The Constitutional Court found No. 226 / 2025 Coll.
Findings of the Constitutional Court sp. zn.
Valid
226
FIND
The Constitutional Court
of 4 June 2025
sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 19 / 24 in the case of the application for annulment of § 6 paragraph 3 of Act No. 93 / 2009 Coll., on Auditors and on the amendment of certain laws (Act on Auditors), as amended
On behalf of the Republic
On 4 June 2025, the Constitutional Court decided under sp. z. z. pl. ÚS 19 / 24 in plenary composed of the President of the Court of Josef Baxy and the judges and judges of Lucie Dolanská Bányai, Josef Fiala, Milan Hulmák, Veronica Christian, Zdeňka Kühn, Tomáš Langášek, Jiří Nábán, Catherine Ronovské (Judge of the Rapporteur), Dita Řepková, Jan Svatona, Pavel Šámal, Jan Wintra and Daniela Zeman on the proposal of the Supreme Administrative Court for the annulment of Article 6 (3) of Act No 93 / 2009 Coll., on Auditors and on the amendment of certain Laws (Act on Auditors), as amended by the Parliament of the Czech Republic, on behalf of the Parliament of the Parliament of the Senate,
as follows:
Motion denied.
Reasons
Definition of the case
1. The Supreme Administrative Court, by a proposal pursuant to Article 95 (2) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution) and Article 64 (3) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as the Law on the Constitutional Court) seeks the annulment of Article 6 (3) of the Act No. 93 / 2009 Coll., on auditors and on the amendment of certain laws (the Law on Auditors), as amended, (hereinafter referred to as the Act on Auditors).
2. Paragraph 6 (3) of the Auditor Act, which the Supreme Administrative Court proposes to abolish, reads as follows:
"The Chamber shall suspend the audit firm from carrying out its audit activities if a criminal prosecution has been brought against it for a criminal offence committed intentionally, until the date on which the decision terminating the criminal prosecution becomes legal. '
3. The appellant, the Supreme Administrative Court, is conducting proceedings under sp. zn. 5 As 154 / 2023 on a complaint against a commercial company which was entitled to conduct an audit activity [i.e. an audit firm within the meaning of § 2 (e) of the Auditor Act]. By decision of the Executive Committee of the Chamber of Auditors of the Czech Republic ("the Chamber"), it was suspended from carrying out audit activities under Section 6 (3) of the Auditor Act. The Public Audit Supervisory Board ("the Board ') rejected the appeal of the audit firm and confirmed the decision of the Chamber. The Supreme Administrative Court is to decide on the appeal complaint lodged by the audit firm against the decision of the Municipal Court in Prague by which it dismissed its action against the previously mentioned decision. The primary objection of the complainant before the Supreme Administrative Court is the inconstitutionality of Section 6 (3) of the Auditor Act.
Arguments of the appellant
4. The appellant considers that the contested provision has a fundamental impact on the rights of audit firms which it makes impossible to exercise their business freely and, in view of the potentially significant length of criminal proceedings, may also have liquidation consequences. According to the appellant, the infringement of Article 26 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as the Charter) constitutes an infringement of Article 26 (1). The formal interpretation of the contested provision is, according to the appellant, not possible because, by its wording, it excludes any possibility of discretion.
5. The appellant considers that the contested provision interferes with the essential core of the right to business, as it makes it impossible for audit firms against which criminal proceedings are being prosecuted for an intentional offence to fully carry out an activity for which they have previously been authorised and professionally competent. In view of this, the proportionality test must be considered, in which, according to the appellant, it does not stand up to the criterion of necessity (necessity). Although it is a measure that is appropriate to achieve the legitimate objective pursued, which is preventive protection for third parties, this objective can, according to the appellant, be achieved more carefully by assessing individual cases according to the individual circumstances of the case. This is not possible if there is a binding suspension. The legislator should have left the decision-making body with the possibility of discretion.
6. Indeed, this was the case for a number of other professions of a similar nature - notaries, authorized architects, tax advisors, court executors, judges, insolvency administrators, experts or interpreters, as evidenced by the appellant's references to legislation. Thus, the wording of Paragraph 6 (3) of the Auditor Act may also constitute an infringement of the principle of equality (Articles 1, 3 (1) of the Charter). In that context, the appellant also drew attention to the specific circumstances of the case-by-case - an audit firm which has been suspended from carrying out the audit activity, has carried out its activity in a qualified manner and is not prosecuted for an intentional offence which was directly related to its audit activity [note.
7. The appellant pointed out that the legislator had in the past fluctuated whether or not the Chamber had acknowledged the possibility of considering whether the conduct of audit activities should be suspended during the prosecution. He originally allowed a discrepancy, and then he withdrew completely from it; the effective adjustment is then made when the discrepancy is permitted for malpractice prosecution and excludes criminal prosecution for intentional crime. The appellant points out that such development violates the so-called standstill doctrine, i.e. the principle of maintaining the level of protection of fundamental rights achieved, in its procedural aspect. Without the scope to take administrative consideration, i.e. on a binding suspension, the judicial protection of the rights of the operators concerned is limited.
Proceedings
8. The proposal fulfils all the statutory requirements and is admissible under Section 66 of the Constitutional Court Act.
9. In the context of the examination of the conditions of the procedure, the Constitutional Court was further obliged to examine whether the application had been lodged by a legitimate appellant. Under Article 95 (2) of the Constitution, Article 64 (3) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the active legitimacy of the Court of First Instance for the application to review the constitutionality of the specific provisions of the Law is given only if it concludes that the law (or part thereof) to be applied in the resolution of the case is contrary to the constitutional order.
10. The Constitutional Court takes the view in its decision-making practice that proceedings initiated pursuant to Article 95 (2) The Constitution is not an abstract review of constitutionality, but it is conducted in a narrow framework of judicial decision-making of a particular case [see for example the find sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 34 / 10 of 24.7.2012 (N 130 / 66 CollNU 19; 284 / 2012 Coll.), paragraph 32. Therefore, the active legitimacy of the court to file an application for annulment or its provision depends on the subject matter of the proceedings and the legal qualification of the case. The Court of First Instance may make an application for annulment of only such a law (or its sub-provisions) as it is to apply directly (immediately) in order to resolve the pending proceedings. The condition of direct (immediate) use is fulfilled if the application of the law (or its individual provision) is necessary, necessary, not only hypothetical or given by a wider context of the case [see for example Resolution sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 39 / 2000 of 23.10.2000 (U 39 / 20 of SbNU 353) or the finding of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 20 / 05 of 28.2.2006 (N 47 / 40 of SbNU 389; 252 / 2006 Coll.)].
