The Constitutional Court found No 173 / 2019 Coll.
The Constitutional Court found of 14 May 2019 sp. zn.
Valid
The Constitutional Tribunal found
Text versions:
11.07.2019
173
FIND
The Constitutional Court
On behalf of the Republic
The Constitutional Court decided under sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 21 / 18 on 14 May 2019 in plenary composed of the President of the Court of Paul Rychetský and Judge Louis David, Jaroslav Fenyk, Josef Fialy, Jan Filip, Jaromír Jirsa, Tomáš Lichovník, Vladimir Sládeček, Radovana Suchánek, Kateřina Šimáková, Vojtěho Šimíček, Milady Tomková, David Uhíř (Judge of the Rapporteur) and Jiří Zemánek (as amended by the Ordného order of 3 July 2019) on the proposal of the Regional Court in Hradec Králová, on the terms of the operation of vehicles, and the amendment of Act No. 168 / 1999 Coll.
as follows:
Motion denied.
Reasons
Subject matter
1. On 9 March 2018, the Constitutional Court received the application of the Regional Court in Hradec Králové, for which JUDr. Jan Rutsch, President of Chamber 30 A, (hereinafter referred to as "the appellant") pursuant to Article 95 (2) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as "the Constitution") and Article 64 (3) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as "the Law on the Constitutional Court") on the abolition of part of the provisions of Article II (Transitional Provisions) (4) (b) of Act No. 239 / 2013 Coll., amending the Act on the Insurance of Vehicle Liability from Operation), as amended, (hereinafter referred to as "the Law on the Law on the Constitutional Tribunal"), "of the Constitutional Tribunal."
2. The appellant submits that, in the context of his decision-making activities, under sp. 30 A 95 / 2017, an action for protection against unlawful interference, instruction or enforcement of an administrative authority pursuant to § 82 et seq., Act No. 150 / 2002 Coll., the administrative court order, as amended by Act No. 303 / 2011 Coll. He sees the plaintiff Pavel Horák in that the defendant - Magistrate of Hradec Králové denies the registration of the plaintiff in the register of road vehicles as the owner of the road vehicle Yamaha XTZ 750 SUPER TENER, registration mark XXX, and records the vehicle as extinct. The applicant acquired ownership of the marked road vehicle on 15 September 2014 and the original owner was unregistered in the vehicle register on 17 September 2014. However, by 30 June 2015, the applicant did not request the competent administrative authority to register the change of the new owner to that vehicle. He became interested in the defendant of the City of Hradec Králové in August 2015. The applicant received a notice of 7 August 2015 informing the applicant that it could not carry out a change of ownership of the road vehicle in question because the vehicle was removed from the register because it was deemed to be dead for legal reasons. The applicant's repeated application of 15 February 2016 was rejected by the defendant's decision of 17 February 2016 sp. zn. SZ MMHK / 029682 / 2016 OD2 / HJ MHK / 031448 / 2016 and the appeal against that decision was rejected by the decision of the Regional Office of the Králové Hradec Region of 7 April 2016 No. The applicant brought an action against these administrative acts pursuant to § 65 et seq. of the Administrative Rules of Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "p."), which was rejected by the order of the Regional Court in Hradec Králové of 21 February 2017 No 30 A 31 / 2016-46, since, according to the case law of the Supreme Administrative Court (judgment of 11 February 2016 No 9 As 281 / 2015-57), the implementation or non-registration of changes in road vehicle register data is not an administrative decision issued in the context of administrative proceedings, but is a so-called other act under Part Four of Act No 500 / 2004 Coll., Administrative Order. The appellant does not know that he would file a complaint against this applicant's decision. Subsequently, the applicant has now brought an action for intervention.
Text of the contested provision
3. Article II (4) of Law No 239 / 2013 Coll. reads:
"4. A road vehicle which is permanently excluded from the register of road vehicles at the date of entry into force of this Act shall be deemed to be a road vehicle which has died. A road vehicle shall also be deemed to have died if, at the date of entry into force of this Law,
(b) the owner is not registered in the road vehicle register and no application for registration of the owner of the road vehicle in the register shall be made within six months of the date of entry into force of this law. "
Arguments of the appellant
4. The appellant stated in the proposal that the defendant relied on the reference to Article II (Transitional provisions), point 4 (b) of Act No. 239 / 2013 Coll. According to that provision, the deadline for the entry (registration) of changes in vehicle owner data into the road vehicle register expired on 30 June 2015. As from 1 July 2015, all vehicles that were not registered (re-registered) in the road vehicle register until 30 June 2015 have therefore died legally. The applicant contends that the conduct of the defendant in refusing to register changes in the data relating to the owner of the vehicle is an unlawful interference, since the defendant, by his inactivity in the exercise of public administration, prevents the applicant from exercising his right of ownership.
5. The appellant testified to the applicant's argument in the action and supplemented by the Court's hearing on 6 March 2018 that, in the case of the defendant's conduct in which the applicant sees unlawful interference, it is an ongoing and not one-off action with lasting consequences. The duration of the intervention is seen in that the claimant is not entitled to use it permanently in the light of the fiction of the disappearance of his vehicle, thus preventing him from exercising his right of ownership. In this regard, the appellant sees the difference from the factual and legal situation addressed, for example, in the Resolution of the extended Senate of the Supreme Administrative Court of 13 October 2015 No 7 As 107 / 2014-53. In the context of this, the applicant also stated that, should that intervention be regarded as a one-off measure with permanent consequences, it would not only be limited in the exercise of its right of ownership, but would even be deprived of its right to judicial protection after a period of two months, without having been properly informed of this consequence, which is not generally foreseeable for a normal citizen.
6. The appellant therefore concludes that it is not appropriate to dismiss the action on account of its delay (on the ground that it was lodged within the so-called subjective period provided for in Paragraph 84 (1) of the EC Treaty), since the contested intervention was found to have been sustained. It therefore concludes that the provision of Law No 239 / 2013 Coll. in question will be applied in the present court proceedings.
7. Furthermore, the appellant had to deal with the applicants' claims that the provision was not in line with the constitutional order of the Czech Republic and concluded that it was in agreement with the plea. In the appellant's view, the application of the contested provision infringes the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right to the protection of property pursuant to Articles 11 and 36 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms ("the Charter ') and Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (" the Convention'). The applicant's right of ownership has been completely impaired as the applicant is not entitled to use the case for administrative reasons. According to the appellant, the applicant's right to dispose of the case has been suppressed, as the applicant is formally entitled to transfer his right of ownership to another, but even the potential acquirer will not be entitled to use the case, which makes the contractual transfer of the right of ownership virtually impossible. As is apparent from the explanatory memorandum to the draft law, later approved and published in the Collection of Laws under No. 239 / 2013 Coll., the amendment was intended, inter alia, to clarify the data in the register of road vehicles in order to remove data relating to unused vehicles. However, the fiction of the irreversible administrative demise of vehicles, which was in a state of so-called "semi-transfer ', was only part of the proposed version of Act No 239 / 2013 Coll. on the basis of the amendment of the Economic Committee of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic (" the Chamber of Deputies'); the reason for this change has not been explained. It can therefore be assumed that the purpose other than ensuring the clarity of the register of vehicles is not pursued by the contested provision. However, such a purpose cannot, in the appellant's view, be considered to be sufficiently serious to justify interference with the constitutionally guaranteed rights of vehicle owners. Nor can the fact that these owners have been granted a period within which to complete outstanding transfers alter that conclusion.
