The Constitutional Court found no 232 / 2019 Coll.
The Constitutional Court found of 30 July 2019 sp. zn.
Valid
The Constitutional Tribunal found
Text versions:
05.09.2019
232
FIND
The Constitutional Court
On behalf of the Republic
On 30 July 2019, the Constitutional Court decided, under point Pl.
as follows:
I. Proposal for the annulment of § 11 (g) of Act No. 121 / 2008 Coll., on Senior Judicial Officials and Senior Officials of the Public Prosecutor's Office and on the amendment of the related laws, as amended by Act No. 293 / 2013 Coll., in the words "if the execution title of the Executive or notarial registration is" is rejected.
II. The remainder is rejected.
Reasons
Subject matter
1. By order of 24 August 2017 No 27 C 182 / 2017- 22 of the Regional Court of Liberec (hereinafter referred to as the "applicant" or the "district court"), Mr Martin Homer (hereinafter referred to as the "creditor") had been ordered to pay him an amount of CZK 216 623,74 with accessories and reimbursement of costs. On the basis of an enforcement proposal entitled to recover that claim, an enforcement procedure was initiated under which the District Court, by order of 12 December 2017, No 73 EXE 61941 / 2017-8, issued by a senior judicial officer, Lenka Holatova, mandated the execution of the court executor JUDr. Ing. Petr Kucheru, Executive Office of Kladno. By a subsequent order of 26 January 2018 No 73 EXE 61941 / 2017-16, also issued by that senior judicial officer, the district court rejected the application for suspension of execution as unfounded. In fact, he found no reason which, according to § 268 of the Civil Code, in conjunction with § 52 (1) of Act No. 120 / 2001 Coll., on judicial executors and execution activities (execution order) and on the amendment of other laws, would justify the suspension of execution.
2. It made compulsory appeals against that resolution pursuant to Article 9 (1) of Act No. 121 / 2008 Coll., on Senior Judicial Officials and Senior Officials of the Prosecutor's Office and on the amendment of related laws, as amended by Act No. 293 / 2013 Coll., hereinafter referred to as "the Law on Senior Judicial Officials'. In deciding on it, the District Court first addressed the question of whether the senior judicial officer was entitled to decide on a motion to stop execution. If this were not the case, this would already allow the appeal to be appealed and the order under appeal to be annulled.
3. The acts of the Court of First Instance, to which a senior judicial officer is entitled, are laid down in the General Clause supplemented by a negative list contained in Section 11 of the Law on Senior Judicial Officers (hereinafter referred to as "the contested provision '), which excludes from those acts" the decision on the enforcement of a judgment or the delegation of a judicial executor, and the order of execution for the enforcement to be made in order to obtain the financial execution, if any, if the enforceable title is the executive registration or notarial record, including the decision to suspend the enforcement of a judgment, if the application was lodged by a legitimate or judicial executor, or was appealed against the application'. The District Court concluded that, pursuant to Article 11 of the Law on Senior Judicial Offices and Contrario, a senior judicial officer could have decided on a motion to suspend the execution, since, in the case under examination, the execution was the law of the court. At the same time, however, he found such an authorisation contrary to Article 94 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution), under which paragraph 2 of the Act may determine which cases and how other citizens are involved in the decision-making of the courts alongside the judges. Pursuant to Article 95 (2) of the Constitution and Article 64 (3) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as "the Law on the Constitutional Court '), the District Court therefore made an application for the annulment of this legal provision. The application was submitted to the Constitutional Court on 20 June 2018.
Text of the contested provision
4. Paragraph 11 of the Act on Senior Judicial Officials, which the appellant seeks to abolish, reads as follows:
A senior judicial officer in civil proceedings and administrative proceedings may, save as otherwise provided in a special law, carry out all acts of the Court of First Instance, except:
(a) conduct negotiations on the substance of the matter;
(b) the judgment in the case itself in the form of a judgment;
(c) ruling on the substance of the case in the form of a resolution in proceedings under the Civil Code, the Rules of Procedure of the Administrative and Law governing specific proceedings other than those of the Court of Justice,
1. hiding procedures;
2. instrument amortisation proceedings;
3. matters concerning the determination of paternity by a declaration of agreement;
4. Proceedings concerning the custody of minors and the custody of persons restricted to their own right or persons having jurisdiction, persons who are not known to be resident, unknown persons and persons whose health is causing them difficulties in managing property or defending rights in which no hearing has been ordered,
5. proceedings concerning public registers of legal and natural persons and the insolvency register in which no hearing has been ordered;
(d) decisions on interim measures;
(e) decision-making on the enforcement of decisions by the administration of real estate, the sale of real estate, the disability of a business establishment or the establishment of a judicial lien;
(f) the decision on the regulation of the enforcement of decisions by withholding wages, ordering claims or selling movable property in the proceedings in which the proceedings were ordered;
(g) the decision on the regulation of the enforcement of a decision or of the delegation of a judicial executor and the ordering of an execution to obtain cash performance, where the enforcement title is the executive record or notary record, including the decision to suspend the enforcement of a decision, if the application has not been lodged by a legitimate or judicial executor, or if an appeal has been lodged against the application;
(h) deciding to satisfy the rights of non-cash performance;
(i) decision-making on the regulation of the enforcement of decisions on the care of minors, with the exception of maintenance;
(j) certification of the European Enforcement Order;
(k) ruling on the suspensive effect of an action in administrative proceedings;
(l) cases where the act of special law is expressly entrusted to the judge,
(m) proceedings and decisions in insolvency proceedings
1. the provisions of the insolvency administrator;
2. Withdrawal of the insolvency administrator from office,
3. exemption from the function of insolvency administrator;
4. the annulment of the resolution of the creditors' meeting,
5. The provisions of the provisional creditor committee,
6. Decisions and measures taken in the execution of decisions or execution in breach of restrictions under the insolvency law;
7. a proposal for a regulation of an interim measure limiting the debtor's right to dispose of the property;
8. Proposal for a Moratorium,
9. That the debtor is bankrupt,
10. rejection of the insolvency proposal;
11. the abolition of bankruptcy,
12. declaration of bankruptcy and cancellation;
13. approval of the final report and the timetable resolution;
14. authorisation of the reorganisation, approval of the reorganisation plan and its amendments and conversion of the reorganisation into bankruptcy,
15. the approval of the debt relief and its amendments, the granting of an exemption from payment of debts included in the debt relief and the withdrawal of such an exemption and the cancellation of the debt relief;
16. closure of the debtor's business establishment,
17.
