Is The Constitutional Court found No 177 / 2013 Coll. still valid?

Yes, The Constitutional Court found No 177 / 2013 Coll. is still valid and effective.

The Constitutional Court found No 177 / 2013 Coll.

Q: When it became The Constitutional Court found No 177 / 2013 Coll. effectiveness?

The Constitutional Court found No 177 / 2013 Coll. became effective date not available.

The Constitutional Court found of 29 May 2013 sp. zn.

Valid The Constitutional Tribunal found

Text versions: 27.06.2013

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177

FIND

The Constitutional Court

On behalf of the Republic

The Constitutional Court decided under sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 10 / 13 on 29 May 2013 in plenary composed of the President of the Court of Pavel Rychetský and Judges Stanislav Balík (Judge-Rapporteur), Jaroslav Fenyk, Jan Filip, Vlasta Formánková, Military Gütler, Pavel Holländer, Ivana Janů, Vladimir Kórka, Dagmar Lastovecká, Jan Musil, Jiří Nykom, Miloslav Excellent and Michaela Židlická on the proposal of the Group of 18 Senators of Parliament of the Czech Republic on the abolition of the Act No. 428 / 2012 Coll.

as follows:

I. Paragraph 5 (i) in the words of the "just" Act No. 428 / 2012 Coll., on property settlement with churches and religious societies and on the amendment of certain laws (Act on property settlement with churches and religious societies) is deleted from the date of the declaration of the finding in the Collection of Laws.

II. The proposal in the part against the provisions of § 19 to 25 of Act No. 428 / 2012 Coll., on property settlement with churches and religious societies and on the amendment of certain laws (Act on property settlement with churches and religious societies) is rejected.

III. The remainder is rejected.

Reasons

I.

Definition and recap of the proposal

1. "The Group of 18 Senators of the Parliament of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as" the Proposals "), represented by the lawyer, Dr. Karol Hradela, with a proposal from the Constitutional Court on 5 February 2013, seeks, pursuant to Article 87 (1) (a) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the" Constitution "), or under Article 64 (1) (b) of the Act No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, the abolition of the Act on the Religious Society, and, where appropriate, on property compensation with churches and religious societies, and on the verbs of which they are" or other legal persons, "(hereinafter referred to as" the Law on Settlement with the Church ")," (hereinafter referred to as regards the Church of Religion the Law of Religion Religion Religions of Religion Religion the Spirals of Religion the Spiral, and of the Spiral, "Article 5)," Supports of the Republic of the Republic of the Republic of the Czech Republic of the Czech Republic of the Czech Republic of the Czech Republic of the Czech Republic of the Czech Republic of the Czech Republic of the

2. In addition, this group of Senators, by the same proposal, sought the annulment of part of the provision of Paragraph 64 (1) (b) of the Constitutional Court Act in the words "at least 41 'and in the words" at least 17' as well as the repeal of Paragraph 64 (5) of the same Act in the words "the required number of Members or Senators'. By order of 17 April 2013, sp. zn. The Constitutional Court held that the application to abolish part of the provision of § 64 (1) (b) and part of the provision of § 64 (5) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, is excluded for separate proceedings.

3. Resolution of 5 March 2013 sp. zn. The Constitutional Court, on the one hand, rejected the application for interim measures and, on the other hand, held that the case brought under point (b) of the first subparagraph of Article 10 / 13 was urgent and would be dealt with outside the order of order.

4. On 22 May 2013, the Constitutional Court received the submission of a legal representative of a group of 18 senators, in which, inter alia, an objection to the bias of the Judge-Rapporteur in the case sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 10 / 13 Stanislav Balík was raised. By order of 28 May 2013, the Constitutional Court held that Judge Stanislav Balík was not excluded from the hearing and decision-making in the case under point Pl.

II.

Participation and intervening

5. The participant - the draftsman - is a group of 18 senators of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, represented by the lawyer JUDr. Karol Hradel. The Constitutional Court found that the application in question fulfilled all the legal formalities and conditions and that, therefore, there was no impediment to its hearing and judgment on the substance of the case. The Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as "the Chamber of Deputies') and the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as" the Senate ') are also parties to this proceedings within the meaning of Paragraph 69 (1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court.

6. In accordance with the same proposal received by the Constitutional Court on 18 February 2013, a group of 47 Members of the Chamber of Deputies, represented by Mr Dr. Lubomir Zaoralk, also sought the annulment of the Act on Settlement with the Churches. This proposal by the Constitutional Court by its Resolution sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 11 / 13 of 26 February 2013 pursuant to § 43 (2) (b), in conjunction with § 43 (1) (e) of Law No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as "the Law on the Constitutional Court '), was rejected because of the impediment to litispendence. The Constitutional Court has recruited 47 Members within the meaning of Paragraph 35 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court as an intervener (hereinafter referred to as" intervener 1') in the current, previously initiated proceedings on the motion of the Group of 18 Senators. As is apparent from the provisions of Paragraph 28 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the intervener has the same rights and obligations in the proceedings as the parties.

7. On 21 February 2013, a group of 45 Members of the Chamber of Deputies, represented by Dr. Zuzka Bebarow-Rujber, was submitted to the Constitutional Court for the purpose of the provisions of Paragraph 64 (1) (b) of the Law on the Constitutional Court seeking the annulment of the law on the settlement of churches. Resolution sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 12 / 13 of 26 February 2013 The Constitutional Court also rejected the proposal for a litispendence impediment and also brought this group of Members of the Chamber of Deputies as an intervener [hereinafter referred to as "intervener 2 '], initiated by a group of 18 senators.

8. By letter received by the Constitutional Court on 27 February 2013, the Ombudsman waived his right to intervene within the meaning of Article 69 (3) of the Law on the Constitutional Court.

9. By letter dated 20 March 2013, the Government of the Constitutional Court, together with its observations on the present proposal, also notified the Constitutional Court that it was intervening.

III.

Arguments of the promoters and the interveners on the constitutional conformity of the Act on Settlement with churches

III/a

Arguments of the group of plaintiffs against the content of the contested law

10. In their proposal, the appellants blame the contested law on its discriminatory character guaranteeing churches and religious societies to exercise their restitution rights over other legal persons of a favourable position, even though church legal entities have not been discriminated negatively against in the past on restitution. In their view, the granting of such a privilege to religious legal persons is not only contrary to the prohibition of discrimination enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as "the Charter '), but also deprives the State of its secular character guaranteed in Article 2 (1) of the Charter. Moreover, according to their opinion, the law threatens the very foundations of the Czech Republic, destroys the ideas of the founding fathers of the Czechoslovak Republic and de facto declares the decrees of President Beneš a source of injustice. The promoters also see in the law an effort to create a material base for right-wing political forces, from the resources of all citizens and to such an extent that the country's economic and legal stability is threatened.

11. The specific arguments put forward by the appellants, which bring a contradiction between the content of the contested law and the constitutional order, can be summarised briefly in particular in the following statements:

12. The contested law, particularly in the legal order of the Czech Republic, imposes discrimination against atheists and atheist legal persons, when, regardless of their religion and in breach of the principle of religious neutrality of the state enshrined in Article 2 (1) of the Charter, the property of enormous value transfers to the property of organizations serving against the interests and beliefs of a large part of society and political spectrum. This is intended to infringe the principle of protection of political pluralism, which, together with the secular character of the state, must be regarded in the Czech constitutional order as an essential requirement within the meaning of Article 9 (2) of the Constitution. There is no doubt that this law, under the shell of morality, creates an economic base for a certain spectrum of political and belief forces in society, which can also call its adoption a flagrant violation of Articles 5 and 6 of the Constitution and Article 22 of the Charter.

13. The contested law in Paragraph 2 also allows for the issue of property owned by third parties (e.g. collaborators and traitors) for the benefit of religious legal persons, from which the right of ownership has gone directly to the State. According to that provision, religious legal entities now have the right to issue assets that in the past were "belonging to them only ', which, in the appellants' view, often includes public property, which only occasionally served for cultural purposes. Unlike all other restituents, churches and religious societies may not prove their original property right, but they will be issued all assets related to the activities of churches owned by obliged persons, with full rights of disposition, which the church organization has never had since the Middle Ages.

14. Furthermore, according to the appellants, the law clearly discriminates against non-religious (particularly atheistic) humanitarian legal persons, who were also not in the past allowed to fully restitute the property, even though they were also based, for example, for medical or educational purposes.

15. According to the contested law, church legal persons are entitled to financial compensation in the amount of market prices for the assets they have not issued, whereas in the past (since 1919) they are subject to a table compensation for the confiscated assets, which is significantly lower. Thus, the financial compensation does not correspond to the historical traditions or to the expected compensation under the Land Reform Regulations of 1947. From there, the applicants import that church legal persons are unjustly privileged to other restituents, and therefore the conclusion of the agreement of the state with churches on the financing of churches distorts the secular character of the Czech Republic. In addition, the financial compensation is also granted for assets which are not certain when it switched to the State, thereby breaking the border on 25 February 1948. The financial compensation granted under the contested law is unduly high, which does not correspond to the historical tradition of replacing confiscated property under the first publication legislation. There is no rational reason for such a high compensation when the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as "ESLP ') accepted both sufficient and significantly reduced compensation. Moreover, the explanatory memorandum does not deal with the discrepancies arising from historical documents concerning (not) the payment of compensation for confiscated property after 1948.

16. The law does not take into account the historical circumstances in which the churches acquired their property, thereby denying, according to the appellants, the fundamental principles of law, according to which no one can benefit from his dishonesty and from injustice, the law cannot rise. Historical sources describing the relations between the state and the churches in the territory of the Czech countries point out that the Church has often taken up its property by oppression against religious freedom and that its withdrawal during the period of the first republic was a legitimate attempt to atone for these injustices at least partially. The law thus admits the creation of property rights as a result of oppression, building on these injustices committed on the Czech nation, which President Masaryk tried to atone for with his policy. The state is thus retreating to the pressure of churches, whose representatives in the past clearly declared church restitution de facto terminated, especially at a time when it itself is in evidence of distress because the important archives of the Ministry of Agriculture were destroyed in the floods in 2002. Nor can it be forgotten that the creation of the property now issued is linked to the pressure of foreign power, which is now to become rich again at the expense of the Czech state (virtually the people). Moreover, according to the world's media, this foreign power is linked to many financial scandals associated with money laundering, threatening to de facto support international crime.

17. Doubts are also raised by the size of the issued (or replaced) property, which, according to the applicants, is greater than that resulting from the overviews for the revision of the 1947 land reform.

18. Furthermore, the appellants argue that even if church legal entities were the owners of the disputed property, financial compensation would be granted only to registered churches and not directly to legal persons who may have had ownership in the past, as a result of which the actions of such non-injurious religious legal persons cannot be ruled out and the law cannot thus fulfil its declared purpose.

19. Churches and religious societies are, according to the promoters, the only legal persons to whom the unbuilt land is issued. This results in discrimination against other legal entities and in a distortion of the secular character of the State. In general, restitution for the benefit of legal persons was exceptional, with the Church not being discriminated against, but now there is only restitution for the benefit of religious legal persons, at an unprecedented rate for any other type of restituent. Moreover, in contrast to previous restitution rules for legal persons, the regulation creates the risk of a huge number of legal disputes brought about by the contested law by discriminated entities, despite the fact that its "generosity" already threatens the state budget, with final "spending" on the basis of the law on the settlement of churches being able to move in the order of hundreds of billions of crowns. The contested law thus constitutes a state power procedure which not only serves all citizens within the meaning of Article 2 (3) of the Constitution, but goes against the interests and views of the majority of society.

