Full text of Act No. 436 / 2005 Coll.

Full text of Act No. 143 / 2001 Coll., on the Protection of Competition and on the amendment of certain laws (Law on the Protection of Competition), as resulting from subsequent amendments

Valid Declared full text
Text versions: 03.11.2005
436
PRESIDENT OF THE GOVERNMENT
Announces
full text of Act No. 143 / 2001 Coll., on the Protection of Competition and on the amendment of certain laws (Law on the Protection of Competition), as follows from amendments made by Act No. 340 / 2004 Coll., Act No. 484 / 2004 Coll., Act No. 127 / 2005 Coll. and Act No. 361 / 2005 Coll.
THE LAW
on the protection of competition
Parliament has decided on this law of the Czech Republic:

ČÁST PRVNÍ

PROTECTION OF COMPETITION

HLAVA I

INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS
§ 1
Preliminary provisions
(1) This Law provides for the protection of competition in the market for goods and services ("goods') against its exclusion, restriction, other distortion or threat (" disturbances').
(a) agreements between competitors (§ 3 (1)),
(b) misuse of the dominant position of competitors; or
(c) the merger of competitors.
(2) This law also provides for the procedure for the application of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (hereinafter referred to as "the Treaty ') by the authorities of the Czech Republic and certain matters relating to their synergies with the Commission of the European Communities (hereinafter referred to as" the Commission') and the authorities of the other Member States of the European Communities in the procedure under Council Regulation (EC) on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (hereinafter referred to as "the Regulation ') and the Council Regulation on the control of mergers (hereinafter referred to as" the Merger').
(3) Competitors who, by virtue of a special law or a decision given under a special law, provide services of general economic significance (1c) shall be subject to that law only if its application does not make it impossible to provide such services.
(4) This law shall apply mutatis mutandis to proceedings concerning competitors whose conduct could affect trade between Member States of the European Communities pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty.
(5) This law also applies to the conduct of competitors abroad which distorts or threatens to distort competition in the Czech Republic.
(6) This law shall not apply to the negotiations referred to in paragraph 1, the effects of which are manifested exclusively on the foreign market, unless the international agreement to which the Czech Republic is bound results otherwise.
(7) Furthermore, this law does not apply to the protection of competition against unfair competitors (2).
(8) Furthermore, this law does not apply to the conduct of competitors in the field of the production and trade of agricultural products when they act in accordance with European Community3a).
(9) This law also does not apply to the conduct of competitors which is a breach of the obligation laid down by the Electronic Communications Act (4a) or a decision given on the basis thereof.
§ 2
Definition of certain terms
(1) Competitors under this law are natural and legal persons, their associations, associations of such associations and other forms of grouping, even if such associations and groups are not legal persons if they participate in or may influence their activities, even if they are not entrepreneurs.
(2) The relevant market is the market for goods which, in terms of their characteristics, price and intended use, are identical, comparable or interchangeable in the territory in which the competitive conditions are sufficiently homogeneous and clearly distinct from neighbouring territories.

