The Constitutional Court found no 163 / 2010 Coll.
The Constitutional Court found of 20 April 2010 on the application for annulment of the provisions of § 74 (2) of the second sentence of the second part after the semicolon of Act No. 141 / 1961 Coll., on criminal proceedings (criminal order), as amended
Valid
163
FIND
The Constitutional Court
On behalf of the Republic
On 20 April 2010, the Constitutional Court, in plenary composed of Stanislav Balík, František Duchoň, Vlasta Formánková, Vojen Güttler, Ivana Janů, Vladimir Kórka, Dagmar Lastovecká, Jan Musil, Jiří Nykodým, Pavel Rychetský, Miloslav Excellent, Eliška Wagner (Judge of the Rapporteur) and Michaela Židlická, on the motion of the Second Chamber of the Constitutional Court to abolish the provisions of § 74 paragraph 2 of the sentence of the second section behind the middle of Law No. 141 / 1961 Coll., on criminal proceedings (Criminal Code), as amended by the Chamber of the Parliament of the Czech Republic and Senate as parties to proceedings
as follows:
I. Paragraph 74 (2), second sentence, of the second part, after the semicolon including the semicolon of Act No. 141 / 1961 Coll., on criminal proceedings, as amended, which reads as follows: '; if the release from custody following the publication of the exoneration judgment is made, the complaint of the prosecutor shall have suspensory effect only if the prosecutor has also made an appeal against the judgment', the date of the publication of this finding in the Collection of Laws.
II. The defendant will always be released immediately after the acquittal. The plaintiff's complaint against the decision to release the defendant for his / her freedom of custody after the issuing of the acquittal judgment shall not have suspensory effect.
Reasons
1. In the proceedings for a constitutional complaint brought under sp. zn. II. ÚS 331 / 10, complainant M. Z. sought the annulment of the order of the Supreme Court in Prague of 22 December 2009 sp. zn. 10 To 125 / 2009, since he considered that the Supreme Court had infringed the constitutional guaranteed right guaranteed by Article 8 (1), (2) and (5) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereinafter referred to as "the Charter ') and the rights enshrined in Article 5 (1) (c), Article 5 (3) and (4) and Article 6 (1) of the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as" the Convention'. By order of the Supreme Court in Prague, the order of the Regional Court in Pilsen of 7 December 2009 was annulled No 34 T 3 / 2008-9891, by which the complainant was released from custody of freedom. On the basis of a complaint from the Prosecutor of the Regional Prosecutor in Pilsen, the Supreme Court annulled the discharge order of the Regional Court, left the complainant in custody and rejected his application for freedom.
2. The substance of the constitutional complaint is the complainant's doubts that, after he had been given an acquittal and the decision to release him from custody of the court finding his freedom, the complainant's complaint court, which also lodged an appeal to the acquittal judgment, decided to keep the complainant in custody. According to the complainant, this practice has been contrary to Article 5 (3) of the Convention in the interpretation drawn by the European Court of Human Rights ("the ECHR ') since 1968 (Wemhoff v Germany, 27 June 1968). Furthermore, the complainant saw the violation of fundamental rights in that it had not been given a personal hearing by the Supreme Court in the decision on the duration of the detention. According to the complainant, the decision of the Supreme Court was also, in principle, unverifiable for its comprehensive reasoning.
3. The second Chamber of the Constitutional Court did not consider the constitutional conformal part to be a semicolon of the sentence of the second § 74 paragraph 2 of Act No 141 / 1961 Coll., on criminal proceedings of the Court (criminal order), as amended, as it contradicts the requirement for the proportionality of the limitation of personal freedom by binding, when it does not respect the requirement to demonstrate the presence of reinforced reasons for further restrictions of personal freedom by binding, which results both from the case-law of the Constitutional Court [the Constitutional Court's finding sp. v IV ÚS 689 / 05 of 12.12.2005 (N 225 / 39 SbNU 379) *), and from the case-law of the ECHR (Wemhoff v SRN of 27.6.1968, Labita v Italy of 6.4.2000, Rokhlin v Russia of 7.4.2005), available at http: / www.echr.coe.int. It therefore submitted to the plenary of the Constitutional Court an application for annulment of the provision cited.
