The Constitutional Court found No. 193 / 2021 Coll.
The Constitutional Court found of 30 March 2021 sp. zn.
Valid
The Constitutional Tribunal found
Text versions:
12.05.2021
193
FIND
The Constitutional Court
On behalf of the Republic
On 30 March 2021, the Constitutional Court decided, under sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 9 / 20, in plenary composed of the President of the Court of Paul Rychetský and Judges Louis David, Josef Fial, Jan Filip, Jaromír Jirsa, Tomáš Lichník (Judge of the Rapporteur), Vladimir Sládeček, Radovan Suchanek, Pavel Šámal, Kateřina Šimáčková, Vojtěch Šimíček, Milady Tomková, David Uhlíř and Jiří Zemánek, on the motion of the Municipal Court in Prague for the annulment of the third Act No. 549 / 1991 Coll., on the Judicial Charges, as amended by Act No. 296 / 2017 Coll., with the Parliament of the Czech Republic and the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic,
as follows:
The application for annulment of Paragraph 9 (1) of the third sentence of Act No. 549 / 1991 Coll., on judicial fees, as amended by Act No. 296 / 2017 Coll., which reads "No account shall be taken of the fee to be paid after the expired period."
Reasons
Recital of the content of the proposal and of the procedure at the appellant
1. By application of Article 95 (2) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution) of 27 March 2020, the Municipal Court in Prague (hereinafter referred to as the "applicant") seeks the annulment of the provisions of Article 9 (1) of Act No. 549 / 1991 Coll., on judicial fees, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as the "ZSP" or "Law on judicial fees"), to the extent of its third (last) sentence, which reads: "The payment of the fee after the expired period shall not be taken into account."
2. From the content of the application as well as the requested court file held at the District Court for Prague 2 under sp. above C 135 / 2018 The Constitutional Court found that, in this proceedings, the plaintiff sought protection of the personality in which the defendant was to intervene illegally in the course of his reporting by violating the principle of presumption of innocence.
3. By order of the District Court for Prague 2 No. 20 C 135 / 2018-64 of 26 October 2018, which was delivered to the applicant's representative on 31 October 2018, the applicant was asked to pay the legal fee for the action of CZK 20 000 within 15 days of the receipt of the order. In the course of that period, the claimant requested exemption from court fees and by order of the District Court for Prague 2 No 20 C 135 / 2018-83 of 16.1.2019, the claimant was granted an exemption of 50%. After this resolution gained legal power, the claimant was invited, through his representative, to pay a court fee of CZK 10,000 within 15 days. The applicant has been instructed that if the court fee is not paid within the time limit, the proceedings before the Court of First Instance will be terminated. The invitation was received by the applicant's representative on 10 April 2019. Subsequently, the District Court of Prague 2 issued order No 20 C 135 / 2018-86 of 29.7.2019, by which the proceedings were terminated pursuant to the provisions of § 9 (1) of the Law on Judicial Charges, as the plaintiff did not pay the legal fee for the action of CZK 10 000 within an additional deadline.
4. The applicant brought an early appeal against the order for termination. The appeal is brought before the appellant as a court of the appellant under point 22 of Co 190 / 2019. The applicant contends that the legal fee for the action was paid in due time by postal order of type A on 12 April 2019. It explains that on 6 August 2019 he asked at the relevant post office whether and how he could claim payment and that he was related to the accounting office of the District Court for Prague 2 and tried to resolve the situation. In his words, he did everything he could to pay the court fee properly and in time. The appeal was accompanied by a copy of the copy of the copy of the postal order, which indicates that it pointed out that the payment of the court fee of CZK 10 000 in favour of the District Court for Prague 2 on 12 April 2019. He added to the applicant's request that he first paid the court fee of CZK 10 000 on 28 January 2019 and again on 12 April 2019. Czech Post, although it did not make any payments, did not inform the applicant of this fact and waited for the claim to be made. The claimant was thus only informed of the failure to make both payments in connection with the service of the termination order. The reason for not making payments was according to Czech Post in the absence of an account. A post order of 28 January 2019 should have been filed by the postal worker as the applicant. The plaintiff's complaint was settled by the Czech Post on 19. 8. 2019 and the plaintiff was reimbursed a total amount of CZK 20,000. The plaintiff finally successfully paid the legal fee for the action of CZK 10,000 on 20 August 2019.
