The Constitutional Court found No 2 / 2026 Coll.
Findings of the Constitutional Court sp. zn.
Valid
The Constitutional Tribunal found
Text versions:
15.01.2026
2
FIND
The Constitutional Court
of 26 November 2025
sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 31 / 24 concerning the application for annulment of § 41 paragraph 3 of Act No. 262 / 2006 Coll., Labour Code, as amended
On behalf of the Republic
On 26 November 2025, the Constitutional Court decided under sp. zn.
as follows:
Motion denied.
Reasons
Subject matter of the procedure, text of the contested provision of the law and related provisions
1. By a proposal pursuant to Article 95 (2) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as "the Constitution") and Article 64 (3) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as "the Law on the Constitutional Court"), the Supreme Court (hereinafter referred to as "the applicant") seeks the annulment of § 41 (3) of Act No. 262 / 2006 Coll., the Labour Code, as amended. It contests its contradiction with Article 9 (1), in conjunction with Article 26 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as the Charter), Article 4 of the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as the Convention), Article 8 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 5 (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Convention on Forced or Compulsory Work (hereinafter referred to as the Convention on Forced Work).
2. The contested Paragraph 41 (3) of the Labour Code reads as follows: "If the purpose of the transfer provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 cannot be achieved by transferring an employee in the context of a contract of employment, the employer may transfer it to work of a kind other than that agreed in the contract of employment, even if the employee disagrees. '
3. The contested provision remained unchanged even after the amendment of the Labour Code by Act No. 120 / 2025 Coll., amending Act No. 262 / 2006 Coll., the Labour Code, as amended, and certain other laws (hereinafter referred to as "Amendment Act No. 120 / 2025 Coll. ').
4. Amendment Act No. 120 / 2025 Coll. came into force on 1.6.2025, after the application by the Supreme Court, and touched on a number of provisions of the Labour Code, including some parts of Sections 41, 52 and 67. Unless otherwise stated, the Constitutional Court will refer in the statement of reasons to the wording of the relevant provisions of the Labour Code, which was valid and effective at the relevant time and not as amended by Amendment Act No. 120 / 2025 Coll.
5. Paragraph 41 (1) (b) of the Labour Code is closely linked to the contested provision of the Act, according to which the employer was obliged to transfer the employee to another work, unless the employee is entitled, in accordance with the medical opinion or decision of the administrative body which examines the medical opinion, to carry out the work to date, inter alia, for an accident at work.
6. Paragraph 52 (d) and (g) of the Labour Code was also relevant in the procedure from which the proposal now under consideration came. According to those provisions, the employer may give notice to the employee - in short - if the employee is unable, in accordance with a medical opinion or the decision of the administrative body which examines the medical opinion, to continue to carry out work, inter alia, for an accident at work [Paragraph 52 (d)], or if the employee is given reasons for which the employer could immediately cancel the employment relationship with him or for a serious breach of the obligations arising from the legislation relating to the worker's work, or, after fulfilling other legal requirements, for a continuous minor breach of the obligation arising from the legislation relating to the work carried out [§ 52 (g)].
7. The reason for the termination also affects the area of the right of severance. According to Section 67 (2) of the Labour Code, it was, among other things, that employees who had been dismissed by the employer for the reasons set out in Section 52 (1) of the Labour Code were entitled to give notice. (d) the labour code or agreement for the same reasons shall be subject to severance from the employer at the end of the employment contract of at least twelve times the average earnings. On the contrary, in the case of termination under § 52 (g) of the Labour Code, employees are not entitled to severance payments (§ 67 of the Labour Code and contrario).
Proceedings before general courts
8. The appellant submitted an application for annulment of Paragraph 41 (3) of the Labour Code in connection with the procedure under point 21 of Cdo 1103 / 2024 in the case of the employee's application ("the applicant ') on the determination of the invalidity of the notice of employment given to it by České Airlines, a.s. (" the defendant') by letter dated 28.1.2020.
9. The General Courts shall deal with the applicant's action to determine the invalidity of the notice of employment given to it by the defendant. During the training course on 10 December 2018, the applicant suffered an accident at work (a fracture of the heel bone and damage to the soft tissues of the ankle), resulting in the loss of medical fitness for the cabin crew. The defendant therefore submitted to her a proposal for an agreement amending the contract of employment amending the agreed type of work from the "cabin crew 'position to the" dispatcher-planner' position with effect from 16 December 2019 until the time of improvement of the health status for the performance of the current work. At the same time, the defendant presented a notification of transfer to another work, namely the position of the dispatcher whose work is, in short, the provision of preparation and further processing of service plans, shifts and working hours of crew members, the provision of their accommodation, transport and, on the operating day, their deployment for each flight.
10. The applicant, by letter dated 18 December 2019, informed the defendant that it considered the transfer to a new job invalid and did not appear to carry out the work without an apology. By letter dated 15 January 2020, the defendant drew the applicant's attention to a serious infringement of the labour law, but the applicant did not appear to carry out the work; The defendant therefore gave her a statement on 28 January 2020 for a serious breach of labour discipline consisting of 25 unagreed working days and shifts. Subsequently, on the same day, the applicant also made a statement stating that she had lost her fitness as a cabin crew member, had not been transferred to another (due to her medical condition) work and the defendant had not untied the employment relationship with her with the medical statement. According to the defendant, cabin crew members who are unable to perform their original work during pregnancy were transferred to this position by default. The defendant therefore considered the position appropriate to the applicant.
11. The District Court for Prague 6 ("the District Court"), by judgment of 3.11.2022 No 61 C 126 / 2020-86, determined the annulment of the statement. It referred to the consistent case law of the Supreme Court, according to which the transfer to another work in the event of a worker's disagreement is to be provisional only until the agreement of the Contracting Parties on the further application of the employee is concluded, or the termination of the employment. If the defendant transferred another job to the applicant without her consent, she should have done so for a specified period (clearly determined) and then directed her directly towards an agreement with the applicant in order to enable her to carry out the work she can and wants. If the defendant was not in a position to offer the applicant such work (for which it was appropriate) in accordance with Paragraph 41 (1) (b) of the Labour Code, it was to terminate the employment relationship with the applicant by giving notice for the long-term loss of medical fitness to carry out its previous work under Paragraph 52 (d) of the Labour Code or by agreement for the same reason. However, the defendant failed to fulfil her obligations by transferring the applicant to the dispatcher's position for an indefinite period. Since the transfer of the applicant to the post of dispatcher-planner was invalid and the applicant was not allowed to carry out the work of the cabin crew member for the loss of medical fitness, there could be no undue delay in the shift.