20. The appellants point out that the law is based on a misjudgment about the existence of a constitutional obligation to restitut church property or to deal with religious legal persons in any way. On the contrary, this obligation is infringed by the law when it does not take into account the resources currently spent by the State on the activities of churches, in particular the salaries of clerics. On the contrary, the European Court of Human Rights clearly stated that the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention ') does not establish the right to restitution of property confiscated before accession to the Convention.

21. (j) In the appellants' view, the contested law cannot be applied in the case of the so-called Beneš Decrees, which have been adopted in an exceptional historical situation and do not meet the recognised standards for the law of the democratic rule of law. In fact, the legislature is attempting to revise the consequences of these decrees and endangers their validity, since the provisions of Paragraph 8 (1) (h) of the contested law expressly include them in the provisions not covered by the compensation.

22. Paragraph 11 of the contested law, according to the appellants, infringes the law applicable to the other restitution rules that the rights belong to the vigilant, as it transmits to the State the obligation of the restituent to seek a mandatory person.

23. Furthermore, the appellants see the non-constitutional provision of Paragraph 18 (1) in that it endangers the property rights of third parties who have acquired assets in good faith and does not give them adequate protection of their property rights in breach of Article 11 of the Charter.

24. Paragraph 18 (9), according to the appellants, directly abolishes the reform of Joseph II and crosses the border of February 1948, to which no representative of state power has spoken and does not explain the reason for the report.

25. The appellants subsequently pointed out that part of the fourth contested law discriminates against other restituents who were not exempt in the successful restitution procedure. Thus, this law infringes the prohibition of discrimination and the principle of religious neutrality and the prohibition of binding the State on any ideology within the meaning of Article 2 (1) of the Charter.

26. The appellants conclude that the law on the settlement of churches is unpredictable, as its content does not correspond to what the voters could have expected on the basis of the electoral programs of each party. Thus, the Act does not meet the standards of a consistent source of law within the meaning of the Constitutional Court's finding, sp. zn.

III/b

Arguments of a group of 47 Members against the content of the contested law

27. The specific arguments of a group of 47 Members as interveners, which bring a contradiction between the content of the contested law and the constitutional order, can be summarised briefly in particular in the following statements:

(i) At the beginning of its proposal, a group of 47 Members, represented by Mr PhDr. Lubomír Zaorálk, illustrates that until 1949, religious legal persons were considered to be public-law entities and had the last say in handling their property. Thus, the basic premise of the contested law is questioned that even if the State has a moral obligation to restitute the so-called church property, as the disposition with it has been subject to at least the State's consent since 1848. Thus, the artificial design of the "property injustices" loses its truthfulness, as church religious societies did not enjoy the right of private autonomy in dealing with their property even before the decisive period (and even almost three years after). It is therefore inadequate that Act No. 428 / 2012 Coll. bases the issue of assets on essentially identical facts, as was the case with other restitution rules. This gives the wrong impression that religious legal entities suffered a similar type of property injustices.

(ii) In addition, according to the interveners, it is not possible to determine which specific property is subject to extradition and for which financial compensation is paid, for which reasons the stated extent of the issued and replaced property was chosen in the explanatory report, nor why the extent of the property issued under Act No. 428 / 2012 Coll. very close to the size of the assets of religious legal entities in the so-called first land reform in 1919. This, among other things, constitutes an empty declaration from the defined period of determination starting on 25 February 1948. In fact, the law does not allow for a determination of whether the same property will be replaced twice by religious legal persons - both in kind and by financial compensation.

(iii) The construction of the property issue process shows, in the opinion of the interveners, the characteristics of legislative arbitrariness, since a large part of the issued property is merged by a mandatory and administrative body which is legally obliged to supervise the legality of the entire process. Of course, such a legislative structure offers no guarantee of impartial decision-making, which is not subject to any review within the executive authorities, and even in fact the law limits the protection of legality by judicial review. Such an arrangement is hardly compatible with the principles of the rule of law protected by Article 1 (1) of the Constitution.

(iv) The free issue of such a large amount of property in the hands of religious legal persons is, according to the interveners, contradictory to the principle of the Laitian State enshrined in Article 2 (1) of the Charter, since this gift, to which the chartered organisations have no subjective claim, creates a link directly to the creed to which they claim.

(v) The legal amendment of the flat-rate financial compensation within the meaning of the provisions of Section 15 of the Act on the Settlement of Churches does not, in the view of the interveners, make clear its purpose. If this were to be a reduction in property injustices, it would be illogical for such financial compensation to be paid to religious companies that did not operate on the territory of the State at the relevant time and, on the contrary, not paid to those who were demonstrably engaged in religious activity at the time, but are now no longer on the list of registered churches. If the reason behind the economic autonomy of the churches is that the legislative approach chosen by the legislature will achieve exactly the opposite effect, since for a period of 30 years the State will bind the state as creditor and patron of the selected churches, while the fate of the other churches is indifferent to it, thus bringing the adjustment into clear conflict with the principle of religious neutrality of the state enshrined in Article 2 (1) of the Charter. If the purpose of this regulation is then to provide a legal basis for the waiver of the private legal rights of religious legal persons to the so-called indigenous property, this provision is also meaningless, as there is no such claim. In this regard, so unclear and indefinite legislation contradicts the principle of legal certainty, which is an inherent attribute of the rule of law, the principles of which are protected by Article 1 (1) of the Constitution.

(vi) In addition to the unclear purpose, according to the bystanders of the law, the explanatory note and the expression of government officials, it is not apparent what method the resulting financial compensation was determined, which is intended to amount to CZK 59 billion in total, and whether the assets issued by the accounting laws of the early 1990s and the assets issued by the so-called executive channels between 1996 and 1998 were taken into account in their determination.

(vii) The adjustment of the flat-rate compensation, according to the conviction of the interveners, fulfils the characteristics of obvious discrimination, since its above and so-called inflation clause according to the provisions of Section 15 (5) of Act No. 428 / 2012 Coll. provides for a significant inequality between religious legal persons and other restituents.

(viii) Under the law, a government is to conclude contracts for settlement with religious legal persons, which, however, lack any constitutional authority. The Government may, pursuant to Article 78 of the Constitution, issue only regulations implementing the laws. Nothing in constitutional order allows the government, according to the interveners, to implement the law by means of a private-law contract with normative effects. Thus, the process of concluding settlement agreements between the State and the church legal entities is in conflict with Article 78 of the Constitution.

(ix) The settlement agreement concluded under Act No. 428 / 2012 Coll. is considered by the interveners to be an exceptional liability by their non-standard nature since it cannot be terminated by any of the ordinary private legal means of termination of the obligation, such as withdrawal, resignation, but not even netting, debt waiver or agreement. Such an asset claim may be regarded as conflicting with Articles 11 (1) and 3 (1) of the Charter, which establish the principle of equality of property rights.

(x) The interveners and the arrangements for the payment of the contribution to the promotion of the activities of the churches and religious societies concerned contained in the provision of § 17 of Act No. 428 / 2012 Coll., since despite the declared purpose of increasing the economic independence of churches and religious societies, the statutory regulation has maintained the principle of state funding of certain churches for a relatively long period of 17 years. These selected churches thus have for many years secured state contributions for their activities, which they cannot lose even if they seriously violate the laws of the Czech Republic. Moreover, these contributions are highly discriminatory as they do not take into account other religious companies, which have decided not to apply for the State's contribution for any reason at the moment, as well as companies that are still to be made over the next 17 years. The contested regulation therefore contravenes Article 2 (1) of the Charter, which is also reinforced by the cumulative payment of the financial compensation provided for in Article 15 of Law No 428 / 2012 Coll. and the contribution to the promotion of activity within the meaning of Article 17 of the same law. This allows the chosen religious societies to be independent of their members and followers of the religion. All this in the application of the provisions of § 4 (2) of Act No. 3 / 2002 Coll., on the freedom of religion and the status of churches and religious societies and on the amendment of certain laws (the Law on Churches and Religious Societies), according to which the State may not carry out religious or counterreligious activities, as well as the principle of religious neutrality of the State as enshrined in Article 2 (1) of the Charter and the established conclusions of the case-law of the Constitutional Court under which the State is required to guarantee religious pluralism and not to discriminate against certain religious directives or organizations.

(xi) For all the above reasons, the interveners proposed that the Constitutional Court should abolish the law on the settlement of churches for a conflict with the constitutional order.

III/c

Arguments of a group of 45 Members against the content of the contested law

28. In addition to the arguments that import the inconstitutionality of the contested law referred to in the two above-mentioned proposals of a group of 18 Senators and a group of 47 Members, a group of 45 Members considers as interveners the unconstitutional introduction of an institute of "non-competent persons', that is to say persons different from the person required to issue a case which the law imposes on a number of obligations which it is free of charge for churches and religious societies.

29. Unlike other restituents, the law provides religious legal persons with the possibility of protecting against the transfer of assets carried out in the early 1990s in contravention of mandatory legislation. The interveners claim that this will very likely lead to a number of constitutional complaints from persons who will feel discriminated against in comparison with the churches and religious societies mentioned in the contested law.

30. In particular, the interveners stress that the content of the law itself is contrary to good manners, because it does not take into account the fact that church legal persons have acquired assets in the past at the expense of the Czech people, and moreover, it completely absurdly obliges the Czech Republic and the Czech people to correct the injustices committed during the period of the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy in which the sovereignty of the Czech nation itself has been suppressed. This, among other things, makes the law clearly breaking the declared beginning of the relevant period set for 25 February 1948.

IV.

Arguments questioning the constitutionality of the legislative process of adopting a law on settlement with churches

IV/a

The applicants' objections

31. The appellants state in their submissions that, as a result of the unconstitutional way of adopting the contested law, in particular the right of citizens to participate in the governance guaranteed in Article 21 (1) of the Charter and the constitutional principle of pluralism of political forces and the protection of political minorities within the meaning of Articles 5 and 6 of the Constitution and Article 22 of the Charter have been infringed.

32. The appellants point out that during the adoption of the contested law, the rights of opposition Members have been restricted many times in violation of the Constitutional Court's interpretation of the constitutional principles of the protection of pluralism of political forces and the right to the unimpeded exercise of the parliamentary function. By unduly affecting the free competition of political parties, the contested law and the manner in which it is discussed and adopted constitutes an unjustified interference which distorts the essential elements of a democratic rule of law within the meaning of Article 9 (2) of the Constitution.

33. Denying the possibility of opposition Members, as representatives of certain citizens, also violated Article 1 of the Charter when discussing the contested law, according to which all people are equal in rights, as well as Article 2 (2) of the Charter, according to which state power can only be exercised in cases and limits provided for by the law and in the manner envisaged by the law.

34. Obstruction in criticising the contested law, seeking to obtain the necessary information to discuss the law and the possibility of influencing other Members and the public through mass media is, according to the appellants, a gross violation of the right of free speech within the meaning of Articles 10 and 14 of the Convention and Article 3 of the Charter. The failure to provide the required information to Members and to restrict the rights of critics has also infringed the right to information guaranteed by Article 17 of the Charter and the failure to respect the censorship prohibition laid down in Article 17 (3) of the Charter, as well as the rights to political activity arising from Article 20 (2) and (3) of the Charter.

