The Constitutional Court found No 224 / 2019 Coll.
The Constitutional Court found of 9 July 2019 sp. zn.
Valid
The Constitutional Tribunal found
Text versions:
05.09.2019
224
FIND
The Constitutional Court
On behalf of the Republic
The Constitutional Court decided under sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 34 / 17 on 9 July 2019 in plenary, composed of the President of the Court of Paul Rychetský and the Judges Louis David, Jaroslav Fenyk, Josef Fialy, Jan Filip, Jaromír Jirsy, Tomáš Lichovník, Vladimir Sládek (Judge of the Rapporteur), Milady Tomková, David Uhír and Jiří Zemánek, on the proposal of the Senate Group of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, represented by Mgr. František Korbel, Ph.D., a lawyer, based on Florence 2116 / 15, Prague, on the abolition of § 148 paragraph 3 (a) of Law No 561 / 2004 Coll., on pre-school, secondary, secondary, secondary and higher vocational education (Education Act), as amended of the Czech Republic,
as follows:
Motion denied.
Reasons
Subject matter
1. On 6 November 2017, the Constitutional Court received a proposal from a group of 18 senators of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as "the draftsman ') to repeal § 148 (3) (a) of Act No. 561 / 2004 Coll., on pre-school, primary, secondary, higher vocational and other education (the Education Act), as amended by Act No. 472 / 2011 Coll. (hereinafter referred to as" the contested provision').
2. The application was made pursuant to Article 87 (1) (a) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution) and Article 64 (1) (b) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, on the contradiction with Article 1 (1), Article 2 (1) and (3) of the Constitution, Article 2 (2), Article 4 (2), Article 32 (4), Article 33 (1) and (3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as "the Charter ', Article 2 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as" the Convention') and Article 13 (3) of the International Pact on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter referred to). On 5 April 2018, the proposal was accompanied by a request for a preliminary hearing pursuant to Article 39 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No 48 / 2002 Coll., with a justification for the decision to take place as soon as possible and for the possibility of authorising the emergence of new schools before the start of the school year 2018 / 2019.
Arguments of the appellant
3. In particular, the appellant contends that the current legal status allows the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (hereinafter referred to as "the Ministry ') and the regions to avoid the emergence of new schools only on the basis of long-term intentions. According to the contested provision of the Education Act, the Ministry assesses the compliance of the application for the school registration with two documents of a political-official nature only. It is a long-term intention to educate and develop the educational system of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as" the national long-term plan') as well as the long-term project of the region (hereinafter referred to as "the regional long-term plan ').
4. In the absence of conditions in the Education Act, as amended, and in Decree No 15 / 2005 Coll., laying down the formalities for long-term projects and annual reports, as amended, ("Decree No 15 / 2005 Coll. '), which should be taken into account in the processing of long-term projects of the Ministry and of the regions (" long-term plans'), the competent authorities, according to the author, have no limited scope for influencing the education system through long-term projects. As a result of the application of § 148 (3) (a) of the Education Act, as amended by Act No. 472 / 2011 Coll., long-term intentions have a direct effect on whether a particular school will be registered and allowed to exist. If the long-term intention to set up new schools is restrictive, they can effectively prevent their creation. According to the appellant, this may be fatal in relation to private or church schools, which are an alternative to the public school network, provide greater pluralism in the education system and a healthy level of supply of education and competition between schools, which may be beneficial to the education system.
5. Regional long-term projects usually assume the emergence of new schools only for capacity reasons; The Ministry refuses to allow new (private) schools with the simple argument that there is enough (even less quality) schools. Thus, according to the appellant, the possibility of setting up private schools is limited to cases where capacity in public schools is insufficient. Other criteria such as the quality of education, the school concept, its educational orientation or the provision of alternatives are not taken into account. The author illustrates this on selected examples of regional long-term intentions. According to the author, it is in some cases already completely discriminatory - such as in the case of the long-term intention of the South Bohemia Region, where it is stated that, in view of the demographic situation and existing capacity, the emergence of new private and church schools will not be encouraged.
6. The appellant further argues that the contested scheme is contrary to the rule of law under Articles 33 (3) and 4 (2) of the Charter. According to the appellant, it follows from the first sentence of Article 33 (3) of the Charter that the establishment of conditions which define the content of the right to operate private schools is reserved for the law. Since one of the conditions for the creation of a new school is that its application for registration in the register of schools and educational establishments be consistent with the long-term intention of education and development of the education system of the Czech Republic or the relevant region; the criteria to be taken into account for the drawing up of a long-term project are not regulated in the Education Act or in any other law, it can be concluded that the requirement of reservation of the law is not met in the present case. According to the appellant, the conditions for the setting-up of new schools are laid down freely by the government or the region in long-term intentions, while they are not specifically limited by law and in themselves do not allow any judicial protection and review. The conditions for the creation of private schools are therefore not actually laid down by law, but by a quasi-legal document of a political or official nature.
7. The appellant refers to the case-law of the Constitutional Court concerning the interpretation of the reservation of the law in relation to the determination of the conditions for the exercise of fundamental rights [finds sp. zn. Pl. In this context, it argues that the texts of Article 31 (right to free care) and Article 33 (3) The Charter is similar and there is therefore no reason why the standard of review of the fulfilment of the requirement of reservation of law applied by the Constitutional Court to Article 31 of the Charter should not be applied to Article 33 (3) of the Charter.
8. According to the appellant, the practice of the Ministry is contrary to the principles of the rule of law and to the division of power expressed in Article 1 (1), Article 2 (1) and (3) of the Constitution and Article 2 (2) of the Charter. The unconstitutional nature of the appellant does not see the existence of long-term intentions as conceptual documents, but in their normative nature, which arises in conjunction with the contested provision. If the application for enrolment of a new school, according to the Ministry, is contrary to a long-term intention (namely the part: "Setting up of new primary schools only in places where there will be a permanent need for basic school facilities'), the school is not registered. This results in the content of a long-term project gaining a legally regulatory nature. The conclusions of the administrative courts that long-term intentions do not have the character of legislation, but are merely strategic documents of a non-legislative nature, cannot, according to the appellant, stand. The Ministry's action is thus contrary to the principle of division of power, since it will create a power-efficient intervention into legislative power.