(n) processing of requests with a foreign country, outside the Slovak Republic. '
Arguments of the appellant
5. The appellant takes the view that Paragraph 11 (g) of the Law on Senior Judicial Officials authorises senior judicial officers to decide to suspend enforcement in cases where the enforcement title is not an executive registration or notarial registration. However, this interpretation, which is based on the text of the contested provision, has been gradually overcome in the decision-making practice of the District Court and the Regional Court in Ústí nad Labem - branches in Liberec ("the Regional Court ') and in recent years such decisions have been abolished due to a lack of authorisation of senior judicial officers. The reason for this change is a contradiction of the original decision-making practice with the legal conclusions contained in the decision of 22.5.2013 sp. zn. According to this finding, the position of a senior judicial officer does not correspond to his decision independently of the judge, in addition to the substance of the case, as is the case when the proceedings are terminated. Senior judicial officers may only act separately if they do not exceed their auxiliary role in the performance of the judiciary. The appellant observes that in a number of its decisions, the Regional Court considered Paragraph 11 (g) of the Law on Senior Judicial Officials to be unconstitutional. However, he has never submitted a motion for its annulment, although that provision provides for a decision to be taken by senior judicial officers to cease enforcement. In this situation, the appellant himself did so because of a breach of the contested provision with Article 94 of the Constitution. The application for annulment of the contested provision as a whole justified that, in view of the wording structure, only part of it could not be deleted.
Proceedings before the Constitutional Court
6. In accordance with Article 69 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court sent the proposal to the chambers of Parliament and to the Government and the Ombudsman as authorities entitled to intervene as interveners.
Observation of Parliament's chambers
7. The Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, both in their observations of 31 July 2018 and 19 July 2018, signed by the Presidents of the individual chambers of Mgr. Radek Vondráček and Milan Štěm, summarised the course of the legislative process under which Act No. 293 / 2013 Coll., amending Act No. 99 / 1963 Coll., the Civil Code, as amended, and certain other laws. By this Act the amendment of Act No. 121 / 2008 Coll., on Senior Judicial Officials and Senior Officials of the Prosecutor's Office and on the amendment of related laws, as amended, included a new text of the contested provision.
Government observations
8. By order No 461 of 18 July 2018, the Government decided to enter the proceedings, which was notified by the Constitutional Court within the statutory deadline. The Government has authorised the Minister of Justice to draw up detailed observations on the proposal in question and to represent it in the present proceedings.
9. In its observations of 22 August 2018, signed by the then Minister of Justice, JUDr. Jan Kneženka, Ph.D., the Government questioned the applicant's right to file a motion for annulment of the contested provision. It pointed out that, in the case of the application for suspension of the execution resulting from the application for annulment of the contested provision, that provision was already exhausted by a decision of a senior judicial officer, and that the district court would decide on the appeal against it pursuant to Article 9 (1) of the Law on senior judicial officials. Otherwise, however, the appellant's design authorisation could only be given in relation to Article 11 (g) of the Law on Senior Judicial Officials concerning the decision to cease enforcement. The other paragraphs of the contested provision in the case could not have been applied and their abolition would have constituted a disproportionate interference with the law. The annulment of the contested provision as a whole would not be necessary even if the proposal were justified. In fact, it would be possible to obtain the required result so that senior judicial officers could not be able to rule on the cessation of execution by cancelling Section 11 (g) of the Law on Senior Judicial Officials, which makes it conditional on the exclusion of such decisions by the nature of the Enforcement Order.
10. In the event that the application was not rejected as being manifestly unjustified by the person concerned, the Government commented on the question whether the contested provision would stand in the light of the legal conclusions contained in the decision of the Court of First Instance. In its view, the shortcomings which the Law on Senior Judicial Officials has been criticised for the status of Senior Judicial Officials have already been remedied. It cannot be overlooked that, following the adoption of that finding, both the contested provision and the normative surroundings relevant to its systematic interpretation have changed. The provision already under appeal guarantees that the centre of gravity of the judiciary is not in the work of senior judicial officers. Any judgment of the Court of First Instance may be reviewed as it is always admissible for an appeal before the Court of First Instance. In addition, in the event of legal or factual action, the senior judicial officer shall be required to refer the case to the Judge or, where appropriate, the Judge may withdraw it. The application of certain acts to which a senior judicial officer is entitled may also be reserved for the Judge.
11. The Law on Senior Judicial Officials thus allows a distinction to be made between when an action, the decision to stop execution, including as a routine act (for example, if this is to happen on the basis of a proposal from the person who proposed the execution order) and when it is a complex act (for example, if, after the decision has been given, the right granted by it or if execution is inadmissible). This is in line with the purpose of the law, which is to relieve judges of the actions carried out by the courts in matters which are neither legally nor factually complex, while at the same time allowing for considerable variability in the organisation of work on the courts, which should contribute to speeding up proceedings. The government believes that the work of a judge can no longer be done without the cooperation of others. It is essential that the implementation of acts of a trivial nature by senior judicial officers does not undermine the relevant constitutional principles, which is ensured in particular by the fact that the activities of senior judicial officers are under the control of the judge and that an appeal against decisions taken by them is always admissible. This is precisely the guarantee that a review of the matter can always be achieved by a judicial body pursuant to Article 6 (1) of the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention '). The current scope of the powers of senior judicial officials shall in no way restrict the right to judicial protection under Article 36 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as the Charter) or to a fair trial under Article 6 (1) of the Convention.
12. The decision-making of non-judicial staff is, according to the Government, not unusual even abroad, as is shown by examples from Germany and Austria, whose legislation has become a model of our legislation as senior judicial officials. In Austria, senior judicial officers (Diplomrechtspfleger) issue almost 80% of all judicial decisions in civil proceedings. Their agenda includes civil procedure, execution and insolvency proceedings, out-of-court or property register, vessel register and commercial register matters. In Germany, higher judicial officers (Rechtspfleger) act as "the second pillar of the judiciary." They shall, inter alia, be entrusted with a number of operations in the field of execution, forced auctioning, forced administration or enforcement of sanctions. Like our legislation, the requirements for education, practice and the personal assumptions of senior judicial officers, which differ from those for the duties of judge, are addressed in both countries. The laws of that country define the types of proceedings in which senior judicial officers participate by combining a positive and negative list.