35. Infringements of the above-mentioned principles and provisions of the constitutional order are brought by the appellants in particular from the following facts:

36. The adoption and discussion of the law took place at a time when pressure and political attacks on the government side of the Public Affairs were culminating in order to split the party, which was subsequently confirmed by the court which negotiated the indictment of Vít Bárta, the husband of the Vice-President of the Public Affairs. Indeed, this dismemberment of the party took place, creating a group of "renegades," with which the government coalition could impose opaque religious restitution. Moreover, from the beginning of the negotiations, the Political Party of Public Affairs has consistently been misled by false promises made by the Prime Minister and other government officials. Without this lie of support from the Public Affairs Party, the law would be rejected at first reading.

37. Throughout the bill, the government coalition refused to address questions and comments from opposition Members in all areas, even remotely related to church restitutions, such as reasonable suspicions about the attempt to split up the political party Public Affairs, the question of breaking down the period of February 1948, the purpose of the so-called block section or the extent of the issued and replaced property.

38. In the hearing, Members of the Government of the Coalition were deliberately distorted by the conclusions of the Constitutional Court's case-law so that Members concluded that, notwithstanding their vote, church property would be restituted, as the obligation to issue confiscated property stems directly from the Constitution. Similarly, the rapporteur has falsely argued that the Catholic Church renounces a significant part of its claims, which is in direct conflict with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which consistently states that there is no legal claim for restitution and cannot therefore be waived.

39. The Chamber of Deputies has, contrary to the provisions of § 59 (1) of Act No. 90 / 1995 Coll., on the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, limited the speaking time of individual Members, thereby limiting the right of a political party to express its position through its elected Member. In the speeches of the Members of the Public Affairs Party, noise was often in the Chamber, thereby limiting their ability to speak to other Members even more.

40. Opposition Members were forced to discuss the law in such limited circumstances and in the late hours of the evening, as amended by the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies (hereinafter referred to as the "Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies'), which is a clear attempt to tire the government coalition of its political opponents, thereby limiting the debate. This infringed the provisions of paragraphs 53 (1) and (2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, which does not allow for action after 21: 00 p.m., but merely gives the Chamber of Deputies the right to vote on the bills after 19: 00. According to the appellants, it is necessary to apply mutatis mutandis to the negotiations of the Chamber of Deputies the mandatory rest periods laid down in the Labour Code. For this reason, the resolutions of the Chamber of Deputies adopted in breach of the Rules of Procedure laid down in Section 53 of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies should be considered to be void.

41. The Chamber of Deputies did not discuss the motion of the contested law returned by the Chamber of Deputies at the next meeting within the meaning of Rule 97 (3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, but its discussion was postponed for questionable reasons, thereby effectively rejecting it. His later discussion is not only a violation of the Rules of Procedure, but also the Senate's right to discuss the Senate's objections in a speedy manner in the minimum changes in the composition of the Chamber of Deputies. The law was passed only after, under suspicious circumstances, suspected of corruption, a part of the government Members who had been replaced by new Members had resigned for more accessible government arguments. All this violated the principles of the ordinary legislative process and the principles of the democratic rule of law.

42. The law was adopted at the time of the de facto recess, which is a gross violation of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies and the right to the unimpeded performance of the duties of Members. In the same situation as the break in favour of the government party was declared, the benefit of the break in favour of the political party was denied to the public in a despicable way. The Vice-President of the Public Affairs Party asked for a break for his parliamentary club, and the President of the Chamber of Deputies declared this break, but immediately admitted a vote on the opening. However, this vote was no longer attended by any opposition Member. As a result, the contested law was the first to actually be passed in history at the time of the break.

43. The law was sent unnormally quickly to sign the President of the Republic and his position to Members, explaining that the law would not return to the Chamber of Deputies, but would not even sign it, sent the President of the Chamber of Deputies to Members before the deadline for a possible refoulement had expired, thus preventing the President of the Republic from changing its mind, for example on the basis of comments from citizens.

44. The adoption process and the ongoing media presentation of the contested law did not take place in a democratic social atmosphere, as the opponents of the law (including experts) were hardly invited to the mass media, including public law, which must be described as censorship, which, along with the deliberate avoidance of certain issues, calls into question the legality of the law in itself.

45. For all the reasons set out in Parts III / a and IV / a of this finding petit a group of 18 senators, the Constitutional Court first requires that the entire Act No. 428 / 2012 Coll., on property settlement with churches and religious societies and on the amendment of certain laws (Act on property settlement with churches and religious societies) be annulled.

46. If the abovementioned law as a whole had not been repealed by the Constitutional Court, a group of 18 Senators proposes, in an alternative petition, to abolish those parts of the contested law, which are listed in point 1 of this decision, for a conflict with constitutional order.

IV/b

Arguments of 45 Members questioning the constitutionality of the legislative process of adopting the contested law

47. A group of 45 Members of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, represented by JUDr. Zuzka Bebarow-Rujbria, sees the adoption of Law No. 428 / 2012 Coll. in the legislative process, a violation of the constitutional principle of the prohibition of legislative arbitrage, which, by failing to comply, has seriously challenged the legitimacy of the law. The Chamber of Deputies has made it impossible for citizens of the Czech Republic to participate directly in the exercise of public authority, which is guaranteed to them in Article 2 (1) and (3) of the Constitution and Article 21 (1) of the Charter, although most of the citizens of the Czech Republic have expressed their opposition to the content of the contested law. By doing so, the Government Members have violated their provisions in Article 23 (3) Constitution-based parliamentary promise to exercise their mandate in the interests of all the people.

48. The proper course of the legislative process was violated, according to the applicants, by the fact that the Chamber of Deputies did not vote on the Senate's bill returned at the next meeting, thereby effectively rejecting it. The inclusion of a vote on the Senate rejected by the bill for another meeting later took place in violation of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, without Members exercising their right as enshrined in the Rule 1 (2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies adjusting the rules for the consideration of bills rejected by the Senate. Thus, the contested bill could only be reconsidered as a new House Press for a proper legislative process.

49. For all the reasons set out in Parts III / c and IV / b of this finding, the appellants request that the Constitutional Court repeal Act No. 428 / 2012 Coll..

V.

Recital of the observations of the parties and the intervener

50. The Constitutional Court, pursuant to Articles 42 (4) and 69 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, has sent the application for annulment of the contested provisions to the Government and the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.

V/a

Observations of the Chamber of Deputies

51. The Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, in its observations received by the Constitutional Court on 11 and 21 March 2013, signed by President Miroslava Nemcová, gives a detailed review of the legislative process of the adoption of Act No. 428 / 2012 Coll., which it does not consider to be an unconstitutional one and thus does not agree with the applicants' objections.

52. The Chamber of Deputies stated in its observations that the shortened duration of the parliamentary speeches did not concern the whole legislative process. It was only during the third reading that the time of the parliamentary speeches was shortened and the whole House was adjusted. The interpretation of the provisions of Rule 53 of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies by the appellant is incorrect as the last sentence of paragraph 1 of that provision on the possibility of amending the time of the hearing and voting of the Chamber of Deputies refers to the whole of paragraph 1. Such an interpretation has been accepted in the Chamber of Deputies since 1995. Similarly, the Chamber of Deputies, in its observations, contends against the appellant of the stated interpretation of Rule 97 (3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, which only regulates the obligation of the President to submit a proposal to the Chamber of Deputies, but no longer provides for the obligation of the House to decide on this proposal in a final manner. The absence of opposition Members at the time of the vote on the recess for the Public Affairs Group was not caused by a "confused situation," as suggested by the applicants, but by the demonstrative departure of the opposition Members.

53. The Chamber of Deputies thus notes that Law No 428 / 2012 Coll. was adopted after a properly implemented legislative process and it is therefore entirely up to the Constitutional Court to assess the constitutionality of that law in the context of the draft.

V/b

Statement by the Senate

54. The Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, represented by President Milan Štěm, in its observations received by the Constitutional Court on 12 and 21 March 2013, is largely recap the proposals sent and subsequently describes the discussion of Act No. 428 / 2012 Coll. on the Senate's behalf, repeating the most fundamental arguments raised during the discussions in the Senate.

V/c

Arguments of the Government in support of constitutional conformity of the content of the contested law

55. The Government, in its comprehensive observations on the objections of the appellants and the interveners - groups 45 and 47 of the Members - first of all, pointed out that it was not for it to express itself either on the question of the active legitimacy of the appellants or on the question of the course of the legislative process in Parliament's chambers, including the consideration of the separation of the political party of the Public Affairs, but rather to express itself only on those parts of the proposal which are aimed at the actual content of the Act on Settlement with the churches, the proposal submitted to the Chamber of Deputies for approval.

56. The Government strongly opposes the appellants' objections and the arguments of the other interveners, and its arguments can be summarised briefly in particular in the following statements:

(i) According to the contested law, discrimination against other (non-church) legal persons cannot be seen in the contested law when the Constitutional Court accentuates in its case-law the fact that the principle of restitution legislation is based on the starting point that the relevant property cannot be claimed under the general rules, but only by the restitution rules, the question of the extent, perfection or completeness of restitution being entrusted solely to the legislature and not to the Constitutional Court [Opinion of the Constitutional Court of First Instance, sp. v. In this context, it also pointed out that the Constitutional Court found, in relation to the failure to comply with Article 29 of Act No. 229 / 1991 Coll., on the treatment of property relations with land and other agricultural property (hereinafter referred to as the "Soil Act '), the unconstitutional state not with reference to the equality between former restituents and religious entities, but with reference to other provisions of the constitutional order, and itself highlighted the difference between church entities and other natural and legal persons, referring here to the finding of the Constitutional Court of First Instance, sp.

(ii) As unfounded, the Government considers that the provisions of Paragraph 11 of the Act on the Settlement of Churches would introduce principles and obligations which were not applied to other restitution laws and argue that they are principles (e.g. the synergy of public authorities in the provision of extracts from registers, etc.) which arose from the "restitution 'case-law of the Constitutional Court and which therefore did not naturally exist in the early 1990s; Now, however, the law could not ignore these legal requirements and therefore had to be incorporated into the law.

(iii) The Government also disputes that the State's agreement with the churches does not take account of the current payments of the State to the churches, and notes that such a requirement of credits goes against the sense of mitigating property injustices and lacks legal basis. In this connection, on examples of the issues of so-called economic security of churches, as well as the institute of so-called state consent pursuant to Act No. 218 / 1949 Coll., on economic security of churches and religious societies by the State, as amended, demonstrates the unsustainability of the objection, including in connection with the ban on the retroactivity of the law against its addressees.

(iv) The Government rejects the argument of the appellants and other parties to the alleged breach of the principle of the secular nature of the State pursuant to Article 2 (1) of the Charter, stating that there is no link to religion from the agreements concluded, and that the provision of the Charter cannot be interpreted as a flat-rate ban on the existence of any relations between the State and the churches.

(v) In the view of the Government, the reservation of the appellants and other interveners is also, in the view of the Government, that the provision of Paragraph 18 (1) of the Law on Settlement with Churches endangers the property rights of other persons who have acquired the property of the State in good faith and who are not protected in this situation when the explanatory note explicitly states that the provision of Paragraph 134 of the Civil Code on maintenance is not affected by this contested provision, referring to the case law of the Constitutional Court on good faith in the case of acquisition of property from a non-owner.

