The Constitutional Court found No 116 / 2018 Coll.
The Constitutional Court found of 16 May 2018 sp. zn.
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116
FIND
The Constitutional Court
On behalf of the Republic
The Constitutional Court decided under sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 15 / 16 on 16 May 2018 in plenary composed of the President of the Court of Paul Rychetský (Judge) and judges Louis David, Jaroslav Fenyk, Josef Fiale, Jan Filip, Jaromír Jirsa, Tomáš Lichovnik, Jan Musil, Vladimir Sládeček, Radovana Sukánek, Catherine Šimáková, Vojtěch Šimíček, Milady Tomková, David Uhlíř and Jiří Zemánek on the proposal of the Regional Court in Ostrava, under which the President of the Law 22 and Mgr. Jiř. Jiří Gottwald, on the annulment of § 125f. 1 of this Act, in effect until 30 June 2017, with the Parliament as a member of the Czech Republic as a member of the Parliament, as a member of the Czech Republic, as a member of the procedure of the European Parliament of the Czech Republic, as a secondary court of the Czech Republic, and of the Czech Republic, as a part of the proceedings of the Czech Republic, and of the
as follows:
Motion denied.
Reasons
Subject matter
1. Before the Regional Court in Ostrava ("the applicant" or "the Regional Court"), proceedings for the action of Mgr. Jiří Malysiak ("the plaintiff") against the decision of the Regional Office of the Moravian-Silesian Region, Transport Department, dated 2 July 2014 No. MSK 76329 / 2014 are pending. This Decision confirmed the decision of the Municipality of Ostrava ("the Municipality ') of 15 May 2014 No. SMO / 181631 / 14 / DSČ / Mar, which decided that the claimant had committed an administrative offence pursuant to Section 125f (1) of Act No. 361 / 2000 Coll., on road traffic and on amendments to certain laws (Road Traffic Act), as amended by Act No. 297 / 2011 Coll., (unless otherwise stated below," Road Traffic Act' means this Act in its version effective until 30 June 2017). According to Section 125f (3), in conjunction with Section 125g (3) of the Road Traffic Act, he was fined in the amount of CZK 2 000 together with the obligation to pay the costs of the proceedings connected with the hearing of the administrative offence of CZK 1 000.
2. In accordance with Article 10 (3) of the Road Traffic Act, the applicant should have committed the offence by not ensuring that the driver's obligations and road traffic rules laid down by the Road Traffic Act were respected when using it. In the administrative procedure, it was demonstrated that a more undetected driver left this motor vehicle in the centre of Ostrava on 31 October 2013, 3 December 2013 and 18 December 2013 in places that were either within the scope of the traffic signs prohibiting standing or where the prohibition of standing was due to the fact that this place was less than 5 m before and 5 m behind the intersection. This was intended to satisfy the facts of the infringement under § 125c (1) (k) of the Road Traffic Act.
3. All three cases of misdemeanor have been reported by the city police and reported to the Magistrate. On 7 February 2014, the plaintiff, as a vehicle operator, received calls for payment of a specified amount of CZK 500 for each of these offences. On 20 February 2014, the Municipality received its communication indicating the person who was to drive the vehicle. In the course of the investigation, it was found that this person died on 23 January 2014 and that, in the period when the offences were committed, he could not drive a motor vehicle due to his health. Since the Municipality did not find the facts justifying the initiation of proceedings against a person within 60 days of the date on which it became aware of the infringements, the case under Paragraph 66 (3) (g) of Act No. 200 / 1990 Coll., as amended, was postponed. At the same time, the condition laid down in Section 125f (4) (a) of the Road Traffic Act was to be met to discuss the applicant's administrative offence.
4. The decision on the application depends on the assessment of whether the imposition of a penalty for an administrative offence pursuant to Section 125f (1) of the Road Traffic Act, committed by the vehicle operator by infringing obligations under Section 10 (3) of the Road Traffic Act, will not result in a breach of the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights and freedoms of the applicant. Those provisions shall lay down the responsibility for the natural person who is the operator of the vehicle for the failure of another person to comply with the driver's obligations and road traffic rules when using the vehicle. According to the Regional Court, the law thus presupposes the fault of a motor vehicle operator for violating obligations that cannot be ensured. The vehicle operator may, in principle, prevent an administrative offence from being dealt with only by communicating, within 15 days of receipt of the call for payment of the specified amount, information on the identity of the driver of the vehicle at the time of the offence, even if it is a close person.
5. In the view of the Regional Court, the contested provisions are contrary to the rule of law under Article 1 (1) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as "the Constitution '), the right to withhold the statement referred to in Article 37 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as" the Charter'), the principle of presumption of innocence under Article 40 (2) of the Charter and the right to a fair trial under Article 6 (1) of the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as "the Convention '). The Regional Court, by order of 17 March 2016 No 22 A 85 / 2014-29, therefore suspended the action of the applicant and filed with the Constitutional Court an application for annulment of Paragraph 10 (3) of the Road Traffic Act. The application was served together with the relevant judicial and administrative file on 8 April 2016.
6. The Court of Justice of the European Union ("the Court of Justice ') of the European Union (" the Court of Justice of the European Union') stated that the Court of Justice of the European Union ("the Court of Justice of the European Union ') had adopted a decision on the application for annulment. In order to challenge the Constitutional Court, it amended its proposal in this part by means of a letter received on 27 September 2017 by proposing, in the light of the amendment of Section 125f (1) of the Road Traffic Act, which was implemented with effect from 1 July 2017 by Act No. 183 / 2017 Coll., amending certain laws in the context of the adoption of the Act on Liability for Infringements and Proceedings and of the Act on Certain Infringements, a declaration of the ilconstitutional nature of that provision, as effective until 30 June 2017.
Arguments of the appellant
7. The appellant points out that the amendment to Act No. 361 / 2000 Coll., on road traffic and on amendments to certain laws (Road Traffic Act), as amended by Act No. 297 / 2011 Coll., introduced the objective responsibility of the vehicle operator for the administrative offence committed by the vehicle operator not ensuring that the driver's obligations and road traffic rules laid down by the Road Traffic Act are respected when using the vehicle. This responsibility has been established despite the fact that the vehicle operator, whether it is a legal person, a natural person doing business or another natural person, cannot fulfil this obligation, as it will generally not be able to influence the driver's behaviour. Moreover, his responsibility is assumed, which is contrary to any rules of criminal or administrative law. Nor can a contradiction with certain fundamental rights and principles of the rule of law under Article 1 (1) of the Constitution be overlooked. In this context, the appellant points out that the fundamental features of the rule of law also include the requirement that the State, through its institutions, should not affect anyone for acts which are not illegal or harmful and which are even expressly permitted by law.
8. The caselaw of the administrative courts, like the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, is based on the principle in the long term that the same basic principles apply to criminal penalties for administrative offences. This applies both in the area of substantive and procedural law. Those basic principles include the presumption of innocence under Article 40 (2) of the Charter. It is the State that bears the burden of proof, and it is therefore up to the administration to prove the defendant's guilt. The defendant cannot be blamed for denying certain facts. Legal liability must be based in principle on the principle of fault, which is not respected by the contested provisions. According to the appellant, the concept of objective liability on which so-called other administrative offences are based should only be an exception to the principle of presumption of innocence and should only be admissible if those offences can be refuted by the accused.
9. Furthermore, the appellant submits that the contested provisions create unjustified disparities in the position of citizens. The person prosecuted for the offence is in a better position than the person prosecuted for the administrative offence. In so doing, other administrative offences of natural persons do not differ by nature from offences based on the principle of guilt. The reason for the departure from this principle cannot be an attempt to simplify the position of an administrative body, which was precisely the intention of the legislator, who wanted to prevent drivers from abusing the institution of a loved one.
10. The current legislation gives the vehicle operator only two possibilities to behave when the person close to the vehicle is involved in the offence. It shall exercise its right to remain silent, knowing that it will be sanctioned itself, or shall not exercise that right, indicating the identity of the driver of the vehicle. The use of the right to remain silent within the meaning of Article 37 (1) of the Charter, without any penalty being imposed on the operator of a motor vehicle or its person close to it, shall not be possible.
11. It appears appropriate for the appellant to refer to the similarity of the responsibility of the weapon holder, where he is only entitled to entrust it to the person who has the relevant authorisation. By analogy with the current dictation of the Road Traffic Act, the person holding the gun would be responsible for the crime against life or health committed by the person to whom the gun was lawfully entrusted, and the actual shooter would have escaped without punishment, which is obviously an absurd and completely constitutionally unconformal situation.
Proceedings before the Constitutional Court
12. The Constitutional Court, pursuant to Article 69 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as "Law on the Constitutional Court"), sent a proposal to Parliament's chambers as its representatives in the present proceedings (cf. Article 9 of Act No. 300 / 2017 Coll., on the principles of conduct and relations between the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, and amending Act No. 90 / 1995 Coll., on the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, as amended, which will become effective on 1 September 2018, and on the Government and the Ombudsman's rights as authorised to intervene as a party to the proceedings. A further submission by the appellant, specifying the application, was also received.
Observation of Parliament's chambers
13. The Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, both in their observations dated 1 June 2016 and 29 May 2016, signed by the Presidents of the individual chambers of Jan Hamakk and Milan Štěm, briefly summarized the course of the legislative process under which Act No. 297 / 2011 Coll., amending Act No. 361 / 2000 Coll., on road traffic and amendments to certain laws (Road Traffic Act), as amended, and Act No. 247 / 2000 Coll., on the acquisition and improvement of professional competence for the management of motor vehicles and on amendments to certain laws, as amended. These comments were also referred to in their submissions of 19 December 2016 and 9 December 2016, which responded to the extension of the proposal.