8. In the appellant's view, the contested provision cannot stand the proportionality test. It can be accepted that the first step in the proportionality test can be achieved, as the objectives pursued (removing certain vehicles from the register) can be achieved in this way. However, the contested adjustment will not stand in the test of necessity and proportionality. The intended objective could have been achieved in other ways, i.e. without the constitutional guarantee of the fundamental right to peaceful use of property being affected. The design of a rebuttable presumption of the demise of a vehicle, whereby the owner would be able to demonstrate that the vehicle in question exists and is fit for use on the road, may be considered as another offering option. Such a procedure could also be charged. The administrative demise of the vehicle was also not the only conceivable type of penalty - compliance with the vehicle owner's obligation could have been enforced, for example, by means of administrative punishment, i.e. by imposing an adequate fine for offence or administrative offence. The legislature's chosen consequence of de facto expropriation (when the formally existing property right ceases to exist because the matter cannot be used) represents an extremely intense intervention in the sphere protected by the right to peaceful use of property.
9. On the other hand, the public interest pursued by the contested provision (clarification of the register of vehicles) is, according to the appellant, questionable and its degree of gravity is negligible compared to interference with the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights. The appellant considers that, in this context, it is necessary to take into account the fact that even the petitioner did not request such an adjustment and became part of the law only during the legislative process, so that the administrative authorities clearly did not feel the difficult need to deal with the state of the vehicle register, which could justify interference with the right to peaceful use of property.
Proceedings before the Constitutional Court
10. The Constitutional Court pursuant to Article 69 (1), (2) and (3) of the Law on the Constitutional Court sent the proposal to the chambers of Parliament of the Czech Republic as parties to the proceedings and the Government of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the "Government") and to the Ombudsman (hereinafter referred to as the "Ombudsman") as the authorities entitled to intervene as interveners.
Observations of the parties
11. The Chamber of Deputies, in its observations of 23 May 2018, signed by the President of the Chamber of Deputies Mgr. Radek Vondráček, summarised the course of the legislative process under which Law No 239 / 2013 Coll. was discussed and approved and stated that the law was approved by a necessary majority of Members of the Chamber of Deputies, signed by the relevant constitutional authorities and was duly declared. In this state of affairs, it cannot be said that the legislature acted in the belief that the law adopted was in accordance with the Constitution and our rule of law.
12. The Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic ("the Senate"), in its observations of 16 May 2018 signed by its President Milan Štěm, also summarised the course of the legislative process in such a way that the Senate, when negotiating Act No. 239 / 2013 Coll., acted within the limits of the Constitution established competence and in a constitutional manner. He dealt with the proposal as a guarantee and only committee on the economy, agriculture and transport, which met at its 15th meeting on 2 July 2013, recommending the Senate to approve the bill as referred to by the Chamber of Deputies. The Senate discussed the Act at the 11th meeting of 3 July 2013. None of the senators have spoken in the general debate. In the light of the description, it can be concluded that the provision under examination has not been the subject of critical considerations or discussions in the Senate.
13. On 3 May 2018, the Constitutional Court received notification from the Ombudsman that it was entering the proceedings. On 24 May 2018, the Constitutional Court received the same information from the Government. In both cases, this was done within the statutory time limits.
Observations by the interveners
14. In its observations of 24 May 2018, the Protector stated that it repeatedly meets the cases of complainants who point to the very sensitive effects of the contested legislation. Since 2015, i.e. from the effectiveness of the amendment in question, it has been approached by 26 people whose stories differ in many ways, but they have one thing in common - everyone realises that they have committed administrative errors and are willing to bear the appropriate consequences. At this point, however, their expectations are fundamentally different from reality and actual legal consequences, as they have been omitted by the so-called administrative demise of their vehicle and the associated factual impossibility of continuing to use them on the road. She then mentioned several specific examples, including file tags. The protector, together with the appellant, is convinced that the contested provision cannot stand in the proportionality test in the constitutional control procedure. In addition, it is convinced that Article II (4) (a) of Act No 239 / 2013 Coll.
15. At the same time, the Protector stated that the register of vehicles, prior to its "cleansing" by the said Act, contained a large number of vehicles that did not actually exist, including the problems of the Czech Insurers' Office, which, according to previous legislation, addressed the owners of registered vehicles to pay contributions to the Guarantee Fund for vehicles that did not exist. It can also be considered legitimate that the State or the Ministry of Transport wanted the state of the vehicle register to copy the actual state as much as possible. The chosen way to meet these legitimate objectives undoubtedly led to this, and thus the measure was capable of achieving the intended objective (suitability test).
16. According to the defendant, the contested provision will not stand a second step in the test as to whether the device used is the most moderate of the fundamental rights. The legislature did not have to proceed to the irreversible institute of administrative demise of the vehicle, but it could have made it conditional on a refutable assumption without time limits. Another suitable alternative could be, for example, an extension of the deadline for "rectification 'of the administrative status from six months to four years, thereby avoiding a large majority of cases with regard to setting intervals for regular vehicle inspections at technical control stations. However, this solution would not be fully effective for vehicles temporarily disabled. The solution chosen by the legislature thus materially intervened in the fundamental right to property ownership under Article 11 (1) and (4) of the Charter. The persons affected by this law, although de jure did not lose their ownership of the vehicles, but could no longer use them in the normal way or sell them at the normal price, since even the new owner could not use the vehicle for the intended purpose. In other words, the ownership of these persons has been completely impaired, only because of their administrative misconduct.
17. The protector considers that the measure taken will not even stand the proportionality test. In fact, it was often not only the old-fashioned vehicles at a small market value that could appear at first sight, but often the vehicles after the lease, only a few years old, worth several hundred thousand crowns. Instead of being hit by administrative errors, for example, only by a higher administrative charge for the operation of the vehicle register, they have often suffered very significant property damage. However, the size or legibility of the injury significantly contrasts with the fact that the register of vehicles is, in substance, in accordance with the Supreme Administrative Court (Decision of 11 February 2016 No 9 As 281 / 2015-57), a mere register and therefore, any errors contained therein do not have any significant consequences. Thus, the public interest pursued by the State, i.e. the register of vehicles cleared from de facto non-existing vehicles, appears to be quite marginal compared to the intervention in the constitutionally guaranteed right of ownership. In particular, if such blatant neglect of administrative action (whether due to neglect or omission) is capable of causing extremely disproportional damage to individual owners. The inadequacy of the above illustrates a mechanism whereby, for example, a vehicle of the order of hundreds of thousands, due to its failure or ignorance of the law, the owner cannot continue to use it in a manner that is normal (or less common, e.g. sales for spare parts). The Protector considers that such a vehicle becomes waste within the meaning of § 3 (4) of Act No. 185 / 2001 Coll., on Waste and on the amendment of certain other laws, as amended by Act No. 169 / 2013 Coll., following the obligation to have the vehicle disposed of in accordance with § 36 et seq., Act No. 185 / 2001 Coll., as amended. There is therefore no dispute over the excessive impact of this law on the ownership of the persons concerned.