12. The Municipal Court in Prague ("the Municipal Court") confirmed the judgment of the Circular Court by judgment of 5 September 2023 No 30 Co 196 / 2023112. It agreed with the conclusion of the Circuit Court on the invalidity of the notice of employment, but did not agree with the grounds of invalidity which the Court adduced. The transfer of an employee to another work within the meaning of Paragraph 41 (1) (b) of the Labour Code may not be made invalid by reason of the absence of a specific period to which the employee is temporarily transferred, since such a requirement does not result from the legislation. It is therefore not a necessary requirement of this legal act, for which the absence of which it could be considered invalid. The applicant was therefore validly transferred with effect from 16 December 2019 to the dispatcher-planner position, which was consistent with both her health and professional qualifications and competences. The applicant was therefore obliged to respect this transfer and was obliged to carry out the work of the dispatcher with effect from 16 December 2019. If it did not do so and did not do so, it infringed the obligation under the legislation relating to the work carried out ("labour discipline"). However, the municipal court found the statement of employment in accordance with § 52 (g) of the Labour Code invalid because the defendant - having regard to the meaning and provisional nature of the Institute of Transfer to another work - "was primarily obliged to give notice to the applicant under § 52 (d) of the Labour Code ', at the time when the applicant informed the defendant that it did not agree to transfer to another work.
13. Against the judgment of the Municipal Court, the defendant lodged with the Supreme Court an appeal, which was accompanied by a motion to defer the legal power of operative part I of the judgment of the Municipal Court.
14. By order of 10 July 2024 No 21 Cdo 1103 / 2024-144, the Supreme Court rejected the defendant's application to postpone the judgment of the Municipal Court.
15. The Supreme Court finds that Paragraph 41 (3) of the Labour Code, which it considers to be applied in the case, is contrary to the constitutional order. It therefore submitted the case to the Constitutional Court for consideration pursuant to Article 95 (2) of the Constitution and, at the same time, by order of 5.11.2024 No 21 Cdo 1103 / 2024-161, it suspended the application until the Constitutional Court's decision on the application.
Arguments of the appellant
16. The appellant points out that private law - not including labour relations - is governed by the principle of the autonomy of the will, one of the exceptions in labour law is Section 41 (3) of the Labour Code. This provision allows the staff member to be transferred to a different type of work than that agreed in the employment contract, even without his consent. The nature of the transfer to another work consists in the unilateral legal action of the employer, which results in a change in the content of the employment relationship (or agreed type of work).
17. In assessing whether the transfer to another work without the consent of a worker pursuant to Article 41 (3) of the Labour Code constitutes a forced labour within the meaning of Article 9 (1) of the Charter and Article 4 (2) of the Convention, the appellant shall base its assessment on the definition contained in Article 2 (1) of the Convention on forced labour, under which that term refers "to any work or service which is enforced on any person under the threat of any penalty and to which the said person has not volunteered '. It also refers to exceptions to the definition of forced labour as enshrined in Article 2 (2) of the Convention on Forced Labour and Article 9 (2) of the Charter, Article 4 (3) of the Convention or Article 8 (3) (b) and (c) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
18. If it is to fulfil the definition of forced labour, dependent work (here specifically work on the position of dispatcher to which the applicant has been transferred) can undoubtedly be placed under the broader term "work '. The appellant also considers it clear that this is a job to which the employee has" not volunteered'. It can be seen that, if a staff member refuses to carry out a job for which he has been transferred without his consent, he may be dismissed for a serious breach of work or repeated minor breach of obligations [Paragraph 52 (g) of the Labour Code] without a right of severance (Section 67 of the Labour Code and contrario), and not, for example, for the failure to continue to perform work for an accident at work [§ 52 (d) of the Labour Code] with a claim for severance (Section 67 (2) of the Labour Code). In addition, the law does not explicitly limit the period for which an employee can be transferred to another job. A certain degree of temporary transfer results only from Paragraph 44 of the Labour Code, according to which an employee must be reclassified by the employer under the employment contract, inter alia, if the reason for the transfer to another work is lost, but according to the applicant it is not sufficient. Another restriction is that the employer is obliged to take account of the suitability of work for employees (Section 41 (6) of the Labour Code) and, in certain circumstances, to discuss his reason with the trade union (Section 46 of the Labour Code), which is not sufficient.
19. The appellant does not deny that the legislation on transfer to another work contained in Section 41 (1) and (2) of the Labour Code pursues a legitimate objective and, in some cases (albeit not all), the protection of one of the employees' constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights (e.g. workers' rights to satisfactory working conditions or health protection rights) is directly monitored. However, the purpose pursued by this legislation can be achieved, according to the appellant, without significant interference in the prohibition of forced labour and the right to freedom of choice of profession, such as the possibility for an employer to transfer employees to work of another kind without his consent, enshrined in Section 41 (3) of the Labour Code.
20. Moreover, Article 41 (1) and (2) of the Labour Code could, in the absence of the contested Paragraph 41 (3) of the same Act, be interpreted in a constitutional manner while respecting the will shown by the employee, the contractual concept of employment and the principle of contractual freedom, in such a way that the employer is "obliged" in the cases provided for in Article 41 (1) and in the cases provided for in paragraph 2 "may make a proposal to amend his employment classification." When transferring to another job, it would be up to the staff member to agree to such a change in the type of work and to continue to be obliged to carry out such other work for the employer (in which case it would not be possible to find a breach of his duty). However, the current concept of Paragraph 41 (3) of the Labour Code does not allow a constitutional conformal interpretation.
Observation of the party and the intervener
Statement by Parliament as party to the proceedings
21. The Constitutional Court, pursuant to Article 69 (1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, requested the observations of the two chambers of Parliament acting on its behalf (Article 9 of Act No 300 / 2017 Coll., on the principles of conduct and relations between the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate and on the amendment of Act No 90 / 1995 Coll., on the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, as amended), i.e. the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.
22. The Chamber of Deputies described the course of the legislative process leading to the adoption of the Labour Code, which it was part of from the outset, in its unchanged form, and the contested § 41 (3). The Labour Code was passed by the necessary majority of Members of the Chamber of Deputies, signed by the President of the Chamber of Deputies and the Prime Minister and declared without the President's signature. Following the rejection of the bill by the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies maintained its original wording. Subsequently, the President did not sign the bill, with the House of Deputies again remaining on its original text. The Chamber of Deputies acted in the belief that the law adopted was in accordance with constitutional order.