5. The appellant stated in his proposal that he had asked the Czech Post himself about the circumstances of the applicant's claims. In its reply, the Czech Post stated that the respective vouchers of CZK 10 000 (one lodged at the post office of Plzeň 8 on 28.1.2019 and one lodged at the post office of Plzeň 12 on 12.4.2019) were paid by the post office of Plzeň 8 on 19.8.2019 back to the sender on the basis of his claim of delivery of the ordered amount. The crediting of the amount of CZK 10,000 to the addressee could not be done because the sender entered the wrong account number on the main part of both vouchers. The error was that the sender wrote an account number in a box with only the account number on both vouchers on their main work. For this reason, the account number appeared to be incorrect and therefore the amounts requested could not be credited to the account of the District Court for Prague 2. According to the appellant, there is no dispute in the case at hand that the action has been terminated for the failure to pay the court fee in a situation where the applicant has made a mistake in completing the postal order. If this error had not been made, the court fee would certainly have been paid in due time, since the first payment had been made by the claimant before the court fee had been requested for the legal power of the resolution on the partial exemption from the court fees, and the second payment had been reversed upon receipt of that call. The appellant summarized that there was a written error in filling out both postal orders, the plaintiff did not know, the Czech Post itself did not give it to him and responded only to the complaint made after the proceeding had been terminated.
6. The appellant considers that the amendment to the Law on Judicial Charges, as amended, implemented by Act No. 296 / 2017 Coll., amending Act No. 99 / 1963 Coll., the Civil Code, as amended, Act No. 292 / 2013 Coll., on Special Rules of Procedure, as amended, and certain other laws, was not in doubt in practice that the court fee could be effectively paid until the date of the legal authority of the order of termination, i.e. not only until the end of the period for appeal against that order, but also during the entire duration of the possible appeal proceedings against that order. According to the appellant, neither the Court of First Instance nor the appellant can take into account the reasons for which the legal fee for the action was not paid within the time limit of the applicant. However, such legislation, in his view, contradicts constitutional order.
7. The appellant expressed an understanding of the reasons for which Paragraph 9 of the SAA in paragraphs 1 and 7 was amended. It should have been an incentive for the parties to comply with their fee obligations without delay and not to rely on the effective payment of the court fee at the latest during the appeal proceedings against the order to stop proceedings for non-payment of the court fee. The ineconomy of issuing orders to stop proceedings only to be cancelled or amended is, according to the appellant, evident. But the new legislation represents a shift of the pendulum into the opposite extreme, with its unfounded and intolerable stubbornness. In fact, it does not take into account the exceptional situation in which the taxpayer did not cause the court fee to be paid within the time limit, or where the rate of fault for its failure to pay is negligible, justifiable and completely inadequate, the severe consequences which a termination of proceedings may entail for the taxpayer. In addition, the appellant added that it was obvious in the case under trial that the claimant did not wish to avoid the charge obligation and that it did not want to delay the procedure. The plaintiff only made the obvious excuse for writing the account number on the voucher together with the prefix. Only for this reason did the post office not make the payments and did not even inform the plaintiff itself. In this situation, the appellant considers that the termination of the procedure cannot be regarded as an adequate consequence without the possibility of overturning it, in particular in view of the effects arising from it for the taxpayer.
8. Consequently, the appellant would have prevented the plaintiff from filling out a claim for reimbursement in the present case, and another time, the letter or bank itself could have caused the error, so that the taxpayer would not be at all liable to the charge that the court fee had not been paid within the prescribed period. Similarly, according to the appellant, unexpected circumstances may arise with the taxpayer, such as sudden illness, injury and so on, which will make the payment of the court fee impossible within the prescribed period. None of these unexpected events or errors attributable to the taxpayer is mentioned in Section 9 (1) of the Law on Judicial Charges or in any other legal provision. In so doing, the consequences of the termination of proceedings for non-payment of the court fee may be fundamentally negative for the taxpayer and often irreparable; If the appeal procedure is terminated, the new appellant may no longer call on it.
9. Before bringing the case to the Constitutional Court, the appellant tried to interpret, using all possible interpretative rules, the applicable provisions of the Law on judicial fees or other legal standards in such a way as to enable the resolution under review to be amended by the Court of First Instance in such a way that the action could be continued, but found no such way. However, the Law on Judicial Charges is explicit, unambiguous and no exceptions, including those foreseen in Paragraph 9 (4) of the SAA, are not applicable in the circumstances of the case in question. Nor is it possible to waive the time limit for payment of the court fee, as the time limit is forfeited, according to the applicant.
