Communication from the Constitutional Court No 141 / 2022 Coll.
Notice from the Constitutional Court of the adoption of the Opinion of the plenary of the Constitutional Court of 10 May 2022 sp. zn.
Valid
Communication from the Constitutional Court
Text versions:
31.05.2022
141
COMMUNICATION
The Constitutional Court
The Plenum of the Constitutional Court was adopted on 10 May 2022 under sp. zn. Pl.
the following opinion:
The infringement of Article 36 (1) and Article 40 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, in conjunction with Article 2 (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and of Article 1 (1) and Article 2 (3) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic, does not, if the separable part of the contested decision of the Court of Appeal within the meaning of Article 258 (2) of the Penal Code or of Article 265k (2) of the Penal Code, contain only a partially satisfactory statement (in the sentence on punishment or protection measure, compensation, etc.) and does not contain a specific statement rejecting or refusing appeal, where applicable, in the remainder; the condition is that it will deal with all relevant objections in the statement of reasons.
Reasons
The facts of the case and the content of the contested decisions
1. The Constitutional Complaints pursuant to Article 87 (1) (d) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as "the Constitution"), conducted under sp. zn. IV. ÚS 1448 / 21, the Complainant seeks the annulment of the order of the Supreme Court of 27. 1. 2021 No. 3 Tdo 840 / 2020-8413, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Prague (hereinafter referred to as "the Supreme Court") of 25. 11. 2019 No. 6. To 16 / 2019-8098 and the judgment of the Regional Court of Budeovice (hereinafter referred to as "Regional Court of Justice") of 22. 11. 2018 No. 16 T 18 / 2015- 7927, alleging that it has infringed its constitutional rights guaranteed in Article 8, Article 36 (1) and Article 40 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Together with this, the complainant is opposed to the action of the Regional Court, which ordered him to serve a prison sentence.
2. The constitutional complaint and its annexes state that the contested judgment of the Regional Court recognised the complainant as guilty of committing a crime of fraud pursuant to § 209 (1) and § 5 (a) of Act No. 40 / 2009 Coll., the Penal Code, as amended.
3. On appeal of the complainant, the Supreme Court annulled the judgment of the Regional Court in the part concerning compensation for damages to one of the victims, to whom he admitted a lower amount (CZK 944 067) and referred him to civil proceedings in the rest. In this way, the Supreme Court corrected the typing error in a written copy of the judgment of the Regional Court in which the Court accidentally ordered one of the victims to pay two sums. Thus, it was a confusing statement which raised uncertainty about the complainant's obligations.
4. Against the judgment of the Supreme Court, the complainant lodged a claim which the Supreme Court rejected by the contested order pursuant to Paragraph 265i (1) (e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure as manifestly unfounded. It is important for the current proceedings in the case of the IV Chamber's proposal that, in the statement of reasons for the contested order, the Supreme Court addressed in greater detail the objection (not) to the existence of a missing operative of the decision of the Court of Appeal, namely the question now raised by the IV Chamber under Article 23 of Law No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, to deliver an opinion. In the judgment under appeal, the Supreme Court partially complied with the appeal brought to remedy the "typist error 'resulting from an incorrect transcription of the judgment (the judgment was therefore declared factually correct). The Supreme Court acknowledged that such an error could be rectified by an amending order pursuant to § 131 (1) of Act No. 141 / 1961 Coll., on criminal proceedings of the Court (criminal law), as amended, but at the same time the appeal court's procedure, which, in order to maintain legal certainty (of the amount of the sum), accepted the annulment of the judgment under appeal. Moreover, the reasoning of the Supreme Court's judgment shows clearly the scope of its appeal review and full settlement in the appeal. According to him, this was not a missing statement if the Supreme Court had partially annulled the judgment of the Regional Court and the rest of the appeal was no longer rejected by another statement. In fact, the negative statement applies only when the appeal as a whole is rejected. This procedure, according to the Supreme Court, has been consistently accepted by the Constitutional Court (sc. never explicitly stated such a defect), although it has taken a completely different view in some recent findings (see below). However, the Supreme Court maintained the conclusions of its earlier decisions, which were challenged by constitutional complaints which were rejected for obvious unfounded reasons (see resolution of 6.10.2020 sp. zn. II. ÚS 2195 / 20 and 3.3.2020 sp. zn. I. ÚS 364 / 20). The Supreme Court based its practice on the grounds that the clandestine clandestine legal formalism, expressed in the (rubberised) findings of 10.7.2018 sp. zn. IV. ÚS 1272 / 18 (N 123 / 90 CollNU 83), of 9.10.2018 sp. zn. IV. ÚS 597 / 18 (N 168 / 91 SbNU 117) and of 16.7.2019 sp. zn. I. ÚS 448 / 19 (N 133 / 95 CollNU 116), could, as a result, cause damage to the rights of the accused persons, as it would only extend the criminal proceedings and increase its costs for formalistic reasons. By abolishing the judgment of the Court of First Instance only in its part, the Court of Appeal implicitly confirmed the accuracy of the remainder of that decision.
