Decree No. 162 / 2017 Coll.
Decree on safety assessment requirements under the atomic law
Valid
Effective from 15.06.2017
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162
DECLARATION
of 25 May 2017
on safety assessment requirements under the atomic law
According to Section 236 of Act No. 263 / 2016 Coll., Atomic Act, for the implementation of Section 48 (6):
Subject matter
This decree implements the relevant regulations of the Euraton1) and provides for:
(a) the rules for carrying out safety assessments and the different types of assessments and the time limits within which they are carried out;
(b) the method of documenting the safety assessment and the different types of assessments and the content of the safety evaluation documentation and the different types of assessments; and
(c) the method of using the safety assessment.
Terms
For the purposes of this decree:
(a) an analysis of the uncertainties of the impact of uncertainties associated with the various elements of the logical model of the current state of the nuclear installation created in the framework of the probability safety assessment (hereinafter referred to as "probability safety assessment model") on the overall results of the probability safety assessment;
(b) analysis of sensitivity analysis of the impact of the assumptions used and input data on the results of the evaluation;
(c) by generic operating data, a numerical indication of the reliability of the systems, structures and components not based on information on past states of the evaluated nuclear installation and applicable for the determination of the reliability of the systems, structures and components of that nuclear installation;
(d) an event of initiation requiring the response of a nuclear installation or its operation to transfer a nuclear installation to a safe state which, in the event of a failure of response, could result in damage to a nuclear fuel or a leak of a radioactive substance from a nuclear installation;
(e) a scenario of a sequence of events involving, in particular, the random occurrence of an initiation event, the response of individual systems, structures and components providing security functions and the transfer of nuclear equipment to a safe or other state;
(f) a specific operational indication of the reliability of the systems, structures and components based on information on past states of the evaluated nuclear installation;
g) a large early leak of 137Cs from a nuclear installation with an activity greater than 2,0E + 15 Bq within 10 hours of the announcement of a radiation accident,
(h) a large leak of 137Cs from a nuclear installation with an activity greater than 2,0E + 15 Bq.
General safety assessment requirements
(1) The safety assessment must be carried out according to current and practical application of proven methodologies in accordance with the current level of science and technology and good practice.
(2) The safety assessment shall take into account changes capable of affecting nuclear safety, radiation protection, technical safety, monitoring of the radiation situation, management of the radiological incident and security occurring during the life cycle of the nuclear installation.
(3) The safety assessment shall take into account new knowledge from operational experience and information on the risks and consequences of the use of nuclear energy relevant to nuclear safety, which could significantly affect the safety assessment.
(4) The procedure referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 shall apply a graduated approach based on the impact of the facts taken into account on nuclear safety, radiation protection, technical safety, monitoring of the radiation situation, management of radiological emergencies and security.
Safety deterministic assessment
(1) A deterministic safety assessment must demonstrate the acceptability of the consequences of the response of nuclear equipment and its systems, structures and components and personnel to nuclear safety, radiation protection, technical safety and management of radiological emergencies.
(2) The deterministic safety assessment must be assessed
(a) the ability of nuclear installations to ensure compliance with the principles of the safe use of nuclear energy;
(b) the resilience, reliability and effectiveness of safety systems and other nuclear safety-related systems, structures and components under the conditions for which they are intended; and
(c) the ability of workers to ensure that the essential safety functions of a nuclear installation are fulfilled.
(3) The deterministic safety assessment must assess compliance with the requirements of the Decree on requirements for a nuclear installation project.
(4) The results of the deterministic safety assessment shall be given in the procurement safety report, the preliminary safety report, the operational safety report for the first physical launch of nuclear installations with a nuclear reactor, the operational safety report and the decommissioning safety report.
Probable safety assessment
(1) The likely safety assessment must include:
(a) 1. the level of probability assessment of the safety under which the project of a nuclear installation and its operation, including the previous phases of the life cycle, must be analysed in such a way as to reveal a sequence of events which may result in damage to nuclear fuel or system, design or component containing other radioactive substances occurring in that installation and to determine the frequency of occurrence per year with which such damage may occur as a result of the sequence of such events; and
(b) level 2 of the probability safety assessment, which shall analyse the chronological development of the consequences of damage to nuclear fuel and other systems, structures or components containing radioactive substances present in the nuclear installation, detected in the first level of probability safety assessment, including quantitative evaluation of the phenomena resulting therefrom; in the context of Level 2 of the probabilistic safety assessment, the means by which escaped radioactive substances may spread to the environment shall be identified.
(2) The likely safety assessment must take into account:
(a) radioactive substances occurring in a nuclear installation;
(b) operating regimes for nuclear installations, including outages; and
(c) internal and external initiation events, including those resulting from the location properties of the territory.