HLAVA II

COMPETITION AGREEMENTS
§ 3
(1) Agreements between competitors, decisions of their associations and concerted practices (hereinafter referred to as "agreements") which lead or may lead to distortions of competition are prohibited and invalid (4), unless such or special law provides otherwise, or the Office for the Protection of Competition (hereinafter referred to as "the Office") authorises an exemption from the prohibition by implementing legislation.
(2) In particular, agreements prohibited under paragraph 1 shall be prohibited which lead to or may lead to distortions of competition because they contain provisions on:
(a) direct or indirect determination of prices and, where appropriate, other commercial conditions;
(b) restrictions or controls on production, sales, research and development or investment;
(c) the distribution of the market or sources of purchase;
(d) that the conclusion of a contract is to be linked to the acceptance of further transactions which are not, in substance or according to commercial practices and principles of fair trade with the subject-matter of the contract;
(e) the application of different conditions to individual competitors in the same or comparable transactions which disadvantage certain competitors in competition;
(f) that the parties to the agreement will not trade or otherwise cooperate economically with or otherwise cause harm to non-competitors (group boycott).
(3) If the reason for the prohibition concerns only part of the Agreement, only that part shall be prohibited and invalid. However, where the nature of the agreement, its content, its purpose or the circumstances in which it took place shows that it cannot be separated from the other content, the whole of the agreement shall be prohibited and invalid.
(4) The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to agreements which:
(a) contribute to the improvement of the production or distribution of goods or to the promotion of technical or economic development and provide consumers with a fair share of the benefits resulting therefrom;
(b) not impose on competitors restrictions which are not necessary to achieve the objectives referred to in (a);
(c) do not allow competitors to exclude competition in a substantial part of the market for goods the supply or purchase of which is the subject of an agreement.
§ 4
Block exemptions
(1) The prohibition laid down in Article 3 (1) does not apply to agreements which cannot affect trade between Member States of the European Communities under Article 81 of the Treaty but fulfil the other conditions laid down by block exemptions adopted pursuant to Article 83 (1) of the Treaty for the implementation of Article 81 (3) of the Treaty by the relevant Commission or Council Regulations ("Community block exemptions").
(2) The Authority may also allow block exemptions for other types of agreements where it is demonstrated that the distortion of competition to which the block exemption would result is outweighed by advantages for other market participants, in particular consumers.
(3) By decision of an individual competitor, the Authority shall withdraw the benefit of the exemption provided for in paragraph 1 or 2 if, as a result of market developments, an agreement subject to such an exemption would not fulfil the conditions laid down in Paragraph 3 (4).
§ 5
Horizontal and vertical agreements
(1) Agreements between competitors operating at the same level of the goods market are horizontal agreements.
(2) Agreements between competitors operating at different levels of the goods market are vertical agreements.
(3) Mixed agreements between competitors that operate simultaneously at the same horizontal level and at different vertical levels of the goods market shall also be considered as horizontal agreements; in doubt, it is considered to be a horizontal agreement.
§ 6
(1) The prohibition of agreements under Article 3 (1) does not apply to:
(a) a horizontal agreement where the joint share of the parties to the agreement in the relevant market does not exceed 10%;
(b) a vertical agreement, where none of the parties' shares in the relevant market exceeds 15%;
(c) sales organisations and associations of agricultural producers' agreements on the sale of unprocessed agricultural commodities 3a).
(2) The exemption from the prohibition of agreements referred to in paragraph 1 shall not apply to the following agreements, even if they fulfil the conditions laid down in paragraph 1:
(a) horizontal agreements on direct or indirect pricing, restriction or control of production or sales or on the distribution of markets, sources of purchase or customers;
(b) vertical agreements on direct or indirect pricing to the buyer for resale of goods or on the granting to the buyer for such resale of full protection on a defined market;
(c) individual agreements which form part of a set of agreements concerning the same, comparable or interchangeable goods, provided that:
1. the joint share in the relevant market of participants in agreements forming a set for which at least the same competitor participates exceeds the percentage limits set out in paragraph 1; or
2. a set of vertical or mixed agreements is limited to access to the relevant market to competitors not participating in such agreements constituting the package and competition on that market is significantly distorted by the cumulative effect of parallel networks of similar vertical or mixed agreements concluded for the distribution of the same, comparable or interchangeable goods, provided that the joint share of participants in the horizontal agreement or of one of the participants in the vertical agreement exceeds 5% in the relevant market.
§ 7
(1) If the Office finds, in proceedings relating to cases referred to in paragraphs 3 to 6, that a prohibited agreement has been concluded, it shall state that fact in the decision and, by this decision, prohibit the implementation of the agreement for the future.
(2) In the proceedings referred to in paragraph 1, the Office may require the parties to comply with the measures they have jointly proposed if they are sufficient to protect competition and if they are removed from the situation. If the Office does not find such measures sufficient, it shall inform the competitors in writing and continue the proceedings; otherwise impose such measures and suspend the proceedings.
(3) The measures referred to in paragraph 2 may be proposed in writing by the parties to the proceedings to the Office no later than 15 days after the date on which the Office served them with reservations to the Agreement; the subsequent submission or amendment of the proposed measures shall be taken into account by the Authority only in cases of particular consideration. The parties to proceedings shall be bound by their proposal against the Office and between each other and, where appropriate, against third parties, and shall not, from the submission of the application to the decision of the Office referred to in paragraph 2, comply with the Agreement as originally adopted.
(4) The Authority may not take a decision pursuant to paragraph 2 if the prohibited agreement has already been implemented and has or may have had the effect of significantly distorting competition.
(5) After the termination of the procedure referred to in paragraph 2, the Office may reopen the procedure referred to in paragraph 1 if:
(a) the conditions applicable to the decision referred to in paragraph 2 have changed substantially;
(b) competitors act in contravention of the measures imposed; or
(c) the decision was made on the basis of false or incomplete documents, data and information.
§ 8 a 9
cancelled