9. The appellant further contends that the contested regulation interferes in the core of the right to establish private schools pursuant to Article 33 (3) of the Charter, which according to the appellant expressly states "the possibility of establishing private schools (Article 33 (3)) as a fundamental right '. It supports this interpretation by referring to the note to the Charter that" the right to establish non-state schools is a necessary consequence of the open nature of education in a democratic pluralist society. This must include I, the right to the alternative' "(Bobek, M. In: Wagner, E.; Shimel, V.; Langášek, T.; Pospíšil, I. et al. Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. Comment. Praha: Wolters Kluwer ČR, a. s., 2012, p. 684). The regulation of the creation of private schools based solely on capacity criteria is, in the appellant's view, unconstitutional in itself because it does not take into account the purpose for which private schools are constitutionally protected, namely, the protection of parents' right to decide on the way in which their children are raised and trained.
10. The contested regulation according to the appellant also interferes with the right of children to education under Article 33 (1) of the Charter and the right of parents to decide how their children are to be raised and trained under Article 32 (4) of the Charter, Article 2 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention and Article 13 of the International Pact. The appellant points out that securing a place at school is not the only dimension of the right to education, but it also includes the right to choose the way of education, in relation to what parents consider to be a quality and appropriate education for their children. While the right to education is one of the social rights that can only be invoked within the limits of the law under Article 41 (1) of the Charter, there is no legitimate reason that would entitle the State to prevent the exercise of the right to quality education in private schools if it itself is unable or willing to provide a quality and pluralistic offer of education.
11. The author also points to the different quality between the different primary schools in the Czech Republic, which illustrates the results of the international investigation into education. These results, according to the author, confirm that many Czech schools still have outdated teaching methods and lack of emphasis is placed on the development of skills that are generally considered necessary for a successful life in this century. The appellant also points to the different interest of parents in individual primary schools depending on their quality. According to the author, the majority of private primary schools are created on the initiative of parents or grandparents in an effort to find others for their children or grandchildren, according to parents' opinion, better education than available public schools offer at the place. If, for any reason, parents do not comply with the quality of any publicly available public school with free capacity and want their child to be able to attend a school where he receives an education more appropriate to his needs, then this effort must be considered as a realisation of the child's right to education within the meaning of Article 33 (1) of the Charter.
12. Furthermore, according to the appellant, the current legislation is also contrary to the principle of not linking the State to a specific ideology within the meaning of Article 2 (1) of the Charter. It sees that the implementation of the basic right to education is linked to the content of the long-term educational objectives of the regions and to the activities of the central administration. The appellant points out that the activities of the Ministry as a whole are significantly affected by the current distribution of political forces and, similarly, at regional level, as a result of which political criteria are reflected in decision-making and approval processes. Private schools are perceived as competing with state or public interests, whose interests are protected by the Ministry as a priority, and therefore there are reasonable doubts as to whether its decisions cannot be discriminatory.
13. Finally, the appellant points out that it is aware that certain regulation of the number of schools is legitimate both in terms of funding and in terms of ensuring equality in access to education. The purpose of the proposal is to lay down reasonable rules for the establishment of new private schools that offer real-life alternatives to public education, be predictable and build on the quality of the education programme and not just linearly calculated capacities and respect the constitutionally guaranteed pluralism in education.
14. For the above reasons, it proposed the repeal of the above provision of the Education Act.
Proceedings before the Constitutional Court
15. The Constitutional Court pursuant to Article 69 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended, sent the proposal to the chambers of Parliament of the Czech Republic as parties to the proceedings and to the Government and the Ombudsman as authorities entitled to intervene as interveners.
16. In its observations, the Chamber of Deputies summarised the course of the legislative process under which the Education Act was discussed and approved. She stated that the law was adopted in a constitutional manner. It stated that it was up to the Constitutional Court to examine the question of the unconstitutionality of the contested provision and to decide on the application for annulment.
17. In its observations, the Senate briefly described the legislation in question and stated that the contested provision was amended only once in 13 years from the effectiveness of the Education Act, by Act No. 472 / 2011 Coll., on the basis of which, with effect from 1 January 2012, the cumulative concentration (the institution will reject the application if, in accordance with the intention of the State and at the same time the relevant region) is not replaced by an alternative expressed by the word "or." In its observations, the Senate further summarised the course of the legislative process and noted that the contested provision did not give rise to any major debate in the Senate, all the more so as to doubt its constitutionality even when approving the original draft Education Act in 2004 or when discussing its amendment in 2011. It is more possible to deduce from the debate the perception of education as a long-term public service, whose availability and quality are primarily the responsibility of the State and which should not be subject to current political influences or strict market regulations. When discussing the draft Act of Education at the 17th meeting of the Senate on 5.8.2004, the amendment was made only by Senator Meisřík, which consisted in adding the words "if the school is established by the State, the Region, the Municipality or the Municipality 'at the end of point (a) in § 148 (3). His amendment was not accepted (only 14 out of 56 senators were supported). After the debate, the Senate adopted Resolution 517, with which it returned the bill to the Chamber of Deputies with 24 amendments, none of which concerned the issue of school registration. According to the Senate, it is up to the Constitutional Court to examine and decide the application for annulment of the contested provision of the Education Act.
18. The Government has indicated that it is entering this procedure and has proposed rejecting the proposal. It has empowered the Minister of Justice, in cooperation with the Ministry, to draw up the Government's observations on the proposal and, at the same time, to entrust it with representation in this proceedings.
19. In addition to the alleged intervention of the appellant in the right to establish private schools, the Government stated that all schools - public, private, or ecclesiastical - carry out education according to the same framework training programmes according to § 3 and 4 of the Education Act, as amended by Act No. 189 / 2008 Coll. Public schools are financed from the state budget according to § 160 et seq. of the Education Act, as amended, in a normative manner. Private schools are co-financed from the state budget by a percentage of the annual volume of non-investment expenditure, wage resources and statutory contributions for one child, pupil or student in a comparable field of education and the form of education in public schools or educational establishments. The percentage is 60% and 80% respectively for secondary or primary schools. Since the second year of operation of the school, the percentage under the conditions laid down by the law is 100%. In addition, private schools have the possibility to collect tuition fees, unlike public schools.
20. The Government stressed that the State is responsible for regulating the quality of education and exercises its competence towards the education system as a whole, therefore the education and education services provided under the Education Act, as amended, are a public service, regardless of the promoters, as is clear from Section 2 (3) of the Education Act. The education and provision of education services under the Education Act, as amended, cannot therefore primarily be regarded as a business, although the Education Act, as amended by Act No. 82 / 2015 Coll., in § 8 (6) expressly allows the school to be set up by a legal person whose predominant object of activity is business.