13. In the case of the contested provision, the present decision-making practice of the Constitutional Court has a restrictive interpretation rather than a concern about the continuing inconstitutionality of the legislation. A number of resolutions by the Constitutional Court essentially and discussed the application of the contested provision. The Government adds that the abolition of the possibility of senior judicial officials participating in judicial decisions in the current form would necessarily have to lead to the staffing of the courts in the positions of judges, which would entail considerable economic consequences. According to the internal statistics of the Ministry of Justice, as of 1 July 2018 a total of 1 398 persons performed the post of senior judicial officer. Article 38a of the Civil Code and Article 3 (2) of Act No. 6 / 2002 Coll., on Courts, Judges, Addresses and Government Administration of the Courts and on the amendment of certain other laws (Law on Courts and Judges) provide for the possibility for higher judicial officers to participate in the exercise of the judiciary. The annulment of the contested provision would also affect the scope of the powers of the assistant judge, which are defined by analogy in § 36a (5) of the Law on Courts and Judges, as amended by Act No 79 / 2006 Coll. The Government proposes that the Constitutional Court reject or reject the application for annulment of the contested provision.
Communication from the Ombudsman
14. The Ombudsman Mgr. Anna Shabatová, Ph.D., informed the Constitutional Court by letter of 9 July 2018 that she was not taking advantage of her right to intervene in this proceedings.
Replication of the applicant
15. The appellant responded to those observations by a reply of 17 September 2018, in which it rejected such a constitutional conformal interpretation of the authority of the senior judicial officer to decide to suspend the execution, which would allow for such a decision only in some cases, in addition to the indeterminate nature of the complexity of the case, although this criterion is contained in Section 7 (a) of Act No. 121 / 2008 Coll., on senior judicial officials and senior civil servants of the public prosecutor and on the amendment of related laws. In the case of the contested provision, it is a matter of competence, to be precise, of the court's occupancy. According to the appellant, a senior judicial officer is entitled to decide either to suspend the execution or not. If doubt is given, it is appropriate to resort to the conclusion that it does not have this authorisation. At the same time, however, this means that the legal provision which he is expressly recognised by him is unconstitutional and must be abolished and not ignored under the guise of "constitutionally conformist interpretation."
16. The appellant agrees with the importance and benefit of the non-judicial apparatus in the performance of the judiciary, as described by the Government in its observations. He is convinced that decisions of senior judicial officials, other than procedural matters, can be accepted. However, the fact remains that, to a minimum to some extent, the provisions adopted do not comply with the conclusions set out in the sp. zn. Only the Constitutional Court may resolve the question in which cases senior judicial officers may take decisions in proceedings for annulment of the contested provision. On the contrary, it cannot be addressed locally at different levels of the judicial system.
17. In a situation where the Regional Court refuses to apply Article 11 (g) of the Law on Senior Judicial Officials because of its inconstitutionality, the contested provision would have no meaning if the Constitutional Court could not comment on the question of its constitutionality. The appellant refuses not to have a design authorisation in this procedure. In the light of the legislative technique, the definition of the powers of senior judicial officers (a combination of a positive general clause supplemented by a negative calculation) had to propose the annulment of the contested provision as a whole. The repeal of point (g) alone would lead to the extension of the powers of senior judicial officers. A cancellation of only part of it, which makes it conditional on the decision-making of senior judicial officers by the nature of the enforcement title, would also exclude their right to delegate the executive. To refer to the Government's review of the Constitutional Court's decision-making practice in cases decided by the non-judicial apparatus of the courts, the appellant states that this did not concern, nor did the Constitutional Court comment on the decision-making of senior judicial officers on the substance.
Oral proceedings
18. In accordance with Article 44 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court has ruled in the matter without the oral hearing, since further clarification could not be expected from it.
Proceedings before the Constitutional Court
19. The Constitutional Court has first examined whether all the legal procedural conditions for the examination of an application under Article 87 (1) (a) and Article 95 (2) of the Constitution and Article 64 (3) of the Law on the Constitutional Court are fulfilled. The proposal clearly fulfils all the formal requirements laid down by the Constitutional Court Act.
20. The fundamental question in relation to the assessment of the procedural assumptions of the proposal concerns the design authorisation itself. Paragraph 64 (3) of the Law on the Constitutional Court provides that the application for annulment of the law or its individual provisions is also entitled to be lodged by the Court in the context of its decision-making activities under Article 95 (2) of the Constitution. According to this Article, if the court concludes that the law to be applied in the resolution of the case is contrary to the constitutional order, it shall bring the matter before the Constitutional Court. That condition of the design authorisation is fulfilled in respect of a law or provision of which the application of which is to be immediate or unavoidable in the present case [Resolution of 23.10.2000 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 39 / 2000 (U 39 / 20 SbNU 353)], the existence of which simultaneously impedes the achievement of the desired (constitutionally conformal) result [for example, the finding of 6.3.2007 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 3 / 06 (N 41 / 44 SbNU 517; 149 / 2007 Coll.), paragraph 26; the finding of 28.1.2014 sp.
21. The appellant made an application for annulment of the contested provision in the context of a review of a court decision given by a senior judicial officer rejecting an application which was compulsory for the cessation of execution, which was the subject of a judgment by a court. The contested provision defines the authority of a senior judicial officer to carry out administrative acts of the Court of First Instance in civil or judicial proceedings. At the same time, it shall establish a list of operations in which such authorisation shall not apply. However, none of these exceptions falls within the competence of the Court of First Instance of the appellant of the contested decision. Thus, although the appellant does not oppose the authorisation of a senior judicial officer to carry out acts of the Court of First Instance in general, the inconstitutionality of the contested provision as a whole finds that, although it is a comprehensive legal regulation of that authorisation, it does not include an exception to that authorisation which applies precisely to the decision on the application for suspension of an execution, which was made by the Court's decision.