10. In the appellant's view, the failure to take into account any justifiable grounds in the event of late payment of the court fee and the necessarily resulting termination of proceedings constitutes such a restriction on access to the court and the denial of justice that it is contrary to constitutional rules, namely Article 36 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms ("the Charter '). The removal of the last sentence of Paragraph 9 (1) of the SAA will be sufficient to remedy this unconstitutional situation, since after its annulment, the Municipal Court in Prague will be able to take account of the payment of the prescribed legal and judicial fee from before 30 September 2017. According to his words, the appellant is not concerned in the long term with the possibility that the pendulum of adjustment should be redirected to the same state that was here before this date. Nor was this state desirable, but it was not unconstitutional, as it is now.
11. Finally, the appellant also referred to the correspondence held with the Ministry of Justice in the framework of the interministerial comment procedure concerning the amendment to the Law on Judicial Charges, in which the Municipal Court in Prague, inter alia, communicated its observations on the consequences of the amendments to the provisions of Paragraph 9 (1) of the SAA by Act No. 296 / 2017 Coll. Even then, and with knowledge of the circumstances in the case sp. zn. 22 Co 190 / 2019, he referred to the same issue and advocated that, after the amendment, it be possible to take into account the late payment of the legal fee for an justifiable reason, which, according to the appellant, was not heard by the Ministry with reference to the improper implementation of the changes in view of the short period of validity of the new regulation.
Proceedings before the Constitutional Court
12. The Constitutional Court pursuant to Article 69 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as "the Law on the Constitutional Court") sent the proposal to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as "the Chamber of Deputies" and "the Senate") as parties to the proceedings, as well as to the Government of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as "the Government") and to the Ombudsman who are entitled to intervene as interveners.
13. On behalf of the Chamber of Deputies, the President of the Chamber of Deputies sent his observations, stating that the draft Act No. 296 / 2017 Coll. containing the contested provisions of the Law on Judicial Charges was submitted by the Government. In that context, he described the course of its approval and stated that the standard had been adopted and declared on the basis of a proper procedure and that it was for the Constitutional Court to examine the question of the unconstitutional nature of the contested provision and to take the relevant decision.
14. On behalf of the Senate, its President, who also described the process of approving the draft law in question, as well as outlining the brief genesis of the contested legal provision. In that context, he noted that the amendment to the provisions of Paragraph 9 of the Law on Judicial Charges remained in the background of the interests of the Senate, since the material which is the subject of the application for annulment was not mentioned in any way by the speakers. The President of the Senate expressed his belief that the Senate had acted in a constitutional manner when discussing the draft law and did not find its contradiction with the constitutional order. In conclusion, he stated that it was entirely up to the Constitutional Court to examine the proposal and decide on the case.
15. In its detailed statement, the Government first analysed the developments in the legislation and the reasons which led to the amendment of Paragraph 9 (1) of the SAA. It stated that the amendment to the Law on Judicial Charges in the form of draft Act No. 296 / 2017 Coll. generally followed the elimination of the most pressing problems that occurred in practice in civil court proceedings. It sought to streamline the judicial procedure, including the postponement of the courts. As the initiator of the amendment, the Ministry of Justice, after consulting the General Courts, found that there was unnecessary burden on the courts as part of the procedure for the payment of judicial fees. According to the previous regulation, the fee was already due when the application was lodged, but in practice it was not paid together with the submission. It was often the other way around. Although the court decided to terminate the proceedings for the non-payment of the legal fee, the claimant could still pay the fee within the time limit for the appeal, or until the court's order to terminate the proceedings became final. Thus, in the view of the Government, there was a paradoxical situation where the court had to issue a new resolution on the basis of the additional fee paid, by which it annulled its original order of termination, and subsequently continued in the main proceedings. Thus, the Court of First Instance was regularly burdened with two unnecessary procedural acts, by a decision to stop proceedings and by a resolution to repeal the order to stop proceedings.