11. The judicial files and administrative files submitted together with the application show that the applicant is entitled to submit the application. As he explained in the proposal, the fundamental assessment of the constitutional consistency of Article 6 (3) of the Auditor Act, which was applied in administrative decisions which are subject to review by administrative courts, is the decision on the complaint. The above conditions are therefore met.
Comments on the applicant's proposal and reply
12. The proposal was sent pursuant to Article 69 (1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court to the two chambers of Parliament, which are entitled to act on its behalf [Paragraph 9 of Act No. 300 / 2017 Coll., on the principles of conduct and contact between the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate and on the amendment of Act No. 90 / 1995 Coll., on the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, as amended, (Liaison Act)]. At the same time, pursuant to Article 69 (2) and (3) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, it was also sent to the Government and the Ombudsman, i.e. to the bodies entitled to intervene as interveners.
13. The President of the Chamber of Deputies Margaret Pekarova Adamová summed up the legislative process. It stated that Act No. 334 / 2014 Coll., amending Act No. 93 / 2009 Coll., on Auditors and amending certain laws (the Act on Auditors), as amended, amending Section 6 (3) of the Act on Auditors to the still effective text, was approved by the necessary majority of Members of the Chamber of Deputies, signed by the relevant constitutional authorities and duly declared.
14. Also Senate President Miloš Vyšl described the legislative procedure for which he stated that the bill was adopted by the Senate within the limits of the Constitution of the established competence and the constitutional procedure. He noted that Act No. 334 / 2014 Coll. in relation to audit firms only assumed the existing legal construction of the suspension of activities still affecting statutory auditors.
15. The Government, through the Minister of Legislation, has informed Michal Solomon that he will not enter the proceedings. The Ombudsman also decided not to use the right to intervene.
16. The Constitutional Court also requested comments on the proposal of the Ministry of Finance, the Chamber of Auditors of the Czech Republic and the Public Audit Board.
17. The Ministry of Finance did not identify with the appellant's argument. In his view, the legal objective of the contested provision is not to protect the users of the services of audit firms but to protect confidence in the audit profession as a whole. According to the Ministry, the credibility of auditors is essential because of information asymmetry - auditors act as a specific intermediary between two parties that need to be trusted without exchanging confidential information. The outcome of the audit activity serves to assure that the claim of the other party is reliable. However, the auditor is bound by confidentiality as to what he bases his findings. Instead of a transparent justification, he guarantees his conclusion only with confidence in his good name and in the good name of the audit profession. The Ministry therefore considers that the objective thus defined cannot be achieved by more moderate means. In conclusion, it pointed out that the application of criminal law means is an ultima ratio instrument, which will only take place in the most serious cases and very exceptionally.
18. The Chamber of Auditors of the Czech Republic has expressed the view that the contested provision can be justified by the nature of the audit activity and profession of the auditor and the high requirements imposed on them by European Union legislation. It pointed out that the audit activity was carried out in the public interest, unlike most of the professions with which the regulation for audit firms was compared by the appellant. This is not the only difference - auditors must also, unlike other professional groups, suffer the publication of a decision on their culpability (§ 27a of the Law on Auditors) or count on the elimination of their disciplinary penalty after seven years (§ 27 of the same law). According to the Chamber, the mere initiation of the prosecution of an auditor has always had an impact on his credibility in the eyes of the public, all the greater in terms of intentional crime. It then stated at the request of the Constitutional Court that the case dealt with by the appellant was the only case where criminal proceedings against an audit firm were conducted (the same information was also based on a communication from the Public Audit Supervisory Board).
(19) On the contrary, the Public Audit Board agreed with the appellant's argument. It explained that it considered the existing legislation to be unduly stringent since the decision to suspend the activity was taken entirely mechanically without the need to assess the impact of criminal prosecution on the conduct of audit activities and the credibility of the audit firm and the necessity of such action was assessed. At the same time, it drew attention to the "procedural non-economics' of legislation, since the suspension of the authorisation could take place directly from the law (ex CS), without the need to issue administrative decisions on this. It also noted that if the Constitutional Court accedes to the annulment of Paragraph 6 (3) of the Auditor Act, it will create an undesirable regime for audit firms and statutory auditors for which similar arrangements (§ 6 (1) of the Auditor Act, as amended by Act No. 334 / 2014 Coll.) will remain valid and effective.
20. The observations received by the Constitutional Court have been notified to the appellant and a possible reply. In response to the opinion of the Ministry of Finance, the appellant pointed out that the protection of the audit profession (as a whole) is necessarily linked to the protection of third parties. The appellant does not see the relevant difference justifying the stricter treatment of audit firms in that auditors do not justify their conclusions; He pointed out that, for example, the interpreter must also rely on the interpretation being done correctly without providing a "justification '. The applicant did not comment on the additional opinions sent by the Chamber and the Council.
Further proceedings before the Constitutional Court
21. The Constitutional Court decided on a proposal without a regulation of oral proceedings because it did not carry out the taking of evidence within the meaning of Paragraph 44 of the First Law on the Constitutional Court and further clarification of the case could not be expected from the hearing.
Review of the procedure for the adoption of the contested provision
22. The Constitutional Court, before considering the constitutionality of the contested provision from a factual point of view, assessed, in accordance with Article 68 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No 48 / 2002 Coll., whether the contested provision was adopted within the limits of the Constitution of the established competence and in a constitutional manner.
23. The effective text of Paragraph 6 (3) has now been inserted into the Act on Auditors by Act No. 334 / 2014 Coll. Neither the appellant nor the party to the proceedings raised any deficiencies in the legislative procedure nor raised any doubts as to the constitutionality of the procedure for the adoption of the contested provision. The Constitutional Court has verified from freely accessible sources that the relevant bill (print 209) has been discussed and approved by the quorum of the Chamber of Deputies by the necessary majority. After the Senate had properly discussed the bill (press 356) and returned it to the Chamber of Deputies with an amendment, the Chamber of Deputies adopted it in the Senate by the approved text, again by the necessary majority. After the signing of the President of the Republic, the law was declared.