HLAVA III

DOMINANT STABILITY AND REDUCTION
§ 10
(1) The dominant position on the market is that of a competitor or together more competitors (joint dominance), which allows their market power to behave to a large extent independently of other competitors or consumers.
(2) Market power referred to in paragraph 1 The Authority shall assess, on the basis of the value expression of the quantities of supplies or purchases on the market of the goods concerned (market share) achieved by a competitor or by a competitor with common dominance in a period which is examined under this law and by other indicators, in particular the economic and financial strength of competitors, legal or other barriers to entry for other competitors, the degree of vertical integration of competitors, the structure of the market and the size of the market shares of the closest competitors.
(3) If the indicators referred to in paragraph 2 do not prove otherwise, the dominant position shall not be deemed to have been taken by a competitor or competitors with a common dominant position who have reached a market share of less than 40% in the period under examination.
§ 11
(1) Abuse of a dominant position on the detriment of other competitors or consumers is prohibited. The abuse of a dominant position is in particular:
(a) direct or indirect enforcement of unfair terms in contracts with other market participants, in particular enforcement of transactions which, at the time of conclusion of the contract, are manifestly disproportionate to the consideration granted;
(b) tying consent to the conclusion of a contract on condition that the other Party also withdraws other transactions which are not related to the subject-matter of the contract in substance or according to commercial practice;
(c) the application of different conditions in identical or comparable transactions to individual market participants which are disadvantaged in competition;
(d) stopping or restricting production, sales or research and development at the expense of consumers;
(e) the long-term offer and sale of goods at excessively low prices which have or may have the effect of distorting competition;
(f) a refusal to grant other competitors access to their own transmission networks or to similar distribution and other infrastructure facilities owned or used by a dominant competitor on other legal grounds where, for legal or other reasons, other competitors cannot, without the co-use of such facilities, operate on the same market as dominant competitors who do not demonstrate that such co-use is not possible for operational or other reasons or cannot be reasonably demanded of them; The same shall apply mutatis mutandis to refusal of access to other competitors for an appropriate remuneration for the use of intellectual property or access to networks owned or used by a dominant competitor on a different legal basis where such use is necessary for participation in competition in the same market as the dominant competitors or in another market.
(2) Paragraph 1 (f) does not apply to the conduct of competitors which is the exercise of communication activity (5a) under the Electronic Communications Act.
(3) Where the Office finds that a dominant position has been misused in the proceedings referred to in paragraph 1, it shall state that fact in the decision and shall prohibit such conduct for the future by this decision.
(4) In the proceedings referred to in paragraph 3, the Office may require the parties to comply with the measures they have jointly proposed if they are sufficient to protect competition and if they are removed from the situation. If the Office does not find such measures sufficient, it shall inform the competitors in writing and continue the proceedings; otherwise impose such measures and suspend the proceedings.
(5) The measures referred to in paragraph 4 may be proposed in writing by the parties to proceedings to the Office no later than 15 days from the date on which the Office served them with reservations concerning their conduct; the subsequent submission or amendment of the proposed measures shall be taken into account by the Authority only in cases of particular consideration. The parties to the proceedings shall be bound by their proposal to the Office and to each other or, where appropriate, to third parties, and shall not, from the submission of the application to the Office's decision pursuant to paragraph 4, proceed in a manner which is the subject of the Office's reservations.
(6) The Authority may not take a decision pursuant to paragraph 4 if the abuse of a dominant position has resulted in a material distortion of competition.
(7) Upon termination of the procedure referred to in paragraph 4, the Office may reopen the procedure and issue a decision pursuant to paragraph 3 if:
(a) the conditions applicable to the decision referred to in paragraph 4 have changed substantially;
(b) competitors act in contravention of the measures imposed; or
(c) the decision was made on the basis of false or incomplete documents, data and information.