16. In the next part of its statement, the Government focused on the three bases of the review of the constitutional conformity of judicial fees, namely whether the restriction of the right of access to the court pursues a legitimate objective, whether there is a reasonable relationship between the resources used and the objectives of proportionality and whether the rule does not affect the very essence of the right of access to the court. The Government considers that all three requirements for compliance of the contested legal provision with the constitutional order are met in the present case.
17. On the question of the legitimate objective, the Government stated that the regulation which abolished the third additional possibility to pay the court fee aimed at streamlining the procedure and delaying the courts from the above unnecessary procedural acts. It was intended to reduce the overall duration of the proceedings.
18. On the question of the proportionality of the contested legislation, the Government pointed out that the charge was still imposed when the action, appeal or appeal was brought. If the claimant fails to fulfil that obligation, the court shall allow him to fulfil the obligation in question within an additional period to be specified in the notice. The plaintiff therefore has a second option to comply with the charge obligation at the request of the court. In addition, the Government noted that the time limit laid down by the Court for the payment of the fee was a procedural and judicial period. Therefore, if the claimant is unable to comply with the deadline, he may, for serious reasons, request a further extension of the period. Thus, the legislation allows for the specific circumstances of the case to be taken into account and is not unduly stringent.
19. On the issue of maintaining the substance of the right of access to the court, the Government stated, in addition to the two above mentioned opportunities for payment of the court fee, that the Law on Judicial Charges itself remembers exceptional situations and, by example, pointed out the provisions of Paragraph 9 (4) of the SAA. In these situations, it is her view that the consequences foreseen by the last sentence of Paragraph 9 (1) of the SAA, i.e. that the additional payment of the court fee is not taken into account, must be explained systematically. The Government also recalled other points which, in its view, maintain the substance of the right of access to the court, namely the right of exemption from the court fee and the fact that the termination of proceedings alone is not a decision on the substance of the case which would prevent a new action or create other direct negative consequences.
20. The Government also recalled that the Constitutional Court had already had the opportunity in several cases to deal with applications for annulment of Paragraph 9 (1) of the SAA, which did not comply with them on the ground that the obligation of the courts itself to require the taxpayer to pay the legal fee due was to some extent a benefit, since the charge is clearly determined by law and there is nothing in principle preventing the applicants from having to fulfil it properly when the action is brought. If they do not do so and even do so within the additional period provided by the court, the termination of proceedings is a logical and constitutional consequence of their passivity. It also referred to the selected decisions of the Constitutional Court dealing with situations similar to those in which the applicant found himself in the appellant of the case.
21. In addition, the Government focused on assessing the constitutionality of the contested legal provision by referring to the appellant of the case under appeal and concluded that the contested legislation could also be maintained in the circumstances of this particular case. In its view, the applicant had sufficient space to pay the court fee properly. In particular, after the second call for payment, he had to find out that an error had occurred during the previous payment. However, the claimant did not search for the non-payment and followed the same procedure as the first one, thus attempting to re-fill the postal order of type A, again committing the same error. In fact, this would have happened even under previous legislation with three opportunities to pay a legal fee. These considerations, as well as their other arguments, were further elaborated by the Government and proposed that the Constitutional Court reject the proposal as unfounded.
22. The Ombudsman informed the Constitutional Court that, within the meaning of Paragraph 69 (3) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, he would not intervene.
23. The Constitutional Court sent the observations of the parties and the intervener to the applicant for a reply. In it, the appellant maintained his original argument and stated that the government's arguments did not convince him. The so-called stubborn clauses are, in his view, common in procedural law, and unguilty or excused circumstances are explicitly mentioned in many places of the law as exceptions to the rule. Such an adjustment, according to the appellant, is missing in the contested standard and, according to the Government's clear statement, it is missing on purpose. In his words, the appellant prefers the repeal of the law to the legal way rather than bending it.
24. The Constitutional Court did not order oral proceedings because it did not expect further clarification of the case and at the same time did not consider it necessary to carry out the taking of evidence. The oral proceedings were not requested by the parties or by the intervener. The Constitutional Court therefore waived it under Article 44 of the Constitutional Court Act.
Presumption of a formal assessment of the proposal
25. The Constitutional Court notes that it is competent to discuss an application which is admissible and also fulfils all the statutory requirements in the rest.