Meritative review of the contested provision
24. The Constitutional Court has concluded that the contested provision will stand up in the constitutional review.
25. The justification for this conclusion is structured in two headings. First, it assesses the contested provision from the point of view of the right to engage in other economic activities (VII.A), then addresses the partial objection to the so-called standstill doctrine (VII.B).
Compliance with the right to undertake and pursue other economic activities
(Article 26 (1) of the Charter)
26. The Constitutional Court first examined whether the contested provision interfered with a constitutional right.
27. Auditor activities are, within the meaning of the Auditor Act, "carrying out statutory audits, reviewing the management under another legislation, provided that such reviews are carried out by the auditor, verifying accounting records, verifying other economic information by the auditor, verifying the report on sustainability or carrying out other activities by the auditor, provided that this is provided for by another legislation or by a directly applicable European Union law, or by another verification of accounts, other accounting records or parts thereof carried out by the auditor" [§ 2 (c) of this Act]. It is a gainful activity subject to extensive public law, which is carried out in the public interest (the Constitutional Court is more closely concerned with this fact in paragraphs 42 and 43 below). However, it does not involve the exercise of public authority as such and therefore does not constitute a public office within the meaning of Article 21 (4) of the Charter [cf. sp. zn.
28. The Constitutional Court has previously identified the condition of integrity (criminal integrity) for the acquisition and exercise of a business authorisation as a restriction on the right to engage in business [the findings of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 38 / 04 of 20.6.2006, Condition of expertise and integrity of agricultural entrepreneurs, (N 125 / 41 CollNU 551; 409 / 2006 Coll.) and sp. zl. ÚS 35 / 08 of 7.4.2009, To the condition of integrity for the pursuit of business, (N 83 / 53 SbNU 51; 151 / 2009 Coll.)].
29. The nature of the restriction resulting from the contested provision can be seen in the same way. In the case of audit firms, the Auditor Act provides for the integrity of [§ 5 (1) (h) of the Auditor Act as one of the conditions for carrying out the audit activities of the company. A person who has been convicted of a criminal offence committed intentionally or negligently in connection with the conduct of an audit activity shall not be deemed to be righteous (§ 5 (4) of the same Act). If there is a loss of integrity, the Chamber will prohibit audit firms from carrying out any further audit activity [Section 7 (3) (c) of the Auditor Act]. The contested provision requires that "preventive 'be suspended from carrying out an audit activity with the start of a criminal prosecution, which could potentially lead to a loss of integrity (by acquiring legal power condemning a judgment) and thereby to a prohibition of action.
30. Therefore, the Constitutional Court concluded, in agreement with the appellant, that the contested provision led to interference in the rights protected by Article 26 (1) of the Charter.
(i) General considerations on the right to engage in business and to pursue other economic activities
31. Everyone has the right to free choice of profession and to prepare for it, as well as the right to engage in other economic activities (Article 26 (1) of the Charter). The content of the right to do business is the freedom to pursue a certain gainful activity on its own account and the responsibility for making a profit. It guarantees the possibility of carrying out such an activity as well as that the obligations and restrictions relating to it will not prevent its main purpose [finding sp. zn. At the same time, the Constitutional Court observed that, in addition to the negative aspect (freedom to engage in business), the right to engage in other economic activities also included a positive aspect [see sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 43 / 18 of 18.1.2022, Bail for Labour Agencies (N 5 / 110 SbNU 44; 28 / 2022 Coll.), paragraph 41].
32. The right to do business and to pursue other economic activities includes the Charter as a separate law, which by its nature also belongs to legal persons (WINTR, Jan. Article 26 of the Charter. In Wagner, Eliška et al. Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. Comment. 2. Praha: Wolters Kluwer, 2023, p. 611).
33. Article 26 (2) However, the Act may lay down conditions and restrictions for the pursuit of certain professions or activities for any purpose which is not constitutionally inadmissible (cf. However, even in the case of rights protected by Article 26 (1) The Charter applies the requirement under Article 4 (4) of the Charter, namely the obligation that their substance and meaning should be investigated when establishing the limits of the Constitution for protected rights. The legislature therefore has a relatively wide but not unlimited scope for a specific definition of the content and manner of implementation of the rights under Article 26 (1) of the Charter [cf. the findings sp. zn. Any restriction must also respect the principle of equality in rights within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 1 of the Charter, and Article 3 (1) of the Charter, respectively.
34. The Constitutional Court therefore, when assessing the compliance of a law or other law with the right to conduct business which is of the nature of economic law, takes the same approach as in the case of social rights for which the review of the existing case-law was designed and developed by the so-called "reasonable test '[cf. It consists of the following four steps:
(a) the definition of the meaning and substance of economic or social law, namely its essential content;
(b) an assessment of whether the law or other legislation does not affect the very existence of economic or social law or the actual realisation of its essential content;
(c) an assessment of whether the legislation contained in the law or other legislation pursues a legitimate objective, that is to say, whether it is an arbitrary substantial reduction in the overall standard of fundamental rights; and
(d) consider whether the means used to achieve it is reasonable, albeit not necessarily the best, the most appropriate, the most effective or the wisest.
35. If the Constitutional Court, in the second step of the proportionality test, concludes that the contested legislation affects the very existence of one of these rights or the actual realisation of its essential content, it shall assess the admissibility of the intervention in that law within the framework of the (stricter) proportionality test. This means that he will continue to evaluate:
(a) whether the intervention in question pursues a legitimate (or constitutionally challenged) objective of limiting the fundamental right in question;
(b) whether this intervention is appropriate to achieve this objective (suitability criterion);
(c) whether this objective cannot be achieved in any other way that would be more rewarding (criterion of necessity); and
(d) whether the interest in achieving this objective, within the framework of a legal relationship, outweighs the fundamental right in question (proportionality criterion in the narrower sense).
36. In the case of the right to choose and prepare a profession, as well as the right to engage in business and to pursue other economic activities, the restriction on their substance and the meaning would also be if, as a result, a particular group of individuals were significantly hampered or prevented from having access to a particular profession or the possibility of carrying out a particular activity (point 48 of the PSC Opinion 5 / 15).
(ii) Application to the present case
37. Article 6 (3) of the Auditor Act may be attributed to the appellant in its interpretation. The Chamber must issue a decision to suspend the operation if the criminal prosecution is conducted for a criminal offence committed intentionally and does not have a discretion.
