The Constitutional Court found No. 149 / 2007 Coll.
The Constitutional Court found of 6 March 2007 on the application for annulment of § 26 paragraphs 3 and 4 of Act No. 449 / 2001 Coll., on hunting, as amended
Valid
The Constitutional Tribunal found
149
FIND
The Constitutional Court
On behalf of the Czech Republic
The Constitutional Court decided on 6 March 2007 in plenary in the composition of Stanislav Balík, František Duchoň, Vlasta Formánková, Pavel Holländer, Vladimir Kórka, Jiří Mucha, Jan Musil, Jiří Nykodým, Pavel Rychetský, Miloslav Excellent and Eliška Wagner on the proposal of the Regional Court in České Budějovice - a branch in Tábor on the abolition of the provisions of § 26 paragraphs 3 and 4 of Act No. 449 / 2001 Coll., on hunting, as amended,
as follows:
I. The proposal to repeal the provisions of § 26 paragraph 3 of Act No. 449 / 2001 Coll., on hunting, as amended, is rejected.
II. The proposal to repeal the provisions of § 26 paragraph 4 of Act No. 449 / 2001 Coll., on hunting, as amended, is rejected.
Reasons
Recital of the proposal
1. By submission to the Constitutional Court on 27 January 2006, the Regional Court in České Budějovice - Branch in Tábor (Chamber 15 Co., composed of: the President of the Chamber of the JUDr. Robert Ožvald and the Judges of the JUDr. Marcel Pech and JUDr. Libuš Vorlíčková), with reference to Article 95 (2) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as "the Constitution") and pursuant to Article 64 (3) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, and No 444 / 2005 Coll., that the Constitutional Court should, in its view, repeal the provisions of Article 26 (3) and (4) of Law No. 449 / 2001 Coll., on hunting, as amended by Act No. 320 / 2002 Coll.
2. In the civil proceedings held at the Pelhřimov District Court under Article 1 C 106 / 2005, the applicant seeks payment of CZK 8 077.50 as "compensation for the compulsory restriction of property rights', which should have been done by the fact that although he had terminated his membership of the defendant, Kamenice, Lipa, on 31 December 2002, his properties with which he joined the fellowship are still being used by the company to exercise the right of hunting. Although (according to the applicant) the requested" compensation 'should have been granted "for the analogous application' of Paragraph 30 (2) of the Hunting Act, the Court of First Instance dismissed the action, in the absence of legal basis; the application of this provision is not, in his view, considered to be out of the question since the competent authority of the State has not decided to assign the property concerned to the pursuit of the defendant. The applicant's appeal shall be decided by the applicant and the appeal proceedings shall be based on his proposal, which has been specified above.
3. First of all, the appellant announces that it shares the objections to the unconstitutional nature of the Hunting Act, which are incorporated into the proposal of a group of Members and Senators to abolish some of its provisions, which is brought before the Constitutional Court under the Pol. It argues that the right of hunting constitutes an interference with the property ownership rights of the individual owners of the property on which that right is exercised, as foreign land is used, managed and used. The right of hunting, as defined in Section 2 (h) of the Hunting Act, does not, according to the appellant, cover only the protection of animals, but a number of other activities which constitute an interest, sport or economic activity, which makes it clear that there is no public interest in restricting the property owner's property right used "despite his disapproval to exercise the right of hunting '. Therefore, the appellant's interpretation by the Supreme Court in the judgment of 7.10.2002 sp. zn. 22 Cdo 3006 / 2000 states that it is a restriction on property rights within the meaning of § 128 (2) of the Civil Code.
4. The contested provisions "create a situation" contrary to Article 11 (4) of the Charter where the property owner is, against his will, restricted in his right to use his property, as he exercises the right of hunting on them "by a different person who is neither a member nor a member." If, in accordance with Article 26 (3) of the Hunting Act, a member of the Hunting Society dissigns from that fellowship, he is not allowed to create another (own or social) chase and remains "unattached" in relation to the legal regulation of hunting law; on the one hand, he is no longer a member of the company, on the other hand, his real estate remains part of the chase which he holds.
5. The appellant considers as important "from the point of view of constitutional rights' that the Hunting Act" does not provide for any compensation for the owner of land which is still used for the exercise of hunting rights' when the affiliation of land (and of compensation) under Paragraph 30 (1) and (2) of the Hunting Act cannot, in his view, be considered; The "performance 'of the company has no impact on the existence of a chase' and the property and former member remain part of it. The legal arrangement (contested by Paragraph 26 (4))" solves "only claims relating to membership (to the share of the settlement)," compensation "sought by the claimant in the present case, but" the provisions in Section 26 (3), (4) of the Act do not "anchor the provisions in question."