23. The Senate described in detail the course of the legislative process. He pointed out that all three Senate committees concerned proposed the rejection of the bill. It was subsequently repeated in the general debate that there was insufficient room for the will of the parties and that significant obligations were imposed on the parties, as well as that the new Labour Code rather preserved the current situation. The question of switching to another job was only mentioned in the context of the problem of trade union representativeness, but was not individually accentuated. Nevertheless, it was stated in the discussion of the draft law that "in the opinion of some experts in the field of labour law, including some members of the Legislative Council of the Government, certain provisions of the Labour Code are contrary to the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and even the Constitution of the Czech Republic." In vote 115, the Senate adopted Resolution 398 rejecting the bill.
Government's observations as interveners
24. The Constitutional Court, pursuant to Article 69 (2) and (3) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, has called on the Government to inform it within the legal period laid down by law whether it is intervening in the proceedings and, where appropriate, to comment on the application. The Government decided to intervene and subsequently sent its observations on the application to the Constitutional Court.
25. The Government does not in any way contradict the appellant's claim that the Labour Code is a private law, therefore it is subject to general principles of civil law such as the autonomy of the will or the pacta sunt servanda principle. The principle of unilateral transfer of a staff member to another work is, to a certain extent, excluded. However, these principles are not absolute and cannot be applied unreservedly to every single provision of the law; On the contrary, it is common that private law also contains provisions which derogate from these principles for a certain range of legal relations. This is often due to the interest in balancing the actual inequality of individuals. This is most clearly reflected in the area of consumer law, but also in labour law, as in the case of the contested § 41 (3) of the Labour Code.
26. This is relevant for assessing whether the transfer of an employee to another job can be regarded as a constitutional order prohibited by forced labour. On the one hand, it cannot be disputed that, under the contested provision, a staff member may be transferred to another work without his consent (involuntary). On the other hand, however, it cannot be accepted that he would be threatened with punishment within the meaning of the Convention on Forced Labour. The possibility of giving notice to a staff member who fails to fulfil his / her duties (including those who he / she has not volunteered to perform) is not a standard in labour law. According to the Government, an example can be given, for example, overtime according to § 93 of the Labour Code, which can be ordered unilaterally by the employer, even in a time of continuous daily rest. For switching to another job, overtime is about the difference in intensity, or extent, rather than substance. In addition, the transfer to another job is temporary because after the reasons for the transfer have been put out, the employer is obliged to re-classify the employee under the employment contract (Section 44 of the Labour Code). Although it might be appropriate to establish an explicit limit on the maximum length of conversion, even in the current legal situation this can be explained.
27. The Government also considers that protection against forced labour is designed in the Charter and international treaties as protection against authoritarian intervention by public authorities, not by private law. According to the Government, this is due, among other things, to the wording of exceptions to the prohibition of forced labour in relevant constitutional documents which are always directed towards public authorities. This limitation should also be known by the appellant, who imports public intervention into the rights of individuals from the mere existence of a law (Labour Code). But that is not enough for the government.
28. Finally, the Government admits that the current legislation may not be the most appropriate solution, but these imperfections do not achieve constitutional legal relevance and do not violate constitutional order. It therefore proposes rejecting the proposal.
Communication from the Ombudsman
29. The Constitutional Court, pursuant to Article 69 (2) and (3) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, called on the Ombudsman to state within the legal period laid down by law whether he was intervening in the proceedings and, if necessary, to comment on the application. The Ombudsman informed the Constitutional Court that he did not intervene.
Replication of the applicant
30. The Constitutional Court sent the applicant the above observations of the party and the intervener for a possible reply. The appellant did not take this opportunity.
Proceedings
31. The Constitutional Court has also assessed whether the legal procedural conditions for the hearing of the application under Article 87 (1) (a) and Article 95 (2) of the Constitution and Article 64 (3) of the Constitutional Court Act are fulfilled.
32. Article 95 (2) The Constitution states that if the court concludes that the law to be applied in the resolution of the case is contrary to the constitutional order, it shall bring the matter before the Constitutional Court. The General Court is entitled to make a proposal when proposing the repeal of the law or its individual provision, the application of which is to be immediate and necessary; not only hypothetical or given the broader context of [finding sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 92 / 20 of 11.4.2023 (N 54 / 117 SbNU 211; 124 / 2023 Sb.), paragraph 29; finding sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 20 / 05 of 28.2.2006 (N 47 / 40 SbNU 389; 252 / 2006 Sb.)]. It follows from the purpose and meaning of the so-called specific control of the constitutionality of the legislation that the General Court is entitled to propose the annulment of only such law or provision thereof, which obstructs the achievement of the desired, i.e. the constitutionally conformistic result [finding sp. zl. ÚS 92 / 20, paragraph 29; finding sp. zn. In other words, the active legitimacy of the General Court depends on the subject-matter of the proceedings before it.
33. From the requested court file, the Constitutional Court verified the facts raised by the appellant in the application in favour of its active legitimacy. The municipal court applied, inter alia, Article 41 (3) of the Labour Code in its decision-making. The assessment of the appeal against the judgment of the Municipal Court on which the Supreme Court decides also depends on the resolution of the question of whether the employer may give notice to the employee under Paragraph 52 (g) of the Labour Code on the grounds that the employee has seriously infringed the obligation under labour law when he refused to carry out the work to which he was transferred by the employer pursuant to Article 41 (1) (b) in conjunction with Article 41 (3) of the Labour Code without his consent. According to the information available, the notice was not found inadmissible and the applicant did not find any grounds for terminating the appeal. The appellant is therefore actively authorised to submit a proposal.
34. The contested Paragraph 41 (3) of the Labour Code is still unchanged (i.e. it was not affected by Amendment Act No. 120 / 2025 Coll.). The proposal therefore also fulfils the procedural conditions of the proceedings under Sections 66 and 67 of the Constitutional Court Act.
35. The Constitutional Court summarises, in the light of the above, that the legal procedural conditions for hearing the application have been fulfilled.
Abandonment of oral proceedings
36. The Constitutional Court concluded that, in view of the content of the application and the written observations of the parties to the proceedings, further clarification of the case could no longer be expected from the oral hearing, and therefore, on the basis of Article 44 of the Constitutional Court Act, it decided on the case without its regulation.
