The Constitutional Court found no 499 / 2002 Coll.

The provisions of § 4 (3), § 5 (3), § 7 and § 13 of the Government Decree No. 114 / 2001 Coll., on the establishment of sugar production quotas for quota years 2001 / 2002 to 2004 / 2005 shall be deleted from the date of publication of this finding in the Collection of Laws.

The proposal to repeal Article 13 of Act No. 256 / 2000 Coll., on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund and to amend some other laws (Act on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund) is rejected.

The Group of Members in its proposal under Article 87 (1) (a) and (b) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution) and Article 64 (1) (b) and (2) (b) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, argues that Act No. 256 / 2000 Coll., on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund and on the amendment of certain other laws (Act on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund) prohibits the production of agricultural goods. It provides for a discrepancy with the freedom to conduct business under Article 26 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms ("the Charter '). The freedom to do business as a pursuit of certain professions and activities can only be restricted by law or conditions for them, but a complete prohibition is not possible. Such a prohibition, according to the appellant, constitutes a penalty levy of 115% of the minimum or regulated price of an agricultural product for exceeding an individual production quota (Section 13 of the State Agricultural Intervention Fund Act). This is a penalty which is the result of an act expressly prohibited by law. The regulation by means of production quotas led to the definition of the preferred category of so-called strategic sugar producers without any influence on the choice of other producers. In conjunction with this differentiation with the freedom of enterprise, there is inequality under Articles 1 and 3 (1) of the Charter. This reflects the free distribution of production quotas between the current producers and only a small margin remains for the other potential producers. According to a group of Members, the producers - the owners of the equipment, which had a high financial cost, may also be omitted in the period before the law was effective and did not produce sugar during the reference period. In a similar position are those who bought the equipment. Discrimination between entrepreneurs with an allocated production quota and entrepreneurs who do not have it creates discrimination in the right of ownership. This has the same legal content and protection under Article 11 of the Charter. In fact, those owners of production facilities are prohibited by law from producing the relevant commodity by decision of the State without compensation. Their ownership is impaired by the application of production quotas, thereby giving it a different content and reducing its protection. The Group of Members recalls that the Government has already tried to regulate sugar production by Regulation No 51 / 2000 Coll., setting out the measures and share of the State in creating the conditions for ensuring and maintaining sugar and sugar production and stabilising the sugar market. This provision was repealed by the Constitutional Court in Case 96 / 2001 Coll. but it was valid from 14.3.2000 to 12.3.2001. Over that period, it created unfavourable conditions for potential new applicants to start production and then to allocate the quota under Government Decree No. 114 / 2001 Coll.

The Group of Members admits that the legislator is to take into account the general interest in adjusting the situation in the economic sectors when issuing ordinary laws, but, on the other hand, consider the existence of a public interest. However, intervention must respect the balance between the general interest and individual rights. There must be proportionality between the resources used and the objectives pursued. Otherwise, as the Constitutional Court pointed out by the finding of 15.2.1994 sp. zn. The regulation of agricultural production by group of Members shows the public interest, not only in the context of preparing for accession to the European Union. However, the Act on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund determines restrictions on the freedom to do business in agriculture by means of production quotas in a disproportionate manner, since it does not provide for a range of agricultural products that can be regulated. It thus empowers the State Agricultural Intervention Fund (hereinafter referred to as the Fund) to intervene in producers' rights without any closer legal definition. That threatens to abuse him. The legal reference to international treaties (Paragraph 1 (2)) is understood by a group of Members as a reference to European Community rules, in particular to Council Regulation No 2038 / 1999. The regulation of sugar production created by them applies only for a limited period of time, whereas the Law on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund envisages a repeated and thus unlimited application of quotas.

The Group of Members introduces the application of the Administrative Code only to applications for aid and not to other decisions, including decisions on the allocation of quotas or the imposition of a penalty levy, in an explicit restriction (Section 5 (5) of the Act on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund).

The Group of Members recalls that a substatutory delegation for law-making is to be regarded as unconstitutional (Section 4 (3) of the Decree of Government No. 114 / 2001 Coll.) if the Fund determines the amount of the reserve to be published in the Bulletin of the Ministry of Agriculture. It also considers the delegation of the Ministry of Finance to determine the minimum price for sugar to be unconstitutional. In both cases it refers to the finding of the Constitutional Court No. 96 / 2001 Coll., according to which the legislator is unable to delegate the scope of the regulation of the relations provided for by law to the power of executive and thus in fact to resign its legislative obligation; All the more so, the executive power cannot assume the right to the adjustment itself. The two provisions are therefore contrary to Article 79 of the Constitution and the first to Article 12 (3) and 12 (4) of the Act on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund.

Furthermore, the contested government regulation does not define any quality characteristics of sugar for which production quotas are fixed. The reference in the footnote to Decree No. 334 / 1997 Coll., implementing § 18 (a), (d), (j) and (k) of Act No. 110 / 1997 Coll., on foodstuffs and tobacco products and amending and supplementing certain related laws, for natural sweeteners, honey, chocolate confectionery, cocoa powder and cocoa blends with sugar, chocolate and chocolate confectionery, as amended by Decree No. 94 / 2000 Coll. The Constitutional Court ruled that the purpose of the footnotes was merely to clarify the rules and that they had no legal relevance. The definition of the production quota system as incomplete does not meet the requirement of the law.

In the extension of the proposal which the Constitutional Court has accepted, a group of Members also requests the annulment of Section 7 of Government Decree No. 114 / 2001 Coll. The reason for this is, according to the appellant, a lack of legal authorisation for a delegation to distribute sugar production quotas and reserves from the government to the Fund, without being expressly authorised by the Law on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund. Clear authorisations include up to Sections 4, 7 and 16 of the Government Decree No. 114 / 2001 Coll. The appellant considers the authorisation of the quota system to use the State Agricultural Intervention Fund under Paragraph 1 (2) (d) of the Act. On the contrary, in relation to production quotas, the most diverse competences are entrusted to the government [§ 3 (3) (a), § 12 of the Act on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund]. Paragraph 4, 6 and 7 of Decree-Law 114 / 2001 Coll. are unconstitutional as they establish an illegal delegation to exercise public authority. Moreover, the position of a public authority is expressly granted to the Fund only when deciding on aid (Section 5 of the State Agricultural Intervention Fund Act). A group of Members proposed the abolition of Article 13 of Decree-Law No 114 / 2001 Coll. for its contradiction with Article 79 of the Constitution, since the Government delegated its legal obligation to another body by authorising the Ministry of Finance to set the minimum price for sugar marketed in the Czech Republic, thereby violating Article 12 (4) of the Act on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund.