(vi) According to the Government, the Act on the Settlement of Churches does not break the border of February 1948, when it itself defines the period of time of 25 February 1948 to 1 January 1990 in Paragraph 1. As regards the position of the Religious Matrix, this has changed substantially over time, with the current Religious Matrix not being compared with the institution set up at the end of the 18th century, and its activity after 1948 can hardly be described as the result of the reforms of Emperor Joseph II, which the appellants believe should be abolished by the contested law. Neither the provisions issued by Joseph II nor those of the so-called First Republic are included in the list of legal grounds for property injustices. In addition, the law explicitly states that there are no issues confiscated by the President of the Republic. The Act No. 142 / 1947 Coll., on the revision of the first land reform, was adopted on 11 July 1947, but was implemented only after 25.2.1948, when the first expropriation under that Act and on the basis of that Act could take place up to 1.3.1948, with the fact that the date on which the State actually took over the land was decisive for the transfer of ownership to the State, which is the same principle as that applied in the Land Act (§ 32 (2)).

(vii) Nor does the Government agree with the objection of discrimination against other restituents (non-religious legal entities) on taxation, as this objection itself contradicts any other objection from the appellants, namely that these other restituents were discriminated against because they could not restitution themselves. Therefore, if they could not restitution, then they could not even be exempt from such tax, or because they did not, they could not be regarded as discriminatory without tax. The basic obstacle to the real inclusion of other legal persons in the Qualifying Persons' heading has always been and is the fact that they are terminated without a legal successor after 1948, unlike physical persons.

(viii) The objection to discrimination against flat-rate compensation for non-issued property is impossible, since the institute is only a subsidiary after that, unless it is possible to have a natural restitution, and the basic method of restitution does not differ in any way from the model chosen in Act No. 87 / 1991 Coll., on extrajudicial rehabilitation, as amended. In addition, account should be taken of the case-law dimension of refunds, the amount and method of calculation of which is dependent on the conclusions reached in the past by the Constitutional Court. In this context, the government explains extensively why the consideration of the compensation of the property claim had to be based on the current values at the time when the legislative solution was adopted by restitution.

(ix) The objection that the property was issued to legal persons took place on the basis of an accounting law, which is now not discriminatory, does not stand up because these accounting rules were issued before the case law of the Constitutional Court requiring the universality of the law and, therefore, the adoption of the Bill today could lead to a non-improbable challenge to the constitutional conformity of such a solution if the law were found only in its form but not in its content.

(x) It cannot be accepted that religious legal persons are the only legal persons who change their ownership over the period before their transfer to the State, as this was to a different extent the case for all restitutions after 1990.

(xi) It cannot be accepted that, prior to the adoption of the contested law, there was no obligation on religious legal persons to restitution or otherwise to deal with them, when such a commitment resulted, inter alia, from a constant and gradual commitment to church bodies, which is to the benefit of the Constitutional Court's case-law, which is to be pointed out. References to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights are not relevant because those obligations do not concern the legislator at all.

(xii) The Vatican itself, or more precisely the Holy See, will not receive any restitution because the owners will become specific church bodies - parishes, orders and charities, but not the Roman Catholic Church, which, as a legal person in the past, did not own anything, in addition to the group of authorised persons, there are 17 churches, from which the Catholic Church represents only the Roman Catholic Church and the Greek Church, other churches have no ties to the Vatican.

(xiii) The purpose of the 17-year transitional period for which the church concerned will receive a contribution to support their activities is to minimise the consequences of a radical change in the arrangement of relations between the state and churches and religious societies, so that the existing dependency is phased out, and therefore the contribution is designed to be degressive, since without this transitional period there would be a significant and negative downturn in the activities of churches and religious societies, in particular an immediate reduction in the number of spirituals.

57. In conclusion, the Government has proposed that the Constitutional Court reject the proposal to abolish the law on settlement with churches or its individual parts.

58. As an amici of the Curiae of the Constitutional Court, representatives of the Czech Bishop Conference, representatives of the Ecumenical Council of Churches in the Czech Republic and representatives of the Federation of Jewish Municipality in the Czech Republic ("representatives of religious societies") have sent their joint observations on the proposals under discussion. In their view, the Constitutional Court is to consider, for the sake of an idea of how the institutes of the contested law were presented to representatives of religious societies on whose part such content of the contested law was subsequently given consent. The representatives of religious societies recall that the contested law, although it can be described as part of the restitution and rehabilitation legislation, follows two equal purposes, namely the correction of certain property injustices committed by the Communist regime on the one hand and the settlement of property relations between the state and the selected religious societies on the other. The set of institutes by which the contested law seeks to meet these objectives represents an "antithesis to the system established by the communist totalitarian regime." These individual institutes, i.e. in-kind restitution and so-called financial settlement, must be understood as interlinked, inseparable paths, which cannot be clearly identified, which of them are more closely pursued by the objective of rectification of property injustices and which of them constitutes the path of creation on a state-independent property base. Financial compensation, consisting of financial compensation and a contribution to support the activities of churches as interlinked quantities, is needed as an end to a few hundred years of the church support system by the state. Subsequently, representatives of religious societies take their views on some of the applicants' objections. First of all, in their view, it is not possible to compare, in view of the limited nature of the natural restitution and the termination of the current system of support for religious societies by the State, the financial compensation under the contested law with financial compensation within the meaning of other restitution rules. Similarly, it is odd that the financial compensation will be paid to churches that did not suffer any property injustices at the time of the communist regime, since one of those churches was separated from another religious society, which was proven to have suffered property injustices at the time of the totalitarian regime, and in the latter case the religious society was recognised by the State only in 1989, but its representatives were active and were persecuted already in the 1950s. Finally, religious society leaders submit a short economic analysis of the effects of financial compensation, which shows that the approved model is at the limit of the possible survival of religious societies, since two of them will not cover financial compensation or the cost of spiritual salaries. For others, "profits" exceeding those costs can only be referred to in units or tens of percent, which is all the means that religious societies acquire for "creating on a state independent property base."

VI.

Oral proceedings

59. At oral hearing, the Judge-Rapporteur summarised the course of the proceedings.

60. During the negotiations, representatives of the appellants, representatives of the group of 45 Members and representatives of the group of 47 Members made proposals to supplement the taking of evidence.

61. The counsel of the plaintiffs asked that the witnesses Michael Babák, Vít Bárta, Radek John and Kateřina Klasnová should be heard. This proposal was rejected by the Constitutional Court on the grounds that their possible testimony on the course of 45, 46, or 47 meetings of the Chamber of Deputies is superfluous because the court is based on stenograms that provide much more accurate information about the course of the meeting than the memories of individual participants with a longer time interval.

62. The representative of a group of 47 Members requested that the Constitutional Court supplement the evidence of the witness interviews of Mgr. Alena Hanáková, Minister of Culture, Ing. Petr Bendla, Minister of Agriculture, JUDr. Petr Šívoček, Director of the State Land Office, Ing. Michal Gaube, Director General of the Forests of the Czech Republic, (all in order to clarify the method of calculating and determining the extent of compensation); Milan Kern, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Brotherhood Unity of Baptists, and Jan Graubner, Archbishop of Olomouc, (to the circumstances relating to the conclusion of treaties between the Government and the Church). This proposal was rejected by the Constitutional Court. A similar motion by a representative of a group of 47 Members to request written observations from those witnesses on the submissions made by that intervener, a reply and questions raised at the oral hearing, was also rejected by the Constitutional Court, in all cases on the grounds that, with the exception of the Archbishop of Olomouc and the Brotherhood Unity of Baptists, the authorities under which the Government is acting in this procedure. In the case of the Archbishop of Olomouc and the Brotherhood Unity of Baptists, the Constitutional Court concluded that the written report, which should relate to negotiations within the church bodies concerned, was not relevant to the proceedings in question. The Constitutional Court also failed to comply with another motion by this group of Members to suspend proceedings and raise a preliminary question to the Court of Justice of the European Union.

63. The representative of the 45 Members proposed that the Constitutional Court request from the Chamber of Deputies the stenographies of the 45th and 47th meetings, which were discussed by the House of Press 580, and that it request further specified reports from the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Agriculture, as well as the opinion of the President of the Czech Regional and Catastrophe Office (hereinafter referred to as "the Czech Republic '). The Constitutional Court stated that the stenograms of the 45th and 47th meetings were already at its disposal and therefore there is no need to supplement the evidence in this regard. As regards the proposals of this group of Members on request of reports from the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Agriculture and the opinion of the President of the Czech Republic, the Constitutional Court did not comply with them on the grounds that they were opinions relating to the previously intended draft Bill and not the law which is the subject of the proceedings.

64. In his final proposal, the counsel of the appellants repeated the argument set out in the proposal to initiate the procedure and subsequent written submissions, having carried out a historical excursion to highlight various historical events related to the status and activity of churches. He proposed that the Constitutional Court annul the contested law as set out in the proposals.

65. A representative of a group of 47 Members dealt mainly with the question of how the government reached the amount to be paid under the financial compensation. Finally, he referred to the arguments set out in the written proposals as well as the replies to the Government's observations.

66. The representative of a group of 45 Members agreed with the arguments put forward by the appellants as well as by a group of 47 Members and reiterated the key objections already raised by that group in a written copy of its proposal. In addition to them, it addressed in particular the question of the status of religious legal entities in terms of their subjectivity in the legal order in the past, including in relation to the contested law. Finally, she proposed the annulment of the contested law.

67. In his speech, the representative of the Government responded in particular to the speeches of the appellants and both groups of Members and refuted their claims. In conclusion, he noted that he did not regard the contested law as constitutionally unconformal.

VII.

Own review

68. The Constitutional Court considered the arguments put forward by the appellants, the parties and the interveners, and concluded that the proposal is, to the extent that it is directed against Article 5 (i) of Law 428 / 2012 Coll. in the word "fair '. To the extent that it is directed against the provisions of § 19 to 25 of Act No. 428 / 2012 Coll. is clearly unfounded and in the rest the proposal is unfounded.

VIII.

Review of competence and legislative process

69. The examination of the compliance of the law with the constitutional order shall consist of three elements according to the provisions of Section 68 (2) of the Constitutional Court Act. These are the competences of the body which issued the contested law, the procedure for the adoption and publication of the law and the compliance of its content with the constitutional order. The Constitutional Court first considers from the logic of the case whether the competent authority is entitled to issue the contested legislation. In the event of a positive reply, the Constitutional Court shall examine whether the contested law has been given in a constitutionally prescribed manner and, if the Constitutional Court does not find an error even in this element of the review of the constitutionality of the contested law, shall, at last, proceed to assess the content of the contested law with the standards and values of constitutional order.

70. From the short-term report of the 41st session of the Chamber of Deputies of the sixth parliamentary term, held on 14 July 2012, the Constitutional Court found that Law No 428 / 2012 Coll. tabled by the Government (Parliamentary Press No 580 / 0) was adopted by the Chamber of Deputies at third reading in the vote of No 158, of which 182 Members (present) voted in favour of the proposal by 93 Members, against the motion of 89 Members (Resolution No 1251). Subsequently, the approved bill was passed on to the Senate on 19 July 2012 as print No 391 / 0.

