The Constitutional Court found No 427 / 2024 Coll.
Findings of the Constitutional Court sp. zn.
Valid
The Constitutional Tribunal found
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427
FIND
The Constitutional Court
of 4 December 2024
sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 41 / 23 on the proposal to repeal certain provisions of Act No. 253 / 2023 Coll., amending Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll., on association in political parties and in political movements, as amended, and other related laws
On behalf of the Republic
Article 1 (1) (a) of Regulation (EC) No 1913 / 2006, Article 1 (1) (a) of Regulation (EC) No 1913 / 2006, Article 1 (1) (a) of Regulation (EC) No 1913 / 2006, Article 1 (1) (b) of Regulation (EC) No 1913 / 2006, Article 1 (1) (a) of Regulation (EC) No 1913 / 2006, Article 1 (1) (a) of Regulation (EC) No 1913 / 2006, Article 1 (1) (a) of Regulation (EC) No 1913 / 2006, Article 1 (1) of Regulation (EC, Article 1) of Regulation (EC, Article 1) of Regulation (EC) of Regulation (EC) of Regulation (EC) of Regulation (EC), Article 1 (EC) of Regulation (EC. Article I (7) to (11); Articles III, IV and V; and on the application for priority consideration, with the participation of Parliament as a party to the proceedings and of the Government as an intervener;
as follows:
I. In Act No. 253 / 2023 Coll., amending Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll., on association in political parties and in political movements, as amended, and other related laws, the provisions of Article 2 (1) (a) and (b) shall apply. I point 6 in the section concerning the wording of § 19g paragraph 1 (a) of Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll., on association in political parties and political movements, as amended, in words "and the supervision of compliance with the Act on Conflict of Interest 'and in the section concerning the wording of § 19g paragraph 1 (h) of the same Act; Article I (7) to (11); Articles III, IV and V shall be deleted from the date of the publication of this finding in the Collection of Laws and International Treaties.
II. The remainder is rejected.
Reasons
Definition of the case
1. The finding deals with the issue of legislative stickers. Following the previous case-law, the Constitutional Court summarises the nature of the amendments. It specifies under which conditions it is necessary to repeal the legal provisions resulting from the adhesive because of the inconstitutionality of the legislative process.
For the sake of clarity, the Constitutional Court summarises the content of the finding:
I. Definition of the case (paragraphs 1-5)
II. Affected treatment (point 6)
III. Arguments of the appellant (paragraphs 7-13)
IV. Observation of the parties (paragraphs 14-29)
IV.1 Statement of the Chamber of Deputies (paragraphs 16-18)
IV.2 Statement of the Senate (paragraphs 19- 22)
IV.3 Government observations (paragraphs 23-28)
IV.4 Communication from the Ombudsman (paragraph 29)
V. Replication of the appellant (paragraphs 30-34)
VI. Subject matter of proceedings before the Constitutional Court and its procedural assumptions (paragraphs 35-48)
VII. Oral hearing (paragraphs 49-73)
VIII. Review of the procedure for the adoption of contested legal provisions (74- 82)
IX. Legislative stickers (points 83-168)
IX.1 Legislative stickers in general (paragraphs 83-85)
IX.2 up to now case law (paragraphs 86-89)
IX.3 There is no reason to leave the existing case-law (paragraphs 90-105)
IX.4 Algorithm of review of legislative stickers (paragraphs 106-127)
IX.5 Application to the present case (paragraphs 128-168)
X. Limiting the debate at third reading (paragraphs 169-178)
XI. Consequences of deregulation (paragraphs 179- 193)
XI.1 General principles (paragraphs 180-185)
XI.2 Application to the case under assessment (paragraphs 186- 191)
XI.3 Consideration of deferral of enforceability (paragraphs 192- 193)
XII. Conclusion (paragraphs 194-207)
2. The appellant objects to the process of adopting Act No. 253 / 2023 Coll., amending Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll., on association in political parties and political movements, as amended, and other related laws. According to the appellant, the original government draft of the Act merely changed the organisational structure and management of the Office for the Management of Political Parties and Political Movements ("the Office '). However, Mr Jakub Michalek's amendment included a tightening of the ban on media ownership of politics and the acceptance of subsidies and investment incentives in the conflict of interest law and reflected the same in two other laws. According to the appellant, that amendment is a non-constitutional adhesive. Moreover, according to the appellant, there was an unconstitutional shortening of the parliamentary debate, because the debate at the third reading of the bill was closed, although speakers were still involved. The provisions, which have been amended on the basis - in the opinion of the appellant of the unconstitutional - of the amendment, are also challenged by the appellant for its content contradiction with the constitutional order.
3. By a proposal pursuant to Article 87 (1) (a) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as "the Constitution") and Article 64 (1) (b) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, the appellant originally expressly sought the annulment of all provisions amended by Act No. 253 / 2023 Coll., i.e.:
Article 13 (1) (b) (b) of the Act, "Article 4 (1) (b), (2), (3), (2), (2), (3), (3), (3), (3), (3), (4), (4), (6), (5), (6), (5), (6), (6), (6), (1), (c), (2), (1), (1), (1), (2), (1), (2), (1), (1), (2), (1), (2), (1), (2), (2), (1), (2), (2), (2), (2), (2), (2), (2), (2), (2), (2), (2), (2), (2) and (3), (3), (2), (2), (3), (2), (3), (3), (3)
4. Should the Constitutional Court not find the proposal fully justified, the appellant proposed that at least those provisions which had been amended following the adoption of Mr Mikhalek's amendment be repealed. By its submission of 29 November 2024, the appellant specified this part of the proposal by requesting the annulment of not only the amended provisions, but possibly the amendments, namely:
Act No 253 / 2023 Coll., amending Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll., on association in political parties and in political movements, as amended, and other related laws, in Article I (6), in the section on § 19g (1) (a) of the Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll., on association in political parties and in political movements, as amended, in the words "and the supervision of compliance with the law on conflicts of interest 'and in the section on § 19g (1) (h) of the same Act in the words" in cases provided for by the law, of the invalidity of legal acts and other measures provided for by law'; Article I, points 7 to 11; Articles III, IV and V.