In its observations, the Chamber of Deputies states that the motion of a group of Members is unfounded, because everyone has the freedom to decide whether and under what conditions he will do business in a particular area. State interference must respect a reasonable balance between a requirement of general interest and a requirement to protect fundamental rights. There must be a reasonable relationship between the resources used and the objectives pursued. The introduction of sanctions under the production quota system does not follow restrictions on the guaranteed right to do business for all without distinction, the aim being to guarantee balance between production and sales. Even in the European Union, regulation of agriculture is not understood as a violation of the principle of equal right to do business. The legislature may therefore, within the limits of the guaranteed fundamental rights, define or affect the type and number of operators active in a particular sector, or limit the contractual freedom to apply production on the market. The Chamber of Deputies refers to the limits laid down in Article 41 (1) of the Charter. These rights are fundamentally different from fundamental rights, and the legislator's ability to impose restrictions is greater. The Chamber of Deputies agrees with the positions on the issue of regulation which the Constitutional Court has taken in the findings No 231 / 2000 Coll. and No 410 / 2001 Coll. It recalls that Article 13 of the Act on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund was adopted as an amendment. According to its assessment, the government proposal was hardly feasible in practice. It does not therefore consider the proposal to be justified. The legal situation under the production quota system would not improve by repealing this provision. The Chamber of Deputies states that the law has been properly passed, signed by the relevant constitutional authorities and declared in the Collection of Laws. It believes that the law adopted is in line with the Constitution, the constitutional order and our legal order.

In its observations on the proposal, the Senate recalls that constitutional objections were not raised during the discussion of the draft law and therefore did not act in this respect. The sanctions provided for in Article 13 of the State Agricultural Intervention Fund Act are considered by the State as an instrument by which the anticipated stabilisation of the agricultural market is enforced by the State. According to him, sanctions do not constitute a means of discrimination between entrepreneurs. Equality is guaranteed by Article 12 (7) of the State Agricultural Intervention Fund Act, which allows new entrants to enter the market. It does not agree with the view that the administrative order does not apply to decisions on the levy under Section 13 of the Act on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund. Decisions shall also be subject to review by the court pursuant to Article 36 of the Charter.

The Government of the Czech Republic states in its comments on the proposal that the main objective of the sugar production quota system is to stabilise the market and protect all its participants from negative fluctuations. The Government's contested regulation states that the adjustment is in full compliance with the rules applicable in the European Union and is based on the domestic and export share of the quota. The main motivation is to keep sugar production at a historically recent level, including some overproduction. Another system of regulation would be contrary to the model applied in the European Union. Thus, the Czech Republic would not comply with the approximation obligation under the Europe Agreement establishing an association between the Czech Republic, of the one part, and the European Communities and their Member States, of the other part, No 7 / 1995 Coll. (Articles 69 to 71). The government also states that it has established a way of fulfilling and releasing the reserve. The publication of related data in the Ministry of Agriculture Bulletin is merely information. As regards the alleged discrimination between entrepreneurs who produced or did not produce sugar, it states that it is generally possible to buy the quota or apply for a quota from the reserve. Stricter conditions for those who have not produced sugar are understandable as their ability to produce sugar is not proven. On the provision of § 5 (3) of Decree No 114 / 2001 Coll. it states that it contains only an obligation to provide certain information in the application. In this context, the Government points out the argument on the nature and limits of equality expressed in the Constitutional Court No 410 / 2001 Coll. On the proposal for the annulment of the provisions concerning the authorisation of the Ministry of Finance points to its jurisdiction under Act No. 526 / 1990 Coll., on Prices, as amended. They therefore claim that the contested provisions of Decree 114 / 2001 Coll. do not infringe the constitutionally guaranteed rights of producers. It therefore proposes rejecting the proposal.

In its comments on the extended proposal, the Government recalls that the reason for the creation of a system of sugar production quotas is the introduction of Community law principles into the Czech legal order, both because of the requirements of the association agreement and because of the prevention of adverse effects on sensitive agriculture following the forthcoming accession to the European Union, while reminding the Institute of National Production quotas. On the objection expressed in the extension of the proposal, the Government states that the Fund is an executive body which, without free discretion, implements the policy laid down by the Government's regulation. For such application of the production quotas, it is called not only by Government Decree No. 114 / 2001 Coll., but above all by the Act on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund, whose § 1 (2) (d) provides that, in accordance with this Act and the international treaties and on the basis of regulations issued by the Government to implement this Act, it implements measures and introduces market rules for stabilising agricultural products and food markets by using production quotas. The Government points to the acceptance of the system of milk production quotas by the Constitutional Court, which did not find the very way of establishing production quotas unconstitutional. It therefore proposes that the proposal be rejected in its entirety.