71. It follows from the short-term report of the 25th Senate meeting, held on 15 August 2012, that the bill was rejected by Resolution 713, when 33 senators voted against it in vote 9 for the adoption of this resolution by the 77 senators present. Subsequently, the bill was returned to the Chamber of Deputies on 16 August 2012.

72. The Chamber of Deputies voted again on the bill, at its 47th meeting on 8 November 2012. Voting number 156 The Chamber of Deputies maintained the bill (Resolution 1359), with which it initially agreed when 102 Members voted in favour of it, voted against by 1 Member.

73. On 8.11.2012 the law adopted was delivered to the President of the Republic; he neither signed nor returned it to the Chamber of Deputies on 22 November 2012. The position of the President of the Republic was circulated to Members on the same day as Parliament Document No 4603. On 5. 12. 2012 the law was declared in the amount of 155 Collection of Laws under the number 428 / 2012 Coll.

74. As regards the assessment of the competence of the issuing body, the Constitutional Court notes that the subject of the review in the present case is the constitutionality of Act No. 428 / 2012 Coll. and the competence of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, which adopted that law, clearly follows from Article 15 (1) of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court therefore finds the question of competence to issue the contested law to be resolved, and neither one of the applicants objected in that direction.

75. The first group of objections raised by a group of 18 senators and a group of 45 Members are alleged non-compliance with the constitutionally prescribed process of adopting the contested law. This is mainly an objection to the passing of the bill in breach of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies as a result of its failure to discuss it at the first possible meeting after its return by the Senate and an objection to systematic violations of the rights of opposition Members throughout the legislative process.

76. The first of these objections does not consider the Constitutional Court to be justified. The question of voting on the bill returned by the Senate and its discussion in the Chamber of Deputies is governed by Rule 47 (1) of the Constitution, which provides that if the Senate rejects the bill, the Chamber of Deputies shall vote on it again. The bill is adopted if it is approved by an absolute majority of all Members. Paragraph 97 (3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies also provides that if the Senate rejects the bill by way of a resolution, the President shall submit it at the next meeting, but at the earliest ten days after the resolution is served, to the House, to vote on it again. The bill is adopted if approved by the House by an absolute majority of all Members.

77. On the nature of the period contained in the relevant provision of Paragraph 97 (1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies (in the words "without undue delay"), the Constitutional Court has in the past expressed itself in the decision of the Chamber of Deputies on page 5 / 02 of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies (N 117 / 28 of the SbNU 25; 476 / 2002 Coll.) in the following words: "The resolution of the Chamber of Deputies giving its assent must therefore be regarded as a decision containing, at a given procedural stage, the final sentence which ended the legislative process in the Chamber of Deputies; the requirement of the Act (Chamber of Deputies) that the approved bill be sent to the Senate by the President of the Chamber of Deputies without undue delay (§ 97 (1) of the Act No. 90 / 1995 Coll.) does not even have a substantive or temporal connection to the Chamber of Deputies' own decision-making process and, in fact, as a technical instruction to face administrative delays between the (terminated) legislative process in the Chamber of Deputies and the powers of the Senate (§ 97 (2) to (4) of the Chamber of Deputies' s.

78. The Constitutional Court also agrees with this interpretation in the case of the provisions of Rule 97 (3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies and notes that the time limit set by the words "at the next meeting, but not earlier than ten days' has neither a substantive or temporal link to the Chamber of Deputies' own decision-making process and is a guideline of a technical nature directed only at the President of the Chamber of Deputies, which administratively regularises the link between the final legislative process in the Senate, which rejected the motion and the House's repeated vote. In addition to the attempt to face administrative delays (" the next meeting '), it also contains a deadline ("first in ten days') to give Members sufficient time to familiarise themselves with the legislative process in the Senate and the reasons for rejection. The expiry of the deadline under Rule 97 (3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies or the fulfilment of the obligation of the President of the Chamber of Deputies within a given period is therefore of no influence on the Chamber of Deputies' own decision-making process, in particular it is not a forfeit of the deadline for a substantive vote addressed to the Chamber of Deputies. The provision cited in Paragraph 97 (3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies is fulfilled by the President of the Chamber of Deputies by the submission of a refunded law, when other questions of time or substance relating to the vote go into the sphere of the Chamber of Deputies (as a whole).

79. In its Rule 47 (1), the Constitution expressly states that it shall vote again on the motion returned. Voting is always a positive act within the meaning of the Constitution, i.e. not a consistent, omissionary act. Exceptional situations where the inaction of the institution has specific positive consequences in the legislative process must be explicitly defined in the Constitution, which is, for example, Article 46 (3) of the Constitution. Paragraph 97 (3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies does not contain, according to its text, any precondition for the vote of the Chamber of Deputies, which it cannot even contain in the light of the wording of Rule 47 (1) of the Constitution. Such a period is contained only in the provision of § 97 (2) of Act No. 90 / 1995 Coll., directly following the wording of Article 46 (3) of the Constitution.

80. Even in the context of the interpretation of purely sub-constitutional law, the requirement of the appellants is not appropriate. Even if the existence of a deadline for re-voting by the Chamber of Deputies could be withdrawn from Rule 97 (3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, the law does not link the expiry of that time limit to any consequence, in particular does not provide for a fiction of non-approval of the proposal. The words' to vote on it 'also indicate the duty to vote, not the free reflection of the House, to vote on a Senate-rejected bill.

81. Doctrinary Conclusions (Suchanek, R. In Šimělek et al. Constitution of the Czech Republic, Comments. Prague: Linde, 2010, p. 589) can be confirmed to the extent that they indicate that only the Chamber of Deputies, which approved it and forwarded it to the Senate, can vote on the Senate rejected or returned draft law. There is no doubt that the deadline for voting in the Chamber of Deputies (the final time limit) exists. However, it does not follow from the words' at the next meeting 'in accordance with Rule 97 (3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, but from Article 34 (4) of the Constitution, according to which the session of the Chamber of Deputies ends with the expiry of its term of office or its dissolution, in conjunction with Article 121 (1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, according to which, in the new parliamentary term, proposals which have not been debated and decided in the previous parliamentary term cannot in principle be debated.

82. That the Senate rejected the bill by the President of the Chamber of Deputies at the next meeting of the Chamber of Deputies, but not earlier than ten days after being sent to Members to vote on it again, within the meaning of Rule 97 (3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, the appellants and the interveners do not make it questionable. It follows from the observations of the Chamber of Deputies that this was the 3rd item of the 45th meeting of the Chamber of Deputies, held since 4 September 2012. The fact that a vote subsequently took place to remove the item from the programme 45th and 46th session of the Chamber of Deputies, and in substance the item was discussed only at the 47th session of the Chamber of Deputies, which took place since 23 October 2012, is not relevant in terms of reviewing the issue of compliance with the constitutional procedure.

83. The Constitutional Court also considers the objections of the parties to the systematic violation of the rights of opposition representatives to be unfounded. The Constitutional Conformation of the Legislative Process, in view of the possible shortening of the rights of opposition representatives, the Constitutional Court in the past dealt mainly with the finding of 1 March 2011 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 55 / 10 (N 27 / 60 CollU 279; 80 / 2011 Coll.) and the finding of 27 November 2012 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 1 / 12 (437 / 2012 Coll.). In relation to the present proposal, the Constitutional Court notes that it did not find a breach of the binding conclusions of the above findings in the case of the legislative process of adopting Law No 428 / 2012 Coll..

84. In the finding of sp. zn. The conclusions drawn can be drawn analogous to this. 180 Members voted for postponement from 45th to 46th session of the Chamber of Deputies, only 1 Member opposed, 179 Members voted for postponement from 46th to 47th session, 3 opposed.

85. in the decision of 22 March 2011 sp. zn. The Constitutional Court stated that "it considers it necessary to emphasise that the Institute of the motion for the annulment of the law or its individual provisions under Article 87 (1) (a) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic, submitted by a group of Members or Senators pursuant to § 64 (1) (b) of the Constitutional Court Act, is, inter alia, a manifestation of the constitutionally guaranteed principle of the protection of minorities (Article 6 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic) and primarily serves as one of the instruments of protection of the parliamentary minority (opposition) against any arbitrage (or omission) in decisions taken by a parliamentary majority rule [cdvom. 2010], which allows for a constitutional review by the Venice Commission CDL-AD (2010) 025, Report on the role of the opposition of defence]." In the decision of 15 November 2011 sp. zn. 36 / 2012 Coll.) The Constitutional Court stated that "the proposal is made by an actively legitimate appellant, even though he did not overlook that the group of appellants is partly composed of Members who voted in favour of the contested legislation in the Chamber of Deputies." In the decision of 22 March 2011 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 24 / 10 The Constitutional Court stated to the Members forming a group of appellants that "in addition, and this cannot be left to the Constitutional Court without a critical remark, they directly participated in the adoption of the contested legislation by voting (!) in a overwhelming majority of their consent during the legislative process. In such cases, the Constitutional Court would be obliged to refuse such proposals in future."

86. In the present case, the Constitutional Court did not overlook that for the two postponement, namely from 45th to 46th meeting and from 46th to 47th meeting, the Members who saw it as a constitutional non-conformal procedure, namely Aleksandr Černý, Miroslav Grebeníček, Pavel Hojda, Kateřina Konáčná, Ivana Levá, Marie Neddová, Marie Rusová, Karel Šíslo, Zuzka Bebalovej-Rujbrová, Jiří Dolejš, Stanislav Grospich, Gabriela Hubáčková, Vladimir Koníček, Soňa Marková, Josef Nekl, Marta Semelá, Miloslav Ostá, Petr, Vojty Filik, Milada Halíková, Jan Klán, Pavel Kováčik, Květ Matushovská, Miroslav, Miroslav, Šelka Šelka Šenfel, Pavel Šenfel Šenfel, Pavel Antonín, Pavel Kulinský, Válový, One of the five members in various clubs who proposed to postpone the hearing from 45th to 46th meeting was Lubomir Zaoralek.

87. The general shortening of the speaking time of individual Members took place according to the Constitutional Court in accordance with Rule 59 (1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies and, in particular, in accordance with the provisions of Section 59 (4) of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, the Constitutional Court did not, in any case, find a step forward from the terms of the Constitution or the Charter. The Constitutional Court examined part of the record of the meeting of the Chamber of Deputies in question (available from http: / / www.psp.cz / eknih / 2010ps / stenprot / 041schuz / s041125.htm) and concluded that the President of the Chamber of Deputies had not infringed any provisions of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies by withdrawing the word of Mr Babák, and thus less any constitutional provision. The limitation of speaking language enshrined in Rule 59 (4) of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies applies to all Members (or speakers), including in the capacity of a Member giving a lecture on the position of the parliamentary club. The privileges of the Member giving a lecture on the position of the parliamentary club cannot, by definition, apply to indiscriminate speeches, since even the Member's club does not demonstrate the right to publicly demonstrate its position on the matter (cf. Paragraph 59 (1), second sentence and contrario). Nor can it be ignored that Mr Babáš has been alerted several times by the President to the ignorance of his speech, and yet was unwilling to withdraw from the line of his original speech. The proportionality of the above restrictions can then also be imported from the advanced phase and length of the legislative process, which clearly shows that the opponents of the contested law had sufficient time and resources to demonstrate their views, since a large number of members of the opposition parties spoke about the proposal on the same day.

