The Constitutional Court found No 160 / 2023 Coll.
The Constitutional Court's finding of 9 May 2023 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 22 / 22 on the application for annulment of certain provisions of Act No. 128 / 2000 Coll., on Municipality (municipal establishment), as amended, Act No. 129 / 2000 Coll., on Regions (regional establishment), as amended, Act No. 131 / 2000 Coll., on the City of Prague, as amended, and Decree No. 318 / 2017 Coll., on the remuneration of members of the local authorities, as amended
Valid
The Constitutional Tribunal found
Text versions:
15.06.2023
Zobrazeno prvních 200 z celkem 208 ustanovení tohoto předpisu.
Zobrazit celý předpis →
Pro stažení celého znění použijte tlačítko Stáhnout výše.
160
FIND
The Constitutional Court
On behalf of the Republic
(1) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (a) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2), (2), (((2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2)
as follows:
I. Paragraph 73 (1), § 134 (3) and § 153 (1) of the Act No. 128 / 2000 Coll., on municipalities (municipal establishment), as amended, § 48 (1) and § 98 of the Act No. 129 / 2000 Coll., on counties (regional establishment), as amended, § 54 (1) and § 87 (4) of the Act No. 131 / 2000 Coll., on the capital of Prague, as amended, and the Government Decree No. 318 / 2017 Coll., on the remuneration of members of the local authorities, as amended, shall be repealed on 31 December 2023.
II. The remainder is rejected.
Reasons
Definition of the case
1. By application pursuant to Article 64 (1) (b) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, received by the Constitutional Court on 3.8.2022, a group of 24 Senators of the Senate of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as "the Group of Senators" or "the draftsman") requested that the Constitutional Court in the proceedings under Article 87 (1) (a) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as "the Constitution") should repeal some of the provisions of Act No. 128 / 2000 Coll., on the Municipality (hereinafter referred to as "the Act on the City of Prague"), as amended by the Law No 129 / 2000 Coll., on the Councils of the Region, as amended by Act No 131 / 2000 Coll. The proposal was accompanied by a request for priority consideration.
2. The following provisions of the municipal establishment are proposed for annulment: § 71 (4), in case of the words "even after the end of the term of office ', § 73 (1) and (3), in § 74 (1) the words" and implementing legislation', § 76 (2) and (3), in § 84 (2) (n) the word "unreleased ', § 134 (3) and § 153 (1). The following provisions of the regional establishment are proposed for cancellation: in § 35 (2) (p), in § 46 (4), in event of the words" even after the end of the term of office', in § 48 (1) and (3), in § 51 (2) and (3) and in § 98. The following provisions of the Law on the Capital City of Prague are proposed for annulment: § 52 (6), in eventum, the words "even after the end of the term of office ', § 54 (1) and (2), in § 55 (1) the words" and implementing legislation', § 57 (2) and (3), in § 59 (2) (u) the word "unreleased ', § 87 (4) and § 120 (1).
Arguments of the appellant
3. A group of Senators justified the proposal to abolish the above provisions of the municipal establishment, regional establishment, the Law on the Capital City of Prague and Decree No. 318 / 2017 Coll. by their alleged dispute with constitutional order, namely the provisions of Articles 1, 8, 100 and 101 of the Constitution.
4. According to the appellant, the common denominator of all the contested standards is the fact that, on the one hand, the level of remuneration to representatives of the authorities, both at municipal and regional level, is decided by the government, that is to say, the executive body, without the material and formal limits laid down by the laws, and that the form of the legislation is significantly restrictive, which does not respect the constitutional order of the guaranteed right to self-government, but also other constitutionally guaranteed rights.
5. On the substance of the legislation proposed for annulment and its consequences, a group of Senators generally stated that the contested provisions concerned the issue of remuneration for representatives of the local authorities. The basic rules for the remuneration of self-employed persons, both at municipal and regional level, are contained in the municipal establishment, regional establishment and the Prague Capital Act. All these laws foresee that implementing legislation in the form of government regulations will be issued for their implementation. The Government issued Decree No. 318 / 2017 Coll. At the date of the submission of this proposal (the application was served on the Constitutional Court on 3.8.2022), this Decree of the Government was amended twice by Decree of the Government No. 202 / 2018 Coll. of 4.9.2018 and Decree of the Government No. 338 / 2019 Coll. of 9.12.2019. Following the submission of this application to the Constitutional Court, the third amendment to Decree No. 318 / 2017 Coll. was adopted in the form of Decree No. 415 / 2022 Coll. of 30.11.2022, which took effect on 1 January 2023. The purpose of all three amendments to Decree No. 318 / 2017 Coll. was to amend its Annex, which sets the amount of the remuneration of the elected representatives and the maximum amount of the remuneration of the non-released members of the councils.
6. In addition to the approval of the proposal for a government regulation on remuneration on 11 September 2017, the Government approved the rule (point II.3 of Government Resolution 627), according to which it is the duty of the Minister of Interior to "submit to the Government a legislative proposal to increase the remuneration of representatives of the local authorities on 1 January of the calendar year following 1 January 2018, provided that the statistical indicator of the average gross monthly nominal wage for the converted number of employees in the national economy for the preceding calendar year is increased by at least 2,5% '.
7. In the appellant's view, the government has long ignored the issue of remuneration for representatives. The appellant submits that, since the last amendment of the Government Decree of 9 December 2019 on the amount of remuneration at the date of the submission of this proposal, no amendment of the amount of remuneration for representatives of the Authority has been made. According to the above rule, the inflation increase for 2019 must also be calculated, with inflation between 2019 and the end of 2022 at 2.8% (2019), 3.2% (2020), 3.8% (2021) and expected 12% to 15% in 2022. Yet the government, which is the only one who is entitled to decide to increase the remuneration for self-government officials, has not done so without justification, or even does not respect its own resolution on the obligation to review this inflationary increase and take inflation into account when determining the remuneration of representatives. It has not done so for two years, although the inflation threshold for amending legislation has always been exceeded in each year, which has led the appellant to consider the unsustainability of the current situation and to reflect on the constitutional conformity of the legal standards creating a model of remuneration for representatives of the local authorities. The appellant submits that although the Ministry of the Interior submitted to the Government in October 2021 a proposal for a government regulation amending Government Decree No. 318 / 2017 Coll., it was discussed by the Government at the date of the submission of the proposal (i.e. on 3.8.2022) and no increase in remuneration was decided, despite the fact that the proposal envisaged the effectiveness was on 1.1.2022. As mentioned above, following the submission of this proposal, the Government adopted Decree No. 415 / 2022 Coll., amending Decree No. 318 / 2017 Coll., which came into force on 1 January 2023. Its purpose was to amend the Annex setting the level of remuneration of the elected representatives and the maximum amount of remuneration of the non-released representatives.
