The Constitutional Court found No 430 / 2025 Coll.
Findings of the Constitutional Court sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 19 / 25 in the case of the annulment of Section 4 of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., on the salary and other formalities relating to the performance of the duties of representatives of the State Government and of certain state institutions and judges and Members of the European Parliament, as amended
Valid
The Constitutional Tribunal found
Text versions:
24.10.2025
Zobrazeno prvních 200 z celkem 246 ustanovení tohoto předpisu.
Zobrazit celý předpis →
Pro stažení celého znění použijte tlačítko Stáhnout výše.
430
FIND
The Constitutional Court
of 1 October 2025
sp. zn.
On behalf of the Republic
On 1 October 2025, the Constitutional Court decided, under point Pl.
as follows:
Paragraph 4 in the words "for judges 126,685 CZK" of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., on the salary and other formalities connected with the performance of the duties of representatives of state authority and of certain state bodies and judges and Members of the European Parliament, as amended, shall be deleted from the date of the declaration of findings in the Collection of Laws and International Treaties.
Reasons
Definition of the case
1. In the finding, the Constitutional Court assesses the constitutionality of the temporary restriction of judicial salaries provided for by the Law for 2025.
2. The Judge of the District Court of Decin, JUDr. Štěpán Klapka, hereinafter referred to as "the plaintiff", is seeking the payment of a salary supplement and a payment of a multipurpose flat-rate reimbursement of the expenses for February 2025 against the Czech Republic - the District Court of Decin, by an action before the District Court of Decin. Following the extension of the action, the applicant shall apply for the same repayments for the months of March and April 2025. According to the plaintiff, the contested legislation is unconstitutional.
3. The District Court in Děčín referred to the Constitutional Court pursuant to Article 95 (2) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as "the Constitution") and Article 64 (3) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, with a proposal for the annulment of Section 4 in the words "for Judge 121 685 CZK" of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., on the salary and other formalities associated with the performance of the function of representatives of state authority and of certain state bodies and judges and Members of the European Parliament, as amended.
4. For January 2025, the plaintiff does not request a supplement. The Constitutional Court takes the view that the judges and judges, i.e. the plaintiff, have received both the salary and compensation for this month, calculated in the light of the gap in the law, referring to the case law of the Constitutional Court on the basis of 3 times the average national economy wage in 2023. The contested legislation was adopted by the legislator only afterwards. On 7 March 2025 and pursuant to the transitional provision of Act No 57 / 2025 Coll., amending Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., on the salary and other formalities relating to the performance of the duties of representatives of the State Government and of certain State bodies and judges and Members of the European Parliament, as amended, and certain other laws, the level of the salary base laid down in the contested provision shall also apply retroactively to the period from 1 January 2025.
Arguments of the appellant
5. The appellant considers that the circumstances, manner and justification of the current intervention in the salary of judges do not meet the criteria defined in the case-law of the Constitutional Court and constitute its direct denial.
6. The reduction and freezing of the salary of judges is already considered unconstitutional by the appellant on the ground that the salary restriction falls exclusively within the pay ratios of judges. As a result of Law No 57 / 2025 Coll. there was a de facto reduction in the salary already achieved, which was paid to the judges for January 2025 and which was based on the current case law of the Constitutional Court. In relation to judges, the salary reduction is 6%. The salary to be paid to the judge for the period 2024 shall remain at the same level. As a result of the aforementioned amendment of the law, the increase in officials' salaries is about 6.9%, while reducing and further freezing the judges' salary. Since 1 January 2025, there has been a flat-rate increase in the salary tariff, an increase in the teacher's pay rates, a rise in salaries for members of the security corps, firemen and police officers. Thus, the judges remain the only category of representatives of State authority who have been frozen (or reduced).
7. Despite interference in the salary of judges, the explanatory memorandum to the amendment states that an increase in GDP of 2.7%, an increase in wages and salaries of 6.4% and an increase in average wages of 7.2% can be expected for 2025. As is apparent from the data of the Czech Statistical Office, in the fourth quarter of 2024 the average gross monthly nominal wage increased to the converted number of employees in the national economy against the third quarter. Contrary to the principle of proportionality, the reduction in the pay base of judges is in fact contrary to the trend in wage growth of workers in the national economy.
8. The legislature did not give rise to real arguments that, in accordance with the case law of the Constitutional Court, would include a comprehensive economic analysis which would show the possibility of a state budget following the economic situation of the State and which would allow comparison with the pay ratios of the representatives of the legislative and executive powers. Salary restrictions are justified by budget deficits of the state, an argument that is cyclically repeated in all standards of wage "freezing" or reduction. The system-based solidarity between judges and other employees in the national economy is enshrined in the pay machine, which makes the system of calculating the pay of judges consistent and stable.
9. According to the appellant, the inconstitutionality of the salary restriction lies in the absence of a proper hearing with the representatives of the judiciary.
10. Furthermore, the reduction in the salary of judges is contrary to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter the "SDEU '), according to which salary restrictions must form part of a more general framework to ensure that a wider group of civil servants participate in the budgetary effort pursued. Decisions to reduce or freeze the salary of judges shall be based on rules which are objective, predictable, stable and transparent. The measure affecting the salary of judges must be exceptional, temporary and proportionate to the objective in question, which the appellant considers to have failed. The appellant further stresses that the SDEU considers it important whether it is an exceptional measure or a persistent or recurrent situation. However, there have already been 16 interventions in the salary of judges, and an amendment to the Law on the salary of judges was adopted only a few months after the Constitutional Court declared the inadmissibility of the intervention, which was in fact identical to the current intervention.
11. The appellant submits the applicant's view that the facts of the current reduction in the salary of the judges give rise to the justification for the reimbursement of the salary as in sp. zn. The opposite approach would lead the power of legislative and executive to consider wage restrictions on judges, which, despite the intervention of the Constitutional Court, would pay off at least for a time.
Comments on the proposal
12. The Constitutional Court has sent a motion for observations by Parliament as a party to the proceedings (Paragraph 69 (1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court) and the Government and the Ombudsman as potential interveners (Paragraph 69 (2) and (3) of the Law on the Constitutional Court). The Government entered the proceedings as an intervener. The Ombudsman informed the Constitutional Court that he would not use this authorisation.
13. It was also sent to the Constitutional Court by the Judicial Union of the Czech Republic, hereinafter referred to as "the Judicial Union '.
14. The Constitutional Court also received a request for a preliminary hearing from the President of the District Court in Děčín (acting as district court in the capacity of defendant in the original dispute). According to the President of the District Court in Děčín, the salary restriction which is the subject of the assessment in the present proceedings "is not as such intense enough to put a judge at risk of material uncertainty (thereby immediately undermining judicial independence) '. However, there are currently parallel proceedings before the General Courts on payment actions of judges on two different grounds. Some actions are based on the unconstitutional nature of the contested part of the law and await a decision by the Constitutional Court in the proceedings. Other actions are based on the direct applicability of EU primary law and the case-law of the SDEU and the judges who" went this way' are successful with their actions. In view of this "double-rail" action, there will be inequalities in the judge's pay assessment. That's why he's asking for priority. This request was not formally decided by the Constitutional Court because it was not lodged by a party or by an intervener, but is mentioned by the Constitutional Court for that context.
Observation of Parliament's chambers
15. The Chamber of Deputies, in its observations, summarised the course of the hearing and approval of the draft law by which the contested provision was inserted into the legal order and issued as Act No 57 / 2025 Coll.
16. The bill was submitted to the Government of the Chamber of Deputies in the 9th parliamentary term on 18 October 2024 and was distributed to Members as print 825. The first reading took place at the 119th meeting of 19 November 2024. The Chamber of Deputies did not agree to the debate so that it could agree to the draft law at first reading and ordered the draft law to be discussed by the Committee of Budgets as a committee of guarantee. The Committee on Budgets discussed the draft law and issued a resolution on 27 November 2024 with amendments delivered to Members as print 825 / 1. The second reading took place at the 123rd meeting of 20 December 2024, all the amendments tabled were processed as 825 / 2. The third reading took place on 15 and 17 January 2025 at the 126th meeting and the bill was adopted. Paragraph 4 was approved by the Chamber of Deputies as proposed by the Government.