88. The Constitutional Court also does not agree with the objection to the inadmissibility of the proceedings of the Chamber of Deputies at night and agrees with the interpretation of the provisions of Section 53 of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, as outlined in its observations by the Chamber of Deputies. Thus, the Constitutional Court considers the constitutional interpretation of that provision to be consistent, which gives the Chamber of Deputies the opportunity to act in an emergency situation and to vote after 21: 00 p.m., since the opposite, the right of the Chamber of Deputies to restrict inpretations does not result from any provision of constitutional order. In principle, the ability of government Members to give themselves and opposition representatives enough rest is once again a matter of political culture in the Czech Republic. Moreover, as the Chamber of Deputies points out in its observations, such a procedure has been practiced several times in the past and no objections have been raised. In this respect, the Constitutional Court considers that constitutional conformal established practice, which can be considered a legitimate part of the rules of the legislative process [cf. paragraph 38 of the Constitutional Court's finding of 15 February 2007 sp. zl. ÚS 77 / 06 (N 30 / 44 SbNU 349; 37 / 2007 Coll.)].

89. Nor can the Constitutional Court testify that the law was deliberately adopted at the time of the recess when opposition Members were already outside the Chamber. It follows from the House of Deputies that the vast majority of the opposition Members have left the Chamber in a different way from the announcement of the break and before the vote on the objection against the proposed break. The result of the vote on this objection and the subsequent vote on Act No. 428 / 2012 Coll. The President of the Chamber of Deputies could not, therefore, have been altered by any error, as is apparent from the stenoprotocol from the relevant meeting of the Chamber of Deputies (the relevant text is available from http: / / www.psp.cz / eknih / 2010ps / stenprot / 047schuz / s047221.htm).

90. The Constitutional Court also considers it equally irrelevant to object to the rapid sending of the President of the Republic's position on the contested law, as this objection also has no basis in fact. Nothing prevented the President of the Republic from changing his possible opinion and, by the 15th day, the approved Act to return to the House (Article 50 of the Constitution). The fact that his opinion was sent to Members on the 14th day of that period does not alter that competence. The Constitutional Court cannot, for such a purely formal reason, abolish Act No. 428 / 2012 Coll., especially in a situation where the President of the Republic himself clearly did not object to this procedure, since he is himself entitled under the provisions of § 64 (1) (a) of the Law on the Constitutional Court with active legitimacy to file an application for annulment of the contested law.

91. The Constitutional Court cannot also attest to the intervener's objection that Members voting in favour of the contested law denied the citizens of the Czech Republic the right to participate directly in governance through a referendum. The constitutional order of the Czech Republic clearly states that the legislative power belongs to Parliament (Article 15 of the Constitution) and that the constitutional order is known by reference to the so-called reservation of the constitutional law (Article 2 (2) of the Constitution). It is clear from this that the Constitution preferred to approve laws through the Parliament of the Czech Republic. For the same reason, it is also odd that the vote to approve the contested law infringes the parliamentary promise.

92. The Constitutional Court did not therefore proceed to the annulment of the contested law on grounds of infringement of the rules of the legislative process, since it did not find that the process in its entirety did not allow for rational discourse, hearing of the parties and an open debate between the advocates of the competing views, including those of the minority, supported by the possibilities of active participation of the participants in its course (cf. the finding of the Constitutional Court of 1 March 2011 sp. zl. In relation to the other objections, the Constitutional Court notes that it is not entitled to review the constitutionality of aspects of the legislative process such as the interest of the media (including public law) on the views of opposition representatives, promises between representatives of (former) government coalition, government interpretations of the case law of the Constitutional Court or the willingness of the Government to respond to questions from opposition Members. These are all issues primarily of political culture in the Czech Republic, not protected by the Constitutional Court (Article 83 of the Constitution and contrario). Although the Constitutional Court condemns the moral decline in the backdrop of the legislative process, by causing both defiant groups of Members, it cannot, unless it is out of the professional body for the protection of constitutionality to become a moral arbiter and a governer of political representatives, go to derogation of the contested law solely because of the disrespect of one part of the legislators to another.

IX.

Overview of the relevant case law of the Constitutional Court on the issue under examination

IX/a

Judgments of the Constitutional Court in restitution cases

93. In assessing those parts of the proposals which affect the restitution provisions of the contested law, the Constitutional Court considers, first of all, that it is necessary, in short, to recap the principles and to recall the points of reference drawn up as red thread by its extensive, already second decade, restitution case-law.

94. The Constitutional Court has already based ex favore restitutionis since its first decisions in restitution cases and has innumerable points out that restitution matters need to be treated in the light of the fact that a number of injustices have been caused in the past to those who are restitution, including the property. The Constitutional Court of the CSFR already concluded, in its finding in sp. zn. I. ÚS 597 / 92 of 21.12.1992 (see the Collection of Resolutions and Finances of the Constitutional Court of the CSFR, 1992, Found No. 16), that the restitution laws of a democratic society seek to mitigate at least partially the consequences of past property and other injustices arising between 25.2.1948 and 1.1.1990. The State and its authorities are therefore obliged to comply with the restitution law in accordance with the legitimate interests of persons whose damage, caused by a totalitarian communist regime, is to be compensated at least partially. The guiding principle must always be the abovementioned purpose of restitution, the fulfilment of which requires that the restitution laws be interpreted in relation to the beneficiaries in the most favourable manner possible, in the spirit of the attempt to mitigate certain injustices resulting in the withdrawal of the assets [cf. sp. zn. I. ÚS 154 / 95 of 18.1.1996 (N 7 / 5 of SbNU 47), the finding sp. zn. I. ÚS 754 / 01 of 23.10.2003 (N 123 / 31 of SbNU 113), the finding sp. zn. II. ÚS 2896 / 09 of 29.4.2010 (N 97 / 57 of SbNU 273) and others].

95. In the case under consideration, it is generally known that injustices were committed not only on religious legal persons, but also on individual spiritual persons. The Constitutional Court considers it widely known that historians and historians of art published in the first half of the 1990s were well aware of this circumstance. An example of the Roman Catholic Church can only be selected demonstratively: "From the decision of the Bureau of the Czech Republic in 1950 by the State Institute for Religious Affairs, confidential material was developed for Prime Minister Antonín Zapotocký on the liquidation of the church, especially Catholic orders in Bohemia. The night of the 13th to 14th April 1950 is called the Bartholomew Night of the Catholic Church. During this period, members of the State Secret Security took over all 28 male monasteries (except for the religion of merciful brothers), to which were 219 Greek houses. A total of 2,376 religious workers were transported to five so-called centralised camps having the status of forced labour camps. Several hundred priests were centralized 'in prisons in Leopold and Valtice. In August and September of the same year, State Secret Security repeated an action targeted at women's monasteries this time. A total of 850 objects with equipment and collections were taken from the beet and fell to 15,000 religious and religious objects. 1 227 970 books were also taken over by the State. The central archive took the monastery archives, 624 paintings and 249 plastics were transferred to the National Gallery and the depositories of castles and castles. The National Museum in Prague has obtained valuable ornaments taken over by the Museum of Arts, which manages in professional care and at a thousand liturgical and artistic objects of unimaginable prices." (cf. M. Mžyková, Introduction, in: Returned Treasures. Restitutio in integrum. Praha: PRAGAFILM, 1994, str. 14.)

96. In its case-law, the Constitutional Court repeatedly points out that restitution legislation is intended to alleviate only some of the property injustices and that the intention of the legislature cannot be the intention of the legislature, even with its best will, of removing all the unlawful communist regime of injustices. In doing so, the Constitutional Court accentuates the lawmaker's will to determine the consequences of which property injustices will be mitigated.

97. In the present consistent case-law of the Constitutional Court in restitution cases, it is impossible to overlook that, as a negative legislator in the intentions of the above-mentioned favoris restitutionis as a negative legislator, it has never abolished the provisions of the restitution regulation against the physical and legal persons that the legislator has allowed by law to mitigate the injustices committed by them. Thus, the ruling of the Constitutional Court has always been in principle in favour of those who have resisted (permanent residence, national cultural monuments).

98. The Constitutional Court is aware that at the time of its decision, the possibilities of the legislature were adequately met by the restitution requirements of natural persons and selected legal persons, and that the recovery of historical assets was achieved by the restored municipalities. In its case-law, the Constitutional Court has never nodded in the restitution case an argument based on the fact that one restituent should not be restituted because another person was not included by the legislature among those to whom the legislator did not reduce property or other injustices.

99. The Constitutional Court has also repeatedly ruled on church restitutions. It is clear from his case-law that he has accentuated legitimate expectations and pointed to the legislator's inaction. In such a situation, it would certainly be surprising, and it would rightly give the impression that it is burdened with signs of lewdness and insolence, shortly after the legislation was finally adopted.

100. The Constitutional Court is not called upon to judge the dispute over the meaning of Czech history, the part-argument segment of which the applicants bring. The Constitutional Court considers it appropriate to recall that, for example, "the nature of the non-mutant problem alone makes it possible for different views to live here and for dialogue to be conducted without intolerance and demagogy. If the holiness of the vicar general can be doubted, then the locust cult and the locust legend are historical taxes that cannot be questioned." (cf. V. Wool, Jan Nepomuk Czech legend. Prague - Litomyšl: Paseka Publishing, National Gallery in Prague, 2013).

101. The Constitutional Court, like the ordinary courts, is not only a basis for deciding on matters in which there is no agreement between the parties, but also a court whose activities should lead to the prevention of disputes and the search for friendly solutions. In the case under trial, this is the ratio of the state and the churches, namely the issue which was, is and will be inextricably linked to the history of Czech statehood. According to the preamble of the Constitution, this was adopted because "We, the citizens of the Czech Republic in the Czech Republic, Moravia and Silesia, at the time of the restoration of a separate Czech state, loyal to all the good traditions of the ancient state of the Czech and Czechoslovak countries, determined to build, protect and develop the Czech Republic in the spirit of the inviolable values of human dignity and freedom as a country of equal, free citizens who are aware of their obligations to the second and the responsibility to the whole, as a free and democratic state, based on respect for human rights and on the principles of civil society, as part of the family of European and world democracies of the Czech Republic, determined to guard and to develop their inherited natural and cultural, material and spiritual wealth, determined to abide at all the best principles of the rule of law, through our freely elected representatives of the Czech Republic." The Constitutional Court considers that the application of the principle of minimising the intervention resulting in the rejection of the proposal opens up the scope for consolidating the consensus reached between the state and the churches more than would have been the case if it had reopened the problem of finding solutions with its activism.

IX/b

Judgments on the property rights of church bodies

102. Since 2005 at the latest, the Constitutional Court began to establish a significant line of caselaw on the question of the property rights of religious legal persons applied under the general rules (actions of ownership, determination). In principle, the development of this case-law was characterised by two competitive approaches which differed to the extent of the possibility of judicial power to intervene in complex and complex social and political issues, where the centre of responsibility for the adoption of legislation lies primarily with the legislator.