6. The appellant considers that, after a member has left the company, his land remains part of the chase, "problematic '; in such a case, the" right and obligations arising therefrom' (Article 4 (3) and (4), Article 11 (4) of the Charter) should cease to exist, or it should "be possible to allow the power of the authorities of the State of hunting to assign... (its land)... to another chase ', but the law also does not provide for that. Otherwise, the owner of the affluent land that has left the affluent community would" have a different, legally worse position vis-à-vis other owners of the land - members of the affluent community - because he cannot logically exercise the right of hunting, "and according to the appellant, there is no reasonable reason or public interest in such a different position. The appellant expects that the question of the compliance of the legislation with the constitutional rule of law of affiliation will also be examined by the Constitutional Court when discussing a proposal under the sp. zl. ÚS 34 / 03 (see below).
Observations of the parties
A.
Chamber of Deputies of Parliament of the Czech Republic
7. First of all, the Chamber of Deputies stated that the legislature was acting in accordance with the prescribed procedure when negotiating the law on hunting and believing that the law adopted was not contrary to the Constitution of the Czech Republic. The Hunting Act does not deny or exclude fundamental human rights guaranteed by all the Constitution of the Czech Republic and the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.
8. The appellant's legal opinion to the Chamber of Deputies appears "to be useful '; As well as the proposal in the case of the Constitutional Court sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 34 / 03 challenges the fundamental principles of hunting law and expresses itself on the issue before the Constitutional Court has decided on this proposal. In her view," it is not appropriate to amend the hunting law simply because of the unique and often personally reserved interpersonal relations between members of the society. "
9. The Chamber of Deputies also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court of 17 October 2002 in Case 22 Cdo 3006 / 2000, according to which the Hunting Act limits the rights of owners of hunting grounds "in order to protect hunting." The restrictions are already taking place at the moment when the social chase was recognised and the affluent society was created. The law does not link the owner of the hunting ground to the removal from the hunting ground of the hunting ground and therefore the owner, who is no longer a member of the hunting ground, is obliged to abide by the obligation to exercise the right of hunting on its land, "and is therefore entitled to compensation."
B.
Senate of Parliament of the Czech Republic
10. The Senate stated in its observations that the problem of the absence of compensation for the use of the owner's hunting grounds was addressed in the discussion of the amendment to the Hunting Act (No 59 / 2003 Coll.). By his resolution, he returned to the Chamber of Deputies the draft amendment, inter alia, with an amendment which assumed that the owners of the covered hunting grounds who were not members of the company were compensated. However, the Chamber of Deputies approved the amendment to the Act in the original version in which it was referred to the Senate.
11. As in the case of comments on the proposal under sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 34 / 03 The Senate stated that, when assessing the contested provisions in the context of the whole hunting law, the fundamental question of defining the public interest which is based on the exercise of hunting rights is the legitimacy of specific restrictions on property rights of owners of hunting grounds. The Senate has no doubt that the need to protect animals so that everyone, in accordance with Article 35 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, can be guaranteed the right to a favourable environment, constitutes a public interest.
12. The right of hunting, both in terms of its historical development and in terms of its current adaptation, is characterised by the Senate as a compact summary of the relevant rights and obligations which are interlinked in its implementation and which must therefore be assessed in their respective context.
Opinion of the Ministry of Agriculture
13. The Constitutional Court, pursuant to Articles 48 (2) and 49 (1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, invited the Ministry of Agriculture to comment on the submitted application.
14. The Ministry of Agriculture does not agree with the appellant's legal views; Article 30 (1) and (2) of the Hunting Act provides for the treatment of hunting land which does not constitute own or social hunting ground, while the law does not distinguish what was the cause of "establishing this relationship." Therefore, if the owner of the hunting ground pursuant to § 26 (3) of the Hunting Act ceases to be a member of the hunting community, his land remains in the hunting ground in question, but cannot remain among the hunting grounds of the existing fellowship and must be assigned to the hunting operation by the competent authority of the State.