The Ministry of Agriculture ("the Ministry ') and the State Agricultural Intervention Fund also took an opinion on the proposal. Both opinions are identical in substance. The two authorities recall that the aim of the sugar production quota system is to stabilise the market in view of its particularities, which still distort external relations. The basic step for the implementation of the system was the adoption of the Act on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund, which further mandates the Government to specify it within the framework of the timetable agreed in the context of negotiations on the accession of the Czech Republic to the European Union. The legal framework is therefore given. The Government is empowered to issue regulations in addition to the law and the Constitution (Article 78). The aim of stabilisation is to maintain a certain volume of production and for exports. The system is based on a system applied in the European Union (Council Regulation No 1260 / 2001 / EC on the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector). By establishing an identical system, the Czech Republic fulfils the agreement resulting from the Europe Agreement establishing an association between the Czech Republic, of the one part, and the European Communities and their Member States, of the other part (No 7 / 1995 Coll.) on the commitment to take over the so-called acquis communautaire in the field of agriculture (Articles 69 to 71). On the objection that sugar production quotas constitute an unconstitutional restriction on the freedom to do business, it recalls that this right is a right of choice. The Constitutional Court in the Found of 3 April 1996 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 32 / 95 (published under No. 112 / 1996 Coll. and published in the Collection of Decisions, Volume 5, Found No. 26) categorized fundamental rights. Economic, social and cultural rights can only be claimed within the limits of the law defining them (Article 41 of the Charter). The same is laid down directly for the freedom of business (Article 26 (2) of the Charter). The legislation under examination is the subject of this legal and on the basis of it and in accordance with the Constitution of the statutory regulation. The quota systems (milk and sugar) in place so far correspond to those in the European Union. Any entity wishing to produce sugar may acquire quotas from another producer or apply for allocation from the reserve. It is not true that market access is closed. On the objections of a group of Members to the sanction levy, both the Ministry and the Fund point out the view expressed by the Constitutional Court in Found No 410 / 2001 Coll. According to him, the legislator and others may, as far as it is concerned, regulate production in a particular sector and determine the type and number of operators involved or restrict contractual freedom. This is primarily the task of the legislator. The authorities point out that the purpose of the penalty levy is precisely to discourage excess production. If the State may prohibit it, it may also deter it from the penalty payment. Penalties are a necessary complement to the production quota system. The Ministry and the Fund recall that only current producers are taken into account in the allocation of quotas in the European Union. Therefore, the statutory provisions do not go beyond the limits laid down by the law. The differentiation of the quota allocated to a group of existing producers took account of past production. New and existing producers are not prevented from acquiring quotas by buying from another producer or by dividing them from the reserve. The prioritisation of current producers in the first distribution of quotas is necessary to exclude speculators. In view of the need for a certain disadvantage for new producers, the Ministry and the Fund also refer to the Constitutional Court finding on milk quotas. Similarly, they respond to the objection of a breach of the fundamental right of ownership. The quota system constitutes a form of control over the use of property in the public interest. In the modern market economy of Western European democratic states, such measures are common. The public interest is to stabilise the sugar market and maintain the production of sugar beet at an acceptable price for growers. Both the Ministry and the Fund consider the instrument used to be appropriate. They remind us that there is no expropriation. In addition to the quota produced, the sugar produced is only subject to a levy and is not removed from the producer. The Ministry and the Fund refer to the new Council Regulation No 1260 / 2001 concerning the alleged infringement of the regulation in the European Union. The tools used there are identical to those applied in the Czech Republic. They also argue that price regulation is being applied in the European Union. They reject the claim that the regulation in force in the European Union is limited in time, while not in the Czech Republic. Both the Ministry and the Fund do not share the opinion of a group of Members on the exclusion of the administrative rules from decisions on the allocation of quotas or on the penalties or on the exclusion of judicial review. The application or exclusion of application of the administrative rules laid down for decisions on the different types of agricultural aid cannot be inferred from any other decision under the State Agricultural Intervention Fund Act. Nor is a judicial review of the relevant decisions expressly excluded in any law. Both the Ministry and the Fund consider that the government does not have to determine the amount of the reserve at all. The publication of the specified data in the Ministry of Agriculture Bulletin shall have an information character for the quota year concerned on the allocation of quotas in that quota year. Both the Ministry and the Fund consider that the quality characteristics of sugar as a regulated product are determined independently of the rules on market regulation of agriculture by Decree No. 334 / 1997 Coll. They reject the claim that the reference to this Decree is contrary to the case law of the Constitutional Court. In order to determine the minimum price for sugar, they refer to the fact that the Ministry of Finance is competent to determine it under Act No. 526 / 1990 Coll. They state that it is not desirable to fix a price for five quota years. They therefore propose rejecting the proposal of a group of Members.

The Ombudsman shares the belief that the Fund's competence to provide for a reserve of production quotas is unconstitutional, as well as the authority of the Ministry of Finance to set a minimum price for sugar, both with reference to the wording of § 12 (3) and (4) of the State Agricultural Intervention Fund Act. It is convinced of a breach of the principle of equal treatment and of the requirement of an objective method of calculating quotas under Article 12 (6) of the State Agricultural Intervention Fund Act. It stresses that it harms producers who have not produced or produced sugar in small quantities in more than three years out of the five in question. It rejects in this respect the argument relied upon by such an interpretation of the case law of the Constitutional Court, which allows for the de facto division of applicants into groups with a completely unequal status. The ability to produce sugar is given not by past production, but by the availability of devices that meet the legal requirements. It recalls that Article 7 of Decree 114 / 2001 Coll. creates an objective method of allocating production quotas, where it is not taken into account that production facilities may be sold or leased. The Ombudsman thinks that the Law on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund empowers the Fund to use the quota only, not to determine.

The procedural conditions for proceedings before the Constitutional Court are fulfilled.

The application was lodged by the applicant, the contested legislation was adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution and the constitutional procedure. The Act on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund applies in its original version, the Decree of Government No. 114 / 2001 Coll. was amended by Decree of the Government No. 296 / 2002 Coll. published on 2 July 2002 and, from that date, also effective, but the contested provisions were not affected by it.

In plenary, the Constitutional Court expressed its findings on proposals for the repeal of legislation twice on agricultural production quotas.

Found No. 96 / 2001 Coll. (sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 45 / 2000 out of 14.2.2001, published in the ECR, Volume 21, Found No. 30) passed the proposal of Sugar Vol., s. r. o., to repeal Government Decree No. 51 / 2000 Coll. According to the Constitutional Court, the Government did not issue a regulation for implementation and within the limits of Act No. 252 / 1997 Coll., on Agriculture, as defined in Article 78 of the Constitution. The initial provisions of the Act (Sections 1 and 2) do not provide for restrictions on farming activities (Articles 26 and 41 of the Charter) in the form of production quotas. The Constitutional Court did so with the knowledge that the Parliament of the Czech Republic has so far adopted Act No. 256 / 2000 Coll., which knows the production quotas, but the government regulation under examination was not adopted for its implementation.