103. The view according to which the provisional act consisting solely of the adoption of Act No. 298 / 1990 Coll., on the modification of certain property relations of the Greek Regulations and Congregations and Archbishop of Olomouc, as amended by Act No. 338 / 1991 Coll., (hereinafter referred to as "Act No. 298 / 1990 Coll.") and the contested provision of § 29 of the Law on Soil and, at the same time, the continued absence of the Act on the Historical Property of the Churches (i.e. the Inactivity of the legislator) is not on the obstacle to the simultaneous protection of the property rights of the church bodies to which the so-called Law No 298 / 1990 Coll. divergent opinions on the opinion of Plen. zn. A competitive view prevailed, which, when highlighting the legislator's primary obligation to regulate the issue of so-called church restitutions, considered the integrity of the judiciary (protection of individual claims) before the adoption of a special law to be an impossible judicial activism [find sp. zn. II. ÚS 528 / 02 of 2.2.2005 (N 23 / 36 SbNU 287); Opinion of the plenary of 1 November 2005 (sp. zn. Pl. ÚS-st. 22 / 05; resolution of 19 January 2006 sp. zn. II. ÚS 687 / 04 (not published in SbNU, available at http: / / nalus.ujud.cz) and a number of subsequent decisions).

104. Thus, already in the above-mentioned finding, page II of the ÚS 528 / 02, the Constitutional Court stated that "[general courts] in the course of the proceedings failed to consider that the transfer of the property of the churches is covered by the mandatory provision of § 29 of Act No. 229 / 1991 Coll., according to which the property whose original owner was the churches, religious orders and congregation cannot be transferred to other persons until the adoption of the law on that property. The Land Act therefore assumes that agricultural property previously owned by religious legal persons will be dealt with by a separate law and protected until that law is issued. This property must therefore be covered by the regime of restitution laws and therefore there is no room for actions to determine ownership in the absence of an urgent legal interest. Nor can it be inferred from the fact that the State was not able to issue a special restitution law, although Act No. 229 / 1991 Coll., which had already entered into force on 24 June 1991, foresees the issue of such a law. The State must, however, fulfil its obligation to issue a restitution law resulting from the provision of the Land Act cited, concerning church property, because it must meet legitimate expectations on the part of church legal entities based on a legal provision." This conclusion (in competition with the finding of sp. zn. IV. ÚS 298 / 05) was subsequently confirmed by the opinion of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS-st. 22 / 05, which in particular expressed the nature of Act No. 298 / 1990 Coll. as a restitution law, since the restitution purpose of the Act was fulfilled through the listing of the authorised persons and the assets (transferred) concerned, although it was only provisional. Moreover, the opinion was taken over by part of the statement of reasons for the finding in point II.II of the ÚS 528 / 02 in the part in which the legislature's obligation to issue a restitution law is expressly stated, as it must meet legitimate expectations on the part of religious legal persons based on legal provisions. It is clear from this, and above all from the brief point of view of the opinion, that the purpose of the opinion was not to draw any other new legal conclusions, but to internalise one of the legal opinions already expressed, namely a different opinion on the finding of sp. zn. IV. ÚS 298 / 05 and the legal conclusion of the finding of sp. zn. II. ÚS 528 / 02, which appeared in competition with the legal opinion of the finding of sp. zn. IV. ÚS 298 / 05. That finding of the legislature's obligation to adopt a restitution law, thus fulfilling legitimate expectations on the part of church bodies, is consistently reproduced in a later case-law of the Constitutional Court [cf. the resolution already mentioned, sp. zn. II. ÚS 687 / 04; and resolution sp. zn. II. ÚS 230 / 05 of 16 March 2006; Resolution No IV of 19 June 2006; Resolution sp. zn. I. ÚS 679 / 03 of 10 May 2007; Resolution sp. zn. I. ÚS 1652 / 07 of 18 July 2007 (not published in SbNU, available at http: / / nalus.ujud.cz); paragraph 29 of the decision sp. zn. IV. ÚS 34 / 06 of 21 November 2007 (N 201 / 47 SbNU 597); Resolution sp. zn. IV. ÚS 158 / 08 of 6 May 2008; Resolution sp. zn. II. ÚS 2904 / 08 of 7 January 2009 (not published in SbNU, available at http: / / nalus.ujud.cz) and a number of others; the finding of 24 June 2009 sp. zn. I. ÚS 663 / 06 (N 149 / 53 SbNU 811)].

105. On the basis of that case-law, the finding of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 9 / 07 of 1 July 2010 (N 132 / 58 SbNU 3; 242 / 2010 Coll.), which rejected the proposal to abolish § 29 of Act No. 229 / 1991 Coll., in particular he stated that "[d] the lenient inaction of the Parliament of the Czech Republic consisting in the failure to adopt a special law which would settle the historical property of churches and religious societies is an anticonstitutional and infringes Article 1 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic, Articles 11 (1) and (4), Article 15 (1) and Article 16 (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms." In this finding, in particular, the Constitutional Court in the absence of the relevant law identified an anti-constitutional loophole in law on the basis of which violations of those provisions of constitutional law occur. The Constitutional Court refers to the fact that, on the part of the legislator, there is an obligation to regulate a certain range of legal relations, which can result either from a simple law where the legislator has expressly imposed that obligation, or directly from a constitutional order, provided that the failure to regulate a particular range of relationships results in constitutional legal consequences. In the case sp. zn. 1. The urgency of the public interest in removing the legal uncertainty arising from the provisional legal situation (Act No. 298 / 1990 Coll. in conjunction with § 29 of Act No. 229 / 1991 Coll.) has already exceeded the tolerable and justifiable limit at the date of decision of the Constitutional Court. The failure to adopt a special law foreseen by Article 29 of Act No. 229 / 1991 Coll., to which the legislature has explicitly committed, for 19 years, although the Constitutional Court has been alerted to the difficulty of its inactivity, is a manifestation of an inadmissible legislative choice and infringes Article 1 (1) of the Constitution. 2. The Constitutional Court stated that in addition to the explicit legal basis in the provision of § 29 of Act No. 229 / 1991 Coll. the legitimate expectations of churches and religious societies also have a basis in the overall concept of the restitution process after 1989, which cannot be interpreted as a whole against the detriment of the entire groups of entities. What the Constitutional Court refers to as legitimate expectations in its case-law is undoubtedly a lasting and specific property interest falling within Article 11 of the Charter and Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention. The failure to realise this property interest (or to obtain compensation) over a period of 19 years (at the date of the court's decision) thus met the point of unconstitutionality, consisting of omission by legislation to resolve the systemic and complex problem which the legislator has repeatedly pointed out by the Constitutional Court. 3. Finally, the provision of Article 2 (1) of the Charter guarantees religious pluralism and religious tolerance, or separation of the state from specific religions (the principle of confessing a neutral state). The principle of religious pluralism and tolerance is expressed in Articles 15 (1) and 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. The central principle of the confessions of a neutral state is implemented by a cooperative model of state and church relations and their mutual independence. It was important for the Constitutional Court to consider whether and to what extent economic self-sufficiency constituted a material presumption of independent exercise of the rights guaranteed in particular by Article 16 (1) and (2) of the Charter. The constitutional order of the Czech Republic does not only contain the imperative of the independence of the state in churches and religious societies (as part of the ideological and religious neutrality of the state), but also the requirement of the independence of churches and religious societies in the state in fulfilling their objectives. The Constitutional Court found that, in the absence of a reasonable settlement of historical ecclesiastical property, when the State, as a result of its own inactivity, continues to be a dominant source of income for the churches and religious societies concerned, without any apparent link to the proceeds of the historical assets held by the churches, in its consequences it infringes Article 16 (1) The Charter on the freedom to show faith in society through public action and traditional forms of religious, public-service activities, using relevant historically formed economic resources, and in particular Article 16 (2) of the Charter, in the economic component of ecclesiastical autonomy. In detail, the Constitutional Court refers to the finding cited.

106. The conclusions of the plenary finding, sp. zn. Findings sp. zn. I. ÚS 2166 / 10 of 22.2.2011 (N 21 / 60 SbNU 215) The Constitutional Court broke the block section (Paragraph 29 of the Land Act) for the benefit of a natural person, upholding its constitutional complaint, thereby allowing the transfer (transition) of ownership to "another person" within the meaning of the text of the block section. He found that there was a constitutionally protected interest on the part of a natural person resulting from the earlier defective privatisation process, and in this particular case it was necessary to give priority to the complainant's interest over the property law of the state and the legitimate expectations of the church, which the Constitutional Court stressed that "fulfilling the legitimate expectations of the church... could be achieved by other means," not only by natural restitution. The finding of sp. zn. II. ÚS 2326 / 07 of 31.3.2011 (N 58 / 60 SbNU 745), which also directly followed the finding of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 9 / 07, was rejected by the constitutional complaint of the church legal person, stating that "the quoted finding of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 9 / 07 had a substantial prediction of the legislature's obligation to adopt the law envisaged by Article 29 of the Land Act in the form of an additive finding. In these new conditions, only a period of time corresponding to the time-consuming of a full legislative process may be considered as appropriate for the adoption of the legislation in question. 'They followed the findings that were met by constitutional complaints from church bodies. The finding of sp. zn. III. ÚS 3207 / 10 of 31.8.2011 (N 146 / 62 SbNU 263) has been granted a constitutional complaint by a religious legal person because the courts have infringed the right to a fair trial if they have refused to rule on its claim to determine ownership of the property collected in 1949 (on the basis of duplicate ownership). In the judgment in Case C-562 / 09 of 31 August 2011 (N 145 / 62 SbNU 245), the Constitutional complaint of the religious legal person was also upheld and the Constitutional Court stated in more detail that" more than 20 years have passed since the adoption of the provisions of Paragraph 29 of the Soil Act (so-called block paragraph)... I deadline, marked by the find sp. zn. II. ÚS 2326 / 07..., corresponding to the full legislative process' can already be considered exceeded... In this context, it should be reiterated that, pursuant to Article 89 (2), The Constitution is enforceable by decisions of the Constitutional Court binding on all the institutions and persons. Parliament is not a sovereign who arbitrarily determines its agenda and serves only its objectives, but is bound by the Constitution, so that Parliament may use its powers only to fulfil the Constitution, not to the contrary [the most striking point was found in the sp. zn. The courts are required, in such a situation, to refer to an action of a church legal person as "an action of its kind (impending action of restitution) with a view to reaching a loophole in the legislature's long-term inactivity in breach of Article 1 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic, Article 11 (1) and (4), Article 15 (1) and Article 16 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and of Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in accordance with the procedure appropriate to remedy beyond 1989." In the case of the protection of fundamental rights, the courts are obliged to rule on actions under general legal principles in order to overcome the unconstitutional absence of the law, and on the contrary they must not refuse to rule on fundamental rights with reference to the absence of the law.

107. The last time the Constitutional Court found sp. zn. II. ÚS 3120 / 10 of 29. 8. 2012 complied with the constitutional complaint of the church legal person concerning claims relating to historical church property, the Constitutional Court pointed out that it was similar to that of the constitutional complaint sp. zn. I. ÚS 562 / 09 in a different situation from that in which it was in at the time of the issue of the sp. zn. II. ÚS 528 / 02. The passage of time plays a fundamental role here. The legal expectations on the part of religious legal entities have long been known as "maturity." The legislature, although repeatedly drawn attention by the Constitutional Court to the obligation to comply with the obligation under Article 29 of the Soil Act and thus to meet the legitimate expectations mentioned, has not yet fulfilled that obligation. The Constitutional Court also stated that it is aware that Parliament of the Czech Republic is currently discussing the draft law on property settlement with churches and religious societies and this legislative process is in an advanced phase. However, in view of the urgency, a substantive decision was taken. Another action by the Constitutional Court could lead to a further extension of provisional constitutional non-conformal legal status.