26. The appellant is also actively authorised to submit an application for annulment of the contested legal provision pursuant to Article 64 (3) of the Constitutional Court Act and Article 95 (2) of the Constitution. The direct application of the contested provision of the Law on Judicial Charges is a consequence in the appeal before the appellant in question which the appellant finds to be unconstitutional, that is to say, the necessity of confirming the annulment of the decision in question by the court finding the termination of the procedure to be factually correct. The annulment of the contested legal provision would allow the appellant to take into account the payment of the applicant's legal fee even after the expiry of the period for payment of the contested legal provision and thus allow him to take a different decision in the case.
Review of the procedure for the adoption of the contested legislation
27. The Constitutional Court is obliged, pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll., in the procedure for checking standards, to assess whether the contested law (or its individual provision) has been adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution established competence and in a constitutionally prescribed manner.
28. The Constitutional Court has already carried out a check of the constitutionality of the procedure for the adoption of Act No. 296 / 2017 Coll., which introduced the contested provision into the provision of Paragraph 9 (1) of the Law on Judicial Charges, by virtue of the Act No. 40 / 18 of 30 June 2020, which was published in the Collection of Laws under No. 327 / 2020 Coll., and concluded that that law was adopted by the constitutional procedure, signed by the relevant constitutional authorities and duly declared. In the details, reference may be made to the justification for the concise finding (see in particular points 24 and 25 of the cited finding).
Text of the relevant part of the law and the contested provision
Payment of fees
(1) The management of the payment of fees is exercised by the competent court or by the administration of the court pursuant to § 3.
(2) Fees are the income of the State budget.
(3) Fees shall be paid to an account opened with the Czech National Bank for the court competent pursuant to § 3 (hereinafter referred to as "the court account ').
(4) Fees which do not exceed CZK 5,000 can be paid by stamp; This provision shall not apply where a charge obligation arises by filing an electronic order for payment. The fee for registration in a public register by a notary may not be paid by stamp marks.
Consequences of non-payment of the fee
(1) If the procedural fee payable by application to initiate proceedings, appeal, appeal or appeal has not been paid, the court shall invite the taxpayer to pay it within a period of at least 15 days; exceptionally, the court may specify a shorter period. After that period has expired, the court shall terminate the proceedings. The fee shall not be taken into account after the time limit has expired.
(2) If the appellate court finds, after having been referred to it for a decision to appeal, that a fee due by appeal has not been paid, it shall invite the payer to pay it within a period of at least 15 days; exceptionally, the appellate court may specify a shorter period. After the expiry of that period, the appeal court shall terminate the proceedings. The fee shall not be taken into account after the time limit has expired. The proceedings before the Court of Appeal shall likewise be followed.
(3) The Court of First Instance will inform the taxpayer in the invitation that the procedure will be terminated if the fee is not paid within the time limit laid down.
(4) For the non-payment of the fee, the court shall not stop the proceedings,
(a) if the matter itself has already begun to be discussed,
(b) where there is an obligation to pay a fee to a taxpayer to whom the court has appointed a guardian as a party whose residence is unknown or who has failed to deliver to a known address abroad,
(c) where there is a danger of delay which could cause damage to the taxpayer and the debtor, within the time limit specified by the court in the notice referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, shall inform the court of the circumstances which certify that danger and shall show that, without his fault, he has not yet been able to pay the fee;
(d) if the application to initiate proceedings has been extended in the same case or if the taxpayer has extended the appeal or the appeal after the court has brought the substance of the case.
(5) The court shall decide that the conditions referred to in paragraph 4 (c) are met by an order which does not need to be served.
(6) In the cases referred to in paragraph 4, the court shall decide to impose an obligation to pay the fee together with the decision terminating the proceedings. Similarly, in the case of a guarantor, the court shall proceed for the payment of a fee for proceedings in public register matters or for proceedings for the appointment of a liquidator of a legal person initiated on its own motion (§ 2 (9)).
(7) If the order to stop proceedings for the non-payment of a charge of legal authority arises, the charge shall cease.
(NB: The contested provision was highlighted by the Constitutional Court.)
Substantial review of the proposal
29. The Constitutional Court considered the arguments put forward by the appellant, the parties, the intervener and the circumstances of the appellant's case and concluded that the application was not justified.