4. The Constitutional Court pursuant to the provisions of Sections 42 (4) and 69 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as "the Law on the Constitutional Court") sent the present application for the annulment of the contested provisions to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic.
5. The Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, represented by President Miloslav Vlček, in its observations of 12 March 2010, merely recap the course of the legislative process leading to the adoption of the applicable text of the contested provision § 74 (2) of the second sentence of the second part beyond the semicolon of the criminal order. At the same time, it agreed to abandon oral proceedings.
6. The Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, represented by the President of MUDr. Overmind Sobotka, also described the legislative procedure for the adoption of the applicable text of the contested provision, § 74 (2), second sentence, behind the semicolon of the Code of Criminal Procedure (amendment of the Code of Criminal Procedure by Act No. 265 / 2001 Coll.) by the Senate. He also stated that the whole of the proposed amendment represented changes to criminal proceedings with reform ambitions and, in its entirety, followed the progressive direction of the so-called passability and enforceability of law. The Senate discussion of the amendment did not directly affect the incriminated part of the legislation; However, the debate was led to another, partially comparable material of the amendment, i.e. the new authorization of the State's Attorney to extend the link in the preparatory procedure. The Senate did not review this proposal for a stronger authority of the State's Attorney after a critical selection and plenary hearing. From the context of the debate, it can be argued that the Senate has moved towards the view of the petitioner that the change in the position of a prosecutor in criminal proceedings had to be properly reflected in the institution of custody. The Senate also agreed to abandon the oral hearing.
Conditions for the applicant's active legitimacy
7. The application for annulment of the sentence of the second part after the semicolon of Paragraph 74 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for its contradiction with the constitutional order of the Czech Republic was submitted by the Second Chamber of the Constitutional Court in the context of the proceedings for a constitutional complaint lodged by the complainant M. Z. under the second paragraph of Article 74 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, when the substance of the constitutional complaint was the view that any continuation of the link following the declaration of the exoneration by the Court of First Instance is contrary to the Convention, while the possibility of continuation of the connection is based on that part of the contested provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is therefore an application made pursuant to Article 64 (1) (c) of the Constitutional Court Act and the conditions of active legitimacy for its submission have therefore been fulfilled.
Derogation of the contested provision
8. The contested provision of the sentence of the second part after the semicolon of the provision of § 74 paragraph 2 of Act No. 141 / 1961 Coll., on criminal proceedings of the judicial (criminal order), as amended, reads:
"if release from custody following the declaration of an exoneration of a judgment, the complaint of the prosecutor shall have suspensory effect only if the prosecutor has also lodged an appeal against the judgment."
Description of the legislative procedure for adopting the contested provisions of the law
9. In addition, the Constitutional Court is required, in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 68 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, to assess whether the contested law or part of it has been adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution laid down by competence and by the constitutional procedure. The provision in question was already adopted before 1993, i.e. before the validity and effectiveness of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution), which constitutes a reference criterion for the assessment of the constitutionality of the legislative procedure for the adoption of legislation (see the resolution of the Constitutional Court sp. zn. Since in the later period the amendments adopted were only formal or linguistic, as they were mainly related to the replacement of the institution of the Prosecutor's Office, the Constitutional Court did not examine the legislative procedure for the adoption of this provision of the law.
Reference aspects for the assessment of the proposal
10. Article 1 (1) The Czech Republic is a legal state based on respect for the rights and freedoms of man and citizen. In the very basis of the rule of law, the "principle under which the freedom of an individual is assumed and its limitation by the State is an exception '(cf. C. Schmitt. Basic Theory. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2008, p. 204). Therefore, the whole concept of criminal proceedings grows logically from the idea of the rule of law. Even in criminal proceedings, the rights and freedoms of the individual must be investigated as much as possible, since unjustifiable and disproportionate interference in the private freedom of the individual can occur through the analysis of the purpose and manner of conduct of criminal proceedings (cf. the Constitutional Court's finding, sp. zn. II. ÚS 1975 / 08, available at http: / / nalus.ujud.cz). From a constitutional legal point of view, it is always important to assess the extent to which the public interest, as defined in the penal law, can legitimately restrict the fundamental rights of a particular defendant in the course of criminal proceedings (cf. the Constitutional Court's finding, sp. zn.