Government observations
14. By order No 486 of 30 May 2016, the Government decided to enter the proceedings, which the Constitutional Court was informed of the following day by the statutory deadline. The Government mandated the Minister for Human Rights, Equal Opportunities and Legislation, in cooperation with the Minister for Transport and the Minister for the Interior, to prepare and send observations on the draft Constitutional Court. At the same time, the Minister of Transport has entrusted the Government's representation in this proceeding.
15. In its observations of 21 June 2016, signed by the Minister for Human Rights, Equal Opportunities and Legislation Mgr. Jiří Dienstbier, the Government expressed its belief that Paragraph 10 (3), in conjunction with Sections 125f to 125h of the Road Traffic Act, does not conflict with the constitutional order. The legal arrangements in question aim to ensure the safety of road traffic and the protection of life, health and property, as well as to ensure the effective enforceability of the statutory obligations of drivers and road traffic rules. It was intended to allow for effective sanctions by technical means of documented negotiations that put other road users at risk for health, life or property. This penalty has been prevented in the past by the massive abuse by the vehicle operators of the institution of a loved one, or by the absence of an explanation. The introduction of objective liability for certain types of "traffic offences' is intended to prevent vehicle operators from continuing to entrust them to persons who have threatened the safety of other road users by acting, or to take measures that would force road traffic rules on such persons.
16. The objective responsibility of the vehicle operator shall not apply to all types of "traffic offences' but only to those identified by means of an automated technical device used without operator and to unauthorised stopping or standing. These are exclusively offences for which there is clear evidence of infringement of road traffic rules, but it is very difficult to identify a particular offender. The Government considers it necessary for the police authorities to use technical means to ensure supervision of compliance with road traffic rules. This is particularly true in cases where it is generally not possible to intervene immediately against the perpetrator of a traffic offence. There is no immediate contact between the police officer and the perpetrator of the offence, or the possibility of stopping the vehicle is made difficult without compromising the safety or fluidity of road traffic.
17. The offences of non-compliance with the maximum permitted speed are significantly involved in the number of persons killed and seriously injured, and in general the other road users are also significantly threatened by health, life or property. In 2015, excessive speed was the main cause of 16,8% of road accidents and 39,1% of persons killed in an accident. In 2012 - immediately before the introduction of the objective responsibility of the vehicle operator - the main cause was 20,6% of accidents and 41% of deaths in a car accident. From 2009 to 2015, i.e. in the reference period in terms of the implementation of the measures of the National Road Safety Strategy, the number of deaths from high-speed accidents was reduced by 133 people and badly injured by 469 people. According to the Government, the legislation in question is a textbook example of how the establishment of effective enforcement of statutory obligations can lead to significant preventive action on the addressees of the standard.
18. In formulating the contested legislation, the legislator was inspired by similar legislation contained in the legal systems of a number of European states, such as the Netherlands, Austria, Germany, Finland and Slovakia. It also took into account the decision of the European Court of Human Rights of 19.10.2004 concerning complaint No 66273 / 01 Falk against the Netherlands. It stated that the rule of objective liability of the vehicle operator is not contrary to Article 6 (2) of the Convention.
19. As regards the arguments put forward by the appellant, the Government stated that the administrative offence of the vehicle operator is based on objective liability with the possibility of liberation, not absolute objective liability. The vehicle operator shall be relieved of liability if it proves compliance with the legally defined liberation grounds set out in Section 125f (5) of the Road Traffic Act. At the same time, it is an administrative offence subsidiary. An administrative offence should be dealt with only if it is not possible, on the basis of any evidence or evidence, to identify and prosecute the actual driver. The Government considers that the construction of an administrative offence corresponds both to the concept of individual liability and to the public interest in penalising objectively existing unlawful status caused by road traffic.
20. The administrative offence in question constitutes a specific type of liability aimed at affecting objectively existing and unequivocally detected unlawful situations caused by the operation or use of the vehicle in road traffic. The point is that this unlawful situation should not remain unpunished despite the impossibility of punishing the perpetrators. Although the rule is that the liability of a non-undertaking, unlike the liability of a legal person or of an undertaking natural person, is based on fault and that the burden of proof is borne by the administrative authority in the proceedings, in the present case there are reasons to depart from the "normal 'concept of liability of the natural person. A natural person has a special status here as a vehicle operator and thus has an increased responsibility for compliance with public law in the form of road traffic rules.
21. A similar arrangement based on increased claims for compliance with public law by non-business natural persons with a special status is therefore not "ordinary" natural persons, according to the Government can be found in other laws. Act No. 111 / 1994 Coll., on Road Transport, as amended, provides for, for example, the objective liability of a natural person in his capacity as carrier. Act No. 289 / 1995 Coll., on Forests and on the amendment and addition of certain laws (Forest Act), as amended, provides for the objective liability of a natural person in the capacity of forest owner, or Act No. 200 / 1994 Coll., on Geometry and amending and supplementing certain laws relating to its introduction, as amended, provides for the objective liability of a person who has been granted an official authorisation.
22. The Government stresses that the administrative penalty which may be imposed on the vehicle operator does not exceed the amount corresponding to the penalty for the offence. In some cases it may even be significantly lower. If it has not been proven that the offence was committed by the operator himself, then it is not possible to assign points in the point system or impose a ban on him. Thus, the person prosecuted for an offence is not in a more favourable position than the person prosecuted for an administrative offence, as incorrectly stated in the proposal.
23. According to the Government, the contested provisions do not impose on the vehicle operator a burden which he is unable to bear. In accordance with Article 11 (3) of the Charter, ownership shall include an obligation against other interests protected by the Constitution and the Charter, which shall apply to the owner. The vehicle operator, although not necessarily its owner, is the person who has the power and actual handling of the vehicle in the long term, decides on its use, ensures its repair, maintenance and fulfilment of other obligations associated with the operation of the vehicle. In the Czech legal order it is not exceptional that the obligation does not fall on a person who has the vehicle in his power at the moment, but that one person is designated to cover the proper operation of the vehicle and who is the carrier of the relevant duties, along with reasonable liberal reasons. For example, pursuant to Article 83 (1) of Act No 56 / 2001 Coll., on the conditions of the operation of vehicles on the road and amending Act No. 168 / 1999 Coll., on the insurance of liability for damage caused by the operation of a vehicle and on the amendment of certain related laws (Act on the insurance of liability from the operation of a vehicle), as amended, as amended, and ("the Act on the conditions of operation of vehicles on the road '), the vehicle operator is sanctioned for the operation of the vehicle without a plate bearing the registration mark being affixed to it.
24. By entrusting the vehicle to another person, the vehicle operator shall not waive the right of ownership or liability for the consequences of the use of the vehicle. The objective responsibility for the consequences of the operation of the vehicle is foreseen in Article 2927 et seq. of the Civil Code and it is quite reasonable that similar liability is enshrined in the general level of protection of the life, health and property of other persons in public law. The vehicle operator shall always be jointly responsible for the operation of the vehicle. By entrusting the vehicle to another person, he is always in a "contractual 'relationship with that person and thus has the opportunity to determine the conditions and manner in which the vehicle will be used and, where appropriate, to resolve the consequences of incorrect use of the vehicle. Therefore, in addition to the training of the driver to whom the vehicle is provided, the operator has the possibility to set up parameters of the relationship in which the possible breach of his liability under Section 10 (3) of the Road Traffic Act will be taken into account. Subsequently, it may enforce the amount of administrative penalty imposed on the actual offender.
25. Nor does the argument that the contested provisions do not comply with the principle of presumption of innocence under Article 40 (2) of the Charter has any justification. The subject of an administrative offence is not an examination of the fault of the vehicle operator for violating a specific road traffic rule, as it is an objective responsibility which is normally provided for in the transport rules. The financial penalty in the much lower range takes into account the secondary nature of the administrative offence. The impact on the personal sphere of the vehicle operator is therefore lower than the impact on direct punishment of the driver.
26. The government is aware of a collision of two constitutionally protected values. On the one hand, there is the right of everyone to refuse a statement if it would create a risk of harm to themselves or to a close person. On the other hand, there are important public interests, namely ensuring road safety, protecting the life, health and property of others, as well as ensuring the enforceability of the law. It is not possible to identify the perpetrator on the spot for offences detected by automatic techniques. Its subsequent findings from the documents at the disposal of the administrative authority are, again, very complicated and almost impossible without cooperation from the vehicle operator. Prior to the entry into force of Act No. 297 / 2011 Coll., a large number of these offences remained unresolved, as the vehicle operators had an excellent use (or abuse) of the right to refuse the statement, which, however, led to the fact that the perpetrators of documented infringements could not be severely punished. Therefore, the legislator's aim was to ensure a balanced protection of all the above values, which could only be achieved by introducing an objective vehicle operator responsibility institute. In the view of the Government, this balance is ensured in particular by the nature of the penalty, by the secondary nature of the objective liability of the vehicle operator in relation to the liability of the vehicle driver for the offence, and by the fact that the responsibility of the vehicle operator applies only to certain infringements of the road traffic rules. Therefore, although the consequences of the objective liability assessment may be seen as some pressure on the vehicle operator to indicate who was driving the vehicle at the time of the infringement of the road traffic rules and is therefore the perpetrator of the infringement, this pressure is balanced by the above parameters.
27. The Government responded to the extension of the proposal by the Minister of Transport, Ing. Dan Choka, dated 23 December 2016, according to which this extension can only be considered as a formal addition to the petition of the original proposal, to which no further argument needs to be made. In addition to the Government's original observations, the Minister referred to the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 16 June 2016 No 6 As 73 / 2016-40, in which that court dealt, inter alia, with the question of compliance of the contested provisions with the constitutional order, in the context of considering the possibility of bringing an application for annulment pursuant to Article 95 (2) of the Constitution. It stated that "taking into account that the liability of the vehicle operator pursuant to § 10 (3) and § 125f of the Road Traffic Act is limited to a narrow group of offences objectively and reliably identified by means of an automated technical device used without operator in the supervision of road safety or consisting of an unjustified stop or stand [§ 125f (1) (a)], (sic)
- provided that such infringement does not result in an accident [then the individual liability of the offender would be fully exercised on the basis of the principle of guilt; § 125f (1) (c)], (sic - rev.)
