termination of the debate before all the speakers have spoken, is contrary to Rule 66 (1) of the Rules of Procedure. The same conclusion was reached by the Constitutional Court in the previous findings, in which it dealt with the conclusion of the debate in this way (cf. the findings of Pl. ÚS 26 / 16, Pl. ÚS 87 / 20, Pl. ÚS 7 / 22, Pl. ÚS 30 / 23 and Pl. ÚS 41 / 23). It can also be added that the infringement of Rule 66 (1) of the Rules of Procedure cannot be justified even in accordance with the procedure laid down in Resolution 248 of the Chamber of Deputies of the 9th meeting of 26 February 1997, which, pursuant to Rule 1 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, regulates its internal circumstances and more detailed rules of procedure. According to Rule 1 of the Chamber of Deputies, it may decide not to vote at a certain time and the vote on the proposals submitted shall take place at a specified time. However, as the Constitutional Court pointed out in the decision of the Chamber of Deputies in its sp. zn.
63. The Constitutional Court therefore had to examine subsequently whether the illegal termination of the parliamentary debate (in fact) had taken place and whether any illegal termination had infringed constitutional standards (principles), or whether at the same time conflicting constitutional standards or principles prevail over the constitutional standard that is affected in the present case.
64. The Constitutional Court has verified from the stenograms and videos of the proceedings of the Chamber of Deputies that the President has repeatedly completed the debate on the draft Act No. 417 / 2024 Coll., although other speakers have been enrolled. On the basis of Mr Benda's adopted proposal, the general debate in the first reading was closed on 30 May 2024 at 18: 04 (cf. 16 of the vote and the following 19 of the vote at the 104th session of the Chamber of Deputies), even though 20 Members were enrolled. Similarly, the general debate at second reading, launched on 2 October 2024, was concluded on 4 October 2024 at 11: 46, although 24 Members were enrolled in it (cf. vote 6 at the 113th session of the Chamber of Deputies, which adopted Mr Benda's motion for a vote on the proposals tabled at the time and subsequent vote 7, which adopted the proposal to close the general debate at second reading). The third reading, which took place on 30 October 2024, 1 November 2024, 6 November 2024 and 8 November 2024, was completed on the basis of Mr Jakob's proposal to set a fixed time for the vote, and thus the end of the discussion of the draft of the contested law, at 12.01 (cf. Vote 13 and subsequent vote 14 at the 117th session of the Chamber of Deputies). 58 Members were enrolled at the end of the third reading debate.
65. By concluding the debate in a situation where 20 Members were added to it at first reading, 24 Members at second reading and even 58 Members at third, Article 66 (1) of the Rules of Procedure was infringed. The Constitutional Court recalls that in § 66 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Parliament of the Czech Republic made it clear that the President would end the debate if there were no other speakers. Thus, unlike other countries (e.g. Germany, Austria, Poland or Slovakia), the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies do not provide for the Institute to close the debate by voting or the possibility to determine in advance the length of the debate.
66. The Constitutional Court found no reason to deviate from the conclusions of the previous case-law, which implies that the breach of Paragraph 66 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, given the adoption of the above procedural proposals and the subsequent termination of the debate by the Presidents of the Chamber of Deputies, may also interfere with constitutional principles. For example in the find sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 41 / 23 (paragraph 170) The Constitutional Court emphasised that this provision is one of the possible details of Members' freedom to participate in the parliamentary debate and their equality arising from Articles 5 and 6 of the Constitution and Article 22 of the Charter. This conclusion was repeated by the Constitutional Court in the sp. zn.
67. It remains to be assessed whether conflicting constitutional standards or principles prevail over a constitutional standard or principle that has been affected. The opposite constitutional principle to be taken into account is the principle of political decision-making based on the will of the majority expressed by free voting (Article 6 of the Constitution).
68. In assessing the conflict of the above constitutional principles, the Constitutional Court relied on the following arguments. In the find sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 30 / 23 The Constitutional Court stated (paragraph 118) that a breach of the Rules of Procedure may have a constitutional legal dimension, provided that, as a result, the parliamentary minority is not allowed to express its views on the content of the draft law. In the find sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 41 / 23 The Constitutional Court added (paragraph 174) that the legitimate objective of limiting the debate is to protect the principle of political decision-making based on the will of the majority expressed by free vote (Article 6 of the Constitution). The device used is appropriate if, without its involvement, the Chamber of Deputies would not have been able to approve the proposal, even if it had the necessary majority. In the find sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 47 / 23 The Constitutional Court has assessed the conflict of the constitutional principles concerned, using the proportionality test, assessing that the adoption of a procedural proposal on a firm voting time and the subsequent termination of the debate constitutes an appropriate and necessary means of enforcing the constitutional principle of political decision-making based on the will of the majority expressed by free voting (paragraphs 83- 90). In the third step of this test, i.e. in the context of assessing the adequacy of the measure and answering the question whether it has intervened in the very essence of the constitutional principles of equality between Members of Parliament as representatives of the people and their entitlement to participate in the debate in this House, the Constitutional Court stressed (paragraph 94) that "it is essential [...] whether there has been an open debate between competitors, including minority views representing these groups' in the parliamentary debate.