21. The rules for the registration of schools in the register of schools and school establishments are identical for all schools, regardless of the organisers. If the registration of a private school is refused on the grounds that its application does not comply with the long-term purpose of education and development of the education system of the Czech Republic or of the region, it is a consequence which would also affect public schools under the same conditions. The Government also stressed that the requirement of equal access to education for all is explicitly laid down in § 1 (2) (c) of Decree No 15 / 2005 Coll. The measure mentioned in the long-term intention of the South Bohemian Region, according to which, in view of the demographic situation and capacity possibilities of existing schools, the opening of other private and church schools is not recommended, is considered by the government to be an excess to the nature and meaning of the long-term project as such and the management of the school system as a whole.
22. The Government also referred in its observations to statistical data on the number of public and private primary and secondary school applications registered and rejected, showing that the number of applications made by private authorities significantly exceeds the number of applications made by public authorities for primary schools. 207 private primary schools are registered on the date of the submission. In particular, the Government points out that 19 new private primary schools were enrolled in the school year 2016 / 2017, representing more than 10% of the annual increase in private primary schools. In the school year 2015 / 2016, when 44 new private primary schools were enrolled, they increased by 30%. With a 30% annual increase in private primary schools over 12 years, they would exceed the number of public primary schools. At the same time, the Government states that, since the number of applications for registration of public schools is very low, it cannot be concluded that no application has been rejected that the Ministry would automatically register any public school. According to the Government, the statistics clearly demonstrate that there is no systemic rejection of the requests made by private authorities to public authorities when applying the contested provision.
23. To the appellant's assertion that the contested provision had been infringed, subject to the law, the Government stressed the link between the educational context, including the economic dimension of the management of the education system, with the need to take into account a number of conditions. The development of the education system is, in fact, a multi-level and continuous process that affects variable factors in terms of time and therefore cannot be governed by legislation, but is typically the subject of conceptual and strategic documents. However, since the activities of schools must be supported by an administrative act - a decision to register schools and educational establishments - the objectives and criteria of a long-term plan must necessarily be brought to life by decision of the administrative authorities. On the basis of these assumptions, the contested provision, which makes the decision of the authority which maintains the school register conditional on the content of the conceptual documents. Therefore, the law expressly allows long-term intentions to be drawn up by directives for administrative discretion.
24. To characterise long-term intentions, the Government stated that it was a conceptual document using means of expression other than normative texts. The law considers it to be an external fact to determine the outcome of the registration procedure for schools and educational establishments. The use of the content of a long-term project (basis of a professional nature) is not an application of the legal standard from the point of view of the administrative authority, but it takes the nature of the assessment of the facts. The Government has also stated that legislation has already been foreseen since 1 January 2001 to take account of the long-term objectives of education and the development of the education system when the new school or school establishment is being included. The appellant's appeal has therefore been in practice for 17 years. In this context, the Government further pointed out that, until 31 December 2004, Section 13b (3) of Act No. 564 / 1990 Coll., on State administration and self-government in education, as amended, expressly stated that the government body responsible for applying for the registration of the school would decide in accordance with the needs and possibilities of network development. Although such a provision is no longer included in the current legislation, the same procedure is still followed, including in the light of Article 2 (4) of Act No 500 / 2004 Coll., the administrative rules under which the administrative authority ensures that the solution adopted is in line with the public interest. The public interest can then be seen precisely in ensuring consistency between the needs and possibilities of developing the education system.
25. The Government points out that the contested legislation was not found to be unconstitutional even in the case-law of the courts. It refers, inter alia, to the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 31 March 2009 No 7 As 52 / 2007-136, which states that "the complainant contends in particular that it is only to assess the compatibility of the proposed school concept with the long-term intention of building a decision on the inclusion of a school in the network. It should be noted, however, that the assessment of this compliance is a legal condition which must be taken into account in the decision-making process (Section 13b (3), second sentence of Act No 564 / 1990 Coll.)." This conclusion was also passed before the Constitutional Court [Resolution sp. zn. IV. ÚS 1508 / 09 of 4.1.2010 (not published in the SbNU, as well as other decisions of the Constitutional Court at http: / / nalus.ujud.cz)].
26. In another part of its observations, the Government does not agree with the appellant's conclusions that private schools are better than public schools, as evidenced by the results of the selection of pupils' results in the 5th and 9th years of primary schools and the corresponding years of the multi-annual colleges. As regards the appellant's argument on the "alternative 'offered by private schools, the Government states that there is no definition of alternative education. In accordance with Section 3 (3) of the Education Act, all schools are trained according to school education programmes which must comply with the Framework Education Programmes (Section 5 (1) of the Education Act), which are uniform for schools of all organisers. A specific way of education is then under the responsibility of the school director and, where appropriate, individual teaching staff. The Government also draws attention to the role of the Institute of Education Council under Section 167 of the Education Act, as amended, which is established at each school and which may significantly affect the form of education at school.
27. The Government considers that the appellant's allegations of the risk of arbitrary and unequal access to private schools allowed by the contested regulation are unfounded and state that the Ministry does not protect any interest groups, but is strictly in line with the public interest.
28. The Government believes that the contested legislation does not conflict with the right to establish private schools, does not conflict with the rule of law and does not infringe any other rights referred to by the appellant. In the light of the above, it proposes that the Constitutional Court reject the application as manifestly unfounded or, if necessary, reject it.
29. In its submission of 27 April 2018, the Ministry of the Constitutional Court sent the text of the Supreme Administrative Court judgment of 28 March 2018 No 2 As 312 / 2017-34 concerning the legal nature of long-term projects.
30. The Ombudsman stated that she did not intervene in this case.
31. The appellant did not reply to the observations sent.
Oral proceedings
32. The Constitutional Court, in accordance with Article 44 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended, considered that there was no need to conduct oral proceedings in the case, since it would in no way contribute to a further or more profound clarification of the case than it had been aware of from the written acts of the appellant and the parties. The fact that the Constitutional Court did not consider it necessary to carry out the taking of evidence justifies the failure of oral proceedings.
Terms and conditions of the formal assessment of the proposal
33. The Constitutional Court notes that it is competent to discuss an application for annulment of the contested legal provisions as the application fulfils all the formal requirements laid down by law [Paragraph 64 (1) (b) of the Law on the Constitutional Court]. Therefore, it has accepted a meritative assessment of the proposal.