108. The Constitutional Court is based on this case-law in the assessment of Law No 428 / 2012 Coll. in the light of the requirements arising from the constitutional order as formulated in the sp. zn. In view of the content of all three proposals submitted, it is surprising that the appellants and the interveners have not been familiar with the existing case-law and have not spoken to it in a controversial or critical manner. Many of their objections seem to be completely missing from the basic paradigms of constitutional protection.

X.

Meritative review of the content of the contested law

X/a

Conceptual clarification

109. Both the appellant and the interveners refer to "restitution" in their proposals, with this notion being treated as being used in more than one sense without taking into account these significant differences in their conclusions. In particular, the intervener (1), on the basis of the confusion of the meaning of the concept of "restitution ', concludes, for its argument, that the contested law does not lead (at least in the case of the Catholic Church) to" restitution (putting it into its original state)', in which the fundamental (non-constitutional) difference between the contested law and similar laws adopted since 1989 so far [paragraph 10 of the proposal by the intervener 1].

110. The intervener 1) does not take into account that restitutio in integrum was not and could not have been the object of any of the laws which, after more than 40 (now sixty) years, were mitigated by certain property injustices. None of the restitution laws could have such ambition, since restitutio after such a long time is not possible after factual (things are subject to changes) or legally (the rule of law has undergone fundamental changes since 1948, and such a requirement would require a difficult-to-think application of the principle of formal discounting with so-called socialist law after 1989). Therefore, no doubt in the case of any of the beneficiaries after 1990, and even in the case of none of the beneficiaries under Act No. 428 / 2012 Coll., this is not a restitutio stricto sensu, but rather a restoration of ownership in current legal - and in particular public - circumstances. In this Act No. 428 / 2012 Coll. is not an exception, but quite logically follows the context of the current legal order, especially constitutional order. Such a procedure is a matter of course for existing restitution legislation, not a lack. It is only in this sense that the term "restitution" or "restitution legislature" is used by the doctrine or case-law, bearing in mind that none of the "restitution laws" of this term is used in the title or in the text, and of course it cannot be ruled out that there will also be restitution in the narrow sense in appropriate cases. The Constitutional Court therefore continues to use the concept of "restitution 'and" restitution legislature' in the terms of the existing case-law, not in the meaning attached to this concept by the appellants and interveners in this proceeding.

111. If the appellants and the interveners consider their argument to be a key element of their argument, in Article 2 (a) they carry out their own definition of the concept of "original assets', which, as will be stated below, constitutes a smaller set of assets in the contested scope than" church assets', and in particular does not include assets originally owned by the State or other persons (in particular, the heading of the compulsory persons is a different issue), which the appellants of Law No 428 / 2012 of the Coll. Although the use of the term in the public sense prevails in the period of literature and case law, the period doctrine was aware of the ambiguity of the term: "The ecclesiastica is a ensemble either for the purposes of the church, or for the church of one (bona ecclesiastica)" (K. Henner, Jvice - the church of the church. In Ott's vocabulary, St. 13. Prague: J. Otto, 1898, p. 572). This corresponds to the definitive narrowing of the concept of "historical property of the churches," as implemented by the Constitutional Court in the sp. zn.

X/b

Character of Catholic ecclesiastical property by private law

112. The appellants submit the argument that the churches and religious societies did not own the original property [paragraph 29 (a); paragraph 47], or that there is a "change in the nature of the ownership ', and argue that the churches and religious societies were not" full owners' [paragraph 29 (k)]. The intervener 1), following a detailed analysis of the legislation in force until 31 October 1949 and part of the period case law, concludes that the church assets were "public-law '(p. 5), or were not owned by churches and religious societies (paragraph 11), referring to two states of Antonín Hobza and the position of the President's Office of 1946, which he considers to be" concise'. The intervener (2) suggests that churches and religious societies, probably even at the beginning of the relevant period, had the status of a "detonator" (Part VIII).

113. First of all, the Constitutional Court takes the view that there is no proposal as to what, in the context of this group of objections, the unconstitutional law on the settlement of churches should consist. Even if those conclusions were correct, it is not argued in the proposals that constitutional order would exclude a hypothetical reduction in property injustices caused by property rights (commercial property, right of management) other than property law, that constitutional order would exclude the adjustment of the property status of churches and religious societies in the future, or that constitutional order would exclude the treatment of state property other than restitutio in integrum stricto sense.

114. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court cannot, in the appellants' argument, overlook some conceptual inclarity in the fundamental institutions of the period - and the present - of private and public law, in this case the concept of ownership and the effects of the public regulation of the Catholic Church (for example, specific objections to it are solely bound by it; In practice, the objections of the appellants and the interveners only affect cult buildings as a public matter). The actual legal argument in this respect is merely a proposal from the intervener (1), but it is quite selective when selecting authoritarian references.

115. The party of ownership on the part of the church bodies of the Catholic Church states the Constitutional Court as follows. The basic legislation at the operative date of 25 February 1948 was Law No 946 / 1811 Coll., General Civil Code, (hereinafter referred to as "o. z. o. ') of 1 June 1811, which, in § 353 et seq., regulated the Institute of Property. In an objective sense, ownership understood the sum of the items belonging to a particular owner, and in a subjective sense it was an authorisation" with the substance and benefits of the matter according to its will to dispose and to exclude anyone else from it. "Paragraph 355 also explicitly stated that" all things are property rights at all, and anyone who is not explicitly excluded by the law is entitled to acquire them on its own behalf or through another person'. Paragraph 357 already regulates the residual Institute of Divided Property (it appears that under that provision the legal relations of the church legal entities of the Catholic Church in the position of "incomplete" - utility - owner) are inferior. Paragraph 358 further states that "any other type of restriction by law or by its will does not invalidate the completeness of ownership." Paragraph 359 stated, among other things, that "according to the different circumstances between the owners and the owners of the company, the property in respect of which ownership is divided, the property of the company, the property of the estate and the inheritance. 'Under the provisions of Paragraph 362, the owner is free to dispose of his property; However, within the limits of the laws prescribed (§ 364).

116. The right of ownership is perceived as elastic by the period and today's legal teaching, i.e. "once the limitations of the rule of law have fallen out..., the right of the owner will be extended, and once new restrictions are created, the right will be reduced (i.e. elasticity of ownership)" (Rouček, F., Sedláček, J. Comments on the Czechoslovak general civil code, part two. Prague, 1935, p. 199, p. 228; similarly Randa, A. About the subject of ownership. In Lawyer 9, 1870, p. 687). "The right of ownership is achieved wherever there is no special restriction. There is also a small ownership if a right for impossibility, whether physical or legal, is not obtained; if ownership is the property of the owner's freedom, it is freedom within the rule of law, not outside the rule of law" (Rouček, F., Sedláček, J. Comment, Part Two, 1935, p. 226). The tavern refers to the tendency of ownership to universality and exclusivity, because by delaying the ownership obligation of the owner, or by "abolishing the exemption from the obligation not to do so, the position of the owner will automatically improve, or the freedom of the owner to dispose of the item becomes less limited" (Stommer, J. Civil law, II. III. additional edition, 1946, p. 98).

117. "Symptomatic (not characteristic) character of ownership is the property, since the owner may have it (but may not)... [O] The definition appears to us to be inalienable, either in the form of inalienable, which lies in the person (i.e., inalienable, inalienable), or in the form of inalienable, which is in the matter (i.e., inalienable)" (Rouček, F., Sedláček, J. Comment, part two. OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 671. The tavern, J. Civil law. This appropriation is intended to cover commitments remaining to be settled from previous years. It is clear from the above that if the appellants and the interveners from the public constraints on certain positions in the case of the Catholic Church import the "incompleteness" of property rights, its other defect or even absence, they argue completely contrary to the notion of ownership law, as it has stabilised over the last two centuries. On the contrary, a public restriction on property disposition requires the concept of ownership. The concept of "inaliability" then does not express anything other than the above, in particular does not give ownership a different "character" that would prevent the restoration of ownership under the conditions of the current legal order and constitutional order. The legal restriction of the disposal before the decisive period fell on the church property Catholic, on the temples of Protestants and Jews, but also on a number of other situations where the state explicitly ruled out a higher degree of independence (in detail Rouček, F., Sedláček, J. Comment, part two, because of the public interest at that time. This appropriation is intended to cover commitments remaining to be settled from previous years. It is clear that such a public restriction is not an expropriation:... "§ 364 to 364b does not shorten ownership, but merely gives it a direction of general benefit" (Tavern, J. Civil law. This appropriation is intended to cover commitments remaining to be settled from previous years. In other words, even cases of nudae proprietatis remain property within the meaning of the present legislation (even in the sense of the present legislation) for their ability to include again all previous sub-rights in the case after the end of the restriction or, where appropriate, other rights created. The basic questions of the property of the Catholic Church were governed even at the time of the reversing josefinism before 1848: "Die Kirche ist eine moralische Person, vom Staate bestätigt, und gleich den Einzelnen desselben bürgerlichen schutzes und derselben bürgerlichen rechte teilhaftig. a) Sie erscheint eben dadurch als eine erwerbfähig Person, b) und muß eine solche sein, wenn sie, was doch der Staat will, und woran ihm gar sehr gelegen ist, ihren Endzweck erreichen soll. Politische Anordnungen setzen indeß ihrer Erwerbung aus mehreren Rücksichten Beschränkungen..." ["The Church is a legal person recognised by the State and received, as well as individuals, the same civil protection and civil rights. a) This manifests itself as a person of property competence, (b) and must be so when he wants - which he also wants to do - and which he very much cares about - to achieve his final purpose. But political orders impose more restrictions on its acquisition..."]. (Helfert, J. Von dem Kirchenvermögen und dem Religionsfonde. Prag, 1834, p. 49). As in the second half of the 19th century and later: "Die Kirche steht hier also principiell auf dem Gebiete des Privatrechts wie jed andre physiche oder juristische Person" ("The Church is thus essentially found here on the ground of private law as any other natural or legal person.") (Schulte, J. F. Lehrbuch des katholischen und evangelischen Kirchenrechts nach dem gemeinen Rechte, dem Rechte der deutschen Länder und Oesterreichs. Vierte Auflage. Gießen, 1886, p. 461). "Under Austrian law, there is no doubt that every corporation or spiritual foundation and every church institution, if they have risen in a legal manner, even the legal capacity in the field of property law is recognised" (Rittner, E. Catholic Church Law, second volume. Prague, 1889, p. 178). Eligibility to be the owner stems from eligibility for rights, which "all persons in principle have legal, i.e. natural and legal" (Rouček, F., Sedláček, J. Comment, Part Two. This appropriation is intended to cover commitments remaining to be settled from previous years.

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Regulation Information

Citation	The Constitutional Court found No. 177 / 2013 Coll., on the application for annulment of Act No. 428 / 2012 Coll., on property settlement with churches and religious societies and on the amendment of certain laws (Act on property settlement with churches and religious societies)
Regulation Type	The Constitutional Tribunal found
Author	-
Collection	Code of Laws

Date of Promulgation	27.06.2013
Effective from	-
Effective until	-
Status	Valid

Legal Areas: Culture Civil law Civil law substantive Judicial and Public Prosecutor's Office Administrative law Constitutional (state) law

The regulation text is for informational purposes only.