As will be explained below, this amendment would have to be examined by the Constitutional Court on the basis of the original proposal, even if it was explicitly directed against the amended provisions.
5. The appellant considers the contested provisions to be contradictory to Articles 1, 2 (1) and (3), 5 and 6, 9 (2), 10, 15, 18, 19 (1) and (2), 41, 44, 57 (1), 81, 90 and 102 (1) of the Constitution; also to Articles 1, 2 (2), 3 (1) and (3), 11 (1), (3) and (4), 21 (1) and (4), 22 and 36 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as "the Charter"), and Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It also sees the contradiction of the contested provisions with the principles of constitutionally consistent standardisation and legislative procedures as well as with other principles expressed in the case law of the Constitutional Court. The appellant therefore requested a preliminary examination of the proposal (Section 39 of the Constitutional Court Act, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll.).
Influenced treatment
6. In the present case, it is not necessary to quote the wording of the contested amended provisions or the version of the amending Act No 253 / 2023 Coll. The key question was whether Mr Jakub Michalek's amendment constituted a non-constitutional attachment. The Constitutional Court therefore refers to publicly available data for the hearing of the House of Press 312 [Chamber of Deputies, 9th Election, since 2021]. The original draft law is under House Press 312 / 0 (available from: https: / / www.psp.cz / sqw / text / print.sqw? O = 9 & CT = 312 & CTl = 0). The amendment by Mr Jakub Mikhalík is under House Press 312 / 3 (available from: https: / / www.psp.cz / sqw / text / print.sqw? O = 9 & CT = 312 & CTl = 3).
Arguments of the appellant
7. The appellant's procedural objections to the contested regulation can be summarised briefly by violating the requirement of free competition between political parties under Article 5 of the Constitution and Article 22 of the Charter and the right of a minority to protection in the legislative process resulting from Article 6 of the Constitution. It also states that the contested provisions are a non-constitutional adhesive.
8. The amendment by Mr Jakub Michalek had nothing to do with the original government bill (House Press 312 / 0). It was not a government-initiated and approved 'amendment'. From the point of view of its material, this proposal had the nature of the adhesive [finding sp. zn. The amendment was tabled at the earliest possible moment in the legislative process. His presentation was unexpected and surprising. The Member had a proposal prepared two weeks before the end of the second reading, and nothing prevented it from being submitted earlier. Therefore, the only place where the contested provisions could be discussed was in plenary of the Chamber of Deputies during the third reading of the draft law. In doing so, the committees of the Chamber of Deputies serve for proper consideration of the draft laws, particularly when it comes to large amendments changing the material of the draft law under discussion.
9. Although the opposition at third reading suggested that the bill be returned to second reading, the proposal was not accepted by the Chamber of Deputies. In addition, there should have been an infringement of Act No. 90 / 1995 Coll., on the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies') by a firm vote on the draft law at third reading on Friday 16 June 2023 at 11.00, although 74 Members were still registered at the time of the debate. The coalition majority knowingly decided to proceed in conflict not only with the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, but also with the rules and principles of the legislative process established by the constitutional order and case law of the Constitutional Court and violated the rights of a political minority when discussing the law.
10. Furthermore, the amendment is contrary to the requirement of the universality of the law. The proposal is, in substance, selective and purposeful. The petitioner never concealed that the proposal was aimed at a single person in the Czech Republic, namely the President of the opposition movement ANO 2011 Andrei Babiš. According to the case law of the Constitutional Court, it is unacceptable to approve individual law, while it is always necessary to assess the true nature of the standard under assessment, not only its formal aspects [cf. the finding of the Constitutional Court sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 55 / 2000 of 18.4.2001 (N 62 / 22 CollNU 55; 241 / 2001 Coll.)].
11. The adoption of the proposal infringes the principle of division of power. It is clear from the contested provisions that the law sets out directly what is meant by the public interest. In particular, it is clear from the construction of Paragraph 19ha (2) of the Association Act in political parties and political movements that, in fact, not the Office, but directly the legislator determines what is to happen to certain property already known owners. Such a procedure is contradictory to the finding of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 24 / 04 of 28.6.2005 (N 130 / 37 SbNU 641; 327 / 2005 Coll.) because, apart from the breach of the requirement of the universality of the law, it constitutes an undesirable legislative act in the power of executive, since it is the legislator and not the administrative body in the specific proceedings who determines what is in the public interest.
12. The substantive objections in the proposal may be summarised briefly by putting the amended regulations in question on the basis of an intervention into the right of access to an elected and other public office pursuant to Article 21 (4) of the Charter, an intervention into the right to own property under Article 11 of the Charter and into the right to do business under Article 26 of the Charter. The resulting regulation prevents certain citizens from exercising the public functions listed in Paragraph 2 (1) of the Act on Conflict of Interest, although it is an approach guaranteed at the level of constitutional order. The appellant sees the unconstitutionality as being constitutionally inadmissible from the political competition and governance of the media owners (in the form of actual owners). The right of citizens to have access to public functions includes not only the possibility of applying for a post, but also, in the event of success in an election or other establishment procedure, to perform it unimpeded.