Assessment of the constitutional conformity of the legislative process
34. In the procedure for checking the standards, the Constitutional Court pursuant to the provisions of Section 68 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll., first assesses whether the contested law has been adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution laid down by competence and by the constitutional procedure. In the case under consideration, the Constitutional Court found that the contested provisions of the Education Act were adopted within the limits of the Constitution laid down by competence and by the constitutional procedure, from the observations of the parties and from the publicly available Parliament (at https: / / www.psp.cz). Indeed, the appellant did not object to the legislative procedure.
Dedication and context of the contested provision
35. The contested provision of § 148 (3) (a) of the Education Act, as amended by Act No. 472 / 2011 Coll., reads:
"(3) The authority which maintains the register of schools and educational establishments shall also reject, in whole or in part, the application for registration of a school or educational establishment in the register if, by examining the application, it finds that (a) the application does not comply with the long-term purpose of education and development of the education system of the Czech Republic or the relevant region;"
36. At the beginning of the examination of the proposal, the Constitutional Court considers it appropriate to define at least briefly the context of the contested legislation. The legislator envisages the existence of conceptual materials in the area of education and development of the education system, when in § 9 of the Education Act, as amended by Act No. 49 / 2009 Coll., the existence of the so-called long-term intention to educate and develop the educational system of the Czech Republic and the educational system of the region. In particular, the provisions in question lay down procedural rules for the creation of long-term projects, whereby the competent Ministry and regional authorities are responsible for their creation at national level. The Ministry shall process a national long-term project, discuss its proposal with the relevant central trade unions, relevant employers' organisations with national competence and with the county, submit it to the Government for approval and publish it in a way that allows remote access. The government then submits a national long-term intention to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate for consideration.
37. The regional authorities process their own long-term intention to educate and develop the education system in a region which must comply with the national long-term intention and submit it to the Ministry for comments. Part of the regional long-term project on education in schools and school establishments established by the region is submitted to the council for approval. Similarly, the regional long-term plan is published in a way that allows remote access. Both types of long-term projects are processed every 4 years. The content of long-term projects shall be laid down by law only in relation to regional long-term objectives, while in Section 9 (3) of the Education Act requires that they include an analysis of the education system in the region and determine, on the basis of projected demographic developments, labour market developments and the projects of further development of the region, in particular the objectives and tasks for each area of education, the structure of the educational supply, in particular the structure of the fields of education, species and, where appropriate, the types of schools and educational establishments and their capacity and the proposal for funding of education and educational services in the region.
38. A more detailed regulation of the creation and content of long-term plans is referred by the legislator to the substatutory legislation by means of an authorisation provision in § 11 of the Education Act. This implementing regulation is Decree No. 15 / 2005 Coll., which regulates the temporal aspects of the gradual formulation of long-term intentions and interactions between the authorities involved under § 9 of the Education Act, as amended by Act No. 49 / 2009 Coll. It also sets out basic aspects for the formulation of long-term plans: lifelong learning, improving the quality and efficiency of education systems and education systems, facilitating equal access to education for all, sustainable development and education levels of the population, demographics, the labour market, employment and social cohesion. As part of the definition of long-term plans, the Decree in Section 1 (2) (c) imposes the existence of a part which defines the criteria for the development and optimisation of the education system and the structure of the future educational supply of schools, regardless of the promoters, with a focus on the structure of the groups of fields of education, school types and their capacity on the basis of the projected demographic development and the objectives of further development.
Substantial assessment of the proposal
39. It follows from the proposal that the infringement of Article 33 (3), in conjunction with Article 4 (2) of the Charter, is regarded as a violation of Article 33 (3) of the Charter, i.e. according to the appellant, the contested regulation interferes with the "core right to establish private schools' under Article 33 (3) of the Charter in conjunction with the violation of the so-called reservations of the law, i.e. the principle that the limits of fundamental rights and freedoms may be governed only by law under the conditions laid down by the Charter.
40. The Charter regulates one of the fundamental principles of the constitutional regulation of the right to education. The right to education contained in Article 33 The Charter is traditionally considered as so-called social law by the doctrine and case-law. The classification also corresponds to the scheme of the Charter, where the right to education articulated by Article 33 is classified in the title of "Economic, Social and Cultural Rights'. It is typical of social rights that, by their nature, they require implementation by law. This principle is laid down in Article 41 (1) of the Charter, which expressly states that those rights, including the right to education under Article 33 of the Charter, may be invoked only within the limits of the laws implementing those rights. The Constitutional Court, in relation to Article 41 (1) of the Charter, concluded that the concept of social rights is" the fact that they are not of an unconditional nature and can only be sought within the limits of the laws [Article 41 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights]. This provision gives the legislator the power to lay down specific conditions for the implementation of social rights... In the case of social rights, it can be concluded that their collective restriction is precisely that they are not directly enforceable under the Charter, unlike, for example, fundamental rights and freedoms. Their limitation lies precisely in the need for legal implementation, which is, however, also a condition for the specific implementation of individual rights'.
41. With regard to Article 4 (4) However, the legislature's discretion (from a constitutional point of view it cannot be) is not entirely unlimited in the area of regulation of social rights and can be subject to review by the Constitutional Court. As further stated by the Constitutional Court in the decision in sp. zn. The legislator must not 'deny the existence of a particular social law itself or, as a result, exclude its implementation. Within these limits, the legislator has a relatively wide opportunity to regulate the implementation of individual social rights, including the possibility of changing them... the specific nature of social rights in no way means that the legislator is not bound by them. The anchoring of their existence in the Charter means that a minimum standard of these social rights must be maintained in the course of legal regulation. Therefore, there must in no way be a de facto denial of which social law, because at the same time the principles laid down in the Charter must be complied with. "As a result of this specific character of social rights, the so-called proportionality test, the application of which significantly limits the discretion of the legislator when adopting legislation governing fundamental rights, is not used in their review.
42. On the basis of the above considerations, the Constitutional Court has constructed the so-called test of rationality or rationality [cf. the findings of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 54 / 10 of 24.4.2012 (N 84 / 65 SbNU 121; 186 / 2012 Coll.) or sp. zn. ÚS 16 / 14 of 27.1.2015 (N 15 / 76 SbNU 197; 99 / 2015 Coll.)].
