Communication from the Constitutional Court No 436 / 2016 Coll.
Communication from the Constitutional Court of 6 December 2016 on the opinion of the plenary of the Constitutional Court, Pl. ÚS- st. 44 / 16 on the interpretation of Article 7 (2) of Act No. 261 / 2001 Coll., on the provision of a one-off sum of money to participants in the national struggle for liberation, political prisoners and persons for racial or religious reasons concentrated in military labour camps and amending Act No. 39 / 2000 Coll., on the provision of a one-off sum of money to members of Czechoslovak foreign armies and allied armies between 1939 and 1945
Valid
Communication from the Constitutional Court
Text versions:
23.12.2016
436
COMMUNICATION
The Constitutional Court
The Plenum of the Constitutional Court was adopted on 6 December 2016 under sp. zn.
the following opinion:
Paragraph 7 (2) of Act No 261 / 2001 Coll., on the provision of a single amount of money to participants in the national struggle for liberation, political prisoners and persons for racial or religious reasons concentrated in military labour camps and amending Act No. 39 / 2000 Coll., on the provision of a single amount of money to members of Czechoslovak foreign armies and Allied armies between 1939 and 1945, according to which: "In the event of a decision on the right to payment of a single amount of money by a legal authority, the right to legal protection under Article 36 (1) and Article 36 (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Equality and the requirement of equality between the parties of beneficiaries of the right of payment of a lump sum of funds has to be transferred in connection with Article 11 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights."
Reasons
The facts of the case and the content of the contested decisions
1. The Constitutional Court has received a constitutional complaint pursuant to Article 87 (1) (d) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as "the Constitution"), by which the complainants seek the annulment of the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 6 November 2013 No 3 Ads 115 / 2012-29. The complainants claim that the judgment under appeal infringed their right to a fair trial under Article 36 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms ("the Charter ') and the principle set out in Article 1 (1) of the Constitution.
2. From the constitutional complaint and the requested judicial file held by the Regional Court in Ostrava (hereinafter referred to as the "Regional Court ') under sp. zn. 38 Ad 1 / 2010, it is submitted that L. J., whose descendants and legal successors are complainants, claimed on 7 November 2002 a one-off amount of money under Act No. 261 / 2001 Coll., on the provision of a one-off amount of money to participants in the national struggle for liberation, political prisoners and persons for racial or religious reasons concentrated in military labour camps and on the amendment of Act No. 39 / 2000 Coll., on the provision of a one-off amount to members of Czechoslovak foreign armies and allied armies between 1939 and 1945, as amended by Act No. 458 / 2011 Coll. (" Act No 261 / 2001 Coll.'). Paragraph 1 (3) of this Act, inserted into the parliamentary draft law (Press No. 859 / 2001, Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, III. Election) in the course of its deliberations, provides that "the participants in the national struggle are also considered to be liberated under this Act by the citizens of the Czech Republic, who, from 15 March 1939 to 8 May 1945, were, for racial or religious reasons, concentrated in military labour camps in the territory of Czechoslovakia on its borders of 29 September 1938 or for the same reasons, in total three months and, if they no longer received a one-off sum under Law No 217 / 1994 Coll., on the provision of a one-off sum of Nazi persection '.
3. L. Ž. stated in the proposal that he was persecuted for racial reasons, hiding in the forest and was later placed in several military labor camps. The Czech Social Security Administration, as the competent administrative authority, decided on the entitlement of L. Ž. four times and rejected the application. The decision of the Czech Social Security Administration has been annulled three times for procedural reasons by the Regional Court in Ostrava. Even against the last decision of the Czech Social Security Administration, L. Ž. brought an administrative action, but he died during the proceedings before the Regional Court. Following the order of the Regional Court of 12 August 2011 No 38 Ad 1 / 2010-58, the complainants entered the proceedings as its successor in title.