11. Article 8 (1) The Charter guarantees each individual freedom, which is the leading place in the catalogue of fundamental rights and freedoms [cf. point 25 of the sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 63 / 06 of 29.1.2008 (N 21 / 48 of the SbNU 223; 90 / 2008 Coll.) * * * *)]. In particular, the provisions of Articles 8 (2) and 8 (5) of the Charter [cf. A similar, even more detailed, regulation contains the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In accordance with Article 5 (1), no one may be deprived of his or her freedom other than those specifically provided for. The deprivation of liberty may take place only in accordance with the procedures laid down by law. Pursuant to Article 5 (1) (c) of the Convention, an individual may be deprived of his or her liberty by reason of the lawful arrest or other deprivation of liberty of a person for the purpose of being brought before the competent judicial authority for a reasonable suspicion of the commission of a criminal offence, or where there are reasonable grounds to believe that it is necessary to prevent him or her from committing the offence or fleeing after his or her commission. Article 5 (3) The Convention shall then provide that anyone who is arrested or otherwise deprived of his or her freedom in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (b). (c) this Article shall be brought immediately before a judge or other official person empowered by law to exercise jurisdiction and shall have the right to be tried within a reasonable period of time or to be dismissed during the proceedings.
12. The Constitutional Court has already expressed several times the nature of the link, which, together with detention and arrest, is among the most serious procedural interference in the rights of the accused. The content of the legal institution of custody constitutes the definition of constitutionally acceptable grounds for limiting the personal freedom of the defendant in order to prevent the purpose of the criminal proceedings from being thwarted or made difficult to achieve [cf. ÚS 40 / 04 of 24.2.2004 (N 28 / 32 of SbNU 261), SbNU IV of 689 / 05 of 12.12.2005 (N 225 / 39 of SbNU 379)]. In the view of the Constitutional Court, the temporary restriction of personal freedom by binding must satisfy several conditions [cf. point 25 of the Constitutional Court's finding, sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 63 / 06 (see above)]: "The fundamental principles of the restriction of personal freedom by binding (which must be reflected by the sub-constitutional right) include the necessity of imposing custody and possession in it only for a certain legitimate purpose, the proportionality of the individual's personal freedom and the interest of society in limiting that freedom, the necessity of restricting personal freedom for the absence of another means to achieve the same objective, the balancing of the benefits of limiting personal freedom with respect to losses resulting, and, finally, the exclusive jurisdiction of the court '.
13. As a result of the fact that the link may constitute an enormous interference in the individual's personal sphere, it was given particular attention in the case law of the Constitutional Court. In his view, "binding 'constitutes an exceptional measure relating to the limitation of personal freedom and is to be imposed only if there is no other eventuality to limit the specific concern for which the link can be ordered' (cf. the Constitutional Court's finding sp. zn. II. ÚS 897 / 08, available at http: / / nalus.ujud.cz). The exceptional nature of this ensuring institute is due to the fact that the link has serious negative consequences: it" relieves a person of his or her freedom presumed innocent before the definitive detection of guilt, isolates the accused from his or her family and social environment, has serious social and psychological consequences, can serve as a means of coercive against the accused in order to obtain his or her confession "(Repik, B. European Convention on Human Rights and Criminal Law. Praha: Orac, 2002, p. 228). As the link can seriously interfere with the individual's personal freedom, it must always be interpreted in a strictly restrictive way, as a legitimate legal exception to the general rule of inadmissibility of the individual's personal freedom, as the ECHR case law also confirms. According to it, the list of exceptions to the right to freedom is exhaustive and therefore only close interpretation is compatible with the objective of Article 5 of the Convention (Giulia Manzoni against Italy, 1997, Quinn against France, 1995). The use of this procedural institute must always be considered from the point of view of proportionality to intervene in the fundamental rights of the accused.