43. The Constitutional Court has taken this test despite the fact that the appellant is acting as defender of non-state (private) schools and the guarantee of their constitutional rights (see paragraphs 51 and 52 in particular). The contested provision applies to all schools and educational establishments under the Education Act, regardless of their public or private nature. The rationality test reflects both the need to respect the legislator's relatively large discretion in the implementation of social rights and the need to exclude its possible interference with the substance and meaning of social rights, while at the same time allowing a review of restrictions which do not interfere with the substance and meaning of social rights. The rationality test consists of the following four steps: 1. definition of the meaning and substance of social law, i.e. its essential content; 2. an assessment of whether the law does not affect the very existence of social law or the actual realisation of its essential content; 3. an assessment of whether the legal regulation pursues a legitimate objective; Therefore, whether it is an arbitrary fundamental reduction in the overall standard of fundamental rights; 4. considering whether the legal means used to achieve it is reasonable (rational), although not necessarily the best, most appropriate, most effective or wisest.
44. The first step of the review is to test the definition of the meaning and substance of social law or its essential content. In the present case, it concerns the definition of the substance and meaning of the right to education under Article 33 of the Charter, in particular in relation to the constitutional arrangements for the establishment of non-public schools within the meaning of Article 33 (3) of the Charter.
45. On the very concept of the right to education, the Constitutional Court stated, in the opinion of the Court of First Instance, that the "concept, right to education '(Article 33 (1) of the Charter) was in itself vague, since a number of social aspects and purposes were associated with this generally formulated law. In the opinion of the Constitutional Court, as in a number of similar cases, the tendency to move any of these aspects and purposes to a level capable of infringing this right would, as in a number of similar cases, be capable of causing a number of socially dysfunctional and undesirable effects." In the finding of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 16 / 14 (see above) from this vague conceptual definition, he then concluded that "the intervention in the very core of the right to education is something exceptional and can only occur in the event of obvious excesses. This could be the case, for example, in a situation where the legislation in question would have generally unacceptable (e.g. discriminatory) consequences or would not meet the requirements in the rule of law generally imposed on legislation (Resolution of 5 January 2011, sp. zn. II. ÚS 2446 / 10)'.
46. The Constitutional Court thus defined in its caselaw certain grounds for the characteristics of the right to education. On the basis of these, it can be concluded that the right to education has several planes, not only in terms of its various aspects as laid down in Article 33 of the Charter, but also in terms of the semantic content of the right to education as a whole. The right to education is in this sense a single institutional and material aspect. The institutional aspect of the right to education is the obligation of the State to establish an adequate system of educational institutions. This obligation of the State, on the one hand, correlates the right of access to educational institutions forming the institutional arrangements achieved. The requirement to ensure the right to education in the sense of material corresponds to the obligation of the State to ensure the appropriate quality of the form and content and the corresponding right of the individual. A certain degree of elementary quality of each of those aspects constitutes the essence and meaning of the right to education under Article 33 of the Charter.
47. The content of the core of the right to education in the material sense is primarily a requirement of an elementary level of quality of content and form of education, which in a democratic rule of law must seek high standards based on the principles of expertise, objectivity and democratic pluralism. The Constitutional Court has already stressed the material aspect of the right to education in relation to teachers in its opinion, Pl. ÚS 36 / 93 of 17.5.1994 (N 24 / 1 SbNU 175; 132 / 1994 Coll.), in which it stated that "teachers are responsible for facilitating the acquisition of highly technical knowledge while fulfilling the conditions of world-class objectivity. These requirements are expressed by the democratic state in Article 33 (1) of the Charter under which everyone has the right to education '. The State, as the body responsible for implementing the right to education, fulfils the above-mentioned maximum material aspects of the right to education by regulatory means applied to the education system, such as ensuring the quality of teaching staff, the system of education programmes or the means of control.
48. The institutional aspect of the essential content of the right to education includes the requirement of the existence of educational institutions to the extent that they provide everyone with effective access to education. The Constitutional Court dealt with the issues of access to education mainly with the question (not) of cross compliance of the right to free education under the Charter [the findings of sp. zn. Pl. Pl. ÚS 35 / 93 of 15.2.1994 (N 7 / 1 of SbNU 51; 49 / 1994 Coll.), sp. zl. Pl. ÚS 27 / 95 of 19.12.1995 (N 84 / 4 of SbNU 293; 13 / 1996 Coll.), or sp. zl. Pl. ÚS 25 / 94 of 13.6.1995 (N 31 / 3 of SbNU 233; 165 / 1995 Sb.)], review of the decision on admission or non-acceptance to study at a university (find sp. ÚS. Pl. ÚS. From the point of view of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR '), the decisive decision is the case-law of D. H. and others against the Czech Republic concerning the unequal access of Roma children to education, which initiated a number of systemic changes in legislation and practice in education (judgment of the Grand Chamber of the ECHR of 13 November 2007 No 57325 / 00). In general, the ESLP's question of access to the right to education is based on the so-called' Belgian language case ', which is based on the principle that the right to education constitutes open and equal access to state-owned and existing educational establishments. In addition, the" Relating to Certain Aspects of The Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium' case against Belgium (ECHR judgment of 23.7.1968 No 1474 / 62 and Others; Cf. also Bobek, M. In Wagner, E., Šiměl, V., Langášek, T., Pospíšil, I. et al. Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. Comment. Praha: Wolters Kluwer ČR, a. s., 2012, p. 680).
49. The Essence of the right to education shall incorporate in its content the existence of non-state schools, preceded by the Constitution of Article 33 (3) of the Charter, thereby excluding monopolisation of education by the State. It does so, particularly in view of the demand for democratic pluralism, which is reflected in the institutional and material differentiation of the content of the right to education through the existence of state and non-state schools. The Constitutional Court notes that, for this reason, the State cannot go to the legal regulation of the right to education which would lead, directly or indirectly, to the complete avoidance of the existence or functioning of non-state schools.
50. In the case at issue, the establishment of non-state schools, the Charter in Article 33 (3), states: "Establish schools other than state schools and teach them only under the conditions laid down by law; in such schools, education may be provided for remuneration. '; That provision should be understood in the broader context of Article 33. For Article 33 (3) In the opinion of the Constitutional Court, the Charter is not a separate right to establish non-state schools, as the appellant seeks to deduce, but one of the constitutional principles specifying the implementation of the right to education. Through this principle, which forms part of the right to education, the legislator creates space for the legislator to use non-state schools to implement the right to education. Thus, non-state schools constitute a subsidiary means of fulfilling the right to education. Through that provision, the Charter creates space for non-state schools to form part of the institutional organisation of the education system and thus contribute to ensuring the right to education in the appropriate quality of content and form of education. That interpretation also corresponds to the language interpretation of Article 33 (3) of the Charter, which makes it conditional on the establishment of schools other than state and teaching in such schools by statutory regulation.