- where, moreover, the liability is not absolute but with the possibility of liberalisation for reasons which the registered vehicle operator could not have had any influence on (cf. section 125f (5)),
- and even when, beyond what is necessary - according to the legal structure, the responsibility of the vehicle operator is only secondary, i.e. only if the necessary steps to identify the actual perpetrator of the offence have not led to the target (§ 125f (4)),
- finally, taking into account the nature and intensity of this form of indirect pressure on the vehicle operator (limited amount of fine, absence of points in the register of drivers), the Supreme Administrative Court... has no serious reason to doubt that the legislation in question will stand up in the constitutional test. "The Supreme Administrative Court also referred to certain decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in which no infringement of Article 6 of the Convention was found in the case of similar legal arrangements in Austria and the United Kingdom.
28. The Government has proposed that the Constitutional Court reject the application for annulment of the contested provisions.
Communication from the Ombudsman
29. The Ombudsman Mgr. Anna Shabatová, Ph.D., by letter of 10 May 2016, informed the Constitutional Court that she was not taking advantage of her right to enter the proceedings. It also maintained its decision in its Communication of 7 December 2016, which it responded to the extension of the proposal.
Oral proceedings
30. In accordance with Article 44 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court has ruled in the matter without the oral hearing, since further clarification could not be expected from it.
Proceedings before the Constitutional Court
31. The Constitutional Court first examined whether all the procedural conditions for hearing an application under Article 87 (1) (a) and Article 95 (2) of the Constitution laid down by the Law on the Constitutional Court were fulfilled in the present case. The proposal clearly complies with all legal formalities (Section 34 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court).
Legality of the appellant
32. Pursuant to Article 64 (3) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, an application for annulment of the Law or its individual provisions is also entitled to be filed by the Court in the context of its decision-making activities under Article 95 (2) of the Constitution. According to this Article, if the court concludes that the law to be applied in the resolution of the case is contrary to the constitutional order, it shall bring the matter before the Constitutional Court. That condition of the design authorisation is fulfilled in respect of the law (or its provision), the use of which is intended to be immediate or unavoidable in the present case [Resolution of 23.10.2000 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 39 / 2000 (U 39 / 20 SbNU 353)] and which simultaneously obstructs the achievement of the desired (constitutionally conformal) result [for example, the finding of 6.3.2007 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 3 / 06 (N 41 / 44 SbNU 517; 149 / 2007 Sb.), paragraph 26; the finding of 28.1.2014 sp. Pl. ÚS 49 / 10 (N 10 / 72 SbNU 111; 44 / 2014 Sb.), paragraph 18].
33. In the proceedings before the Regional Court, it is decided whether the applicant has committed an administrative offence under Section 125f (1) of the Road Traffic Act, namely whether, as a vehicle operator contrary to Section 10 (3) of that Act, he has ensured that the driver's obligations and the rules of road traffic are respected when using a road vehicle. In the context of its legal assessment, the Regional Court is obliged to consider the compatibility of the legislation it is to apply to the matter with the constitutional order, inter alia, in view of the possible consequences of its application to the parties. If the unconstitutional nature of the law were to involve undue interference in their constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights and freedoms, then, in the context of the legal assessment of the matter, protection should be given priority.
34. The Regional Court concluded that Article 125f (1) and Article 10 (3) of the Road Traffic Act, which define the administrative offence which the claimant has been found guilty of, are contrary to the constitutional order, and therefore proposed to the Constitutional Court to decide on the annulment of both provisions. If his application was found to be justified and the contested provisions were repealed because of a breach of the obligations laid down in them with the constitutional rights and freedoms guaranteed, that would mean that the conduct for which the applicant was prosecuted was - despite the legislation in force at the time - legally and should not be penalised. Otherwise, the Regional Court would have to come out of the existing legal regulation and confirm the contested decision as a legal act. In this context, the conditions laid down in Article 95 (2) of the Constitution and Article 64 (3) of the Law on the Constitutional Court have been fulfilled, under which the Court of First Instance may file a motion for annulment of the Law. The application for annulment of the contested provisions was lodged by the applicant.
Jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court to assess the constitutionality of the already repealed law
35. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court examined whether, in the case of the contested provisions, the ground for inadmissibility of the application was given or for the termination of the proceedings. Pursuant to Article 67 (1) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, if the law, other legislation or individual provisions of which annulment is sought cease to apply before the end of the proceedings before the Constitutional Court, the proceedings shall be terminated. This provision reflects the fact that Article 87 (1) (a) and (b) of the Constitution confers on the Constitutional Court the power to decide on the repeal of a law or other legislation (in the sense of the decision on the expiry of them at a given date). Therefore, the termination of proceedings in these cases is justified by the fact that the legislation has been repealed and therefore nothing can be achieved in the proceedings for the repeal of laws and other legislation - from the point of view of the validity of the legislation for the future. For the same reason, Paragraph 66 (1) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, provides for the inadmissibility of the application where the law, other legislation or individual provisions of which the annulment is proposed have ceased to apply before the application is served on the Constitutional Court.
36. While the proposal to repeal Paragraph 10 (3) of the Road Traffic Act clearly does not constitute any of these reasons, the provision of Section 125f (1) of the Road Traffic Act was partially amended by Act No. 183 / 2017 Coll., amending certain laws in connection with the adoption of the Act on Liability for Infringes and Proceedings and the Act on Certain Infringements. In particular, it replaced, with effect from 1 July 2017, the words "A legal or natural person commits an administrative offence by committing an offence as a vehicle operator 'by the words" The vehicle operator commits an offence by committing an offence by'. This change did not only affect the designation of an administrative offence, which is a new offence, but also its legal definition, since it was followed by the general regulation contained in Act No. 250 / 2016 Coll., on liability for and proceedings against offences. It is therefore an amendment [within the meaning of the Resolution of 26.9.2000 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 35 / 2000 (U 33 / 19 SbNU 297)], which resulted in the termination of Section 125f (1) of the Road Traffic Act, as amended by Act No. 297 / 2011 Coll., in the period after the application for its annulment, thus creating the situation foreseen by Section 67 (1) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court. However, the Constitutional Court had to take into account that the appellant had made its application in connection with the proceedings before it, and the assessment of the constitutionality of that provision still required for the decision in the case.
37. Strictly speaking, the consequences of the expiry of the legislation pursuant to § 67 (1) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, should always apply to the proceedings for annulment of the law or other legislation. However, that conclusion will not stand in the case of an application under Article 95 (2) of the Constitution, which regulates the court's obligation to bring the case before the Constitutional Court, if it concludes that the law to be applied in the resolution of the case is contrary to the constitutional order. The purpose of checking the constitutionality of the law by the Constitutional Court is not exhausted by the repeal of the law, which is contrary to the constitutional order. It also includes the possibility to reflect the conclusion on the unconstitutional nature of the law in the legal assessment of cases in which this legislation was or should be applied by public authorities [for example, in detail the finding of 18.12.2007 sp. zn. IV. ÚS 1777 / 07 (N 228 / 47 SbNU 983) and the finding of 3.2.2016 sp. zn. I. ÚS 3599 / 15 (N 24 / 80 SbNU 285)]. Otherwise it would be contrary to Article 1 of the Charter and Article 4 The Constitution is prevented from protecting constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights and freedoms in cases where the application of the unconstitutional law has led to a breach of them.
38. If the law in force is the subject of a check on constitutionality, then the conclusion on its non-constitutionality may be reached in a particular case by way of a procedure for the annulment of a law or other legislation, having regard to the binding nature of all the institutions and persons by binding legal opinion as expressed in the enforceable decision of the Constitutional Court pursuant to Article 89 (2) of the Constitution. However, it must also be possible to achieve the same result in cases where the law has already been repealed (no longer in force), but it remains applicable in relation to the legal facts which have occurred for the period of its effectiveness. These cases do not explicitly reflect the Constitutional Court Act, although the obligation to assess compliance of such a law with the constitutional order results from Article 95 (2) of the Constitution. In these cases, too, the courts referred to in Article 95 (1) of the Constitution are bound by law and cannot, in the present case, refuse its application on the grounds that they find it unconstitutional. Only the Constitutional Court can make a conclusion on the non-compliance of the law or part of it with the constitutional order which would be reflected in the possibility of further application.
39. The fact that the Law on the Constitutional Court does not explicitly recall a situation where a court pursuant to Article 95 (2) The Constitution comes to a conclusion on the unconstitutionality of an already repealed, but still applicable, law cannot be interpreted in the sense of excluding the exercise of the power of the Constitutional Court to express its unconstitutionality. The provisions of the Law on the Constitutional Court governing the procedure for the annulment of the law or other legislation must also be applied - as its closest nature - to the examination of these proposals, unless the use of any of them is excluded from the nature of the case. This will be the case, as the Constitutional Court repeatedly stated in a number of its decisions [in particular the finding of 10.1.2001 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 33 / 2000 (N 5 / 21 SbNU 29; 78 / 2001 Sb.), the finding of 6.2.2007 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 38 / 06 (N 23 / 44 SbNU 279; 84 / 2007 Sb.) and the finding of 29.1.2008 sp. zn. ÚS 72 / 06 (N 23 / 48 SbNU 263; 291 / 2008 Sb.)], in the case of § 67 (1) of Act 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, which is to proceed with the procedure under which the question of the constituency of the annulled, does not count.