18. Although the object of the proposal to repeal the transitional provision causing the administrative demise of the vehicle is vehicles in the so-called "half-transfer 'referred to in point 4 (b) of Act No 239 / 2013 Coll., unless its owner (or at least the application for registration) has been registered within the required legal period, the above-mentioned legal argument can, in the view of the defender, be relied upon by the transitional provision referred to in point (a). This provision states that a road vehicle shall also be deemed to have died if it is temporarily withdrawn from the register of road vehicles for more than 18 months and the owner of that vehicle does not, within 1 year of the date of entry into force of this Act, make the notification provided for in Article 12 (4) of Act No. 56 / 2001 Coll., on the conditions of use of vehicles on the road and amending Act No. 168 / 1999 Coll., as amended (hereinafter referred to as" the Act on the conditions of operation of vehicles on the road'). In other words, it is essentially the same model situation, only with the difference that in these cases vehicles of owners who had the vehicle in deposit are destroyed.
19. The Ombudsman is aware of the fact that, according to the settled view of the Constitutional Court, this court is bound in its decision by the scope of the application and cannot step forward from its borders (ultra petitum). This does not, however, preclude a situation where, as a result of the annulment of a provision of law, the provisions of another provision of the Constitutional Court, in substance from being binding, lose reasonable meaning, that is to say it loses the validity of its normative existence. This is the case, according to settled case law, for the annulment of this legal provision, without being an ultra petitum procedure. The protector believes that this is the case in this case.
20. In addition, the Ombudsman points out that the appellant's argument applies (limited) to the only case dealt with by him in the proceedings for an action for protection against unlawful interference. However, it is clear that, if the Constitutional Court concludes that Article II (4) (b) of Law No 239 / 2013 Coll. has been affected by the applicant's right of ownership and, for this reason, abolishes the provision in question, it cannot ignore the situation in which the related transitional provision [Article II (4) (a)] has the same effect on the rights of owners of road vehicles affected by such a situation with regard to a similar mechanism of vehicle extinction. Article II (4) (a) of Law No 239 / 2013 Coll. reads: "A road vehicle which is permanently excluded from the register of road vehicles at the date of entry into force of that act shall be considered as a road vehicle which has been destroyed. The road vehicle shall also be deemed to have died if, at the date of entry into force of this Act (a) it is temporarily removed from the register of road vehicles for a period exceeding 18 months and the owner of that vehicle does not, within 1 year of the date of entry into force of this Act, make the notification provided for in Article 12 (4) of Act No 56 / 2001 Coll., as effective from the date of entry into force of this Act... '.
21. The Protector therefore believes that the transitional provisions of Article II (4) (a) and (b) of Law No 239 / 2013 Coll. are systematically one whole, they are intrinsically dependent on each other and their partial abolition does not constitute a remedy to the unconstitutional situation. Therefore, in the event of their simultaneous annulment by the Constitutional Court, this is not an ultra petitum procedure. On the contrary, in the event of the finding of unconstitutionality or the annulment of only the contested provision [Article II (4) (b)], the requirement of (additional) prosecution of the second of the provisions [Article II (4) (a)] would constitute a clear formalism and an unnecessary burden not only on the system of courts but also on any financial burden on other potential applicants.
22. In addition, the Ombudsman stated that it was true that the abolition of transitional provisions alone could not have an effect on the owners of administratively extinct vehicles, since the objective of the legislator (cleaning up the register of vehicles) had already been effectively achieved in the meantime. Thus, by derogating the provisions in question, it appears that it is not possible to return to a state where the register of vehicles would be "revived 'at the date of application of the contested law. This condition cannot be remedied by the procedure (described in simplified terms) in a completely new authorisation of technical competence, as it is impossible for the vast majority of vehicles. This is mainly due to the fact that every vehicle that is newly logged in must comply with all technical standards on the date of registration. This requirement is therefore met in particular by vehicles which are completely new because, for example, two or more years old cars may not currently comply with current technical standards (e.g. EURO emission standards, etc.).
23. The implementation or failure to record changes in data in the road vehicle register is a so-called other act under Part Four of the Administrative Regulation. Therefore, in the absence of registration, the administrative authority may be involved in illegal interference. The defendant therefore understands the action of the applicant in a particular case, which the appellant assesses that, after his original action brought pursuant to Paragraph 65 et seq., the appellant has been rejected, he has referred the action to the court for protection against unlawful interference, stating that it is a so-called ongoing unlawful action, which the appellant has testified to. The issue of registration and registration of road vehicles is regulated in § 4 et seq. of Act No. 56 / 2001 Coll., as amended. The whole legislation has undergone considerable amendments to Act No. 239 / 2013 Coll., including the procedure for the demise of a road vehicle (§ 13). The transitional provisions in question then designed the fiction that if, within a certain period of time, the owner of the vehicle is not entered in the vehicle register ("pre-registration 'of the current data), the vehicle will cease to exist on the basis of this administrative incompleteness. On the basis of the legislation in force, the administrative authorities do not allow the registration of a vehicle to be renewed in the registration of road vehicles, and we are, in fact, talking about the failure (refusal) to register such persons as owners in that register, although they are actually owners.
24. It added to that defender that, if no obligation to notify the owners of the vehicles in question had been imposed on the administrative authority by transitional provisions, neither prior (i.e. before the "imminent" disappearance of the vehicle) nor subsequent (i.e. after the administrative disappearance), the persons affected by the change were informed of the deletion essentially by chance (e.g. during routine road police checks, on arrival at the technical inspection station, on transfer of the vehicle, etc.). Therefore, the defender is convinced that, in the present situation, the vehicle has been terminated and the official registration of this fiction in the vehicle register for an illegal intervention which is of a lasting nature, and as long as such intervention persists, which is also the case, the period of so-called subjective or objective action under the Rules of Procedure does not begin to run.
25. By abolishing the transitional provisions of Article II (4) (a) and (b) of Law No 239 / 2013 Coll. the defendant's view may open the way to registration not only to the claimant in the case in question, which is dealt with by the appellant, but also to other owners of administratively degraded vehicles, who, by analogy, will be able to defend themselves individually, including the use of judicial protection through an action against unlawful interference. The Protector considers that such a solution is also of public interest, as it can be assumed that the registration of its ownership, and thus the cancellation of the vehicle's demise in the register, will be claimed by owners who are actually interested in the use of a road vehicle which they have lost for administrative reasons, not vehicle owners already in real (material) non-existing.
26. For the reasons set out above, the appellant's proposal was agreed with the appellant and proposed that the Constitutional Court should comply with the application and repeal the contested provision. At the same time, it proposed that Article II (4) (a) of Act No 239 / 2013 Coll.
27. The Government, in its observations of 13 June 2018 through JUDr. Robert Pelican, Ph.D., Minister of Justice and Chairman of the Legislative Council of the Government, who was empowered to make a detailed statement in cooperation with the Minister of Transport on the proposal in question, stated that it did not agree with the arguments put forward by the appellant, as well as with the conclusions drawn therefrom, and continues to believe that the contested provision complies with the constitutional order of the Czech Republic.