8. Thus, the Land Authority and its representatives, in the appellants' view, find themselves under the authority of the executive authorities, which are not even able to understand the importance of the issue of remuneration for representatives and the composition that the State's intervention in such an important area, which affects not only the budget but also the exercise of self-government, brings. This leads the appellant to believe that the legislation in force on the remuneration of representatives of the authorities is not only a serious interference in the constitutional guarantee of the right to self-government and the principle of the division of power, but also in the right to a fair remuneration for work based on Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. The status of self-government under government is unacceptable from other aspects. The government is also a top political body, whose decisions are taken by completely out-of-law (out-of-constitutional) moments, such as consideration of public opinion and the support of voters for its (other) decisions, the political motives of the coalition parties forming the government, or the current position of the Prime Minister, whether they will even include the subject of adjusting the remuneration of self-government officials in the government's proceedings. All these circumstances, according to the appellant, clearly indicate that the current remuneration and remuneration rules do not offer virtually any guarantees of the democratic rule of law and other constitutional legal bail-outs, but must necessarily be found within them.
9. According to the appellant, the current model is based on the principle that the level of remuneration of the released representatives is fixed by the Government's regulation, with 15 categories differentiated depending on the population. In the case of non-released representatives, the amounts shown in the table are the maximum amounts. The larger the population, the higher the reward. However, these principles, on which the current model of remuneration of representatives stands, do not stem from constitutional standards, nor from the will of the legislator expressed at the legal level, but only from the decision of the executive, made without the existence of a relevant legal framework for regulating the remuneration of representatives of the authorities. The appellant points out that, however serious the discretion of the executive on the remuneration of self-government representatives would be preferred, it is not from a constitutional point of view the only relevant criteria and is not acceptable to their absolute preference linked to the imposition of the applicable constitutional principles.
10. The applicant contends that the legislation in question distorts the principle of division of power, both at vertical and horizontal levels. According to the appellant, the vertical division of power between the State and the self-governing bodies is based on the constitutional recognition of the right to self-administration and the separate decision-making of representatives of municipalities and higher local authorities, including their right to self-manage according to their own budget. The local authorities are significantly restricted by the legal regulation of the remuneration paid to their representatives, which according to the appellant was also highlighted by the dissenting opinion of Judge Radovan Suchanek on the finding of 24.11.2020 sp. zn. The vertical division of power does not allow this state to exercise the right to self-government.
11. The legislation on the remuneration of representatives of local and local authorities, according to the appellant, also distorts the division of power at a horizontal level. In addition to not respecting the constitutional limits of intervention in the right to self-management, the absence of a clear division between the legislature's powers and the executive issuing substatutory legislative acts seems problematic. Even if the possibility of statutory regulation of the remuneration of self-government representatives was found to be a procedure of constitutional conformity, the legislature, with too broad powers at the legal level, waived its power to regulate this area when, in addition to the population criterion, it did not adopt any legal limits that the government should follow when deciding on the level of remuneration. The excessive possibility of an executive in determining the level of remuneration of representatives does not respect the demand for division of power at a horizontal level. The wording empowering the provisions of the law without defining the specific limits for the adoption of the substatutory regulation does not comply with the requirements of the derived norm, which the Constitutional Court considers in its decision-making practice to be grounds for derogating from the powers provisions for conflict with constitutional order. According to the appellant, it is not possible to deduce from the contested authorizing provisions, i.e. from § 73 (1) of the municipal establishment, § 48 (1) of the regional establishment and § 54 (1) of the Law on the Capital City of Prague, sufficient limits to the statutory rule of government required by Article 78 of the Constitution.
12. The appellant also points to a conflict of the legislation in question with the constitutional right to self-government (Articles 8 and 100 of the Constitution). In its view, the issue of the remuneration of representatives of local and local authorities should be viewed by the primacy of the natural right and human legal basis of the right to self-administration of the local authorities guaranteed in Article 8 of the Constitution, which is further developed in the separate Seventh Title of the Constitution, expressing in Article 101 the right of local and regional authorities to self-management, the very substantial guarantee of which is also the independent management of the budget adopted by the local authorities.
13. According to the appellant, it has the right to self-administration - regardless of the law's reservation - even the material aspect (or its own constitutional content), and it is its constitutional guarantee that it cannot be based solely on the wording of the law and the material nature of the right guaranteed at constitutional level. Therefore, the implementing act cannot ignore the content of the constitutionally guaranteed right to territorial self-government or even, as is the case with regard to the remuneration of representatives of local and local authorities, make it possible to intervene in the material substance of the right to self-government only at a statutory level. In this context, the appellant refers to the finding of 7 September 2011 sp. zn. The appellant concludes in this section that the delegated standard for determining the remuneration of members of representative bodies interferes with the right to self-administration.
14. The appellant also contests infringement of the right to self-management of territorial units under its own budget (Article 101 (3) of the Constitution). The constitutional rules governing the management of territorial units protect their property and economic autonomy. Territorial authorities representing the territorial community of citizens must be free to decide, through the autonomous decision-making of their representative bodies, how they will dispose of the funds they are equipped to carry out their tasks. According to the author, the management of its property is one of the attributes of self-government, separately for its own account and its own responsibility.
15. Nature of the right of self-management under the own budget guaranteed in Article 101 (3) According to the appellant, it is necessary to interpret, in the sense of the inadmissibility of the State's ability to "ordinary 'law, the law of local authorities protected at constitutional level and to determine how to manage their own resources, and to limit the costs which are incurred solely by the exercise of self-government rather than by the delegated exercise of state administration. It is a self-governing body responsible for the cost-effective management of public funds within its budget and for fulfilling the requirement that public funds be handled responsibly, economically, efficiently and conscientiously. The appellant also points to the case-law of the Constitutional Court, which considers the autonomous management of the units for its own account and its own responsibility for the self-administration attribute [e.g. the finding of 9.7.2003 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 5 / 03 (N 109 / 30 SbNU 499; 211 / 2003 Sb.)].
16. The appellant considers that the model of setting the remuneration of representatives from the point of view of the authorities, but above all from the point of view of constitutional order, is problematic and materially, i.e. when assessing the rules contained in the above mentioned laws and in the relevant government regulation. It does not respect the basic starting points of self-government activity, the assumed independence of executive power is very binding, it does not respect the specific specificities of a self-governing entity, which are certainly not determined by the number of its inhabitants, and it is difficult to find legitimate justification for them. The appellant considers that the existing model is built on two basic principles, namely unity and transparency, as well as the cost-effective management and control of public funds. However, it is possible, according to the appellant, to fulfil these requirements without interfering with the right to self-administration and remuneration of representatives would not be dealt with at central level and would respect the overall context of the issue.