HLAVA IV

COMPETITION
§ 12
Definition of terms
(1) The merger between competitors takes place by mergers of two or more of the market of previously independent competitors.
(2) The acquisition of a company (7) by a contract, on the basis of an auction or otherwise, of another competitor or part thereof shall be regarded as a merger of competitors under this law. For the purposes of this Act, a part of an undertaking shall also mean that part of a competitor undertaking which can be clearly attributed to the turnover achieved by the sale of goods on the relevant market, even if it does not constitute a separate organisational component of the undertaking (7a).
(3) A concentration of competitors under this law shall also be considered to be the case if one or more persons who are not entrepreneurs but already control at least one competitor, or if one or more entrepreneurs acquire the opportunity to directly or indirectly control another competitor, in particular:
(a) the acquisition of participating securities, commercial or member interests; or
(b) by contract or other means enabling them to control another competitor.
(4) For the purposes of this Act, a check shall mean the possibility of exercising a decisive influence on the activities of another competitor on the basis of legal or factual facts, in particular on the basis of:
(a) the right of ownership or use of the undertaking of the controlled competitor or part thereof; or
(b) rights or other legal elements which give decisive influence to the composition, voting and decision-making of the authorities of the controlled competitor.
(5) The combination referred to in paragraph 3 shall also include the creation of joint control over a competitor (hereinafter referred to as "jointly controlled undertaking '), who shall perform all functions of a separate economic unit in the long term.
(6) The creation of joint control over a jointly controlled undertaking, the purpose of which is to coordinate the competitive behaviour of persons controlling it, who remain independent competitors on the market, shall be treated as an agreement between competitors in accordance with Title II.
(7) A bank's qualifying participation in a legal entity resulting from the repayment of the share issue rate by offsetting the bank's debt to that legal entity shall not be regarded as a concentration of competitors if that qualifying holding is held for the duration of the rescue or financial reconstruction of that legal entity for a maximum period of 1 year. It is also not considered to be a concentration of competitors where competitors that are providers of investment services acquire temporarily, for a maximum period of 1 year, the shares of another competitor for the purpose of selling them, unless they exercise voting rights associated with those shares in order to identify or influence the competitive behaviour of the controlled competitor. On a proposal from a bank or a competitor that is an investment service provider, the Authority may extend the period of 1 year if the applicant demonstrates that the purpose for which he has acquired participation in another competitor could not be achieved during that period for objective reasons.
(8) The transfer of certain powers of the statutory bodies of competitors to persons carrying out activities under special legislation, such as liquidator8) and the trustee of the bankruptcy substance 9) is also not considered to be a link between competitors.
§ 13
Communication from competitors subject to the Authority's authorisation
The concentration of competitors shall be subject to the authorisation of the Office if:
(a) the total net turnover of all merging competitors achieved in the last financial year in the Czech Republic market is greater than CZK 1.5 billion and at least two of the merging competitors each achieved in the last financial year in the Czech Republic market a net turnover of more than CZK 250 million, or
b) Net turnover achieved during the last financial year on the Czech market
1. in the case of a merger pursuant to Article 12 (1), at least one of the parties to the merger,
2. in the case of a concentration pursuant to Article 12 (2), the acquiree or a substantial part thereof,
3. in the case of a concentration pursuant to Article 12 (3), by the competitor under control; or
4. in the case of a concentration pursuant to Article 12 (5), at least one of the competitors forming a jointly controlled undertaking
is higher than 1 500 000 000 CZK and at the same time the worldwide net turnover achieved by the next connecting competitor over the last financial year is higher than 1 500 000 000 CZK.
§ 14
Calculation of turnover
(1) Net turnover (10) of merging competitors means the net turnover achieved by individual competitors only in the activity which is the subject of their business. If competitors are not entrepreneurs, the net turnover is only the turnover achieved in the activity to which they were set up or normally carried out.
(2) Net turnover
(a) by all competing competitors;
(b) persons who will check on the merging competitors after the connection has taken place and persons who are controlled by the merging competitors;
(c) persons controlled by a person who will check on the merging competitor after the connection has taken place; and
(d) persons controlled jointly by two or more of the persons referred to in points (a) to (c).
(3) The share of turnover achieved by the sale of goods between the merging competitors and the persons referred to in paragraph 2 (b), (c) and (d) shall not be included in the common net turnover of the merging competitors.
(4) If only part of the competitor is merged, only the part of the turnover achieved by the merging part of the competitor is included in the net turnover.