28. First of all, the Government considered it necessary to emphasise that the appellant of the contested provision is a transitional provision - that is to say, a provision intended to regulate the relationship of the new legislation to the previous (existing) legislation and to the legal relations under it, in the interests of legal certainty for the addressees of the standard. The contested provision should therefore be interpreted in the context (existing / new legislation), but this was clearly not done by the appellant. For this reason, the Government refers to the general part of the explanatory memorandum (in particular point 1.2.1). A and point 2.1) to Act No. 239 / 2013 Coll. It is clear from the text of the explanatory memorandum that the contested provision constitutes a necessary step in relation to the overall change in the concept of the road vehicle register and the registration process which took place precisely through that amendment. One of the fundamental changes made by the amendment to the Road Traffic Conditions Act was the change of the procedures for the registration of the change in the vehicle owner or operator (so-called "re-registration 'of the vehicle) in order to avoid circumvention or breach of the obligation of both the vehicle owner and the new vehicle owner properly and in time to ensure the registration of the change of the vehicle owner or operator in the road vehicle register.
29. The need to ensure a proper and timely entry of changes in vehicle owner / operator data was triggered primarily by a change in the legal status of the vehicle operator in relation to its obligations under other legislation. An example can be given, in particular, by the Constitutional Court, of the recently identified obligation of the vehicle operator to ensure that, when using the vehicle, the driver's obligations and the road traffic rules are respected, and of this obligation of the subsequent offence for which the vehicle operator is responsible, if the driver of the vehicle cannot be identified [§ 10 paragraph 3 and § 125f of Act No. 361 / 2000 Coll., on road traffic and on amendments to certain laws (Road Traffic Act), as amended]. Other obligations of the vehicle operator arise directly from Act No. 56 / 2001 Coll., for example responsibility for the proper technical condition of the vehicle (including the obligation to undergo regular technical inspections), and from other legislation such as Act No. 13 / 1997 Coll., on roads, as amended, or Act No. 185 / 2001 Coll., on waste and amending certain other laws, as amended. A clear and correct identification of the vehicle operator is also necessary to communicate the relevant data to the authorities of foreign states in relation to offences committed by such vehicles abroad, which is a commitment by the Czech Republic to the other States resulting from its membership of the European Union. As shown above, the amendments made by amendment to Act No. 56 / 2001 Coll. were not a self-purposeful manifestation of the legislature, but rather a legitimate and justified step which allowed for a certain degree of identification of the operators of each vehicle registered in the vehicle register and thus clearly identify any perpetrators of offences involving infringement of road traffic rules (which did not fully permit previous legislation). In the view of the Government, the amendment to Act No. 56 / 2001 Coll. (including the contested transitional provision) has therefore made a major contribution to the maximum relevance of the data on owners and road vehicle operators in the road vehicle register, and hence to ensuring road safety and the protection of the life, health and property of its participants.
30. As regards the contested legislation, the Government itself stated that, in the context of the transition to the new legislation, it was necessary to resolve the link between certain institutes contained in the original legislation but no longer existed in the new legislation. This was also the case with the contested transitional provision. This applies to vehicles which remain in a state of so-called "semi-transmission 'and to vehicles which have remained temporarily excluded from the register of road vehicles even after the maximum possible time of elimination. This transitional provision is contested only in the part concerning the demise of vehicles in the so-called" semi-transfer', but, in order to clarify the meaning of this legal amendment, the Government described the two situations in its observations.
31. In both of these situations, the transitional provision aims only at vehicles in which the process of recording the change of owner or road operator in the register of road vehicles has not been properly completed in accordance with the original legislation, as the persons with them have violated their legal obligations. In the case of "semi-transfer 'vehicles, the main problem was that the original owner notified the municipality of the municipality with extended scope that the ownership of the vehicle had been transferred, the original owner was no longer the owner, with the name and address of the person to whom the ownership of the vehicle was transferred. According to the original legislation, this act was to be followed by the act of the new owner of the vehicle, which was required to register within 10 working days at the latest for the ownership of the vehicle at the municipal office of the municipality with extended scope. However, the second step did not take place for vehicles that remained in the so-called" semi-transmission'. It was thus not clear from the register of road vehicles who was the owner (operator) of such a vehicle, since the originally registered person was no longer (the latter informed the competent authority that it was no longer one), but the new owner (operator) of the vehicle of the Authority was not known. Based on data on the new owner of the vehicle communicated by the original owner of the vehicle to the Authority at the so-called "unsubscribe 'of the vehicle, it was not possible. Also in the meantime, further transfers of the vehicle could have occurred gradually, which might not have been known to the Authority. The retention of vehicles in the so-called" semi-transfer' was beneficial for some vehicle operators, thus avoiding penalties for infringement of obligations under a number of legislation. In addition to the liability already mentioned for the offences committed by the vehicle in road traffic, it was possible in this way to circumvent the obligation to properly dispose of the vehicle in accordance with Act No. 185 / 2001 Coll., on waste and amending certain other laws, as amended. After all, the elimination of the reported undesirable status was the main motivation to change the regulatory concept and nature of the registration of the vehicle operator in the road vehicle register.
32. For the second group of vehicles targeted by the transitional provision in question, that is to say, vehicles which have remained temporarily excluded from the register of road vehicles even after the expiry of the maximum period for which it may have been so removed, the main problem is that, under the original legislation, although the maximum period for which the vehicle may have been temporarily removed from the register of road vehicles has been established, its operator was then obliged to request the suspension of the temporary withdrawal procedure from the register of road vehicles and to attach to the application evidence of compliance with the conditions for the operation of the vehicle on the road, but there was no way in which the vehicle operator could have been forced to carry out this operation. Even the formal retention of a vehicle in a state of temporary withdrawal from the register of road vehicles could have been beneficial for some vehicle operators permanently, as this was also a way of avoiding, for example, the obligation to properly dispose of the vehicle. In this formal state there were thus a large number of vehicles, which in fact no longer existed.
33. For both of the above categories of vehicles, it has been placed under the regime covered by the contested provision as a result of a long-term failure to fulfil the legal obligations of the vehicle owner. The purpose of the contested provision was to compel these persons to fulfil their legal obligations by adopting an amendment to the Road Traffic Conditions Act, which was absolutely necessary.
34. The Government also noted that there were no penalties attached to this additional remedy (even though under the original law for non-compliance could be imposed). At the same time, the legislator did not require the actual owner / operator of the vehicle to comply with the new registration rules in the register of road vehicles (joint application of the original and new owner). The transitional provision has provided for a much simpler procedure in these cases. It was de facto amnesty for a limited period. In the case of vehicles in the so-called "semi-transmission ', it was sufficient for the competent authority to request the registration of the owner of the vehicle without the cooperation of the original owner. For vehicles temporarily disabled, it was sufficient for the Authority to notify the location of the vehicle and the purpose of its use. The implementation of this act was a sufficient step to keep the vehicle registered in the register of road vehicles, with a period of six and twelve months from the entry into force of the amendment in question, respectively.