51. The Charter in Article 33 (1) and (2) guarantees the right to free education in "state" (more precisely public) primary and secondary schools. It thus provides for a public subjective right to education in these schools, which also corresponds to the public obligation (commitment) of the State to create and manage a system (public) of primary and secondary schools. Article 33 (3) The Charter is then laid down that schools other than state schools may be set up and taught on them only under the conditions laid down by law. The immediate link between Article 33 (1) and (2) and Article 33 (3) Thus, according to the view of the Constitutional Court, the Charter is not given. The right to education in non-public primary and secondary schools is not guaranteed, but only the possibility - in accordance with the law - to establish and teach, for example, in private schools for remuneration. Thus, the same State support for such schools is not explicitly guaranteed. The Charter in Article 33 (3) uses a different term "teaching 'in the part before the semicolon. Teaching (teaching) is a process in which the constitutional principles of the right to education must be respected, as is the condition of statutory regulation of teaching in non-state schools.
52. Thus, in the case of non-state schools, they are complementary (subsidiary) institutions, the existence of which in a reasonable number allows the State to effectively complement the system of state (public) primary and secondary schools. Thus, the Charter does not - and logically it cannot - contain a subjective public right to establish a non-public (non-state, private) primary or secondary school, so it does not require the State to provide for the right to "teaching 'in these schools (we leave aside universities where the legislation is different, even if non-public higher education is covered by Article 33 (3) of the Charter). However, the task of the State or legislature is undoubtedly to regulate the establishment and functioning of private primary and secondary schools, among other things because, as has already been mentioned, these schools only carry out an additional form of education alongside the" backbone' system of public schools.
53. Complementary (subsidiary) nature of the Institute of Non-State Schools, expressed in Article 33 (3) The Charter also results from a different constitutional regime between state (public) and non-state schools, where the legislator establishes the right to free education in primary and secondary public schools, while in non-state schools it allows the provision of education for remuneration. The appellant is based on the assumption that the existence of non-state schools in itself constitutes a guarantee of the open and pluralistic nature of the education system. However, it ignores the fact that NSAs generally provide education for remuneration. By doing so, they are essentially building economic barriers to access to education, thereby enhancing not only existing social and economic differences in society, but at the same time strengthening economic stratification of social groups in the long term. The effective application of market mechanisms through the possible dominant position of non-state schools in the institutional composition of the education system could therefore mean limiting not only access to education, but also the pluralistic nature of educational institutions themselves. The potential negative consequences are anticipated by the Constitution itself, which is based on the preference of free education in state (public) primary and secondary schools. It is in this way that the Constitution fulfils the basic requirement of equal access to education.
54. Given the fact that the State is obliged to guarantee a constitutionally adequate guarantee of the exercise of the right to education, both in its institutional and material aspects, it can be concluded that it has a privileged position in determining the institutional structure of the education system, including regulation of the quality of the form and content of education. Although the State cannot intervene in the essential content of the right to education, the legislator enjoys a wide margin of discretion in establishing conditions for the establishment of non-state schools and schools. There is no doubt that this discrepancy is part of a broad consideration when determining the way in which non-state schools are legally regulated. The ECHR also concludes that Article 2 The Additional Protocol to the Convention does not impose an obligation on States to set up certain types of educational establishments, but merely to guarantee the right of persons under their jurisdiction to use existing educational means (the so-called "Belgian language case '). After all, the ESLP stated this directly in relation to the complaint of the Private Primary School Path to Success in Prague, s. r. o., and the Civil Association School against the Czech Republic (dated 22. 11. 2011 No 8314 / 10). However, when establishing the legal regulation of the formation of non-state schools, the legislator is bound by the principle of equality in the sense of prohibiting the provision of unfounded different legal treatment between state and non-state schools.
55. Although European Union law, whose competence in general education is only complementary and applies within the scope of the freedom of movement of persons (typically in the schooling of children - family members of migrant citizens of the European Union), considers the freedom to establish public or private educational establishments as one of the aspects of freedom of entrepreneurship, its exercise is subject to compliance with the national laws of the Member States (Article 14 (3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union), which have full responsibility for the content of teaching and for the organisation of educational systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity (Article 165 (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union).
56. In view of the above characteristics of the nature and meaning of the right to education within the meaning of Article 33 of the Charter, the Constitutional Court took the second step of the rationality test to assess whether the contested provision affects the very existence of social law or the actual realisation of its essential content.
57. In the present case, the appellant claims that the contested provision interferes with the core right to establish private schools under Article 33 (3) of the Charter, in which it states that "the possibility of establishing private schools (Article 33 (3)) is a fundamental right '. This view cannot be taken into account in view of the above-mentioned view of the Constitutional Court relating to the nature of Article 33 (3) in the context of Article 33 of the Charter as a whole (cf. paragraphs 51 and 52).
58. As regards the question of whether the contested provision of the Education Act interferes with the essential content of the right to education, the Constitutional Court reached a negative conclusion. The current practice clearly shows that, as a result of the application of the contested provision, that is to say, the condition of registration in the register of schools and school establishments, in accordance with national long-term intention and with the relevant regional long-term intention, does not prevent the creation of non-state schools. The very potential of the abuse of the legal mechanism contained in the contested provision § 148 (3) (a) of the Education Act, as amended by Act No. 472 / 2011 Coll., for example, in a situation where long-term intentions exclude the existence of non-state schools in a flat-rate way from the concept of education, is based on the assumption of hypothetical unconstitutional treatment of that institution (act of specific application of the law) and therefore cannot in itself serve as an argument of the unconstitutional nature of that mechanism (provision). At the same time, the legal requirement of compliance of the school's activities with long-term intentions as a condition for the registration of the school is applied equally to both state and non-state schools. Paragraph 148 (3) (a) of the Education Act, as amended by Act No. 472 / 2011 Coll., therefore does not affect the very existence of social law or the actual implementation of its essential content.