17. Furthermore, the appellant contends that the requirement to limit State interference in the activities of local authorities (Article 101 (4) of the Constitution) is not met. In its view, the guaranteed right of self-governing entities as public bodies to self-management under their own budget must also be interpreted in conjunction with the limit on State interference with local authorities pursuant to Article 101 (4) of the Constitution. The State can intervene in the activities of local and local authorities only if the protection of the law so requires and only in the manner laid down by the law. The issue of remuneration for representatives of municipalities and regions is not regulated by constitutional order. However, according to the appellant, it is clear that, where appropriate, the remuneration decision concerns the management of a given local authority with its public resources.
18. According to the appellant, the fact that the remuneration of representatives of local and local authorities is decided by the executive authority - although it is on the basis of legal authorisation - seems doubtful from a constitutional point of view, especially when the legal arrangements do not provide for virtually any executive powers (the level of remuneration, as well as whether it will be adjusted at all, depends entirely on the approval of the government). At the legal level, the definition of a legal framework for determining the level of remuneration of a group of members of the representative bodies of the self-government (the vacant members of the representative bodies) is not a subject of a statutory law, i.e. the way in which the State's intervention in the activity of the local self-government in the remuneration of members of the representative bodies should be implemented is not regulated, but there is no reason for that intervention in the exercise of the self-government. According to the appellant, none of the laws entrusting decisions on the level of remuneration of the elected members of the council to the government and authorising the issue of implementing legislation in this field provide the authorities with guarantees of abuse of such delegated powers when, in principle, it does not contain any safeguards that could be met by the Government's approval. It is not bound by any substantive or procedural limits.
19. According to the appellant, it is not possible to deduce from the remuneration regulation of the representatives and its purpose the need for State intervention, i.e. the fulfilment of the limits of intervention under Article 101 (4) of the Constitution, consisting of "the protection of the law '. It is not clear to the appellant what legal interest could be jeopardised if the issue of remuneration were left to their decision-making powers, in accordance with the right to self-exercise and the management of territorial units. It is also not sufficient to fulfil the presumption of a constitutional limitation on interference in the activities of territorial authorities, which stipulates that this can only be done in the" way laid down by law', that the law determines a formal source of law - a type of substatutory standard which is designed to adapt the issues affecting the activities of territorial authorities at a substatutory level. According to the appellant, the requirement of the eligibility of an intervention consisting in the existence of a "legal method 'must be interpreted as requiring the definition of all the assumptions to determine the parameters of such an intervention, at a legal, not a substatutory level. Article 73 (1) of the municipal constitution, Article 48 (1) of the regional constitution and Article 54 (1) of the Law on the City of Prague therefore, according to the appellant, the constitutional requirements of the limitation of State interference in the activities of the local authorities pursuant to Article 101 (4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. They do not comply with the Constitution and thus provide absolute freedom, or rather the possibility, of the Government's desire to determine the remuneration of representatives of the local authorities.
20. In the appellant's view, the fact that the government is simply a restriction of both procedural and material nature in this respect gives rise to the danger of choice in its decision-making. And these considerations are not only theoretical, which, according to the appellant, has been demonstrated by the experience of applying the contested regulation.
21. As far as the procedural aspect of the case is concerned, the appellant considers that the Government can abuse the decision on the form of a government regulation and that it also abuses it. In its view, this is evident by looking at the dates on which the last two amendments to the government regulation in question were adopted and the lax position on another proposal submitted by the Ministry of Interior in October 2021. While the first amendment took place only a month before the municipal elections in 2018, the second one was at the end of 2019. In the first case, it is possible to talk about the indirect but inadmissible and undesirable interference of the government until the elections to the municipal councils, whose importance is expressed by Article 101 (1) of the Constitution, in the second case the adoption of a decision is thirteen working days before the end of 2019, when a number of territorial authorities have already approved their budgets for the following year, the problematic and unforeseeable intervention by the State in the management of their own budget, which is foreseen in Article 101 (3) of the Constitution, in accordance with the relevant regulations.
22. Finally, the appellant states that it is constitutionally unacceptable that the remuneration of representatives of the authorities should be regulated by the legislative act by delegating them without any material and formal restrictions to the implementing regulation adopted by the executive. According to the appellant, it is also constitutionally unacceptable for an executive to exercise this power in a manner that denies the right to self-administration, in particular in the sense of the right to operate under his own budget. Last but not least, it is constitutionally unacceptable for the executive to make procedural abuse of this power and indirectly interfere with the right to self-administration, even in the size of the economy on its own budget. It therefore proposes that the Constitutional Court should call the contested provisions unconstitutional and as such abolish them.
Observations of the parties
23. The Constitutional Court, pursuant to Article 69 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as the Law on the Constitutional Court), called upon the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate acting on behalf of Parliament as a party to the proceedings and the Government, together with the Ombudsman, who are entitled to intervene as interveners, to comment on the proposal.
24. The Ombudsman sent a communication that he did not intervene. In its observations of 27 September 2022, the Government stated that it had discussed the application to intervene in the proceedings brought by the Constitutional Court and adopted order No 816, which decided not to exercise its right to intervene. In the light of the above, the Government also did not exercise its right to comment on the proposal to repeal Government Regulation No. 318 / 2017 Coll.
a) Expression of the Chamber of Deputies
25. The House of Deputies' observations relate only to the legislative process which led to the adoption of the contested legislation. It stated that the draft law after its adoption published under No 99 / 2017 Coll. (hereinafter referred to as the "draft law '), which amended the municipal establishment, the regional establishment, the law on the capital city of Prague and certain related laws, the Government submitted to the Chamber of Deputies on 28 June 2016. On the same day, the bill was circulated to Members like House Press No. 851 / 0 in the VII parliamentary term.
26. The Chamber of Deputies discussed the draft law at first reading on 14 September 2016 and ordered it to be discussed by the Committee on Public Administration and Regional Development as a guarantee committee. It then discussed the bill at second reading on 29 November 2016. The proposed amendments to the draft law were drafted and published under the number of House Press 851 / 2. The Chamber of Deputies discussed the bill at third reading on 13 January 2017 and agreed to the bill. It follows from the relevant stenoprotocol that a resolution was adopted in the final vote by which the Chamber of Deputies agreed to the government bill when 154 Members voted in favour of the proposal, no one voted against it.
27. The Chamber of Deputies has passed a bill to the Senate, which approved the bill as referred to by the Chamber of Deputies. The Act was delivered to the President of the Republic for signature on 15 March 2017. The President of the Republic signed the Act on 23 March 2017. The Act was published in the Collection of Laws in the amount of 39 sent out on 5 April 2017 under the number 99 / 2017 Coll.
(b) Statement by the Senate
28. The Senate, in its observations of 21 September 2022, after recalling the argument for the annulment of the contested provisions, pointed out the course of the legislative process which led to the adoption of the contested legislation.