35. At the same time, in the view of the Government, it is necessary to emphasise that, in the case of Law No 239 / 2013 Coll., the legislator has chosen a really long legiskation period of one and a half years, with the public repeatedly being informed, through a large media campaign, of the transition to new legislation and of the need to take the aforementioned action in the case of certain vehicles. It was also possible to verify at the time whether or not this obligation was applicable to each vehicle on the Ministry of Transport website. The registration of the disappearance of the vehicle under the contested provision was thus only in cases where the owner of the vehicle did not remedy the continuing unlawful situation described above, in the legal manner stipulated.
36. The Government is therefore of the opinion that the effects of the transitional provisions of the amendment to the Road Traffic Conditions Act have only been affected by vehicle owners who have not fulfilled their legal obligation and have not made use of the correction of the (long) long-lasting illegal situation that they have created themselves.
37. If the appellant then submits that the contested provision does not stand in the proportionality test, the Government considers that it has come to the conclusion on the incorrect assumption that the sole purpose of the contested provision is to "remove certain vehicles from the register '. However, the proportionality test of the contested provision is, in the view of the Government, necessary, in the context of the main purpose, to implement all relevant parts of the amendment to the Road Traffic Conditions Act, which was to ensure legal certainty - in the sense of ensuring as far as possible the relevance of vehicle owners and road vehicle operators kept in the Road Vehicle Register or, for certain reasons, to identify the operators of each vehicle registered in the Road Vehicle Register, as this is the person responsible for the operation of the vehicle which bears a number of obligations relating to the operation of the vehicle.
38. In the light of the foregoing, the Government considers that it is clear that the contested provision is capable of achieving the above legitimate objective or was an appropriate measure to achieve that objective. Due to the application of the contested provision, it is possible to identify its operators for each vehicle registered in the register of road vehicles. At the same time, vehicles that do not actually exist are not registered in the register of road vehicles.
39. In order to assess the contested provision in terms of necessity, it can also be clearly stated by the Government that (in view of the legitimate objective pursued) it was not possible to keep in the register of road vehicles for which it could not be established for certain who their owner, namely the operator, and whether these vehicles actually still exist. It was therefore necessary to define the period during which corrections could be made and then not to register in the road vehicle register vehicles that did not take the necessary action, i.e. vehicles that did not actually exist anymore in the vast majority of cases.
40. As regards other procedures that could achieve the objective pursued, none of them, in the view of the Government, would be a more effective solution. The appellant's possibility of imposing obligations (enshrined in the original legislation) by means of administrative penalties was not taken into account as the new legislation was based on a completely different concept and therefore it was no longer possible to penalise the infringement under the original legislation. This issue could not even be addressed through individual administrative procedures, since it was hundreds of thousands of vehicles temporarily disabled or vehicles in so-called "semi-transfer ', which would need to be managed separately. That would certainly not be effective or manageable. Moreover, in a number of cases, this solution would not only be a major administrative burden for vehicle owners, but would often not even be able to demonstrate compliance with the original obligations, thus being subject to sanctions (for example, if the vehicle had been environmentally disposed of, but a long time ago and no longer had proof of this, or if the vehicle had been subject to inheritance, etc.). Nor would it be useful to establish a rebuttable legal presumption, which is also pointed out by the appellant, as it would be necessary in all cases to register the disappearance of the vehicle when moving to the new road vehicle register, but to continue to register those vehicles separately and then to re-register them in the road vehicle register if necessary. However, this would undermine legal certainty, which was the central objective of the new legislation.
41. The Government believes that the legislation in question will also stand in the final step of the proportionality test, namely by measuring the severity of the conflict of constitutional protected values; in this case of public interest in the unambiguous identification of the vehicle operator who is the person responsible for the operation of the vehicle, who bears a number of duties relating to the operation of the vehicle, including in the level of administrative punishment, which has a direct impact on road safety and, in contrast, individual property rights. In this context, the Government considered it necessary to underline the fact that, as a result of the application of the contested transitional provision, neither the right of ownership of the vehicle nor the definitive prohibition of its use were withdrawn. The right of ownership remains preserved, the vehicle cannot only be used on the road but can continue to be used in another way. It is also possible to use the legal procedures by which the vehicle can be re-entered in the register of road vehicles, i.e. the approval of the technical competence of the vehicle produced individually.
42. Finally, the Government considered it appropriate to reiterate that the registration of the disappearance of vehicles in the register of road vehicles as a result of the application of the contested provision had not taken place unexpectedly, but the act was preceded by a long-term failure to fulfil the legal obligations of the owner of the vehicle, which subsequently did not make use of the possibility of rectification, for which a sufficient period of time was granted (as stated, the legal period of the amendment of the law of one and a half years and another six months or twelve months, respectively, resulting from the contested transitional provision). This action was therefore a result of long-term inactivity and the maintenance of the unlawful status of the vehicle owner, and the public was repeatedly and extensively informed of this possible consequence in the media. This information was therefore generally known. This is also suggested by the fact that the vast majority of vehicles that have actually existed have been corrected at the time, and the potential negative consequence of the transitional provision, according to the information available to the Ministry of Transport, is only related to case units. The Government therefore proposed that the Constitutional Court reject the appellant's application for annulment of the contested provision.
43. The Constitutional Court delivered on 24 July 2018 the observations of the parties, the defender and the Government to the appellant, which the appellant did not reply to.
Terms and conditions of the formal assessment of the proposal
44. The Constitutional Court is competent to consider an application for annulment of the contested provision, the appellant's application fulfils all the formal requirements laid down by law and has been filed in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 64 (3) of the Law on the Constitutional Court by a court entitled to do so. At the same time, the Constitutional Court did not find any grounds for inadmissibility of the application or termination of proceedings. Therefore, the conditions for a substantive assessment of the proposal are met.
Assessment of the competence and constitutional conformity of the legislative process of adopting the contested provision
45. According to Article 68 (2) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll., the assessment of the constitutionality of the law with a constitutional order consists of answering three questions: whether it was adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution prescribed competence, whether it was adopted in a constitutional manner and whether its content is in accordance with constitutional laws.
46. In the present case, the appellant did not object to a defect in the legislative process or to a breach of the legislature's constitutional competence. It follows from the observations of the parties that the Government submitted a draft law containing the contested provision to the Chamber of Deputies on 20 June 2012. The proposal was discussed under the number of the House Press 717 / 0. At the first reading on 26 October 2012, the proposal was ordered to the Economic Committee. This committee has discussed the draft law and issued a resolution to Members on 7 May 2013 as press 717 / 1. The second reading of the bill took place on 10 May 2013 at the 53rd meeting of the Chamber of Deputies. The summary of the amendments tabled was drafted as House Press 717 / 2 and circulated to Members on 10 May 2013. At the third reading, the bill was debated on 15 May 2013 at the 53rd meeting, where it was approved in vote 130 (Resolution 1644); 159 Members present voted in favour of draft law 103 and against 15. The Chamber of Deputies passed the bill on 17 June 2013 to the Senate. The bill was approved in vote 63 in the version referred to by the Chamber of Deputies; Of the 47 senators present on May 24, 46 were in favour, against none. The Act was delivered to the President of the Republic for signature on 18 July 2013 and was signed by the President. The approved Act was served for signature to the Prime Minister on 23 July 2013. The law was published in the Collection of Laws in the amount of 93 under number 239 / 2013 Coll. These findings in this procedure are sufficient to conclude that the Act No. 239 / 2013 Coll. was applied within the limits of the Constitution and was adopted in a constitutional manner.