69. The Constitutional Court first of all, after meeting the content of the stenograms and video recordings of the Chamber of Deputies, states that the bill was discussed at the Chamber of Deputies plenary on 28 May 2024 from 13: 00 to 23: 00, on 29 May 2024 from 9: 00 to 23: 00, on 30 May from 9: 00 to 18: 16. At the second reading on 2.10.2024 from 9.00 to 21.58, on 3.10.2024 from 9.00 to 20.31 and on 4.10.2024 from 9.00 to 12.36. The third reading took place on 30.10.2024 from 12.00 to 15.34, 1.11.2024 from 9.00 to 13.50, 6.11.2024 from 9.00 to 14.01 and 8.11.2024 from 9.00 to 12.55. The duration of the proposal now under consideration cannot be considered to be extremely short. Since the submission of the government bill to its adoption by the Chamber of Deputies, six months have passed, and the bill has been debated at plenary for 10 days, almost 79 hours in total. As is apparent from the Chamber of Deputies, the opposition Members have spoken about 600 times in the course of the bill. The Constitutional Court considers, in the light of the circumstances of the contested law, that the opposition Members have had sufficient time to comment on the subject matter of the law and that the appellant cannot be held responsible for not allowing a parliamentary minority to be defined against the draft law by a governmental majority.
70. At the same time, the Constitutional Court did not overlook - despite the appellant's view that the debate in the Chamber of Deputies was taking place factually and culturally - that the discussion of the draft law under consideration was also accompanied by obstruction by the opposition. During the hearing on 2 October 2024, for example, Member A. Babiš said: "Please, the Prime Minister said that obstruction is a manifestation of freedom and democracy, so for all pro-government journalists, I am announcing that Alice has entrusted me with the task of garnishing, gardening, so I will speak for a long, long time. And why are we working? [...] Why are we working? To put it simply, we want to prevent further theft of pensioners, because it is not reform." In the course of the performance, A. Babiš said: "So I will return to my speech. Just so the citizens here know that I've been hoarding - you know, hogging, talking for a long time. How long have I been talking? It'll be two hours soon. I'm working so they don't rob our pensioners." The performance of A. Babiš took a total of 2 hours 51 minutes, with a large part of it apparently not related to the subject matter of the law now under consideration. It can also be referred to by Mr H. Lang, who said on the same sitting day: "We are clearly saying here that this is a form of obstruction of the press, but it is not such a obstruction that I would open, I don't know, a quiet house here and start reading from the beginning to the conclusion. I will try to repeat some of the arguments that have already been made in the 10 or 11 hours." Mr Lang's performance took 1 hour 7 minutes.
71. The Constitutional Court therefore considers it appropriate to refer to the conclusions already set out in the decision on page 30 / 23, in which it stated (paragraph 124) that if the opposition, through its representatives, declared that the purpose of the act is to obstruct the adoption of the draft law, it cannot subsequently be argued that the parliamentary opposition was denied the right to express itself on the draft law because of a lack of time when it used the time it had received to do so also for obstruction, i.e. for something other than factual discussion of the draft law. Thus, as in previous similar cases, the Constitutional Court notes that the course of the legislative process as a whole did not lead to restrictions on the rights of the parliamentary opposition, consisting of the possibility of participating in the legislative procedure as its full participant. From a constitutional point of view, the opposition's representatives were not deprived of the possibility of actually familiarising themselves with the draft law and expressing their views on it (cf.
72. The Constitutional Court reiterates that, by concluding the debate in a situation where other Members have yet to be entered into the debate, Paragraph 66 (1) of the Rules of Procedure has been infringed, according to which the President will close the debate if no other speakers are entered. Together with the violation of Rule 66 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the constitutional principles of equality between Members of Parliament as representatives of the people and their right to participate in the House debate have also been affected. However, with reference to the proportionality test already mentioned in the sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 47 / 23, the Constitutional Court states that the means used, i.e. the adoption of procedural proposals on the fixed time of the vote and the subsequent termination of the debate, was not only capable of achieving the objective pursued, i.e. the protection of the contradictory constitutional principle of political decision-making based on the will of the majority expressed by free voting (Article 6 of the Constitution), but also responded to the obstructive behaviour of the opposition (cf. Furthermore, in line with the quoted finding, the Constitutional Court considers that the device used in this way was a minimal interference in the constitutional principles of equality between Members of Parliament as representatives of the people and their entitlement to participate in the House debate, since the Rules of Procedure do not offer any other less effective means of achieving the objective pursued, i.e. promoting the political will of the majority (cf. paragraphs 88 and 89). Given the wide possibility of opposition to the draft law, the Constitutional Court also considers the intervention of the above-mentioned constitutional principles protecting, in particular, members of the parliamentary minority to be appropriate. The process of the Chamber of Deputies in this matter was therefore in line with the Constitution.
73. The Constitutional Court concluded that, despite shortening the debate at first, second and third reading, the negotiation of the law now under consideration sufficiently balances the rights of the parliamentary majority and the minority. In short, the majority has the right to rule, and the minority must have a real opportunity to express their opinion, which has been fulfilled in the case submitted by the appellant.
Review of other alleged errors in the adoption of the contested law
74. The Constitutional Court subsequently examined the remaining procedural objections or objections challenging the constitutionality of the legislative process leading to the adoption of Act No. 417 / 2024 Coll.