4. On 24 September 2012, the Regional Court dismissed the action by judgment No 38 Ad 1 / 2010-84. The complainants lodged a complaint against the judgment. By the judgment under appeal, the Supreme Administrative Court annulled the judgment of the Regional Court and dismissed the action for lack of conditions of procedure because, in its view, the conditions of procedural succession under § 107 of Act No. 99 / 1963 Coll., the Civil Code, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as the "Civil Code '), in conjunction with the provisions of § 64 of Act No. 150 / 2002 Coll., the Administrative Code. It came to the conclusion that Article 7 (2) of Law No 261 / 2001 Coll. shows that the right to a successor in title is transferred only if it has not been decided on or if a lump sum has not been paid.
Arguments of complainants and observations of participants
5. In a constitutional complaint, the complainants oppose, in particular, the interpretation of Article 7 (2) of Act 261 / 2001 Coll., which is denied the transition of the claimed and yet unrecognised claim from the deceased legal predecessor to them. They argue that the judgment under appeal provides a arbitrary interpretation of the law, which denies, on the one hand, the general principle of law, that the State is to honour its obligations and cannot avoid their execution by unlawful procedure, and that the general obligation of the State to compensate for the apparent injustice which it has expressly provided for in its laws. They also reject the fact that their legal predecessor was interned because of his / her relationship to work, thereby denying the reason for the adoption of the law.
6. According to the complainants, it is not possible to justify an interpretation based on random consequences, according to which periods in which the contested right to a successor is passed on, with periods in which it is not. The contested provision should therefore be interpreted as meaning any decision, including judicial review and constitutional review. If the court faces pluralism of interpretations, it must explain in its reasoning why the interpretation of the law chosen by it is the right one. However, in their view, the Supreme Administrative Court did not provide such a statement of reasons, so it acted wildly when it issued a decision based on a legal opinion which the complainants could not have foreseen until the decision was given. Therefore, the complainants consider the statement of reasons for the judgment under appeal to be unverifiable.
7. The complainants also point out that the entire procedure, from the time the original application was lodged to the last decision, took more than seven years, and the legal period for the decision in question was thus exceeded 85 times. The courts may not proceed to an interpretation of the law which allows the State itself to rely on its own infringement and its consequences, in this case an artificial extension of the administrative procedure which has led to the death of an authorised applicant. According to the complainants, the State denied in the present case a claim of a specific nature without taking into account its nature. The Court of First Instance opted for such a restrictive interpretation of the law that it exceeded the mandinels given to judicial decision-making by the value basis of Czech constitutionality.
8. However, it is important for the Chamber of the Constitutional Court to which the case has been challenged, first of all, that the complainants are aware of the finding of the Constitutional Court of 10 May 2012 sp. zn. III. ÚS 3069 / 10 (N 100 / 65 SbNU 337) and the legal opinion arising from it, but consider that it is a matter of fact different since, in the present case, the Constitutional Court addressed the question of the transfer of entitlement to the recovery proceedings, in the case of the complainants, the question of the transfer of entitlement to compensation itself. If the Constitutional Court considers the question to be already resolved by the cited finding, the complainants propose that the question be referred to the plenary. The complainants also referred to the resolution of the extended Senate of the Supreme Administrative Court of 1 April 2014 No 4 Ads 32 / 2012-50, which drew the conclusions of the complainant; the first party to the proceedings therefore exceeded its own view in the contested decision as incorrect and unconstitutional.
Need to put a question to the plenary
9. The main interpretation of the case at issue in the case at issue under sp. zn. III. ÚS 84 / 14 is that of the Constitutional Court under sp. zn. III. RUS 3069 / 10 engaged. The question was whether the descendants of an applicant whose claim for compensation under Law 261 / 2001 Coll. was rejected by the competent administrative authority (as well as the application for renewal and appeal against the recovery decision) and who subsequently died were actively legitimate in the action against the last administrative decision. The Constitutional Court of § 7 (2) of Act No. 261 / 2001 Coll., which reads: "In the time of the claim applied, if it has not been decided upon, or if a lump sum has not been paid, it shall, in the event of the death of the beneficiary, pass on to its heir."