Assessment of the active legitimacy to submit a proposal
47. In accordance with Article 64 (3) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, an application for annulment of the Law or its individual provisions is also entitled to be filed by the Court in the context of its decision-making activities under Article 95 (2) of the Constitution. According to this Article, if the court concludes that the law to be applied in the resolution of the case is contrary to the constitutional order, it shall bring the matter before the Constitutional Court. That condition of the design authorisation is fulfilled in respect of the law (or its provision), the use of which is intended to be immediate or unavoidable in the present case [resolution of 23 October 2000 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 39 / 2000 (U 39 / 20 SbNU 353)], and which simultaneously obstructs the achievement of the desired (constitutionally conformal) result [e.g. the finding of 6 March 2007 sp. zn. Pl. Pl. ÚS 3 / 06 (N 41 / 44 SbNU 517; 149 / 2007 Sb.), paragraph 26, the finding of 28 January 2014 sp. sp. zn. Pl. ÚS.
48. As regards the applicant's active legitimacy, in the present case it is the so-called specific (incident) control of standards. In proceedings before the appellant for an action for protection against unlawful interference, order or coercion of an administrative authority pursuant to § 82 et seq., the decision is to determine whether the applicant has been directly reduced to his rights by unlawful interference, order or by an administrative authority which is not a decision. In the context of its legal assessment, the appellant is obliged to consider the compatibility of the legislation to be applied in the matter with the constitutional order, inter alia, in view of the possible consequences of their use for the parties. If the unconstitutional nature of the law were to involve undue interference in their constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights and freedoms, then, in the context of the legal assessment of the matter, protection should be given priority.
49. The appellant concludes that the contested provision, namely Article II (4) (b) of Act No 239 / 2013 Coll., which will be applied in the present court proceedings, is contrary to the constitutional order and therefore proposed to the Constitutional Court to decide on its annulment.
50. Pursuant to Article 68 (1) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, in proceedings for the annulment of laws and other laws, if the application has not been rejected and the grounds for the termination of proceedings have not been established during the proceedings, the Constitutional Court is required to discuss and decide on the application without further proposals; This type of procedure before the Constitutional Court is therefore governed by the principle of official record [cf. Case C-7 / 03 Pl. ÚS 7 / 03 (N 113 / 34 SbNU 165; 512 / 2004 Coll.) and by the order of 7 June 2011 sp. zn. In this context, the conditions laid down in Article 95 (2) of the Constitution and Article 64 (3) of the Law on the Constitutional Court under which the Tribunal may file a motion for annulment of the Law have been fulfilled and the application for annulment of the contested provision has been made by a legitimate appellant.
Abandonment of oral proceedings
51. The Constitutional Court has concluded that further clarification of the case cannot be expected from oral proceedings and, since he did not take evidence, he did not order oral proceedings in accordance with Paragraph 44 of the Constitutional Court Act.
The Constitutional Court's own review
52. The appellant seeks the annulment of the contested provision for its contradiction with the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right to the protection of property pursuant to Articles 11 (1) and (4) and Article 36 of the Charter and Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention.
53. The application was submitted by the appellant in connection with the proceedings for protection against unlawful interference, instruction or enforcement by an administrative authority under the provisions of Section 30 A 95 / 2017 under Paragraph 82 et seq., p. His right to dispose of the case is also suppressed, as he is formally entitled to transfer his right of ownership to another, but even a possible acquirer will not be entitled to use the case. The appellant refers to the solution chosen by the legislator as "de facto expropriation ', which constitutes an extremely serious intervention in the sphere protected by the right to peaceful use of property. On the other hand, the public interest pursued by the contested provision (clarification of the register of vehicles) is questionable and the degree of its seriousness is negligible compared to the interference with the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights.
54. The Constitutional Court considered the arguments put forward in the application and in the observations of the Ombudsman and the Government and concluded that the proposal was not justified.
55. The Constitutional Court recalls that it has already stated on several occasions that the principle of legal certainty cannot be reconciled with the requirement for the absolute integrity of the legislation, which is subject, inter alia, to social and economic and technical changes, which may also require reflection in the demands on the vehicle register and road safety.
56. The Constitutional Court dealt with the issue of the protection of property rights in a number of its findings. The nature of the property right and its scope, subject matter and content are governed by Section 1011 et seq. of Act No. 89 / 2012 Coll., Civil Code. The new definition in Paragraph 1012 expresses independence, unity, completeness and continuity of ownership. The owner can freely dispose of his property - he can act on his cause or not - how he likes and others to exclude him from acting on the matter (it is purely for the owner to decide how he will manage the property). However, to dispose freely does not mean to dispose unrestricted (the owner is limited to the constitutional order, law and subjective rights of other persons). The fundamental property of property law is also the limitation of its enforcement by law.
57. The Charter itself does not contain a definition of the content of the property right. The principle set out in the second sentence of Article 11 (1) of the Charter refers to a law which sets out the specific content of ownership as a general legal category and the Charter constitutes a constitutional guarantee guaranteeing the unity of the content of that category.
58. Article 11 (4) of the Charter does not imply any inadmissibility of the restriction of property rights. The restriction of property rights must only be understood as excluding the exercise of ownership rights in whole or to the extent that it significantly prevents the exercise of ownership rights in one of its components. This approach also confirms the extent of the guarantees enshrined in Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention: Each natural or legal person has the right to use his property peacefully. No one may be deprived of his property except in the public interest and under the conditions laid down by the law and general principles of international law.
59. The Constitutional Court assessed whether the contested legal provision was directly affected by some part of the constitutional order. Therefore, it was necessary to assess whether the ownership of the entity concerned had been affected, as claimed in the proposal, in the context of whether the intervention was legal (i.e. whether it had been implemented by law) and legitimate (i.e. whether it had followed a particular public interest or was aimed at the general well-being) and whether the negative effects that are reflected in the interference with fundamental rights and freedoms were not disproportionate to the positive effects that arise from the measure taken for society (the principle of proportionality).
60. The contested provision was issued in the form of Act No. 239 / 2013 Coll., and it is therefore clear that the condition of possible interference with property rights has been fulfilled.
61. The Constitutional Court expressed positively in its case-law on the general possibility of the legislator to restrict the right of ownership under Article 11 of the Charter [e.g. the findings of 16 February 1995 sp. zn. III. ÚS 114 / 94 (N 9 / 3 SbNU 45), of 8 April 2004 sp. zn. II. ÚS 482 / 02 (N 52 / 33 SbNU 39) and of 9 August 2016 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 20 / 16 (N 147 / 82 SbNU 337)]. The Constitutional Court, for example, reached similar conclusions in the finding of 23 June 1994 sp. zn. I. ÚS 35 / 94 (N 36 / 1 SbNU 259), which dealt, inter alia, with the limitation of property rights due to the protection of cultural values, the finding of 13 December 2006 sp. zn.