(3) A safety probability assessment model shall be established which shall be based on realistic modelling of the progress of internal and external initiation events.
(1) When creating a model of probability safety assessment,
(a) data from the nuclear installation project on the facts affecting nuclear safety, radiation protection and management of radiological emergencies are used;
(b) justified by the determination of the time for which the response of nuclear installations to internal and external initiation events is modelled;
(c) the operational modes of the nuclear installation are divided into partial operational conditions according to the facts relating to the state of the nuclear installation, which may lead to the same response of the nuclear installation to the initiation events;
(d) for sub-operational stocks, initiation events which are not practically excluded;
(e) set up groups of initiation events as referred to in (d) and determine the frequency of their occurrence per year;
(f) established:
1. acceptance criteria for not achieving nuclear fuel damage or for not reaching the category of radioactive substance leakage analysed in the probabilistic level 2 safety assessment; and
2. minimum criteria for the success of corrective actions to prevent damage to nuclear fuel or to prevent the leakage of radioactive substances of each leakage category, on the basis of the acceptance criteria referred to in point 1;
(g) a causal analytical method used to evaluate the progress of the process and its events leading to possible damage to nuclear fuel or possible leakage of radioactive substances of the category analysed using the acceptance criteria and the minimum criteria for the success of corrective actions referred to in (f);
(h) trees of events are constructed for each group of initiation events in the form of a graphic logical model based on the results of the use of a causal analytical method;
(i) cycling in the safety probability assessment model is solved to take into account functional dependencies between systems, structures or components;
(j) a deductive method based on a probabilistic approach, which analyses retroactively the development of an adverse event or system failure, in order to find all chains of causes that may lead to such an event, using the acceptance criteria referred to in (f);
(k) trees of malfunctions are constructed for each system, design or component used in response to the initiation event in the form of a graphic logic model based on the results of the application of the deductive method;
(l) a comprehensive analysis of the human factor shall be carried out to include possible errors of personnel carrying out activities related to the use of nuclear energy, exposure situations and radiation emergency management activities; This analysis shall take into account factors capable of affecting the activities of workers in all sub-operational states of a nuclear installation, including dependencies between human errors,
(m) a comprehensive analysis of common cause disorders has been carried out; and
(n) an analysis of radiological incidents resulting in analysed categories of radioactive leakage from nuclear installations.
(2) In the model of the likely safety assessment, further account must be taken of:
(a) any functional dependencies between systems, structures or components;
(b) any physical dependence resulting from the location of systems, structures or components; and
(c) interdependence between different nuclear installations located in the same territory for the location of the nuclear installation.
Based on a model of probability safety assessment,
(a) a calculation of the rate of damage to nuclear fuel in the nuclear reactor active zone (hereinafter referred to as the "active zone") shall be made per year involving:
1. the total frequency of occurrence,
2. the frequency of occurrence for each sub-operational state; and
3. frequency of occurrence for each group of initiation events;
(b) a calculation of the frequency of nuclear fuel damage occurring in and outside the active zone per year involving:
1. the total frequency of occurrence,
2. the frequency of occurrence for each sub-operational state; and
3. frequency of occurrence for each group of initiation events;
(c) a calculation of the frequency of major early releases and major releases of radioactive substances per year involving:
1. the total frequency of occurrence,
2. the frequency of occurrence for each sub-operational state; and
3. frequency of occurrence for each group of initiation events;
(d) the accuracy of the calculation of the probability safety assessment model to achieve realistic results;
(e) the main scenarios leading to damage to nuclear fuel or radioactive leakage from nuclear installations for level 1 and level 2 of probability safety assessment are identified;
(f) for the 1st and 2nd levels of probability safety assessment identified the smallest set of events;
1. whose co-occurrence in the scenario results in damage to nuclear fuel or the release of radioactive material from a nuclear installation; and
2. which make the most significant contribution to the overall risk posed by nuclear installations;
(g) an assessment of the importance for the overall results of the probability safety assessment carried out by the individual
1. systems, structures and components,
2. errors caused by human factor; and
3. Common causes disorders and
(h) monitoring of the level of risk posed by the nuclear installation during the operation of the nuclear installation.
(1) A safety probability assessment model must be conducted
(a) analysis of statistical uncertainties related to the data used in the safety probability assessment model and required to establish the reliability of systems, structures and components and the probability or annual error rates of workers; and
(b) Sensitivity analysis of variables which show a high degree of uncertainty may have a significant impact on the results of the probability safety assessment and are associated with:
1. the initial assumptions used in the development of a model of probability safety assessment;
2. the data used in the safety probability assessment model to determine the reliability of systems, structures and components to perform their prescribed function; and
3. the data used in the safety probability assessment model needed to determine the probability or annual frequency of error of workers.