13. Finally, the contested regulation interferes with the constitutionally guaranteed right to own the property. It forces interested parties to exercise their public functions (i.e. to exercise their constitutionally guaranteed right) to waive part of their assets under the threat of a forced transfer. This forces them to give up their share of governance. This argument is further extended by the appellant to references to the earlier conclusions of the Constitutional Court presented in the judgment in Case 4 / 17 of 11.2.2020 (N 21 / 98 SbNU 163; 148 / 2020 Sb.) and underlines that, contrary to the earlier version of § 4a of the Act on Conflict of Interest, changes brought by the amendment of the permissible interference with the right to engage in business by newly and unacceptably interfering with the right to own property.
Observations of the parties
14. The Constitutional Court, pursuant to Article 69 (1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 18 / 2002 Coll., called on the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, acting on behalf of Parliament as a party to the proceedings, to comment on the application to initiate proceedings.
15. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 69 (2) and (3) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended, he called on the Government and the Ombudsman to state within the statutory deadline whether they were entering the proceedings (as interveners) and, where appropriate, to comment on the proposal.
Observations of the Chamber of Deputies
16. In its observations, the Chamber of Deputies described the process of discussion and stated that the law was passed by the necessary majority of Members of the Chamber of Deputies, signed by the relevant constitutional authorities and duly declared.
17. It stated that the Bill No. 253 / 2023 Coll. was submitted to the Government of the Chamber of Deputies in the 9th parliamentary term on 27 September 2022, as the House Press 312. The first reading of this press took place at the 41st meeting of 14 October 2022, in which the press was ordered to discuss the Audit Committee and the Constitutional Law Committee, with the deadline for the discussion of the Committees being reduced to 30 days. The Audit Committee discussed the draft law and issued on 20 October 2022 a resolution delivered to Members as House Press 312 / 1. The Constitutional Legal Committee discussed the draft law on 2 November 2022 and issued a resolution to Members as Parliament Press 312 / 2. The second reading took place at the 48th meeting of 16 December 2022. All the amendments tabled have been drafted as House Press 312 / 3. The Audit Committee issued a resolution by the Guarantee Committee, which was delivered on 20 January 2023 to Members as House Press 312 / 4. The subsequent third reading started at the 52nd meeting of the Chamber of Deputies on 8 February 2023, continued at the 66th meeting on 19 May 2023. On 16 June 2023 a vote on the proposal took place at the 66th meeting. Of the 165 members applied for, 86 were against 65. The bill has been passed.
18. The Chamber of Deputies passed the approved Senate Bill on 4 July 2023. The Senate approved the bill on 2 August 2023 at the 15th Senate meeting. The law was delivered to the President for signature on 7 August 2023. The President signed the Act on 10 August 2023. The Act was published on 25 August 2023 in the Collection of Laws in the amount of 116 under No 253 / 2023 Coll.
Statement by the Senate
19. In his observations, the Senate recited the content of the proposal, also described the process of discussing the draft law and expressed the belief that it followed within the limits of the Constitution established competence and the constitutional procedure. It left it to the Constitutional Court to assess the compliance of the draft contested provisions with the constitutional order.
20. The approved bill was passed on to the Senate by the Chamber of Deputies on 4 July 2023. In the Senate, the proposal was negotiated as Senate Press 126 in the 14th term.
21. The proposal was discussed by the Constitutional Legal Committee as a committee guaranteeing 11 July 2023. Both the rapporteur's report and the general debate focused, inter alia, on tightening up the conflict of interest law. The current legislative process has been evaluated. The Committee concluded that the material was sufficiently discussed, the Government's position was mentioned. In its resolution No 83 of 11 July 2023, the Committee recommended that the Senate approve the bill as referred to by the Chamber of Deputies. The bill was further discussed by the Senate's Standing Committee on Public Resources on 2 August 2023. The Commission also issued a positive recommendation by Resolution No 14 of 2 August 2023, at the same time proposing to adopt an accompanying resolution on limiting the influence of public officials on Internet media.
22. The Senate Plenum dealt with the bill at its 15th meeting in its 14th term of office on 2 August 2023. The bill was presented by the Minister for European Affairs Martin Dvořák, who represented the Minister of Interior Vít Austrian. In order to extend the material through amendments, he stated that the aim was to improve the enforceability of public officials' obligations under the Act on Conflict of Interest, in particular obligations and restrictions in relation to ownership or control of the media. As part of the report, the President of the Constitutional Legal Committee, Tomáš Golán, summed up the conclusions of the debate held on the committee. The subject was no longer addressed in the general debate. In vote 14, the Senate adopted Resolution 247 approving the bill as referred to by the Chamber of Deputies. Of the 65 senators and senators present there were 50 for, against 8, delayed 7. Furthermore, in vote 15, the Senate adopted accompanying resolution 248 on the issue of limiting the influence of public officials on Internet media. Of the 65 senators and senators present there were 40 for, against 6, remained 19.