62. In the light of the points of reference contained in those findings of the Constitutional Court, it can be concluded in a particular case that the contested provision has limited ownership as a result of the administrative demise of motor vehicles with an effective date of 1 July 2015, and it is necessary to examine in detail whether the restriction on ownership to which the legislator has acceded in this case is proportionate, in accordance with other constitutional guarantees and whether it saves their substance and meaning under Article 4 (4) of the Charter.
63. The Constitutional Court points out in its settled case-law that the limitation of fundamental law must, above all, meet the requirements of the rule of law and meet the requirements of the proportionality test. In cases of conflict of fundamental rights or freedoms with the public interest or with other fundamental rights or freedoms, the purpose (objective) of intervention in relation to the resources used should be assessed, the criterion for assessment being the principle of proportionality (in the wider sense). The legislation in question must be precise and clear in its wording and sufficiently predictable to provide the potentially affected individuals with sufficient information on the circumstances and conditions under which the public authority is entitled to intervene in their ownership and, where appropriate, to adjust their behaviour to avoid conflict with the restrictive standard. The powers conferred on the competent authorities, the manner and rules for their implementation must also be strictly defined in order to protect individuals against arbitrary interference.
64. The assessment of the admissibility of the intervention under the principle of proportionality (in the wider sense) includes three criteria. The first is the assessment of the eligibility of the purpose (or suitability) and it is established that a specific measure is capable at all of achieving the intended objective of protecting another fundamental right or public good. In addition, the need is assessed in the second step and it is examined whether the most respectful of basic law was used in the selection of funds. Finally, proportionality (in the narrower sense) is assessed, i.e. whether the injury to the fundamental right is disproportionate in relation to the intended objective. Therefore, measures restricting fundamental human rights and freedoms must not, if they are to conflict with the fundamental right or freedom of public interest, exceed, by their negative consequences, the positive effects which constitute a public interest in the measures [cf. the finding of 18 December 2018 sp. zn.
65. The Constitutional Court therefore accepted the assessment of all three aspects of the so-called proportionality test and focused on whether the regulation in question, implemented by Act No 239 / 2013 Coll., fulfils the urgent social need of the existence of a public interest scheme and, in particular, the relationship of proportionality to the legitimate objective pursued. He focused on whether the legislator respected the principle of proportionality and reached a fair balance between the conflicts of interests involved.
66. The legitimate objective (purpose of legal regulation) of the contested provision, as stated by the Government, may be identified as a legitimate objective in the form of a proper and timely entry of changes in data concerning the owner or vehicle operator, which was primarily triggered by a change in the legal status of the vehicle operator in relation to his obligations under other legislation. It is also necessary, in line with the Government's statement, to emphasise that the contested provision is a transitional provision, that is to say, a provision intended to regulate the relationship between the new legislation and the legal relations under it, for the sake of legal certainty of the addressees of the standard. It is clear from the text of the explanatory memorandum to Act No 239 / 2013 Coll. that the contested provision constitutes a necessary step in relation to the overall change in the concept of the road vehicle register and the process of their registration, which took place precisely through that amendment. One of the fundamental changes made by the amendment to the Road Traffic Conditions Act was the change of the procedures for the registration of the change in the vehicle owner or operator (so-called "re-registration 'of the vehicle) in order to avoid circumvention or breach of the obligation of both the vehicle owner and the new vehicle owner properly and in time to ensure the registration of the change of the vehicle owner or operator in the road vehicle register. In the context of the transition to new legislation, it was necessary to resolve the link between certain institutes contained in the original legislation but no longer exist in the new legislation. This was also the case with the contested transitional provision. This applies both to vehicles which remain in a state of so-called" semi-transmission' [Article II (4) (b)] and to vehicles which have remained temporarily removed from the register of road vehicles after the maximum possible decommissioning period [Article II (4) (a)]. In both of these situations, the transitional provision aims only at vehicles in which the process of recording the change of owner or road operator in the register of road vehicles has not been properly completed in accordance with the original legislation, as the persons with them have violated their legal obligations. For both of the above categories of vehicles, it is true that it has entered into a regime subject to a transitional provision due to a long-term failure to fulfil the legal obligations of the vehicle owner. The purpose of the transitional provision was to compel these persons to fulfil the legal obligations relating to the adoption of the amendment to the Road Traffic Conditions Act.
67. In assessing whether the damage to the rights of owners of motor vehicles which may have been caused by a change in the legal regulation was caused by the contested provision in a situation where, within a given period of six months, they did not fulfil their obligations under the transitional provision of Article II (4) (b) of Act No 239 / 2013 Coll., it should be pointed out that the transitional measure was applicable to hundreds of thousands of vehicles, and, as is apparent from the observations of the defender, those who did not follow it and the defender, are several tens. In doing so, the contested provision has made a major contribution to the greatest possible relevance of data on road vehicle owners and operators in the road vehicle register, and hence to ensuring road safety or protection of the life, health and property of its participants. It follows that the scheme in the form of the contested provision fulfils the condition that the purpose (suitability) is fulfilled.
68. In order to assess the contested provision in the second step of the proportionality test (examination of the principle of necessity), it should be pointed out that there were, first, a number of vehicles in the so-called "half-transmission '[Article II (4) (b)] and, in the formal condition of registration, also large quantities of vehicles that did not actually exist at all [Article II (4) (a)]. It was therefore necessary to define the period during which corrections could be made and then not to register in the road vehicle register vehicles that did not take the necessary action, i.e. vehicles that did not actually exist anymore in the vast majority of cases. The transitional provision has provided for a much simpler procedure in these cases. In the case of vehicles in the so-called" semi-transmission', it was sufficient for the competent authority to request the registration of the owner of the vehicle without the cooperation of the original owner. The implementation of this act was a sufficient step to keep the vehicle registered in the register of road vehicles, with six months from the entry into force of the amendment in question. Due to the application of the contested provision, it is possible to identify its operators for each vehicle registered in the register of road vehicles. For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that the solution in question also complies with both the examination of the fundamental right in question and the requirement of predictability of the law, which provided sufficient time for the vehicles to meet the conditions of the so-called "half-transfer ', since Law No 239 / 2013 Coll. came into force on 6 August 2013, but became effective only on 1 January 2015, when the six-month period for the fulfilment of the obligation began. In assessing the need for the contested legislation, the Constitutional Court concluded that it was a regulation designed to ensure the right of registration of motor vehicles.
69. In the event of an assessment of the third step of the proportionality test, that is to say the principle of proportionality, the Constitutional Court agrees with the Government, when comparing the gravity of the collision of the public interest in ensuring the safety of road traffic, or the protection of the life, health and property of its participants, and the fundamental right of vehicle owners who have not complied with the legal conditions for their motor vehicle not to be irrevocably extinguished, that the application of the contested transitional provision does not result in the withdrawal of the right of ownership of the vehicle, or in the definitive prohibition of its use. The right of ownership is maintained, but the vehicle cannot be used in road traffic. From the classical civil point of view of the nature of the property right, only ius possiddi, ius disponendi et ius abutendi, is retained by the owner, whereas ius utendi is substantially restricted by the rules of public law. The owner of the vehicle in question, if he intends to use it for use on the road, in the present case the possibility of re-applying for registration in accordance with § 5 et seq. of Act No. 56 / 2001 Coll., as amended, on the basis of the approval of the technical competence of the vehicle produced individually, as stated by the Government in its observations cited in paragraph 41, is maintained, but from an economic and technical point of view it is more of a theoretical possibility. In case of a vehicle of historical significance, the owner may use it in operation after its registration in the register of historical and sports vehicles in accordance with § 79a et seq. of Act No. 56 / 2001 Coll., as amended. In other cases, the vehicle can reasonably only be used as a source of spare parts.