5. The referring Chamber recalls that it was not necessary to give further arguments to other parts of the contested decisions of the General Court in respect of the procedure under Article 23 of the Constitutional Court Act, given what is the subject of the present proceedings.
The complainant's argument
6. The complainant contends that the Supreme Court has not properly ruled on the entire petition lodged by him. Therefore, the complainant's appeal was not validly decided and the "judgment 'of the Supreme Court could not have gained legal authority. In addition, the complainant criticises the Supreme Court for seeking to" correct the typing error "in accordance with the procedure laid down in Section 258 (1) of the Criminal Code, as it affects other situations (incorrectly determined damage). If the Court of Appeal does not revoke any part of the judgment of the Court of First Instance and does not reject the appeal, the decision cannot be regarded as being proper (sc. correct). Such a defect cannot be remedied even in the justification of a decision which is not an enforceable part. The complainant (referring to the findings mentioned in the header) considers the practice of general courts to not settle the whole petition to be unconstitutional and contrary to the case law of the Constitutional Court. According to the complainant, the wording of Section 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not preclude such a procedure. According to the complainant, it is desirable that, as in civil proceedings, all issues should always be dealt with explicitly in criminal proceedings. According to the complainant, the failure to comply with this obligation has resulted in an extremely high breach of constitutional protection.
7. Furthermore, the complainant contends that there is a so-called extreme contradiction between the evidence carried out and the conclusions of the general courts. The courts have also failed to carry out the proposed evidence without due justification and the assessment of some of the evidence made is contrary to the in dubio rule for reo. In particular, the complainant points out that, as a result of his long-term mental illness, his criminal liability is excluded, as stated by the first judgment of the Regional Court. It then decided exactly the opposite without clarifying its different approach (compared the value of the various expert opinions and considered "professional rivalry" among experts). The Supreme Court subsequently severely criticised the expert's assessment of the complainant's sanity, but it came out of the newly submitted opinion without hearing the expert, with a number of testimonies pointing to the complainant's unusual behaviour in assessing the question. The complainant's inability to assess his actions is also demonstrated by the cessation of criminal prosecution (due to insanity) for repeated threats to the prosecutor in this case (he then repeated the proceedings against the judges of the appellate court), his opposition to the conduct of the defence of the proposed actions (evidently serving in his favour) or his own submission of an expert opinion serving against him. In addition, on a proposal from the Public Prosecutor's Office, the complainant was significantly limited in its own right in 2018.
Reason for bringing a question to the plenary pursuant to Article 23 of the Constitutional Court Act
8. According to Article 23 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, in the interests of consistency in the decision-making activities of the Constitutional Court, a Chamber is required, in the context of its decision-making activities, to arrive at a legal opinion which deviates from the legal opinion of the Constitutional Court as set out in the decision-making decision-making decision-making decision-making decision-making decision-making decision of the Constitutional Court. Since the IV Chamber has reached such an opinion in the proceedings in respect of the constitutional complaint in question, it gives its opinion on the reference (see sub-4) to the findings of the Constitutional Court, i.e. the findings of 10.7.2018 sp. zn. IV. ÚS 1272 / 18 (N 123 / 90 SbNU 83), of 9.10.2018 sp. zn. IV. ÚS 597 / 18 (N 168 / 91 SbNU 117) and of 16.7.2019 sp. zn. I. ÚS 448 / 19 (N 133 / 95 SbNU 116).