... "it is clear that the skirt as such is accepted; the right (right) to receive (payment) a lump sum is not a right which would be extinguished by the death of a natural person (applicant) as personally linked to it... There is no reason to doubt that the critical decision 'within the meaning of Article 7 (2) of Law No 261 / 2001 Coll. is to have a decision given in the proceedings in respect of which, in the context of its substantive competence enshrined in Article 6 of that law, an administrative authority - the Czech Social Security Administration - is called in the proceedings under the administrative rules' (cf. § 7 (3) of that law), the purpose of which is to make a decision establishing, amending or repealing the rights or obligations of a named person or declaring, in a particular case, that such a person has rights or obligations' (cf. § 9 of Act No 500 / 2004 Coll., the administrative order, as amended). Similarly, the administrative procedure defines the provisions of Paragraph 67 (1) of the Administrative Regulation and, in accordance with the first sentence of Article 73 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, the final decision is binding on the participants and on all administrative authorities and on other persons in cases provided for by the law to the extent specified therein.
On the other hand, there is no convincing argument that such a decision should be situated until the judicial review stage if it is not for the court (against the administrative authority) to establish, in fact, the rights and obligations of the party to the administrative proceedings or to declare them authoritatively - on the contrary - it is not for the court (against the administrative authority) to establish the rights and obligations of the party to the administrative proceedings; in the present proceedings, it is only entitled (contrary to the procedure under Part Five o. s. s.) to examine the legality of the previous administrative decision. Also, in view of the principle of legal certainty (it is not justified to make a difference whether an administrative action is brought or not), the validity of the view that the word link expressed in Article 7 (2) of Act No 261 / 2001 Coll. (if it has not been decided) cannot be denied that it is appropriate to understand that the right to compensation is passed on to the heir only until a final decision has been taken by the administrative authority on the subject-matter and the decision given by both the administrative authority and the parties to the proceedings is binding. In other words, only if the claimant (father of the complainants) had died during the administrative procedure (until the final decision) would the claim be passed on to the heirs (complainants) who would have entered into his procedural rights and thus become parties to the administrative procedure and, where appropriate, to the subsequent legal proceedings. '
10. Although the finding in point III of the ÚS 3069 / 10 concerned the applicant's heirs' active legitimacy in a situation where the applicant had died before the administrative action was brought, that is to say, against the decision of the administrative authority on the recovery of proceedings, the interpretation of the essential provisions of Article 7 (2) of Law 261 / 2001 Coll. gives virtually no room for other conclusions on the active legitimacy of the heirs following the deceased in the legal proceedings in the present case. It is important to point out that the legal opinion expressed by the Constitutional Court in this finding is strongly based on the complainant's contested decision of the Supreme Administrative Court.
11. On 29 November 2016, the Senate reached a legal opinion which deviates from the legal opinion of the Constitutional Court as set out in the decision of 10 May 2012, sp. zn. III. ÚS 3069 / 10 (N 100 / 65 SbNU 337), and in accordance with Article 23 of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, it therefore turned to the proposal for an opinion. The question to be answered in the light of the said divergence of legal opinions is therefore:
Does the right to compensation under Act No. 261 / 2001 Coll. in the event of the death of the beneficiary after the legal authority of the decision of the administrative authority on that claim and, accordingly, of the participation in the proceedings in the administrative judiciary, to its heir?
Justification for the diverging legal opinion of the referring Chamber
12. Against that interpretation, which, as a result, deprives complainants of access to the court and thereby infringes their right to judicial protection pursuant to Article 36 (1) and (2) of the Charter and the principle of equality between the heirs of the rights of the beneficiaries referred to in Article 11 (1) in fine in conjunction with Article 3 (1) of the Charter, the Board of Appeal shall make that argument known.