29. The Chamber of Deputies referred the bill to the Senate on 13 February 2017. It was ordered by the Committee on Territorial Development, Public Administration and the Environment as a guarantee and also as a constitutional legal committee. The Senate dealt with the bill at its 5th meeting on 8 March 2017. After the opening word of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs Michaela Marks (Deputy Minister of Interior Milan Chovanka), the rapporteur of the Radko Martínek Guarantee Committee, who informed those present with the resolution of the Committee and accentualised that, although there was to be an increase in the remuneration of both released and unreleased representatives, this would be the cost of the budgets of municipalities, cities and regions. The speech followed by the rapporteur, the Constitutional Legal Committee, Senator Anne Hubáček, who informed the people present of the amendments that she had abandoned following previous consultations, and proposed the law to be passed as referred to the Chamber of Deputies. By order, the Senate decided to approve the bill, as referred to by the Chamber of Deputies, of the 65 senators present, 57 were in favour, no one opposed.
30. Finally, the Senate stated that the draft law, subsequently published under No. 99 / 2017 Coll., was adopted by the Senate within the limits of the Constitution established competence and in a constitutional manner.
31. Since the observations of the two chambers of Parliament relate exclusively to the procedure for adopting the contested provisions against which the appellant raised no objection, the Constitutional Court did not consider it necessary to send those observations to the appellant for a reply.
Oral proceedings
32. The Constitutional Court, in accordance with Article 44 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, considered that there was no need to conduct oral proceedings in the case, since it would in no way contribute to a further or more detailed clarification of the case than to the fact that it was informed of the written acts of the appellant and the parties. The fact that the Constitutional Court did not consider it necessary to carry out the taking of evidence justifies the failure of oral proceedings.
Dedication and context of the contested provisions
33. The contested provisions are marked in bold.
34. Paragraph 71 (4) of the municipal establishment:
"(4) The municipality may not grant a gift to a member of the council of the municipality in connection with the performance of the office of a member of the council of the municipality, even after the office has ceased. '
35. Paragraph 73 (1) to (3) of the municipal establishment:
"(1) Implementing legislation provides for a breakdown by size category of municipalities
(a) the amount of remuneration to be paid to the vacant members of the town council per month;
(b) the maximum amount of remuneration granted to non-released members of the municipal council per month.
(2) The size categories of municipalities referred to in paragraph 1 are set out in the Annex to this Act.
(3) The remuneration of the vacant member of the municipal council, who acts as mayor of the statutory city, in the municipality's size category of over 200 000 inhabitants, shall be fixed at least 2,5 times the remuneration of the deputy member of the municipality, who acts as mayor, in the municipality in the municipality in the municipality in the municipality in the municipality in the municipality in the municipality in the municipality in the municipality in the municipality in the municipality in the municipality in the municipality in the municipality in the municipality in the municipality in the municipality in the municipality in the municipality in the municipality in the municipality in the municipality in the municipality in the district in the region in the region in the region of 500 000 inhabitants. "
36. Paragraph 74 (1) of the municipal establishment:
"(1) To the unreleased member of the council of the municipality, who is entitled to receive the will of the fiancé to join the marriage, 53), the council of the municipality may increase the remuneration by up to CZK 2000 above the maximum amount of remuneration provided for the performance of his duties under this law and the implementing legislation, taking into account the time and frequency of the ceremonies. An unreleased member of the council of the municipality, who is responsible for managing the municipal police54), may increase the remuneration by up to CZK 2000 above the maximum level of remuneration for the performance of his duties under this Act and the implementing legislation, taking into account the time-consuming nature of this activity."
37. Paragraph 76 (1) to (3) of the municipal establishment:
"(1) A member of the council of the municipality may receive exceptional remuneration for the fulfilment of extraordinary or particularly important tasks of the municipality.
(2) The cumulative amount of exceptional remuneration granted in the calendar year to a member of the municipality's representative shall not exceed twice the maximum remuneration due to him during that calendar year for the performance of his duties in the month.
(3) The cumulative amount of exceptional remuneration granted to the non-released member of the municipality's representative in the calendar year shall not be more than twice the maximum amount of remuneration laid down by law and implementing legislation for the performance of the functions performed by the municipality or in total for the performance of its duties in the month. ';
38. Paragraph 84 (2) (n) of the municipal establishment:
"(2) The municipality is reserved
(n) determine the amount of remuneration to the non-authorised members of the municipality's council. ';
39. Paragraph 134 (1) to (3) of the municipal establishment:
"(1) Urban districts and urban areas act as a statutory city in matters entrusted to them by law and within the limits of the law by statute.
(2) Urban districts and urban areas cannot issue generally binding regulations or regulations.
(3) Implementing legislation provides for a breakdown by size categories of urban districts or urban areas
(a) the amount of remuneration to be paid to the vacant members of the town district council or the town section per month;
(b) the maximum amount of remuneration to be paid to non-released members of the town district council or part of the city district per month. "
40. Paragraph 153 (1) of the municipal establishment:
"(1) The Government shall issue regulations implementing Articles 73 (1) and 134 (3)."
41. Paragraph 35 (2) (p) of the Regional Act:
"(2) The representative is reserved
(p) determine the amount of remuneration to non-released members of the council per month; ';
42. Paragraph 46 (4) of the Regional Act:
"(4) The Region may not grant a gift to a member of the council in connection with the performance of the duties of a member of the council, even after the duties have ceased. '
43. Paragraph 48 (1) to (3) of the Regional Act:
"(1) Implementing legislation establishes by size category of regions
(a) the amount of remuneration paid to the elected members of the council per month;
(b) the maximum amount of remuneration granted to non-released members of the council per month.
(2) The size categories of regions referred to in paragraph 1 are:
(a) regions with a population of up to 500 000;
(b) regions with a population range of 500 001 to 1000 000;
(c) counties with a population above 1 000 000.
(3) The remuneration of the elected member of the council, who acts as captain, in the county in the region's size category of regions of up to 500 000 inhabitants shall be fixed at least 2,5 times the remuneration of the elected member of the council of the municipality, who acts as mayor, in the municipality in the municipality's size category of municipalities of up to 300 inhabitants. The remuneration of the vacated member of the council, who acts as captain, in the region in the size category of regions over 1 000 000 inhabitants shall be fixed in such a way that it is not higher than the remuneration of the vacated member of the council of the capital of Prague, who acts as mayor of the capital of Prague. "
44. Paragraph 51 (1) to (3) of the Regional Act:
"(1) A member of the council may receive exceptional remuneration for the performance of exceptional or particularly important tasks of the county.
(2) The aggregate amount of exceptional remuneration granted to the member of the representative in the calendar year released shall not exceed twice the maximum remuneration due to him during that calendar year for the performance of his duties for the month.
(3) The aggregate amount of exceptional remuneration granted to the non-released member of the representative in the calendar year shall not exceed twice the maximum amount of remuneration laid down by law and implementing legislation for the performance of the functions he holds or, in total, for the performance of his duties per month. ';
45. Paragraph 98 of the Regional Constitution:
"The Government shall issue a Decree implementing Paragraph 48 (1)."