15. The Ministry of Agriculture thus concluded that, in the decision of the case on the basis of which the applicant made the present application for annulment of paragraphs 26 (3) and (4) of the Hunting Act, the primary administrative authority of the State Administration of Hunting committed an error when, after the termination of the membership of the owner of the hunting land in the hunting community, he did not make the addition of that land to the existing hunting ground within the meaning of Section 30 (1) of the Hunting Act, thereby preventing the owner of the hunting land from exercising the right under Section 30 (2) of the Hunting Act, i.e. to compensate for the addition. It is therefore not appropriate, the Ministry of Agriculture, to amend the law on hunting only with regard to the "unique error of procedure of the primordial authority of the State Administration of Hunting."
Abandonment of oral proceedings
16. Since the appellant and the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic have agreed to waive the oral hearing explicitly and the Chamber of Deputies in silence (Paragraph 63 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, Section 101 (4) of the Civil Code), and the Constitutional Court considers that further clarification of the case cannot be expected from the hearing, the conditions for the Constitutional Court to rule on the case without ordering oral proceedings (Paragraph 44 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court) have been fulfilled.
Active ID of the applicant
17. The Court of Justice of the European Union ("the Court of Justice of the European Union ') has consistently held that the Court of Justice of the European Union has the power to rule on the application of Article 95 (2) of the Constitution. Whether it is given in a particular case depends on the subject of the dispute and its legal qualifications [see sp. zn.
18. Having regard to the specification of the provisions proposed for annulment and to the subject matter of the procedure on which the proposal is based, as well as the related parts of the preamble to the proposal, the Constitutional Court concluded that the appellant is primarily pursuing the removal of the "gap 'in the law, which consists in the absence of an explicit modification of the" substitute' consequences of the disappearance of membership of the affiliation community of a person whose affluent land continues to be used by the affluent community to exercise the right of hunting.
Constitutional conformity of the legislative process
19. The Constitutional Court did not address the question of whether a law whose provisions are contested had been adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution laid down by competence and by a constitutional procedure (Paragraph 68 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court), since it had already been examined in the context of the proceedings on the proposal of a group of Members and Senators [sp. zn.
Derogation of the contested provision
20. The whole provision, part of which is contested by the applicant, reads:
Membership in the hunting community
(1) If a member of the hunting community transfers ownership of the hunting land which is part of the hunting ground, his membership of the hunting community ceases; the transferee of the land becomes a member of the affiliation society unless, within 30 days of the date of the establishment of its title, he notifies the affiliation community in writing.
(2) Membership of the affiliation society shall continue to cease if the administrative authority authorised under this law has declared the land owned by a member of the affiliation community to be unfavourable.
(3) A member of the Community may terminate his membership on the basis of a written notification; the membership shall cease on the last day of the calendar year in which the notification was made.
(4) A person whose membership of the affiliation community has ceased to exist is entitled to a share of the settlement. The amount of that share or the method of calculating it shall be determined by the statutes.
(5) Co-owners of hunting grounds which are part of a social chase must agree which of them will exercise the rights of a member of the hunting community or may designate a joint agent.
(6) The owners of the hunting grounds assigned by the State Administration of Hunting to the Social Hunting shall become full members of the hunting community if, within 30 days of receipt of the notification of the affiliation, they notify the affiliation community in writing that they insist on membership. "
The appellant shall require the repeal of paragraphs 3 and 4 of this provision.
Evaluation of the Constitutional Court
21. In the most general sense, the appellant criticises the law on hunting by objecting to the fact that the right of hunting, as it regulates it, constitutes an intervention in the property rights of the individual owners on which that right is exercised (since the exercise of that right involves the use of foreign land, the management of it and the acquisition of its benefits), which is not justified by the appropriate public interest, and it states that a constitutionally relevant reason to restrict ownership of hunting, "despite the opposition of the owner, is not given.
22. This conclusion - at least in view of the subsequent case-law of the Constitutional Court - will not stand.
23. The Constitutional Court dealt mainly with the legal regulation of hunting and the right of hunting and its evaluation from the point of view of constitutional guarantees in the above mentioned finding of 13.12.2006 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 34 / 03 (see above), in which it stated that it was essential to protect game and to protect hunting as a national cultural heritage. "Under the conditions of the Czech Republic, hunting and hunting rights are social activities and are discussed by the state to protect and develop one of the environmental components of the game. The Hunting Act does not constitute an adjustment of hunting activity as an interest activity, but as a basis as a dedicated and regulated activity to protect and develop nature." In assessing the substance of the hunting legislation, as is apparent from the above, the Constitutional Court concluded that it was an activity to carry out a constitutional task of the State (Article 7 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic). "The fulfilment of a constitutional obligation cannot therefore be regarded as being of general or even public interest '. This summary allowed the Constitutional Court to express the fundamental principle applicable to the assessment of the present case, namely that" the realisation of hunting and hunting rights is, in general, a legitimate restriction on ownership'.