Government observations
23. The Government has proposed to the Constitutional Court the rejection of the application. In its view, there was no breach of the requirement of free competition between political parties or of the right of a minority to protection in the legislative process. While the appellant contends that the amendment was applied in the case under consideration at the very end of the second reading and for this reason was not discussed in the committees of the Chamber of Deputies, this is true, subject to the examination of the proposal by the Audit Committee as a committee guaranteed on 19 January 2023, which had the opportunity to comment on all the amendments tabled and of which the opposition Members are members. The appellant contradicts a procedure that can be described as normal because it is not restricted by the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies. This allows Members to submit amendments to the draft law until the end of the second reading, regardless of when they are drawn up by their petitioners. From the point of view of procedural guarantees and requirements for the formal and content rationality of standardisation, it would certainly be possible to consider the application of amendments exclusively through a committee designated by the Committee on Safeguards or by other committees, as the case may be. The application of separate or group amendments by Members is clearly the prevailing practice, which is also better in line with the principle of representative democracy. It is not possible to establish arbitrarily the time limit for the submission of amendments during the second reading.
24. The amendment was discussed in the third reading by the Chamber of Deputies in a total of four days (8 February, 19 May, 14 June and 16 June 2023), particularly in the last two cases a broad debate was held with the participation of both the government and opposition Members. Some six weeks have elapsed between the application of the amendment by Mr James Michalek and the first day of the third reading on the draft law, after which Members had the opportunity to take a position on the proposal. This also corresponds to the requirements of Rule 95 (1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies. The opinion of the Guarantee Committee, which discussed the draft law on 19 January 2023, could also help Members in both. In summary, the debate included some 200 speeches by Members, among whom Members of the ANO 2011 movement were quite clearly dominated, namely those of the opposition, who are now in the position of author. Thus, according to the Government, minority rights were not restricted. The appellant's fact that the opposition Members "delayed and used obstruction" at third reading does not contradict, only states that the government majority in the Chamber of Deputies caused this situation. Although they then state that a return to second reading could alleviate the "stickiness" of the amendment, it is not clear what arguments underpin this conclusion. In fact, if the essence of the "adhesive" nature of the amendment is that it is not closely related to the original material of the draft law, it cannot change the fact that it is returned by second reading.
25. The Government also rejected the argument that the contested provisions constitute an inadmissible adhesion. The connection is relatively narrow. The purpose of the original government bill was to make a change in the organisation and functioning of the Office, inter alia, by establishing the College of the Office, by clarifying the position of the Office's officials in the exercise of supervisory and methodological activities and by improving the information within the Office. To that end, the draft law was intended to make partial adjustments to the internal division and exercise of the powers conferred on the Office. Therefore, it cannot be regarded as surprising, incomprehensible or incoherent if the proposed government proposal was accompanied by an amendment which further amended the powers and responsibilities of the Office, although it did so in relation to an area where supervision and control had not yet been exercised, i.e. the areas of the conflict of interest law. The new scope was entrusted by the Authority's amendment almost exclusively in relation to the supervision of compliance with the prohibition under Paragraph 4a of the Act on Conflict of Interest, i.e. the ban on the possession of media primarily by directly elected public officials (policies). This is a ban which, by its construction, pursues very similar objectives, such as those which follow the rules on funding and the conduct of electoral campaigns over which the Office has already been vigilant under previous legislation. These are objectives linked to the protection of political competition against its deformation, including ensuring its freedom and pluralism (Article 22 of the Charter).
26. The amendment does not dispute the requirement for the universality of the law. In the case of § 4a, all public officials are affected under § 2 (1) of the Act on Conflict of Interest in the number of lower tens of thousands of directly elected officials, and in the case of § 4c, there are slightly more than 30 persons in the position of either the President of the Republic or the Head of the Central Administrative Office, in the foreground with members of the Government. A time point is also important in this regard, as the contested legislation is intended to affect all similar cases for futuro. It regulates situations that already exist, and those that may arise in the future, and is in no way limited to specific persons who hold defined functions at the date of effective amendment of the conflict of interest law.
27. The Government also refused that the amendment would go against the principle of division of power. Contrary to the case which constituted the factual background of the finding, sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 24 / 04, it is not the case where the legislator directly ascertains, through the law, what solution is in the public interest to a specific life situation, and thus excludes it from the powers of the law enforcement authorities and judicial review. The Act only lays down, on a general basis, the requirements for solutions to the type situations associated with the accumulation of political, media and, where appropriate, economic power and, in the rest, the Authority is entrusted with an assessment of whether the public office of the chosen solution will be able to meet those requirements.
28. The Constitutional Court should not testify to substantive objections either. There was no interference with the right of access to the elected office or the right of ownership. The Constitutional Court has already dealt with similar arguments in the sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 4 / 17. Therefore, while maintaining the limits described (prohibition of discriminatory, arbitrary and unreasonable or inadequate standardisation), it is permissible for the legislator to lay down the conditions for the exercise of public functions as a measure to prevent the purpose of exercising public functions by pursuing an objective other than public interest and general welfare. The appellant disinterprets this finding. In fact, no one is denied the property or the ability to do business. It is up to everyone to decide whether or not to fulfil the conditions of public office by giving up certain activities (temporarily). In the view of the Government, this conclusion is valid even after the adoption of the contested amendment.
Communication from the Ombudsman
29. The Ombudsman noted to the Constitutional Court that he would not exercise his right under Paragraph 69 (3) of the Constitutional Court Act, as amended, and thus did not intervene.
Replication of the appellant
30. The appellant stated in its reply that it continued to insist on hearing its proposal and requested that the Constitutional Court grant it.