Found No. 410 / 2001 Coll. (sp. zn. The Constitutional Court decided on a motion by a group of Members to repeal Government Decree No. 445 / 2000 Coll., on establishing milk production quotas for the years 2001 to 2005. It partially complied with the proposal and annulled its Article 4 (2) because of the lack of legal authorisation to limit the allocation of production quotas from the reserve to farmers operating in the organic livestock system and Article 14 (2) because of the unconstitutional and illegality of the delegation's decision on the amount of the reserve for the Ministry of Agriculture (Minister). However, milk production quotas were not found by the unconstitutional and illegal Constitutional Court itself. In the statement of reasons of the finding, the Constitutional Court found the penalty levy provided for in Article 13 of Law No 256 / 2000 Coll. by the Constitutional Tribunal, while stressing that the relevant provision was declared unconstitutional by a group of Members in the statement of reasons of the proposal, but did not propose it to be annulled (because of the size of the group of Members it could not have done so successfully).

In the current proceedings, the Constitutional Court will evaluate legislation similar to that already dealt with. The argument of today's group of Members is similar. However, it does not call for the repeal of the entire government implementing regulation, but only its selected provisions. Moreover, the repeal of the provisions of the State Agricultural Intervention Fund Act is proposed. The Constitutional Court should therefore base its decision on its earlier assessment, unless it finds substantial differences or changes its legal opinion. The assessment of the case will therefore follow the reasoning for finding No 410 / 2001 Coll.

The purpose of applying production quotas is to limit non-monopolised production to the volume observed. It is driven by efforts to stabilise prices on the markets without promoting price regulation and imposing a contractual line on customers. Market stabilization does not occur through market forces if they are crippled by massive state subsidies and protectionism. The adjustment is based on a national (national) production quota, which according to a certain key is distributed among the current producers. They shall then be prohibited from producing (collection, processing) production in excess of or discouraged from the quota by the penalty levy. New quotas are not granted at all or very little, and the old ones can be shortened. The use of quotas in a modern democratic state with a market economy is rare. In Western Europe, they are applied to agriculture and part of the food industry, which affects customs protectionism and large-scale subsidisation, brought about both by the political recognition of the general interest in its prosperity and by the involvement of farmers and farms as strong interest groups. Within the framework of the common agricultural policy of the European Community (European Union), only dairy products and sugar are currently used. Similar objectives and effects to the production quota are prohibited from cultivation or the expansion of cultivation cultures such as wine.

The key issue of the case in question, as well as the case decided by the decision of No. 410 / 2001 Coll., is the constitutional acceptability of limiting the quantities of agricultural production promoted by the sanction levy for overproduction. Their assessment, in the light of fundamental (constitutional) legal principles and fundamental human rights, necessarily slides towards a separate search for answers to individual questions, as indicated by the current proposal of the group of Members and the quoted finding.

In its case-law, the Constitutional Court refuses to break down the fundamental principles of the rule of law, such as equality (Article 1 of the Charter) and the proportionality of legislation (Article 4 of the Charter) from individual human rights and freedoms, such as the fundamental right to property (Article 11 of the Charter) and the freedom of business (Article 26 of the Charter). A breach of the fundamental principles was found to justify its intervention only if they were not respected in regulating the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms.

Although the fundamental rights in question are both classified by the Charter and perceived as rights of different categories (the first as basic as economic and social), they are nevertheless closely related. Entrepreneurship freedom is even known as freedom derived from the right of ownership. This view can only be partially rejected. Entrepreneurship and other economic activity are certainly, in particular, activities aimed at creating the assets needed to ensure living needs. Their daily result is property (in the modern economy money), which protects the fundamental right of ownership at both constitutional and international European levels. Moreover, ownership of assets (capital) is a prerequisite for starting and continuing business. In addition, however, business is a way of personal and group self-realization. Even the right of ownership, if it is not to be adopted in a self-purposeful way, provides for the use of other fundamental and other rights.

The assessment of the system of sugar production quotas as an adjustment affecting the freedom of business may be based on the assessment of the finding No 410 / 2001 Coll. Article 26 (1) Each Charter shall have the right to free choice of profession and to prepare for it, as well as the right to undertake and pursue other economic activities. Under paragraph 2, the law may lay down conditions and restrictions for the pursuit of certain professions or activities. The Constitutional Court further emphasised that neither constitutional order nor international treaties on human rights and fundamental freedoms prohibit legislators from limiting the quantity of production, distribution or consumption of goods. Therefore, the legislator may, within the limits of the constitutionally guaranteed basic principles, human rights and freedoms, as it considers, introduce price or quantitative regulation of production in a particular sector of the economy, define or affect the type and number of operators involved in it, or restrict contractual freedom in the application of production on the market or in the purchase of raw materials and production facilities. The argument of a group of Members that restrictions can only be qualification and similar assumptions has been described as a disproportionately narrow interpretation of this provision. From Article 41 (1) Moreover, the Charter is clear that economic, social and cultural rights, including freedom of enterprise, can only be invoked within the limits of the law. The Constitutional Court did not find the free market free of all regulation as a value of constitutional importance. He pointed out the limits of freedom of business in the European Union, where the market economy is directly declared a constitutional principle in the Treaty of Establishment. He rejected the view that any restriction on the freedom of enterprise can only be implemented by law. For practical reasons, the Constitution allows the adoption of substatutory rules when the rules laid down by them move within the limits of the laws. The Constitutional Court recalled that production quotas are applied in agriculture of the democratic states of Western Europe, in the countries of the European Union according to a common model, and were not found incompatible with the global or European international or, where appropriate, national systems with a national constitutional standard of human rights.

As a fundamental right, the international human rights pact is silent about freedom of business. Nor does the European postwar standard of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Additional Protocols. Its inference from the guarantee of property law and personal freedom is a disproportionately broad interpretation which does not find any support in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. Indeed, it has never dealt with similar sectoral rules on economic activities. Only the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union knows the freedom of business (economic activity), but it envisages its limitations in European and national law. Moreover, the Charter has not acquired the character of an international treaty, it is merely a political declaration. To define the concept of the Czech guarantee of freedom of enterprise under Article 26 The Charter is therefore called only by the Constitutional Court.

At the same time, the current foreign patterns rather confirm that the Constitutional Court advocates a limited concept of freedom of enterprise as a right that the legislator may limit relatively widely.

In Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court does not reject professional freedom certificates (Article 12 of the Basic Law) in relation to the way in which the occupation is exercised, but recognises the wide scope for the legislature's regulation. A more rigorous position, in the light of which the Czech legislative practice would not often stand up, takes on only many restrictions and demands relating to access to the field. However, the Federal Constitutional Court did not address the regulation of agricultural or other production through production quotas or similar measures, as they were governed by the priority and directly effective European Community law.

The concept of constitutionally expressed freedom of enterprise, which could be supported by a group of Members, could be sought in the case law of the US Supreme Court by the 1930s. His concept of contractual freedom and right of ownership did not allow essentially any economic policy measures. Since the Great Depression, however, the Supreme Court has stopped intervening against non-discriminatory political interference in individual economic sectors.

In Found No. 410 / 2001 Coll. The Constitutional Court has already noted, on the other hand, that the penalty levy under Section 13 of the State Agricultural Intervention Fund Act of 115% of the minimum or regulated price is a necessary part of the production quota systems. It constitutes a reasonable penalty for the production of an individual quota. In addition, the potential for a significantly less effective overproduction penalty is only a denial of public aid.

On the objection of a group of Members that sugar production above the production quota is not prohibited, it can be noted that the legislation does not expressly prohibit and, nevertheless, disadvantage many activities and thus discourage them. Charging of the operation of slot machines or excise duties may be recalled. The disadvantage of a particular activity is a common legal instrument, especially when a direct prohibition imposed by administrative or criminal sanctions (fines, occupational prohibition or withdrawal of liberty) would be excessive. The Constitutional Court stated in its cited finding that, if there is a possible ban on overproduction, this means, of course, opening up the scope for its disadvantage. Finally, it can be said that the standard wording of the provisions on the facts of criminal offences ("Who... will be punished...") does not literally prohibit criminal offences. However, there is no doubt about their prohibition. A reference to the non-constitutionality of the sanction levy without an explicit ban on conduct from which the penalty levy is discouraged can therefore be rejected.

In Found No. 410 / 2001 Coll. The Constitutional Court recalled both the European and national concepts of the fundamental right of ownership. He rejected the view that the restriction on production constituted an expropriation which was not justified by the public interest without compensation. It stated that the appellant was not withdrawn from milk produced in excess of the production quota. Of course, the penalty levy supporting the production quota system makes it difficult or even impossible to sell overproduction. It pointed out, however, that entitlement to a price on the market is not a fundamental right. He recalled that the system of production quotas represents a form of control of the use of property which is introduced for the public interest. The Constitutional Court stressed that the restrictive measures used were to be proportionate to the objectives pursued. He accepted that there was a public interest in stabilising the milk market, and found the instruments used to be adequate. It recalled that other business measures or other economic activities also have a major impact on its (its) profitability. It rejected the view that the system of production quotas makes it completely impossible to enter the sector, with reference to the possibility of buying or allocating them from the reserve. The Constitutional Court did not feel called upon to assess whether the production quota system was an optimal and economically advantageous solution. He recalled that the production quota system is designed to prevent overproduction, which is caused by extensive state subsidies to agriculture. The Constitutional Court stressed that the application of a system of production quotas (reduction of production volumes) followed the public interest in discouraging investment in the overproduction sector. In its argument, the Constitutional Court recalled that even the European Court of Justice (EC institution) did not find a ban on the planting of vineyards - a breach of the European standard of ownership pursuant to Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

The argument used in the finding No 410 / 2001 Coll. generally also applies to the assessment of the system of sugar production quotas under the Decree of the Government No. 114 / 2001 Coll. The group of Members does not, unlike the previous proposal, emphasise the withdrawal of ownership of sugar produced above the limit. In order to reject the argument on the withdrawal of ownership of the milk produced by the Constitutional Court in its cited finding, it can only be added that, in sectors whose production volume is regulated by production quota systems, production exceeding the limits appears to be at a minimum, since disposal is essentially impossible by imposing a penalty levy.

The current objection of a group of Members is merely a reference to discrimination between those owners of a sugar establishment who receive and can produce a production quota without any de facto restrictions and those who do not have it and their production is prohibited as a result of the application of the penalty levy. The issue of ownership inequality should therefore be addressed in the context of the question of general equality in the application of the sugar production quota system.

It is therefore possible to refer to the case-law of the European Court of Justice, on the one hand and in the form of further development of the arguments of the Constitutional Court in Case 410 / 2001 Coll. on the other. In its judgment in the Metallurgiki Halyps action against the Commission (258 / 81), he stressed that the Community restrictions on the production of steel in the public interest, even if they could jeopardise the company's profitability, do not constitute a breach of the right of ownership. It can also be stressed that the European Court of Human Rights has never evaluated the general legal measures of the Member States of the Council of Europe, which regulated the volume of economic production in view of their compatibility with the European standard of the fundamental right of ownership.

Restricted application of production quota systems, particularly in agriculture, is common in the European Union and in some other developed countries with a social market economy. The current case law of the Constitutional and Supreme Courts of the Member States of the European Union and of other democratic legal States does not imply that restrictions on production for reasons of stabilising prices on the market to a certain level, if imposed fairly on all existing producers, would be considered incompatible with the national standard of ownership. This statement does not, of course, exclude their political criticism, which is strong. The use of this form of farm management is rare. However, there is no reason for the Constitutional Court to interpret Article 11 of the Charter differently. It cannot be overlooked that one of the main reasons for the introduction of a system of production quotas for certain agricultural and food products was to create a framework that applies in the European Union. Radical intervention by the Constitutional Court against systems of production quotas would represent a step towards such a concept of nationally guaranteed fundamental rights that would not last after the upcoming accession of the Czech Republic to the European Union.