46. Paragraph 52 (6) of the Prague Capital Act:
"(6) The City of Prague may not give a gift to a member of the Prague City Council in connection with the performance of a member of the Prague City Council, even after the performance of his duties."
47. Paragraph 54 (1) and (2) of the Law on the City of Prague:
"(1) The implementing act provides for:
(a) the amount of remuneration granted to the vacant members of the Prague City Council per month;
(b) the maximum amount of remuneration granted to unreleased members of the Prague City Council per month.
(2) The remuneration of the vacant member of the City Council of the City of Prague, who acts as Mayor of the City of Prague, shall be fixed at least three times the remuneration of the member of the City Council of the Municipality, who acts as Mayor, in a municipality in the municipality's size category of municipalities up to 300 inhabitants. "
48. Paragraph 55 (1) of the Prague Capital Act:
"(1) An unrelaxed member of the City Council of Prague, who is entitled to receive the will of the fiancé to join the marriage (36), may increase the remuneration by up to CZK 2,000 above the maximum amount of remuneration provided for the performance of his duties under this Act and the implementing legislation, taking into account the time and frequency of ceremonies."
49. Paragraph 57 (1) to (3) of the Prague Capital Act:
"(1) A member of the City Council of the City of Prague may receive an extraordinary reward for the outstanding or particularly important tasks of the City of Prague.
(2) The cumulative amount of exceptional remuneration granted to a member of the City Council of Prague in a calendar year shall not exceed twice the maximum remuneration due to him during that calendar year for the performance of his duties in a month.
(3) The cumulative amount of exceptional remuneration granted to the non-released member of the Prague City Council in the calendar year shall not exceed twice the maximum amount of remuneration laid down by law and implementing legislation for the performance of the functions he holds or, in the sum of, for the performance of his duties in a month. "
50. Paragraph 59 (2) (u) of the Prague Capital Act:
"(2) The representative of the capital city of Prague is reserved
u) determine the amount of remuneration to unreleased members of the City Council of Prague per month. '
51. Paragraph 87 (4) of the Prague Capital Act:
"(4) Implementing legislation establishes by size categories of urban areas
(a) the amount of remuneration to be paid to the vacant members of the town council per month;
(b) the maximum amount of remuneration to be paid to non-released members of the town council per month. "
52. Paragraph 120 (1) of the Prague Capital Act:
"(1) The Government shall issue regulations implementing Articles 54 (1) and 87 (4)."
53. Government Decree No. 318 / 2017 Coll., on the remuneration of members of the representatives of the local authorities, as amended by Government Decree No. 202 / 2018 Coll. and Government Decree No. 338 / 2019 Coll., (without an annex setting out the amount of remuneration in the table):
"The Government mandates pursuant to § 153 (1) of Act No. 128 / 2000 Coll., on municipalities (municipal establishment), as amended by Act No. 626 / 2004 Coll. and Act No. 99 / 2017 Coll., under § 98 of Act No. 129 / 2000 Coll., on counties (regional establishment), as amended by Act No. 231 / 2002 Coll., Act No. 626 / 2004 Coll. and Act No. 99 / 2017 Coll., and under § 120 (1) of Act No. 131 / 2000 Coll., on the Capital City of Prague, as amended by Act No. 626 / 2004 Coll.
Amount of remuneration
The amount of remuneration granted to the vacant members of the municipal council, the municipal district council or the urban part of the statutory town, the county council, the Prague capital district and the Prague capital district for a month and the maximum amount of remuneration provided to the unreleased members of the municipality, the municipal district or the city district, the county council, the Prague capital district and the Prague capital district for a month is set out in the Annex to this Regulation.
Repeal
Government Regulation No 414 / 2016 Coll., amending Government Regulation No 37 / 2003 Coll., on remuneration for the performance of the duties of members of the Councils, as amended, is hereby repealed.
Efficacy
This Regulation shall enter into force on 1 January 2018. ';
Active procedural legitimacy and management conditions
54. According to Article 64 (1) (b) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, a group of at least 17 senators may submit an application for annulment of the law or its individual provisions. A group of 24 senators submitted this proposal. In accordance with Article 64 (5) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 320 / 2002 Coll., it also attached to it a signature document to which each of them individually confirmed that it was attached to the application. A group of senators therefore fulfils the condition of active legitimacy, both on the proposal to repeal the provisions of the law and on the proposal to repeal the government regulation.
55. The proposal contains all other legal requirements and is admissible within the meaning of Section 66 of the Constitutional Court Act. At the same time, there are no grounds for terminating the procedure under Section 67 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll.
Assessment of the constitutional conformity of the legislative process
56. The Constitutional Court in the Intentions § 68 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll., examined whether the contested laws were adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution laid down by competence and by the constitutional procedure. It concluded that there is nothing to blame the legislator in this regard. Moreover, the parties to the proceedings do not mention any shortcomings in the legislative process. The Constitutional Court refers to a summary of the legislative process in the statements of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.
Substantial assessment of the proposal
General considerations
(a) Territorial Authority in the case law of the Constitutional Court
57. The Constitution guarantees the self-administration of territorial units (Article 8 of the Constitution). The Czech Republic is divided into municipalities which are basic local authorities and regions which are higher local authorities (Article 99 of the Constitution). The local authorities are the territorial communities of citizens who have the right to self-government (Article 100 (1) of the Constitution), and the municipality is always part of a higher local self-government (Article 100 (2) of the Constitution). The local authorities are public bodies which may have their own assets and manage their own budget (Article 101 (3) of the Constitution). The State may intervene in the activities of the local authorities only if the protection of the law so requires and only in the manner laid down by the law (Article 101 (4) of the Constitution). The exercise of the administration can only be entrusted to the authorities of the State if the law so provides (Article 105 of the Constitution). The local authorities are managed separately by the representative (Article 101 (1) and (2) of the Constitution). The scope of the Councils can only be established by law (Article 104 (1) of the Constitution).
58. The so-called dual or mixed model of public administration is applied in the Czech Republic. The local authorities or their authorities are both engaged in the exercise of separate powers (self-government) and in the exercise of a delegated administration. State authorities, or regional authorities, may intervene in their own competence only if the protection of the law so requires and only in the manner provided for by the law. The scope of the separate scope can be limited by law (cf. § 7 (1) of the municipal establishment, § 2 (1) of the regional establishment). The state administration, which has been entrusted by law to the authorities of the municipalities or regions, exercises their powers as delegated bodies (§ 7 (2) of the municipal establishment, § 2 (2) of the regional establishment). If the special law provides for the jurisdiction of municipalities or regions and does not provide for the transferred jurisdiction of the municipality or region, it is always a separate competence (§ 8 of the municipal establishment, § 4 of the regional establishment). The local authorities are independently managed by their representatives (§ 5 (1) of the municipal establishment or § 1 (3) of the regional establishment).