Constitutional conformity of the legislative process
37. After the Constitutional Court found that the procedural conditions for the procedure had been met, it went to review the contested provision. In accordance with Article 68 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll., he first addressed the question of whether it was adopted and issued in a constitutionally prescribed manner and within the limits of the Constitution established competence.
38. The findings of the observations of the chambers of Parliament (see in detail paragraphs 22 and 23 above) consider that the Constitutional Court is sufficient to conclude that the contested Paragraph 41 (3) of the Labour Code, which is an unchanged part of the Labour Code from the outset, has been issued within the limits of the constitutional competence and adopted in a constitutional manner. This, moreover, is not disputed by the appellant. There are no arguments raised by the government in this area.
A substantive review of the constitutionality of the contested provision of the law
39. The Constitutional Court has treated the constitutionality of the contested § 41 (3) of the Labour Code exclusively in the light of the appellant's duly raised and substantiated arguments.
Right not to be subjected to slavery, serenity and forced labour and services - general principles
40. The right of the individual not to be subjected to slavery, serenity and forced labour and services is from the outset a solid part of the constitutional order and the system of protection of fundamental rights in the Czech Republic. In view of its importance and its close association with the ability of everyone to have rights (Article 5 of the Charter) and human dignity and freedom (Article 1 of the Charter), it must also be considered to be part of the nature of the Czech Republic as a democratic rule of law (Article 1 (1) of the Constitution).
41. The right not to be subjected to slavery, serenity and forced labour arises from both the Charter and from international human rights treaties, which form part of the reference framework for the review of constitutionality [FTC 36 / 01 of 25.6.2002 (N 80 / 26 CollNU 317; 403 / 2002 Coll.)]. In particular, reference may be made to Article 4 of the Convention, Article 8 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. If it is a matter of national anchoring, its basis should be sought in Article 9 of the Charter. According to its first paragraph, "no one may be subjected to forced labour or services'; its second paragraph then defines the content of the first paragraph and indicates those cases which cannot be regarded as forced labour or services, although they may otherwise fulfil their definitions. Although Article 9 of the Charter explicitly affects" forced labour or services only, it also includes the prohibition of slavery and serenity, including their modern forms (mainly trafficking in human beings), resulting from Article 5 of the Charter in conjunction with Article 9 of the Charter.
42. The boundaries between slavery, serenity and forced labour are not entirely unequivocal and simply defined, which is manifestly reflected, for example, in their modern forms (judgment of the European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR") of 7 January 2010 in the Rantsev case against Cyprus and Russia, complaint No 25965 / 04, § 282). Slavery can generally be regarded as the most serious form of forced labour which is inseparably linked to the (factual) reduction of an individual to a mere object of law. In its modern form, it generally refers to the commodity of the victim, the restriction and control of his movements, the forced to work and, as a general rule, to life in poor conditions, using threats or violence (judgment of the ECHR in the Rantsev case against Cyprus and Russia, § 280 to 281; judgment of the ECHR of 26.7.2005 in the Siliadin case against France, complaint No 73316 / 01, § 122; judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia of 12.6.2002 in the Prosecutor v Kunarac, Vukovic and Kovac case, § 117 to 119; to the traditional conception of slavery, see Article 1 (1) of the Convention on slavery, published under No 165 / 1930 Coll.). In the current view, serenity is understood as an extremely serious case of unlawful deprivation of personal liberty linked to the execution of forced labour, the characteristic of which is the absence of the victim's ability to change that situation in any way (judgment of the ECHR in the Rantsev case against Cyprus and Russia, § 276; judgment of the ECHR in the Siliadin case against France, § 123 and 124; judgment of the ECHR of 7.3.2000 in the case of Seguin case, complaint No 42400 / 98; see Article 1 (b) of the Additional Convention on the abolition of slavery, trade in slaves and institutions and practices of similar slavery, approved in Geneva on 7.9.1956). Forced work does not define constitutional order. The initial approach to defining its content is Article 2 (1) of the Convention on Forced Labour, according to which the term refers to "any work or service which is enforced on any person under the threat of any penalty and to which the said person has not volunteered '. At the same time, however, not every job for which an individual has not volunteered will be a constitutionally rebelled forced labour; This also results from the negative definition of forced labour in Article 9 (2) of the Charter and similar provisions of international human rights treaties (e.g. judgment of the Grand Chamber of the ECHR of 25.6.2020 in case S. M. against Croatia, complaint No 60561 / 14, § 281; judgment of the ECHR of 7.7.2011 in case No 37452 / 02, § 117).
43. A number of conditions must be fulfilled in order to ensure that the work carried out at all falls within the scope of Article 9 (1) of the Charter (see, in detail, LANGÁŠEK, T. Article 9 of the Charter). In: WAGNER, E., ŠIMÍČEK, V., LANGUŠEK, T., SETTLEMENT, I. et al. Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms: Comment. Praha: Wolters Kluwer, p. 260 to 267]. (b) the exercise of that activity must be involuntary;
44. As indicated above, it must be primarily a personal exercise of a particular activity. It is not decisive whether it is physical or mental.
45. Furthermore, the involuntary execution of an activity must be given. If there is an assessment of the involuntary character, it is necessary to examine carefully all the circumstances of the case which may help determine whether an activity has been carried out contrary to the individual's free will. In fact, it may be the case not only in the case of explicit opposition, but also in the case of formal consent, which, in view of all the circumstances, was not freely given (ECHR judgment of 30 March 2017 in Chowdhura and Others v Greece, Case No 21884 / 15, § 96; ECHR judgment in Case S. M. v Croatia, § 285). Moreover, the Constitutional Court has pointed out in the past that "it would, of course, be illusory to believe that deciding whether to do a job or not is free of further influence and that even free speech of will in this regard cannot be forced by the circumstances of a particular person. But the nature of this ban is elsewhere. It cannot be seen as being prevented by individuals, with all responsibility, to consider their needs and adapt their actions, for example by accepting a job that he would otherwise not be interested in, but, given his current financial situation, he considers that he must accept. It is precisely the exclusion of the possibility of making such a serious and free decision" [finding sp. zn. At the same time, the involuntary nature is typically not given in respect of obligations arising from legal proceedings, obligations arising from offences, obligations normally linked to property law or obligations normally arising from family law relations (see, for example, the sp. zn. Resolution sp. zn. I. ÚS 371 / 06 of 27.3.2007; Resolution sp. zn. III. ÚS 1272 / 08 of 24.7.2008; the decisions are available at https: / / nalus.ujud.cz]. The specific case is the voluntary pursuit of a particular profession, with which, however, the obligation to carry out certain activities may not be accepted by the person concerned; in the field of health care, for example, to which the legislator has remembered in Article 9 (2) (d) of the Charter. In these cases, the case-law does not normally see the fulfilment of the sign of involuntary [a) for the provision of legal services see, for example, the judgment in plenary of the ECHR of 23.11.1983 in case Van der Mussel v Belgium, Case No 8919 / 80, § 36; the ECHR decision of 25.1.2022 in case Dănoi and Others v Romania, Case No 54780 / 15 and two others in case No 57818 / 85; b) for the pursuit of the profession of doctors see, for example, the ECHR decision of 6.2.2018 in case of Adigüzel v case of Turkey, Case No 7442 / 08, § 30; the ECHR decision of 14.9.2010 in case of Steindel v Germany, Case No 29878 / 07; c) for the work of the night and the overtime see for example ESLP of 24.10.2017 in Case of Tibet Mentechs.