17. The bill was passed on to the Senate on 17 January 2025, which it placed at its 5th meeting. The Senate has not adopted a resolution on the bill. The law was delivered to the President for signature on 17 February 2025, the President did not sign the law and returned it to the Chamber of Deputies on 17 February 2025.
18. The vote on the law returned by the President took place on 4 March 2025 at the 131st meeting of the Chamber of Deputies, which remained on the original bill.
19. Finally, the Chamber of Deputies stated that the law was passed by a necessary majority of Members of the Chamber of Deputies, signed by the President of the Chamber of Deputies and the Prime Minister and declared without the President's signature. The legislature acted in the belief that the law adopted was in line with the Constitution and our rule of law.
20. The Senate stated in its observations that it had been referred to it by the Chamber of Deputies on 17. 1. 2025 and was discussed in the Senate as a print 43. The proposal was discussed by the Committee on Economy, Agriculture and Transport as a committee guaranteeing 28 January 2025. In the context of the examination of the proposal, the fact that the proposed legislation is, in fact, identical in terms of its consequences to that which has been abolished by the finding of the Constitutional Court, without it being clear that there are sufficient grounds for such action. In addition, the fact that the proposed transitional provisions foresee retroactive application of the proposal was also criticised. The Committee has not adopted any resolution containing a recommendation to the Senate. On the same day, the proposal was dealt with by the committee of constitutional and legal. Also in this committee, a potential discrepancy of the ad hoc salary base for 2025 with the constitutional order was discussed, and an amendment was tabled which deleted the proposed amendment to Article 4 of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll.. However, according to Article 102 (1) of Act No. 107 / 1999 Coll., on the Rules of Procedure of the Senate (hereinafter referred to as the Senate Rules of Procedure), the Committee first voted on a proposal to approve the draft as referred to by the Chamber of Deputies and this proposal was adopted.
21. The Senate dealt with the bill at its 5th meeting in the 15th term of office on 28 January 2025. The contested regulation was criticised by reference to its (potential) non-compliance with the case law of the Constitutional Court by Senators Michael Canov and Jan Paparega. The retroactive application of the legislation was critically thematic by Senator Daniela Kovářová. Following the conclusion of the general debate, in accordance with Rule 108 (2) of the Senate Rules of Procedure, a vote was taken on the draft constitutional legal committee to approve the bill as referred to by the Chamber of Deputies. In vote 44, the 60 people present voted in favour of Proposition 28, against which 15 were opposed, so the motion was not adopted. Subsequently, pursuant to Rule 109 (1) of the Senate's Rules of Procedure, a detailed debate was launched on the proposal, in which Senator Michael Canov put forward the proposed amendments aimed at deleting the contested regulation. None of the amendments were accepted and the Senate's deliberations on draft law No 57 / 2025 Coll. were concluded without the Senate's resolution on the draft law.
22. The Senate concluded in its observations that, when discussing the draft law, it acted within the limits of the Constitution and in a constitutionally prescribed manner.
Government observations
23. The Government stated, first of all, that the amendment of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll. made by Act No. 57 / 2025 Coll. was a necessary response by the legislator to the finding of the plenary of the Constitutional Court of 15.5.2024 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 5 / 24, as a result of which the mechanism of calculation of salary bases was not available in the Act. The legislature therefore acceded to reinstating the mechanism for calculating the salary bases as it was before the adoption of Act No. 349 / 2023 Coll., amending certain laws in connection with the consolidation of public budgets, on the grounds that after the expiry of the transitional provision contained in § 4 of Law No. 236 / 1995 Coll. the judges will be paid a salary based on 3 times the average wage in the national economy.
24. The Government stressed that the contested regulation did not reduce the nominal amount of the judicial salary compared to the legislation in force until 31 December 2024, nor did it fix ("freezing") the salary base, but slowed the rate of its growth. The slowdown in the rate of increase in the salary of judges is done by law for objective, legitimate and serious reasons, mainly consisting of the continuing urgent need for consolidation of public budgets (including the need to respond to the devastating floods that occurred in September 2024), in a transparent way based on economic data. The amendment was carried out in a consistent manner and in an equal proportion with all the main representatives of the individual State-owned entities and the majority of public-sector workers, while other salary restrictions which do not apply to judges have been applied in parallel in other State-owned branches. The rate of increase in salary bases in 2025 corresponds to the increase in the average wage in the national economy between 2022 and 2023, which forms the basis for calculating the salary bases for 2024 and 2025, and is 6,95%. From the point of view of the constitutional principle of equality, judges remain a privileged group of people remunerated from public budgets, both by the very existence of an automatic annual increase in the salary base and by the absolute level of pay itself.
25. The Government stated that, although the amendment was prepared and discussed urgently in a certain time-limit, the intention with the representatives of the judiciary was demonstrably addressed through at least two ad hoc colloquia (15.10 2024 and 12.11.2024). According to the Government, however, it is not possible to import a categorical requirement for the full consent of the representatives of the judicial authority to the relevant amendment of the law, the issue of the management of public funds and the adjustment of the level of salaries falls within the competence of legislative and executive powers, not within the common competence of the judicial authority.
26. The complicated economic situation of the last few years is necessarily reflected in all areas of public life. The salary restriction itself was part of a large and systemic consolidation of public budgets, which is essentially involved by all population groups. The current regulation replaced the abolished permanent restriction on the salary of judges, which took place in 2023, at a time when the legislature also agreed to pay the old-age pensioners whom the Constitutional Court accepted. The legislator was not an incentive to make it difficult or impossible to exercise judicial authority, but to save public funds across the state administration. Since 2020, the difference between revenue and expenditure of the state budget has fallen significantly and the government's debt has increased in a step. This is the result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the deterioration of the energy and security situation in the European region, and the related economic measures, which, according to publicly available information, were taken in September 2024, as well as the need for additional budgetary measures to address the effects of floods. Savings by suspending the rate of increase of the judge's salary until the end of 2025 is estimated at CZK 620.3 million. It is therefore clearly an expression of symbolic solidarity savings in public funds, not arbitrary interference in the independence of judges.
27. The Government underlines that the salary restriction currently under consideration is a temporary reduction in the rate of increase in the pay of judges. This is thus the least serious interference with the pay bases of judges who are subject to a more moderate constitutional review than the permanent ones.
28. According to the Government, the requirement to have a comprehensive economic analysis was met by an above-standard economic analysis in the explanatory memorandum itself, but in the statement, the Government indicates other economic indicators justifying the adoption of the contested scheme. The pay ratios of judges are improving more significantly compared to the rest of the public administration, as demonstrated by the government's accompanying graphs. According to the Government, the amount of remuneration ratios in favour of the representatives of the State of Justice compared to other persons remunerated under Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll. in 2024 and the restoration of the original average in 2025 is apparent from the charts. They also show a significantly different level of pay for representatives of legal professions linked to the so-called pay machine, inter alia, to the detriment of civil servants in the service relationship. The Government refers to the total salary of judges, which allows judges to cope more comfortably with the consequences of pay restrictions than would be the case for persons with a lower absolute income. The partial limited indexation of the salary charges of other public staff groups in their totality does not reach the level of increase that will occur even with the 2025 growth limitation in question in the case of the judicial salary bases. Other graphs show that in 2023 the actual average salary of judges increased by 12.33% and in the following year 2024 by 6.73%. The Government also pointed out a comparison of the level of remuneration of judges in the European Union.