75. The Constitutional Court has not testified to the appellant's objection that Members did not have the opportunity to comment in substance on the amendment of Members J. Jakob and M. Benda. As already emerged from the proposal itself and from the observations of the parties and interveners, this amendment was inserted into the system of the Chamber of Deputies on 4 October 2024 at 10: 41, at a time when the general debate was held at second reading, which ended at 11: 46 on the same day.
76. The Constitutional Court points out that the amendment of the Institute of Amendment does not have its roots in constitutional order, but is in a very general form contained in the rules of sub-constitutional law. The Rules of Procedure provide that a Member may make proposals in the debate. They are to relate to a point under discussion and are to be made clear of what is to be decided by the House, on which certain parts of the original proposal are deleted, extended or amended by an amendment (see section 63 (1) (4) of the Rules of Procedure). The Rules of Procedure explicitly provide that amendments are tabled during the second reading in a detailed debate (cf. Section 94 (1) of the Rules of Procedure), which happened in the case of Amendment 5098 (cf. J. Jakob's speech of 4 October 2024, 12: 20). The parties to the amendment thus complied with the requirement set out in Sections 63 (1) (4) and 94 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, and the amendment under examination therefore does not raise doubts as to compliance with the law. In view of the content of this amendment, it is clear that it was not an attachment (cf. paragraph 83 below).
77. The Constitutional Court also verified from the stenograms and videos of the Chamber of Deputies that Mrs A. Schiller had already spoken about the amendment in question during the detailed debate (started at 11: 48). At the Chamber of Deputies plenary, the material of this proposal was then addressed during the third reading. The Constitutional Court adds that a summary of all the amendments was sent to Members on 7 October 2024, i.e. more than three weeks before the start of the third reading. The Constitutional Court also stresses that the fact that a debate is held at the third reading, in which it can only be proposed to correct the effective date of the draft law, legislative errors, grammatical or written errors and adjustments resulting from the amendments tabled, or to propose a repetition of the second reading (Section 95 (2) of the Rules of Procedure), does not mean that the debate should be limited to precisely these issues or aspects.
78. During the third reading, 13 opposition Members expressed their views on the material of the amendment, namely: A. Babiš, A. Schiller, H. Lang, A. Juchelka, T. Okamura, J. Masek, I. Hendrych, A. Babiš, L. Wenzl, J. Pastuch, L. Saffranková, P. Nacher and O. Richter. It is clear from the above list that the opposition, in short, has had the opportunity to comment on the amendment, with sufficient distance from its distribution to all Members who have provided adequate preparation for a substantive debate, which has apparently also made use of the possibilities. The Constitutional Court also took into account that the amendments, including Amendment 5098, were debated in the Guarantee Committee (Social Policy Committee) on 9 October and 25 October 2024. The debate within the parliamentary committees, also composed of representatives of the parliamentary minority, is an integral part of the legislative process.
79. The Constitutional Court further took into account that the very nature of the contested amendment was not in any way extensive or complex, as is also demonstrated by the fact that it is integrated into a single provision of Section 37d (2) of the Pension Insurance Act. In other words, although the Constitutional Court does not intend to downplay the seriousness of the amendment and its broad social implications, the fundamental problem in this case did not lie in the fact that Members, for example, objectively needed a long time to study complex material, that they had to obtain expert opinions or consultations and so on. The question in question was perfectly clear, discussed in the Chamber of Deputies and in the public space and communication media. The Constitutional Court considers that, in the case of the contested amendment, it was, in fact, primarily about the way in which the political decision will be made.
80. The Constitutional Court adds that constitutional doubts do not raise a contradiction of the amendment with the original government bill. The right of Members and of the House Committees to submit amendments to the bills tabled and the power of the Chamber of Deputies to approve them is, of course, part of Parliament's legislative power under Article 15 of the Constitution. The appellant's objections alleging a breach of the principles of the material rule of law (e.g. legal certainty and predictability of the State) are therefore considered by the Constitutional Court to be irrelevant.
81. In relation to the objection of the draft law to the other committees of the Chamber of Deputies and the objection of the alleged disregard of Mrs Schiller's proposal, the Constitutional Court concluded that they did not have a constitutional dimension. The Constitutional Court has already pointed out above that, when reviewing the constitutionality of the infringement of the Rules of Procedure, it is quite logically first concerned with possible infringement of the Rules of Procedure and then examined whether any defects may have a constitutional legal dimension. While the conclusion of the debate at the time when other speakers were entered into it, the Constitutional Court, in accordance with its previous case-law, referred to it as contradictory to Article 66 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, did not find the illegality, which was the starting point of the algorithm for reviewing the constitutionality of the legislative process linked to the violation of the Rules of Procedure, in not giving the bill to other committees and not voting on the above-mentioned proposal by Ms A. Schiller. The procedure of the Chamber of Deputies or the decision to order the bill only to the Committee on Social Policy (in this case, the resolution of the Chamber of Deputies No 1023 adopted at the 104th meeting of 30 May 2024) corresponds to the requirements set out in Rule 90 (7) of the Rules of Procedure, which states that the House is obliged to decide precisely which committee will be the guarantor. The commandment to other committees is an option, but not a necessity, which is also confirmed by commentary literature (cf. Syllova, J. et al. Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies. Comment. Praha: Wolters Kluwer, 2021, p. 501). If the contested law has not been ordered by other committees, anything illegal cannot be seen, and even less unconstitutional.