46. The involuntary conduct of a particular activity must be forced. Forcing must be seen as a threat to any sufficiently sensitive - deterrent - punishment (judgment of the ECHR in Van der Mussel v Belgium, § 35). The penalty may be not only public law sanctions, physical violence or restrictions, but also minor forms of direct or indirect pressure, such as psychological pressure (judgment of the ECHR in Case C. N. and V. against France of 11.10.2012, No 67724 / 09, § 77) or the loss of certain rights or advantages (judgment of the ECHR in Case Van der Mussel v Belgium, § 35). It is not decisive whether an individual is forced to pursue a particular activity under the threat of public or private law punishment, as Article 9 of the Charter affects both variants [Sp. zn. However, account must be taken of the overall severity and impact of the sentence or its threat to the sphere of the individual. Indeed, not every potentially negative impact on the individual's sphere can be regarded as a punishment or threat in the above sense (in the Siliadin case against France, § 118, it was accepted that the threat of extradition of a minor immigrant without authorisation to immigration authorities was comparable to the threat of punishment in the above sense; in the case of Tibet Menteşand others against Turkey and Adigüzel against Turkey, the threat of loss of employment was not found to be sufficiently serious to qualify as a threat of punishment; in the Van der Mussel case against Belgium, although the threat of exclusion from the bar and, consequently, the loss of the ability to exercise the profession of lawyer was considered sufficiently serious, this factor was not decisive in the case).
47. It is of fundamental importance to assess whether the pursuit of a particular activity on which an individual did not offer himself voluntarily constituted a disproportionate burden on him (judgment of the ECHR in Van der Mussel v Belgium, § 37; judgment of the ECHR in the case of Graziani-Weiss v Austria of 18.10.2011, No 31950 / 06, § 41; judgment of the ECHR in the case of Chowdhura and Others v Greece, § 91; judgment of the ECHR in the case of Adigüzel v Turkey, § 22, judgment of the ECHR in Case C. N. and V. v v France, § 74). This criterion operates in both directions. On the one hand, the burden is required to reach at least a minimum level. If the burden to be borne by an individual can be considered to be common in a democratic rule of law or even negligible, it will not be a constitutionally prohibited forced labour, even if otherwise prima facie the other characteristics of forced labour are fulfilled (Case C-N and V ECHR v France, § 74; Case C-41 / 00 Graziani-Weiss v Austria, § 41 and 43; Case Van der Mussel v Belgium, § 41; Adigüzel v Turkey, § 34). In assessing whether, in the context of a freely chosen profession, a person is obliged to perform a forced work within the meaning of Article 9 (1) of the Charter, it may be considered, inter alia, whether a remuneration or other compensation is granted for this involuntary work, whether the obligation imposed is based on the concept of social solidarity, whether the forced work by its nature is fundamentally different from that carried out by the person concerned in the context of his profession voluntarily, and whether the scope of that work is capable of [finding sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 14 / 17 of 14. 8. 2018 (N 134 / 90 SbNU 205; 200 / 2018 Coll.), paragraph 60; ESLP v., v., v., v. While providing remuneration for work is not in itself decisive in assessing whether a job can be considered forced, it may reduce or increase the burden. The same applies to the question of the nature and extent of the work done unwillingly. On the other hand, however, the exceptional burden of burden may cast a shadow of doubt on the voluntary performance of certain work (judgment of the Grand Chamber of the ECHR in case S. M. against Croatia, § 285; judgment of the ECHR in case Chowdhura and Others against Greece, § 96).
48. It is the burden of burden that distinguishes, for example, from the work done by the victim of so-called domestic slavery, not entirely voluntarily carried out by a roommate in the maintenance of a common household. In both cases, although at first sight the signs of forced labour under Article 2 (1) of the Convention on Forced Labour are fulfilled, it is material correction in the form of burden distress that excludes the first case from the scope of Article 9 (1) of the Charter and reliably underlines the second case to the scope of Article 9 (1) of the Charter. This was also mentioned by the European Court of Human Rights when it stated that the diametrically different burden borne by an individual is what "distinguishes forced labour from assistance that can reasonably be expected from family members or co-habitants' (ECHR judgment in Case C. N. and V against France, § 74; see, mutatis mutandis, the ECHR judgment in the Siliadin case against France).
49. The prohibition of slavery, serenity, and forced labour results in both negative and positive obligations of the state. The negative obligations of the State are vertical and consist of an order not to subject the individuals to slavery, serenity or forced labour, thereby respecting their freedom, human dignity and possibly the ability to be a subject of rights (point Pl. ÚS 1 / 12). However, this does not exhaust the content of Article 9 (1) of the Charter as it also results from the positive obligations of a State which may be of both a substantive and procedural nature (judgment of the Grand Chamber of the ECHR in case S. M. v Croatia, paragraphs 306 and 307). Substantive positive obligations of the State lie in the obligation to protect individuals from violating their constitutionally guaranteed rights by other (natural and legal) individuals of private law. This includes, in particular, the obligation to adopt legislation guaranteeing this protection (judgment of the ECHR in the Rantsev case against Cyprus and Russia, § 285; judgment of the ECHR in the C.N. and V. case against France, § 105), and the obligation to interpret and apply it in a constitutional manner. In this respect, the so-called effect of the radiance of fundamental rights by the rule of law and the concept of horizontal application of fundamental rights is strongly reflected. In certain cases, the State's positive commitments may also include the obligation to take specific preventive measures to protect the victim of the infringement of Article 9 (1) of the Charter by other private persons. The latter obligation arises if the public authorities knew or should have known that a person has been a victim of slavery, serenity or forced labour or is exposed to a real and immediate risk of such a sacrifice (Rantsev and Russia judgment in Rantsev, § 286; also adequately compared to the judgment of the Grand Chamber in Osman v United Kingdom of 28 October 1998, No 23452 / 94, paragraphs 115 and 116). The procedural positive obligations of the State include the obligation to carry out an effective investigation when a person is alleged to have been the victim of a breach of the prohibition of slavery, serenity or forced labour (Clause 3626 / 13 of 16.12.2015 (N 216 / 79 of the SbNU 475); Rantsev v v Cyprus and Russia, § 288; ECHR judgment in Case C-N and V. v France, § 109).