24. Similarly - the appellants - the Constitutional Court, in the designated finding, also expressed its views on other partial reservations, which added to the criticisms embodied in the rejected proposal of a group of Members and Senators, namely to the regulation of the exercise of the right of hunting on "foreign" grounds or to the Institute of the Assignment of the Land to Hunting. Therefore, if the appellant refers here to the infringement of Articles 1, 4 (3) and 11 (1) and (4) of the Charter, the question of the constitutionality of this legislation has already been assessed in a general position by this finding, and the Constitutional Court has no reason to depart from the conclusions previously adopted.
25. However, the arguments put forward by the appellant are only to be explained, as these objections seem to be out of line not only with their own proposal but also with their design authorisations (legitimacy), which are preceded by Article 95 (2) of the Constitution, cited above. It is clear from the statement of reasons for the proposal that the appellant does not only criticise the provisions of the hunting law which it proposes to abolish, but, in the most important part, its reasoning lacks any link to the proceedings which the appellate court is having.
26. According to Resolution sp. zn. In other words, it follows from the purpose and purpose of checking the constitutionality of legal standards that the law to be applied when dealing with the matter is only the one (its provision) which prevents the achievement of the desired (constitutional) outcome; If not removed, the outcome of the dispute would be different.
27. It can be concluded from the part of the proposal, which has an integral link to the context of the definition of the design legitimacy, that the appellant sees an unfounded inequality in the status of owners of hunting grounds who have not left the hunting community and those whose membership has ceased to exist in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 26 (3) of the Hunting Act or owners whose land has been allocated to hunting (Section 30 (1) of the Hunting Act); one may participate in the exercise of the right of hunting [§ 19 (1) (b) of the Hunting Act], another law grants compensation for the limitation of their right of ownership (§ 30 (2) of the Hunting Act). However, in view of the subject matter of the procedure (payment of the "compensation ') which the appellant is conducting at the appeal stage, the conditions of his substantive legitimacy may be fulfilled solely in relation to the question whether the hunting law does not in fact allow the owner of the affluent land which has ceased his membership of the affiliation community to be granted compensation for the exercise of the right of hunting also carried out on his land (which, according to the appellant, should infringe Articles 1 and 11 of the Charter) and, in the event of a negative, whether such a condition (objectively) is constitutionally acceptable or not.
28. This question of direct (explicit) projection into the provisions of § 26 (3) and (4) of the Hunting Act, which the appellant proposes to abolish, has not; it has been stated above (under point 18) that, from the broader context of the proposal, it can be concluded that the appellant does not refer to those provisions as to what is contained in them, but rather what is not in them, although, in his opinion, it should be (namely the adjustment of the right to compensation for the exercise of hunting rights on the land of the owner who has ceased membership of the affiliation).
29. This opens up the question of the so-called loopholes in the law (omission of the legislator) which the Constitutional Court has assessed several times in its case-law. The opening decision was published in the Official Journal of the European Union. The resolution chosen here, consisting of the abolition of the content of the follow-up provisions, was applied by the Constitutional Court because there was no other solution available, on which it expressly pointed out and which it used in the case sp. z. pl. ÚS 48 / 95 (Collection of finds and resolutions of the Constitutional Court, Volume 5, Found No 21, published under No 121 / 1996 Coll.); in that he filled the gap created by the inequality of the legislation by the constitutionally conformal interpretation of the relevant legal regulation (by argument and minori ad maius in relation to the provision of § 2 (1) of Act No. 243 / 1992 Coll., as amended by Act No. 441 / 1992 Coll., respectively, the concept of "he has regained citizenship ') without having to proceed to the deregation of the law or its provisions.
30. The application of this (the latter) method is also considered in the present case.
31. It is without doubt that the Hunting Act does not contain provisions which expressly govern the question of compensation for the exercise of the right of hunting by the affiliation community on the affluent property of the owner whose membership of the collective has ceased to exist under Paragraph 26 (3) of the Act. The Act only (in Paragraph 26 (4)) lays down a claim to a share of settlement, which is, however, only linked to the "deceased 'participation of a former member in the collective, whereas its subsequent property relations with the host community (which are concerned here) do not apply. Similarly, it is clear that no change in the chase is taking place through membership itself; that is" recognised' (and land-based) by an administrative decision [§ 2 (i), § 18 (1)] as a whole, consisting of specific continuous affluent land (§ 17 (2), first sentence). The property of the owner whose membership has ceased to exist therefore remains part of the chase in which he exercises hunting activity (§ 17 (1) or the right of hunting activity (§ 19 (1) (b)).