82. The objection to the alleged disregard of Ms A. Schiller's proposal is related to the interpretation and application of the rules of subconstitutional law, in this case the Rules of Procedure, which the Constitutional Court only interferes with if it has a so-called qualified defect. The process of interpretation and application of sub-constitutional law is usually followed by such a qualified defect if it is the expression of an apparent and unjustifiable departure from interpretation standards, if it constitutes an unforeseeable interpretative libel, or if it is in extreme conflict with the requirements of a substantive and reasonable settlement of the legal relationship under consideration, or if it is contrary to the generally shared principles of justice and constitutes a so-called overstated formalism [cf. But no such deficit was found by the Constitutional Court in the process of the President of the Chamber of Deputies. The conclusion that the proposal put forward by Ms Schiller is untenable is not an expression of interpretation in the above-mentioned sense, as it is justified by a dispute with the previous resolution of the Chamber of Deputies expressing the willingness to discuss the draft law in a meritative manner, if necessary on 6.11.2024 from 9.00 at the time of the 117th meeting of the Chamber of Deputies. At the same time, the Constitutional Court could not overlook the obstructive dimension in its substance of Mrs A. Schiller's unfounded proposal.
83. The Constitutional Court did not, on its own, fully address the appellant's general objection to the fact that Amendment 5064 has the character of an unconstitutional adhesive. The Constitutional Court consistently states in its case-law that it is not his job to consider the argument for the appellant himself (cf. Resolution sp. zn. III. ÚS 2535 / 21 of 5.10.2021 or sp. zn. II. ÚS 2786 / 21 of 24.11.2021). If this restriction applies in the proceedings on constitutional complaints, all the more so in view of the qualified position of the appellants in the abstract control of constitutionality. However, the Constitutional Court, referring to the algorithm of the constitutional review of legislative stickers (cf. sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 41 / 23, paragraph 106), states at least briefly that the amendment does not consider the amendment to be an extension because it is clearly closely related to the subject matter and purpose of the original draft law. The amendment relates to the modification of the so-called third pillar of the pension system, namely supplementary pension savings, which is one of the instruments to mitigate the fall in financial income associated with retirement. The (third) pension pillar is part of a broader framework of pension reform and it is therefore quite logical that the legislator incorporated an amendment to the relevant law (cf. Act No. 427 / 2011 Coll., on supplementary pension savings, as amended) into a law the Constitutional Court deals with in the present case.
Conclusion
84. The Constitutional Court concludes that, although the process leading to the adoption of Act No. 417 / 2024 Coll. cannot be considered - in the subconstitutional sense - to be impeccable, measured by the primacy of the outlines of the Constitutional Court, it did not find that the individual errors found alone or in summary justified its exceptional interference in the legislative process. The formal defect in the legislative process, as in the case at hand, does not automatically mean that it is necessary to derogate from the legislative procedure of this nature (cf.
85. At the same time, the Constitutional Court considers it necessary to reiterate the view expressed in the findings of sp. zn.
Substantial assessment of the proposal
86. The appellant formulated a possible petition in which it stated that if the Constitutional Court did not find the grounds for the annulment of Act No. 417 / 2024 Coll. for procedural reasons, i.e. because of the defects in the legislative process, then it proposes that only part of Sections 32 (2) and (3) and 37d (2) of the Pension Insurance Act be repealed (see paragraph 3 above). As is apparent from the abovementioned recap, the appellant considers an unconstitutional increase in the age limit for retirement over 65 years, with gearing up at the age limit of 67. There is also an idea of limiting the relief of an increase in retirement age only to risky work classified under public health legislation in the fourth category.
87. The Constitutional Court recalls that the appellant does not rule out that social rights, namely the fundamental right to adequate physical protection in the old age provided for in Article 30 (1) of the Charter, are specific in nature. It therefore does not dispute that the law (Article 30 (3) of the Charter) determines the specific form of that fundamental right, or that it can only be invoked within the limits of the implementing law (Article 41 (1) of the Charter), which is an expression of the legislator's discretion as to how the relevant material can be adjusted.
88. The appellant contests the lack of justification for the contested legislation, both in relation to the actual increase in the age limit for retirement over 65 years and in relation to the limitation of the pension-age relief, in which it sees an infringement of the international obligations under the Convention on Benefits and, therefore, a conflict with the constitutional establishment of the international principle of pacta sunt servanda in Article 1 (2) of the Constitution. In its reply, it explicitly states that it does not put forward "a question of purely political discretion subject to the so-called rationality test '.
89. The Constitutional Court states on the appellant's arguments and objections that, in the abstract control of constitutionality, it is bound by a petition, not by the appellant's arguments. For example, in the finding of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 26 / 08 of 7.4.2009, as amended by the amending order of 27.5.2009 (N 82 / 53 CollNU 33; 171 / 2009 Coll.), paragraph 45, the Constitutional Court stated that "the principle of the procedure for abstract control of standards does not apply, and the Constitutional Court is therefore not bound by the grounds of the application, but is, on the contrary, obliged to examine the contested provision also in terms of compliance with constitutional law other than those for which the appellants challenge it '. Done at sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 29 / 15 of 31.5.2016 (N 94 / 81 SbNU 537; 233 / 2016 Coll.) The Constitutional Court stated in a similar manner (paragraph 42) that" the subject of the review in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court is, however, defined by the petition, not by its reasoning, by which the Constitutional Court is not bound'.