30. The Constitutional Court has already expressed in its decision-making practice on the contested legislation following the amendment of the Law on Judicial Charges by Act No. 296 / 2017 Coll., in the framework of numerous procedures on constitutional complaints. Some of these constitutional complaints were accompanied by proposals for the annulment of the provisions of Paragraph 9 (1) of the SAA, whether the whole of this provision or only to the extent that the appellant has a conflicted last sentence. In resolution sp. zn. IV. ÚS 1334 / 18 of 15.5.2018 The Constitutional Court concludes that the wording of the law is clear in the last sentence of Paragraph 9 (1) of the SAA in question and does not allow for a derogation. In addition, the Constitutional Court added that the obligation of the courts alone to ask the taxpayer to pay the legal fee due is to some extent a benefit, since the charge is clearly determined by law and there is in principle nothing to prevent the taxpayer from fulfilling it properly when the charge is filed. If it does not do so and even does not do so within the additional period provided by the Court, the termination of proceedings is a logical and constitutional consequence of its passivity.
31. The Constitutional Court soon came to the same conclusions in resolution sp. zn. I. ÚS 1335 / 18 of 20 June 2018, in which it further advanced its argument. On the one hand, he pointed out the possibility of avoiding the negative consequences of the termination of proceedings in accordance with the procedure laid down in Paragraph 9 (4) (c) of the SAA, which is a timely explanation of the reasons for which the taxpayer had not yet been able to pay the fee and, on the other hand, made a further comment on the forfeit period for payment of the legal fee. It did not call its determination arbitrary, but it found it to unify the procedure that can be expected of the court in the absence of a court fee. In particular, the Constitutional Court pointed out that the adoption of the new legislation had restated the minimum 15-day duration of that judicial period compared to the previous situation (unless exceptional reasons are given for determining the shorter duration period). Furthermore, the very consequence of failure to comply with the obligation to pay the court fee was united in time. In that connection, the Constitutional Court, referring to the Decree of Paragraph 9 (7) of the SAA, as effective by 29 September 2017, recalled the existence by that time of the different treatment of taxpayers in civil and administrative proceedings. While in the civil judiciary, the failure to comply with the statutory charge obligation had no negative consequences, despite the Court's call, if the taxpayer had paid the court fee before the end of the period for appeal against the order for termination of proceedings, in the administrative judiciary, the taxpayer had the opportunity to pay only the order for termination of proceedings. This is typically the end of the day on which this resolution is delivered to him, since an appeal against this resolution, which would have suspensive effect by law, is not known to the administrative court.
32. The Constitutional Court reiterated the above-mentioned view of the constitutional conformity of the new version of § 9 (1) of the SAA in the sp. zn. I. ÚS 2535 / 18 of 21.5.2019 (N 88 / 94 of the SbNU 148), in which it referred to this legislation as constitutionally acceptable (cf. point 10 of the cited finding). The same conclusions were maintained by the Constitutional Court in a number of subsequent decisions (cf. Resolution in cases sp. zn. It is clear from a brief overview of this case-law that the contested legal provision has not yet raised any doubts in the Constitutional Court regarding its compliance with the constitutional order.
33. The right of access to a court shall be worded in Article 36 (1) of the Charter in such a way that "Everyone may seek access under the prescribed procedure of his right... '. It is essential in this wording that rights can be claimed by a" procedure'. As can be seen from the above-mentioned arguments put forward by the Constitutional Court in the decisions cited, the Constitutional Court considers the "procedure laid down 'provided for in the contested provision to be strict but constitutional. In light of a combination of several interrelated factors.
34. The first is to provide sufficient space to fulfil the fee obligation. The Constitutional Court reiterates in its decision-making practice that the obligation to pay judicial fees and to respect procedural time is a standard condition for the proper conduct of legal proceedings and it is therefore for the taxpayer to comply with the time limits laid down by the Court of First Instance in a reasonable period of time and to fulfil his obligation to pay the legal fee for the application properly [cf. The basic starting point, however, is the fact that the charge obligation is essentially already due to the application for the initiation of proceedings (Paragraph 4 (1) of the SAA), and its reimbursement only to the court's appeal is the possibility of being dealt with by law, but not foreseen as an initial one. In fact, the applicant has two opportunities, two "attempts' to pay the court fee. The conclusion on the undue limitation of access to the court and thus the unconstitutionality of the contested provision cannot be made on the basis that the previous legislation provided three" attempts' instead of the current two.