(5) If, over a period of 2 years, there have been two or more links between the same competitors, consisting of the transfer of part of the undertaking to another competitor, such links shall be considered jointly as one.
(6) For bank11), net turnover means the sum of income, in particular interest income, securities and equity, fees and commissions and profits from financial operations. In the case of insurance undertakings (12), net turnover means the sum of premiums written according to all insurance contracts concluded.
§ 15
Initiation
(1) The procedure for authorising a concentration shall be initiated on a proposal.
(2) In the cases referred to in Article 12 (1), (2) and (5), all competitors intending to merge with a merger are required to enter into a contract with another competitor or to gain control over a jointly controlled undertaking; in the cases referred to in Article 12 (3), it shall submit an application for the authorisation of a concentration by a competitor who shall be able to directly or indirectly control another competitor.
(3) Application for authorisation of a connection:
(a) may also be submitted before the conclusion of a contract establishing a concentration or before obtaining control of another competitor by other means;
(b) it must contain the justifications, documents certifying the facts applicable to the concentration and the formalities laid down in the implementing legislation (Section 26 (3)).
(4) The procedure for authorisation of a concentration shall be initiated on the date on which the application for authorisation of a concentration containing all the elements referred to in paragraph 3 was received to the Office. If the draft does not contain such elements, the Office may, on the basis of an assessment of the supporting documents received, issue only a written opinion as to whether the concentration is subject to authorisation under this law and the proposal should be supplemented.
§ 16
Procedure
(1) The Office shall immediately notify the initiation of the procedure for the authorisation of a concentration in the Trade Bulletin, setting a time limit for the submission of objections to that concentration.
(2) Following the initiation of the procedure, the Authority will assess whether the concentration is subject to its authorisation. If the Office is not subject to a concentration of authorisation, it shall issue a decision within 30 days of the initiation of the procedure. In cases where the concentration is subject to an authorisation by the Authority but does not result in significant distortions of competition, the Authority shall, within the same period, issue a decision authorising the concentration. If the Authority finds that the concentration raises serious concerns about significant distortions of competition, in particular because it creates or strengthens the dominant position of the merging competitors or of any of them, it shall notify the parties in writing within the same time limit and inform the parties that it continues the proceedings.
(3) If the Office has not given a decision on the application for authorisation of a concentration within the time limit referred to in paragraph 2 or has not informed the parties in writing that, for the reasons set out in paragraph 2, it has continued the procedure, the Office has authorised the concentration by the expiry of that period.
(4) The Authority may, under the conditions laid down in the Merger Regulation (13), request the Commission to carry out the procedure and to examine the concentration itself. Pending the Commission's decision whether to assess such a concentration itself, the Office shall suspend the procedure. If the Commission decides to consider such a concentration itself, the Office shall suspend the proceedings.
(5) If the Office notifies the parties in writing pursuant to paragraph 2 that it is continuing the procedure for the application for authorisation of a concentration, it shall take a decision within 5 months of the initiation of the procedure. If the Authority has not given a decision on the concentration within that time limit, it shall allow the concentration to expire.
(6) The Office may invite a party in writing to provide further information necessary for the decision to authorise a concentration or to provide further evidence of such facts. The period from the date of service of such an invitation to the party to the proceedings to the date on which that obligation is fulfilled shall not be counted against the time limits laid down in paragraphs 2 and 5. Where a decision of the Office on an application for authorisation of a concentration is annulled by a court, the time limits referred to in paragraphs 2 and 5 shall run again from the date on which the decision becomes final.
(7) The concentration may be registered only after the decision of the Office authorising the concentration has become final.
§ 17
Assessment of connection
(1) When deciding on a proposal to authorise a concentration, the Authority shall assess in particular the need to maintain and develop effective competition, the structure of all links between the markets concerned, the share of the merging competitors in those markets, their economic and financial strength, the legal and other barriers to the entry of other competitors into the concentration of the markets concerned, the possibility of choosing suppliers or customers connecting competitors, the development of supply and demand in the markets concerned, the needs and interests of consumers, and research and development, the results of which benefit the consumer and do not prevent effective competition.
(2) The decision to authorise a concentration shall also apply to such restrictions on competition as the competitors indicated in the application for authorisation of a concentration and which are directly related to the concentration and are necessary for its implementation.