38. In order to exclude the discretion of the Chamber, the language expression of Section 6 (3) of the Auditor Act, which also supports a systematic comparison of Sections 6 (3) and 6 (4) of the Auditor Act, is evident. This makes it quite clear that the legislature, by the last amendment of § 6 (i.e. Act No. 334 / 2014 Coll.), created two different arrangements for suspending audit activities: the first stricter, imposing an obligation on the Chamber to decide to suspend activities as an automatic consequence of the initiation of criminal proceedings for offences committed intentionally; and a second milder, tolerant discretion (see use of modality option, "may suspend") for offences committed out of negligence and, moreover, in connection with audit activities. This division is also confirmed by the explanatory memorandum to Act No. 334 / 2014 Coll., which states that (only) in cases of criminal prosecution for a malpractice offence "the decision is left to the administrative discretion of the Chamber '; However, it does not provide any further reasons for adopting such an adjustment. The interpretation of Article 6 (3) of the Auditor Act by accepting the discrepancy of the Chamber to consider the circumstances of a particular case would therefore not correspond to the language or systematic interpretation and clear intention of the legislator.
39. In view of this, the Constitutional Court must first assess whether the contested standard affects the meaning and substance of the right to engage in other economic activities, namely its essential content. As summarised in paragraph 36 above, the meaning and substance of Article 26 (1) of the Charter are affected by such restrictions as to make access to a certain group of individuals (possibly legal persons) significantly more difficult or impossible.
40. In the present case, the Constitutional Court, in agreement with the appellant, considers this to be fulfilled. The application of the standard results in a complete failure to carry out an audit activity, even though the company was authorised to carry out it and, formally, still fulfils the strictly set conditions for carrying out the audit activity, including the requirement of integrity. At the same time, such an intervention cannot be considered less serious simply because it is by its nature a temporary measure. The prosecution may take months, but normally years, and until the final end of the criminal proceedings the decision to temporarily suspend the conduct of an audit activity which may constitute the main or even exclusive activity of the company concerned is prevented. Therefore, since Article 6 (3) of the Auditor Act leads to intervention in the essential content (core) of Article 26 (1) of the Charter, it is appropriate that the Constitutional Court should follow a stricter proportionality test (see generally paragraph 35 above).
41. The appellant admits that the contested provision pursues a legitimate objective since it is a "preventive measure 'ensuring confidence in the proper conduct of audit activities, thereby safeguarding the rights and interests of other persons, including other auditors. The Constitutional Court agrees with that definition.
42. The audit activity is "custom-made" between the auditor and the audited entity. However, this does not become a "client" of an auditor in the usual sense, as the audit does not monitor the protection of the interests of the audited entity - certainly not directly. The audit activities are of interest to ensure that the accounts, consolidated financial statements, sustainability reports, or other documents submitted for audit reliably (faithfully and honestly) indicate the assets and financial ratios of the audited entity (see MÜLLER, Libushe). Auditing for managers or why and how the financial statements are verified. 2. Vyd. Praha: Wolters Kluwer, 2013, p. 15). The audit work thus serves to protect members, shareholders, creditors or (potential) business partners of the audited entity and other individuals, as well as the State, i.e. a wide range of users of the verified information. Thus, in the broadest sense, audit activities contribute to the fulfilment of the public's interests as such.
43. The fact that the audit activity is carried out in the public interest is expressed in point 1 of the preamble to Regulation (EU) No 537 / 2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on specific requirements for statutory audits of public-interest entities and repealing Commission Decision 2005 / 909 / EC as follows: "Statutory auditors and audit firms are legally entrusted to carry out statutory audits of public-interest entities in order to strengthen the degree of public confidence in the annual and consolidated accounts of those bodies. Aspects of public interest in relation to statutory audit means that a broad group of persons and institutions relies on the quality of the work of a statutory auditor or audit firm. A quality audit contributes to the proper functioning of the markets by promoting the integrity and effectiveness of the accounts. Statutory auditors therefore perform a particularly important social role. 'Similarly, point 9 of the preamble to Directive 2006 / 43 / EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17.5.2006 on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts, amending Council Directives 78 / 660 / EEC and 83 / 349 / EEC and repealing Council Directive 84 / 253 / EEC (" Directive 2006 / 43'), is of public interest.
44. The performance of an audit activity in the public interest constitutes only one principle which must be followed by auditors. As the Ministry of Finance has admittedly described, the essence of the audit activity is to verify that the information that the audited entity publishes about itself and its assets and financial ratios is reliable, thus giving a true and fair view of reality. For this finding, the auditor shall have access to private and confidential supporting documents submitted to it by the audited entity. However, they and their content must be kept confidential (Section 15 (1) of the Auditor Act). Therefore, it is decisive for those who benefit from the findings of the auditor to what extent the conclusions of the auditor may be considered credible without having access to the supporting documents allowing them to be independently verified. The auditor therefore underlies the credibility of the outcome of the audit activity in his name and professional reputation. Therefore, it must maintain high professional ethical integrity, be independent, proceed impartially and objectively, be reliable and guarantee the high expertise of its work. This is reflected in the considerable emphasis on the fulfilment of ethical principles of audit activity, which are in particular the exercise of public interest, integrity, impartiality, competence and due diligence (Article 21 of Directive 2006 / 43, implemented by Article 13 of the Auditor Act; See also their fulfillment in the form of the Chamber's Ethical Code, available from https: / / www.kacr.cz / ethic.codex-chamber-auditor-cr).
45. Only if the auditor is perceived to be credible will he / she be perceived as reliable and credible by the conclusions reached in the audit work (cf. Opinion of Advocate General Manuel Campos Sánchez-Bordons of 10.12.2020 in the case of the Court of Justice of the European Union C-950 / 19, and in the presence of Patentti-ja rekisterihallituksen tilintarkastuslautkunt, paragraphs 57 to 58 and 62). It cannot be excluded that a breach of public trust for a particular audit firm may potentially have an impact on the whole stock group. The Constitutional Court thus fully agrees with the appellant that the protection of third parties, the protection of the interests of the audited entities and the protection of auditors as a professional group constitutes the associated vessels.
46. The contested regulation is capable of contributing to the fulfilment of the above legitimate objective of protecting the rights of other persons and ensuring the credibility of the audit activity (criterion of suitability). It excludes from carrying out audit activities those audit firms for which there may be grounds for doubting the performance of audit activities according to the principles currently laid down, although it has not yet been decided in a final manner whether their specific conduct has criminal consequences.