29. The Government did not find the appellant's alleged contradiction in the contested regulation with the SDEU judgment in Case C-146 / 23, which must be understood comprehensively. In paragraphs 51 and 52 of the judgment, the SDEU states that it is a matter for the authorities of power and legislative authority to determine the level of the salary of judges, giving the Member States wide scope for their discretion. In fact, national legislative and executive powers are best placed to take account of the particular socio-economic context of the Member State in which the budget must be drawn up and the independence of judges taken into account. The possibility of organisations of courts to participate in the SDEU legislative process is declared optional. Assessment of the adequacy of the judicial salary should be considered for the overall average wage and for the wages of legal professions. The SDEU recognises a lower increase in the set objective remuneration method, if implemented in the form of a law, exceptionally, in an objective, predictable and transparent manner, temporarily, to the appropriate and necessary extent and the impact on judges is not disproportionate in relation to the intended objective. The SDEU expressly admits the reason for eliminating the excessive budget deficit within the meaning of Article 126 (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as well as the change in the allocation of budgetary resources "in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian Federation's aggression in Ukraine and the unprecedented increase in energy prices resulting therefrom '. The SDEU decision merely outlined the criteria to be complied with when setting the legal framework for determining the salary of judges, did not define how high the judicial salary should be, nor did it state that, in any of the Member States concerned, the independence of judges was affected by the adjustment of their salaries. The government is convinced that the criteria set out for a temporary slowdown in the increase in judicial pay meet.
30. In conclusion, the Government concluded that, in the case under consideration, Parliament had adopted an exclusively time-limited restriction on judicial salaries, which constituted only a reduction in the rate of pay growth, and thus was the least serious interference with the judicial bases. The restrictions applied not only to the salaries of judges but also to the salaries of officials and prosecutors. The restrictions themselves were then subjected to an economic analysis, justified and proportional. It was also discussed with representatives of the judiciary. Therefore, even if the Constitutional Court concluded that the provision in question was not in accordance with the constitutional order, it would not give rise to such conclusion a right to pay back. In a similar situation, this conclusion has already been addressed by the European Court of Human Rights (Case No 61721 / 19).
Amicus curiae brief Judicial Union
31. The Judicial Union considers that the contested treatment has resulted in an unconstitutional salary restriction for judges in the amount of CZK 121 685. If it were not for this salary restriction, the salary base for judges in 2025 would be CZK 129 360. Following the finding of the Constitutional Court sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 5 / 24, a salary set from the salary base corresponding to 3 times the average gross monthly salary was paid to judges between 1.1.2024 and 31.12.2024. In a situation where there was no explicit legal regulation for the period 1.1.2025 to 6.3.2025, it was necessary to base the calculation of the salary base based on that finding, i.e. 3 times the average gross monthly wage.
32. The Judicial Union is convinced of the unconstitutionality of pay restrictions. The draft law No 57 / 2025 Coll. was not discussed with the power of the judiciary in such a way that Members and Senators could be familiar with the position of the judiciary and with how that opinion was dealt with. The Government's bill, in its version containing a salary restriction, did not have a comment procedure and the position of the representatives of the judiciary was not included in the explanatory memorandum. The Judicial Union considers that the Government and Parliament knowingly did not respect the case-law of the Constitutional Court and did not ensure proper consideration of the proposal for a salary restriction with the power of the Court.
33. The Judicial Union further points to the breach of the prohibition of genuine retroactivity, which was to take place under Article II of Act No 57 / 2025 Coll., which states that when determining the level of the salary bases of representatives and judges for the period from 1 January 2025 to the date of entry into force of this Act, the Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., as effective from the date of entry into force of the Act, is followed. That provision bears the characteristics of genuine retroactivity, and in the circumstances of its adoption it cannot be found that there is a reason for allowing exemptions for a breakthrough to the prohibition of genuine retroactivity.
34. The Judicial Union underlines the importance of the independence of judicial power as well as the limits attached to the exercise of judicial power. The guarantee of adequate material security is one of the safeguards for individuals to seek protection of their rights in an independent and impartial court. The level of the judicial salary base is linked to wages on the national economy in the form of a so-called pay machine. The solidarity of judges with other employees is built firmly in the system. In the past, however, there have been repeated wage restrictions against judges. The Judicial Union considers such intervention by executive and legislative powers in the pay machine to be a targeted and long-term activity aimed at the gradual erosion of the material security of judges whose work is absolutely necessary for the functioning of the democratic rule of law.
35. In the present case, there is a moderate salary restriction, as there is a temporary de facto freeze on the salary of judges. The explanatory memorandum to the draft law contains only a general reference to the unsatisfactory budgetary situation of the State and the effects of floods in 2024. Neither the government nor Parliament demonstrated that exceptional circumstances existed in March 2025 to justify the introduction of a salary restriction. Salary restrictions do not pursue a legitimate objective, because the real purpose of its adoption is to obtain the election votes of voters in 2025, in which elections to the Chamber of Deputies will take place.
36. According to the Judicial Union, pay restrictions against judges are contrary to the principle of proportionality compared to other "servants of the state." The judges' salaries were subject to restrictions when, from 1.1.2025, there was an increase in public salaries (even for the highest-ranking civil servants) and there was an increase in the salaries of representatives [§ 1 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll.] and other persons remunerated under Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll. (excluding judges). A further increase in the salary rates takes place with effect from 1.7.2025 [for soldiers, firemen and other members of the State's security forces (including the highest ranking civil servants)]. The Judicial Union proposes the annulment of the contested legislation and the reimbursement of the judicial fees. Only the knowledge that unconstitutionally imposed restrictions cannot pay off economically will reduce the risk of future repetitions.
37. In addition, the Judicial Union reiterated that no proper comment was made on the government bill, which contained a salary restriction. During the relevant period, a number of meetings took place between the representatives of the judiciary and the members of the government, which, however, concerned the pay conditions of the judicial staff. There was only one hearing that asked the present Presidents of the Regional and Higher Courts and the President of the Judicial Union, what would be the response to possible pay restrictions on judges. That was rejected by all the judges involved, and the subject was not further developed. On 15 October 2024, officials of the judiciary were invited to the Office of Government by Minister Jurečka and Blažek. It has been announced here that the government may propose a salary restriction on judges and prosecutors, but despite their request, the text of the draft law for examination has not been submitted. The position of the judiciary so not only could it not be contained in the explanatory memorandum, it was not even known to the ministers and later to the Members and Senators.
Replication of the applicant
38. The Constitutional Court sent a statement from the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate and the Government to the appellant for a reply. The appellant informed the Constitutional Court that it would not exercise its right of reply and referred to the application.
Abandonment of oral proceedings
39. The Constitutional Court concluded that further clarification of the case could not be expected from oral proceedings and that no evidence was needed. Therefore, pursuant to Article 44 of the Constitutional Court Act, it decided on a case without a regulation of oral proceedings.
The text of the legal provision, part of which is contested
40. Paragraph 4 of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll. reads:
Amount of salary bases until 31 December 2025
By 31 December 2025, the salary base for judges shall be CZK 121 685 and CZK 101 364. "
41. Only part of the provision cited is challenged in the words "for judges 121 685 CZK."
Proceedings before the Constitutional Court
42. According to Article 64 (3) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the court is entitled to apply for annulment of the law or its individual provisions in the context of its decision-making activities pursuant to Article 95 (2) of the Constitution. According to that provision, the court submits the case to the Constitutional Court if it concludes that the law to be applied in the resolution of the case is contrary to the constitutional order.
43. The Constitutional Court has consistently interpreted this provision in such a way that the court is entitled to propose the annulment of such a law or provision, the application of which is immediate and unavoidable in the present case. The law (its provision) must prevent the constitutional outcome of proceedings. Therefore, it is not sufficient to apply the hypothetical possibility or other broader context of the law (its provision) to a case dealt with by the General Court [Order of 23.10.2000 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 39 / 2000 (U 39 / 20 SbNU 353) and the finding of 6.3.2007 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 3 / 06 (N 41 / 44 SbNU 517; 149 / 2007 Sb.), paragraph 26; the finding of 28.1.2014 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 49 / 10 (N 10 / 72 SbNU 111; 44 / 2014 Sb.), paragraph 17; the finding of 16.5.2018 sp.