14. Intervention with personal freedom must always be assessed in terms of time; because the link is exceptional to the Institute, it can only last for the necessary time. If it persists for more than a period of time strictly necessary, it shall become an disproportionate measure, unduly affecting the fundamental right of the individual to the personal freedom guaranteed by Article 8 (1) of the Charter, to which priority must be given in the present situation. According to the ECHR, "the continuation of restrictions on personal freedom is justified only if there are specific indications of a genuine need for public interest which, despite the presumption of innocence, outweighs the principle of respect for personal freedom '[cf., for example, the Letellier decision against France of 26 June 1991, Muller against France of 17 March 1997, Punzell against the Czech Republic of 25 April 2000 or Jecius against Lithuania of 31 July 2000, cf. also the finding of the Constitutional Court of First Instance of 12 December 2005 (N 225 / 39 SbNU 379)]. Continued restrictions on personal freedom must be a link in relation to proportionality to the constitutional public interest in the effective prosecution of crime. On the other hand, the legitimacy of the restrictions on fundamental rights in favour of the public interest in fulfilling the purpose of criminal proceedings is diminished and the need to restore respect for the fundamental rights of the individual is intensified.
15. In order to ensure respect and protection of the fundamental right to personal freedom, the ESLP has developed a doctrine of enhanced reasons. According to this doctrine, the general courts must respect the necessity of the existence of increased reasons for the duration of the restriction of personal freedom, otherwise the continued restriction of personal freedom cannot, even if the imposition of the binding may have taken place on the basis of reasonable suspicion, and cannot be discussed. When assessing the adequacy of restrictions on personal freedom, the general court must, in particular, deal with whether the suspicion of committing the offence for which the accused is being prosecuted is strengthened or weakened. Specifically, the duration of the suspicion is "a condition of sine qua non for the legality of the continuation of the bond, but after a certain period of time it is not sufficient in itself. In such cases, the court must determine whether there are other (relevant and sufficient) grounds put forward by the law enforcement authorities to justify this continued imprisonment '(judgment of 7.4.2005 in the Rokhlin case against Russia). The national court must therefore determine whether other grounds put forward by the law enforcement authorities can justify the continued deprivation of the freedom of the person concerned (cf. Hubálková, E. European Convention on Human Rights and the Czech Republic. Praha: Linde, 2003, p. 131).
16. Since the ESLP always assesses the adequacy of the period of limitation of personal freedom by binding, it has specifically expressed its views in many of its decisions on when it can be considered appropriate in terms of time and when the link already constitutes an intervention in the right to personal freedom guaranteed by the Convention. According to the ECHR, there is a time limit which must not be exceeded by imprisonment. As the Constitutional Court points out (paragraphs 13 and 14), according to the ECHR, the link is an exceptional, time-limited institution. While the determination of the beginning of this period usually does not pose a problem, the very key question is the determination of the end of the term of binding, which would still comply with the Convention. It follows from the ECHR's caselaw that this period begins at the moment when a person has been effectively deprived of his or her freedom and ends with the declaration of a judgment of the Court of First Instance, even if he or she has not yet become final (cf. Repik, B. European Convention on Human Rights and Criminal Law. Praha: Orac, 2002, p. 228).
17. This rule was expressed by the ECHR in Wemhoff's decision against Germany of 27 June 1968, according to which the link, having regard to Article 5 (3) of the Convention, ends on the day on which the indictment is decided, even by the Court of First Instance. This legal opinion was confirmed by the ECHR in its decision of 6 April 2000 Labita versus Italy, in which it stated that the end of the link with Article 5 (3) The Convention is the day on which the prosecution is determined to be justified, albeit only in the first instance. It is clear from those decisions that the detention of a person after being acquitted cannot be covered by the exception of Article 5 (1) (c) of the Convention. While the ESLP has acknowledged that a certain period of time for the execution of the decisions on release is often unavoidable, this period must be reduced to a minimum (Guilia Manzoni of 1.7.1997). The important conclusion of this legal opinion is that the duration of the detention cannot be extended by the suspensive effect of the enforcement of the acquittal judgment. In a similar case, the reason for deprivation of liberty under Article 5 (1) (c) of the Convention has ended. The case-law of the ECHR can conclude that, if an exoneration judgment has been given by the Court of First Instance, the defendant must be released immediately, even if the prosecutor has appealed immediately (cf. Repik, B. European Convention on Human Rights and Criminal Law. Praha: Orac, 2002, p. 229). If the defendant is not released, it must be noted that there is a breach of the right to personal freedom guaranteed by Article 5 (1) of the Convention. Further restrictions on personal liberty may occur when the disposition foreseen in Article 5 (1) (a) of the Convention is fulfilled, which allows for legal imprisonment following conviction by the competent court. A person who, after the conviction, claims that the detention period was disproportionate due to delays in the appeal proceedings cannot rely on Article 5 (3) of the Convention, but can only claim and demonstrate infringement of the rights guaranteed by Article 6 (1) of the Convention.