31. On the Government's statement concerning the legislative process, it stated that it considered it misleading. The shortcomings of the legislative process must be assessed comprehensively and in their context. The appellant is aware that, according to the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, amendments can be tabled after the second reading of the draft law, but that does not mean that this right cannot be used - together with other actions by Members of the Government majority - to establish a legal situation which is contrary to constitutional order. This was precisely the case when the contested provisions were approved. If the Rules of Procedure grant Members the right to submit an amendment to the draft law until the end of the second reading of the draft law, they do so so so that they have sufficient time for you to prepare such an amendment, not to deliberately apply the amendments already prepared at the last minute and thereby limit the scope for discussion of the proposal in the bodies of the Chamber of Deputies.
32. The reply further defined against the Government's claim that the proposal would call into question the constitutionality of tens or hundreds of laws that were approved in the wording of the amendment applied at the end of the second reading of the draft law. The constitutionality of the provisions of the Rules of Procedure itself, which provide for a deadline for the application of amendments, is not called into question by the appellant. It calls into question precisely the progress made by Members of the government majority on a particular matter which has led to a breach of the principles of constitutionally conformal norm. The examination of the draft law by the Audit Committee on 19 January 2023 did not heal the shortcomings of the legislative process, since the resolution of that Committee was only on the order in which the Chamber of Deputies should vote on the proposed amendments, but did not take any position on their content. Similarly, the Government's argument in relation to the early termination of the debate is appropriate by firmly including a vote on the bill on Friday, 16 June 2023 at 11.00, although 74 Members have been added to the debate at this time.
33. The Government also misinterprets the rule of a close relationship as the relationship of an amendment to the amended law, which concerns the original proposal (so-called carrier). But that is not the rule of law. According to the case law of the Constitutional Court, the basis for assessing a close relationship is only the original proposal, i.e. the legislative initiative (amending the law) under Article 41 of the Constitution, not the law which is the subject of the initiative (amended law). It therefore does not decide whether the amendment is the subject of, for example, the Commercial Code (broad relationship), but whether it is the amendment to the Commercial Code and the Register Procedure in the Civil Code (close relationship).
34. It also defined itself against the argument as an obstacle to the case decided in relation to the finding of the sp. zn. The contested provisions change the nature of the original restriction in a fundamental way, and therefore the whole matter cannot be "dismissed" by claiming that a similar case has already been decided. The contested provisions do not stand in the step of suitability, necessity or proportionality in the narrower sense. It is indefensible for a democratic rule of law to put such fundamental obstacles in the way of citizens to exercise their fundamental rights.
Subject matter of the proceedings before the Constitutional Court and its procedural assumptions
35. The Constitutional Court first examined whether the procedural conditions of the proceedings were fulfilled. The application was submitted by an actively legitimate appellant, i.e. a group of 70 Members and Members [Paragraph 64 (1) (b) of the Constitutional Court Act], and the Constitutional Court is competent to discuss it [Article 87 (1) (a) of the Constitution].
36. The appellant expressly referred to the provisions amended by Act No 253 / 2023 Coll. It was not until later, at the invitation of the Constitutional Court, that she specified the petition by expressly designating the amendment clause in the scope of Mr Jakub Mikhalek's amendment.
37. According to settled case law of the Constitutional Court, amending legislation and its various provisions generally do not have a separate legislative existence, they become part of the amended legislation. As a general rule, it is not possible to seek annulment of the amending legislation and its individual provisions [finding of 8.10.1996 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 5 / 96 (N 98 / 6 SbNU 203; 286 / 1996 Coll.), of 12.3.2002 sp. zl. ÚS 33 / 01 (N 28 / 25 SbNU 215; 145 / 2002 Sb.) or of 25.9.2018 sp. zn. ÚS 18 / 17 (N 156 / 90 SbNU 525; 261 / 2018 Sb.), paragraph 15. But this rule also has exceptions.
38. Some of the provisions of the amendment, typically its transitional provisions, do not form part of the amended regulation, therefore have a separate regulatory existence and can therefore be directly challenged [see in more detail the finding of 2.4.2013 sp. zn. ÚS 6 / 13 (N 49 / 69 SbNU 31; 112 / 2013 Coll.), paragraphs 15 and 16 and the caselaw cited there].
39. Where there is a lack of normative competence or a breach of the constitutionally prescribed procedure for the adoption of a law, the constitutionality of the amending regulation may be assessed from these points of view "[finding sp. zn.
40. In the present case, the Constitutional Court considers it necessary, in the light of the caselaw cited, to clarify what rules apply where the appellant expressly challenges only the provisions of the amended legislation, but at the same time objects to the way in which the amendment is adopted, resulting in the contested provisions.
41. The Constitutional Court, pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll., assesses "the content of the law or other legislation in terms of its compliance with the constitutional laws, and, in the case of other legislation, the laws are also in place, and ascertains whether they have been adopted and issued within the limits of the constitutional competence and the constitutionally prescribed manner."
42. The Constitutional Court shall, without prejudice to the appellant, establish whether the laws which result in the contested provisions have been adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution laid down by competence and in a constitutional manner. If the appellant finds that the provisions have been amended, the Constitutional Court must therefore, without objection, examine whether a constitutional amendment was adopted in accordance with the law on which the wording of the contested provisions came. The Constitutional Court always addresses this issue; the statement of objections to the adoption procedure has an impact only on the details of the review, as detailed in the reasons for its decision by the Constitutional Court.
43. That practice is established in the case-law. The Constitutional Court has never refused to deal with the constitutionality of the procedure for adopting the amendment simply because the proposal is not directed against the amendment itself, but only against the amended regulation. For example, in the finding of sp. zn.