59. The Constitutional Court considers the local government to be an indispensable component of the development of democracy and has repeatedly stated that the local government is "an expression of the law and capacity of local authorities, within the limits of the law, within the limits of its responsibility and in the interests of the local population to regulate and manage part of the public affairs' [the find sp. zn. The Constitution allows this ability to be enforced by, inter alia, establishing the legal personality of the local authorities and counting on the self-governing bodies to have their own assets and manage according to their own budget (Article 101 (3)). At the constitutional level, the democratic nature of self-government in the guarantee of elected representatives is also confirmed (Articles 101 (1) and (2) and 102 of the Constitution). However, the Constitution also envisages" a single state regulation of self-government in the form of a legal framework. The definition of the part of public affairs which the local or regional community of citizens is capable of managing is entrusted to legislators, or to state authorities (Article 104), and not to legislators who, at the highest level of national law, define matters of local importance. The legislature's mandate to define matters of limited territorial importance entrusted to the local authorities also includes the constitution of a number of other European states "[the find sp. zl. ÚS 34 / 02 (N 18 / 29 SbNU 141; 53 / 2003 Sb.)].
60. In doing so, the Authority, as an important component of the democratic rule of law, must have a real possibility of matter and issues of local importance, including those which exceed the local or regional framework and which it decides within its own competence, at its discretion. The form of representative democracy is thus implemented by the will of the citizens represented at local and regional level, and only by responsibility to the electorate, and on the basis of the legal and constitutional framework, the self-government is then limited in its specific speech (Article 101 (4) of the Constitution). Thus, territorial authorities representing the territorial community of citizens must be free to decide, through the autonomous decision-making of their representatives, how they will dispose of the funds they are equipped to carry out their tasks. It is on its own account that the management of its property is an attribute of self-administration (cf. sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 5 / 03).
61. The Constitution guarantees the ownership and economic position of municipalities and regions, but "such a guarantee is not without a bank, but is necessarily based on the essence of the right to self-government. The local authorities are therefore limited by their position as public bodies (...) in the management of their own assets and in the creation of their own budget. Given the content of the right of local authorities to self-administration, or the right to manage their own property, and according to their own budget, it is necessary to draw attention to its limits, which are determined by the possibilities of independence by law, executive and judicial authorities. The definition of the limits of the right to self-administration within the meaning of Articles 8 and 100 of the Constitution, respectively, the right of municipalities and regions to have their own property and to operate under their own budget pursuant to Article 101 (3) of the Constitution leaves the Constitution to the legislature or the Constitutional Court within the framework of its interpretation of the Constitution (cf. CONSIDERATION, I. IN: RYCHETSKÝ, P., LANGÁŠEK, T., HERC, T., MLSNA, P. and Col. Constitutional Law on Security of the Czech Republic. Comment. Praha: Wolters Kluwer, a. s., 2015, p. 1060) '[Found of 20.2.2018 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 6 / 17 (N 26 / 88 SbNU 329; 99 / 2018 Coll.)].
62. The limits of the powers of the legislature in the law of the local authorities on the self-government are to be sought in the decision-making practice of the Constitutional Court, which has undergone a partial development in this area [cf. the findings of the sp. zn. In fact, the initial interpretation left the legislator to determine the limits of self-administration. The finding of 5.2.3003 sp. zn.
63. On similar grounds, the argument of 20 November 2007 sp. zn. The Constitutional Court states that "the scope to derogate from the intervention of the Constitutional Court would only occur if it was established and demonstrated that the legislation in question effectively imposes a constitutional guarantee of the right of local authorities to self-administration under Article 8 of the Constitution '.
64. The more recent case law of the Constitutional Court in defining the content of the right to self-government is based on the argument that, in view of the constitutional guarantees of that right, it is not possible to rely solely on the wording of the law, since the right to self-administration undoubtedly has a material aspect (or its own constitutional content). The implementing act cannot therefore defuse or de facto eliminate the content of the constitutionally guaranteed right to territorial government [cf. the findings sp. zn.
(b) Constitutional Court on the remuneration of representatives of local authorities
65. The Constitutional Court expressed its views on the rules governing the remuneration of members of the representatives of the local authorities, which are the subject of the application, in the finds sp. zn.
66. In the find sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 34 / 02 The Constitutional Court concluded that the legal restrictions and guidelines for the functioning of the Territorial Authority are admissible. They cannot, of course, completely abolish these rules of territorial self-government. However, individual arrangements may be rather strict and binding, if they are important, justifiable. The Constitutional Court noted, inter alia, that "Detailed legal regulation of the management of the territorial government is admissible, but that self-government does not mean the sovereignty of local communities (Article 101 (4) of the Constitution). The Czech Territorial Authority is not entirely independent in the area of the economy, even in other respects. Taxes are collected uniformly throughout the country according to national legislation, only for certain taxes and charges the State allows the municipalities, towns and regions to be within certain limits (...) Indeed, a state-owned, separate local government, comparable to perhaps early self-government in the USA, does not exist in the Czech Republic and its introduction is unimaginable for many reasons. Comparable legal definitions and restrictions on the operation and provision of territorial units exist in all European states. 'One example on which the Constitutional Court demonstrated this inautonomy was the regulation of remuneration for officials and employees of local and local authorities, which according to the Constitutional Court" is also national'. The Constitutional Court therefore questioned the legislation at the time when it concluded that "the framework for the financing of the local authorities, as well as the definition of their tasks, must undoubtedly not lead to their financial collapse while maintaining the economy '.
67. In the sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 24 / 19, the Constitutional Court dealt with a reduction in the remuneration of the released representatives of the local authorities in the event of a conflict with the role of a Member of Parliament or of the Government. The application for annulment of Article 72 (1) of the Third Municipal Establishment, as amended by Act No. 263 / 2019 Coll., § 47 (1) of the Third Regional Establishment, as amended by Act No. 263 / 2019 Coll., and § 53 (1) of the Third Law on the Capital of Prague, as amended by Act No. 263 / 2019 Coll., the Constitutional Court rejected. He stated that "the contested provisions do not interfere in any way with the right to self-administration. Their abolition would not result in the territorial authorities themselves being able to assess the level of remuneration of the vacant members of their councils, where the functions have been cumulated in question, but in having to provide them with a full remuneration, as is the result of the legislation and the Government's regulation for its implementation (see Section 73 of the Municipality Act, Section 48 of the County Act and Section 54 of the City of Prague, in conjunction with Decree No. 318 / 2017 Coll. '. In the present case, the appellant did not contest the remuneration arrangements of the elected members of the councils as a whole and did not argue that, in view of the right to self-administration, this area should be wholly or to a wider extent entrusted to the territorial authorities. This is why the Constitutional Court has not addressed this issue in more detail in the case under examination.