A) Original intention of the legislator
13. Paragraph 7 (2) must be seen in connection with the provision of § 7 (4) of Act No 261 / 2001 Coll., under which "an appeal may be brought against the decision of the authority referred to in § 6 before the Supreme Court, in whose territory the general court of the authorised person is situated." This provision reflected a situation in which proceedings before administrative courts were still in force under Part Five of the Civil Code, as amended by 31.12.2002. In the context of the administrative justice system, it was decided, on the one hand, on actions against final decisions of the administrative authorities (Title Two) and, on the other, on appeals against decisions of the administrative authorities in the cases provided for by the (special) law (Title Three, Paragraph 250l (1) of the Civil Code, in the version effective until 31.12.2002). Thus, the scope of Paragraph 7 (4) of Act No 261 / 2001 Coll. clearly also included appeals against wrongful decisions of the administrative authorities.
14. The Supreme Administrative Court, whose opinion the Constitutional Court found in sp. zn. III. The ÚS 3069 / 10 discussed, however, the concept of a "decision 'within the meaning of Article 7 (2) of Law No 261 / 2001 Coll. so that it is a final decision. In principle, there is no reason to object to this interpretation, however, with regard to Article 7 (4) of Act No 261 / 2001 Coll. This interpretation, on the other hand, supports the conclusion that the legislature's original intention was to allow the heirs to have legal proceedings even in a situation where the creditor died after the administrative decision was given power, but not the opposite conclusion which would exclude it. In accordance with that interpretation, it is therefore possible to defend itself not only against the unjust but also against the final decisions of the administrative authority under Article 6 of Act No. 261 / 2001 Coll. before the courts of the bringing of an appeal, or from 1 January 2003, of the action, with the possibility that the persons entitled may have this option (having regard to Article 7 (2) of Act No. 261 / 2001 Coll.) and the heir of the person entitled.
15. In this context, the argument of the finding, sp. zn. III cannot be accepted. ÚS 3069 / 10, according to which a judicial review of such a decision is excluded because the court (compared to the administrative body) has a substantive establishment of rights and obligations or is not an authoritative declaration, since the court is only entitled to assess the legality of the administrative decision. In fact, there is no reflection of the fact that, according to Part Five of the Civil Code, it was also for the administrative court to "only" examine the legality of the administrative authority's decision, and yet the decision under Section 7 (2) of Law 261 / 2001 Coll. is considered to be a final decision, including, according to the legislator's intention, a judicial review of that decision. This original intention of the legislator was not subject to a later revision or amendment, even after the adoption of a completely new regulation of the administrative justice system in Act No. 150 / 2002 Coll., the Administrative Rules.
16. The system set up by the means of judicial control of decisions of administrative bodies was reflected in the transitional provisions of this new law of the administrative justice. According to Article 129 (1) of the Administrative Rules of Procedure, in cases of administrative justice in which a special law entrusted the court with the judgment on appeals against decisions of the administrative authorities pursuant to Part Five, Title Three, of the Civil Code, as effective until 31 December 2002, it was possible to bring proceedings before the Court of Justice (i.e. 1 January 2003) within 30 days of the date of service of the judgment under Part Three, Title Two, of the First Law, such an action having been legally granted suspensive effect. Thus, even after the adoption of the new rules on administrative justice, the legislature, under the conditions laid down, envisaged a judicial review of the wrongful decisions of the administrative authorities, while establishing the suspensive effect of such actions must be understood as a sign of the legislature's intention to maintain the specifics of the previous regime of judicial review of the lawless decisions of the administrative authorities, even after the adoption of new legislation.
17. It can therefore be considered that, from the point of view of the concept of the so-called rational legislator, there was no intention to restrict public administration control by the administrative courts to the compensation section under Law No 261 / 2001 Coll. as in the contested decision the first party to the proceedings or the Constitutional Court found in sp. zn. III. ÚS 3069 / 10. Such an interpretation has clearly been contributed by changes that have occurred in the administrative justice legislation since 1.1.2003 and which the legislator (not only) has not sufficiently taken into account in the section of the legislation in question. It is therefore necessary to reflect these changes in the interpretation of the contested provisions by the courts, note bene, unless it is otherwise possible to achieve a constitutional interpretation of Article 7 (2) of Act No 261 / 2001 Coll.