90. Thus, although the appellant's argument primarily seeks to establish a lack of justification for the contested legislation and a breach of the State's international obligations, it cannot be overlooked that the appellant, although in general, objects to the illegality of the very legality of § 32 (2) and (3) and § 37d (2) of the Pension Insurance Act. The appellant therefore challenges the constitutionality of an increase in the age limit for retirement over 65 years up to 67 years, as well as the constitutionality of the exclusion of the so-called third category of work from a group of risky work, for which the legislation guarantees relief from the increase in retirement age. Therefore, in the context of a substantive review, the Constitutional Court will first assess, using the rationality test, the compliance of Articles 32 (2) and (3) and 37d (2) of the Pension Insurance Act with Article 30 of the Charter and then assess the international legal compatibility of those legal provisions.
91. The Constitutional Court adds that it did not overlook the appellant's objections alleging a alleged breach of the principles of the material rule of law (see paragraphs 12 and 13 above). However, it is clear from the above recap of the proposal currently under consideration that the appellant does not apply these principles separately (e.g. as in the sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 47 / 23, in which the temporal effects of the legislative change in the age condition for early retirement, potentially affecting the legitimate expectations of the insured persons) were challenged, but only in conjunction with the alleged lack of justification for the contested legislation. Therefore, the Constitutional Court does not deal with these objections separately, but deals with them through an assessment of compliance with the Charter and international treaties.
Compliance with Article 30 of the Charter - Rationality Test
92. The Constitutional Court, in its established decision-making practice, takes the view that both the application and interpretation of social rights enshrined in the title of the Fourth Charter are understated, as it is aware of the fact that the legal regulation and its application are limited by the possibilities of the State budget, supported by the results of the State's management. Within this framework, the limits set by the relevant Articles of the Charter governing social rights may apply. At the same time, these are matters of political nature. Therefore, the Constitutional Court does not, in principle, leave the legislature to assess the effectiveness and appropriateness of the legal regulation in this field and, except in cases of established non-constitutionality, interfere. Thus, the concept of social rights is that they do not have an unconditional nature and can only be invoked within the limits of the laws in force (cf. Article 41 (1) of the Charter or other provisions referring to legal provisions such as Article 30 (3) of the Charter). This lack of direct enforceability is manifested in the need for their proper legal clarification, which is generally also a condition for the specific exercise of individual social rights [cf., the findings of sp. zn. Pl. Pl. ÚS 8 / 07 of 23.3.2010 (N 61 / 56 of SbNU 653; 135 / 2010 Coll.), sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 2 / 08 of 23.4.2008 (N 73 / 49 of SbNU 85; 166 / 2008 Coll.) and sp.
93. However, the freedom granted by the legislature in Article 41 (1) of the Charter and Article 30 (3) of the Charter is not unlimited. The legal definition of the conditions for the exercise of social rights must not conflict with fundamental constitutional principles and must not interfere with the very substance of these fundamental rights. As in the case of fundamental rights and freedoms directly enforceable under the Charter, the legislature must also respect the rule referred to in Article 4 (4) of the Charter, according to which when applying the provisions on the limits of fundamental rights and freedoms, their substance and meaning must be investigated (cf. the found sp. zn.
94. For these reasons, the Constitutional Court's case-law promoted and established as a methodological tool the review of the legislature's intervention in the field of social rights, the so-called test of rationality (rationality) consisting of the following four steps: 1. definition of meaning and substance, i.e. essential content (core) of economic, social or cultural law, 2. assessment of whether the law does not affect the very existence of social law or the actual realisation of its essential content, 3. assessment of whether the legal regulation pursues a legitimate objective, i.e. whether it is not a arbitrary fundamental reduction of the general standard of fundamental rights, and 4 answers to the question whether the legal instrument used to achieve that objective is rational (251 / 2008), although not necessarily best, most efficient or wisest [cf. In its previous case-law, the Constitutional Court stated in relation to the last step of the rationality test that the measure under assessment would be sufficient if it could not be regarded as manifestly unreasonable [cf. sp. zn.
95. It can be added that if the Constitutional Court, in the second step of the proportionality test, concludes that the contested legislation concerns the very existence of one of these rights or the actual realisation of its essential content, it will assess the admissibility of the intervention in this law within the framework of the (stricter) proportionality test [cf.
96. The Constitutional Court carried out a rationality test in relation to the contested provisions of the Pension Insurance Act following the definition of the general grounds for the review of social rights. He did so briefly because, as has already been said, the appellant does not make any arguments in this regard.
97. The essential content of the right to adequate material security in the old age was defined by the Constitutional Court in the finding of point Pl. ÚS 30 / 23, where it stated, inter alia, (paragraph 180) that "the essence of the fundamental right under Article 30 (1) of the Charter is the guarantee of a decent life in old age, which means, inter alia, a fair and reasonable pension [...] '. In the find sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 54 / 10 The Constitutional Court, in relation to the fundamental right to adequate material security in incapacity for work within the meaning of Article 30 (1) of the Charter, stated (paragraphs 54 and 55) that" in general it is the nature and purpose of that right to ensure a minimum material standard sufficient to lead a decent life in cases where the employee is unable to obtain his own work as a result of illness. However, the obligation of the State to ensure this standard cannot be seen, from a constitutional point of view, as an obligation to provide social services to individuals to the greatest possible (economically sustainable) extent, but only as an obligation to ensure that the level, frequency and nature of such services are ensured by the already mentioned social standard'. The latter conclusions, formulated in the field of sickness insurance, may also be adequately transferred to the area of pension insurance.