9. The Constitutional Court concluded that "the sentence on the sentence is dependent on the existence of a guilty verdict and, according to the Constitutional Court, it is not possible for the Supreme Court to abolish itself only the sentence on the sentence without dealing with the contested plea - the question of guilt remains open and creates legal uncertainty after the decision of the court of appeal. If, in the contested order, any decision on the fault of the complainant (s) is missing, it is not at the same time apparent whether the Supreme Court annulled the sentence of the sentence only to the request of the prosecutor or only the plaintiffs, or how it dealt with other pleas'.
10. IV. ÚS 597 / 18 The Constitutional Court stated that "the Regional Court in Brno did not rule on the appeal in the manner foreseen by the Code of Criminal Procedure, according to which the Court of Appeal will reject the appeal (§ 266, § 253 (1) and (2)), will refuse (§ 253 (3) and (4)) or cancel the contested decision in whole or in part (§ 257, 258), but decided that it only annulled the claim on compensation. According to the Constitutional Court, it is not possible for the Court of Appeal to abolish, on its own, only the statement of compensation without deciding to appeal against the statements of guilt and, consequently, the sentence '.
11. In Case C-448 / 19, the Constitutional Court concluded that "However, the Constitutional Court considered as justified the complainant's objection that the Supreme Court in the operative part of the order under appeal merely annulled the contested judgments of the District Court in Louny and the Regional Court in Ústí nad Labem in its judgment on the punishment in relation to the complainant and left aside the remainder of its appeal against the plea of guilty. Although it can be established from the grounds of the contested order of the Supreme Court that it took a negative position against the complainant's objections against the plea of guilty, it did not in any way reflect this position until the operative part of its decision, i.e. that it did not decide that the complainant's claim was rejected or rejected in the remainder. It follows from the requested criminal file, as well as from the contested order of the Supreme Court, that the complainant, in her request, opposed not only the sentence of the judgment of the Regional Court in Ústí nad Labem and the judgment of the District Court in Louny, but the entire judgments of the court of appeal. In the judgment in Sp. IV, ÚS 1272 / 18, cited by the complainant, the Constitutional Court stated that the sentence on the sentence is dependent on the existence of a statement of guilt, and it is therefore not possible for the Supreme Court to abolish on its own only the sentence of the sentence without dealing in any way with the contested plea of guilt. In such a case, the question of guilt remains open after the decision of the Court of Appeal and creates legal uncertainty. Since the same situation has occurred in the present case, it cannot be resolved otherwise than by the annulment of the contested order of the Supreme Court, which will decide on both the guilt and the punishment." For the sake of completeness, it should be pointed out that this finding also accuses the general courts of not taking into account the complainant's bankruptcy as the circumstances relevant for assessing its criminal liability.