18. In addition, the argument in the finding in sp. zn. III must be considered irrelevant. The Court of Justice of the European Union ("the Court of Justice of the European Union '), which is based on the principle of legal certainty, which it relies solely on for the benefit of the State, although it is intended to testify in public relations to private bodies, to natural persons. The fundamental right (freedom), including legal certainty, is the content of the relationship between its entity (carrier), which is a person (natural person, derivative, legal person), and the addressee of public authority; except for the horizontal application of fundamental rights, where the addressee of fundamental rights (freedoms) is not a public authority but a private law body [cf. the finding of the Constitutional Court of 6.2.2007 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 38 / 06 (N 23 / 44 SbNU 279, 84 / 2007 Coll.) or the resolution of 25.4.2007 sp. zl. ÚS 48 / 05 - all decisions of the Constitutional Court are available at http: / / nalus.ujud.cz]. The possible revocation of a final decision by an administrative authority shall not constitute an intervention in the principle of legal certainty in relation to an administrative authority which has exercised public authority in a given vertical relationship, but shall only remedy the situation arising from an unlawful administrative act pursuant to Article 36 (2) of the Charter.
19. Emphasis on the principle of legal certainty, perceived by the prism of the finding sp. zn. III. Moreover, the ÚS 3069 / 10 could, as a result, lead to the absolute exclusion of an administrative action, since an administrative action under the current rules can be brought solely against a final administrative decision. However, this would lead to unacceptable denial of the administrative justice en bloc. As the extended Senate of the Supreme Administrative Court stated in its Resolution of 1 April 2014 No 4 Ads 32 / 2012-50 (paragraph 67), which the complainants point out (but concerns another legal issue), the emphasis on the effectiveness of judicial protection before public administration proceedings must also be placed on interpreting the rules on transitions (possible) of public law. "The existence of judicial protection is, in itself, a factor which motivates public administration to act in a prudent and law-wise manner, as if it had not acted, its conduct would be penalised by the administration. Therefore, it is essential that the interpretation of the provisions on the transfer of claims lead to the exclusion of procedural succession automatically ending without a substantive assessment of the lawfulness of the public administration's conduct, if an interpretation which, on the contrary, allows the procedural succession to be accepted, thus allowing administrative assessment of the substance in the proceedings... '.
(B) Principle of equality
20. Providing a lump sum is not a fundamental right or freedom. However, if the State has decided to pay such an amount under the conditions laid down, the same principle of non-discrimination shall apply here as in the case of restitution laws, and entitlement to the beneficiaries shall also arise to verify that the conditions laid down are met in accordance with the ordinary legal procedure. In accordance with the procedure and decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court, that prohibition has been infringed. The conclusions of the finding, sp. zn. III. ÚS 3069 / 10, are contrary to the constitutional principle of equality, since the possibility of judicial review in relation to the decision on entitlement to compensation grants the heirs of a person authorised under Law 261 / 2001 Coll. only where that person died before the legal authority of an administrative decision, whereas the heirs of a person who died after the legal authority of an administrative decision (even in the course of a judicial review) deny active legitimacy in the legal proceedings, in which case he does not transfer the right to payment of a specified lump sum to the heir.