22. The Constitutional Court notes that the inconstitutionality of the law or its individual provisions may also result from a lack of regulation of a particular legal institute or part of it (omission of the legislature) if this makes it impossible, even in certain cases, to use it in a constitutional manner. If such inconstitutionality cannot be eliminated only by cancelling part of the legislation of the legal institute in question, then the conclusion of the inconstitutionality falls on the whole. In this respect, a number of cases from the Constitutional Court's decision-making practice can be pointed out. For example, the reason for abolishing the entire legal regulation of the administrative justice system under the former part of the Fifth Civil Code was that it did not contain sufficient guarantees of judicial protection for individuals against decisions or other interventions by public authorities [the finding of 27.6.2001 sp. zn. ÚS 16 / 99 (N 96 / 22 CollNU 329; 276 / 2001 Coll.)]. In other cases, the Constitutional Court annulled the definition of the participants in the approval procedure pursuant to Act No. 50 / 1976 Coll., on Territorial Planning and Construction Regulations (Construction Act), as amended, since this status was not granted to certain persons whose rights and obligations may have been affected by the decision on the final expenses and remuneration of the Insolvency Trustee in cases where the property was not sufficient to cover the costs of bankruptcy [decision of 25 June 2002]. In all these cases, although the various parts of the repealed legislation themselves (outside the context of the legislation in question) did not have to be unconstitutional, the removal of the inconstitutionality found could not have been done without positive interference by the legislator. On the contrary, the Constitutional Court had no choice but to abolish those legal provisions. Article 87 (1) (a) of the Constitution allows it to decide only on the repeal of the law, not on its amendment or amendment (Resolution of 29.6.1998 sp. zn. II. ÚS 272 / 98 (U 42 / 11 of SbNU 323)).
23. If the inconstitutionality of the law or its individual provisions prevents a particular case from reaching a constitutional outcome of the legal proceedings, in a lack of regulation of a legal institute or component thereof, then the General Court is entitled to bring an application to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of that regulation as a whole. At the level of the law, this regulation as a whole is an expression of the rule of law, which is causing the alleged unconstitutional consequence. In this logic, the Constitutional Court accepted, in the decision of the sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 31 / 10, the review and abolition of the entire § 11 Act on Senior Judicial Officials, as effective until 31 December 2013. Even then, the design of this provision was similar, while the lack of an exception to the definition of the powers of senior judicial officers - at the time for deciding on the defendant's objections to the exchange order - could not be removed by cancelling only part of that provision.
24. In the present case, the appellant contests Article 11 of the Law on Senior Judicial Officials on the ground that this provision does not exclude from the acts of the Court of First Instance, to which a senior judicial officer is entitled, the decision of the Court of First Instance, which decided on the application of the compulsory suspension of the execution to obtain the cash execution ordered by the Court's decision. Whereas a satisfactory finding in the case sp. zn. It is true that this exemption is also applicable to decisions to stop execution pursuant to § 52 (1) of the Rules of Enforcement and § 38a of the Civil Code. However, for the application of that exception, further conditions laid down by law must be fulfilled, namely that the executive registration or notarial registration is the enforceable title, and that the motion for suspension has not been filed by the authorised or judicial executor or, where appropriate, has been appealed against. These conditions are expressly stated in the contested provision.
25. The assessment of the constitutionality of the contested provision as a whole would be of relevance in a matter decided by the appellant only if the law did not provide, in relation to the authorization of a senior judicial officer, for acts of the Court of First Instance to make an exception to which a decision to suspend the execution could be placed under. However, such an exception is contained in the contested provision. The reason for which, in the case under examination, the exclusion of the authorisation of a senior judicial officer to decide to cease execution does not apply lies only in the failure to comply with one of the conditions of this derogation, which is expressed in the words "if the executive registration or notarial registration is the enforceable title '. If the reason for the non-constitutionality of the contested provision is that this condition unduly restricts the exemption in question, then its removal may already be achieved by the withdrawal of that part of the contested provision.
26. The Constitutional Court thus concluded that only part of Paragraph 11 (g) of the Law on Senior Judicial Officials, expressed as "if the executive registration or notarial registration is the executive title ', is a legal expression of the rule to be applied by the appellant and of which the inconstitutionality is alleged. That part of the contested provision precludes the appellant from taking a decision in such a way that the senior judicial officer was not entitled to decide to stop the execution. The annulment of the entire contested provision is therefore not necessary. The remainder of the proposal did not fulfil the condition of the application of the law in the resolution of the case under Article 95 (2) of the Constitution and Article 64 (3) of the Constitutional Court Act, as a result of which the appellant was not entitled to file it. It remains to be added that, to the extent that the application for annulment of the contested provision was lodged by the applicant, the application was not inadmissible or no reason was given to stop the proceedings.
Assessment of the competence and constitutional conformity of the procedure for the adoption of the contested legislative provisions
27. According to Article 68 (2) of the Constitutional Court Act, the assessment of the compliance of the law with the constitutional order consists of answering three questions: whether it was adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution, whether it was adopted in a constitutionally prescribed manner and whether its content is in accordance with constitutional law.
28. After Article 11 of the Act on Senior Judicial Officials, as effective until 31 December 2013, was repealed by the finding of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 31 / 10, Parliament, on the basis of its authorisation pursuant to Article 15 (1) of the Constitution, adopted Act No. 293 / 2013 Coll., amending Act No. 99 / 1963 Coll., Civil Code, as amended, and certain other laws. It also included the amendment to the Act on Senior Judicial Officials, including the new text of that provision. As is apparent from the statements of Parliament's chambers and publicly available documents relating to the legislative process, the Government of the Chamber of Deputies presented the draft law (Chamber of Deputies, 6th Election, 2010- 2013, House Press 932 / 0) to the Chamber of Deputies on 5 March 2013. It was approved at the third reading on 8 August 2013 at its 57th meeting (resolution 1748), with 68 out of 119 Members voting for it, 21 opposed and 30 abstentions. The Senate discussed and approved the bill (Senate, 9th term, 2012-2014, Senate Press 175 / 0) at its 13th meeting on 12 September 2013 (Resolution 332). 42 of the 56 senators present voted for approval, 2 opposed and 12 abstained. The adopted law was not signed by the President of the Chamber of Deputies, as the Chamber of Deputies was already dissolved at the time of its adoption. On 17 September 2013, the law was delivered to the President of the Republic, who signed it on the same day, and it was also signed by the Prime Minister. The Act was published in the Collection of Laws on 27 September 2013 in the amount of 112 under number 293 / 2013 Coll. The law was therefore adopted in a constitutionally prescribed manner and the Constitutional Court could proceed to assess the conformity of the content of the contested provision with the constitutional order.