50. The Constitutional Court also pointed out in the past that there is a link between the prohibition of forced labour under Article 9 of the Charter and certain social rights, in particular the right to free choice of profession under Article 26 (1) of the Charter (the finding of sp. zn. At the same time, however, he stressed that the duplication of these fundamental rights could not be said because they do not regulate the same range of legal relations and do not act in an identical way towards public power. In particular, he stated that "the right to freedom of choice of profession concerns a wider range of legal relations than the prohibition of forced labour, as it also includes the issues of access to and the manner in which they are pursued '(ibidem, paragraph 234). The relationship between these fundamental rights is reminiscent of a one-way street: the violation of the individual's right not to be subjected to slavery, serenity or forced labour will, by its very nature, be a violation of the very core of the right to free choice of profession. The opposite, however, is not true, that is, not every violation of the right to free choice of profession is a violation of the right not to be subjected to slavery, servitude or forced labour. This is due to the different content and scope of these rights, namely that the prohibition of forced labour is much closer than the right to free choice of profession, as well as the fact that the assessment of constitutional conformity of interventions in these rights is subject to different standards.
Right not to be subjected to slavery, servitude and forced labour and services - assessment of the constitutionality of the contested provision
51. The appellant bases his proposal on the claim that the possibility of transferring an employee to a work of a kind other than that agreed in the employment contract, even without his consent (or despite his opposition) under Paragraph 41 (3) of the Labour Code, is contrary to the constitutionally enshrined prohibition of forced labour under Article 9 (1) of the Charter.
52. The contested provision of the law must be assessed by the optics of the substantive positive obligations of the State resulting from the prohibition of forced labour pursuant to Article 9 (1) of the Charter, namely the obligation to adopt legislation which guarantees individuals protection against unconstitutional interference with their fundamental rights by other private persons (judgment of the ECHR in Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia, § 285; judgment of the ECHR in Case C. N. and V. v v v v France, § 105). It is clear that the contested provision does not concern the sovereign relationship between the State and the individual or the procedural obligations arising from Article 9 (2) of the Charter. On the contrary, this is a provision which affects a horizontal, private relationship between an employee and an employer.
53. The contradiction between the contested provision and the prohibition of forced labour could then be established if, as a result of the adoption of anti-constitutional legislation, the State allowed private persons to submit to forced labour in breach of Article 9 (1) of the Charter. However, this did not happen.
54. The transfer to another job is understood as "a change of employment consisting of the employer ordering workers to work which does not fall under the type of work agreed in the employment contract '(BULINA, M., DRAPAL, L. et al. Comment. 4. Prague: C. H. Beck, 2023, p. 267); the transfer to another work will not take place, on the other hand, if the staff member is ordered to work other than that of the type of work agreed in the employment contract. The type of work is one of the essential elements of the employment contract [Paragraph 34 (1) (a) of the Labour Code], the employee is obliged to perform the work in person [Paragraph 38 (1) (b) of the Labour Code]. There can therefore be no doubt that the first sign of forced labour - the personal exercise of a particular activity - is fulfilled in this case.
55. The contested Paragraph 41 (3) of the Labour Code also provides room for an employee to be required to carry out work under certain circumstances on the basis of an employer's decision which he did not offer voluntarily. In the context of the case under examination, Paragraph 41 (3), in conjunction with Paragraph 41 (1) (b) of the Labour Code (as amended by 31.5.2025), requires the employer to transfer employees to another work if his inability to carry out the previous work for an accident at work has been established in the medical report (unless, however, the employer has decided not to give the employee notice of employment for the same reason under Section 52 (d) of the Labour Code) and, on the other hand, requires the employees to accept such transfer and carry out the work to which he was transferred, even if he did not agree. The appellant can therefore in principle agree that the second sign of forced labour - the involuntary nature of an activity - may be fulfilled for the contested provision, despite the fact that employees in each of these situations remain entitled to give notice without giving a reason (Section 50 (3) of the Labour Code).
56. As regards the assessment of the question whether an employee under the contested provision is obliged to carry out work under a threat of punishment, it should be recalled that, in the interests of clarity, the appellant sees an element of coercion in that if the employee refuses to carry out this new work, he may be dismissed for breach of employment obligations under § 52 (g) of the Labour Code, thereby losing entitlement to severance payments under § 67 (2) of the Labour Code, as amended by 31.5.2025 [i.e. not for the loss of ability to perform the work done as a result of an accident at at work pursuant to § 52 (d) of the Labour Code, which is entitled to severance payments of twelve times monthly earnings]. The appellant therefore considers that the threat of punishment is to be a loss of the right to severance payments, namely a loss of financial benefits.
57. Before the Constitutional Court assesses the question itself as to whether the loss of the right to severance can be regarded as a threat to punishment and whether the employee loses the right to severance, it considers it necessary to suspend itself from another fact. It follows from the legislation that in the case of accidents at work, there is a serious loss of working capacity for objective reasons, i.e. the deterioration of health. The employer can then typically respond to this objectively established condition by transferring the employee to another job, even without his consent, or by discontinuing the employment relationship by giving notice or agreement. In both cases, however, the legislature has decided not to allow it to carry out such work as may threaten its life, physical integrity or health (Articles 6, 7 (1) and 31 of the Charter), even if the employee wishes to continue to do so. Moreover, this fact is acknowledged by the appellant himself in his proposal.