44. The District Court decides whether the claimant - the judge of the District Court - is entitled to a supplement to the salary and flat-rate reimbursement of expenses for February 2025 (according to the extension of the application also for months March and April 2025). The amount of the judicial salary and compensation depends on the salary base determined by the contested § 4 of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll. in the part concerning judges, in the words "for judges 121 685 CZK '. Accordingly, the application of this provision is immediate and unavoidable and prevents the result which the district court considers to be constitutionally conformal. The procedural assumptions for the review of the contested part of the legal provision are fulfilled.
Review of the procedure for the adoption of the contested provision
45. The Constitutional Court further examined whether the contested provision was adopted within the limits of the constitutional competence and the constitutional procedure (Paragraph 68 (2) of the Constitutional Court Act).
46. The legal provision, which is now contested, is the result of an amendment which was implemented by Act No 57 / 2025 Coll. The Constitutional Court has verified the progress of the process of adopting that law. It was based on the observations submitted by the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, as well as on publicly available electronic resources (stenograms from meetings of both chambers of Parliament, resolutions, House and Senate, freely available at https: / / www.pp.cz and https: / / www.senat.cz /). The data on the process of the adoption of that law contained in the observations of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate correspond to publicly available documents relating to the legislative process and the Constitutional Court did not find any defect in them. From the point of view of the procedure for adopting the contested provision, there is only a dispute between the appellant and the Government as to whether the draft law has been dealt with in advance with the power of the court.
Dissolution of a motion with the power of the court
47. The appellant submits that, despite the requirements of the Constitutional Court's case-law, the application was not dealt with with with the power of the court. The Court also takes the same view, which points out that the draft law containing the restriction of the salary of judges has not been brought to the hearing and the position of the court is not included in the explanatory memorandum. On the contrary, the government believes that the proposal for a salary restriction has been properly negotiated with the authority of the court. In this respect it points to two colloquia with representatives of the judiciary, which took place on 15 October 2024 and 12 November 2024.
General considerations
48. The Constitutional Court has repeatedly stressed in its case law that the judiciary should be given the opportunity to comment on the draft law on restrictions on judicial salaries.
49. The Constitutional Court has already stated, in its judgment of 7 September 2010 in Case 12 / 10 ÚS (N 188 / 58 SbNU 663; 269 / 2010 Coll.), paragraph 25, that before the legislature accedes to the pay restrictions on judicial salaries, it should "obtain the relevant position of the representatives of the judiciary, which should also be part of the explanatory report." In the findings of 2.8.2011 sp. zn. The findings were followed by the finding of 10 July 2014, sp. zn.
50. The finding of the position of the representatives of the judiciary on the measures relating to the pay ratios of judges and the settlement of their arguments ensures that the desired balance of state powers is maintained and counteracts the negative consequences that the judicial situation in the Czech Republic does not have an independent representation [see the find sp. zn.
51.
52. Failure to comply with the requirement to discuss with the power of the judicial bill, which introduces restrictions on judicial salaries, is not in itself a sufficient reason to repeal the law and can only become a derogatory reason in conjunction (cumulation) with other circumstances (concurrently found sp. zn. However, the failure to discuss the bill with the authority of the Constitutional Court cannot and cannot discuss (the finding of Pl. ÚS 28 / 13, paragraph 53). Failure to comply with the requirement to discuss the bill with the power of the court will therefore be reflected in the content assessment as to whether the salary restriction is consistent with the constitutional order. If the draft law has not been discussed with the power of the court at all or if its position has remained unresponsive, it is an aggravating factor suggesting that restrictions are disproportionate. It is not only that the power of the court is to be heard but also that it receives certain answers to the arguments put forward. If, on the contrary, the opinion of the judiciary was responded - that is to say, the comments were fully or partly complied with or were dealt with by arguments which are not circumstantial - it may even be a factor in favour of the conclusion that the restrictions adopted are appropriate.
53. The salary restrictions on judicial salaries are decided by Parliament, which must adopt them by law. In order to comply with the requirement to negotiate with the judiciary, Members must already be able to familiarise themselves with the position of the judiciary and with how it has been dealt with. It must, of course, be given this option before they decide on the bill, ideally at the time of the bill being submitted to the Chamber of Deputies. While it is appropriate that the position of the judicial authority and its settlement should be part of the explanatory memorandum (finding sp. zn.
54. In the case of a government bill, an established process of reminder proceedings can be used. Moreover, according to the current rules, the substantive intention of the law and subsequently the draft law are also sent to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court for comments, "where they are covered by [Article 5 (1) (e), in conjunction with Article 8 (1) of the Government's legislative rules, as organisational bodies of the State or their jurisdiction or procedural rules governing them '. In the event of restrictions on judicial salaries, it would only be necessary to extend the scope of the points of order to include additional representatives of the judiciary (point 130 of the Pol.
55. In the finding of 15.5.2024 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 5 / 24 The Constitutional Court added that negotiations with the power of the judiciary should constitute a dialogue led by an attempt to find a solution. Judicial power must not just be an object in a political game of power executive, or legislative. The subject of judicial pay cannot be merely a means of obtaining political points and thus manipulating the public to undermine confidence in justice and weaken judicial power.
Assessment of the question of a proposal with the power of the court
56. The Constitutional Court found that, to some extent, executive officials tried to comply with the requirement to discuss wage restrictions with judicial powers. As indicated by the Government, on 15 October 2024 a meeting took place between representatives of the Government, the President of the Judicial Union and representatives of the Prosecutor's Office. On 12 November 2024, according to the Government, a second meeting was to take place in the building of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, attended by representatives of the judiciary - the leadership of the two highest courts, the Supreme Courts, the Regional Courts and the President of the Judicial Union.
57. The first of these meetings refers to the explanatory memorandum to Act No 57 / 2025 Coll., which states that "a temporary derogation from the general method of calculation of salary bases with the intended limited effectiveness for 2025 was discussed at the Office of the Government with representatives of the judiciary and the public prosecutor, while the Government undertook to discuss the proposal with other representatives of the judiciary '. The explanatory memorandum does not contain any further communication as to the position of the representatives of the judiciary on the proposed salary restriction or how that opinion was settled. As the Constitutional Court has interpreted, it is not entirely necessary for the position of the representatives of the judiciary to be part of the explanatory memorandum. However, it is essential that legislators have the opportunity to get to know this position and how it has been dealt with before deciding on a salary restriction.
58. The Government does not demonstrate that Members have such an opportunity, only in its observations it refers to the public statements of the representatives of the judiciary, from which it indicates that the legislators had to be informed of the position of power. It does not appear from the documents collected that Members and Senators have the opportunity to be familiar with the position of judicial authority, nor does it suggest that this opinion has been reflected in any way by the Government as a promoter of the bill.
59. The non-standard procedure in the process of accepting the salary restriction is also evidenced by the process of the reminder procedure for draft Act No 57 / 2025 Coll. On the comments, a draft law was circulated which did not contain the restriction of the judge's salary under consideration. The deadline for making comments was 7 October 2024. A new version of the Act containing the contested restriction on the salary of judges, adopted by the Government on 16 October 2024, was drawn up following the conclusion of the comment procedure. This version of the comments was not circulated and the representatives of the judiciary were not allowed to respond to it in the form of a comment procedure.
Summary
60. It cannot be concluded from the facts established that the proposal for a salary restriction under examination was dealt with with with the power of the court in the terms of the former case law of the Constitutional Court. The opinion of the judiciary was not reflected by the government or the legislator in any way, and if the representatives of the judiciary had the opportunity to formulate it during the meeting with the representatives of the government, it remained completely unresponsive. The Government's unsatisfactory practice underlines the process of the comment procedure.
61. The unsatisfactory process of discussing the proposal for a salary restriction does not in itself constitute inconstitutionality, but acts as an aggravating factor in the subsequent substantive review.