Summary of the content of the contested provision in the context of the legal definition of the position and authorisation of a senior judicial officer
29. The opening of the further review must summarise the relevant legal arrangements which, in their entirety, define the content of the contested provision. As already stated above, the Constitutional Court in this proceedings assesses the constitutionality of Section 11 (g) of the Law on Senior Judicial Officials in the words "if the executive title is the executive registration or notarial registration." The content of such a defined part of the contested provision shall be the power of a senior judicial officer to decide on the delegation of a judicial practitioner and the enforcement order for the enforcement of a judgment or execution, including the suspension of the enforcement of a judgment, in cases where the enforceable title is not an executive registration or notary registration. That section of Section 11 (g) of the Act on Senior Judicial Offices excludes such acts from the list of acts of the court to which the Senior Judicial Officer - despite the general authorisation contained in the introductory part of the contested provision - is not entitled.
30. A senior judicial officer shall be the person to whom the law provides for the right to perform certain acts of the court, whether in the exercise of the justice or in the administration of the court. The Law on Senior Judicial Officers sets out the qualification conditions for the performance of this function, which is performed in employment relations with the Czech Republic, for which a specific court acts as its organisational component. These preconditions are citizenship of the Czech Republic, integrity, successful completion of the studies of senior judicial officers or senior officials of the Public Prosecutor's Office or completed university education by graduating from the Bachelor's or Master's degree programme in the field of law at university (§ 2 (1)).
31. As regards the exercise of the judiciary, a senior judicial officer shall be entitled to perform the prescribed acts of the court in civil and administrative proceedings (§ 11) and in criminal proceedings (§ 12), unless the President of the Chamber has reserved for himself the execution of those acts (§ 13). It is always carried out in the judicial department to which it was classified on the basis of a work schedule (§ 4 (1)). The schedule of work determines in which cases, types of proceedings and in which activities of the court the superior judicial officer carries out individual acts on the basis of a mandate or without an mandate from the President of the Chamber and which the President of the Chamber is entitled to delegate (§ 4 (2)). The President of the Chamber shall be authorised to instruct the senior judicial officer in writing how the action is to be carried out. The authority to carry out an individual act and the order of the President of the Chamber shall be binding on the senior judicial officer and the President of the Chamber shall ensure that the action is carried out properly (Section 5). At the same time, a senior judicial officer shall be required to refer the matter to the President of the Chamber in so far as it is a matter of law or fact, or an act which he is not entitled to carry out (§ 7) is required. In the case of a case of legal or factual nature, the President of the Chamber shall withdraw the case from the superior judicial officer and deal with it in his own capacity (§ 8). A senior judicial officer shall also be excluded from carrying out the proceedings of the court for similar reasons provided for by the special law for the exclusion of the judge (§ 6 (1)).
32. An appeal may be brought against a decision given by a senior judicial officer in civil proceedings under the same conditions as against the decision of the President of the Chamber. However, the appeal lodged shall first be submitted to the President of the Chamber, who shall decide on it if he considers that it is to be entirely met. The decision of the President of the Chamber shall be deemed to be a decision of the Court of First Instance and may be challenged by appeal (Paragraph 9 (1)). A decision given by a senior judicial officer in civil proceedings or administrative proceedings against which no appeal, opposition or objection may be brought under civil law may be objected to by the party within 15 days of the date of receipt of his written copy. New facts or evidence cannot be invoked in the objections. Such objections shall be decided by the President of the Chamber, who shall confirm or amend the decision given by the senior judicial officer without hearing. An appeal shall not be admissible against a decision of the President of the Chamber on objections, refusal of objections or termination of opposition proceedings. The decision delivered by a senior judicial officer, against whom it is no longer possible to object, is in legal power. Unless otherwise provided for in the Law on Senior Judicial Officers, the provisions governing appeal under the Civil Code shall apply mutatis mutandis to opposition proceedings (Section 9 (2)).
In general, the possibility of carrying out proceedings by persons other than the judges
33. The constitutional assessment of Article 11 (g) of the Law on senior judicial officers in the words "if the execution title is an executive registration or notary registration" depends on the question whether the Constitution allows the courts to decide on the cessation of enforcement of a judgment or, where appropriate, on the enforcement of a judgment or execution, as well as on the mandate of the court executor to be exercised by persons other than judges, in this case by senior judicial officers. The finding of a reply requires an interpretation of what is understood as a constitutionally defined judicial authority, through which persons such power may be exercised and whether the constitutional requirements relating to the exercise of judicial power apply in the case of any legally established jurisdiction of the court.
34. The judiciary represents one of the elements of state power. Its fundamental role under Articles 4 and 90 of the Constitution is to provide protection of rights, thus simultaneously implementing the right of an individual to judicial protection under Article 36 (1) of the Charter. In a democratic rule of law, protection of rights must be guaranteed not only against the actions of others, but also against intervention by the state itself. Guarantees of independence and impartiality of the exercise of judicial authority are essential to the provision of protection of rights, since only an independent and impartial court is capable of providing justice to all [the finding of 18.6.2002 sp. zn. ÚS 7 / 02 (N 78 / 26 CollNU 273; 349 / 2002 Coll.)]. These guarantees must also be applied effectively against possible interference by State authority, without prejudice to the fact that the judicial authority does not cease to be part of it and is subject to all constitutional requirements for its enforcement.
35. The Constitution, in its Rule 81, entrusts the exercise of jurisdiction to independent courts which exercise it through judges. In this context, it shall lay down the qualification conditions for the performance of the duties of a Judge, the manner in which they shall be appointed and the guarantee of independence and impartiality to be applied to the decisions of each Judge. Those qualifications are according to Article 93 (2) of the Constitution for citizenship of the Czech Republic, integrity and higher education. The Act can then provide - and in Section 60 of the Law on Courts and Judges, as amended, also provides - additional assumptions. In addition to the general assumption of full competence, this is the minimum age of 30 years, the requirement that the experience and moral characteristics of the person to be appointed give a guarantee that he will hold the post properly, consent to his / her provision as a judge and to the assignment to a particular court and to the composition of a professional judicial examination, which always means that he / she has completed the practice of a judicial candidate or equivalent practice.
36. The democratic legitimacy of the exercise of judicial authority provided for in Article 2 (1) of the Constitution shall be guaranteed by the appointment of judges by a decision of the President of the Republic pursuant to Article 63 (1) (i) of the Constitution, which requires the co-signature of the Prime Minister or of a member of the Government appointed by him for his term of office. This is the responsibility of the Government responsible to the Chamber of Deputies (Article 63 (3) and (4) of the Constitution). The exercise of judicial authority is thus legitimised by a shared decision of the constitutional authorities, which are either directly elected by the citizens, or the composition of which is itself legitimised by the decision of elected representatives of the citizens [see, in particular, the finding of 4.9.2018 sp. zn.