44. In such a situation, if the Constitutional Court found that the amending law had not been adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution, and in a constitutional manner, it would have had to repeal the amendment law, even without its express assault. This interpretation does not change the commitment of the Constitutional Court to the petition, that is, what the appellant seeks. The amendment can be repealed only to the extent that the contested provisions of the amended regulation are the result thereof.
45. The opposite interpretation of the Constitutional Court Act would lead to absurd consequences. Although only the amended provisions would be challenged, the Constitutional Court would have to examine whether the amendment was adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution laid down by the Constitutional Court and in a constitutionally prescribed manner, in accordance with Article 68 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court. However, without the explicit extension of the proposal so as to be directed against the amendment, the Constitutional Court would not have been able to abolish it even if it found constitutionally relevant shortcomings in competence or procedure. It is untenable to interpret the Law on the Constitutional Court in such a way that it requires the Constitutional Court to deal with issues which, without amendment, are not the subject of proceedings and cannot have any effect on its outcome.
46. Therefore, even if the appellant is challenging only the amended provisions, the Constitutional Court must, on its own initiative, examine whether the amendment was adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution laid down by competence and by the constitutional procedure. In the event of a finding of constitutionally relevant defects, the Constitutional Court must then abolish the amendment - or parts thereof, which result in the contested provisions - even without an explicit proposal.
47. As mentioned above, in the present case, the appellant made its proposal more precise and some amendments were also challenged, namely those adopted on the basis of Mr Michalek's amendment. Since the Constitutional Court could, on its own initiative, abolish them, it was not necessary to notify the other participants of that clarification. In addition, Parliament and the Government have rightly and in line with established practice already focused in their observations on the constitutionality of the adoption of the amending law, which has made it clear since the beginning of the procedure that this issue is the subject of proceedings before the Constitutional Court.
48. In view of the content of the objections by the appellant, the Constitutional Court considered that, in order to clarify the case and establish the facts (in particular in relation to the proceedings of Parliament's prints 110 and 312, and in view of parliamentary practice concerning amendments and so-called stickers), the Court of First Instance ordered oral proceedings (Sections 44 and 48 (1) of the Constitutional Court Act).
Oral proceedings
49. The Constitutional Court heard the following witnesses at the mandated oral hearing on 6 November 2024: Mr Radek Vondráček, Mrs Helena Vlaková, Mr Radovan Vích, Member submitting the contested amendment to Jakub Michalek, former Minister of Legislation Michal Solomon and Mr Mark Bend.
50. The subject of the evidence at the oral hearing was in particular: (i) the legislative process concerning the draft law adopted as Parliament's Press 312 (Chamber of Deputies, 9th Election, since 2021), later adopted and declared as Act No 253 / 2023 Coll.; (ii) the legislative process concerning the draft law adopted as Parliament's Press 110 (Chamber of Deputies, 9th Election, since 2021); and (iii) the parliamentary practice concerning amendments and so-called 'stickers', including the issue of the use of other House Prints as amendments.
51. The witness Radek Vondráček stated that the amendment was not discussed in the constitutional legal committee of the Chamber of Deputies, in which there is the greatest scope for law-making. The first reading serves to decide whether the Chamber of Deputies will even look at the draft law, the second reading serves for the very creation of the law, and only technical legislative matters are addressed at the third reading, there is no room for substantive discussion.
52. In this witness's view, there was no complete coalition unity to enforce the parliamentary bill, which was to amend the Act on Conflict of Interest and Act No 231 / 2001 Coll., on the Operation of Broadcasting and on the Amendment of Other Acts, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as the "Broadcasting Act '). The proposal was discussed under print 110 and was mainly an initiative of the Pirate Party. Neither the press 110 nor the amendment was discussed in the constitutional legal committee. The opposition had 110 major objections to the press against the actual owner's institute. This institute is designed to prevent money laundering, no place for it in the conflict of interest law. It is common for him to read amendments at second reading, but it is not common for him to do so three minutes before the end of reading. Mr Michalek's procedure excluded discussion of the amendment, the constitutional-legal committee had no chance to influence the form of the law, there was no room for correction of legislative errors.
53. In the past, the witness has repeatedly voted in favour of a proposal with which a non-fully related amendment was approved, which was accompanied by an amendment. In the Chamber of Deputies, he thinks it's happening. If an agreement is reached between the coalition and the opposition, the potential nature of the adhesive is not fully healed, but it will show some autonomy of the Chamber of Deputies. However, this was not the case in the contested application. The practice of Members who do not bother to submit an amendment to the committee and submit it at the last minute is common. Political clubs consider it a negative phenomenon, but it's difficult to keep track.
54. In his view, the political culture in the Chamber of Deputies is such that its Rules of Procedure are often violated, there is no political will across the House to change it. Thus, the negotiation of bills is more often governed by customs, conventions and precedents compared to the past. Recently, for example, "steam abandonment 'through the approval of meeting programmes. There is often a debate among Members as to whether a specific legislative initiative is still a" stickup "for lawful or unconstitutional. There was no debate on the amendment at second reading; the opposition Members failed to respond to the initiative of Mr Jakub Michalek.