(2) The results of the probability safety assessment shall be compared with the probability criteria for acceptance to verify that nuclear safety is consistent with them. The results of sensitivity analyses and uncertainties shall be taken into account when comparing the results of the probability safety assessment with the probability criteria.
(3) The likely safety assessment shall subsequently be subject to an independent expert evaluation in order to identify any deficiencies.
(4) All elements affecting the safety probability assessment carried out shall be taken into account in this safety probability assessment when used for the assessment of:
(a) the frequency of testing of systems, structures and components;
(b) permissible decommissioning times for systems, structures and components; or
(c) changes in the quantities referred to in (a) or (b).
Time limits for the implementation of the probability safety assessment
(1) The likely safety assessment shall be carried out within 12 months of the change in the use of nuclear energy, in the parts which could be affected by the change, if any
(a) the characteristics of the territory for the location of the nuclear installation;
(b) the actual state and operation of the nuclear installation after a change in the project of the nuclear installation or a change in the way the nuclear installation is tested and maintained;
(c) the current state of internal regulations;
(d) the data needed to establish the reliability of systems, structures and components and the likelihood of individual human errors, based in particular on the acquisition of specific operational data from a nuclear installation or a similar nuclear installation;
(e) current technical information on the state of the nuclear installation; or
(f) up-to-date information on the characteristics and behaviour of a nuclear installation in an operational event, including a radiological emergency.
(2) The likely safety assessment shall be carried out cumulatively at least once every 5 years of the operation of the nuclear installation.
(3) In the case of a likely safety assessment referred to in paragraph 2,
(a) take into account the updated data needed to establish the reliability of systems, structures and components and the likelihood of individual error of workers based on:
1. specific operational data from nuclear installations or nuclear installations of a similar type, if available; or
2. generic operating data from a nuclear installation or a similar nuclear installation; and
(b) use of the methods of analysis currently available and tools corresponding to good practice.
Use of probability safety assessment
(1) The likely safety assessment shall be used during the life cycle of a nuclear installation in assessing significant information on the risk and consequences of the use of nuclear energy, in reassessing the existing level of nuclear safety, radiation protection and radiation emergency management and in taking measures to prevent and improve their level.
(2) The likely safety assessment must be used continuously to limit the risk posed by the nuclear installation to identify the need for changes to the nuclear installation project resulting from deficiencies.
(a) a nuclear installation project; or
(b) internal rules.
(3) The likely safety assessment must be used to prioritise the planning of measures to increase the level of nuclear safety, radiation protection and the management of radiological emergencies. In such planning, emphasis must be placed on measures with a significant impact on nuclear safety, radiation protection, radiation emergency management and security.
(4) The likely safety assessment must be used to assess the overall risk posed by nuclear installations.
(5) The likely safety assessment must be used for verification
(a) the balance of the nuclear installation project;
(b) absence of edge effect;
(c) the absence of elements of a nuclear installation project or a group of initiation events representing a disproportionate contribution to the overall risk posed by the nuclear installation; and
(d) the fact that the overall low level of risk is not dependent on contributors with significant uncertainty.
(6) Likely safety assessment must be used for evaluation
(a) the needs and acceptability of changes to nuclear installations;
(b) the need and acceptability of changes in limits and conditions;
(c) the needs and acceptability of amendments to internal rules; and
(d) the seriousness of the events on the nuclear installation.
(7) The method of making use of the likely safety assessment referred to in paragraph 1 under the conditions of the holder of the authorisation shall be laid down in the internal regulation of the holder of the authorisation.
(1) The likely safety assessment must be used for the processing of emergency procedures and for verifying their accuracy.
(2) The results of the likely safety assessment shall be used to verify that the operational control programme covers all systems, structures and components with nuclear safety implications.
(3) The results of the likely safety assessment shall be used to verify whether all systems, structures and components with nuclear safety implications are subject to the controlled ageing process.
(4) The probability assessment of safety shall be used to identify systems, structures and components having an impact on nuclear safety, the operational capacity of which shall always be ensured. The results of a likely safety assessment identifying such systems, structures and components shall be given in the preliminary safety report, in the operational safety report for the first physical launch of nuclear installations with a nuclear reactor, in the operational safety report and in the safety report for decommissioning of nuclear installations.
(5) The results of the likely safety assessment shall be used as input information in the preparation and verification of safety-relevant personnel training programmes, including the training of simulator block supervisor operators.
(6) Any use of a likely safety assessment shall identify and take into account the restrictions on such use. The suitability of the use of the probabilistic safety assessment shall be verified in the light of these limitations.