37. The moment the judge takes up his duties shall be subject to all guarantees of independence and impartiality of the judiciary. Article 82 (1) In the performance of their duties, judges shall be independent and their impartiality shall not be jeopardised. The independence of the judicial authority or of the courts is subject to the independence of the judges. Its guarantees can be divided into two planes. The principle of the binding principle of the judge is merely a law and an international agreement forming part of the rule of law (Article 95 (1) of the Constitution). On a personal basis, the independence of the judge is guaranteed primarily by the duration of the function (Article 93 (1) of the Constitution), its fundamental irrevocability and non-objectivity (Article 82 (2) of the Constitution), the incompatibility of the performance of the duties of the Judge with other functions (Article 82 (3) of the Constitution) and its material security [e.g., the finding of 15.9.1999 sp. zn. Pl. Pl. ÚS 13 / 99 (N 125 / 15 SbNU 191; 233 / 1999 Sb.), the finding of 11.7.2006 sp. Pl. ÚS 18 / 06 (N 130 / 42 SbNU 13; 397 / 2006 Sb.) or the finding of sp.
38. The Constitution presupposes that the judgments of the courts shall be exercised either in the Chamber or as self-judges. Thus, in conjunction with Article 82 of the Constitution, it is impossible for the decision-making activities of the courts to be carried out in a different manner than the judges as the rightholder. Nor is this requirement broken by Article 94 (2) of the Constitution, which allows other citizens to take part in the decisions of the courts, if the law so provides. The purpose of this provision is to create an area for a lay element in an otherwise professionally understood judiciary. Such an element may, for example, take the form of codecision between "other 'citizens in the Senate as" sitting' or in the form of jury courts. The law may define areas of jurisdiction (typically criminal, labour and family matters) where such participation of citizens would be desirable (different opinion of Judge Jan Filip on the finding of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 31 / 10). However, the Constitutional Court points out that taking part in the decision-making process of the Court means only the possibility of taking decisions with the Judge. The law cannot circumvent the constitutional rules governing the exercise of judicial power by passing it on to other persons who have not been democratically legalized to it in the prescribed manner and in respect of whom the guarantees of judicial impartiality and independence do not apply.
39. Those conclusions shall apply without exception in all cases where the General Court fulfils its constitutional function. Judicial protection, as provided for in Articles 4 and 90 of the Constitution, as well as the various Articles of the Charter, whether they guarantee the right to judicial protection in general or make certain interference in fundamental rights and freedoms conditional upon decisions of the Court of First Instance, may not be granted otherwise than by decision of the Judges in one of the ways set out in Article 94 of the Constitution.
40. The specific way of providing judicial protection depends, under Article 90 of the Constitution, on the legal definition of the individual powers of the courts. The legislature has a wide margin of discretion in this regard, but the procedural solution chosen by it must allow an individual, in accordance with Article 36 (1) of the Charter, to always be able to obtain the protection of his subjective rights in court. The Act may provide for an exception to Article 36 (2) of the Charter only for judicial review of decisions of public authorities, provided that this does not preclude the review of decisions concerning fundamental rights and freedoms under the Charter.
41. In particular, the legislature has complied with these requirements by establishing, in the various judicial orders, procedural means by which everyone can defend themselves against interference with their subjective rights. This applies both to interventions by other natural or legal persons and to interventions by public authorities. In that regard, the basic types of action are governed by civil and administrative rules, in relation to the exercise of the powers of the law enforcement authorities. In addition, judicial protection is also provided in the exercise of other jurisdiction of the courts. It's basically an inseparable part of their decision making. Some of these powers have a basis directly in constitutional order. The courts therefore have exclusive jurisdiction to decide on guilt and punishment. Another example is cases where a judicial decision is based on the waiver of liberty (custody, detention) or substantial interference in privacy (home search, wiretaps). However, a number of powers are conferred on the courts by law, although other solutions would be sufficient, typically conferring these powers on administrative authorities while maintaining the possibility of judicial protection.
42. The tentative judicial protection is not the only way in which an individual can obtain protection of his or her subjective rights. The rule of law also regulates various forms of other legal protection, with which, although not linked to the same guarantees of independence and impartiality as in courts, they are usually effective and sufficient in practice. All administrative or other proceedings brought before a public authority other than a court shall be brought here. Other legal protection may be provided not only by public authorities, but also through authorised natural and legal persons. Provided that, ultimately, individual access to court is not excluded, the legislator has wide scope for finding solutions which, in view of the specificity of the legal relationship, will enable effective protection of rights in the required quality, in real time and without unnecessary costs. In such cases, the use of judicial protection should be more of an exception.
43. The various legal forms of legal protection may differ significantly. The legal regulation not only always takes into account the specificities of the legal relations to which it is intended to be protected but also reflects the circumstances in which it was adopted. In some areas, legal protection is thus to a significant extent effectively ensured in administrative proceedings, and generally only a small part of the decision of the competent administrative authority will be subject to judicial review. But there are also areas of legal relations in which the legislator preferred a different solution and gave some authority directly to the courts, even if he did not have to. In doing so, he directly extended the guarantees relating to the exercise of judicial power, but at the same time he entrusted the judicial authority with another non-necessary agenda which would otherwise have been devoted to a much smaller extent only in the context of judicial review.
44. The combination of the increase in the number of legal proceedings initiated and the extension of judicial agendas since the 1990s has led to overburdening of the courts and the related delays in the proceedings. Thus, quite naturally, consideration of the appropriate forms of legal protection has also been avoided by the possibilities of simplifying or accelerating the legal proceedings themselves in ways that would not at the same time harm the parties to their constitutionally guaranteed procedural rights. The solutions to which the legislator has gradually reached were not only related to the actual conduct of the legal proceedings (e.g. the authorisation to decide on a payment order). It also included the conferral of certain acts of the Court, including powers of decision, to persons other than judges. In this way, for example, the enforcement of the decision was transferred in many respects to the judicial executors (the execution order) or to the notary's decision as a judicial commissioner (§ 100 et seq. of Act No. 292 / 2013 Coll., on special court proceedings). However, this includes the authorisation of senior judicial officers or other judicial staff to perform certain judicial tasks.