12. It is clear from the conclusions of these findings and from the complainant's argument that the decision of the Supreme Court (as appellant's court) clearly shows the scope of its appeal review and that it is clear from its reasoning that the appeal against the plea of guilt and punishment was found to be unfounded, which he has detailed. In addition, the Supreme Court stated: "An order refusing an appeal under Section 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall be taken into account only in cases where it is a complete confirmation of the legality and rationality of the judgment under appeal and the proceedings before it. In a situation where, for example, the Court of Appeal concluded that the judgment of the Court of First Instance was unlawful only in the sentence on punishment (or in the statement on compensation), it could no longer decide on the remainder of the appeal by another statement by rejecting the appeal under Paragraph 256 of the Penal Code in respect of that part, since the appeal of the defendant constitutes a single whole. In addition, it follows from the principles set out in Section 258 (1) and (2) of the Criminal Code and Section 256 of the Criminal Code, which govern the decision of the Court of Appeal following the review of the judgment of the Court of First Instance (Section 254 of the Criminal Code) that, if the Court of Appeal considers that only the sentence (or the judgment on compensation) is defective, it shall decide that the other statements in the judgment of the Court of First Instance, that is to say the operative part of the judgment of the Court of First Instance and the operative part of the operative part of the judgment (together with the operative part of that statement), and shall not be affected to that extent. '
13. The Supreme Court also recalled that the Constitutional Court had accepted this procedure in the past (e.g. in resolutions of 20.12.2016 sp. zn. III. ÚS 3806 / 16, 16.10.2018 sp. zn. IV. ÚS 2135 / 18, 21.5.2019 sp. zn. IV. ÚS 4042 / 18, 3.6.2019 sp. zn. III. ÚS 1836 / 18, 30.8.2019 sp. zn. II. ÚS 2710 / 19, 30.8.2019 sp. zn. II. ÚS 2165 / 19 or 24.9.2019 sp. IV. ÚS 2293 / 19), but in some recent cases he took a different view of the issue. In accordance with other resolutions of the Supreme Court, this court decided to maintain its earlier conclusions. He literally stated that, according to these other resolutions, "possible adherence to overriding legal formalism in the sense of the Constitutional Court's finding of 10.7.2018 sp. zn. IV. ÚS 1272 / 18, the finding of 9.10.2018 sp. zn. IV. ÚS 597 / 18 or the finding of 16.7.2019 sp. zn. I. ÚS 448 / 19 could, as a result, even lead to damage to the accused in the application of his constitutional rights to a fair trial. In fact, if the Supreme Court had consistently followed the above findings of the Constitutional Court, it would first have had to order the Court of Appeal, in a private sitting, to complete its original decision in accordance with Article 2651 (2) of the Penal Code. The Court of Appeal would then have to re-order the public sitting and decide explicitly on the guilt and punishment of the defendant. The defendant (and his lawyer) would then run a new period of authorisation, so that it can be rightly assumed that the case would be brought back to the Supreme Court with a period of several months. This would undoubtedly be contrary to the principles of the speed and economy of the proceedings, which, as a result, might not be in favour of the appellant (especially in the context of a situation where he is in prison). At the same time, the Supreme Court pointed out in the decisions cited that, although the appellate court explicitly rejected the appeal of the defendant in part of the objections to which it did not testify, it implicitly confirmed the accuracy of all other statements condemning the judgment. Therefore, if the two courts of the lower institutions have properly dealt with all the objections of the defendant and have provided him with adequate protection of all his rights, none of his fundamental rights, in particular the right to a fair trial, could be infringed by their procedure. In conclusion, the Supreme Court added in those decisions that it could also reasonably be assumed that, after completing the judgment of the Court of First Instance in the required direction, its reasons (already in the light of the reasoning of that decision) would not change, so that the Supreme Court would, however, be in the same position for several months. The Court of First Instance therefore concluded in those decisions that, although that procedure of the second instance is not fully in line with some of the latest findings of the Constitutional Court, it is not of such a serious nature that it must be corrected in the appeal proceedings in the aforementioned manner. '
14. These conclusions were also agreed by the Supreme Court in the present case, adding that the constitutional complaints against the decisions of the Supreme Court in which those conclusions were made (under sp. zn. 3 Tdo 79 / 2020 and 8 Tdo 1059 / 2019) were rejected for obvious unfounded reasons (see resolution of 6.10.2020 sp. zn. II. ÚS 2195 / 20 and 3.3.2020 sp. zn. I. ÚS 364 / 20).
15. On the basis of all the above, the fourth Chamber of the Constitutional Court, which is decisive in the present case, has reached a legal opinion which deviates from the cited legal opinions (sub-paragraphs 9 to 11) in the finds sp. v IV. ÚS 1272 / 18, IV. ÚS 597 / 18 and I. ÚS 448 / 19.