35. The second important element is to lay down the minimum duration of the court-appointed substitute period to meet the fee requirement in the event that the taxpayer has not fulfilled his fee obligation already with the application to initiate proceedings. According to previous legislation, the Court of First Instance was able to determine, in principle, a period of time in order to call on the taxpayer to pay the court's additional fee, as it did not provide for its duration. Although, even with the effectiveness of this regulation, the court was obliged to take into account the circumstances of a particular case in such a way that the taxpayer was not unduly reduced to his right of access to the court, in particular to avoid the determination of the timelimits unduly short, it cannot be overlooked that the determination of the minimum duration of the period in question under the new legislation contributes to a more uniform procedure of the courts and thus to a more equal and fairer treatment of the taxpayers of judicial fees. Even the new legislation allows the court to determine a period of less than 15 days, but this can only happen in exceptional cases. The case of unconstitutionality of the length of the court-appointed substitute period for payment of the court fee must be examined separately in each case, taking into account its unique circumstances (see paragraph 8 of the preamble to the order of the Constitutional Court sp. zn. I. ÚS 1335 / 18). It should also be noted that the period in question is a judicial period. If the applicant is unable to comply with the time limit, he may, for serious reasons, request a further extension of the time limit in time.
36. The third important factor lies in the existence of more than one method of payment of the court fee, namely the threefold possibility of payment, the choice of which makes it easier for the taxpayer to fulfil his fee obligations. The choice of the method of payment of the fee is up to the taxpayer, and the court cannot order the payment of the charge in a certain way, if the law allows for another form. The starting point, preferred by law, is the payment to a bank account set up by the Czech National Bank for the competent court (§ 8 (3) of the SAA). This is either a bank transfer to this account or alternatively via a postal order. Another option is to pay the court fee in cash at the cashier's office. The third method is to pay by stamp, even with restrictions under Paragraph 8 (4) of the SAA. In relation to the latter method of payment of the judicial fees, it should be noted that the substitute period to fulfil the fee obligation is a procedural period and not a substantive one, even after the amendment of the Law on the Judicial Charges by Act No. 296 / 2017 Coll. This view was reached by the Constitutional Court in the finds sp. zn. I. ÚS 2535 / 18 of 21.5.2019, sp. zn. I. ÚS 2025 / 19 of 21.4.2020 and sp. zn. IV. ÚS 322 / 20 of 2.6.2020, in which it stated that the time limit for payment of the court fee was maintained if the last day of that period the stamp was passed on to postal transport. On the other hand, in the case of a cash transfer, the participant shall not fulfil its fee obligation until the date on which the payment was credited to the court responsible and, on payment of the cash charge in cash at the court's treasury, on the date on which the payment was made there. On these issues, the case-law of the Constitutional Court (in accordance with the case-law of the Supreme Court) is established (see, for example, the order in cases sp. zn. I. ÚS 2035 / 20 of 21.10.2020, sp. zn. II. ÚS 4093 / 19 of 11.5.2020 and sp. zn. III ÚS 1348 / 19 of 3.6.2019).
37. The fourth element of the Constitutional Court sees in the possibility of the claimant (s) to avert the result of the non-payment of the court fee within a period of time which is mainly offered by the provisions of Paragraph 9 (4) (c) of the SAA. In its view, the Court of First Instance will not stop the charge if there is a danger of delay which could cause harm to the taxpayer and if, within a period of time appointed by the Court for the additional discharge of the charge, the Court of First Instance informs the Court of First Instance of the circumstances which attest to that danger and demonstrates that it has not yet been able to pay the fee without its guilt. This legal provision therefore moderates the otherwise strict consequence of non-payment of the court fee within an additional period specified by the court.
38. The appellant may agree that the provision in question does not consider all cases of default risk which could cause the taxpayer harm. In particular, this will concern situations in which the taxpayer is not in a position, objectively speaking, to communicate to the court circumstances proving the risk of delay which could cause him harm, such as serious hospitalisation. However, in that connection, the Constitutional Court reiterates that the very existence of a substitute period for payment of the court fee is already a favour for the taxpayer, since the law assumes that the court fee will be paid properly with the application for the initiation of proceedings, i.e. at the time of its maturity (Paragraph 7 (1) of the SAA). It can be concluded from this that a taxpayer who is not capable of a serious and non-fault obstacle (as if it had been the case in the case of that hospitalisation) would normally not be able to apply for the initiation of the procedure itself, as these are simultaneous actions. As a general rule, the taxpayer should not rely on no, albeit understandable, complication in the granting of a second opportunity by a court to pay the court fee, or it will be possible to eliminate them by any means and correct the late payment of the court fee.