62. The participants and the interveners did not object to any other shortcomings in the legislative process and neither did the Constitutional Court. It therefore made a substantive review of the contested provision.
Substantial review
63. The adoption of Act No 57 / 2025 Coll., which incorporated the contested legislation into the law, was in response to the finding of the Constitutional Court sp. zn.
64. By that finding, the Constitutional Court decided to repeal Paragraph 3 (3) in the words "2,822 times" of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., with the expiry of 31 December 2024. At the same time, he stated that this provision could not be applied in respect of judges from 1 January 2024. The gap created in the absence of an explicit determination of multiple of the average gross monthly wage should have been filled in in a constitutional manner. Therefore, from 1.1.2024, according to the finding, the judicial salary base should have been determined as 3 times the average gross monthly salary. According to the set calculation, the amount was CZK 120 951 in 2024.
65. By Act No 57 / 2025 Coll., Paragraph 3 (3) of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll. established the salary base for judges in the intentions of the said finding again as 3 times the average gross monthly wage. However, the application of the general regulation of the pay machine for 2025 was excluded by the legislature for the year 2025 by the current adoption of the contested § 4 of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., which established a salary base for judges of CZK 121 685 until 31 December 2025.
66. The average gross monthly nominal wage for the converted number of employees according to the data of the Czech Statistical Office for the year 2023 amounted to CZK 43 120 according to the data published in December 2024. If the general rule of the pay machine was applied pursuant to § 3 (3) of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., the salary base for judges from 1.1.2025 to 31.12.2025 would amount to 129 360 CZK.
67. As a result of the adoption of the contested legislation compared to 2024, the salary base of judges and judges increased by CZK 734, but at the same time it is CZK 7675 lower than would be under the original rules for calculating the judicial fees.
68. It must be added that Law No 57 / 2025 Coll. entered into force on 7.3.2025. However, the effects of Article 4 of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll. are laid down retrospectively from 1.1.2025, Article II, which reads: "In determining the level of the salaries of representatives and judges for the period from 1 January 2025 to the date of entry into force of the Act, the provisions of Article 4 of the Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., on the salary and other formalities relating to the performance of the duties of representatives of state authority and of certain state bodies and judges and Members of the European Parliament, as effective from the date of entry into force of the Act. 'Article II of Law No 57 / 2025 Coll. does not contest the appellant, therefore the constitutionality of the contested legislation itself does not assess the Constitutional Court in the present proceedings.
69. The appellant considers that there has been an unconstitutional reduction in the judicial salaries compared to January 2025 and their freezing compared to 2024. According to him, the salary restriction falls exclusively into the salary of judges, is not justified by an exceptional situation and is based on a comprehensive economic analysis.
70. The Government argues that the salary restriction consists of a temporary reduction in the rate of increase in the pay of judges and therefore constitutes the least serious interference in the pay bases of judges from the point of view of the categorisation referred to in the case-law of the Constitutional Court. The Government considers that this restriction fulfils the requirements laid down in the caselaw, is justified by the state of public budgets and is supported by sufficient economic analysis. The suspension of the rate of increase of the judge's salary until the end of 2025 is estimated at CZK 620.3 million, according to the government it is an expression of symbolic solidarity savings of public funds.
General considerations - case law of the Constitutional Court
71. In the past, the Constitutional Court has dealt with restrictions on judicial salaries 19 times in total. The basic principles on which its case-law is based were summarised in the finds sp. zn.
- the assessment of the constitutionality of pay restrictions against judges for a specific period of a particular year falls within the framework defined by the principle of judicial independence,
- the constitutional position of judges, on the one hand, and the representatives of the legislative and executive powers, in particular of the state administration, on the other hand, is different, given the principle of the division of power and the principle of the independence of judges, which implies a narrow disposition of the legislature to pay restrictions vis-à-vis judges as compared to the availability of such restrictions in other areas of the public sphere,
- the intervention in the material security of judges guaranteed by the law must be justified by exceptional circumstances, such as the difficult financial situation of the State, based on the principle of proportionality and taking into account the difference in the function of judges from officials of legislative and executive powers.
72. It now refers again to their reasoning in detail and summarises only the underlying thesis relevant to the case under consideration.
Independence of judicial power and division of power
73. Pursuant to Article 81 of the Constitution, the judicial authority is exercised by independent courts. Article 82 (1) The Constitution shall be independent of the judges in the performance of their duties. The independence of judicial authority is one of the important principles of the rule of law (Article 1 (1) of the Constitution) and must be seen in the light of the principle of division of power (Article 2 (1) of the Constitution).
74. In order for the judiciary to function as an independent body of state power, it must have adequate material collateral. The requirement of adequate material security shall not only apply to the judicial authority as a whole, but also to its representatives, namely judges and judges. In the end, it is the individual judges and judges who exercise the judicial power and therefore the requirement of adequate material collateral affects them in particular in their capacity as constitutional actors. Although the independence of judges is "primarily conditional on their moral integrity and professional level, it is also linked to their adequate material collateral '[see, for example, the finding of 14.7.2005 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 34 / 04 (N 138 / 38 SbNU 31; 355 / 2005 Coll.); the finding of 16.1.2007 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 55 / 05 (N 9 / 44 SbNU 103; 65 / 2007 Sb.), paragraph 51; the finding of sp. Adequate material collateral protects judges and judges from the pressure of legislative and executive power, as well as third parties, who would" influence their decisions and generally influence their conduct in finding a right' (see there). The guarantee of adequate material protection of judicial power therefore follows - as other guarantees of independence - the following purpose in particular: "to secure the position of a judge requiring his role in the process of impartial, fair judicial decision-making, in which the judge is bound, in the sense of his promise, only by the rule of law and by his best knowledge and conscience '(Found of 18.6.2002 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 7 / 02). It is therefore one of the safeguards for individuals to seek the protection of their rights in an independent and impartial court (see, in more detail, the finding of the Court of Justice in sp. v. ÚS 15 / 22, paragraphs 147 to 152).
75. The requirement of adequate material security for judges also has an aspect of stability and certainty, the possibility of relying on financial collateral to a predetermined extent and without unforeseen changes. By law, judges are forbidden to effectively supplement any salary drop with new (other) employment activities, business activities, etc., nor are they able to achieve an increase in salary by increasing their labour efforts, as they do not have the possibility of extraordinary rewards. The stability of income resulting from pre-set rules for pay machines therefore constitutes an important guarantee of the protection of the material security of judges and judges.
Determination of judicial salaries (so-called pay machine)
76. The calculation of the salary of individual judges and judges is governed by Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll. The judge's salary is determined from the salary base. She's roughly expressing the starting judge's salary. This base shall be multiplied by coefficients depending on the length of the practice of a particular judge and on the position of the judicial system.
77. The way in which the salary base itself is determined has undergone substantial changes since the adoption of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll.. Since the amendment implemented by Act No. 587 / 2020 Coll., the salary base is determined as "3 times the average gross monthly nominal wage for the converted number of employees in the national economy achieved according to published data of the Czech Statistical Office for the preceding calendar year." It depends on the level of wages in the national economy. This figure is objectively identifiable and generally known.
78. As judges' salaries are linked to wages in the national economy, the economic situation of the state and individual circumstances are also reflected. Thus, the judges' salaries reflect economic developments, only with time delays resulting from the fixation of the previous year. If wages went down, the judge's wages would go down in time. Thus, it follows from this system that if wages fall, "even judges' wages fall only with time delay... The solidarity of the judges with other staff... is therefore built very firmly in the system" (sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 28 / 13, paragraphs 72 and 97). The amount of the judge's salary may therefore be reduced in nominal terms and in this respect the conclusions of the finding of 15.9.1999 sp. zn.