Therefore, pursuant to Article 23 of the Constitutional Court Act, the following question was referred to the full court of the Constitutional Court:
"If the appellate court conforms to an appeal or to a court of appeal which the defendant has made only in part (for example in the judgment on punishment or compensation), does that court have an obligation under Articles 36 (1) and 40 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms to reject or reject the remainder of the appeal (or the appeal) by special statement or is it sufficient to deal with all material objections in the appeal (or the appeal) and that as a result there will be no doubt that it has not found reasonable grounds to object to the other statements of the contested decision (for example of the plea)? '
At the same time, the fourth Chamber shall present a proposal for an opinion which it proposes to express by the following statement:
"The infringement of Article 36 (1) and Article 40 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in conjunction with Article 2 (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 1 (1) and Article 2 (3) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic does not, if the severable part of the contested decision of the Court of Appeal within the meaning of Article 258 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, contain only a partially satisfactory statement (in the operative part of the sentence or the protection measure, compensation, etc.) and does not contain a special statement rejecting or refusing the appeal or, where applicable, in the remainder; the condition is that it will deal with all relevant objections in the statement of reasons. ';
Justification for the diverging legal opinion of the referring Chamber
16. The main focus of the question referred is to assess the extent of the obligations of the courts in criminal proceedings on appeals (brought by the accused) pursuant to Articles 36 (1) and 40 (1) of the Charter. All three of the above findings have come to the conclusions described in the situation in which the general courts have partially complied with the appeal lodged by the defendant. In the remainder, they found an appeal in their reasoning to be unfounded (or manifestly unfounded), which did not include this conclusion in a specific negative (or negative) statement. Thus, if the defendant has lodged an appeal (or an appeal) in the cases in question, the General Court has ruled on him only by a single statement, in such a way that the appeal is partially met.
17. However, in the above mentioned findings, the Constitutional Court concluded that such a procedure was contrary to Article 36 (1) of the Charter (the right to seek the right of an independent and impartial court) and Article 40 (1) of the Charter (the Court only decides on the guilt and punishment for crimes). According to the Fourth Chamber, this legal opinion will not stand up to the contested infringement of Article 40 (1) of the Charter, not only for the reasons set out by the Supreme Court.
18. Since the latter two findings explicitly refer to the oldest finding, it is necessary to look at their arguments in summary terms. The conclusion on the infringement of the rights of the accused was relied on by the Constitutional Court in the following findings by two arguments:
(a) the general courts have acted in breach of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Clause IV of the ÚS 597 / 18): "However, the Regional Court in Brno has not ruled on the appeal in the manner foreseen by the Code of Criminal Procedure, according to which the Court of Appeal will reject the appeal (§ 266, § 253 (1) and (2)), rejects (§ 253 (3) and (4), or abolishes the contested decision in whole or in part (§ 257, 258), but has ruled that it only abolishes the statement on compensation."); and
(b) in addition, in breach of the principle of protection of the legal certainty of the parties (the defendant).
19. If the first of the arguments (infringement of the Code of Criminal Procedure) are made, the findings are limited to a summary of the text of the Decision and do not provide any further interpretation in the legal provisions set out therein, or contain sufficient support to remain on that legal opinion in its confrontation with the Supreme Court's argument based on the implementation of the language, systematic and teleological interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Code, in particular its § 256 and § 258 (2). However, the wording of the other provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure should also be taken into account (see, in particular, Sections 254 and 265i (3) and (4)), which show the link and consistency of the procedure and decision making according to all the rules laid down therein. Therefore, emphasis should be placed on the interdependence of these provisions resulting from the systematic interpretation of the general interpretation of the appeal procedure (or of the appeal procedure) and its purpose, including the rules for the procedure of the court of appeal or appeal, where the case is referred back to it for a new decision.
20. Paragraph 256 of the Penal Code states: "The Court of Appeal shall dismiss the appeal if it finds that it is not justified." It follows from the other provisions that the appeal shall be rejected as unfounded (as a whole), otherwise further provisions on the appeal procedure shall be followed (Sections 254, 257, 258 (1), 259 and 265i to 265m of the Code of Criminal Procedure).
21. Paragraph 257 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure states in the introductory wording: "The court of appeal of the judgment under appeal or part thereof shall be annulled and, to the extent that it is annulled..."