32. This situation is not the only one where the Hunting Act [although it is based on the principle that hunting law is carried out by those who are also owners of the land which constitutes it - see Sections 18 (3), 19 (1) (a) and 26 (1) of the sentence after the semicolon, respectively], provides for a chase involving the land of non-members of the hunting community. According to Article 30 (1), hunting grounds which do not constitute own or community hunting are normally allocated by the State's hunting authority to the hunting ground, which has the longest common border with such hunting grounds, and the principles of sound hunting farming do not require any other affiliation (while owners of the associated land may or may not become members of the hunting community - see Section 26 (6)).
33. However, the hunting law already explicitly and unequivocally regulates the property situation of the owners of the associated land that did not become members of the company. Paragraph 30 (2) states that "The owners of the hunting grounds assigned by the State's hunting authority pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be compensated by the hunting holder; if it is a social chase, the compensation shall be payable by the host community. If the parties concerned fail to assess the amount of compensation, they shall determine the compensation of the State's hunting authority, taking into account the size of the affiliation of the hunting grounds and the anticipated proceeds from the exercise of hunting rights on those parcels. The refund shall be payable retroactively by 31 March of the current year. The compensation shall not, however, apply where the affluent land has been assigned to a social chase and the owner has become a member of the affluent community. '
34. The status of owners of hunting grounds who have left the hunting community and whose land continues to be used by it to exercise hunting rights is clearly comparable to that of those who have never been members of that community and whose land has been assigned to the pursuit by the administrative authority. Therefore, the distinction between them as regards the granting of compensation for the use of their land for the exercise of the right of hunting does not indeed have reasonable grounds and would be contrary to the constitutionally guaranteed principle of equality enshrined in Articles 1 and 3 (1) (in relation to Article 11 (1)) The Charter, as it is normally drawn up in the case-law of the Constitutional Court [cf. sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 5 / 95 (Collection of findings and orders of the Constitutional Court, Volume 4, Found No. 74, Dec. No. 6 / 1996 Coll.), Sv. II. the exclusion from the compensation of owners whose right of ownership has remained restricted by the earlier integration into a recognised chase is also a risk of conflict with Article 11 (4) of the Charter which currently makes the compulsory restriction of the right of ownership conditional on the granting of the refund.
35. However, the instruction to suppress these consequences is already available in a level of sub-constitutional law and constitutes a standard interpretation rule in the form of the Legis analogy, which allows the legal relationship to be explicitly not regulated by a rule laid down in a rule of close or similar nature. It follows from the foregoing that this - analogously applicable - rule can be seen in the provision of the aforementioned provision of Paragraph 30 (2) of the Hunting Act. Its application in the relations under consideration is also urgent because the affiliation of the affiliation of the owner of the affluent land ceases objectively to respect the principle that the exercise of the right of hunting is called in the pursuit of the property of its members (or the land attached to it by an administrative decision) and that compliance with that principle is an important reason for concluding that the regulation of the exercise of the right of hunting and hunting also in relation to the right of ownership from a constitutional point of view can be sustained. The application of the principle of compensation, expressed in the provision of Section 30 (2) of the Hunting Act, also has an idea base (not directly application) in the Institute of Unfounded Enrichment within the meaning of Section 451 et seq. of the Civil Code.
36. The analogous application of the provisions of Paragraph 30 (2) of the Hunting Act must, of course, be without the administrative regime established there, since the right to compensation for the owner whose membership in the hunting community has ceased to exist cannot be exposed to uncertainty as to whether the competent administrative authority will decide to assign its land to the hunt, especially if there is no explicit legal support for such a procedure. However, this does not change the jurisdiction (and obligations) of the court to rule on such a claim, since nothing prevents it from being assessed (already) as a claim from private law to which the court is called to provide protection (cf. the principle expressed in § 4 of the Second Civil Code).
37. It is worth recalling that the judgment referred to by the appellant (judgment of the Supreme Court of 17 October 2002 No 22 Cdo 3006 / 2000-64) envisages the right to compensation, of course, (even without any further justification), and the Regional Court of Hradec Králové, in its decision of 3 April 1997, sp. zn. 19 Co. 502 / 96 (published in the Journal of the Court of Justice, p. 99, 8: 256). It is not important that both are related to the previous legislation, Act No. 23 / 1962 Coll., on hunting, as amended.