39. Finally, the fifth and not negligible factor is reflected in the consequence of the non-payment of the court fee or its reimbursement after the expiry of the period for which the contested provision of the Law on judicial fees is not taken into account. This result is the termination of the procedure initiated by the relevant proposal. The termination of proceedings for the applicant (s) does not constitute an obstacle to a final decision (s), so there is nothing to prevent it from reapplying. However, there is a danger in connection with a possible statute of limitations and also in the cessation of appeal proceedings. The first mentioned danger can be referred to the principle of vigilantibus iura scripta sunt (rights belonging to the vigilant). It is therefore up to everyone to claim their rights in time as far as possible.
40. On the basis of the information currently laid down, the Constitutional Court considers the contested legislation to be legitimate, proportionate and reasonable in the long term. The Constitutional Court has no reason to depart from this view even on the basis of a case before the appellant. The underlying problem is the repeated error in paying the court fee with postal bills. This was created by the fact that on the main part of both vouchers there was a wrong account number of the addressee (for both vouchers, the account number was also written in a box where only the account number and not its subscriptions were to be entered), so that the amounts requested could not be credited to the account of the District Court for Prague 2. The Constitutional Court has already dealt with cases in its case-law in which taxpayers (either themselves or with the help of others) have committed comparable misconduct, but have not granted them a constitutional dimension.
41. In its Resolution No III, ÚS 632 / 20 of 24 November 2020, the complainant dealt with the case in which the court fee was paid by a postal order, whereby the postal worker did not separate the prefix and the bank account number from the order, since the payment to the correct account could not be credited. The Constitutional Court noted that although the alleged misconduct of the postal worker could be found regrettable, the complainants could and should have checked the number of the bank account to which the payment was sent and thus could have detected the error in time and prevented subsequent problems. The proceedings before the Constitutional Court are not intended to replace this normal life-care measure (paragraph 11 of the resolution cited). Similarly, in resolutions sp. zn. I. ÚS 2661 / 20 of 22.9.2020 and sp. zn. II. ÚS 1789 / 20 of 30.6.2020, the Constitutional Court made clear that negligence or technical error on the part of the bank or the legal representative of the taxpayer could not be a particular reason for a departure from the existing case-law.
42. In resolutions sp. zn. III. ÚS 1308 / 20 of 16.6.2020 and IV. ÚS 2774 / 19 of 11.11.2019 The Constitutional Court dealt with cases of brokered payment of the court fee by a third party (81-year-old mother of the complainant, or an employee of the bank who processed the telephone order). The Constitutional Court also stated that it was up to the complainant or his legal representatives, as the case may be, to ensure that the court fee was paid properly within an additional 15-day period. If he left a third party to pay the court fee without verifying whether his early and proper payment had actually taken place, he would have caused the alleged consequences, if he had not acted in the spirit of the principles mentioned above, that the rights belonged to the vigilantes.
43. It is clear from the above that the situation presented by the appellant is not out of the way in the case-law of the Constitutional Court as yet addressed. In addition, the plaintiff committed two misconduct in the appellant's case. After finding that the legal fee had not been paid for the first time, he acted in the same way as the first time, thus attempting to re-fill the letter of type A, again committing the same error. Neither the applicant's observations nor the file material suggest that the applicant would have sought to ascertain, after the second call for a legal fee, what caused the failure of the first payment. All the more so, the considerations expressed in the decisions cited in the preceding paragraphs are applicable to its case. Their core message is that each taxpayer bears his own responsibility for making the court's fee available properly and on time, no matter how he chooses to pay it.
44. For all the reasons set out above, the Constitutional Court concluded that the contested provision of Paragraph 9 (1) of the last Law on Judicial Charges was in line with the constitutional order and therefore rejected the application for its annulment pursuant to Paragraph 70 (2) of the Constitutional Court Act.
President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr. Rychetský v. r.
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Regulation Information
| Citation | The Constitutional Court found no 193 / 2021 Coll., on the application for annulment of § 9 paragraph 1 of the third sentence of Act No. 549 / 1991 Coll., on judicial fees, as amended by Act No. 296 / 2017 Coll. |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | The Constitutional Tribunal found |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 12.05.2021 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
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