58. Thus, neither the employer nor the employee is faced with a choice between whether the employee will continue to carry out the work he has chosen or the work he has transferred to without his permission, but between choosing whether the employee will carry out another job with the same employer or whether his employment will be terminated. In other words, the alternative to transferring to another job is not the performance of the original, employee of the job chosen, but the termination of the employment. The core of the proposal now under consideration is therefore only to which grounds of notice may apply and whether employees will be entitled to severance payments, not whether the legislator allowed employers to force workers to work in breach of Article 9 (1) of the Charter. It already reduces the persuasion of the appellant's claim that Paragraph 41 (3) of the Labour Code allows a worker to submit to forced labour in breach of constitutional order.
59. Even if the Constitutional Court had disregarded the above, it could not have found the contested Paragraph 41 (3) of the Labour Code contradictory to the prohibition of forced labour. Although the loss of certain rights or advantages, including the benefits of a financial nature, may, in certain circumstances, constitute a form of coercion (judgment of the ECHR in Van der Mussel v Belgium, § 35), the case-law states that the overall seriousness and impact of the threat of punishment in the individual's sphere must be taken into account. Not every potentially negative consequence can be considered a threat of punishment within the meaning of Article 9 (1) of the Charter. As stated by the European Court of Human Rights, the very threat of a job loss with a particular employer and, consequently, the loss of income resulting from that work is not a threat to punishment in the aforementioned sense (the judgment of the ECHR in the Tibet Menteşand others against Turkey; the ECHR in the Adigüzel case against Turkey); This could theoretically be a loss of access to the whole sector or to the pursuit of a particular profession in general, but it may not be sufficient without further confirmation of a breach of the prohibition of forced labour, as it is necessary to look at the overall burden borne by the employee (judgment of the ECHR in Van der Mussel v Belgium).
60. As regards the burden on the staff member in the event of transfer to another work without his consent, account must be taken of the subsequent provisions of the Labour Code and of the established case law of the General Courts on the question of the impact of the transfer to another work without the consent of the staff member in the area of applicable grounds of notice and the right of severance. Only these can complete the overall context and burden borne by the employee.
61. In this context, it is first of all necessary to point out Article 41 (6) of the Labour Code, according to which the employer is obliged, when transferring an employee to another job, "to take into account that this work is appropriate for him because of his health and abilities and, if possible, his qualifications'. In particular, that provision prevents an employee from being transferred to a job which does not correspond to his health and abilities. At the same time - although the obligation to transfer employees to work corresponding to their qualifications is only optional at first sight - prevents the employee from being transferred to work diametrically different from that which he originally carried out (judgment of the ECHR in Van der Mussel v Belgium, paragraphs 37 and 39). As the professional literature points out," the possibilities of an employer are, for example, whether an employer has the ability to transfer an employee to work corresponding to his qualifications, i.e. whether he has a job vacancy for the transferred employee that corresponds to his qualifications. If he has such a job, the employer shall transfer the staff member to work appropriate to his qualifications. Only if the employer does not have such a job vacancy is obliged to transfer the staff member to a job that corresponds most to the qualifications of the staff member "[BELINA, M., DRÁPAL, L. et al. Comments p. 268, marg. 3]. Therefore, the Constitutional Court could not conclude that the contested § 41 (3) and the subsequent provisions of the Labour Code provide for the possibility for an employee to be transferred, without his consent, to work entirely different from his original profession.
62. At the same time, the employer is generally obliged to include employees under a contract of employment (i.e. in the position and work of the type to which the employee voluntarily undertook to perform in the contract of employment) as soon as the reasons for which the employee was transferred to another work (Section 44 of the Labour Code) have been waived. The appellant and the government point that out. Although this legal obligation of an employer is unlikely to find a broad application in cases where an accident at work or occupational disease leads to a long-term or permanent incapacity for a staff member to do his or her job, it is a general guarantee that the staff member will not be forced in this way to carry out a job which he or she has not chosen and has not been offered.
63. It is also clear that, even after transfer to another work, the staff member must be paid a salary, salary or other remuneration for the work carried out [§ 2 (2), § 38 (1) (a) and other Labour Code]. Although the fact that a staff member transferred to another work must be remunerated for the work carried out does not, without further indication, indicate whether it is a constitutionally prohibited forced labour or not, that fact is undoubtedly another factor reducing the overall burden borne by the employee.
64. The Constitutional Court takes the view that, according to the settled case law of the Supreme Court, a staff member does not automatically lose or claim to pay a severance allowance of 12 times the average earnings in the event of an involuntary transfer to another work pursuant to § 41 (1) (b) in conjunction with § 41 (3) of the Labour Code. According to this case-law, transferring an employee to another job without his consent does not constitute a definitive solution to the question of what work an employee will continue to do for a particular employer, but only a provisional solution. This temporary solution is to be applied only until agreement has been reached on the further employment of the employee with the employer concerned and, where appropriate, on the termination of the employment relationship. If the employer has not transferred a staff member unfit to carry out his work, inter alia, for an accident at work to another work, or if he has transferred him to another work without his consent (and if the employee's appointment with the employer has not been subsequently resolved by agreement), he shall be obliged to release the employment relationship with him by denunciation under § 52 (d) of the Labour Code or by agreement for the same reasons. If the employer fails to comply with this obligation, the staff member shall be entitled, for the same reasons, to release the employment relationship without prejudice to his right of severance in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 67 (2) of the Labour Code (judgment of the Supreme Court in Case C-5825 / 2016 (R 41 / 2019 civ); Resolution of the Supreme Court sp. zn. 21 Cdo 1809 / 2021 of 31.8.2021 (R 1 / 2025 civ.)]. According to the case-law, when a staff member refuses to perform a job to which an employer has been transferred without his consent pursuant to Paragraph 41 (1) (b), in conjunction with the contested § 41 (3) of the Labour Code, it is not to the detriment of his right to severance pay (cf. Judgment of the Supreme Court in sp. zn. 21 Cdo.
65. This case law of the Supreme Court is also supported by professional literature. The latter points out, inter alia, that "Paragraph 41 of the Labour Code represents a false friend ', which cannot be relied upon if the [employer - note] seeks to transfer an employee to another job with which the employee disagrees. Not only when severance payments are in play, the Supreme Court case law gives employees the right to insist that" hostile' transfer to another job can only be enforced as a transitional solution, for example, during the period of notice or before another, preferred employee, job position. However, if the staff member insists that he is not interested in the position to which he has been transferred, is there no choice but to terminate the employment '[PICHRT, J., TOMŠEJ, J. Transferring to alignment? In: PICHRT, J. MORATE, J. (eds.). Merging private and professional life. Praha: Wolters Kluwer, 2023, p. 10 et seq., in which the authors also recall that there are also other, more critical opinions on the legislation for transferring to another work. Moreover, the refusal of a staff member to perform the work to which he has been transferred against his will, according to professional literature, "cannot be regarded as a breach of the obligation of a staff member arising from the employment relationship and cannot give cause for the termination of the employment relationship by notice or immediate cancellation for that reason." (STRANK, J. et al. Praha: Probes, 2021, p. 162 et seq.). In addition, in accordance with the case law of the Supreme Court, it is noted that in these cases the employee does not lose the right to severance pay (VALENT, K. In: VALENT, K., PROCESS, J., JANŠ, M., OROBIN, V., BRHOHA, D. et al. Comment. 2. Praha: C. H. Beck, 2022, p. 142 and 145, marg. 1 and 13).