79. The size of the judges' salaries is automatically changed along with the economic development of the company. If the components of this imaginary pay machine correspond to the requirements of constitutional order, its application does not constitute a restriction on the judicial salary. In other words, even if there is a nominal reduction in the judge's salary on the basis of a pay machine, this will not be a restriction and the salary thus determined will not be contrary to constitutional order.
80. Thus, the judges do not have "permanent and undeniable entitlement to annual salary increases" (Case 55 / 05 Pl. ÚS, paragraph 57). A pay machine linked to the state of the economy cannot and should not, by its nature, guarantee such growth. The use of this instrument for determining judicial salaries is consistent with constitutional order.
81. The decision on salaries was, is and remains the subject of critical public attention, as it is entrusted (also) to those whose salaries are concerned. It was all the more important to find a mechanism that will "automatically" in all directions depending on the possibilities of society in times of calm and complex. These are almost permanent efforts to intervene in its construction, often with a purposeful motivation or justification, and despite the case law of the Constitutional Court, which threatens and weakens the judiciary, diminishes confidence in it, thereby deviating the balanced division of power legislative, executive and judicial at the expense of the judiciary.
Restrictions on judicial salaries
82. The Constitutional Court considers any measure that modifies the above-mentioned rules on the determination of the salary of judges (the pay machine) and which results in the salary being lower than would have been under those rules.
83. The Constitutional Court distinguishes between two basic types of restrictions - temporary and permanent.
84. The permanent restrictions, which the Constitutional Court considers to be the most serious type of restriction, change the parameters of the pay machine so that the judges' salaries determined by it are lower (see, for example, the finding of Pl. ÚS 5 / 24). The Constitutional Court does not consider permanent restrictions in the present case and will therefore no longer pursue it.
85. On the other hand, temporary restrictions do not change the statutory pay machine, but replace it for a limited period by specific rules. As this is a temporary exception to the general rules for determining judicial salaries, it must first be justified by exceptional circumstances.
86. Judge's salaries are not untouchable. The representatives of the judiciary do not live "in a legal and economic vacuum 'that would completely isolate them from the surrounding economic and social reality" [the finding of 3.7.2000 sp. zn. ÚS 18 / 99 (N 104 / 19 SbNU 3; 320 / 2000 Coll.)]. The Constitutional Court therefore accepted and accepted that exceptional circumstances, such as the difficult financial and economic situation of the State, may justify temporary restrictions [finding sp. zn.
87. The exceptional circumstances must be such that the use of a pay machine is not sufficient to respond to it. For example, it cannot be a mere cyclical downturn in economic development, for it would have been written up to the level of the judge's salary, with a delay in applying the pay machine. Temporary restrictions must therefore be justified by a major crisis - for example, a fundamentally deteriorating or long-term deteriorating situation in the economy of a company that is reflected unexpectedly at the level of wage or salary levels in the national economy, so that even a statutory pay machine would not be able to correct this situation sufficiently in the hands of judges.
88. If there is a need to respond to the exceptional situation through pay restrictions, these restrictions may only apply to judicial power provided that they have the same effect on legislative and executive power. The legislature has limited scope to interfere with the material security of the judiciary, which falls under the protection of judicial independence. As long as pay restrictions are not introduced to the same extent in relation to legislative and executive power, the principle of division of power, in conjunction with the principle of judicial independence, cannot allow the introduction of a salary restriction affecting judicial power. In short: temporary restrictions may never apply solely or mainly to the judiciary.
89. Salary restrictions should generally apply to all "servants of the state" (cf. Findings sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 16 / 11, sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 33 / 11). It should therefore relate to "every employee (or at least most of them) in the public domain '(the find sp. zn. Nevertheless, this requirement cannot be applied to all" servants of the state "with the same intensity. This principle applies more strongly, the higher the person's status. The officials of the legislature and the supreme officials of the executive are closest to judges and judges. Therefore, restrictions on judicial salaries must always, to a comparable extent, affect these persons.
90. However, the restriction of judicial salaries may not always be accompanied by the same restriction in relation to all other employees in the public sphere, and under all circumstances. For example, under certain circumstances, the Constitutional Court could accept a partial increase in salaries, which would focus on a narrowly defined part of the "servants of the State 'and be linked to a solution to the exceptional situation for which the salary restriction was introduced. The increase in salaries and salaries for those involved in dealing with an exceptional situation which required the adoption of a salary restriction or which was most affected by an exceptional situation could therefore be acceptable (cf. However, these situations should constitute duly justified exceptions to the rule.
91. In the case of temporary restrictions, they should also be sufficiently justified, including the conduct of an economic analysis showing the possibility of a State budget following the economic situation of the State (cf. The implementation of economic analyses is not a role of the Constitutional Court (there, paragraph 71), so it was up to the Government and Parliament to process and present them in the present proceedings in the context of their procedural defence against the draft Constitutional Court at the time of drafting the draft law for the purposes of the legislative process. The content of this analysis should be different from the comprehensive economic analysis required in the case of permanent restrictions. While the need and proportionality of a long-term decline in judicial pay should be demonstrated in the case of permanent restrictions, the economic analysis should indicate the necessity and proportionality of a short-term departure from the pay machine in view of the exceptional situation.
92. Above all, temporary restrictions must be proportionate. Therefore, even in the case of temporary restrictions, it must pursue a legitimate objective which could not be achieved by other means, and must not unduly restrict the material security of judicial power.
93. The degree of rigour with which temporary restrictions are assessed depends on the type of restriction.
94. Each temporary restriction represents a reduction in the judicial salary compared to the rules originally in force (pay machine). The least serious form of restriction is the reduction in growth rates. So the judges' wages will grow, but less than under the original rules. The rules referred to above shall also apply to this restriction, including the requirement of the exceptional nature of the situation. Even these restrictions must be judged strictly - but least strictly.
95. A moderate form of temporary restriction is the freezing of salary. In this case, salary stagnation occurs, so the salary does not increase or decrease over the previous period. This is the most common form of temporary restriction, with which the Constitutional Court has been confronted repeatedly in its case-law. Therefore, the rules set out in detail in this finding apply fully to temporary restrictions in the form of freezing.
96. The most serious form of restriction is a pay cut. In this case, the nominal amount of the salary is already reduced compared to the previous period. Nor can this form of restriction be fully prohibited, but it is subject to the strictest conditions.
97. What form of temporary restriction is considered by comparison with the relevant period of last year, not necessarily the last month. The Constitutional Court has already stated, in the decision in sp. zn. monthly income can no longer be compared in the light of the existence of additional salaries paid only in certain months of the year; moreover, the economic, budgetary and tax system is naturally built on the calendar year cycle "[paragraph 55; similarly, the finding of 2.3.2010 sp. zn. Although other salaries (13 and 14) have already been abolished, it is still appropriate to make comparisons in relation to last year.
98. If the legislator makes a salary restriction during the year, it will be a freeze of salary if the salaries return to the level of the previous year and a reduction in salary if the salaries fall even below the level of the previous year. Strict conditions apply to both restrictions, but conditions are stricter to reduce the level of pay.
99. The opposite interpretation, comparing the level of pay to the previous month and not to the relevant period of the previous year, would lead to problematic consequences. The legislator would have had to have frozen the salary before 1 January of the calendar year - any change in the already increased salary during the year would have been regarded as a reduction in the salary, which is only possible under the strictest conditions. The legislator would therefore have to respond to serious crises occurring during the calendar year by freezing salaries in the next year, or by restrictions for the current year, for which however the most stringent conditions would apply (the finding of the Pol. ÚS 15 / 22, paragraphs 192 and 193).
100. The Constitutional Court points out that none of the temporary restrictions can be accepted on the basis of the legislator's approval. All must comply with the above-mentioned conditions, only the rigour of their review differs.