47. The legislature's discretion that it is sufficient to undermine the credibility of an audit firm to start its criminal prosecution for a crime committed intentionally can be considered rational. The communication of criminal charges involving criminal prosecution shall be conditional on the finding of facts justifying the conclusion that the offence has been committed, provided that at the same time the conclusion that the person concerned has committed it is sufficiently justified (§ 160 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Therefore, while respecting the presumption of innocence (Article 40 (2) of the Charter), it can be concluded that the opening of a criminal prosecution for a intentional crime already signals a degree of reasonable suspicion against a particular audit firm which may be transferred to the assessment of the credibility of the audit firm and the results of the audit carried out by it. However, this is a preventive measure - it must be stressed that it does not prejudge in any way the guilt of an audit firm in criminal law.
48. The fact that information about the opening of criminal proceedings and the details of the preparatory procedure are not public and that the public would otherwise have a limited opportunity to learn about the prosecution of an audit firm cannot completely refute that conclusion. Instead of the public's real awareness of whether a particular audit firm is prosecuted, an important guarantee of the credibility of the audit is precisely an adjustment to ensure that no audit firm is prosecuted for an intentional crime to carry out an audit activity. In addition, the public of preparatory management is an obstacle to the possibility for persons using audit conclusions themselves to assess the extent to which the risk of confidence in the proper conduct of audit activities can be attributed to the fact that an audit firm is accused of committing a particular crime.
49. At the same time, the Constitutional Court is willing to accept that the rational link between the legislator pursued by the legitimate objective and the chosen normative means exists for all offences committed intentionally, without any restrictive restriction (since Paragraph 6 (3) of the Auditor Act does not contain any restriction), regardless of the type of seriousness of the criminal offence for which criminal proceedings are conducted and whether the alleged offence should have been related to audit activities.
50. It must be recalled that the Constitutional Court has in the past stated that, in the legal order, integrity is regularly defined in the light of the subject matter and the activity to be discussed. The adjustment of integrity for the acquisition of a trade licence which did not respect this principle was considered unconstitutional, as its consequences were removed from the limits of the purpose pursued (page 5 of the ÚS 35 / 08). However, given the specific nature of the audit activity, this conclusion, which would otherwise lead to a failure to fulfil the criterion of suitability, cannot be taken over without further action.
51. The conclusion of the Constitutional Court in the context of business business cannot be automatically linked to audit activities due to its different nature, which justifies a different approach by the legislator. The audit work is highly specific and professional, and, as has already been stated, it is essential to verify the reliability of the audited entity's own claims in the light of the private supporting documents submitted during the audit. The importance of the trustworthiness of an auditor (an audit firm specifically) is essential for such an activity. In the view of the Constitutional Court, it is reasonable to assume that the credibility of an audit firm is affected by the conduct of any criminal prosecution for an intentional crime from the public's point of view, regardless of how closely the conduct of an audit activity should have been related. It therefore considers that a rational relationship between the legitimate objective and the chosen regulatory instrument is not excluded and that the criterion of suitability is met to the extent necessary. However, the fact that Paragraph 6 (3) of the Auditor Act does not distinguish between different intentional offences must also be reconsidered in the context of the proportionality criterion, i.e. in the final step of the proportionality test (proportionality in the narrower sense).
52. For the second step of the test, the criteria of necessity, the applicant considers that the contested provision will not stand. According to the appellant's view, there is a more moderate measure of assessing individual cases of criminal prosecution of ad hoc audit firms, as the case may be. However, accepting the appellant's argument would practically exclude the legislator from regulating any "total" restriction of fundamental rights at the level of the law, since it can always be theoretically imagined that the restriction resulting from the law can be replaced by an assessment of individual circumstances and decision-making of individual cases as a more sensible means. The assessment of the necessity of limiting economic and social rights falls to a large extent within the legislative sphere. The Constitutional Court will therefore examine whether the legislature has acted in an excessive manner in its reasoning by assessing the question of the necessity (necessity) of limiting the right to engage in business and to pursue other economic activities in close relation to the proportionality criterion. It will thus be assessed whether, given the seriousness of the limitations on the rights of the audit firm, the contested scheme will be adequate to the objective pursued.
53. The legislature has already carried out a measure of conflicting interests at the level of the law, in abstract form. On the one hand, it concluded that, in the event of the initiation of criminal prosecution for a criminal offence committed by negligence, the risk of confidence in the proper performance of an audit activity is lower, or the interest in protecting that trust is outweighed only where the action was to be related to an audit activity and is consistent with the circumstances of a particular case. Therefore, the Chamber gave room for an individual assessment of the case. On the contrary, in the case of a criminal offence committed intentionally, he considered that the suspicion sufficient to initiate a criminal prosecution in itself threatened confidence in the proper conduct of the audit activity so substantially that the suspension of the activity would always be justified. In such cases, according to the legislature, the interest in protecting confidence in the proper conduct of audit activities is always outweighed and without exception.
54. It is clear that the contested scheme leads to serious interference with the rights of audit firms. For a period which they cannot predict or significantly influence, they are prevented from carrying out an audit activity which may constitute the centrepiece of their economic activity, which is the central reason for the very existence of an audit firm as a trading company. According to usual experience, criminal prosecution can be assumed to last at least months, but often years, until its final end. Such a failure to carry out its business will have serious consequences for the audit firm. Moreover, as the appellant pointed out, this is not only an immediate loss of income, but also a loss of clients of an audit firm influencing it in the future. An audit firm may find itself in a situation where, after the end of the prosecution - and its cleansing of the suspicion of committing a crime - it "enters the market again," although it may have previously been an established auditor with a wide client base.
55. Moreover, the contested legislation links the suspension of audit activities to the initiation of criminal proceedings for each offence committed intentionally. It does not therefore take into account the specific suspicion against an audit firm (what is a protected interest, whose breach or threat is suspected), the specific circumstances of the action for which criminal prosecution is conducted, namely the intense threat to the credibility of the prosecution, and the relevance of the audit activity. Even knowing that the application of criminal liability is always to be an ultima ratio instrument reserved for cases of serious social malpractice, it can certainly be seen that criminal prosecution for a relatively minor act, not directly related to audit activities, will have a different - less negative - impact on confidence in the proper conduct of audit activities than an act directly related to audit activities. Therefore, the Council also opposed the revised regulation as an independent public oversight body (unlike the Chamber as a self-governing body of auditors). The Constitutional Court therefore focused on whether the legislator's conclusion is that it is appropriate to limit the rights of the audit firm in any case of criminal prosecution for a intentionally committed offence.