55. Witness Helena Vlakova has joined what Vondráček said in her testimony. The House Press 312 was not a conflicting bill, the witness had three technical proposals. The guarantee committee of the 312 press was a control committee, not a constitutional legal committee. When discussing this press, Mr Jakub Mikhalek came running just before the end of the second reading, surprised her by reading an amendment, to which no one could respond. In the case of a surprising procedure during the second reading, it is right for the proposal to be renegotiated by a constitutional legal committee. The subsequent discussion in the Constitutional Legal Committee was not initiated because the opposition had no chance of success in terms of its composition. In this case, the opposition Members have not been given any space to respond to the amendment. The House Press 312 / 3 was delivered to the witness the same day after the second reading, only then did it have the opportunity to learn what was read and only then could it find out that there was no link between the original proposal and the amendment. The amendment concerned in substance the competence of the Office, with which the proposal was not discussed in advance. Subsequently, the Office criticised the amendment for insufficient staffing and financial security for its new responsibilities.
56. According to the witness, it is purely procedural that the amendment is counted one second before the end of the second reading. Likewise, the reading of the amendment itself, which was the subject of a previous House Press, does not contradict any specific provision of the Rules of Procedure. However, there is an important material and content link between the adhesive and its chassis, which does not exist in this case. The witness has not received a satisfactory reply from the Parliamentary Institute as to whether the supplement was in this case. Members are not clear on what is a permissible adhesive and what is not, the Rules of Procedure do not give a clear answer to this, but the content link between the adhesive and its carrier is important. The Constitutional Court requires the witness to clarify the precarious situation as far as possible.
57. Furthermore, the witness stated that a substantive debate on the amendments was normally held at second reading. The witness refers regularly to them, in this case she could not do so. At the third reading, opposition Members did not apply anything in substance, because the coalition was united in support of the procedure of the referring Member. President Vondráček did not call a constitutional legal committee after the end of the second reading because it was unnecessary.
58. The witness itself made an extensive amendment at second reading concerning the misrepresentation of women's names, which was "glued" to the amendment to the Civil ID Act, which only regulates the formalities of civil ID. [The original proposal amended the provision in which the words "their holders' were replaced by the words" persons to whom a card is issued ', the word "office' was replaced by the words" administrative authority 'and the text of point (h) was added, which reads "number or series, if applicable, and the date of the effective expiry of the invalid card']. The proposal for this content had been prepared for a long time. She was waiting for the appropriate law to join this proposal. If she had submitted her own parliamentary proposal to change the deflection, she expected a 100% or 99% negative result, as the coalition did not agree on it. She tried to discuss this amendment across the political spectrum, so she did not feel that she would surprise anyone. The witness also voted in favour of the amendment of the penal law amendment to the Police Act of the Czech Republic, which regulates primarily the authority of a police officer when checking a motor vehicle to demand payment of the arrears and retention of state plates, to which at second reading an amendment was tabled regulating the procedure of the Supreme Court when deciding on a complaint for infringement of the law and declaring a decision of the Supreme Court. She was aware that this proposal had the hallmarks of an adhesive, but it had political agreement.
59. Witness Radovan Vích stated that the House Press 312 / 0 was discussed in the Audit Committee. It was a non-conflicting amendment to the Bureau Act. Just before the end of the second reading when discussing this press, Mr Jakub Mikhalek brought him an amendment with a brief, several-minute justification. At second reading, there is usually a debate on the amendments. The amendment concerns conflicts of interest, not the functioning of the Office. The Home Secretary Vít Austušan also suspended himself from the progress of Mr Jakub Mikhalík, as the Office is unable to manage the new mandate.
60. The witness Jakub Mikhalek testified that one of the priorities of the Pirate Party was to solve the problem of media and political power after the last elections, so he was prepared to push through the House Press 110, with which the opposition strongly disagreed from the outset. The ANO 2011 movement considered this proposal to be a so-called neuralgia point - a matter of fundamental importance to them among the proposals discussed by the Chamber of Deputies. This was also in line with the determination not to allow this intention to be discussed. The 110 House Press was first included as a first item in the negotiations on a fixed day of procedure, and because of the obstruction, the meeting failed to begin. He was subsequently assigned to an extraordinary meeting of the Chamber of Deputies in early May 2022, which was also interrupted due to the obstruction of the opposition. The leadership of the coalition has dealt with opposition representatives. Their actions have shown that this point is essential to the opposition and that it will not be possible or will be extremely difficult to discuss in this way. The whole meeting of the Chamber of Deputies would be paralyzed, because the obstruction would have to be overcome from the first to the third reading. This would mean that for a few months (perhaps even for a year), the Chamber of Deputies will be blocked by the negotiation of a single bill. On this basis, they sought a path that was in line with the law and the Constitution and would allow them to accept the adjustment. The amendment arose in cooperation with the Government Office, Minister Solomon and his team.
61. In order to submit the amendment, the House Press has chosen 312, which extends the Office's scope, based on a discussion on how to supervise certain political phenomena (e.g. lobbying). This office is essentially one of the few independent and impartial but non-judicial bodies which is not directly included in the executive body and which could exercise that power. That is why they used the press that determined the authority of the Office. They were concerned about whether the amendment was an adhesive. They concluded that the link with the original law was given. To ensure that the proposal is not an adhesive in the case law of the Constitutional Court, also referred to as the so-called wild rider, they did not include, for example, Internet media regulation or open the Law on Periodic Press.
62. The witness did not deny that the element of surprise of reading the amendment was intentional. They assumed that if they had revealed this intention in advance, there would have been even stronger obstruction (literally referred to as "obstructive hell"). That's why they chose a surprising method on which there is nothing illegal. It is unfriendly to the opposition, but the opposition has forced this through its destructive approach towards Parliament. When preparing the press, they made sure that the fundamental purpose of the original proposal was to ensure the functioning of the Office, that it was an independent office and that it had a defined competence. The amendment proposed their extension. The opposition's obstruction was accompanied by a third reading of the House Press 312, and the head of the ANO 2011 club explicitly stated that they were seeking to prevent the press from getting to it.