18. The Constitutional Court states that the ESLP's described practice found a response in the Slovak Republic. Slovakia adopted a broad amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure to ensure respect for the fundamental rights of individuals in accordance with the interpretation of the Slovak Constitutional Court and, above all, the ECHR. The ECHR's case-law on Article 5 (1), (3) and (4) of the Convention has been fully implemented into the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Slovak Republic. Thus, Slovakia fulfilled its obligations under the Convention. The 2007 explanatory report of the Slovak Ministry of Justice lists the specific changes to which this amendment is directed. One of them is the unconditional release of the defendant for custody after the liberation of the Court of First Instance. At this point, the Ministry of Justice referred to the principles of the ESLP decision in Wemhoff v Germany in 1968 (cf. p. 4). The explanatory memorandum also referred to Labita's decision against Italy, which states that the continued duration of the link after the acquittal judgment cannot be justified by the exception permitted under Article 5 (1) (c) of the Convention. In other words, the link after the publication of the acquittal judgment is lost in Article 5 (1) (c) of the Convention, to the extent that the procedural guarantee of Article 5 (3) of the Convention, which guarantees the right to be tried within a reasonable period of time, has been fulfilled in relation to that provision of the Convention. Therefore, it is no longer possible to hold a person in custody if the validity of the charge has already been decided. The explanatory memorandum explicitly stresses that, in accordance with the Wemhoff decision, the date on which the binding ends is the date on which the charge is decided, even by the Court of First Instance (cf. 23).
Own review
19. Thus, in the light of the above constitutional considerations, the Constitutional Court had to assess whether the incriminated parts of the contested provision met the requirements of the above principles and concluded that this was not the case.
20. Paragraph 74 (2) of the second sentence of Part Two of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the suspensive effect of a complaint by a prosecutor following the publication of an exonerating judgment, if an appeal is lodged at the same time. The exoneration judgment is given in a situation where, on the basis of the evidence presented, the defendant's guilt has not been established, whether because (a) it has not been established that the action for which the defendant has been prosecuted has actually taken place, or (b) the alleged action is not a criminal offence in the application, or (c) it has not been established that the offence was committed by the defendant (see Section 226 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, where certain other reasons are set out). Following the issuing of the exonerating judgment, the court must examine whether the grounds for the detention remain or have not changed (see Section 72 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure). As the defendant has been fully acquitted by the court's decision, it is clear at the moment that the grounds for detention are no longer established and that the continued duration of the detention is no longer justified. It is for this reason that the General Court, shortly after the judgment is delivered, also issues a resolution on the release from custody of freedom. The current wording of Paragraph 74 (2) of the second sentence of the second part of the sentence behind the semicolon of the Code of Criminal Procedure constitutes, in substance, the right of the Prosecutor to reverse the court's decision to release him from custody, even for a limited period of time, pending the decision of the Complainant Court.
21. From the point of view of constitutionality, it is hardly acceptable that the continuity of restrictions on personal freedom by binding should not be affected by an exoneration judgment. In the view of the Constitutional Court, this legal regulation of the Code of Criminal Procedure authorizing the Prosecutor to lodge a complaint with suspensive effect contradicts the close interpretation of Article 5 (1) (c) in conjunction with Article 5 (3) of the Convention. The text of the contested part of the provision of the penal order in question is very clear and its deficits cannot be overcome by a constitutional interpretation.