68. Judge Radovan Suchánek, in the appellant's different opinion on the finding of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 24 / 19, stated, inter alia, that "territorial authorities are significantly restricted by the statutory regulation of the remuneration paid to their representatives. The source of these rewards is exclusively the funds of municipalities and counties, not the State. If the law invests in the authorisation of municipalities and counties to dispose of their own property and operate according to their own budgets (Article 101 (3) of the Constitution) by establishing, or requiring the Government to determine, the level of remuneration to be paid by municipalities or regions to their representatives (...), this is certainly a significant interference with the right to self-government (see also Article 101 (1) and (2) of the Constitution). State intervention in self-government must not only be legal and justified, but must also be subject to principles of prudence and subsidiarity '.
(c) Limiting the executive when issuing government regulations
69. Practically all the appellant's arguments call into question the constitutionality of the government's authorisation to adjust the remuneration of the representatives of the local authorities. It argues that such legislation is contrary to the principles of division of power; it interferes with the right to territorial government when it does not (practically) impose any limits on executive power. According to the appellant, the power provision for the Government does not comply with the constitutional requirements of the limitation of State interference in the activities of local authorities under Article 101 (4) of the Constitution. Although the appellant does not expressly state this, the argument is, in fact, primarily directed towards the objection of infringement of Article 78 of the Constitution.
70. The Constitution provides in Article 78 that the Government is entitled to issue regulations for the implementation of the Act and within its limits. Therefore, a government order must not exceed the limits laid down by the law in force, since it must always be issued "within its limits." The Constitutional Court has already concluded in its previous case-law that the limits of the law are either expressly defined or result from the meaning and purpose of the law [cf. Sf. zn. Parliament is not limited in setting these limits unless a constitutional law prescribes the form of law for certain standards.
71. While administrative authorities and authorities of local authorities may legislate on the basis and within the limits of the law, but only if they have been expressly empowered by the law (Article 79 (3) of the Constitution), the Government does not need such authority given by ordinary law: it results directly from the Constitution when the law "implements" and the regulation moves "within its limits" (cf. the findings sp. zl. ÚS 17 / 95 or sp. zn. ÚS 43 / 97). However, the Constitutional Court interprets the freedom of the Government to issue regulations in a restrictive manner: "there is never a clear discretion of the executive, since it is limited by constitutional, international treaties and general legal principles' (the finding of 25 October 1995, sp. zn. If the law empowers the government to issue a regulation, the legislature must" be sufficiently specific in order to assume the clear will of the legislator "in the sense of the regulation above the legal standard, or" the existence of the law is sufficient, but within it there must be room for legislative action of the government "[the findings sp. zn. Thus, the government must not go beyond the" limits "of the law, namely to regulate something that the law does not deal with at all, but cannot even impose new obligations that do not result from the law, it can only specify them.
72. The Constitutional Court has in the past several times abolished the legal authority of the Government [cf. Findings sp. zn. In the finding of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 45 / 2000, he then carried out a summary referred to in later case-law: "The constitutional definition of the derived standard of execution is based on the following principles: - the regulation must be issued by a legitimate body, - the regulation cannot interfere in matters reserved for the law (so it cannot lay down primary rights and obligations), - the legislator's clear will to regulate above the legal standard (so it must be open to the scope of the regulation) (...)."
Review of the contested provisions
73. The nature of the contested provisions is to lay down rules on the remuneration of members of the local authorities. The legal basis of this area is contained in the municipal establishment, regional establishment and the law on the capital city of Prague. All those laws empower the Government to enact an implementing act (Government Regulation), which, broken down by size categories of local authorities, determines the amount of remuneration to be paid to the elected members of the council per month and the maximum amount of remuneration to be paid to the non-released members of the council per month (§ 73 (1) in conjunction with § 134 (3) and § 153 (1) of the municipal establishment, § 48 (1) in conjunction with § 98 of the regional establishment and § 54 (1) in conjunction with § 87 (4) of the City of Prague). The Government adopted Decree No. 318 / 2017 Coll., which took effect on 1 January 2018. The Government of Government Decree No. 318 / 2017 Coll. has already amended three times, by Government Decree No. 202 / 2018 Coll. of 4.9.2018 (became effective on 1.1.2019), Government Decree No. 338 / 2019 Coll. of 9.12.2019 (became effective on 1.1.2020) and Government Decree No. 415 / 2022 (became effective on 1.1.2022). The respective amounts of remuneration of the elected representatives and the maximum amount of remuneration of the non-released members of the representatives are set out in the table annexed to the Government Decree. The purpose of all three amendments to Government Decree No. 318 / 2017 Coll., including Government Decree No. 415 / 2022 Coll. adopted only after the submission of the proposal now under consideration, was only to amend this Annex.
74. By law, the remuneration is only payable to a vacated member of the local authority council (§ 72 (1) of the municipal establishment, § 47 (1) of the regional establishment and § 53 (1) of the Prague Capital Act), and only the members of the council elected to the functions designated by the specific council as "vacant posts' are released members of the council. An unreleased member of the council is not entitled by law to the remuneration, it is provided for by the powers reserved to the representative [§ 84 (2) (n) of the municipal establishment, § 35 (2) (p) of the regional establishment and § 59 (2) (u) of the Prague Capital Act]; This is not true only in the case of the unreleased mayor, mayor and captain - they are entitled to the remuneration, in the statutory minimum amount of 0.3 times the remuneration they would deserve if they performed the function as a release (§ 72 (4) of the municipal establishment, § 47 (4) of the regional establishment and § 53 (4) of the Prague Capital Act).
75. The remuneration of the elected members of the council is determined by Decree No. 318 / 2017 Coll. by a fixed, concrete amount. The contested legal provisions lay down only the rule for determining the remuneration of members of the councils who perform the function of mayor of the statutory city, captain or mayor of the capital of Prague (§ 73 (3) of the municipal establishment, § 48 (3) of the regional establishment and § 54 (2) of the Law on the capital of Prague). For the unreleased members of the council, the maximum possible amount of remuneration is set by Decree No. 318 / 2017 Coll. by decision of the council. During the term of office, the local authority may, at any time, amend, reduce or withdraw remuneration to its non-authorised members (all or only some). An unreleased member of the council of the municipality or capital city of Prague, who is entitled to receive the will of the fiancé to marry, may increase the remuneration by up to CZK 2,000 above the maximum amount of remuneration; The same applies to the unreleased member of the council of the municipality, which is entrusted with the administration of the municipal police (§ 74 (1) of the municipal establishment, or § 54 (2) of the Law on the capital of Prague).