45. In some cases, the legislator has decided to ensure effective legal protection, not by means of legal means prior to any judicial proceedings, but by establishing specific forms of decision-making directly in the context of legal proceedings. The decisions thus given, whether formally by court decisions or only by court-mandated natural or legal persons, clearly do not satisfy the requirements arising from constitutional order in relation to judicial decisions. Nor, as the examples above suggest, are they issued through judges in any of the ways provided for in Article 94 of the Constitution. The question therefore arises as to whether such decisions may be part of the exercise of judicial authority and, if so, under what conditions.
46. In this context, the Constitutional Court notes that the Constitution creates a wide margin for legislators to determine the legal means to protect rights, but the option chosen by it must not create an unacceptable restriction on the constitutional powers of public authorities or cause unacceptable interference with fundamental rights and freedoms or otherwise oppose constitutional order. Thus, any solution may not constitute an obstacle to the constitutionally foreseeable exercise of judicial power under Articles 81, 82, 90 and 94 of the Constitution or to the fundamental right of the parties to judicial proceedings under Article 36 (1) of the Charter. This means that it is not primarily impossible that some of its sub-stages, in which, for example, the speed of proceedings (that is to say, interest in hearing and decision-making without undue delay) should also be included in the legal proceedings at the expense of other constitutional requirements relating to the exercise of judicial authority. Such a diversion will, however, only be sustained if these requirements continue to be secured in the context of legal proceedings as a whole. As in the case of legal remedies prior to legal proceedings, such specific forms of decision-making shall not prevent anyone from hearing and ruling his case by a judge in the context of judicial review.
47. Request for the exercise of judicial power by the Judges in one of the ways provided for in Article 94 The Constitution only concerns judicial decisions. There is therefore nothing to prevent the law from allowing the other acts of the court to be carried out by other persons authorised to do so. Typically, it may be qualified staff of the court whose role is to create conditions for judges to perform their duties properly. By virtue of the nature of the case, the execution of such acts must be in accordance with the instructions of the competent judge, since their purpose is to establish the conditions for its decision on the substance of the case or for any other procedural decision ending either the proceedings as a whole or at least a separate phase thereof.
48. However, if the law had, after all, entrusted persons other than judges with the power to exercise the jurisdiction of the court, other than "alongside the judges' under Article 94 (2) of the Constitution, their decision would not have been without further unconstitutional. It is clear that it would not be a judicial decision in the sense of all constitutional requirements imposed on them. For this reason, the judicial protection provided for in Article 90 of the Constitution could not be exhausted by it itself or the fundamental right to judicial protection under Article 36 (1) of the Charter could not be fulfilled. It is also impossible for a decision so issued to constitute the basis for interference with fundamental rights and freedoms where such intervention is subject to a court decision. A court decision given by a person other than a judge could only constitute a specific form of legal protection, even if provided in the context of legal proceedings. It would not be allowed to be the exercise of powers reserved solely to judges by constitutional order. At the same time, it would have to be ensured that a decision without the participation of a judge could be compensated in the subsequent stages of the proceedings, including a review of that decision by a judge. Otherwise, the legal authorisation in question would effectively replace and not merely supplement, the constitutionally envisaged decision-making of the courts and the parties concerned would inconstitutionally prevent the exercise of their fundamental right to judicial protection.
Constitutional status of the authority of a senior judicial officer to decide to suspend execution
49. Paragraph 11 (g) of the Law on senior judicial officers in the words "where the enforcement title of an executive registration or notarial registration" in conjunction with the introductory sentence of the contested provision provides for the authorisation of a senior judicial officer to rule on the delegation of a judicial officer, the enforcement order and the execution order for the enforcement of a judgment in order to obtain the financial execution and to stop them in cases where the enforcement title is not an executive registration or notarial registration. The entrustment of these and other acts of the Court to senior judicial officials by law is justified by the fact that they constitute professional personnel of the courts, who otherwise provides the judges with conditions for the performance of their duties in a qualified manner. Individual legal proceedings require a number of acts, the nature of which is often simple or formal, and therefore there is no substantive reason for it to be carried out directly by judges. In spite of the fact that they require lower qualifications than the judges, senior judicial officers should be competent to perform these tasks themselves under the supervision of a judge. After all, even if they did not have such legal authorisation, by virtue of their function they would still prepare those acts and ensure the necessary support for judges in this respect. From the point of view of the organisation of the courts, such support creates scope for judges to concentrate, in particular, on the decision-making process.
50. The scope of the actions of the court which are carried out by senior judicial officers, but also by the assistants of judges, judicial candidates, judicial secretaries or prosecutors, is not marginal. In some judicial agendas, namely when issuing payment orders or in execution matters, there have been hundreds of thousands of decisions per year in recent years (detailed statistical summaries are publicly available via the internet application infoData: http: / / czla.justice.cz / InfoData / prehledy-agend.html). The question of the constitutionality of the authorisation in question is thus significantly affected in the wider context by the entire current system of the functioning of the judiciary, which, in view of the scope of the activities of the courts without the participation of those qualified employees, is not possible. It is they who make a major contribution to the provision of judicial protection in accordance with Article 38 (2) of the Charter to the parties without undue delay. As indicated by the Government, comparable solutions can be found in other European countries.
51. However, these facts cannot, in themselves, be a reason to break the constitutional order of the rules laid down for the exercise of judicial authority. Although senior officials are part of it, they are persons other than judges. Their position is not linked to the guarantee of personal independence, as in the case of judges (cf. Thus, any decision-making power conferred on them in the context of legal proceedings must be maintained in the light of the above considerations relating to the possible exercise of the decision-making activities of the court by a person other than the judge. Only these aspects are decisive for assessing the constitutionality of the individual powers of senior judicial officers.
52. In addition, the Constitutional Court dealt with the right of a senior judicial officer to decide in some cases to cease enforcement. As stated in the section concerning the appellant's design authorisation, the contested provision also applies to decisions to suspend execution pursuant to Article 52 (1) of the Rules of Enforcement and Article 38a of the Civil Code. It is precisely to that effect that it should also be applied to the case from which the application for annulment of the contested provision arose. Given that such an authorisation of a senior judicial officer is exercised as a judicial action in the context of the proceedings by the contested provision, its constitutional assessment depends on the aspects of Articles 81, 82, 90 and 94 of the Constitution and Article 36 (1) of the Charter to answer two questions: (a) whether the right in question is reserved exclusively to judges, which would mean that it must always be exercised through a judge in one of the ways laid down in Article 94 of the Constitution, and (b) whether that authorisation does not result in the judicial proceedings as a whole not complying with the requirements of judicial protection arising from constitutional law, in particular Article 90 of the Constitution and Article 36 (1) of the Charter.