98. The Constitutional Court did not find in the present case any intervention in the essential content of the right to adequate material security in the old age. An increase in retirement age would be eligible to intervene in the essential content of Article 30 (1) of the Charter only if the increase was excessive, but this did not occur in the present case. The contested legislation is based on numerous demographic indicators, such as the decrease in the likelihood of death and the associated increase in the expected life expectancy or increase in the so-called life expectancy. The increase in retirement age is therefore only an associated manifestation of demographic development or an adequate response to it, in which the essence of the right to physical protection in old age remains. If the Constitutional Court, when establishing the substance of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 30 (1) of the Charter, has stated that there is no right to a certain amount of pension beyond an inviolable minimum substantive standard (cf. sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 30 / 23, paragraph 180), it is all the more likely that, by virtue of Article 30 (1) of the Charter, legal arrangements should favour a specific well-defined group of persons in determining the retirement age as a result of the performance of the risk work. The determination of this category thus remains an expression of the legislator's political discretion, which must, however, respect international commitments.
99. The assessment of the contested legislation according to the third step of the rationality test answers to the question whether the legal regulation pursues a legitimate objective. The contested legislation aims to ensure the sustainability of the pension scheme. The pension reform, the main focus of which is the increase in retirement age, responds to the fact that the current basic pension insurance arrangements with regard to these demographic indicators in the future were aimed at high pension account deficits. The legislator designed this reform as part of a comprehensive process to restore public finances in terms of their sustainability and long-term balance between public budgets. This intention, i.e. the reduction of any negative financial impact, is also monitored by the adjustment contained in Section 37d (2) of the Pension Insurance Act limiting the range of insured persons entitled to early retirement. The legal objective of the contested legal provisions is therefore defined by means of the above public interest. The Constitutional Court concludes that this objective is constitutionally consistent, pursues a constitutionally challenged interest and does not result in a arbitrary fundamental reduction in the standard of relevant social law.
100. In relation to the fourth step of the rationality test, the Constitutional Court states that its task is not to seek an optimal solution or a solution least restrictive of the fundamental right in question. It is essential for the Constitutional Court that the contested legislation is not unduly discriminatory. In fact, it would not be possible to establish the rationality of the contested legislation if the legal means used to achieve the stated objective were to deny the postulates of a democratic rule of law, including the principle of equality and the prohibition of discrimination, whether direct or indirect (cf. The Constitutional Court has not found violations of these constitutional principles. The contested legislation increasing the retirement age affects all individuals by applying a legally foreseen mechanism to raise the age level of retirement age, as well as that mechanism being linked to a statistically established survival period through the hope of a generation aged 50 years. Finally, if the legislator granted the possibility of early retirement only to insured persons carrying out risk work falling within the fourth (and not the third) category, he did so with the knowledge of the different status of those persons compared to other insured persons, including those in the third category. As is apparent from the reasons for the amendment, in the fourth category of work, health limits are exceeded, thus there is a high risk of health risks which cannot be excluded (as in the third category) or when using available and applicable protective measures such as personal protective equipment.
101. The Constitutional Court considers the contested legislation to be rational, or it did not find anything in it that could be regarded as manifestly or manifestly irrational in the above sense. The positive answer to the question of whether it is a reasonable, albeit not the most appropriate, wisest or best legal means to achieve a legitimate regulatory objective gives all steps to the test. The Constitutional Court therefore concluded that the contested legislation is compatible with Article 30 (1) of the Charter.
Compliance with international obligations (Convention on Benefits)
102. The appellant claims that the contested legislation is contrary to the obligations under Article 15 (2) and (3) of the Convention on Benefits.
103. First, the Constitutional Court states that the Convention on Benefits was ratified and declared by the International Agreement on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which the Czech Republic is bound by, in the sense of Article 10 of the Constitution (as it stood before 1.6.2002, i.e. before the so-called Euronovela of the Constitution), in view of its content. In Part III, this Convention contains an obligation on the State to guarantee the provision of an old-age pension to protected persons under the other Articles of this Part. Therefore, in the light of the finding of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 36 / 01 of 25.6.2002 (N 80 / 26 SbNU 317; 403 / 2002 Coll.) (Competition finding), the reference aspect for the assessment of national law remains the Constitutional Court, with the derogatory consequences.
104. This conclusion does not call into question the fact that ratification of the Convention on Benefits has not been agreed by the legislative authority. As is apparent from the Government Resolution of 24.8.1989 No 254, the Convention on Benefits was only approved by the Government without submission to the Federal Assembly. Ratification took place because it was required by the international treaty itself (cf. Article 47 of the Convention on Benefits) without the prior agreement of the legislature, namely the Federal Assembly (cf. Article 36 (3) of the then applicable Constitutional Law No. 143 / 1968 Coll., on the Czechoslovak Federation). This agreement was not granted subsequently, which was verified by the Constitutional Court by a query at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
105. The Constitutional Court points out that the condition of the assent of the legislature to the ratification of human rights international treaties was incorporated into the constitutional order with effects for futuro, i.e. from 1.1.1993 to Article 49 (2) of the Constitution (as amended before the Euronovela). At the same time, through the Incorporation Clause in Article 10, the Constitution has introduced in the past adopted international human rights treaties without requiring the assent of the legislature to ratify for this category of older treaties.