59. As part of the third step of the rationality test, the Constitutional Court concludes that the contested provision pursues a legitimate objective and therefore does not constitute a arbitrary fundamental reduction in the standard of fundamental rights. The mechanism of conditional registration in the register of schools and school establishments, consistent with national long-term intention and with relevant regional long-term intention, aims to ensure the institutional consistency of the education system with the medium and long-term political concept of implementing the right to education, which is interpreted precisely through long-term intentions. It is certainly a legitimate objective where public power uses regulation of the institutional structure of the education system for the final purpose of implementing the right to education.
60. In the final step of the rationality test, that is to say, the assessment of whether the contested provision constitutes a rational means, albeit not necessarily the best, most appropriate, most effective or wisest, of whether the contested provision will stand up to that. Ensuring an adequate institutional structure of the education system is primarily about regulating the emergence of schools and school establishments. Therefore, the condition of registration in the register of schools and educational establishments, consistent with the national long-term intention and with the relevant regional long-term intention, can be considered as a rational means by which the State achieves the intended structure of the education system in order to ensure the institutional aspect of the right to education, as defined by the education policy, within the framework of constitutional mandinels, in long-term intentions.
61. The Constitutional Court adds to the above-mentioned rationality test that legal institutes or mechanisms establishing or having as a consequence possible restrictions on fundamental rights must be interpreted and applied in a constitutional manner. The authorities responsible for the creation of long-term projects cannot be considered as a means of general destruction of non-state schools by means of a link between the registration of schools and school establishments with their compliance, i.e. long-term projects cannot constitute a means of intervention in the core of the right to education. However, while respecting the requirement of constitutionally consistent interpretation, § 148 (3) (a) of the Education Act, as amended by Act No. 472 / 2011 Coll., constitutes a legitimate and rational means of implementing the State's influence in ensuring the institutional aspect of the right to education.
62. Nor does the proposed restriction on the formation of non-state schools based on capacity grounds, which is objectively used in some long-term projects, result in de facto a general demise of non-state schools under the current form and the chosen time horizon. Therefore, capacity reasons in the current situation are a legitimate criterion for regulating the education system.
63. The appellant, apart from intervening in the essential content of the right to establish private schools, further contests the infringement of Article 4 (2) of the Charter. Article 4 (2) The Charter may be governed by law only under the conditions laid down in the Charter. The purpose of the legislature's exclusive mandate (or the reservations of the law) thus formulated is to make it impossible for executive powers to "realize their own ideas of how and how much fundamental rights can be reduced. By granting this power to a democratically legitimate parliament, it is to be ensured that the limitation of fundamental rights will take place only after the democratic parliamentary discourse, and in addition it will obtain a restriction of fundamental rights and subsequent democratic feedback" (Wagner, E. In: Wagner, E., Šiměl, V., Langášek, T., Pospíšil, I. et al., Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. Comment. Praha: Wolters Kluwer ČR, a. s., 2012, p. 128).
64. Reservation of the Law pursuant to Article 4 (2) The Charter determines in particular the relationship between primary and secondary standards where it requires the limits of fundamental rights to be established only by law. However, as the Constitutional Court has previously stated, the reservation of the law "does not preclude the statutory definition of the social law under which an individual may seek it to be further regulated by a statutory law issued pursuant to Article 78 of the Constitution or under the statutory authority provided for in Article 79 (3) of the Constitution. In this way, however, it cannot be narrowed or extended from the legal regulation resulting from the content" [finding sp. zn. The Constitutional Court has in the past stated that it is not a violation of the rule of law if the substatutory law "specifies the issue laid down in the fundamental features of the law itself. The opposite conclusion, which would require the determination of any obligation directly and exclusively by law, would obviously lead to absurd consequences, namely the denial of the meaning of secondary (and in some cases primary) normomaking, since the conceptual part of each legal standard is the definition of certain rights and obligations of the addressees of the standard" [finding sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 5 / 01 of 16.10.2001 (N 149 / 24 SbNU 79; 410 / 2001 Coll.)].
65. The nature of the contested provision does not, in substance, affect the reservation of the law in the sense of the relationship between primary and secondary standards, since, by virtue of the contested provision § 148 (3) (a) of the Education Act, as amended by Act No. 472 / 2011 Coll., the legislator commits the body responsible for the registration of a school or a school establishment in the register of schools and educational establishments by means of the relevant long-term intentions, which do not constitute a secondary legislative act. Long-term projects are strategic plans at national and regional level, which combine the character of a technical and political document and which set out the medium and long-term concepts for the development of education and education systems (cf. also the Supreme Administrative Court judgment of 28 March 2018 No 2 As 312 / 2017-34).
66. In the present case and in the light of the case-law of the Constitutional Court referred to above, the assessment of the requirement of compliance with the law is necessary in the context of two fundamental questions. First of all, it is a question of the regulatory or legal nature of the mechanism, which links the non-compliance of the application for registration of a school or school establishment with the long-term intention, as a result of the rejection of the application. Secondly, it is necessary to assess the nature of the long-term project itself, which is an essential part of that process with a determining effect on the possible rejection of the application. It is thus an autonomous part of the mechanism which interferes with the exercise of the right to education and is therefore subject to the requirements of the reservation of the law, i.e. in this case to the maximum so that the establishment of the limit of the right to education is not effectively left to the practice of state authorities or other bodies.
67. In relation to the first question, the Constitutional Court states that the formal binding of the authority assessing the application for registration of a school or a school establishment in the register of schools and educational establishments is based on the very substance of § 148 (3) (a) of the Education Act, as amended by Act No. 472 / 2011 Coll., which provides for the binding of the registering authority with the content of relevant long-term intentions; where applicable, the contradiction of the application with a long-term intention is the legal reason for rejecting the application for registration. Thus, the definition of the mechanism at the level of the law itself is in line with the requirement of a reservation of the law.
68. The nature of the long-term project must therefore be assessed in the next step. The Constitutional Court does not agree with the appellant's view, which considers long-term intentions to be an expression of the political will of the executive allowing arbitrary political interference in the right to education. First of all, it should be noted that the very existence of long-term intentions has a legal basis in Section 9 of the Education Act, as amended by Act No. 49 / 2009 Coll., through which the legislator created, in the form of a specific strategic document, the scope for the formulation of school policies by executive bodies. The legislature also established basic procedural rules for the creation of long-term projects and the content of regional educational projects. In detail, by means of legal authorisation, the Ministry entrusted the Ministry with adjusting the content, structure and process of processing long-term projects. The nature of the long-term project is also linked to the fact that they are always drawn up for a limited period of 4 years and are adopted after that, corresponding to possible changes and the needs of the education system.