It should be stressed that the system of sugar (milk) production quotas or the overproduction penalty levy that it is advocated should not be compared to price regulation for the benefit of customers, when it is linked to a contractual direct or forced maintenance of existing contractual relations. The Constitutional Court declared the finding No 231 / 2000 Coll. (sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 3 / 2000 out of 21.6.2000, published in the Collection of Decisions, Volume 18, Found No 93) incompatible with the fundamental right to own the house rental regulation under Decree No. 176 / 1993 Coll., on rent from the apartment and payment for the performance provided with the use of the apartment, as amended, with reference to the fact that the owners of the apartments do not now have paid rent or maintenance and thus degrade their ownership. In the case of agricultural production quotas, no one is forced to produce in such a way that the levy is payable. On the contrary, the purpose of the levy is to discourage producers from socially undesirable overproduction. The penalty payment can therefore be compared to taxes and charges which are intended to increase the price of certain goods or services and reduce their consumption (excise duties on alcoholic beverages, cigarettes or petroleum fuels or fees for the operation of slot machines). The application of constitutional and international guarantees of ownership in these cases, where part of the equipment used after the introduction or increase of those taxes cannot be used as it is up to now and loses the price, as demand will drop after the price increase, would certainly be considered unjustified. The assessment of agricultural regulation cannot be the opposite, although social, and the development of a legal assessment of agricultural overproduction is not so severe.

It should be recalled that the decline in the usability of production facilities - and thus their prices - is not significant if the production restrictions introduced do not force the existing producer to reduce its current production. This is also generally the case for the sugar production quotas under consideration.

The Constitutional Court in Case 410 / 2001 Coll. rejected the view that non-constitutional discrimination constitutes a different legal position for those producers who receive the quota and those who do not request it. Differentiation is an option. The requirement for a quota application is an administrative registration of producers.

The Constitutional Court also did not substantiate the claim of unconstitutional inequality between current and new producers. He recalled that the disadvantage of new entrepreneurs (who have to buy quotas from current producers or hope for their uncertain allocation from the reserve, while competing with current producers) is an integral part of any reduction in production quantities. The aim of the handicap in the sector is to prevent unwanted expansion of production capacity.

However, discrimination between producers who apply for the quota and who receive it in full and producers to whom it will be denied or granted only in part cannot be excluded. Paragraph 12 (6) of the Law on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund requires that the method of the initial distribution of production quotas between applicants be governed by the principle of equality and objective calculation. This general instruction, which is not merely a reflection of the principle of equality referred to in Article 1 of the Charter and Article 1 of the Constitution, shall be taken into account by the Government in determining the method of the initial allocation of quotas within each system of production quotas, taking into account the characteristics and specificities of the production of commodities subject to restrictions. The Constitutional Court can therefore assess the key used in the original quota distribution.

The Constitutional Court, in the decision No 410 / 2001 Coll. of the one-year reference period, together with the general provisions laid down in the partial adaptations, recognised it as appropriate. It admitted that even a detailed key, which remembers the regular causes of fluctuations in production volume, cannot take account of all circumstances. There may therefore also be injustice in individual cases, but it is not constitutional. In doing so, in view of the possible abuse, he has held himself back to mitigating hardness on an administrative basis.

For sugar production, the government envisages the determination of an individual production quota on the basis of the production volume of three in terms of the number of the most successful production seasons of the last five (§ 7 (1) of the Government Regulation No. 114 / 2001 Coll.) and, if no more than three seasons have been produced, according to the seasons when it was produced. In this context, the fact raised by the group of Members cannot be ignored. The status of individual sugar producers was influenced by the legislation of Government Decree No. 51 / 2000 Coll. before its annulment by the Constitutional Court. It was abolished because of a lack of legal support. In addition, however, it can be concluded that the expected distinction between the sugar factories to strategic and non-strategic including the first exhaustive list directly in the text, the operators of which enjoy the immediate granting of a production quota directly, can reasonably be considered to be a suspect qualification (respect qualification according to the US Supreme Court methodology). It constitutes an arbitrary and hardly justifiable distinction between individual sugar producers. At this point, however, it must be denied that a group of Members is also introducing such a distinction.

The method of calculating individual production quotas only mitigates the adverse effects, both for formal reasons of non-constitutional and factually discriminatory under previous legislation, by not deducting a decisive average annual quota from the production volume of all five seasons, which is the subject of a request in accordance with § 5 (3) of the Government Regulation No. 114 / 2001 Coll., but the fact that certain sugar factories have not been in operation for all seasons and takes into account the three seasons when they were produced most or those seasons when they were produced when they were produced after three or less seasons.

However, it is clear that inequality is not eliminated. It is already triggered by the fact that, on the basis of the measures, some producers were already able to increase production for formal reasons of non-constitutional and de facto discrimination, since they were protected from competition which did not have a production quota and could not therefore produce the penalty levy without the burden. The government is now formally correct for the future to maintain an undesirable situation that has triggered its former formal and materially unconstitutional adjustment.

Nor can we forget the fact that a group of Members points out the factually rejected argument about discrimination between existing and new producers. The regulation of sugar production carried out by Decree No 114 / 2001 Coll. does not in any way recall cases where one sugar factory (plant) operated in the past by a different entity than today. The production of the plant taken over during the relevant period shall not be taken into account. The sale of undertakings and plants and the merger of companies cannot be excluded.

The key chosen for the allocation of individual production quotas is thus contrary to the legal requirement of an objective method of calculation (Article 12 (6) of the Act on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund) and, in particular, to the constitutional requirement of equality under Article 1 of the Charter, which, at the same time, establishes a constitutionally incompatible incompatible irregular content of ownership of production facilities under Article 11 (1) of the Charter and an unjustifiable distinction between individual undertakings enjoying the same (thus equally regulated) freedom of business under Article 26 of the Charter.

However, under unconstitutional conditions, it is hardly possible to have the obligation of applicants to communicate their sugar production in the production quota application 1996 / 97 to 2000 / 01 in accordance with § 5 (3) of Decree-Law No 114 / 2001 Coll.

In Found No. 410 / 2001 Coll. The Constitutional Court found that the introduction of milk production quotas was justified as it followed the public interest. This is the guarantee of a minimum price in an environment where state subsidies contribute to increasing production which would not be caused by demand. State interference in agriculture is motivated by its social, economic and ecological specialities. The Constitutional Court recognised that the systems of production quotas for agricultural products existed in the European Union and refused that the national human rights standard required a clean market economy, free from State interference. In doing so, he expressed his restraint in calling for strict control in terms of its necessity and the actual need for legislation by which the State interferes with the economy. He stressed that the choice of economic policy was the responsibility of the Parliament of the Czech Republic as a political body that bears political responsibility to voters for recognising problems in the economy and for selecting tools to deal with them.