56. The Constitutional Court agrees that the contested regulation is very strict. Nevertheless, it does not consider that it leads, in relation to audit firms - as business-specific trading companies - to a disproportionate restriction on their rights.
57. The Constitutional Court considers it an important distinguishing criterion that the suspension of audit activities as an automatic consequence is linked to the subjective aspect of the offence in the form of intent, not negligence. In the case of criminal liability of a legal person, it is not possible to talk about guilt in the same form as for natural persons. The fulfilment of the subjective character must be proved indirectly, through the fault of natural persons who act as a legal person and whose actions are attributed to the legal person (see comment on § 8 in FENYK, Jaroslav et al. Law on criminal liability of and proceedings against legal persons: Comment. Praha: Wolters Kluwer, available in ASPI according to legal status at 31.3.2024). The legal person is conceived by the legal order as a legal fiction. Therefore, it cannot find a "typical internal subjective relationship of the physical offender to other signs of the offence, based on a free and knowledge component, because the legal person itself is unable to show such an internal relationship to the consequences and other signs of the facts of the crime" (ŠÁMAL, Pavel. To blame a legal person under the Law on the Criminal Liability of Legal Persons. Legal perspective, 2017, No 5, p. 169-179, quoted according to Beck online). In the case of legal persons, it is therefore necessary to assess, directly or indirectly, the internal relationship of natural persons associated with a legal person, often having a major influence on it [cf. the range of persons whose infringement may be attributed to a legal person, pursuant to Article 8 (1) of Act No. 418 / 2011 Coll., on the criminal liability and proceedings against legal persons, as amended by Act No. 183 / 2016 Coll., hereinafter referred to as "TOPO '], to the infringement.
58. The intention is generally considered to be a more difficult form of guilt than negligence, since, contrary to negligence, it is linked to a free component - i.e. the will to commit a crime, thus fulfilling all the characteristics of the facts. The existence of the will to fulfil the nature of the offence for natural persons as defined in Paragraph 8 (1) of the TOPO is, contrary to simple negligence, a serious fact indicating internal circumstances within the legal entity, in this case an audit firm. Even at the beginning of the criminal prosecution for a criminal offence committed intentionally, it is possible to speak of a threat to confidence in the proper conduct of an audit activity which justifies the restriction of the rights of an audit firm.
59. In addition, the Constitutional Court would consider the existence of a "related audit activity 'to be more widespread than the appellant, who sees it only in the performance of professional audit activities per se. The range of offences which may be committed by a legal person shall be defined by means of a negative list in the effective text of the Act on criminal liability of legal persons; a legal person may commit all offences as defined in the Criminal Code, except for the facts listed in the list in Section 7 of the Criminal Liability and Proceedings Act, as amended. In this case, the legislator excludes facts which are usually excluded from the nature of the case that they could be committed by a legal person, those which are closely linked to the perpetrator - a natural person, or are selected facts with a specific or special entity (ŠÁMAL, Pavel. For criminal liability of legal persons following the amendment carried out by Act No. 183 / 2016 Coll. Judicial review, 2016, No 11-12, p. 247- 253, quoted according to Beck online). Although this remains open to the possibility of prosecuting legal persons for a significant majority of facts as well as for natural persons, in practice, tax, fraud and crime offences in public procurement are clearly and in the long term dominated (see comment on Section 7 of the Law on criminal liability of legal persons and proceedings against them, as amended, in FENYK, Jaroslav et al. Law on criminal liability of and proceedings against legal persons: Comment. Re-quoted; the data on criminal proceedings against legal persons, including breakdown by facts for which the criminal prosecution has been conducted, are published by the Ministry of Justice, available from https: / / msp.gov.cz / web / msp / statistical-data-z-region-justice). In addition, the case of the prosecution of an audit firm in the appeal proceedings brought by the appellant is also the same. In practice, therefore, criminal prosecutions for offences in property and economic areas, which are primarily targeted by the audit activity, are clearly predominant and can therefore also be established.
60. At the same time, in order for a legal person to be held liable for a criminal offence at all, an offence must be committed in his or her interest or in his or her activities, as is apparent from Paragraph 8 (1) of the TOPO (see, for example, resolution of the Supreme Court sp. zn. 8 Tdo 627 / 2015 of 24 November 2015, publ., under No 23 / 2016, Reports of Judgments and Opinions). In other words, the criminal liability of a legal person is linked to the fact that the act (an unlawful act guilty of it) relates in some way to the attributable conduct of one of the persons referred to in paragraphs 8 (1) (a) to (d) of the TOPO committed in his or her interest or as part of his or her activities, and as a result, his or her criminal liability may be imposed (Section 8 (2) of the Criminal Liability and Proceedings Act, as amended).
61. The suspicion of committing an intentional crime related to the above-mentioned conduct of a particular audit firm thus leads, with all due respect, to the presumption of innocence to reduce its credibility. It cannot be excluded that it will then be reflected in the challenge of the "audit status" as such, as stated by the Ministry of Finance. More importantly, doubts about the integrity of the audit firm reduce the credibility of the conclusions reached in carrying out the audit activities. This is detrimental to the interests of third parties which are based on the audit conclusions and must be able and willing to rely on them, as well as the (intermediate) interests of the audited entity itself. Strict regulation is therefore to be preventive against "chain infidelity" of the entire audit system. The existence of an external audit is not self-effective. The output of an auditor whose credibility is no longer fulfilled and priori is no longer fulfilled denies the very meaning and purpose of the audit within the entire system of market surveillance.
62. The Constitutional Court reiterates that the contested regulation concerns only audit firms, i.e. legal entities of the nature of the company (cf. § 5 (1) of the Auditor Act). The existence of a similar arrangement for statutory auditors - natural persons (see Section 6 (1) of the Auditor Act, as amended by Act No. 334 / 2014 Coll.) is at this time indecisive, which results in the conclusions set out here in relation to audit firms cannot be automatically passed on to statutory auditors.
63. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court does not consider it decisive to compare the regulation of the restriction on the performance of an audit firm against other professions put forward as a central argument in favour of the appellant's inadequacy. In that context, the appellant considered that the legislation of § 6 (3) of the Auditor Act infringes the principle of equality (Articles 1, 3 (1) of the Charter).
64. The Constitutional Court takes the view in its decision-making practice that equality is a category of relative, conceptually requiring the removal of unjustified differences. A breach of the principle of equality requires that different entities in the same or comparable situation should be treated in a different way without such an approach having objective and reasonable grounds [cf. points 44 and 45, or sp. zn.
65. Paragraph 6 (3) of the Auditor Act clearly does not stand on any suspected discriminatory ground referred to in Article 3 (1) of the Charter [see the find of point sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 18 / 15 of 28.6.2016, As regards the unconstitutional taxation of pensions of high-income pensioners (N 121 / 81 SbNU 889; 271 / 2016 Sb.), paragraphs 107 and 108]. It can therefore only be based on the guarantees of non-operational equality in Article 1 of the Charter. However, according to the case-law of the Constitutional Court, only people, not legal persons [the findings of sp. zn.
66. Notwithstanding this, the Constitutional Court has considered whether the comparison made by the appellant indicates the inadequacy of the regulation under review when it adopted a more moderate adjustment for other professions and activities by the legislator, in that it allows the determining authority, even in the case of criminal prosecution, to a criminal offence committed intentionally or, where appropriate, to offences relating to the activity in question.
67. However, such a comparison continues to have a limited storytelling capacity due to the diversity of professions, activities and functions relied upon by the appellant [commensurate with the finding of page I. ÚS 504 / 03 of 25.11.2003 (N 138 / 31 of SbNU 227)]. Part of them constitute public functions involving the exercise of public authority, others being purely gainful (in the form of business). For example, in relation to the comparability of the arrangements for judges, which the appellant and the Ministry of Finance have raised in his observations, the Constitutional Court recalls, first of all, that the power of the court is endowed with specific constitutional guarantees of independence, for which it is difficult to conduct simple analogies between the two professions and activities.
68. To some extent, the position of the audit firm and the tax consultancy company within the meaning of § 3 (6) of Act No. 523 / 1992 Coll., on tax advice and the Chamber of Tax Advisers of the Czech Republic, as amended, may be comparable, although the tax consultancy company itself is not entitled to exercise tax advice and does not become a member of the Chamber of Tax Advisers. Moreover, tax consultancy and audit activities overlap in part in terms of professional focus. On the other hand, even in the existing similarities, the audit firm and the tax consultancy company carry out a fundamentally different activity. Tax advice consists in providing professional services to the client to fulfil his own interests, in particular to the State (cf. representing the client by a tax advisor in tax proceedings and, where appropriate, in subsequent administrative proceedings). On the other hand, the audit activity is carried out in the public interest (see paragraphs 42 and 43 above). Even here, the Constitutional Court cannot conclude on the comparability of the two activities.
69. As regards the possible concerns about insufficiently substantiated allegations and the arbitrary initiation of criminal proceedings against audit firms, the Constitutional Court recalls that it is possible to seek protection against such a procedure by standard instruments in criminal proceedings - by filing a complaint pursuant to § 160 (7) of the Criminal Code, or by submitting an initiative to carry out supervision within the system of public prosecutors (§ 12d (1) of Act No 283 / 1993 Coll., on the Prosecutor, as amended).
70. At the same time, the Constitutional Court took into account the substantive constitutional guarantee of the right to compensation caused by an unlawful decision of a court, another public authority or public authority and the maladministration resulting from Article 36 (3) of the Charter. In its case-law, the Constitutional Court repeatedly recalls that a person who has been required to submit to the proceedings of law enforcement authorities must have a guarantee that, if he has not committed a criminal offence, he will receive compensation for both property and non-property damage suffered by [finding sp. zn. II. This principle is directly linked to the concept of the material rule of law [see already the finding of page 2 of the ÚS 590 / 08 of 17.6.2008, Compensation for unfounded binding, paragraphs 30 to 32]. In the case of criminal proceedings which resulted in the acquittal or in the cessation of criminal proceedings prior to the prosecution, the presumption of illegality of the order initiating criminal proceedings shall be based on a decision pursuant to Article 8 (1) of Act No. 82 / 1998 Coll., on the liability for damage caused in the exercise of public authority by a decision or by an incorrect official procedure and on the amendment of the Act of the Czech National Council No. 358 / 1992 Coll., on notaries and their activities (notarial order), [cf. sp. sp. zn. Pl. the decisions of the Constitutional Court are available at https: / / nalus.ujud.cz]. However, account must always be taken of the specific circumstances of the particular case.
71. According to the case law of the Supreme Court, the loss of profit can also be regarded as material damage (damage caused by an unlawful decision) (see, for example, Case C-2358 / 2021, p. 30 of 8.3.2022, in which the Supreme Court dealt with the loss of profit of a lawyer whose legal activities were suspended ex post following an unlawful decision to take him into custody). In the sp. zn. I. ÚS 922 / 18 of 30.11.2020 (N 221 / 103 SbNU 263) The Constitutional Court pointed out that the requirements laid down by the courts to prove the loss of profit must be proportionate to the specific activities of the particular injured party.
72. The Constitutional Court therefore finds that an audit firm whose activities have been suspended pursuant to Article 6 (3) of the Auditor Act and whose prosecution has ended in a different way than a conviction must be able to claim compensation in the form of a forgone profit, which results from Article 36 (3) of the Charter guaranteeing the right to compensation for damage caused by unlawful criminal prosecution. As the automatic consequence of the start of criminal proceedings for the intentionally committed offence is the suspension of audit activities, the effects of the suspension continue to be directly related to the unlawful prosecution, even though the suspension of audit activities takes place only on the basis of an independently reviewed administrative decision of the Chamber. If the right guaranteed by Article 36 (3) of the Charter is not to be discharged, there must be, in general, the possibility for an audit firm to claim lost earnings [cf. the finding of sp. zn. IV. ÚS 2 / 21 of 19.7.2022, State liability for damage caused to a legal person by the unlawful prosecution of natural persons who control it (N 86 / 113 SbNU 51), paragraphs 14 to 15].