69. However, the authorities responsible for the processing of educational projects are not bound, when formulating them, by a simple definition of long-term projects in § 9 of the Education Act, as amended by Act No. 49 / 2009 Coll., and by Decree No. 15 / 2005 Coll. In addition to the above, they must in particular respect the principles and objectives of education as defined in Section 2 of the Education Act. The principles set out in Paragraph 2 (1) of the Education Act include, in particular, the principles "taking into account the educational needs of an individual," "mutual respect, respect, tolerance, solidarity and dignity of all participants in education," "free basic and secondary education of national citizens of the Czech Republic or of another Member State of the European Union in schools established by the State, region, municipality or community of municipalities," "evaluation of the results of education in view of the achievement of the educational objectives laid down by this Act and of educational programmes." The general educational objectives referred to in § 2 (2) of the Education Act include, in particular, "the development of a person's personality, which will be equipped with cognitive and social competence, moral and spiritual values for personal and civil life, the pursuit of a profession or work activity, the acquisition of information and learning throughout his life 'or" the understanding and application of the principles of democracy and the rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedoms, together with responsibility and a sense of social cohesion'.
70. The above legally binding qualitative requirements for educational purposes are accompanied by a requirement of constitutionally consistent interpretation, in a (material) legal state the application of public authority is bound or limited: "in cases, within the limits and in the ways laid down by law ', including the constitutional law (Article 2 (3) of the Constitution; Article 2 (2) of the Charter). Thus, the authorities responsible for formulating educational projects must respect not only the broader quality requirements in the field of education laid down by the Education Act, as amended, but also take into account the very constitutional nature of the right to education and the constitutional principles of the exercise of state (public) power. Therefore, long-term intentions cannot be used as a means to prevent the formation of non-state schools or educational establishments, as this would lead to interference in the above-defined essential content of the right to education in relation to Article 33 (3) of the Charter.
71. The Constitutional Court concludes that the existence of long-term intentions is subordinate to a range of procedural and content requirements arising out of both constitutional and legal arrangements, and therefore their existence and content cannot be considered as a case where the law provides without further delay for the establishment of the limits of the fundamental law of the activities of the executive bodies, i.e. contrary to the rule of law. Thus, the activities of the Ministry and the counties in formulating long-term intentions cannot be considered as an activity which would perhaps be regulated by a vague legal regulation leaving wide scope for the political discretion of the executive.
72. It is precisely because of compliance with the rule of law that the existence of long-term plans constitutes a breach of the principle of division of power, since not only the content of Article 4 (2) of the Charter is maintained, which provides that "the limits of fundamental rights and freedoms may be governed by law only under the conditions laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (...) ', but also by the principle of legality requiring that state power be exercised in cases, limits and in the manner laid down by the law (Article 2 (3) of the Constitution; Article 2 (2) of the Charter).
73. The Constitutional Court did not find the contested provision contradictory, nor with Article 32 (4) of the Charter, Article 2 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention and Article 13 of the International Pact, as the appellant contends. First, it should be noted that Article 32 (4) The Charter does not provide for the right of parents to decide on the method of education and education as formulated by the applicant. Pursuant to Article 32 (4) of the Charter of childcare and their upbringing is the right of parents. The Constitutional Court notes that the concepts of education and education need to be distinguished in this respect, as education, compared with education, includes a highly formalised institutional and material aspect in which it takes place. Education has a different goal and means - "a focused systematic care for (successful) mental and physical development (young) person" (dictionary of writing Czech. Praha: Academia, 1994, p. 509). While education can be characterised as "developing mental abilities and learning a wide knowledge by studying" (Dictionary of writing Czech. Praha: Academia, 1994, p. 529). The functional purpose of the right to education is to provide its bodies with an adequate level of knowledge which is not fully available to parents under Article 32 (4) of the Charter. This can be inferred from both the constitutional obligation of compulsory education and the way in which domestic education is regulated, within which the State requires an adequate degree of content and form of education. The choice of a method of education as the expression "right to an alternative" is not absolute and cannot relativism the state's obligation to ensure the right to education as a whole.
74. This conclusion is also supported by the interpretation of Article 2 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention and the ECHR case-law, according to which the right to education cannot be regarded as absolute, since within that framework implicitly accepted limits arise from the need for regulation by the State (cf. the Golder case against the United Kingdom, the ECHR decision of 21.2.1975 No 4451 / 70 or Fayed against the United Kingdom, the ECHR decision of 21.9.1994 No 17101 / 90).
75. According to the appellant, the contested legislation is also contrary to the principle of not linking the State to a specific ideology within the meaning of Article 2 (1) of the Charter. This contradiction is seen by the appellant in that the implementation of the fundamental right to education is linked to the content of the long-term educational intentions of the regions and to the activities of the central administration body, which is significantly affected by the current distribution of political forces. Its argument cannot be accepted, as is apparent from the above nature of the substance and meaning of the right to education. The Constitutional Court adds that the fundamental principles of the right to education are laid down in the Charter and its specific material and institutional aspects are implemented in the law. Public authorities are obliged to respect these principles and make their decisions within the limits of the Charter and the implementing laws.
Conclusion
76. On the basis of the above, the Constitutional Court has concluded that the contested provision of the Education Act does not conflict with the constitutional order or with Article 1 (1), Article 2 (1) and (3) of the Constitution, Article 2 (2), Article 4 (2) of the Charter, Article 32 (4), Article 33 (1) and (3) of the Charter and Article 2 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention, and has therefore decided, in accordance with Article 70 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as stated in the operative part. It did not comply with the proposal for a preliminary ruling because no relevant reasons were found for such a procedure.
President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr. Rychetský v. r.
In accordance with Article 14 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, Judge Ludvík David and Judge Milada Tomková took a decision in plenary.
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Regulation Information
| Citation | The Constitutional Court found no 224 / 2019 Coll., on the application for annulment of § 148 paragraph 3 (a) of Act No. 561 / 2004 Coll., on pre-school, primary, secondary, higher vocational and other education (Education Act), as amended by Act No. 472 / 2011 Coll. |
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| Regulation Type | The Constitutional Tribunal found |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 05.09.2019 |
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| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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