40. Following the amendment of Act No. 361 / 2000 Coll., on road traffic and on amendments to certain laws (Road Traffic Act), as amended by Act No. 183 / 2017 Coll., the appellant changed its proposal by seeking, directly on the basis of Article 95 (2) of the Constitution, the declaration of unconstitutionality of Article 125f (1) of the Road Traffic Act, as amended by Act No. 297 / 2011 Coll., which was effective until 30 June 2017. That reason for the termination of proceedings under § 67 (1) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, is therefore not applicable in this case. There is nothing to prevent the Constitutional Court from dealing with the proposal as a matter of substance.
Assessment of the competence and constitutional conformity of the procedure for the adoption of the contested legislative provisions
41. According to Article 68 (2) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll., the assessment of the constitutionality of the Act with a constitutional order consists of answering three questions: whether it was adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution, whether it was adopted in a constitutionally prescribed manner and whether its content is in accordance with constitutional laws.
42. Paragraph 10 (3) and Article 125f (1) of the Road Traffic Act were inserted into the Act by Act No. 297 / 2011 Coll., amending Act No. 361 / 2000 Coll., on Road Traffic and on Amendments to Certain Acts (Road Traffic Act), as amended, and Act No. 247 / 2000 Coll., on the acquisition and improvement of professional competence to drive motor vehicles and on amendments to certain acts, as amended.
43. The Constitutional Court notes that Parliament was competent to adopt that law within the meaning of Article 15 (1) of the Constitution. From the statements of his chambers and publicly available documents relating to the legislative process, he also found that the Government submitted the draft law (Chamber of Deputies, 6th Election, 2010- 2013, House of Press 300 / 0) to the Chamber of Deputies on 25 March 2011. It was approved at the third reading on 15 June 2011 at its 19th meeting (Resolution 559), with 135 out of 175 Members voting for it, 2 opposed and 38 abstentions. The Senate discussed the bill at its 10th meeting on 22 July 2011 and returned it to the Chamber of Deputies with amendments (Senate, 8th term of office, 2010- 2012, Senate Press 135 / 0). 58 of the 59 senators present voted in favour, 1 abstained. The Chamber of Deputies of 6 September 2011, at its 21st meeting, remained on the original approved bill (Resolution 677). 106 out of 157 Members were voted in favour, 24 opposed and 27 abstained. The law adopted was delivered to the President of the Republic on 15 September 2011 and signed on 29 September 2011. His publication took place in the Collection of Laws on 14. 10. 2011 in the amount of 105 under No. 297 / 2011 Coll. These findings are sufficient to conclude that the law was adopted in a constitutional manner.
Text of the contested provisions and related legislation
44. For the purposes of further review, the Constitutional Court considers it desirable to state the wording of the contested provisions and to summarise the relevant legal provisions. Paragraph 10 (3) of the Road Traffic Act reads as follows:
Obligations of the vehicle operator
...
(3) The vehicle operator shall ensure that the driver's obligations and road traffic rules laid down by this law are respected when using a vehicle on the road.
... "
The vehicle operator shall be the owner or any other person registered as an operator in a road vehicle register under a specific legislation or similar record of another State in accordance with Section 2 (b) of the Road Traffic Act for the purposes of this Act. The Road Traffic Conditions Act allows a person other than his owner to be entered in the register of road vehicles as a vehicle operator [Paragraph 4 (1) (a)], but always with the consent of the owner. The application for registration of the vehicle operator shall be submitted jointly by the owner and the new vehicle operator [Paragraph 9 (1) (a)]. The owner or the vehicle operator may submit the application themselves only if the owner [Paragraph 9 (1) (b)] is to be the new vehicle operator.
45. Article 10 (3) of the Road Traffic Act, or the obligation laid down by it, is followed by Article 125f, the text of which was effective until 30 June 2017 was as follows:
Administrative offence of the vehicle operator
(1) A legal or natural person commits an administrative offence by not ensuring, as a vehicle operator in breach of Section 10, that the driver's obligations and road traffic rules laid down by this law are respected when using a vehicle on the road.
(2) A legal or natural person shall be responsible for an administrative offence where:
(a) the infringement has been detected by means of an automated technical device used without operator in the supervision of road safety or is an unauthorised stop or stop;
(b) the infringement of driver's obligations or road traffic rules shows signs of an infringement under this law; and
(c) the infringement does not result in an accident.
(3) A fine shall be imposed for the administrative offence referred to in paragraph 1. In order to determine the amount of the fine, the penalty margin shall be used for an offence the features of which are shown by the infringement of road traffic rules; however, the fine does not exceed CZK 10,000.
(4) The municipal authority of the municipality having extended the scope of the administrative offence referred to in paragraph 1 shall discuss only if it has taken the necessary steps to identify the perpetrator of the offence; and
(a) has not initiated an infringement procedure and has suspended the case because it has not found the facts justifying the initiation of the proceedings against a person; or
(b) the infringement proceedings have been suspended because the defendant for the offence has not been proven to have committed the offence.
(5) The vehicle operator shall not be responsible for an administrative offence if it proves that, in the period prior to the infringement of the driver's obligation or road traffic rules,
(a) the vehicle of which it is an operator has been stolen or its registration plate has been stolen; or
(b) has submitted a request for registration of a change in the vehicle operator's register. ';
46. The proposal of the Regional Court does not go against the whole of Section 125f of the Road Traffic Act, but only against paragraph 1 thereof. However, this paragraph cannot be interpreted in isolation. The conditions under which the responsibility of the vehicle operator arises are explicitly formulated in paragraphs 2 and 5. The provisions of paragraph 4, in turn, lay down procedural conditions for dealing with an administrative offence which, in substance, underpin its subsidiarity in relation to the liability of the driver of the vehicle for the offence. These paragraphs add up to the legal definition of an administrative offence.
47. In interpreting the contested provisions, the subsequent provisions of the Road Traffic Act, namely § 125g and 125h thereof, cannot be omitted. Paragraph 125g (1) of this Act, as effective until 30 June 2017, addressed the relationship between the administrative offence of the vehicle operator and the infringement proceedings of the vehicle driver. Its wording was as follows:
(1) Where proceedings are initiated to impose a fine on an administrative offence pursuant to Article 125f, infringement proceedings for the same infringement of driver's obligations or road traffic rules may no longer be initiated. An infringement procedure may be initiated if the vehicle operator is relieved of responsibility for an administrative offence pursuant to Section 125f (5).
... "
The administrative procedure prior to the opening of the administrative offence procedure was amended in Section 125h of the Road Traffic Act, as amended by 30 June 2017, which provided:
(1) The municipal authority of the municipality with extended jurisdiction shall, without delay after detection or notification of an offence, invite the vehicle operator with whom the offence has been committed to pay a specified amount if:
(a) the conditions laid down in Article 125f (2) are met,
(b) the identity of the driver of the vehicle is not known or evident from the ground for initiating the infringement procedure; and
(c) the infringement may be dealt with by imposing a fine in block proceedings.
(2) The amount determined shall be fixed at the same amount as the fine in block proceedings. In determining the designated amount, the municipal authority of the municipality shall take into account the seriousness of the infringement of the driver's obligations or of the road traffic rules.
(3) The amount determined shall be payable within 15 days of the date of receipt of the call referred to in paragraph 1.
(4) The invitation referred to in paragraph 1 shall contain a description of the action to identify the place and time of its commission, a description of the offence the characteristics of which it shows, the amount determined, the date of payment of the amount determined and other information necessary for the execution of the payment and the instructions referred to in paragraphs 6 and 7.
(5) If the amount determined is paid at the latest on the due date, the municipal authority of the municipality with extended scope shall postpone the case. Otherwise, the widespread municipal authority shall continue to investigate the infringement. This procedure shall be communicated by the municipal authority of the municipality with the extended scope of the vehicle operator in the call referred to in paragraph 1.
(6) If the vehicle operator does not pay the specified amount, it may communicate in writing the details of the identity of the driver of the vehicle at the time of the offence within the time limit referred to in paragraph 3 to the municipality with extended scope which requested him to pay the specified amount. This communication shall be deemed to provide an explanation. This procedure shall be communicated by the municipal authority of the municipality with the extended scope of the vehicle operator in the call referred to in paragraph 1.
(7) If the determined amount is paid after the due date, the municipal authority shall return it to the vehicle operator without delay.
(8) The amount determined shall be the income of the municipality whose municipal authority has requested the vehicle operator to pay the amount determined. '
48. It follows from the provisions cited that a distinction should be made between the general obligation of the vehicle operator under Section 10 (3) of the Road Traffic Act and its responsibility for that obligation of the subsequent administrative offence under Section 125f (1) of the Road Traffic Act, which, however, does not arise without further but is linked to the fulfilment of additional conditions. The vehicle operator is responsible for the administrative offence in the event that a breach of the driver's obligation or road traffic rules shows signs of an infringement under the Road Traffic Act [Paragraph 125f (2) (b)] and has not committed a traffic accident [Paragraph 125f (2) (c)]. At the same time, an infringement must be detected by means of an automated technical device used without operator in the supervision of road safety, unless it is an unauthorised stop or stand that could be detected by any means [§ 125f (2) (a)]. Therefore, such liability is not exclusively due to a breach of the obligations of the vehicle operator, but the way in which that breach was found may also be significant. On the contrary, the vehicle operator shall not be liable for an administrative offence if, prior to a breach of the driver's obligation or road traffic rules, the vehicle of which it is an operator has been stolen or its registration plate [§ 125f (5) (a)] has submitted a request for registration of the change of the vehicle operator in the register of road vehicles [§ 125f (5) (b)].