Documentation of probability safety assessment
The documentation of the probability safety assessment shall include:
(a) a description of the extent of the likely safety assessment;
(b) a description of the methodology used and documentation to ensure the quality of the likely safety assessment;
(c) information on the nuclear equipment being evaluated necessary to carry out a likely safety assessment;
(d) a list of the sub-operational states of the nuclear installation to which all operational modes of the nuclear installation have been allocated for the purpose of the likely safety assessment and a description of the process for their determination;
(e) a description of the process of selecting and grouping of initiation events, their list and a description of each group of initiation events with annual frequencies, including an analysis of these frequencies, and the assignment of each group of initiation events to each sub-operational state of the nuclear installation to which the operation of that installation has been allocated for the purpose of carrying out a likely safety assessment;
(f) a description of the trees of events constructed, including the assumptions and criteria used, in accordance with Article 6 (1) (h);
(g) a list of errors caused by the human factor included in the likely safety assessment and a description of their analysis;
(h) a list of the data needed to establish the reliability of the systems, structures and components used for modelling the failure of the equipment and its repair, maintenance and testing, and a description of its analysis;
(i) a list of common causes and a description of their analysis;
(j) a description of the cycling solution in the safety probability assessment model;
(k) a list of the main assumptions used in carrying out the probability safety assessment and limiting the probability safety assessment model;
(l) a description of the analysis of the systems and of the trees of malfunctions, including the assumptions used;
(m) a description of the relations between 1st and 2nd level of probability safety assessment;
(n) a description of the analysis of the radiological emergency resulting in the leakage of radioactive material from nuclear installations, which provides the most important contribution to the risk posed by nuclear installations;
(o) the definition of the categories of releases of radioactive material released to the vicinity of nuclear installations by size and time level;
(p) the description and characteristics of the quantity of radioactive material released to the vicinity of the nuclear installation, depending on the leakage category referred to in (o);
(q) a description of the main results of the 1st and 2nd level of probability safety assessment in accordance with Section 7;
(r) results of sensitivity analyses;
(s) the results of analysis of uncertainties,
(t) conclusions and recommendations for the possible improvement of the level of nuclear safety, including an assessment of the effectiveness of the heavy-duty accident management strategy; and
(u) a description of the 1st and 2nd level of probability safety assessment covering each level
1. probability assessment of safety for power states;
2. a likely safety assessment for low-powered and weaning conditions; and
3. likely safety assessment for individual internal and external initiation events.
General requirements for the conduct of periodic safety assessment
(1) The Periodic Safety Assessment must compare the state of nuclear safety, radiation protection, technical safety, monitoring of the radiation situation, management of the radiological emergency and security achieved on nuclear installations with the regulatory requirements and with those resulting from the current level of science and technology and good practice (hereinafter "safety requirements") in force at the time of its implementation.
(2) The following areas must be systematically and comprehensively examined at pre-specified intervals by the Periodic Safety Assessment:
(a) nuclear plant project;
(b) the actual state of the systems, structures and components;
(c) the eligibility of systems, structures and components to perform the functions required by the nuclear installation project (hereinafter referred to as "qualification of the installation");
(d) ageing of systems, structures and components;
(e) deterministic safety analyses;
(f) probability assessment of safety,
(g) risk analysis;
(h) safety;
(i) the use of operational experience from other nuclear installations and the knowledge of science and research;
(j) organisation and management;
(k) procedures and regulations;
(l) human factor,
(m) management of radiological emergencies; and
(n) the effect of the operation of a nuclear installation on its environment in terms of radiation protection.
(3) The periodic safety assessment of a research nuclear installation at pre-determined intervals must further systematically and comprehensively examine the specific nature of the use of the nuclear reactor for research, education, the production of radionuclides, neutron radiography, testing of materials or the provision of health services (hereinafter referred to as "nuclear reactor use").
(4) A periodic safety assessment must be carried out on a systematic and comprehensive basis for radioactive waste storage at pre-determined intervals in the field of specific use of radioactive waste storage.
(5) The periodical safety assessment must examine the condition referred to in paragraph 1 in the operation and decommissioning of a nuclear installation and during the period of validity of the permit to close the radioactive waste storage site.
(6) For each area referred to in paragraphs 2 to 4, a set of requirements and criteria shall be laid down and the safety requirements may be deemed to be met.
(7) For each area referred to in paragraphs 2 to 4, a partial evaluation of all safety requirements for the relevant area shall be carried out. The results of the sub-evaluations of the areas referred to in paragraphs 2 to 4 shall be used for the overall evaluation of all areas.
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Regulation Information
| Citation | Decree No. 162 / 2017 Coll., on Safety Assessment Requirements under Atomic Law |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | - |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 02.06.2017 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | 15.06.2017 |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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