66. As regards the possible obligation of the staff member to carry out the work to which he was transferred without his consent, the conclusions set out in sp. zn. The Constitutional Court also dealt with a unilateral change in the employment obligation in the cited finding, concluding that this obligation under normal conditions "can be considered appropriate in view of the normal possibilities for a normal employer to acquire new employees. The obligation of a staff member to work after a period of notice is a certain, tax on workers for the legislative stabilisation of employment conditions by a modern social state. Under such conditions, the employer also deserves some stabilisation in the field of employment relations'.
67. The legislator was also aware of the case law of the Supreme Court, which led to the amendment of the Labour Code by Act No. 120 / 2025 Coll. As is apparent from the explanatory memorandum, this law aimed to remedy some of the problems raised by the amended legislation - interpreted in the light of the Supreme Court case-law -. In the explanatory memorandum to Act No. 120 / 2025 Coll. it states, inter alia: "The amount of severance payment, which corresponds to about the annual income of an employee, can be literally liquidation for some employers (namely smaller employers). In practice, this often leads to employers striving to avoid paying severance pay obligations, as evidenced, among other things, by the Supreme Court case-law, which, for example, had to deal with the case where, due to the employer's inactivity, the employee in question finally had to untie the employment relationship, and according to the Supreme Court, it was not in the way that employees were entitled to legal severance payments (see judgment of the Supreme Court of 30 January 2018, sp. zn. 21 Cdo 5825 / 2016). 'In view of this, the legislature has abolished the right of an employee who, as a result of an accident at work, is unable to carry out his previous work, to severance payments under Paragraph 67 (2) of the Labour Code, and has newly introduced a single compensation institute under Section 271ca of the Labour Code, which will be" covered' by the employer's insurance. It is therefore clear that this case law of the Supreme Court has also been sought by the legislator.
68. The way in which the Supreme Court interprets and applies the relevant provisions of the Labour Code, the Constitutional Court considers, from the perspective of Article 9 of the Charter, to be constitutionally conformal. Although the legislator has no doubt the possibility of adjusting the matter of switching to another work differently, the case-law of the Supreme Court illustrates that even the current legislation does not derogate from the constitutional limits of this fundamental law and, despite the appellant's assertion to the contrary, it can be interpreted in a constitutional manner even without the annulment of the contested provision.
69. The above facts necessarily lead to the conclusion in summary that the transfer of an employee who, inter alia, as a result of an accident at work, has long ceased to be able to carry out his previous work [Paragraph 41 (1) (b) of the Labour Code], to an appropriate other work, even without his consent (Paragraph 41 (3) of the Labour Code), cannot be regarded as a constitutionally resisted forced work. The exercise of such work, although not necessarily voluntary, is not enforced under the threat of punishment and the employee is not obliged to bear an excessively burdensome burden. A staff member may be transferred only to work corresponding to his health, abilities and qualifications as far as possible; after the reasons for the transfer have lapsed, the employer shall be obliged to include the staff member in accordance with the employment contract; the staff member must be remunerated for the work to which he has been transferred; and finally, as a result of the transfer, the staff member does not necessarily lose any entitlement to severance payments. A staff member may, at any time, obtain termination of an unsatisfactory employment relationship by giving a statement, even without giving a reason.
70. The Constitutional Court therefore notes that it did not find the grounds for the annulment of Paragraph 41 (3) of the Labour Code for the contradiction with the prohibition of forced labour pursuant to Article 9 (1) of the Charter. The contested provision cannot at all be regarded as a forced labour and therefore does not fall within the scope of Article 9 (1) of the Charter. For the same reason, it is not necessary to examine whether any of the exceptions in Article 9 (2) of the Charter affect the matter.
Right to free choice of profession
71. The appellant also contests the contested provision with the right to free choice of profession under Article 26 (1) of the Charter. In this regard, however, it does not make almost any argument as it considers the right to free choice of profession to be merely the "other side of the coin" of the prohibition on forced labour. This was subsequently reflected in the content of the observations of the parties and the intervener, which also contained no coherent argument on the infringement of the right to freedom of choice.
72. However, the Constitutional Court has already stated above that the prohibition of forced labour pursuant to Article 9 (1) of the Charter and the right to free choice of profession pursuant to Article 26 (1) The Charter does not regulate the same range of legal relations (or overlap only for a small part), it does not act in the same way against public power and, consequently, the constitutional conformity of interventions in them is examined in a different way (inter alia, in the light of Article 41 (1) of the Charter, according to which the rights referred to, inter alia, in Article 26 of the Charter can be invoked only within the limits of the laws implementing this provision). As regards the infringement of the right to freedom of choice of profession, the application would therefore have to contain specific arguments in order for the Constitutional Court to deal with it. As this is not the case, the Constitutional Court has not found room to examine this issue in any more detail.
Conclusion
73. The Constitutional Court found no reason to annul the contested Paragraph 41 (3) of the Labour Code. It was not demonstrated in the proceedings that it was contrary to the prohibition of forced labour pursuant to Article 9 (1) of the Charter. However, the Constitutional Court does not in any way prejudge whether the contested provision is compatible with other fundamental rights or constitutional principles, since it could not even address this issue on the basis of the application.
74. The Constitutional Court therefore rejected the application for annulment of the contested provisions as unfounded pursuant to Paragraph 70 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court.
President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr.
In accordance with Article 14 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, Judge Zdeněk Kühn took a different position on the decision of the plenary.
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Regulation Information
| Citation | The Constitutional Court found no. 2 / 2026 Coll., sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 31 / 24 on the application for annulment of § 41 paragraph 3 of Act No. 262 / 2006 Coll., Labour Code, as amended |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | The Constitutional Tribunal found |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 15.01.2026 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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