49. Another limitation of liability is in fact due to the specific procedural arrangements laid down by the Road Traffic Act for the "hearing of an administrative offence of a vehicle operator '(§ 125f (4) or to the initiation of" proceedings for the imposition of a fine for an administrative offence under § 125f' (§ 125g (1)). The municipal authority of the municipality with extended competence shall conduct an investigation into who, as a driver of the vehicle, has committed acts showing signs of an infringement. If the driver is known to him or is evident from the grounds for initiating the infringement procedure [§ 125h (1) (b)], he or she shall initiate the infringement procedure. Otherwise, the infringement investigation shall continue to be carried out where it is possible to discuss it in block proceedings [Paragraph 125h (1) (c)], and shall send a notice to the vehicle operator to pay an amount corresponding to the penalty granted in block proceedings within 15 days of its receipt (Paragraph 125h (3)). The vehicle operator may respond to it within that time limit in two ways which it must be adequately informed about, as well as the consequences of the futile expiry of that time limit. In particular, it may pay this amount at the latest on the due date. The municipal authority of the municipality with extended scope will subsequently postpone the case for this reason (§ 125h (5)), which means that no infringement proceedings will be initiated. However, instead, the vehicle operator may also communicate information on the identity of the driver of the vehicle at the time of the offence (§ 125h (6)). In the event that he has made this communication, or has neither made it, nor paid the amount specified, the municipal authority of the municipality with extended scope shall continue to investigate the infringement.
50. After taking the necessary steps to identify the perpetrator of the infringement, the municipal authority of the municipality shall evaluate the facts found in the investigation. Subsequently, they either initiate an infringement proceedings against a person or postpone the case because they did not find the facts justifying the initiation of such proceedings. In the latter case, it shall initiate proceedings on the administrative offence of the vehicle operator [Paragraph 125f (4) (a)]. This procedure will be initiated even if the infringement procedure has been terminated because the accused of the transfer has not been established [Paragraph 125f (4) (b)]. If an administrative offence is initiated by the vehicle operator, the infringement proceedings for the same infringement of the driver's obligation or road traffic rules may no longer be initiated. This is not the case if the vehicle operator is relieved for one of the reasons set out in Section 125f (5) of the Road Traffic Act (Section 125g (1)).
51. If the above conditions for dealing with an administrative offence of a vehicle operator (Section 125f (4)) are met, the municipality of the municipality with extended scope shall discuss it and decide whether the vehicle operator has committed it. A fine shall be imposed for the administrative offence, the determination of which shall be subject to the margin of the offence fine, the features of which it shows of infringement of road traffic rules; However, the fine does not exceed CZK 10,000 (§ 125f (3)).
Objective liability with regard to the requirement to comply with the legal obligation referred to in Articles 2 (3) and 4 (1) of the Charter
52. The Constitutional Court has undertaken its own examination of the constitutionality of the contested provisions, in which it settled the objections raised by the appellant. First of all, he had to answer the question whether the obligation of the vehicle operator under Section 10 (3) of the Road Traffic Act, the infringement of which constitutes an administrative offence (now an offence) under Section 125f (1) of the Road Traffic Act, is an obligation to be fulfilled.
53. In a democratic rule of law, no one can be obliged to do anything. No one can be obliged to act which is objectively impossible. Such an obligation would already have placed its addressee in the position of its infringer at the time of its creation, which can be sanctioned without having the opportunity to act by right at all. If the exercise of the right were to depend on its fulfilment, that right would be de facto inapplicable [compare the finding of 5.3.2009 sp. zn. II. ÚS 281 / 09 (N 50 / 52 SbNU 499), point 21, or the finding of 5.4.2016 sp. zn. II. ÚS 703 / 16 (N 61 / 81 SbNU 67), point 34]. A law that would allow any of these consequences would not be a right in the material sense, but a tool of injustice that undermines trust in the law in its addressees.
54. The requirement to fulfil a legal obligation shall apply without exception. It is understood that any obligation imposed by law pursuant to Article 4 (1) The Charter must be achievable and that only in order to fulfil such obligations can an individual be forced under Article 2 (3) of the Charter. The obligation not to comply with this requirement would be imposed in breach of these provisions [compare the finding of 6.12.2016 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 32 / 15 (40 / 2017 Coll.), paragraphs 69 and 70].
55. Within the framework of the control of constitutionality, the requirement to fulfil a legal obligation may be assessed only in the case of those laws or provisions which provide for a certain legal obligation. If the legislation or its provisions does not provide for a legal obligation in its entirety, but only one of its component components, which is not itself an obligation, then their compliance with that requirement can only be assessed to the extent that it does not render the legal obligation impossible.
56. Paragraph 10 (3) of the Road Traffic Act provides that the vehicle operator shall "ensure" that the driver's obligations and road traffic rules under the Road Traffic Act are respected when using the vehicle on road. It is clear that this provision does not impose on the vehicle operator the same obligation as the driver. However, the law does not specify what "collateral" means.
57. The obligation of the vehicle operator to "ensure compliance with the driver's obligations and road traffic rules, as defined in Section 10 (3) of the Road Traffic Act," allows for a dual interpretation. In particular, "securing 'can be understood as an active action on the part of the vehicle operator, consisting of any possible (legally prohibited) measure by which the driver's behaviour can be so affected that the road traffic law is not infringed on its part. In such a case, the vehicle operator would be solely responsible for whether it acted in the desired manner. If he had not acted in this way and his fault would have infringed the driver's obligation which could otherwise have been avoided, he would have committed an administrative offence under Article 125f (1) of the Road Traffic Act and would have had to pay a fine.
58. The word "secure" may have other meaning. It can also be interpreted as simply expressing the responsibility of the vehicle operator for possible infringements of the obligations of the driver or of the road traffic rules that occur when the vehicle is used. The vehicle operator would thus bear the legal consequences of the infringement of those obligations, although it itself did not commit any infringement. In this case, its liability would take the form of liability for an administrative offence under Article 125f (1) of the Road Traffic Act, which would result in an obligation to pay a fine.
59. The various interpretative options differ in that, while the first of them makes the vehicle operator responsible solely for its actions, the second of them attaches responsibility for the driver's actions. According to that interpretation, the contested provisions give rise to its objective liability, which, contrary to subjective liability, does not require fault on the part of the responsible body.
60. Objective responsibility is not an unacceptable or unusual legal institution. As much as the principle that everyone is responsible for their own actions can be regarded as a natural basis for liability legal relations, effective regulation of certain areas of human action may require special adjustment in this respect. The objective of objective liability may then differ depending on the subject matter of the legislation. It will normally consist of seeking a fair balance between the rights and obligations of participants in certain legal relations, and possibly simplifying and clarifying legal relations between the parties concerned in order to better meet their practical needs.
61. The determination of objective liability is not excluded even in administrative law. The administrative offences committed by the offender by failure to fulfil his obligation, regardless of fault, are justified, in particular in cases where a particular operation is regulated or a certain qualified activity in which a larger number of persons may participate. It is not relevant how the compulsory body ensures that a particular obligation is fulfilled, but solely whether or not it has been infringed. Typically, they are administrative offences involving legal persons or business natural persons who carry out their activities through their employees or other authorised persons. But it can also be administrative offences against non-business natural persons. The Government pointed out the examples of some of them in its opinion. The possibility of establishing an objective liability in administrative law was also recognised by the European Court of Human Rights, even though it did so indirectly in the form of the distribution of the burden of proof and the establishment of factual or legal presumption of responsibility for the infringement or the situation (for example, Case 10519 / 83 Salabiak v France [1988] ECR 28 et seq., or Falk v Netherlands; the European Commission's decision of 7.12.1990 on complaint 12995 / 87 Duhs against Sweden).
62. The Constitutional Court has examined the contested provisions in the light of the requirement to comply with the legal obligation, dealing with the two alternatives to their interpretation. According to the first, the content of the obligation of the vehicle operator is a certain active act which is capable of preventing a breach of the driver's obligations or of road traffic rules. However, their identification remains a question. No measure can completely exclude the autonomous behaviour of the driver of the vehicle and therefore the possibility of intentionally or inadvertently committing an infringement. The interpretation that the vehicle operator should always be present for use and its physical intervention (such as pulling the steering wheel) to prevent the driver from breaking his obligations cannot be regarded as meaningful. Such a requirement would be miles away from the real running of things and would not have stood up from the point of view of other provisions of the Road Traffic Act, which provides for the driver's obligations.
63. This only applies to measures which, although they cannot completely prevent a breach of the driver's obligations or road traffic rules, may constitute the maximum amount of what the vehicle operator is still able to do for this purpose. Such measures may relate first of all to the choice of the driver. It is undoubtedly desirable that the vehicle operator, if it does not decide to use the vehicle alone, should always carefully consider to whom to entrust it. Such a person must comply with the basic conditions of participation in road traffic laid down by the Road Traffic Act in § 3 (2) and (3) (for example, physical and mental fitness or relevant driving authorisation). However, the prohibition to entrust driving to a person who does not fulfil these conditions to the vehicle operator is already provided for in Article 10 (1) (b) and (c) of the Road Traffic Act and therefore makes no sense for it to also be the content of the obligation under Article 10 (3). Other conditions in relation to the person to be entrusted to the vehicle can then be imagined only in the plane of a specific subjective assessment whether the person is a "good 'or" responsible' driver. These criteria certainly have their place in the considerations of the vehicle operator, but their uncertainty excludes the conclusion that the legal obligation is fulfilled or not to be assessed.
64. Possible measures by which the vehicle operator would fulfil the obligations under Section 10 (3) of the Road Traffic Act cannot be seen in any specific contractual arrangements for its legal relations with the driver. It is not possible to deduce from this provision the obligation of the vehicle operator to entrust his vehicle to another person only if there is a specific contractual arrangement between them containing the driver's obligation not to commit a breach of the driver's or road traffic rules and that the infringement of those obligations will result in a contractual penalty. The obligation to make such an arrangement would have to be formulated in the law in such a way that it is accessible to its addressees, which is not the case in the present case. Stricter sanctions would certainly affect drivers as regards the need to consider the legal consequences of their actions, but if the legislator wanted to provide for them, it should do so explicitly and not leave it to any further contractual arrangements.