Similarly, Wickard v Filburn [317 U. S 111 (1942)], the United States Supreme Court, expressed its preference for political authorities in establishing systems of production quotas for wheat cultivation. His decision is an example of the restraint of judicial restraint.

The Constitutional Court, which is essentially applicable to the assessment of sugar production quotas, has applied to the approach it takes, for example: The US Supreme Court since the 1930's, when it ended with the practice of marking economic and social regulations as incompatible with the absolute freedom of contract and the right to property, has recognised that general shaping of economic policy, including restrictions on business, is primarily a matter for political authorities. In assessing the legislation, a rational basis test, i.e. a continuous verification of whether the measure in place can lead to the objective pursued, is sufficient. The system of production quotas monitors restrictions on production which are undermined by state subsidy policy. This is also the case if it is only necessary to prepare for accession to the European Union where such conditions exist.

The approach to a strict assessment of the production quota system would force the Constitutional Court to assess the necessity and usefulness of the state's policy of subsidisation and the prerogative of agriculture. In such a case, the Constitutional Court would have to resort to some economic-political doctrine, here, on liberalism. But such a move does not correspond to the relative political neutrality of the Charter and the Constitution.

Consideration on the justification and proportionality of the application of the sugar production quota system cannot be made without comparison with the model applied in the European Union, in particular with regard to the preparation of the Czech Republic for accession. The limitation of sugar production has a long tradition in the European Community. It was first introduced in the 1960s in response to overproduction. Thus, even in agriculture, an exceptionally strict joint measure was used by the European Community to respond to the overproduction caused by the common agricultural policy and the intervention by Member States involving subsidies, subsidies and intervention in the markets, the intensification and concentration of the sugar industry, which led to the abolition of sugar factories. The basis of the adjustment is the EC Single Market Order Regulation adopted for several years. This is followed by the European Commission implementing regulation. For the 2001 / 2002 to 2005 / 2006 seasons, the basic Regulation is Council Regulation No 1260 / 2001 on the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector. It has been adopted in the context of a partial reform of the common agricultural policy. Its aim is to reduce its fiscal intensity and reduce overproduction. It includes a reduction in sugar production quotas.

The Regulation determines national quotas for each Member State. The sugar produced is divided into groups for production quotas. Sugar A and B sugar are allowed to be produced, although they are also burdened by drains. For A sugar, 2% of the intervention price is negligible. The production of B sugar is subject to a more significant levy, which can certainly affect production, of 30 - 37,5% of the intervention price. Its production does not enjoy as much support and protection as the production of A sugar, but rather the fate of overproduction does not follow. It's called C sugar. This may be produced but may not be placed on the EC market. The only legal use of C sugar is therefore its export. Any non-export shall be affected by a levy. Its level and method of determination shall be adjusted permanently by Commission Implementing Regulation No 2670 / 81 so that the C sugar, the production of which is supported but the lack of proof of export to third States, is subject to a levy corresponding to the highest customs duty imposed on imports from third States. This customs burden is high, as the single EC external trade policy remains protective despite WTO liberalisation actions (World Trade Organisation) in conjunction with the common agricultural policy. As is generally not paid for the import of sugar into the Community, neither is the overproduction of sugar. Moreover, the different approach to A, B and C sugar is reflected in the opposite subsidy and intervention policy. The production, processing, storage, disposal and export of C sugar does not enjoy any intervention to maintain the desired high intervention price or to provide sufficient income for farmers and processors.

In the Czech Republic, a uniform model is used to sanction overproduction of 115% of the minimum price (which is comparable to the intervention price). The model for determining the overproduction levy was the adjustment of milk production quotas in the Community under Council Regulation No 3950 / 92. As a result, the charging of over-production of sugar in the EC is comparable to the measures currently applied in the Czech Republic, although the way in which overproduction is punished is not the same. For example, unlike Poland today, the Czech Republic does not promote a comparable system of production quotas, but the EC's intention to limit sugar production for protectionist reasons is monitored and the results are comparable. Sugar production above the quotas laid down shall not be paid and shall therefore be abandoned.

If the Czech Republic joins the European Union in the coming years, then, if there is no fundamental reform of the common agricultural policy in the sugar sector, the Community standard with comparable effects will apply gradually (due to a number of expected transitional periods) to it. Negotiations on access are being completed in these months. One of the most difficult chapters of the negotiations is No 7 "Agriculture." Until now, none of the candidate countries has concluded a preliminary agreement on the way and schedule for their agriculture to be involved in the common agricultural market and the establishment of the common agricultural policy. The main dispute is about the volume of direct subsidies from farmers in candidate countries. However, for agricultural commodities whose production is limited by production quotas, there is also no agreement. The candidate states want their agriculture to be allowed to produce more without sanctions than the European Community today and the current Member States want to allow.

In the case of sugar production in the Czech Republic, the difference is not a multiple but is not even negligible. The Czech Republic demands 505 thousand tonnes of national sugar production quota, which corresponds to today's global production quota and reserve under Government Decree No. 114 / 2001 Coll. The European Community offers 441 000 tonnes for A sugar and 4 000 tonnes for B sugar. Agriculture is undoubtedly politically extremely sensitive both in Western and Eastern Europe. Sugar production in the Czech Republic and elsewhere shows significant seasonal variations (in thousands of tonnes 1996 / 7 610, 1997 / 8 532, 1998 / 9 470, 1999 / 2000 395, 2000 / 1 434 and 2001 / 2 491). In the last two seasons production has already been dampened by production systems. A sugar surplus is produced in the Czech Republic. The volume of exported sugar consistently exceeds that of imported sugar (including sugar in food and beverages). Imports of sugar into the Czech Republic are limited by import duties and quotas, while exports are encouraged.

The system of sugar production quotas introduced today in the Czech Republic despite its particularities is not inconsistent with the EC system. The pressure to reduce the production of sugar in the Czech Republic persists, which gives reason to introduce and apply Czech sugar production quotas.

It should therefore be rejected that any system of sugar production quotas backed by the State Agricultural Intervention Fund law and provided for by the penalty levy provided for in Article 13 of the Treaty constitutes an unusual arrangement for international and European comparisons.