106. The above defined conditions of incorporation foreseen by Article 10 of the Constitution (as before the Euronovela) are fulfilled by the Convention on Benefits. Ratification of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was registered on 11 January 1990 by the Director-General of the International Labour Office. Pursuant to Article 48 (3), this Treaty entered into force 12 months after the date of registration of the ratification. The Convention therefore entered into force for the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic on 11.1.1991 (according to the ratification declaration of the legal predecessor, the Czech Republic is bound precisely by Part III of this Treaty concerning old-age benefits) and was declared under No 416 / 1991 Coll. Subsequently, the Suces of the Czech Republic were confirmed between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the International Labour Organisation in this Convention on 1 January 1993.
107. If the Convention on Benefits fulfilled the terms of the incorporation provided for in the previous constitutional arrangements, it was not only part of the rule of law, but also a reference framework in the abstract standard control procedure. It remains part of this reference framework, i.e. even after the adoption of the Euronovella, taking into account the legal conclusions of the sp. zn. In this finding, the Constitutional Court stated that "from the constitutional maximum provided for in Article 9 (2) of the Constitution, the provisions do not only apply to the constituency but also to the Constitutional Court. The inadmissibility of the amendment to the fundamental essentials of the democratic rule of law includes an instruction from the Constitutional Court, according to which no amendment to the Constitution can be interpreted in the sense that the consequence would be to limit the procedural level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms already achieved. [...] The constitutional establishment of the general incorporation standard, thereby overcoming the dualistic concept of the relationship between international and national law, cannot be interpreted in the sense of removing the reference aspect of ratified and declared international human rights treaties and fundamental freedoms for the assessment of national law by the Constitutional Court, with the effect of deregation."
108. The Constitutional Court subsequently assessed whether the contested legislation complies with the requirements of Article 15 (2) and (3) of the Convention on Benefits.
109. If Article 15 (2) of the Convention on Benefits provides that retirement age may exceed 65 years only taking into account demographic, economic and social considerations, supported by statistical evidence, it can be concluded from this wording that an increase in retirement age provides evidence of certain qualified reasons which act as a material source of legislation contained in Section 32 (2) and (3) of the Pension Insurance Act.
110. The Constitutional Court considers that this requirement (international commitment) has been met in the present case.
111. The presentation of the government bill itself preceded an expert debate. The explanatory memorandum states that the issue of maintaining the sustainability of the pension system was addressed, inter alia, by an advisory team of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs for Pension Reform, composed of representatives of government political parties (movement), representatives of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the Ministry of Finance and external experts. The measure consisting in the automatic increase of retirement age was also proposed by the National Economic Council of the Government (cf. explanatory memorandum, pp. 34 and 35).
112. The explanatory memorandum refers to the analysis of the pension system (cf. above the Report on the state of the pension system), which shows that an end to the increase in retirement age would lead to an enormous increase in the financial burden that the pension system would create within the State budget (there, p. 35). The RIA Final Report, which states that the proposed legislation responds in particular to the fact that the current basic pension scheme leads to high pension deficits in the future and thus to the financial unsustainability of the pension scheme (cf. RIA Final Report, p. 10). The need to adopt the legislation now under review is based on a number of demographic indicators. The report on the state of the pension system (p. 5) mentions, for example, an increase in the population share of people aged 65 and over, a fall in the child component in the population and a decrease in the likelihood of death. The explanatory memorandum then points (p. 35) to an increase in the expected life expectancy measured by HALE, published by the World Health Organisation, which has increased by three years since 2000. It can be added that the report on the state of the pension system also uses (p. 22 et seq.) an extensive set of statistics on pension insurance.
113. It is clear only from the brief recap of the explanatory memorandum and the follow-up documents that the increase in the retirement age (including its designation) is a manifestation of the legislature's complex and rational considerations, which justified the need for a change to the current regulation by a sufficiently representative set of economic, demographic and statistical data. The Constitutional Court therefore concludes that the increase in retirement age carried out by Article 32 (2) and (3) of the Pension Insurance Act will comply with the requirement set out in Article 15 (2) of the Convention on Benefits.
114. The Constitutional Court subsequently assessed the compliance of the contested legislation with Article 15 (3) of the Convention on Benefits, which the appellant refers to, by reference to the alleged lack of justification of § 37d (2) of the Pension Insurance Act, i.e. in relation to the legislation providing for an increase in pension age for risky work. However, the Constitutional Court considers that the international commitment concerning the justification (or rather proof of certain qualified reasons) of the national provisions of this provision, contrary to Article 15 (2) of the Convention on Benefits, does not result. The appellant aims primarily at that provision because there is a requirement to reduce the retirement age for persons who have worked in the work considered to be severe or harmful to health.