65. The Constitutional Court therefore concludes that, if such an interpretation of the contested provisions were to be applied, the obligation of the vehicle operator to take measures which, in accordance with Article 10 (3) of the Road Traffic Act, could effectively "ensure" compliance with driver's obligations or road traffic rules would, in the absence of such measures, be impossible. In addition, it has only dealt with the second interpretation alternative, according to which the contested provisions provide for the objective liability of the vehicle operator in the event of a breach of certain legal obligations which may arise in connection with the use of the vehicle.
66. Such an interpretation essentially identifies a breach of the obligation to "ensure" compliance with the driver's obligations and the rules on road traffic pursuant to Section 10 (3) of the Road Traffic Act with a breach of those obligations. This is an automatic consequence of this infringement, which the vehicle operator, if not its driver, cannot effectively prevent. Consequently, compliance with the obligations of the vehicle operator depends exclusively on whether or not the driver is in breach.
67. In favour of this interpretation, the subsequent legal regulation of an administrative offence pursuant to Article 125f (1) of the Road Traffic Act shows that the act of a vehicle operator which would "ensure 'that there is no breach of the driver's obligations or road traffic rules does not count. In this context, it can be pointed out that the proportionality of the prosecution of this administrative offence against the prosecution of the relevant offence of the driver of the vehicle (§ 125f (4), § 125h), which is intended to prevent both the driver and the vehicle operator from being affected for the same conduct that led to the offence. The vehicle operator shall be allowed to identify the driver of the vehicle (Section 125h (6)) before the administrative proceedings are initiated. However, where proceedings are initiated for the imposition of a fine on an administrative offence, the opening of infringement proceedings for the same infringement of the driver's obligation or of the rules on road traffic is excluded, except for the waiver of liability of the vehicle operator pursuant to Article 125f (5). The law therefore follows from the fact that both the offence of the driver and the administrative offence of the vehicle operator are committed as a result of the identical behaviour of the driver, while those provisions seek to prevent such action from being affected in both ways.
68. The requirement to fulfil a legal obligation may be extended both to an obligation with which there is a breach of objective liability and to a penalty which is the legal consequence thereof. In the case of the contested provisions, this means that the individual obligations of the driver and the rules on road traffic can be assessed by this aspect, but they are not in question in this respect. The penalty for the administrative offence under Article 125f (3) of the Road Traffic Act could also be assessed for compliance. On the contrary, it is not possible to assess, by the nature of the case, the fulfilment of objective liability itself, since it is not a rule of conduct itself, but merely a legal consequence.
69. The Constitutional Court concludes that the content of Paragraph 10 (3) of the Road Traffic Act - despite its literal wording - is not to establish a certain obligation for the vehicle operator, but only its objective responsibility for the breach of the driver's obligations or road traffic rules, the content of which is defined in other provisions of that Act. For this reason, as well as the subsequent section 125f (1) of the Road Traffic Act, this provision does not and cannot be contrary to the requirement that the legal obligation under Articles 2 (3) and 4 (1) of the Charter be fulfilled.
Objective responsibility of the vehicle operator as interference with the right of ownership pursuant to Article 11 (1) of the Charter
70. By virtue of Article 10 (3) of the Road Traffic Act, the vehicle operator's obligation under Article 10 (3) of the Road Traffic Act is his objective responsibility for violating certain obligations of the driver or the rules on road traffic. This liability is exclusively in the form of liability for an administrative offence (now an offence) under Section 125f (1) of this Act. On the other hand, there are no other legal consequences for the infringement of Article 10 (3) of the Road Traffic Act. This also applies to the level of private-law relations (for example, claims for compensation) in respect of which the objective liability of the vehicle operator is laid down in Sections 2927 to 2932 of the Civil Code governing the right to compensation caused by the special nature of the operation of means of transport.
71. The liability of the vehicle operator for an administrative offence under Article 125f (1) of the Road Traffic Act interferes with its right of ownership under Article 11 (1) of the Charter. In the event of a breach of certain obligations of the driver or road traffic rules, it is consequently obliged to pay the fine specified in Section 125f (3) of the Road Traffic Act. The nature of the intervention is also the payment of the amount provided for under § 125h (1) to (3) of the Road Traffic Act, which, although the vehicle operator is not directly obliged to do, will result in the postponement of the case by paying it, and will not be prosecuted for administrative offence. Although the contested provisions do not directly regulate that penalty, they define the legal conditions for its imposition.
72. Although the appellant's proposal is directed against only Article 10 (3) and Article 125f (1) of the Road Traffic Act, the various components of the obligation of the vehicle operator to intervene in its right of ownership under Article 11 (1) of the Charter are also expressed in other provisions. Paragraph 125f (2) of the Road Traffic Act (definition of the substance of the administrative offence), § 125f (3) (obligation to pay a fine), § 125f (4), § 125g and 125h (procedural conditions for the application of objective liability) and § 125f (5) (liberal reasons) may be mentioned. The assessment of the constitutionality of the contested provisions must reflect the full legal definition of the legal obligation laid down by them, including those parts of the legislation which were not contested.
73. In accordance with its established decision-making practice, the Constitutional Court examined the intervention in the ownership right of vehicle operators to which the public authorities are entitled under the contested provisions in the proportionality test [for example, the finding of 12.10.1994 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 4 / 94 (N 46 / 2 SbNU 57; 214 / 1994 Coll.), the finding of 20.6.2006 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 38 / 04 (N 125 / 41 SbNU 551; 409 / 2006 Coll.) or the finding of 10.7.2014 sp. It assessed whether the intervention pursues a legitimate (constitutionally addressed) objective and, if so, whether it is capable of achieving it (the requirement of suitability), whether this objective could not be achieved by other means which would be more efficient in relation to the fundamental law concerned (the requirement for necessity) and, finally, whether, taking into account the substance and meaning of the fundamental right concerned, the interest in achieving the objective pursued (proportionality in the narrower sense). If any of those requirements were not met, the non-compliance of the contested provisions with property law under Article 11 (1) of the Charter would be based.
74. The Constitutional Court sees the purpose of the contested provisions in ensuring the safety and continuity of road traffic, in particular in the preventive action of road users in order to avoid such action as may result in loss of life or damage to health or property. The contested provisions follow essentially the same purpose as the statutory obligations of the driver or the rules on road traffic, the infringement of which results in an administrative offence pursuant to Article 125f (1) of the Road Traffic Act. This is undoubtedly a legitimate purpose for which the legislator could have laid down obligations to intervene in the ownership of the vehicle operator. It corresponds to the principles contained in Article 11 (3) of the Charter according to which ownership is committed and must not be misused to harm the rights of others or contrary to the legally protected general interests.
75. The responsibility of the vehicle operator for the administrative offence under Section 125f (1) of the Road Traffic Act is justified in substance by the fact that it is the vehicle operator, which is either the owner or another person with the consent of the owner, that usually depends on who is using the vehicle. The fact that the legal arrangements foresee the possibility for the vehicle operator to influence the driver's person is also evident from Section 125f (5) of the Road Traffic Act. This provision excludes his / her responsibility for an administrative offence in cases of theft of a vehicle or a change of ownership where a change to the vehicle operator has been applied for in the register of road vehicles.
76. As the vehicle operator is responsible for the administrative offence regardless of fault, its responsibility is primarily not to punish the driver who has violated any of the driver's obligations or road traffic rules. In particular, drivers should be prevented from infringing these obligations in future. It is assumed that the vehicle operator knows who used the vehicle at the time of the offence under the Road Traffic Act, as well as that he is interested in obtaining compensation for the fine paid, or the amount determined, or, where appropriate, that he will act in a different way on the driver in the context of mutual relations so as not to repeat the infringement, including the possibility of preventing him from continuing to use the vehicle. If the vehicle operator did not respond adequately to a breach of the driver's obligations or road traffic rules, it would be at risk of bearing any further penalty consequences in the future.
77. That definition of liability relationships provides a reasonable explanation of the preventive function of objective liability under the contested provisions. This also justifies the conclusion that interference with the right of ownership consisting of the objective liability of the vehicle operator under the contested provisions is an appropriate and therefore appropriate means of achieving the legitimate purpose pursued by them.
78. As regards the question of whether the objective pursued could have been achieved in another way which would have been more efficient in relation to the fundamental law in question, the Constitutional Court considered the existence of other possible options of a solution which would have been comparable to the legislator's choice in terms of its effectiveness. In this respect, the first option is to maintain an earlier situation where the objective liability of the vehicle operator and the associated interference with its right of ownership has not been established at all and the sole responsibility of the perpetrator for the offences committed by the alleged objective liability has been the sole responsibility of the vehicle operator.
79. The reason for which the legislator has accepted to determine the objective liability of the vehicle operator in excess of the existing infringement provisions under the Road Traffic Act lies in an attempt to remedy a situation where some of these offences could not be penalised in a large number of cases. While it was demonstrated reliably that the offence had occurred, effective means were lacking to identify the person who was to commit the offence. Automated technical means often did not detect the perpetrator, or did not record him in such a strong way as to identify him with a particular person. In the event of an unauthorised stop or standing, the driver's absence of the driver's identification was then prevented. Other possibilities for identifying the driver person were generally very limited. However, the operator should always have an overview of who used the vehicle.
80. The effectiveness of the two solutions is particularly different in the way in which the responsible person is found. While the vehicle operator is clearly identified by the register of road vehicles, the identification of the person of the driver who committed the offence takes place only in the context of a follow-up investigation by the police authority and subsequent infringement proceedings. It always depends on the specific circumstances whether evidence can be collected to enable the offender to be found and to prove his guilt. It follows from that comparison that the objective responsibility of the vehicle operator under the contested provisions allows, contrary to the prosecution of the perpetrator of the offence, at least indirectly, the infringement of the driver's obligation or road traffic rules. Therefore, the associated interference with the vehicle operator's right of ownership is necessary to ensure the effective operation of the relevant driver's obligations and road traffic rules. This intervention is mitigated by the fact that the vehicle operator may subsequently claim payment of an amount corresponding to the amount of the fine paid by the vehicle operator or the amount determined, respectively, after the actual perpetrator of the offence.