70. In its caselaw, the Constitutional Court repeatedly and consistently recalls the link between the principle of predictability of the consequences of legislation and the principles of the rule of law. The predictability of legislation must undoubtedly also be assessed from a dynamic point of view, i.e. the legislator must take into account the existing legal situation, including the development of legal relations, when changing legislation, and must implement the changes sensitively and only to the extent necessary to achieve the regulatory objective. It is necessary to insist on such action by the legislature as this guarantees the stability of the sphere of free conduct and also the legal certainty of the parties to the legal relationship [finding of 1 March 2007 sp. zl. ÚS 8 / 06 (N 39 / 44 SbNU 479; 94 / 2007 Coll.), paragraph 27].
71. In view of the above, it can be concluded that the purpose (objective) of the alleged interference in property law in a particular case can be considered as appropriate in relation to the resources used, that the principle of eligibility for the purpose (suitability) has been fulfilled, as the contested provision has achieved the intended objective of achieving the public interest in the form of a proper and timely entry of changes in vehicle owner or operator data in order to clarify the register of motor vehicles. Thus, the contradiction with the principle of necessity was not found. The solution in question also complies with both the examination of the basic law in question and the requirement of predictability, when the legislator also fulfilled the requirement to provide sufficient time for motor vehicle owners to adapt the new legislation to their behaviour. The content of the contested legislation was not the withdrawal of the right to property. In a situation where the restriction of owners to use the case is permitted by law for the protection of the public interest, in assessing whether the contested provision pursues a legitimate objective, whether it is in accordance with the constitutional order and whether it is proportionate in relation to the objective pursued in the comparison and assessment of the interest in achieving a clearly and clearly defined public interest, on the one hand, and the restriction of the right of ownership to owners of motor vehicles in the so-called "semi-transfer ', it must be concluded that it is the public interest which, in the form of the clarification of the register of road vehicles, is clearly an overriding interest.
72. It is clear that one of the objectives of the new regulation was to remove the most important shortcomings of previous legislation, which consisted in particular of abuse or circumvention of obligations to register the owner or vehicle operator. For example, the vehicle was registered to a new owner without his knowledge or the new owner did not sign on to the vehicle and continued to operate it. The so-called "semi-transfers' created an area for illegal machinations with vehicles, so it was intended to remove the so-called" semi-transfers' and to ensure that the vehicle's current owner was always visible in the vehicle register. The contested provision was then possible by 30 June 2015 by simple administrative measure, without any subsequent penalty, to submit an application for registration of the owner of the road vehicle in the register. The owner of a vehicle that did not do so within the prescribed time limit and did not make use of this possibility caused its vehicle to be permanently removed from the vehicle register and deemed to be extinct.
73. The new legislation creates new categories of vehicles and new obligations linked to time limits and penalties, not how legal relations are to be handled according to the current situation (procedures already started, competences of the institutions, rights and obligations to date as regards implementing provisions). The original legislation knew the disappearance of the vehicle (e.g. the ecological disposal of vehicles), not the vehicle which was destroyed by the breach of registration obligation.
74. It is necessary to recall at this point the above-mentioned finding sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 20 / 16. The essence of this finding was the interpretation of the provisions of § 8 paragraph 1 of Act No. 172 / 1991 Coll., on the transfer of certain items from the property of the Czech Republic to the property of the municipalities, after the amendment carried out by Act No. 173 / 2012 Coll., to exercise the claim under this Act. The Constitutional Court considered the interpretation of the general courts to be constitutionally conformal. By Law No. 172 / 1991 Coll. the property was returned to the municipalities, by its amendment by Act No. 173 / 2012 Coll. it was established, inter alia, that the property of the municipalities was transferred to the State by the futile expiry of the deadline. The Constitutional Court concluded that such an authorisation was fully available to the legislature, which, on the one hand, weighed the potential ownership rights of municipalities and, on the other hand, sought to put an end to the period of uncertainty as to ownership of the land concerned by the restitution. This resulted in the withdrawal of the municipality's right of ownership, which did not, in the view of the Constitutional Court, constitute its unconstitutional status.
75. On the other hand, in the case under consideration, the owners of road vehicles had a fixed period by which they could apply for registration of the owner of the road vehicle in the register, but the vehicle was not affected by the right of ownership, but the vehicle was removed from the register and considered to be extinct. As a result, an application for registration of a change in the owner of a road vehicle may not be made, but only an application for registration of a road vehicle in the register of road vehicles under current legislation. In such a case, the right of ownership is not terminated under private law, but only the registration, i.e. the vehicle is no longer in existence but is not legally registered, it is not an infringement of the right of ownership, but merely a determination of the conditions for its exercise in the interests of the public and general (Article 11 (3) of the Charter), in addition to the relief of the administration in the vehicle registration section, without imposing any burden on vigilante owners with several exceptions. The register of road vehicles, like the register of real estate, is a public register which performs functions in the field of ensuring the public interest (e.g. ensuring an overview of the public authority on ownership and other rights to road vehicles and ensuring a certain degree of legal certainty about these relationships to the entities receiving data from it). The status of registration in this register also affects the area of private law (in particular the difficulty of transferring ownership rights to the vehicle if the registered status does not correspond to the actual status). In the case under consideration, only a few dozen of the tens of thousands of road vehicle owners in the so-called "semi-transfer 'did not respect the contested provision.
76. As regards other procedures proposed by the appellant and the defender to achieve the objective pursued, the Constitutional Court recalls that the subject of the proceedings before the Constitutional Court was a review of the constitutionality of the contested provision and not an assessment of the possibilities that should have been followed differently.
77. On the basis of the above, the Constitutional Court concludes that the contested provision is not contrary to the constitutional order and that there are therefore no grounds for its annulment. He therefore rejected the application under Paragraph 70 (2) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court.
President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr. Rychetský v. r.
In accordance with Article 14 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, the Judge of Vojtěch Šiměl took a different position on the decision.
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Regulation Information
| Citation | Findings of the Constitutional Court No 173 / 2019 Coll., sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 21 / 18 concerning the application for annulment of part of Article II (4) of Act No. 239 / 2013 Coll., amending Act No. 56 / 2001 Coll., on the Conditions for the operation of vehicles on the Road and amending Act No. 168 / 1999 Coll., on the Insurance of Liability for Damage caused by the operation of a vehicle and on the amendment of certain related acts (Act on Insurance of Vehicle Liability), as amended by Act No. 307 / 1999 Coll. |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | The Constitutional Tribunal found |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 11.07.2019 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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