115. The Constitutional Court states, moreover, that if the appellant contends that the exclusion of a third category of work from a more favourable regime for early retirement constitutes an internationally illegal conduct or breach of an international obligation, it fails to see that Article 15 (3) of the Convention on Benefits leaves the identification of that category of heavy and health harmful work for the purposes of reducing retirement age and providing retirement benefits entirely to national legislation. This approach corresponds to the "division of labour 'in the area of international legal regulation on social security (cf.). The Constitutional Court considers that, in view of the wording of Article 15 (3), The Convention on Benefits would fulfil its international obligations, whether it includes third and fourth category or only fourth category work under the relevant public health regulations. The Constitutional Court takes note of the fact that for persons carrying out a third category of work, the legislator has chosen a different solution which should have similar financial implications for insured persons to their inclusion in the preferred group within the meaning of the Pension Insurance Act. As is apparent from the third-reading debate, where the resulting form of Section 37d (2) of the Pension Insurance Act was further justified, this is a measure falling within the III Pillar of Pension, which includes the employer's compulsory contribution to old age savings products. The bill introducing this measure is currently being discussed in the Chamber of Deputies as House Press No. 894.
116. Finally, the Constitutional Court considers it appropriate to at least briefly assess further international human rights obligations in the field of social security. It stresses that, despite the broad consensus on the judicial enforceability of social rights in general and social security rights in particular, it remains relatively difficult to define cases of international illegal conduct in this area, on the grounds that international law leaves very wide scope for States in this area to implement international obligations.
117. This conclusion is confirmed, for example, by General comment No 19 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("the Committee ') of 2008, according to which the Parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are to take appropriate measures to establish a social security scheme providing benefits to older persons from a certain age, as provided for by national legislation. Furthermore, in relation to the determination of the retirement age, the Committee added in general (paragraph 15) that that age should be in line with national conditions which take into account, inter alia, the nature of the profession, in particular the dangerous professions and the working capacity of the elderly. A similar conclusion can also be found in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which decides on the right to social security, for example, through the right to peaceful use of the property guaranteed by Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. As is apparent from the ECHR judgment of 17.1.2023 in the case of Žegarac and others against Serbia (complaint No 54805 / 15), that provision does not restrict the freedom of the parties to decide whether to introduce or not to introduce a form of social security scheme or to select the type or amount of benefits to be provided under that scheme (paragraph 78).
118. The Constitutional Court refers, in the context of the interpretation of Article 30 of the Charter, to Article 26 (2) of the European Social Security Code (published under No 90 / 2001 Coll.), according to which the age of retirement will not exceed 65 years. However, a higher age may be established if the number of inhabitants of that age is not less than 10% of the total population younger than that age but over 15 years. This requirement is also met by the legal regulation under appeal because, as is apparent from the most recent data of the Czech Statistical Office (according to the state of 1.1.2024) on the age composition of the population, the ratio between the age category 67 + and the age category 15- 66 is 28% when determining the age for 67 years.
119. Finally, the Constitutional Court found no contradiction in relation to the Convention on Minimum Social Security Standard (No 102), published under No 461 / 1991 Coll., which has a similar status to the Convention on Benefits. Article 26 (2) of the Treaty states that the age (old-age pension) laid down may not exceed 65 years, with the competent authorities being able to determine an age higher in terms of the working capacity of the elderly in the country concerned. The rationality test already carried out, as well as the assessment of compliance of the contested legislation with the Convention on Benefits, shows that the labour capacity of the elderly has been taken into account by the legislator, whether in the context of demographic indicators (e.g. a decrease in the likelihood of death and a related increase in the expected life expectancy, or an increase in the so-called life expectancy), or in the context of the performance of work in the fourth risk category for which the retirement age is 65 years.
120. The Constitutional Court therefore considers, for the reasons set out above, both the increase in retirement age and the reduction of the pension age relief to be consistent with international human rights obligations.
Conclusion
121. In this finding, the Constitutional Court first addressed the constitutionality of the legislative process under which Act No. 417 / 2024 Coll. It concluded that, although the Rules of Procedure had been infringed (Paragraph 66 (1)), that breach did not constitute the unconstitutional nature of the entire legislative process. In other words, in this case, the constitutional principle of political decision-making, based on the will of the majority, prevailed over the Members' right to participate in the House debate. The Constitutional Court, as in the finds sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 41 / 23 and sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 47 / 23, calls on the legislature to pursue the reform of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, which, in its current dysfunctional form, allows the parliamentary majority to enforce the laws, even though they have enough votes to adopt them, often only at the cost of violating them.
122. Subsequently, the Constitutional Court dealt with a substantive review of the contested legislation, both in terms of fulfilling the conditions of the so-called rationality test and in terms of compliance with international obligations. For the reasons set out above, the Constitutional Court has not testified to the appellant's objections.
123. According to Article 70 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court therefore rejected the application for annulment of Law No 417 / 2024 Coll. and in case of annulment of the contested provisions of the Pension Insurance Act as unfounded.
President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr.
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Regulation Information
| Citation | The Constitutional Court found No 256 / 2025 Coll., sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 11 / 25 on the application for annulment of Act No. 417 / 2024 Coll., amending Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., on Pension Insurance, as amended, and other related laws, and in eventum on the repeal of certain provisions of Act No. 155 / 1995 Coll., on Pension Insurance, as amended |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | - |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 29.07.2025 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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