22. The continuity is expressed in the phrase "also" also in the introductory wording of Section 258 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure: "The Court of Appeal shall also annul the judgment under appeal... '
23. Paragraph 258 (2) of the Penal Code states: "If only part of the judgment under appeal is defective and can be separated from the others, the Court of Appeal shall revoke the judgment only in that part; However, if, even in part, the plea of guilt is abolished, it shall at the same time abolish the entire sentence of punishment, as well as the other statements of guilt. '
24. Paragraph 259 of the Penal Code then follows by saying: "If, following the annulment of the judgment under appeal or a part of it, a new decision must be made, the Court of Appeal may refer the case back to the Court of First Instance only if it cannot... '
25. Paragraph 265i (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be mentioned in the law of the procedure. The wording of Paragraph 265k (2) of the Penal Code, which states: "If only part of the contested decision is defective and can be separated from the others, the Supreme Court shall revoke the decision only in that part; However, if, even in part, the statement on guilt is abolished, it shall at the same time abolish the whole sentence on punishment, as well as the other statements on guilt. At the same time, it shall repeal any other decision on the repealed decision or the repealed part of the decision which follows if, in the light of the change made by the cancellation, the substance has ceased to exist. Paragraph 261 shall apply mutatis mutandis. 'There is also a similar link between the provisions of Sections 265i to 265m of the Code of Criminal Procedure).
26. Nor is the interpretation advocated by the Supreme Court in Order No 3 Tdo 840 / 2020-8413, in the view of the Fourth Chamber, indisputable, in order to avoid the systematic interdependence of the legislation of the appeal (or of the appeal) proceedings, where individual provisions cannot be "coupled ', as the findings cited also do. However, the arguments in favour of constitutionality to the recent interpretation of those provisions (not only in case-law, but also in expert literature) prevail.
27. In particular, Section 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and its interpretation are key in the context of all other relevant provisions under the heading "Decisions of the Court of Appeal ', in particular Sections 257 to 259 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see already sub 20 to 24). If it is concluded by the Supreme Court that the appeal must be assessed as a whole in principle and that this provision is applied only when the appeal is rejected as a whole, that is the conclusion drawn by the grammatical and systematic interpretation of the text of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which does not, however, constitute the only possible constitutional conformal interpretation of the provision associated with the constitutional' benefits' mentioned sub 12 and 13. Therefore, the newly applied alternative interpretation in the references linked to the emphasis on the principle of legal certainty (the sedes materiae of which, however, is in Article 1 (1) of the Constitution) by which the Constitutional Court would, through the application of Articles 36 (1) and 40 (1) of the Charter, impose an obligation on the courts to reject a specific statement and a mere part of the appeal, cannot be described as an interpretation to which it was necessary (and possible) to sacrifice systematically linked and to which a successive regulation of the proceedings and decisions on appeals, or an appeal or an appeal in criminal proceedings has been made. In order to enable the Constitutional Court to conclude that an interpretation is to prevail (cf. Article 83 of the Constitution and Article 2 (2) of the Charter and Article 2 (3) of the Constitution, in conjunction with Article 1 (1) of the Constitution in fine), which is based on another approach (the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure" coupled with each other ', rather than on the link and interconnections as a result of an entirely understood criminal procedure in a particular case), it would have to demonstrate that the procedure of the courts at least reduces the level of protection of either fundamental rights and freedoms of the accused or of another Constitution of a protected principle. However, according to the Constitutional Court, this is not the case and there is no sufficient reason to intervene in established case-law practice (that is to say also the aspect of legal certainty).
28. The principle of legal certainty referred to in the cited findings, which is measured by the requirement of public authority to respect the rights of man and citizen, is undoubtedly one of the principles protected by constitutional order and by the rule of law as a whole. However, its protection, in particular if it is brought about in a way that ignores the coherence and specificity of the rules governing appeals and, where appropriate, legal redress in criminal matters, must reflect in particular the material dimension of fundamental rights and freedoms. Legal certainty can then be difficult to argue from a general point of view where there is established caselaw and interpretation which respects the specificities of criminal proceedings. It is therefore appropriate to draw a conclusion which is consistent with the requirement that criminal justice be carried out under the general requirement of Article 2 (2) of the Charter and Article 2 (3) of the Constitution in cases, limits and in the manner laid down in the criminal rules. In view of the problem of the circumstantial retrospective of the judicial departure, intervention in the interpretation of the law (in particular in criminal proceedings) should be considered if there are no serious arguments against them. This can certainly be the violation of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the parties to criminal proceedings, not only the accused, but also the victims. In other words, it is difficult to accept the distortion of the stability of law and its interpretation (legal certainty) only on the basis of the argument of the need for the stability of law and its interpretation, that is, the argument of legal certainty again.