(3) The Authority will not authorise the concentration if it would result in a significant distortion of competition on the relevant market, in particular because it would create or strengthen a dominant position between competitors or one of them. If the combined share of the merging competitors in the relevant market does not exceed 25%, their concentration shall be deemed not to result in a significant distortion of competition unless the opposite is demonstrated in the assessment of the concentration.
(4) The Office may make the clearance of the concentration conditional on the fulfilment of commitments which the merging competitors proposed to the Office in order to maintain effective competition before or during the procedure for the authorisation of the concentration, but not later than 15 days from the date on which the last of the parties received the notification pursuant to Article 16 (2) that the procedure was continued. The Office shall take account of any subsequent proposals for commitments or changes in their content only in cases of special consideration if they are received by the Office within 15 days of the end of the period referred to in the first sentence of this provision. If the merging competitors propose such commitments during the first 30 days of the procedure, the period referred to in Article 16 (2) shall be extended by 15 days. If the merging competitors propose these commitments after having been informed by the Authority, pursuant to Article 16 (2), that the procedure is continued, the time limit for the decision under Article 16 (5) shall be extended by 15 days. If the parties do not propose such commitments or if the commitments proposed by them to maintain effective competition are not sufficient, the Authority may, in order to maintain effective competition, lay down conditions and restrictions not proposed by the parties in the decision to authorise the concentration if the competitors agree to take over. Where the Authority makes the clearance of the concentration conditional on the fulfilment of commitments proposed by competitors, it may, by decision, lay down the conditions and obligations necessary to ensure that those commitments are fulfilled.
§ 18
Deferred execution of the concentration
(1) Before the submission of an application to initiate proceedings pursuant to Paragraph 15 (1) and before the legal power of the decision of the Authority authorising the concentration, the concentration must not be carried out by a competitor.
(2) The prohibition referred to in paragraph 1 shall not apply to the execution of a concentration which is to take place on the basis of a public offer of take-over of participating securities or on the basis of a series of transactions in listed securities resulting in the control being obtained from different entities, provided that an application for the initiation of proceedings pursuant to Paragraph 15 (1) has been made without delay and that the voting rights attached to such securities are not exercised; This shall be without prejudice to the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4.
(3) The Authority may decide, on a proposal from competitors, to authorise an exemption from the prohibition on the implementation of concentrations referred to in paragraph 1 if they or third parties otherwise suffer serious damage or other serious harm. An application for an exemption may be submitted by competitors at the same time as the application for authorisation of the concentration or at any time during the procedure. The application shall be written and justified.
(4) The application for an exemption referred to in paragraph 3 shall be decided by the Authority without delay, not later than 30 days after its receipt. In deciding to authorise an exemption, the Authority shall take into account, in addition to damage and other damage, the consequences of the exemption on competition in the relevant market. If the Authority has not taken a decision within that period, the exemption shall be granted. The Authority may lay down conditions and restrictions in the decision authorising the exemption in order to maintain effective competition.
(5) Where the Authority finds that the concentration has been carried out contrary to the Authority's final decision, it shall decide on the measures necessary to restore effective competition on the relevant market. To that end, the Authority shall, in particular, oblige competitors to sell their shares, transfer the merged undertaking or part thereof, or terminate the contract on the basis of which the concentration took place, where appropriate, to take other appropriate measures necessary to restore effective competition in the relevant market. The Authority may issue such a decision even if it finds that a concentration has taken place without a request for initiation pursuant to Article 15 (1).
§ 19
Repeal of the clearance decision
(1) The Office may revoke the decision authorising a concentration if it finds that it has authorised the concentration on the basis of supporting documents, data and information for which the completeness, accuracy and veracity of the case are the responsibility of the parties and which have been found to be wholly or partly false or incomplete, or the authorisation has been obtained by the parties to the proceedings having misled the Office or failing to comply with the conditions, restrictions or obligations which the Office has made conditional on the authorisation.
(2) The procedure for the annulment of the decision authorising the concentration may be initiated by the Authority within 1 year of the finding of the facts referred to in paragraph 1, but not later than 5 years after the occurrence of the facts.