53. On the first question, the Constitutional Court states that the decision to cease enforcement or execution is a procedural decision terminating the proceedings. It does not appear from the constitutional order that decisions to suspend the enforcement of a decision or execution would be the exercise of a power which must always be conferred solely on judges. This conclusion does not change the fact that, depending on the reason for the termination (Paragraph 268 (1) of the Civil Code), this decision may have the character of a substantive decision concerning the continued duration of the right for which enforcement or execution has been ordered (for example, if the recovery of the claim has ceased to be met, which may require the execution of the evidence). It is true that decisions on the substance take place naturally in other forms of legal protection, which alone is not in a position to exclude the powers of senior judicial officers.
54. In the case of the second question, it is necessary to highlight the changes granted by the legal regulation since the issue of the sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 31 / 10. The Law on Senior Judicial Officials now precludes that judicial proceedings be brought to an end by a decision given by a Senior Judicial Officer without the possibility of bringing an appeal against that decision, which would be decided by a judge. Thus, the authority of a senior judicial officer shall not apply to the function of the court in the provision of protection of rights under Article 90 of the Constitution or to the right of the parties to judicial protection under Article 36 (1) of the Charter. A party shall always be able to bring an appeal (appeal, opposition, objection) or, in the absence of such an appeal, an objection pursuant to Article 9 (2) of the Law on Senior Judicial Officials on the basis of which the President of the Chamber shall confirm or amend the contested decision. In the event of a decision to cease enforcement or execution, judicial protection is thus always maintained by a decision given by a judge in one of the ways provided for in Article 94 of the Constitution.
55. It can only be added that the Law on senior judicial officers, the relevant parts of which have been summarised above, allows a senior judicial officer to decide to suspend the enforcement of a judgment or execution, but that the latter or any other acts of the court may be performed only if the President of the Chamber does not provide otherwise. In the exercise of its powers, it shall also be bound by the instructions of the President of the Chamber, who shall oversee his activities. In addition, the President of the Senate shall always deal with matters of legal and factual complexity. These restrictions relating to the conduct of court proceedings by a senior judicial officer essentially strengthen the elements of judicial protection in its decisions.
56. Those conclusions shall apply mutatis mutandis to decisions taken by a senior judicial officer on the delegation of a judicial practitioner and the enforcement order or execution order to obtain cash performance. The Constitution does not reserve any of these procedural decisions under the exclusive jurisdiction of judges. The possibility of judicial protection shall be fully ensured by means of appeals, including objections under Article 9 (2) of the Law on Senior Judicial Officials. It can only be added that this assessment can also be applied to a number of other acts of senior judicial officials and, in general, it is applicable, depending on the specific act being carried out, also in relation to the powers exercised by the assistants of the judges, the judicial candidates, the judicial secretaries or the judicial executors.
57. The Constitutional Court, with the interpretation made in accordance with Article 13 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, derogates from the legal opinion expressed in the sp. zn. According to this finding, senior judicial officers may only act separately in actions which do not exceed their auxiliary role, in particular those of a simple and routine nature (the finding of page P.V. ÚS 31 / 10, in particular points 35, 42 and 43). This categorical interpretation, according to the Constitutional Court, is no longer sustainable. It is based on the incorrect assumption that the decision of a senior judicial officer in its substance replaces the decision of a judge, although under the law in force on senior judicial officials, it is merely a supplement to the legal proceedings allowing for a case to be dealt with more quickly which, contrary to previous legal regulations, does not in any way affect the constitutional requirements relating to judicial decisions. As has been repeatedly stated, the party to proceedings may, notwithstanding this authorisation, always obtain judicial protection pursuant to Article 90 of the Constitution and Article 36 (1). The Charter by consulting and deciding by an independent and impartial judge in one of the ways set out in Article 94 of the Constitution.
58. In conclusion, the Constitutional Court considers it desirable to refer - beyond the framework of a constitutional assessment - to the complexity and difficulty of Article 11 (g) of the Law on Senior Judicial Officials. Both the overall structure of this provision and some inaccuracies of a legislative nature. In that provision, there is, for no reason, a different term which, however, indicates a comparable procedural procedure. Specifically, the words' decision-making on the regulation 'and' ordering 'are of equal importance. It should also be pointed out that this provision includes, in the list of acts of the court to which it applies, the enforcement order and the enforcement of the enforcement proceedings, but in the event of a suspension, it does so only for the enforcement of the decision, even though, according to § 52 (1) of the Rules of Enforcement and § 38a of the Civil Code, it will also apply in cases of suspension of enforcement. Paragraph 11 (g) of the Law on Senior Judicial Officials is also partly obsolous, since the possibility of lodging an appeal against an application for suspension cannot be established. The appeal may be brought not against the proposal but against the decision on the proposal. While those deficiencies do not give rise to uncertainty in Article 11 (g) of the Law on Senior Judicial Officials, which would make it impossible to interpret and use it, it would be appropriate for the legislator to consider a different wording of this provision which would remove any room for interpretation doubts in the future.
Conclusion
59. Since the Constitutional Court did not find any contradiction in Article 11 (g) of the Act on Senior Judicial Officials in the words "if the enforcement title is the executive record or notarial record 'with Articles 81, 82, 90 and 94 of the Constitution and Article 36 (1) of the Charter, it has decided pursuant to Article 70 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court to reject the application for annulment of the contested provision in this section (operative part I). In the rest, he rejected this proposal under Paragraph 43 (1) (c) of the Constitutional Court Act as being submitted by a person manifestly unjustified (operative part II).
President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr. Rychetský v. r.
Sign in for notes, favorites and notifications
Regulation Information
| Citation | The Constitutional Court found No. 232 / 2019 Coll., on the application for annulment of § 11 of Act No. 121 / 2008 Coll., on Senior Judicial Officials and Senior Officials of the Prosecutor's Office and on the amendment of related laws, as amended |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | The Constitutional Tribunal found |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 05.09.2019 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
Comments 0