73. For these reasons, the Constitutional Court has concluded that Paragraph 6 (3) of the Auditor Act, on the basis of which the performance of the audit activity is suspended due to the initiation of criminal proceedings for a criminal offence committed intentionally, does not lead to undue interference with the right to conduct business and other economic activities.
Inadmissibility of reducing the level of protection of fundamental rights achieved
74. The appellant further pointed to the so-called standstill doctrine, the essence of which is to see the inadmissibility of the reduction of the level of protection of fundamental rights already achieved. The Constitutional Court considers that it is recognised by the Constitutional Court in relation to the level of procedural protection already reached [for the distinction between procedural and substantive level of protection see the judgment of page Pl. ÚS 4 / 18 of 18.12.2018, Transport noise limits (N 201 / 91 SbNU 535; 30 / 2019 Coll.), paragraphs 61 to 62]. The development of legislation on the suspension of auditors' activities following the start of criminal prosecution shows that the legislator has made an inadmissible approach to reducing the procedural level of protection of the right to do business.
75. The Constitutional Court has, however, so far referred to the inadmissibility of the reduction of the procedural level of protection of fundamental rights only in connection with the maintenance of international human rights and fundamental freedoms treaties as the reference criterion for the review of constitutionality, for the first time obiter dictum in the decision sp. zn. In its specific context, with reference to the essential elements of the democratic rule of law (Article 9 (2) of the Constitution), it stated that "the [u] constitutional entrapment of the general incorporation standard, thereby overcoming the dualistic concept of the relationship between international and national law, cannot be interpreted in the sense of removing the reference point of the ratified and declared international human rights treaties and fundamental freedoms for the assessment of national law by the Constitutional Court, with the derogatory consequences'. In similar terms, the inadmissibility of the reduction of procedural protection of fundamental rights was also discussed in other decisions [see for example Resolution sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 12 / 08 of 2.12.2008 (U 12 / 51 CollNU 823)].
76. In the context of the present case, it is not possible to refer to a priori unacceptable reduction of the procedural level of protection of the fundamental rights of the persons carrying out the audit activity in a sense that could be imported from the finding of Mr Pol. ÚS 36 / 01. It is merely a procedural consequence of changing the substantive conditions of the restriction of the right to do business and to operate another economic activity.
77. However, it is appropriate to assess whether the contested scheme complies with Article 36 (2) of the Charter.
78. Article 36 (2) Any person claiming to have been shortened on his rights by a decision of a public authority may appeal to the court to examine the legality of such a decision, unless otherwise provided for by the law. However, the review of decisions relating to fundamental rights and freedoms under the Charter shall not be excluded from the jurisdiction of the court. The Constitutional Court has repeatedly made it clear in its previous case-law that everyone has: The Charter of the right to seek the protection of its rights in a court or other body, the conditions and rules governing the exercise of that right being laid down by law, then a law issued on the basis of that constitutional authority cannot deny that right - under the conditions and rules laid down therein - on the other hand. The cited Article 36 (2) of the Charter is a logical consequence of this. Reflects the different relevance of fundamental rights and freedoms to which, because of their different nature, there is a logically higher protection than those established only by law [finding sp. zn.
79. The Constitutional Court does not dispute the appellant's fundamental consideration that the content of the substantive rules affects the content and scope of the judicial review. "Automatist" in decisions of the Chamber, which does not have the option of using administrative discretion and in the fulfilment of the hypothesis of a legal standard (opening a criminal prosecution of an audit firm for a criminal offence committed intentionally), must proceed as required by the disposition of the standard (suspension of audit activities by decision), limits the scope of the legal issues assessed by the administrative authority and the assessment of which may subsequently be reviewed by the administrative court following an action against an administrative decision. If the Chamber were to have an opportunity to take administrative account of whether it would take up the suspension of audit activities, it would be for the administrative court to assess, inter alia, whether the limits or abuse of administrative discretion had been exceeded (Section 78 (1) of the Administrative Rules). The administrative court could thus assess to a greater extent whether or not the suspension should have taken place without, however, replacing the consideration of the administrative authorities. In the "automatic 'decision-making regime, the review of the legality of the administrative court is limited to verifying the fulfilment of formal legal conditions, without the possibility of taking into account the material aspect of the case (in particular the circumstances of criminal prosecution).
80. However, in spite of this, the access of an individual to the court remains fully maintained and the administrative court may deal with the legality of the administrative procedure in its entirety, without the judicial review being limited in substance in the sense that certain issues examined by the administrative authority and applicable to the outcome of the case would be completely excluded from judicial review.
81. This makes the present case different from that dealt with by the sp. zn. In this case, the Constitutional Court dealt with the effectiveness of judicial review of the administrative decision to refuse the issue and withdrawal of a travel document to a person prosecuted. The Constitutional Court identified the inconstitutionality of the provisions at the time contested in that it did not give the administrative authority any discretion. However, this must be put in the full legal context of the case. The issuing of an administrative decision was an automatic consequence of a request by a criminal authority, so that the question of the adequacy of such withdrawal of a travel document could not be assessed by administrative courts. However, the law enforcement authority applied a discrepancy when submitting the request - it was legally entitled, not obliged, to make such a request. However, the request of a police authority, not subject to effective judicial review, was at the same time not subject to review in the context of criminal proceedings. Thus, the person prosecuted could not defend himself effectively if he considered the withdrawal of the travel document to be a disproportionate restriction on freedom of movement. Although de jure exclusion from judicial review was not established, there was an unconstitutional exclusion from judicial review de facto.
82. In the present case, although the administrative authority also does not have a discretion, this affects the scope of the review before administrative courts. However, the creation of an obligation to issue administrative decisions no longer depends on the discretion of another authority; the obligation to issue administrative decisions following the initiation of criminal proceedings is imposed directly by the law. The decision to start a criminal prosecution, which is the legal reason for the administrative decision, is then reconsidered by standard means in criminal proceedings (see paragraph 69 above). The Constitutional Court therefore does not consider that there is a breach of Article 36 (2) of the Charter in this respect.
Conclusion
83. For the above reasons, the Constitutional Court found that Article 6 (3) of the Auditor Act was not contrary to the constitutional order. He therefore rejected the application under Paragraph 70 (2) of the Constitutional Court Act as unfounded.
President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr.
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Regulation Information
| Citation | The Constitutional Court found No. 226 / 2025 Coll., sp. zn. |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | - |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 03.07.2025 |
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| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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