76. The remuneration provided to members of the councils represents a traditional monthly remuneration instead of a salary or salary for work. It is not supplemented by any additional fees that are usual for employees (such as personal allowances, management allowances, overtime, etc.). An exceptional remuneration may be awarded to a member of the council for the fulfilment of extraordinary and particularly important tasks in favour of the local authority, the aggregate amount of which may not exceed twice the maximum remuneration that the member of the board who has been released has been due for the performance of his duties in a month. In the case of a non-released member of the council, the cumulative amount of extraordinary remuneration provided in the calendar year shall not exceed twice the maximum amount of remuneration laid down by law and implementing legislation for the performance of his duties per month (§ 76 (2) and (3) of the municipal establishment, § 51 (2) and (3) of the regional establishment and § 57 (2) and (3) of the Law on the City of Prague).
77. The contested provisions - in addition to the provision of remuneration to members of the councils - also prohibit the member of the council from providing a gift in connection with the performance of his duties, even after the performance of his duties (§ 71 (4) of the municipal establishment, § 46 (4) of the regional establishment and § 52 (6) of the Prague Capital Act).
78. The contested provisions fall within the separate competence of the local authorities (in particular Article 35 (2) of the municipal constitution, Article 14 (2) of the Regional Constitution and Article 16 (3) of the City of Prague), their competence to determine the level of remuneration to the non-authorised members of the local authorities' representations reserved to the municipality's representative [§ 84 (2) (n) of the Municipal Constitution], to the county representative [§ 35 (2) (p) of the regional establishment] or to the municipality's representative [§ 59 (2) (u) of the City of Prague. It follows from the above legal provisions and contrario that it is not reserved for the representatives of the local authorities to determine the amount of remuneration to their released members, since that remuneration is by law a claim (§ 72 (1) of the municipal establishment, § 47 (1) of the regional establishment and § 53 (1) of the Law on the City of Prague). The amount of remuneration released to members of the Councils shall be determined directly by the Government of the contested regulation; It is therefore a competence which is entrusted by special laws to the government as the exercise of state administration.
79. The Constitutional Court has examined the contested provisions and found that the law did not impose any limits on the Government to enact this implementing legislation if it was authorised to enact a government regulation on the level of remuneration of members of representatives. The contested provisions of the municipal establishment (§ 73 (1) in conjunction with § 134 (3) and § 153 (1)), the regional establishment (§ 48 (1) in conjunction with § 98) and the City of Prague (§ 54 (1) (a) and § 134 (3) (a) of the City of Prague) merely empower the Government to issue an implementing law (regulation), which sets out the amount of the remuneration provided to the released members of the Municipality of Prague (§ 54 (1) (a) and (a) of the City of Prague (§ 54) and § 87 (4) of the City of Prague) and the maximum amount of the remuneration granted to the unelected members of the Municipality of the Municipality of Prague (§ 73 (1) (b).
80. In the provisions under review of the contested laws, the Constitutional Court lacks the limits of legal authorisation for the issue of a government regulation, i.e. a certain basis or clear criteria for determining the level of remuneration of representatives (both released and not released). The contested laws also do not provide for a mechanism for increasing (valorisation) the remuneration of members of the councils. In addition to the adoption by the Government of Decree No 627 (of 11 September 2017) of a government regulation (statutory, implementing legislation) on the amount of remuneration of representatives' members (point I), the Minister of the Interior ordered the Government to submit a legislative proposal to increase the remuneration of representatives' members on 1 January of the calendar year following 1 January 2018, provided that the statistical indicator on the average gross monthly nominal wage per number of employees in the national economy for the preceding calendar year is increased by at least 2,5% (point II.3). The indexation of the government's resolutions in this (internal) part does not directly address the overarching condition that the Home Secretary should submit a "legislative" proposal to the government (perhaps a proposal for a government regulation).
81. In this context, the Constitutional Court recalls that the Government, as a senior executive body (Article 67 (1) of the Constitution), manages and controls the performance of the administration and decides on fundamental issues of national importance, when it is not competent to decide on them to ministries, other central authorities or bodies governed by them. The government resolution obliges all members of government, ministries, other central government bodies (§ 21 of the Act of the Czech National Council No. 2 / 1969 Coll., on the establishment of ministries and other central government bodies of the Czech Republic), other administrative offices and other bodies, if provided for by a special law. The majority of the resolution may be qualified as an internal (individual) act by which the government, as the executive executive body, imposes tasks on individual members of the government. The Constitutional Court has previously stated that the Government's resolution in this form constitutes a normal, constitutionally conformal means by which the Government, within the framework of its competence regarding the internal regulation of government matters, unites its activities and implements its political will [cf. Resolution sp. zn. I. ÚS 482 / 97 (U 37 / 10 SbNU 483) or sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 9 / 22 (available at https: / / nalus.ujud.cz)].
82. The Constitutional Court accepts the appellant's view that Parliament, with too broad powers at the legal level, has waived its power to regulate the remuneration of representatives when, in addition to the population criterion, it has not adopted any legal limits that the government should follow when deciding on the level of remuneration, including an indexation mechanism. The government's too broad and virtually unlimited possibility of deciding on the level of remuneration of representatives does not respect the demand for division of power at a horizontal level. The wording empowering the provisions of the contested laws without defining specific limits for the adoption of substatutory legislation does not comply with the requirements of the derived norm, which the Constitutional Court considers in its decision-making practice to be grounds for the annulment of the powers for conflict with constitutional order (cf. recitals 70-72).
83. The contested legislation, which empowers the Government to enact an implementing act (Government Decree), considers the Constitutional Court to be ambiguous and allows the Government to have dual access. As there is no mechanism in the laws under assessment (municipal establishment, regional establishment and the law on the capital city of Prague) for determining the remuneration of members of the councils, as well as for increasing them (indexation), these fees may be set by the government either as too low (indisputable compared to other public officials) or as too high, which could lead to the "destruction" of the budgets of the local authorities.
84. The Constitutional Court recalls that the rules for calculating the level of the salary of constitutional officials (e.g. Members, Senators and Members of the Government) are laid down by Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., on the salary and other formalities relating to the performance of the duties of representatives of state power and of certain state bodies and judges and Members of the European Parliament, as amended, and by Act No. 201 / 1997 Coll., on the salary and certain other formalities of civil servants, as amended. The rules for the calculation of salaries shall be laid down directly by these laws and may be a methodological guide for the legislator when adjusting the level of remuneration of the members of the representatives, or for setting limits to the adoption of implementing legislation in accordance with Article 78 of the Constitution.
Sign in for notes, favorites and notifications
Regulation Information
| Citation | The Constitutional Court found No 160 / 2023 Coll., on the application for annulment of certain provisions of Act No. 128 / 2000 Coll., on Municipality (municipal establishment), as amended, Act No. 129 / 2000 Coll., on Counties (regional establishment), as amended, Act No. 131 / 2000 Coll., on the City of Prague, as amended, and Decree No. 318 / 2017 Coll., on the remuneration of representatives of local authorities, as amended |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | The Constitutional Tribunal found |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 15.06.2023 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
Comments 0