22. The Constitutional Court therefore concludes that the contested part of the provision of Paragraph 74 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is directly contrary to the requirements arising from the principles contained in the ECHR case-law (paragraphs 14 to 17), which are thus not respected by the Czech legislation. The continuing restriction of personal liberty following the issuing of the acquittal judgment is no longer justified from the point of view of the public interest in the effective prosecution of crime, as the requirement for the presence of enhanced grounds for the continued duration of the detention is not fulfilled (paragraph 15). If the ECHR's case-law requires that the grounds which would legitimise the continued duration of the detention should be strengthened with the time elapsed, it is obvious that the contested part of the provisions of the penal order cannot be complied with. In fact, the issue of an exoneration judgment causes those grounds to disappear. In other words, the acquittal is the moment in criminal proceedings when the grounds for detention have disappeared or are reduced to a minimum, since the charges have proved to be unjustified, namely by a court ruling, and therefore no public interest in the duration of the detention which could outweigh the requirement of respect for personal freedom. Where a court is required to deal with whether a suspicion of the commission of a criminal offence is strengthened or weakened (paragraph 15), following the issuing of an exoneration judgment, the grounds for the suspicion are refuted by the Court's decision on the illegality of the charge itself. The dismissal of the defendant cannot be considered premature, although there is a possibility that the appeal against the defendant will be accepted by the appellate court. As already stated by the Constitutional Court in the finding in sp. zn. IV. ÚS 689 / 05 of 12.12.2005 (N 225 / 39 SbNU 379), the reason for the extension of the link consisting of a completely unfounded hypothetical conclusion on the possibility of the appeal by the Court of Appeal "is entirely arbitrary, contrary to Article 8 (2) (5) of the Charter, not only by extending beyond the legal framework the grounds for restricting personal freedom but also by imposing on the complainants an implicit assumed inability to refute their defence by the Court of First Instance."
23. The suspensive effect of a complaint by the state's attorney is a situation in which an individual is required to make a greater sacrifice than the person to whom the presumption of innocence - confirmed by the court - can reasonably be claimed. The Constitutional Court cannot therefore accept the concept of Czech legislation, according to which the continuation of the binding is possible at the moment. The implementation of the competence provided for in the contested provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure by prosecutors leads to undue and unconstitutional interference with the fundamental right to personal freedom, which must, however, be respected by the State in the formulation of criminal law standards. Therefore, it remains to be concluded that the duration of the detention cannot be extended through the suspensive effect of the decision to release from the detention as a result of a complaint by the prosecutor, as this construction leads to undue interference with the constitutionally guaranteed right to the personal freedom of the accused.
24. The Constitutional Court expressed in a number of its decisions on the interpretation of Article 89 (2) of the Constitution [cf. the finding of the Constitutional Court sp. zn. Paragraph 74 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure will read as follows after the derogation of the contested part: "The only suspensive effect is the State's complaint against the decision to release the accused and the parties against the decision to obtain the State's financial guarantee. However, if the prosecutor was present at the time of the publication of such a decision, his complaint shall have suspensory effect only if it was lodged immediately after the publication of the decision. 'This provision will have to be interpreted in a constitutional manner in such a way that this standard cannot be applied if an exoneration judgment has been given in the case. As a result of the abolition of a given part of the criminal order, the defendant must always be released immediately after the exoneration of the sentence. The plaintiff's complaint against the decision to release the defendant for his / her freedom of custody after the issuing of the acquittal judgment shall not have suspensory effect. The Constitutional Court is aware that a certain period of time for the execution of the decision on release is necessary, but recalls that in the Labita case against Italy (paragraph 17), the delay in release from custody due to the necessity of carrying out administrative formalities of around 10 hours was found disproportionate to the ECHR.
President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr. Rychetský v. r.
*) NB: Collection of finds and orders of the Constitutional Court, Volume 39, Found No. 225, p. 379
* *) NB: Collection of finds and resolutions of the Constitutional Court, Volume 14, p. 32, p. 309
* * *) NB: Collection of finds and resolutions of the Constitutional Court, Volume 48, Found No. 21, p. 223, Declared under No. 90 / 2008 Coll.
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Regulation Information
| Citation | The Constitutional Court found no 163 / 2010 Coll., on the application for annulment of the provision § 74 paragraph 2 of the second sentence of the second part behind the semicolon of Act No. 141 / 1961 Coll., on criminal proceedings of the judicial (criminal order), as amended |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | - |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 26.05.2010 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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