21. The requirement of equality between the heirs of the entitlement of the beneficiary, irrespective of the time of his death, cannot be outweighed by any argument of the nature of the entitlement of the beneficiaries as a claim of a purely personal nature or as a claim (in relation to the heirs) of a lesser moral value. If the legislature's original intention was to allow a judicial review of the legality of the administrative decision and the heirs of the entitlement of the beneficiary (see Section 7 (2) in conjunction with Section 7 (4) of Act No 261 / 2001 Coll.), the very nature of the claim cannot be a reason for a different approach to the heirs of the entitled person who died at a "incorrect 'moment (only after the legal power of the administrative decision). Moreover, the nature of the claim had to be the subject of consideration by the original legislature, with no indications indicating a later change in his intention to allow the beneficiaries of the beneficiary to have a judicial review. Finally, it also relates to the consideration that, contrary to other rehabilitation and restitution arrangements in the early 1990s, the legislator decided to take a humanitarian step ten years later, when he had to expect a number of beneficiaries to be at an advanced age (closer to sub 23 et seq.).
22. Although, in general, there is no fundamental right of the heir to the transfer of a claim, all the more so, if it is a claim of a personal nature or exceptional character, and it is in principle a matter for the legislator to adjust these issues, whether it is a substantive or procedural basis, in the exercise of State authority, the prohibition of arbitrarily and arbitrarily [Article 2 (2) of the Charter, Article 2 (3) of the Constitution, for example, the finding of 8 January 2009 sp. zn. II. ÚS 1009 / 08 (N 6 / 52 CollNU 57)] applies. It is precisely such a defect that must be seen in an interpretation which constructs the state of different treatment of the heirs of the claim, only in view of the randomness of the time of death of the entitled person in the course of the proceedings for such entitlement.
C) The concept of "entitlement" and its transition
23. In view of the fact that the number of beneficiaries (not only under this law but also under other compensation laws) is a specific heading, since they are older persons, the transfer of the right to the heir ensures to a certain extent that the right to be exercised can be fulfilled in a timely manner. In other words, the legislator certainly did not intend to make this "compensation" adjustment a large part of the obsolescence gesture if it would not often be fulfilled because of the death of beneficiaries. Nor is there a rational reason that the right of entitlement or the administrative decision not to admit it should not be subject to judicial review. As has been explained above, the legislator did not intend to make a distinction between the beneficiaries and their heirs in relation to the judicial review.
24. It should be added that, of course, in the proceedings (administrative or judicial), the deceased applicant may have shown that he did not actually qualify for the allowance (did not meet the conditions for his admission). In that case, no substantive claim could be passed on to the heir of such a person, but the right to be parties to the proceedings in the case of an application for compensation, which should result in an assessment of the merits of the claim for compensation, or a review of the legality of that assessment by the administrative authority (see also, mutatis mutandis, the resolution of the enlarged Chamber of the Supreme Administrative Court of 1 April 2014 No 32 / 2012-50).
25. The context of the interpretation of Article 7 (2) of Law No 261 / 2001 Coll. is also aimed at the conclusions which testify in favour of the transfer of the right to the heir, not only the heir of the entitled person who died after the legal power of the decision of the administrative authority (including judicial review), but the heir of the entitled person in general, without a time limit. In relation to Article 7 (1) of the Law, where the procedural term "proposal to initiate proceedings' is used (citation:" Proceedings under this law shall be initiated on the basis of a proposal by an authorised person '), which implies the possibility of a decision of both a positive and a negative nature, the entanglement of the substantive term "claim' in § 7 (2) (citation:" In due time, if it has not been decided upon, or in the absence of payment of a one-off sum of money, it appears to be intended, in the event of the death of the beneficiary, to undermine a positive decision ').
26. The purpose of such an interpretation would be to establish a transfer of entitlement to the heir of the beneficiary without a time limit. The precondition for this transition is that the object of the transition exists, i.e. that it has not ceased to be fulfilled, as envisaged by the provision in question. In this way, the heirs of the entitled person shall cease to be entitled if it has been positively decided upon and if a lump sum has been paid.
27. Otherwise, if there is no positive decision on entitlement, or if there is such a decision, but no payment of the amount of money has yet been made, the claim shall be transferred in the event of death to the heir of the beneficiary without further action. Therefore, the transfer of the claim does not prevent the issue of an administrative decision - even if negative - because that means that the claim claimed has not yet been annulled and that the succession can be called upon to give its recognition by legal remedies.