Moreover, on the basis of the provisions common to all systems of production quotas in Czech agriculture, a system of production quotas for milk is established, where the penalty levy is determined and imposed in the same way as in the European Community. Therefore, there is no reason to repeal Article 13 of the Act.

The Constitutional Court in its finding No 410 / 2001 Coll. did not allow another substatutory delegation, according to which according to the classification of the regulation under consideration, the publication of the amount of the reserve for the following years in the Ministry of Agriculture Bulletin is determined by the Ministry (Minister). The current situation is similar. Paragraph 4 (3) of Decree 114 / 2001 Coll. calls for the allocation of the Fund to be determined. The view of the Constitutional Court cannot be reversed. The amount of the allocation reserve is a requirement of a system of production quotas pursuant to § 12 (3) and (4) of the Act on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund, which is to be created by the Government by its regulation.

The claims made by some parties concerning the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance to determine the minimum price of sugar under Act No. 526 / 1990 Coll., as amended, are incorrect. It ignores the explicit provision of Section 12 (4) of the Act on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund. This standard of competence is clearly lex specialis for general price regulations. It is for the government to be able to do so in order to determine the minimum price. A reference to the inappropriateness of such a method of pricing applied by the Regulation for several years is irrelevant. Efforts to transfer competence to another body which uses a legally problematic form of price notice are merely a result of unwillingness to respect the recommendations of Section 12 (5) of the State Agricultural Intervention Fund Act, so that the Regulation on systems of production quotas is adopted "normally 'for a period of one year.

The assessment of the Fund's competence is not clear in the light of the State Agricultural Intervention Fund Act. While it does not call on the Fund to distribute quotas, it provides that the system of production quotas uses [Paragraph 1 (2) (d)], thereby implementing measures and introducing market arrangements to stabilise the agricultural and food products market (Section 1 (2)). At the very least, the allocation of production quotas results from the context of the law and the general provisions on the activities of the Fund. Paragraph 7 of Decree No 114 / 2001 Coll., which, on the basis of the objection of incompetence, is proposed for annulment, appears to be unconstitutional mainly because of the preservation of unjustifiable distinction between producers.

The group of Members questions the model where the government can introduce production quota systems by regulation to the extent that their use in the European Union is significantly greater. It can be confirmed that the Act on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund does not specify closer agricultural and food products whose production may be restricted by systems of production quotas. The extent of the scope for applying serious restrictions such as production quotas is at the very limit of acceptability in terms of constitutional principles of power sharing. Only a legally indistinct restriction constitutes a reference to the obligations arising from negotiations on accession to the European Union under Section 12 (3) of the State Agricultural Intervention Fund Act. There is also evidence of an excessive tendency to adapt by substatutory regulations to compare with foreign ones. For example, Poland, which is also seeking entry into the European Union, is introducing systems of agricultural production quotas and is doing so under a special law (Ustawa on the regulation of the 2001 sugar sector). However, a group of Members does not propose the repeal of the relevant provisions of the Law on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund on the substantive application of the law (scope of the economic sector regulated).

Unlike Government Decree No. 445 / 2000 Coll., which specifies the qualitative characteristics of cow's milk, Decree No. 114 / 2001 Coll. refers to another legislation in the footnote. It is not possible to share the opinion of a group of Members on the absence of the definition of sugar, since this legislation determines in a constitutionally acceptable way (Decree of the Ministry of Agriculture No. 334 / 1997 Coll., issued on the basis and within the limits of Act No. 110 / 1997 Coll.) the qualitative characteristics of sugar, of course produced in volumes determined by production quotas.

It is not possible to share the view that Section 5 (5) of the State Agricultural Intervention Fund Act excludes the application of the administrative rules for decisions of the Fund on quotas by limiting its application only to decisions on aid applications under Section 1 (2). The Group of Members omits the systematic inclusion of that provision, which applies only to the granting of aid. The exclusion of the administrative order does not in itself open the scope for administrative discretion and the impossibility of judicial review derived therefrom. The Constitutional Court has previously stated that, in cases of interpretation ambiguity, the administrative and judicial authorities are to choose an interpretation which ensures greater respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, where the right to good administrative procedure and fair trial also belongs.

As has already been said, the Government, when drafting Decree 114 / 2001 Coll. passed the legal recommendation to issue regulations for one year. However, it is not important whether the system of production quotas can be introduced by government regulations repeatedly or not without the legislator's intervention.

The Group of Members does not ask the Constitutional Court to abolish those provisions of the Act on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund or Government Regulation 114 / 2001 Coll., which, according to it, constitute an unacceptable form of definition of sugar, exclusion of judicial review or lack of time limits on the application of production quota systems. Even if the Constitutional Court accepted these objections, it could not decide to this extent.

For the reasons set out above, the plenary of the Constitutional Court decided pursuant to § 70 (1) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll., to repeal § 4 (3), § 5 (3), § 7 and § 13 of the Government Regulation No. 114 / 2001 Coll., § 4 (3) of the Act on the Conflict with Article 78 of the Constitution, § 7 for the Conflict with Article 1 of the Charter, Article 11 (1) of the Charter and Article 26 (1) and (2) of the Charter, and also Article 12 (6 of the Act on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund and § 13 for the Conflict with Article 79 (3 of the Constitution, and also with Article 12 (4) of the Law on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund.

Paragraph 5 (3) of Decree 114 / 2001 Coll. does not in itself have to be contrary to the constitutional law or the law, but the Constitutional Court also annulled them because they are closely related to the other provisions. This fate could meet a number of other provisions of Government Decree No. 114 / 2001 Coll., but their abolition has not been proposed and the Constitutional Court is bound by a proposal when making its decision.

The application for annulment of Section 13 of the Act on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund was rejected for the reasons set out in the grounds for the finding pursuant to Section 70 (2) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll.

To the second part of the statement rejecting the application for annulment of Article 13 of Act No. 256 / 2000 Coll., on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund and on the amendment of certain other laws (Act on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund), they took a different view of the judges JUDr. Vladimir Cermák, JUDr. Pavel Holländer, JUDr. Vladimir Jurka, JUDr. Eliška Wagner and JUDr. Eva Zarebová.