HLAVA V

OFFICE
§ 20
(1) The competence of the Office is governed by specific legislation14). Office other than powers under other provisions of this law
(a) monitor whether and how competitors fulfil their obligations under this law or by decisions of the Office under this law;
(b) publish proposals to permit the concentration of competitors and its final decisions.
(2) In carrying out the supervision referred to in paragraph 1 (a), the Authority may initiate an own-initiative procedure. In the exercise of supervision, the Authority shall act mutatis mutandis in accordance with § 21 (5) to (9).
§ 20a
(1) The Authority has the power to apply Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty in individual cases where the conduct of competitors could affect trade between Member States within the meaning of Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty. To that end, it shall be entitled to:
(a) require the cessation of the infringement;
(b) order precautionary measures;
(c) making commitments;
(d) impose fines.
(2) The Authority may, by decision of an individual competitor, withdraw the advantage of the Community block exemption where agreements have, in a particular case, effects incompatible with Article 81 (3) of the Treaty in the territory of the Czech Republic or to a part thereof which has all the characteristics of a separate geographic market.
(3) The Office is hereby authorised to:
(a) request the Commission to provide copies of the documents necessary for the assessment of the case;
(b) consult the Commission on any case in which Community law is applied;
(c) to provide each other with the Commission and other competition authorities of the Member States and to use as evidence any factual or legal fact, including confidential information;
(d) request the Commission to include the case in the agenda of the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices;
(e) submit observations to the courts on questions relating to the application of Article 81 or 82 of the Treaty and request the competent court to send any documents necessary for the assessment of the case;
(f) conduct investigations at the request of the competition authority of another Member State;
(g) to submit its opinions on the procedures to be followed by the Commission under the Merger Regulation;
(h) to take decisions in cases where Regulations of the European Communities, adopted in accordance with Articles 83 to 86 of the Treaty, entitle the Office to take decisions;
(i) take corrective measures, the conditions and details of which have been determined by the Commission and when it has authorised the Member State to take the necessary corrective action pursuant to Article 85 (2) of the Treaty.
(4) The Office shall:

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Regulation Information

CitationFull text of Act No. 436 / 2005 Coll., Act No. 143 / 2001 Coll., on the Protection of Competition and on the Amendment of Certain Acts (Law on the Protection of Competition), as is apparent from subsequent amendments
Regulation TypeDeclared full text
Author-
CollectionCode of Laws
Date of Promulgation03.11.2005
Effective from-
Effective until-
Status Valid
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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