A comparative view: case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union
101. The independence of judges, including the aspect of their material security, is also protected by European Union law, the second subparagraph of Article 19 (1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in conjunction with Article 2 TEU. According to the case law of the SDEU, the requirement of judicial independence forms part of the fundamental right to effective legal protection and to a fair trial, which is essential as a guarantee of the protection of all rights conferred on individuals under Union law, and as a guarantee of the maintenance of the common values of the Member States referred to in Article 2 TEU, in particular those of the rule of law (judgments of 11.7.2024 in Cases C-554 / 21, C-622 / 21 and C-727 / 21 HannInvest and Others, paragraph 49, and Case C-119 / 23 Valančius, paragraph 46). It is the judgment of the Court of Justice of 27 February 2018 in Case C-64 / 16 Associação Sindial dos Juízes Portugues, paragraphs 44 and 45, that the remuneration assessment together with the irrevocability of the judges constitutes an important guarantee of their independence.
102. In a recent decision of 25.2.2025 in joined cases C-146 / 23 [Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstok] and C-374 / 23 [Adoreikė], the SDEU addressed the issue of the setting of judicial salaries. In that judgment, the SDEU stated, inter alia, that the principle of the independence of judges did not prevent "the legislative and executive powers of a Member State from deviating from national legislation which objectively defines the methods of determining the salary of judges, by deciding to increase that salary by less than that provided for by that legislation or even freeze or reduce the amount of that salary if such a derogation is not taken arbitrarily, but:
- is provided for by law,
- establish objective, predictable and transparent remuneration rules,
- is justified by the objective of general interest pursued under measures which, subject to duly justified exceptional circumstances, do not specifically concern judges but generally concern the remuneration of categories of officials or civil servants,
- is necessary and strictly adequate to achieve this objective, which assumes that it remains exceptional and temporary and does not affect the adequacy of the salary of judges in relation to the importance of the functions they perform, and
- may be subject to effective judicial review in accordance with the procedural conditions laid down by the law of the Member State concerned. "
103. The SDEU therefore allows for a derogation from the statutory pay machine provided that the above conditions are met. A general objective of general interest justifying a salary restriction may be to demand the correction of the excessive government deficit. However, the budgetary reasons for adopting a measure derogating from the general rules governing the remuneration of judges must be clearly formulated and must not be directed only at members of national courts and must be part of a more general framework aimed at ensuring that a greater number of persons employed in public administration are involved in the budgetary effort (paragraph 69 of the judgment). The SDEU also stresses the principle of subsidiarity, which implies that wage restrictions must be capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the objective of general interest pursued, limited to what is strictly necessary to achieve that objective and must not be disproportionate to that objective (paragraphs 72 to 75 of the judgment).
104. The requirements set out in the case-law of the SDEU constitute a standard of protection of the independence of judicial authority in relation to the judicial fees required by European law. These grounds are worthy of consideration in the current review from a legally comparative point of view (it should be pointed out that the Constitutional Court reviews the contested regulation through the perspective of Czech constitutional order, not from the point of view of Union law). The requirements of the SDEU case-law do not conflict with those observed by the Constitutional Court in the review of compliance of salary restrictions with constitutional order. On the contrary, the case law of the SDEU shows that the case law of the Czech Constitutional Court also has a parallel in the requirements of the Union law system.
Own assessment of the case
105. Following the publication of the finding of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 5 / 24, the judicial and judicial salary base was calculated as 3 times the average gross monthly salary for 2024. In the absence of relevant legislation (repealed by the quoted finding) and newly adopted only in March 2025, the salary of judges was thus assessed also in January 2025.
106. The contested legislation retroactively (effective only from 7.3.2025) provided that between 1.1.2025 and 31.12.2025 the judicial salary base of the judges would be reduced in comparison with the rules of the vending machine, to which the legislature returned on the basis of the stated finding of the Constitutional Court. Thus, the contested regulation confers a lower salary on the judges and judges than would have been due to them under the rules of the vending machine, in the form and subject to the Constitutional Court. A temporary salary restriction was introduced by the contested adjustment.
107. The rigour of the review by the Constitutional Court depends on the type of temporary salary restriction in which its seriousness is reflected. In order to assess the type of salary restriction for 2025, a comparison between the salary of judges in 2024 and 2025 must be made.
108. If this comparison is to be correct, the increase in the salary of judges cannot depend on the salary base established for 2024 by the legal regulation which was subsequently abolished by the Constitutional Court for its inconstitutionality. This is the explanatory note to Act No 57 / 2025 Coll., which shows in its calculation that the contested regulation increases the pay base of judges by 6,95%. This argument cannot be accepted and it is not possible to allow the legislator to refer to a legal regulation which has been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court found in sp. zn. For comparison of pay restrictions in 2025, it is therefore necessary to base this calculation, which was CZK 120 951.
109. The salary restriction now under consideration established a salary base for judges of CZK 121 685. Thus, compared with last year, there was an increase in the judicial pay base by 0.6%, which represents a slowdown in the rate of increase of the judicial salaries, which is actually close to freezing them. However, even such a salary restriction must be subject to careful review by the Constitutional Court, even though, according to the case law of the Constitutional Court, that salary restriction can be classified as least severe. It is not possible to argue with the Government that the conclusions of the former case law of the Constitutional Court do not fall under the current salary restriction. On the contrary, the finding, sp. zn.
Exceptional circumstances
110. It follows from the case law of the Constitutional Court that even restrictions on the slowdown of the rate of increase in judicial salaries compared to the statutory rules laid down by the general rules (the pay machine) must be justified by exceptional circumstances. The explanatory memorandum states that the reason behind the slowdown in salary base growth is the unsatisfactory budgetary situation in which all population groups face the effects of austerity measures under Act No 349 / 2023 Coll. The explanatory memorandum also mentions the need to face the effects of floods in 2024. In its comments on the proposal, the Government also stressed the need for a broad consolidation of public budgets, pointing out the development of an increase in the state budget deficit and an increase in the state debt as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic, the deteriorated energy and security situation in the European region and the associated economic measures.
111. A difficult financial situation may be one of the reasons for accepting temporary restrictions on judicial salaries. However, the Constitutional Court has doubts that the government and Parliament actually considered the financial situation as difficult as the explanatory memorandum suggests.
112. Doubts as to whether the restriction on the salary of judges in 2025 was made in response to exceptional circumstances relating to the financial situation of the State are already triggered by the process of adopting the contested legislation. It is clear from the comments on the draft law No 57 / 2025 Coll. that the original draft law did not contain a salary restriction and envisaged a return to the calculation of the judicial salary base as 3 times the gross monthly salary, i.e. a return to the pay machine before the amendment of Section 3 (3) of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll. by Act No 349 / 2023 Coll. The original draft law was intended not only to increase the pay bases of judges in accordance with the case-law of the Constitutional Court, but also to increase the pay bases of other representatives of the State, i.e. the increase in the salary of politicians (the original version of the draft law available in the electronic library of VeKLEP, https: / / odok.gov.cz / portal / veklep / material / version / KORND9LJHWXR /). As is apparent from publicly available sources, the increase in the salary of politicians was the subject of strong criticism from both the public and the opposition parties (inter alia, an extraordinary meeting of the Chamber of Deputies was convened on the subject of politicians' salaries, which took place subsequently on 24.10.2024, https: / / www.psp.cz / eknih / 2021ps / stenprot / 116schuz / index.htm). In response, in particular, to this criticism, an amended bill was approved at the Government meeting on 16 October 2024, which already contained provisions on the reduction of the salary base.
113. The published material of the Ministry of Justice confirms that the amendment of the draft law containing a new restriction on the salary of judges, together with the salaries of officials, took place "in particular in response to negative publicity, which focused on the increase of the salary base of representatives due to the return to the standard calculation mechanism" (Ministry of Justice, Information to the Government of the Czech Republic on the state of pay to judges and on the related facts, https: / / vlada.gov.cz / cz / urad- government / provided -information-sufficient / information- These findings raise serious doubts as to whether the motives that led the government to amend the draft law in the sense of reducing the salary bases are indeed as they were officially declared in the explanatory memorandum and in the statement on the current proposal. On the contrary, it shows the absence of a legitimate objective of the salary restriction under consideration and the arbitrary procedure of executive and legislative power.