D) Interpretation of the hypothesis provision § 7 paragraph 2 of Act No. 261 / 2001 Coll.
28. The interpretation of the terms used in the provision in question also corresponds more to the opinion expressed here. Determination of the hypothesis: "if a lump sum has not been paid," the undertaking is, in substance, self-evident. In other words, it makes no sense to regulate such a legal relationship in a situation where a commitment simply cannot switch to anyone because it has ceased to exist.
29. The same argument can be made in the case of a hypothesis: "unless it has been decided on 'where it cannot be built on identifying the absence of a claim and its demise. Since that provision regulates the question of the transfer of entitlement to a successor in title, it implies that the right must be exercised by the beneficiary. At the same time, it can be concluded that, unless it does so (and dies), the claim in question ceases to exist. Although this is self-evident, it must be emphasised that it cannot pass (cease) the claim claimed which does not actually exist (under the law). Because the question of whether a claim is given or not does not depend on a decision (it is not a matter of discretion, a measure against hardness), but is an objective fact which is to be established in the case of an emergency procedure before a social security institution in accordance with the rules laid down in Act No 261 / 2001 Coll.
30. The fact that, under Article 1 (3) of Act No 261 / 2001 Coll. in the case of the citizens of the Czech Republic, the fact that "from 15 March 1939 to 8 May 1945... for racial or religious reasons, they were concentrated in military labour camps in the territory of Czechoslovakia... or for the same reasons they were hiding in the territory for a total period of at least three months'. Legally, it cannot be ruled out that a decision on this can be defective. Therefore, only when the proceedings as a whole with respect for Article 36 (1) and (2) of the Charter are terminated can it be definitively concluded whether the claim existed legally. In other words, it is only at this point that its (not) existence is" objectivising. "However, the finding in respect of which this opinion is defined essentially states that the claim in question ceases to exist by a negative decision (even if it is a defective and not final) of the administrative authority, without the possibility of its subsequent judicial review under the requirements of Article 36 (2) of the Charter.
31. Therefore, from the point of view of the purpose of Act No 261 / 2001 Coll. it cannot be concluded that also possibly a defective (and at the same time negative) decision should have caused the existing claim to cease, namely that the termination of the claim would be linked to not objective facts such as the expiry of time, fulfilment, etc., but to a "subjective" procedure whereby, by issuing a negative but defective decision, the entitled entity would be "deprived" of its right to exercise (because it "ceases").
Conclusion
32. For the reasons set out above, the plenary of the Constitutional Court has therefore concluded that the purpose and purpose of the provisions of Article 7 (2) of Law No 261 / 2001 Coll. corresponds, in terms of the right to judicial protection under Article 36 (1) and (2) of the Charter and the principles of the equality of the heirs of the rights of the beneficiaries under Article 11 (1) in fine in conjunction with Article 3 (1) of the Charter, to an interpretation thereof which allows the right to be transferred to the heir of the beneficiary (applicant) without a time limit. In the present case, it is therefore necessary to give priority to an interpretation which will allow access to the court by the beneficiaries of the person entitled, even in a situation where his death has occurred following the legal authority's decision on entitlement to compensation.
President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr. Rychetský v. r.
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Regulation Information
| Citation | Communication from the Constitutional Court No 436 / 2016 Coll., on the Opinion of the plenary of the Constitutional Court of 6 December 2016 in Pl. ÚS-st. 44 / 16 on the interpretation of Article 7 (2) of Act No. 261 / 2001 Coll., on the granting of a lump sum to participants in the national struggle for liberation, political prisoners and persons from racial or religious reasons concentrated in military labour camps and amending Act No. 39 / 2000 Coll., on the provision of a lump sum to members of Czechoslovak foreign armies and allied armies between 1939 and 1945 |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | Communication from the Constitutional Court |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 23.12.2016 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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