38. Moreover, the restriction on the owner of the hunting grounds may not be permanent or non-exceptional, and the owner may face it otherwise than by claiming compensation; According to Article 17 (2) of the Hunting Act, the administrative authority is also entitled to declare the land inhospitable, even because of the "interest of the owner '; The Constitutional Court also expressed its views on the definition of this condition in the previously mentioned Pl. ÚS 34 / 03.
Final summary
39. The lack of explicit regulation of the legal situation of the owner of the affluent land, which has ceased its membership of the affiliation community in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 26 (3) of the Hunting Act, thus does not prevent its relationship with the affinity community, which continues to use its land to exercise the right of hunting, from being interpreted on the basis of a positive right. In relation to what is the subject of the civil proceedings and to what is subordinate to the content of the definition of the design legitimacy of the determining court pursuant to Article 95 (2) of the Constitution (Article 64 (3) of the Constitutional Court Act), it is established at the level of that law that the owner of the hunting grounds is entitled to compensation from the company in accordance with the similar application of Article 30 (2) of the Hunting Act, which the court will decide (in the absence of an administrative decision to assign the land to the hunt). The Constitutional Court considers that this conclusion is constitutionally conformal and also corresponds to the considerations expressed by the proposing court of appeal in relation to the constitutional conformity of the hunting law; considers only that the Court should have reached it itself, as it is not excluded from the obligation to provide protection for fundamental rights and freedoms (Article 4 of the Constitution).
40. In the intentions of the above-mentioned (recalled) method of finding sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 48 / 95 (see above), the Constitutional Court also concludes that, in view of the imported interpretation of the applicable positive law, which is eligible for a constitutional conformal application in a particular case of trial, it is not justified to propose that the provisions of the Hunting Act be repealed therein.
41. It is then appropriate, for the purposes of formulating the final outcome of the procedure for the application of a general court pursuant to Article 95 (2) of the Constitution and Article 64 (3) of the Constitutional Court Law, to which the conclusion is drawn, to recall those conditions which have been noted above (see paragraphs 17 to 18 and 25 to 28) in the sense of the existence of an active legitimacy for its submission. It can be accepted that, in a situation where the appellant claims a "loophole in the law," it is logically difficult to define those provisions to be derogated in order to open up the scope for an adjustment which - as compared to the present one - also includes the ability to regulate relations which have not yet been forgotten, at the same time those which are required to be assessed by the appellant (as a decisive general court) in a specific court. Contrary to the previously stated general principle, there is no choice but to link the applicant's active legitimacy with those provisions which, although in themselves, do not prevent "the achievement of a constitutional consensus result" (cf. paragraph 26 above), but with which, in terms of systematic, logical and content, it is appropriate to combine the requirement that the existing regulation - to remove the alleged non-constitutional "gap '- be added.
42. If it finds that the active legitimacy of the applicant in this way is so enacted, in relation to the provisions of Paragraph 26 (4) of the Hunting Act (by adjusting the property claims linked to the disappearance of membership of the Hunting Society and that the "gap" also reflects property claims of a different kind), the same is not sustainable - taking into account the above-mentioned condition of an adequate relationship - as regards the provision of Section 26 (3) of the Hunting Act, since it does not provide for any other than the right of a member to resign from the Hunting Society. The lack of active legitimacy of the appellant is therefore a standard ground for rejecting the application within the meaning of Article 43 (1) (c) of the Constitutional Court Act, as this is a proposal made by someone manifestly unjustified.
43. For the reasons set out above, the Constitutional Court rejected the application for annulment of § 26 (4) of Act No. 449 / 2001 Coll., on hunting, as amended, pursuant to § 82 (1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court and rejected the application for annulment of § 26 (3) of the Law pursuant to § 43 (1) (c) of the Law on the Constitutional Court.
44. It is not said that it would not be possible for the legislator to make a positive adjustment to the question of compensation for the use of the affluent land of those who left the affluent community without calling for a declaration of the affluent land, when such an opinion was already expressed in the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic.
President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr. Rychetský v. r.
In accordance with Article 14 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, the Court of First Instance took a different position on the decision of Judge Eliška Wagner.
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Regulation Information
| Citation | The Constitutional Court found No. 149 / 2007 Coll., on the application for annulment of § 26 paragraphs 3 and 4 of Act No. 449 / 2001 Coll., on hunting, as amended |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | The Constitutional Tribunal found |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 27.06.2007 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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