114. The exceptionally poor state of government public finances is not supported by macroeconomic indicators. At the time of the adoption of draft law No 57 / 2025 Coll., according to publicly available information, GDP growth of 2,4% and inflation of 2,6% (Czech National Bank, forecast of November 2024, https: / / www.cnb.cz / en / menova- policy / prognoza / prognoza-cnb- archive / Prognoza-CNB- autumn-2024 /), respectively, GDP growth of 2,5% and inflation of 2,3% (Ministry of Finance, macro-economic prediction of November 2024, https: / www.mfcr.cz / en / breakdowns-policy / macroeconomics / macroeconomic-prediction / 2024 / macroeconomicka-prediction-listopad-2024-57608) were expected. As the Ministry of Finance states, "last year the Czech economy returned to growth. The withdrawal of high inflation was reflected in the return to real household income and their consumption spending... in the balance of foreign trade... also supported the growth of the economy" (Ministry of Finance, State Budget 2025 in a nutshell, https: / / www.mfcr.cz / assets / attachments / 2025-03-27 _ Statni-budget -2025-v-kosce.pdf).
115. While the government's argument concerning the increase in government debt cannot be undermined, this alone cannot be considered as a sufficient reason to accept a restriction on the salary of judges by intervening in a pay machine, in a situation where other indicators show economic growth of the state. Despite the increase in debt in recent years, according to the Ministry of Finance, the Czech Republic remains one of the least indebted countries of the European Union and maintains a stable rating above the average rating of the euro area Member States (see the Ministry of Finance, the State Budget 2025 in a nutshell, https: / / www.mfcr.cz / assets / attachments / 2025-03-27 _ Statni-budget -2025-v-kosce.pdf). The dismal state of public finances, which is argued by the government, is not evidenced by the evolution of the government budget deficit, which for 2025 is set at CZK 41 billion lower than in the previous year (see Act No. 434 / 2024 Coll., on the state budget of the Czech Republic for 2025). Thus, in the very state of public finances, it is difficult to see the reason for the need to intervene in the judicial salaries.
116. Even in the light of the above economic indicators already known to the Government and the legislators at the time of the adoption of the contested legislation, the exceptional situation which would justify the restriction of pay cannot be imported from the State's obligation to deal with the effects of the September 2024 floods. Although the fundamental impact of floods in the lives of many individuals and whole regions is undoubted, the situation in 2025 (including the remediation of the effects of floods from the previous year) cannot be compared with the situation that the Constitutional Court dealt with in the sp. zn.
117. Moreover, most of the financing for the remediation of flood damage should have been addressed in the budget for 2024. By adopting Act No. 294 / 2024 Coll., amending Act No. 433 / 2023 Coll., on the State Budget of the Czech Republic for the year 2024, the government budget reserve was increased by CZK 30 billion for the removal of flood damage. In addition, in the budget for 2025, extraordinary flood expenditure was to represent a significantly lower amount than last year (CZK 10 billion), according to the Ministry of Finance, such expenditure should not enter the structural deficit (see the Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic, https: / / www.mfcr.cz / en / Ministry / media / press-reports / 2024 / government-schvalila- proposal-statni- budget-to-year -202-57156). Nor does the need to face the effects of the 2024 floods, following the overall economic situation of the State, indicate that the State is faced with exceptional circumstances within the meaning of the above-mentioned case law of the Constitutional Court.
118. It must be added that the government's argument justifying payment restrictions on flood damage weakens the findings of the Supreme Audit Office (SAO), which stated in its opinion on the draft state final account for 2024 that the actual drawing-up from the budget reserve to the aftermath of the floods reached only CZK 3.5 billion. "Only 15.6 billion CZK was released for flood purposes. The remaining part of CZK 14.4 billion was released for other purposes..." Overall, according to the SAO data, only CZK 3.9 billion had to be spent from the state budget to finance flood-related measures by the end of 2024 (SAO, Opinion on the draft state closing account of the Czech Republic for 2024. https: / / www.nku.cz / cz / publication- a-documents / opinions-nku- ke-statnimu-budget / default.htm).
119. Already in the find sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 15 / 22 The Constitutional Court expressed doubts about the argument of the distressing financial situation of the State at the moment when a substantial increase in the budget of the Office of the Government was evident under the State Budget Act. Also in the present case, the Constitutional Court points to an increase in the State budget expenditure on the operation of the Office of the Government from CZK 1.2 billion to almost CZK 1.6 billion compared to last year, without the Constitutional Court having any opportunity to assess the reasons for this increase.
120. From the above, the Constitutional Court concluded that one of the main preconditions for the constitutionality of the temporary restriction of judicial salaries was not fulfilled, namely the existence of exceptional circumstances such that the application of the pay machine would not be sufficient to respond to them. The temporary restriction of judicial salaries for 2025 was not adopted in response to the difficult financial situation of the State, which would be exceptional enough to justify such a restriction.
Reductions in salaries of other factors
121. In its case-law, the Constitutional Court stated that another condition of the constitutionality of the restriction of the salary of judges is that, at least to the same extent as the restriction of the judicial salaries, the restriction must also apply to the salaries of legislative and executive powers. This is particularly true of the leaders of these powers. To illustrate the fact that a similar condition is required by the SDEU, which, under one of the conditions of intervention in a legal payment machine, requires such intervention to be carried out within the framework of measures which do not specifically concern judges but generally concern the remuneration of categories of officials or civil servants (judgment of the Grand Chamber of SDEU of 25.2.2025 in Joined Cases C-146 / 23 and C-374 / 23).
122. Both the appellant and the Judicial Union believe that the salary restriction falls exclusively on the judge. The task of the Constitutional Court is to assess whether this is the case or whether the wage restrictions have also been applied equally to other groups of civil servants.
123. The legal provision, part of which is subject to the present review, also contains a salary restriction in relation to representatives within the meaning of § 1 of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll. Although there is also a decrease in the salary base in their case, there is no such significant slowdown in the rate of wage growth as in the judges. In fact, compared to 2024, the salary base grew by 6.95%, while judges grew by 0.6% (see above). Therefore, wage restrictions do not apply to officials to the same extent as to judges.
124. The Constitutional Court is aware that the difference in the percentage increase in the salary of judges and officials is the result of the payment of the remuneration of judges in 2024 after the then salary restriction was abolished as a non-constitutional finding of the Constitutional Court, Pl. ÚS 5 / 24. While the legislature has now returned to a previously established ratio between the salaries of judges and officials (the salary base for officials is 83.3% of the judicial salary base), this was done at the expense of the judicial salaries, which, unlike the salary of officials, increased significantly less compared to 2024. In short, a substantial difference in the percentage of the salary increase between judges and officials in 2025 was made by the legislator's attempt to reconcile the discrepancy between the salaries of the two groups as a result of previous unconstitutional interference in the salary of judges. However, it cannot be concluded from the legislature's current efforts to bring about such a discrepancy that wage restrictions would affect representatives in the same way as judges, at least when assessing a change in salary by comparing 2024 and 2025.
125. It cannot be concluded that the salary restriction would equally affect other "servants of the State 'whose salaries are paid from public budgets, since even in relation to public service and administration employees and civil servants, there was a flat-rate increase in the salary rates, although in relation to staff performing the best paid work, this increase was not in any way dramatic (from 2.1%). The explanatory memorandum to the draft law states that the indexation of public service and administration and civil servants' wage charges in their totality is below the level of an increase of 6,95%, but it has to be pointed out once again that, in 2025, only the salaries of officials (including politicians) increased, rather than those of judges who remained practically at the same level compared to 2024, which completely ignores the explanatory memorandum.
Sign in for notes, favorites and notifications
Regulation Information
| Citation | The Constitutional Court found No 430 / 2025 Coll., sp. zn. |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | The Constitutional Tribunal found |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 24.10.2025 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
Comments 0