29. To argue legal certainty, it should be noted that, due to many different concepts of legal certainty - such as the security of persons through law (considered after World War II in the preparation of a new constitution), stability, as a certainty in law in the sense of vertical and horizontal - legal certainty can be otherwise understood in public law relations (public law behaviour) and otherwise in private law relations. Likewise, the Constitutional Court does not intend to enter the field of knowledge of legal certainty from an objective point of view (whether it exists independently of the entity's beliefs) or only in a subjective sense (respecting the individual's belief that this is how the law will be interpreted and used). Moreover, even in a legal state, the concept of legal certainty may be different depending on whether we stand on the concept of the rule of law in a formal sense (e.g. lex dura sed lex) or on its value basis, without which it cannot be dura, or cannot be accepted as lex (legal certainty in a formal and material sense).
30. In view of the role of the Constitutional Court as a judicial body for the protection of constitutionality, constitutional legal protection of the principle of legal certainty has its irreplaceable place where it effectively manifests itself in the legal position of the person concerned. However, it cannot be disregarded that the argument of legal certainty has different effects in different areas regulated by law. It is of particular form and importance in criminal law (rules of evidence, principle of presumption of innocence and rule in dubio for reo, prohibition of retroactivity, transparency and predictability of application of law, access to law, principle of rei iudicatae, principle of ne bis in idem). For the purposes of legal certainty, it is a key possibility for criminal actors to recognise whether certain acts are allowed, possible, prohibited or ordered, protected. The question in the present case is what the consequences of legal proceedings (appeals, appeals) can, in particular, be expected by the defendant and what should be stated in it to give the requested response (public response).
31. The Constitutional Court therefore monitors, in the protection of this principle, whether, in a particular case, the complainant's legal status is improved, or whether, by failing to provide such protection, there is a real deterioration in his position, i.e. the so-called interference in fundamental rights and freedoms in the material sense [cf., for example, the order of the Constitutional Court of 26.3.2009 sp. zn. I. ÚS 3108 / 08 (U 9 / 52 SbNU 821); Similarly, the opinion of the plenary of 3.12.1996 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS-st. 3 / 96 (ST 3 / 7 of SbNU 40)]. By formalising the protection of this principle, there will not only be any strengthening of the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, but, on the contrary, such a procedure may have negative consequences for the level of protection of other fundamental rights and freedoms.
32. According to the Constitutional Court, it cannot be borne in mind that, by establishing an obligation (following a civil procedure, as the complainant claims, the need for the main procedural institutions in the Czech judiciary to be interpreted in a uniform manner) to deal with the specific court's statement (ruling on the appeal) with any statement challenged by the appeal, there is a real strengthening of the protection of the rights of the accused. If the criminal court fulfils its obligation to deal with the defendant's argument in a clear and comprehensive manner in the statement of reasons for its decision, the requirement to translate these considerations into a specific statement is merely a formalistic strengthening of the protection of the defendant's rights. In other words, the defendant's legal status is not actually strengthened by promoting such an obligation.
33. According to the Constitutional Court, the defendant in such a situation is not in doubt as to the enforceability and enforceability of the judgments in his case, since the decision of the appellant (or of the appellant) of the Court of First Instance constitutes one whole in terms of enforceability with the decision of the Court of First Instance (see also the frequent wording "judgment of the District Court... as amended by the judgment of the Regional Court... '). This is particularly true when the court of appeal or of appeal has ruled by the judgment under appeal on punishment or compensation for damages, when those statements are directly dependent on the fact that they have been found to be the correct verdict on guilt (see also paragraphs 258 (2) and 265k (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure). In other words, they cannot exist without it, so that, for example, punishment cannot be imposed unless the court of appeal or the court of appeal finds it unfounded to object to the plea of guilt and, as a result, the correct plea of guilt.