81. Another possible option was to replace the objective responsibility of the vehicle operator with his obligation to register the person who allowed the vehicle to be used and the time at which it was used. However, such an obligation, for example in the form of a travel book, would clearly constitute a much more intensive intervention in the vehicle operator's right of ownership if it were to be set for this purpose alone. Instead of a one-off obligation to pay a fine, each vehicle operator would have to keep records of vehicle use data, whether used for business or only for private purposes. Nor can a possible interference with the right to private life under Article 10 (2) of the Charter be overlooked, both on the part of the vehicle operator and on the part of the driver, which could occur in view of the nature of the data so maintained.
82. Finally, the Constitutional Court considered whether, as an acceptable option, the different definition of liability of the vehicle operator was not taken into account, whether it was the amount of the fine for an administrative offence under Section 125f (1) of the Road Traffic Act or the conditions under which such a fine could be imposed.
83. The upper limit of the amount of the fine is not relevant for the assessment of the necessity of the interference under the contested provisions. Its determination is primarily a question of a political decision in which all relevant aspects, such as the general prevention aspect, are to be assessed, the degree of threat to an orderly human coexistence arising from the intensity of the risk of criminal conduct or public perception of the importance of individual and social values and legal goods damaged by criminal conduct [compare the finding of 25 October 2011 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 14 / 09 (N 183 / 63 SbNU 117; 22 / 2012 Coll.), paragraphs 29, 34 and 36]. Therefore, the constitutional review of the upper limit of the fine in terms of interference with property law is limited to the requirement to exclude extreme disproportionality [finding of 13.8.2002 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 3 / 02 (N 105 / 27 SbNU 177; 405 / 2002 Sb.), finding of 27.11.2012 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 1 / 12 (N 195 / 67 SbNU 333; 437 / 2012 Sb.), paragraph 332.]. Even if this line were excessive, its unconstitutional nature would not give rise to the unlawful regulation of the administrative offence as a whole. It would relate exclusively to § 125f (3) of the Road Traffic Act, the constitutionality of which, if attacked, would be assessed separately.
84. Otherwise, in the case of legal conditions under which the objective liability of the vehicle operator under the contested provisions applies. These conditions complement the legal regulation of objective liability as a whole, co-determine its purpose and ability to achieve it, and may also be an essential element distinguishing between different options of possible solution. They are therefore relevant for the overall assessment of proportionality of interference in property law under the contested provisions.
85. The related provisions of the Road Traffic Act make the procedure for imposing a fine on an administrative offence in accordance with Article 125f (1) conditional on the failure by the administrative authority to penalise the perpetrator of the offence as well as a detailed procedural procedure, the purpose of which is primarily to punish that offender. The subsidiarity of an administrative offence thus expressed makes the vehicle operator's objective responsibility a means that, in order to achieve the objective pursued, interferes more gently with its right of ownership than would have been the case with a variant thereof which would have allowed the imposition of a fine without further action.
86. The adaptation of the various sub-elements of the procedural procedure, which is preceded by the procedure for imposing a fine on administrative offences under Section 125f (1) of the Road Traffic Act - in particular the call for payment of the amount determined, its amount, the time limits for payment and the further procedure for the detection of the perpetrator of the offence - is therefore only relevant in view of the assessment of possible alternatives to the solution, whether it actually allows the objective liability of the vehicle operator and, on the contrary, does not constitute an obstacle. In the case of legislation supplementing the contested provisions, this requirement is met.
87. The above conclusions do not categorically exclude that the permissible interference with property rights could also constitute some of the more stringent options of the solution, especially if it simultaneously pursues another legitimate purpose. However, this consideration is irrelevant at the moment, as the legislator has chosen a more moderate solution. The Constitutional Court did not find that there was any other variant of legal regulation which, with comparable eligibility to achieve the objective pursued, interfered more effectively with the vehicle operator's right of ownership. The contested provisions will therefore also stand up to the requirement of necessity.
88. Finally, the Constitutional Court, in the context of the proportionality test, assessed whether, taking into account the substance and the meaning of the right to property, outweighs the interest in achieving the objective pursued by the contested provisions. The objective liability established by them is part of the obligations associated with the status of the vehicle operator, which, irrespective of whether the owner or the person with the consent of the owner, does not directly restrict the right to use the vehicle or allow it to be used by another person. It creates only a place for imposing a penalty, the type and amount of which (here a fine of up to CZK 10,000) are set out in other provisions of the Road Traffic Act, other than the contested provisions. In this situation, no reason can be put forward which, in view of the substance and the sense of ownership, would call into question the enforcement of objective liability under the contested provisions. These provisions do not conflict with Article 11 (1) and (3) of the Charter.
Objective responsibility for the administrative offence in view of presumption of innocence
(Article 40 (2) of the Charter, Article 6 (2) of the Convention)
89. The legislator has established the objective responsibility of the vehicle operator as the responsibility for the administrative offence and therefore all principles of a fair process relating to administrative punishment apply to it. This is related to another of the objections raised by the appellant, according to which this objective liability is contrary to the principle of presumption of innocence under Article 40 (2) of the Charter and Article 6 (2) of the Convention.
90. According to Article 40 (2) of the Charter, any person against whom criminal proceedings are brought is considered innocent if his guilt has not been declared by the final judgment of the Court of Justice. Article 6 (2) of the Convention then provides that anyone charged with a criminal offence shall be considered innocent until his guilt has been proved legally.
91. The principle of presumption of innocence relates to the decision of the court on guilt and punishment. Individuals shall guarantee the right to legal proceedings in respect of which their status as accused shall not give rise to any negative consequences as regards the possibility of exercising their procedural rights and the assessment of their guilt. The defendant's guilt can only be proved in court, on the basis of the evidence under which practical certainty must be obtained as to the existence of relevant facts. At the same time, if there were reasonable doubts about it in a given context, which cannot be removed or through the execution of further evidence, it would have to be decided in favour of the defendant [for example, the finding of 24.2.2004 sp. zn. I. ÚS 733 / 01 (N 26 / 32 SbNU 239)].
92. The State's obligation to conduct criminal proceedings in accordance with the principle of presumption of innocence is justified by the seriousness of the interference with individual rights. The recognition of the guilty has already interfered in many ways with the personal rights of the condemned, as it affects his reputation, family and other interpersonal relations or the possibility of self-implementation. The ensuing punishment may then mean the rid of his personal freedom, the loss of property or other serious interference in the various spheres of his life. As legitimate as the state's efforts to penalise crime are, the action of its authorities to which this objective is being pursued must, to the greatest extent possible, prevent the emergence of irreparable or difficult-to-repair damage which could result from the condemnation of a person other than the perpetrator. It is the principle of presumption of innocence that effectively avoids such a consequence. It precludes that the non-imposition by the State of the burden of proof in relation to any sign of the nature of the offence be compensated by the court's reasoning. The State must always prove with sufficient certainty that the accused has actually committed a crime.
93. The protection of the rights of an individual guaranteed by the principle of presumption of innocence must apply to all criminal proceedings under Article 6 (2) of the Convention. It is irrelevant whether the offence for which such proceedings are conducted is referred to as a criminal offence by the legislator. The assessment of whether or not criminal charges still exist may not always be obvious and the purpose of the sanction (whether or not the criminal offence is of a general nature) and the nature of the criminal offence (whether or not it is a criminal offence) and the purpose of the sanction (whether or not it is at least partially preventive and repressive), and the third type and degree of severity of the penalty which, in the present case, could be imposed for the offence (2 / 2000 Sb.) or the so-called Engel criteria formulated in the main and yet unpassed judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 8.6.1976 in Case No 5100 / 71, 5101 / 71, 5354 / 72 and 5370 / Engel and Others against the Netherlands, § 82 and 83; see also Case No 23.11.1999 sp. These criteria need not be met cumulatively. It is sufficient that at least one of them will be fulfilled (judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 2 September 1998 in Case No 27061 / 95 Kadoubec v Slovakia, § 51).
94. In the case of an administrative offence (now an offence) under Section 125f (1) of the Road Traffic Act, the Constitutional Court has no doubt that the criteria are met. The administrative offence protects the general interest, which is to ensure the safety and continuity of road traffic, and may be fined for which it fulfils a preventive and indirectly repressive function. Moreover, the principle of presumption of innocence would be applied as a general principle in the area of administrative punishment [compare the finding of 11.3.2004 sp. zn. II. ÚS 788 / 02 (N 38 / 32 SbNU 373)]. In the past, it was explicitly stated in § 73 (1) sentence of the Second Act No. 200 / 1990 Coll., on infringements, however, only related to offences which could have been committed by natural persons. Since the entry into force of the Act on Liability for Infringements and Proceedings, it has been expressed in its Section 69 (2) for all administrative offences, now referred to as offences.
95. The principle of presumption of innocence applies to all administrative offences, including administrative offences under Section 125f (1) of the Road Traffic Act. In this case, too, the State must bear the burden of proof as regards the fact that, when using the vehicle, there has been a breach of the obligations of the driver or of the road traffic rules which show signs of an infringement. It must also demonstrate that the conditions for initiating proceedings for the imposition of a fine on that administrative offence have been fulfilled, including that the necessary steps have been taken to identify the perpetrator of the offence. However, if these conditions are met, the responsibility of the vehicle operator shall be a legal consequence regardless of the fault. The question of guilt is not relevant for this consequence, therefore logically there is no room for the presumption of innocence.
96. In principle, the Constitutional Court does not see the presumption of innocence under Article 40 (2) of the Charter as an obstacle to objective liability for administrative misconduct. It is a procedural principle relating to criminal proceedings or proceedings on criminal charges, but there are no limitations on the substance of criminal offences or administrative offences. Such restrictions can, on the contrary, be imported from other constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights and freedoms, depending on the nature of the offence and the legal consequences associated with it. It is the fundamental rights concerned, and not the principle of presumption of innocence, that is the decisive criterion of the admissibility of objective liability for administrative misconduct.
97. The administrative offence under Section 125f (1) of the Road Traffic Act interferes exclusively with the vehicle operator's right of ownership under Article 11 (1) of the Charter. There is no significant interference with the charge of committing this offence in the personal rights of the defendant, for example, in the form of a stigmatizing act affecting his name and reputation (the importance of this aspect was also recognised by the European Court of Human Rights, for example, the judgment of the Grand Chamber of 23 November 2006 on complaint No 73053 / 01 Jussila against Finland). Although the fine and the amount determined indirectly allows for the punishment of infringements of the driver's obligations and road traffic rules, due to the objective responsibility of the vehicle operator, it has rather a regulatory function in relation to the behaviour of road users. All of this differs from some other administrative offences, such as offences against civil cohabitation or property (formerly § 49 and 50 of Act No. 200 / 1990 Coll., on infringements, as amended, now § 7 and 8 of Act No. 251 / 2016 Coll., on certain offences), where recognition of the guilty is indicative of certain socially harmful conduct of the accused, which significantly reduces the scope for any form of objective liability. Similarly, it is different from the offences of drivers under the Road Traffic Act. Therefore, it cannot be attested to the appellant that this is an unjustified discrepancy in the status of persons prosecuted for an administrative offence by a vehicle operator under Section 125f (1) of the Road Traffic Act and persons prosecuted for a misdemeanor.
98. For the sake of completeness, it should be added that the recognition of a guilty offence always involves such serious interference with the person or other rights of the convicted person that he cannot be granted objective responsibility. It is here that the reason for which Article 40 (1) The Charter guarantees that, in the case of criminal charges, the court will always decide on 'guilt', whereas in the case of administrative offences, such a strict requirement is no longer laid down. A statement by the appellant that, in the case of an objective liability for an administrative offence on the part of a vehicle operator under Section 125f (1) of the Road Traffic Act, this is essentially a similar situation, as if the holder of the weapon had objectively been responsible for any of the offences against life or health committed by the person who was lawfully entrusted with the weapon is therefore not applicable.
99. It is therefore necessary to conclude that the contested provisions do not conflict with the principle of presumption of innocence under Article 40 (2) of the Charter and Article 6 (2) of the Convention.
The right of an individual to refuse a statement where the identification of the offender can prevent the initiation of an administrative offence for which he has objective responsibility (Article 37 (1) of the Charter, Article 6 (1) of the Convention)
100. Finally, the appellant contends that the contested provisions may put the vehicle operator in a situation where he or she will have to decide whether to designate a close person as the perpetrator of the offence or, on the contrary, to be recognised by the perpetrator of the administrative offence (now an offence) under Article 125f (1) of the Road Traffic Act. For this reason, they claim that their non-compliance with the right of a witness to refuse a statement for the risk of criminal prosecution by him or his person close to him pursuant to Article 37 (1) of the Charter.
101. The Constitutional Court notes that that right protects individuals from the need to make a choice between the public interest in clarifying and penalising crime, on the one hand, and its natural interest to protect itself and its loved ones on the other. Such a choice would put it in the face of a fundamental internal dilemma, because under threat of sanctions it would be forced to give up its own will for freedom or betray the mutual trust that is part of its closest interpersonal relations. The consequences of his decision would inevitably fall into his intimate sphere, whether it be his conscience or a social background that could be damaged irreparably. The question is, to what extent is an individual capable of speaking objectively about the facts that could threaten these natural interests.
102. The right of the witness to refuse a statement for the risk of criminal prosecution of his or her close in accordance with Article 37 (1) of the Charter shall apply, for the same reasons as in the case of the principle of presumption of innocence, to administrative punishment [compare the finding of 18.2.2010 sp. zn. I. ÚS 1849 / 08 (N 30 / 56 CollNU 339)]. In this context, attention should also be drawn to the right of the defendant to refuse a statement under Article 40 (4) of the Charter and the right not to blame himself, which may be inferred from the right to a fair trial under Article 6 (1) of the Convention. The Act on Liability for Infringements and Proceedings expressly provides for the right of the defendant to remain silent, as well as a prohibition on forcing him to testify or to confess. Paragraph 55 (4) of Act No. 500 / 2004 Coll., the administrative order according to which the statement may be denied by the person who would cause it to himself or a person close to the risk of prosecution for a criminal offence or administrative offence. This provision has already been applied in the past in proceedings concerning so-called other administrative delicacies not covered by Act No 200 / 1990 Coll., on infringements, as amended.
103. The vehicle operator may be prosecuted for an administrative offence under Section 125f (1) of the Road Traffic Act only if the driver has not been found guilty of an offence under the Road Traffic Act on the same facts. The subsidiarity of both administrative offences thus defined allows the vehicle operator to avoid prosecution by providing the administrative authority with the evidence necessary to prosecute the perpetrator of the infringement. To this end, it may provide an explanation by means of a communication pursuant to § 125h (6) of the Road Traffic Act or otherwise. However, the question remains whether, in subsidiarity itself, the prosecution of an administrative offence under Section 125f (1) of the Road Traffic Act cannot be seen as a means of effectively forcing the vehicle operator to communicate the identity of the driver even in cases where his person is close to the perpetrator of the offence.
104. As mentioned above, the objective liability of the vehicle operator under the contested provisions was to eliminate a situation where certain offences under the Road Traffic Act could not be effectively penalised in a large number of cases. One reason was the fact that the vehicle operator, who had knowledge of who was using the vehicle, usually exercised his right to refuse a statement indicating that it could cause the risk of prosecuting a loved one. Other possibilities for detecting the driver's person have often not been given.
105. The Constitutional Court did not find that the obligation under Article 10 (3) of the Road Traffic Act and the subsequent administrative offence under Article 125f (1) of the Road Traffic Act directly constrained the vehicle operator in the possibility of exercising the right to refuse a statement for the risk of criminal prosecution of his or her persons close to the Charter pursuant to Article 37 (1). The contested provisions do not provide for an obligation to disclose information on the identity of the driver of the vehicle at the time of the offence involving his or her loved ones, nor is the infringement of such obligation sanctioned. This respects a higher standard of protection of the right guaranteed by the Charter than that which provides the right to a fair trial in this respect under Article 6 (1) of the Convention. In these cases, the European Court of Human Rights admits a restriction on the right of a witness to refuse a statement and in several of its decisions it did not find a breach of this Article or a direct penalty for a breach of the obligation of the vehicle operator to identify the person driving the vehicle (compare the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 8.4.2004 in Case No 38544 / 97 Weh v Austria, judgment of 29.6.2007 in Case No 25624 / 02 O'Halloran and Francis v United Kingdom, or judgment of 10.1.2008 in Case No 58452 / 00, 61920 / 00 Lückhof and Spanner v Austria).
106. The contested provisions do not, however, restrict the vehicle operator from exercising his right to refuse a statement for the risk of criminal prosecution by his or her person close to the Charter pursuant to Article 37 (1) or indirectly. The possibility of avoiding prosecution for an administrative offence pursuant to Article 125f (1) of the Road Traffic Act by means of the vehicle driver's mark, which is the result of the subsidiarity of that administrative offence to the misconduct of the driver, does not yet constitute a legal or factual obstacle to the exercise of that right. Each of these administrative offences follows a different purpose. While the driver's subjective responsibility for the offence is as a result of his infringement, the objective responsibility of the vehicle operator for the administrative offence is an expression of his wider responsibility as the owner of the vehicle or of the person operating the vehicle with the agreement of the vehicle owner. The law may impose obligations on the vehicle operator to ensure the effective regulation of road traffic, which requires the massive use of motor vehicles with which some hazards to the lives, health and property of people are naturally linked. Anyone who decides to get a vehicle must be aware of these obligations.
107. The restriction of the right to refuse a statement could result only from a comparison of the consequences of both administrative offences. Undoubtedly, it would be imposed if the penalty for the administrative offence of the vehicle operator were set so strictly that it would actually force it to communicate the identity of the driver. An example can be given of an unduly high fine, or a fine that is disproportionate to the penalty that would threaten the perpetrator of the offence. However, this impact of the fine on the behaviour of the vehicle operator cannot be assessed in the context of the review of the contested provisions, as the fine is only provided for in Section 125f (3) of the Road Traffic Act, which is not contested. In addition, in the case of the administrative offence under consideration, in view of the limitation of the amount of the fine for its commission, as well as the absence of a record of points in the register of drivers, and the fact that the vehicle operator may claim compensation for the amount paid to the perpetrator of the misdemeanor is clearly not a disproportionate fine. There can be no pressure on the vehicle operator to testify against a close person. Instead, the payment of the fine or the amount determined, in these circumstances, allows him to protect him from prosecution for the offence.
108. The appellant's proposal could therefore not be attributed to its objections in this heading. The contested provisions shall stand in the light of Article 37 (1) of the Charter and Article 6 (1) of the Convention.
In addition to the constitutional assessment
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Regulation Information
| Citation | The Constitutional Court found No 116 / 2018 Coll., on the application for annulment of § 10 paragraph 3 of Act No. 361 / 2000 Coll., on road traffic and on amendments to certain laws (Road Traffic Act), as amended, and on the declaration of illegality § 125f (1) of Act No. 361 / 2000 Coll., on road traffic and on amendments to certain laws (Road Traffic Act), as effective until 30 June 2017 |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | - |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 21.06.2018 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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