34. In addition, in the appeal proceedings, the Code of Criminal Procedure requires compulsory representation by a lawyer assisting the defendant to meet all the requirements for the application of this extraordinary remedy. If, in exceptional cases, there is doubt about the defendant's ability to defend himself properly (which is certainly an element of the ability to understand what and how the courts decide), such an accused must have a lawyer in the rest of the criminal proceedings (§ 36 (2) of the Criminal Code). The law on criminal proceedings therefore contains mechanisms to compensate for exceptional individual problems in order to protect the principle of legal certainty concerning the content of judgments.
35. However, it cannot be overlooked that, in contrast, maintaining legal opinion in the cited findings has several consequences that undermine the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms or constitutional principles. As the Supreme Court argues, the strict enforcement of this practice will lead to an extension of the procedure in breach of Article 38 (2) of the Charter (and the principle of economy). As is apparent from the above (see sub-13) of the order of the Supreme Court, this right is limited without sufficient legitimate material grounds.
36. The same applies to the protection of the principle of legal certainty in the procedural sense (predictability of the decision-making process) and in the material sense (predictability of the outcome). In the case of certain decisions (decisions of the Court of Appeal or, for example, of the Court of Appeal relating to compensation for damages) which would be annulled and recovered in the event of a breach of practice, there is also a "breaking 'of their legal power and enforceability, thereby (for purely formal reasons) undermining the legal status of the parties, including the impact on third parties. It cannot be seen that the legal power and enforceability of the decision are not only related to the defendant (and the prosecutor), but also to other persons, in particular the injured (in some cases particularly vulnerable victims), although the protection of their legal status and subjective rights is" postponed "in this way, in exceptional cases (e.g. death of the accused) even questioned. It is therefore a threat of a real impact on the legal status of the participants in criminal proceedings, which could not always be avoided or predicted when following the legal opinion in the cited findings. On the contrary, the possibility of obtaining procedural rights in criminal proceedings by recourse to appeals is not directly and inevitably affected by the law on judicial protection under Article 36 (1) of the Charter.
37. Where there is a possible infringement of the rights under Article 40 (1) of the Charter, the scope of those rights (its extension) shall not be affected by any change in past practice. Each sentenced person shall have the right to a clear, verifiable statement of his or her guilt and to a comprehensive settlement of his or her objections to (not) accuracy and (not) the legality of that statement in the reasoning of the court decision. Nor can it be inferred from this provision of the Charter that a court of appeal (or of appeal) would be required by a special order to dismiss the appeals brought in respect of a plea which, in its view, has already been correctly decided by a court of a lower degree, which would, moreover, in the circumstances of the case, call into question the outcome of the proceedings on the basis of the case before the Court of Appeal or the Court of Appeal.
Conclusion
38. For the reasons set out above, the Constitutional Court has concluded that the violation of the constitutional rights of the defendant or of other persons entitled to appeal is not, if his unfounded appeal (s) is not responded only in the preamble to the judgment. The level of protection of their constitutional rights does not reduce such action. The Constitutional Court thus finds that, in breach of Article 36 (1) and Article 40 (1) of the Charter in conjunction with Article 2 (2) of the Charter and Article 1 (1) and Article 2 (3) of the Constitution, the separable part of the contested decision of the Court of Appeal within the meaning of Article 258 (2) of the Penal Code or the Appeal Court within the meaning of Article 265k (2) of the Penal Code is not merely a partially satisfactory statement (in the sentence on punishment or protection measure, compensation, etc.) and does not contain a specific statement rejecting or refusing appeal, or appeal, in the rest; the condition is that it will deal with all relevant objections in the statement of reasons.
39. In the light of the above, this opinion also covers constitutional complaints already lodged with the Constitutional Court, which have not yet been decided.
President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr. Rychetský v. r.
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Regulation Information
| Citation | Communication from the Constitutional Court No 141 / 2022 Coll., on the adoption of the Opinion of the plenary of the Constitutional Court of 10 May 2022 sp. zn. |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | Communication from the Constitutional Court |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 31.05.2022 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
Legal Areas:
Criminal law
Criminal law
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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