63. Before reading the amendment, the witness did not deal with the Office, and the President did not discuss the comments until subsequently. It is not always necessary to ask the competent authority about the new powers conferred. According to the witness, the Office can manage its competence, so-called RIA is not always a quality ethon. The aim of the witness was to promote fair conditions of political competition. The 110 House Press concerned a conflict of interest, the 312 House Press Office. Both prints are related to the fair functioning of the political competition.
64. On the practice of the Chamber of Deputies, the witness mentioned several examples where laws containing amendments with completely different material from the original law, to which the proposal was read (e.g. House Press 109 and Amendment 1371 in 2018, House Press 247 and Comprehensive Amendment 2066 in 2019, House Press 1091 and Amendment 8299 in 2021). He pointed out that legislation has developed compared to the situation assessed by the Constitutional Court under the so-called "sticker '. In addition, a guarantee committee has been set up to examine the proposals in its deliberations and an electronic collection of laws has also been put in place to clarify the content of the legislation for citizens. According to the witness, the right of a Member to submit another amendment to the proposed amendment cannot be interpreted as an obligation of the Chamber of Deputies in all cases to create a time limit for everyone to submit an amendment to the proposed amendments. In practice, this would require the conduct of a second reading in two working days each time in order to create room for their preparation. This is not how the Chamber of Deputies progresses. It is not common for the original press (House Press 110) to be translated into an amendment, because the majority of Members make an amendment directly and do not abstain from submitting their own bill.
65. The witness supplemented his testimony in accordance with the invitation of the President of the Constitutional Court by a document of 13.11.2024. On the basis of the processing of data on the time at which the amendments were tabled, it shows that recording amendments only on the day of the second reading or even after the opening of the amendment is not an unusual practice (the proposals that were uploaded to the system only after the second reading was launched and, at the same time, on its one or last day, accounted for 8,6% of the amendments tabled in the last parliamentary term). It therefore does not consider it a sustainable argument that the debate on a specific amendment or the ability to respond to it during the second reading would be a prerequisite for a good legislative process. If this were to be the case, the time limit for the submission of amendments would have to be set before the start of the second reading, not at the end of the second reading. Similarly, a summary of the amendments as the basis for the debate at second reading should be circulated in good time before it, and Members should be familiar with them, but instead the Rules of Procedure require that it be drawn up only after the end of the second reading. This would not work out of logic, either, because it would be another reading that the law does not know, and further amendments could not be tabled to the "other" amendments. It concludes from the current text of the Rules of Procedure and from practice that the purpose of the second reading is not to evaluate the amendments tabled. Only the following stages of the legislative process are intended for this. The debate on the proposal at second reading is only an option, its absence does not affect the regularity or even the constitutionality of the legislative process, as this stage does not serve and cannot serve to evaluate amendments under the current parliamentary procedure. The amendment in question was presented from a formal point of view in full compliance with the Rules of Procedure Act and does not deviate from normal practice.
66. In order to demonstrate the above claims, the witness added the tables of the time at which the amendments were tabled in the Chamber of Deputies in the period 2017- 2024, examples of vaguely related amendments or complete stickers submitted by the appellants, examples of amendments tabled at the last minute approved by the House, as well as detailed dates on the time when the amendments were tabled.
67. The witness Michal Solomon testified that the government agreed to the 110 House Press, originally a parliamentary proposal. He has not dealt with his legislative initiative with Mr Jakub Michalek. The Government did not press for comments on the amendment. The 110 House Press dealt with conflict of interest issues, the 312 House Press Office's operation, in general it is a culture of political competition.
68. The witness Marek Benda testified that the Chamber of Deputies is currently in a fighting period, the opposition has chosen too many conflict issues, but the witness does not perceive the dramatic change in the functioning of the House. Members often agree to apply a sticker in the legislative process; it is a common legislative technique. In the case of Mr Jakub Michalek's amendment, all the Members knew what they were voting on at the third reading, the situation here was different from the case which dealt with the finding of Mr ÚS 77 / 06. According to the witness, the finding is already over, the Rules of Procedure have been amended since its publication, the amendments being uploaded to the system in electronic form. The amendment to the Rules of Procedure is the most sensitive issue for Members at all; it is not a real quality amendment to be implemented.
69. It is generally right for amendments to be discussed in committees. In the third reading, there is no discussion in the detailed debate, only the vote is being taken. The debate sometimes takes place in a general debate, not in a detailed debate. Members shall have 14 days to prepare for third reading, which shall be calculated only from the distribution of the relevant documents. In view of the possibility for Members to be familiar with the proposal, it is sufficient that the proposal is discussed in the Guarantee Committee after the second reading and then discussed in the third reading.
70. In this case, the coalition acted in a consistent manner, but the witness does not know whether Mr James Michalek's progress in the coalition was coordinated. The witness doesn't think that a similar procedure would turn into a convention, it was an exceptional procedure. It does not find the problem that the proposal has not been discussed by a constitutional legal committee. No one has tried to gather him, and even if his actions had taken place, it would probably have made no difference. From the beginning, the opinions were clear from all sides and from all the votes. In this case, the witness doesn't mind the element of surprise. Everyone knew what they were voting on. The procedure when the amendment is loaded in the last minutes before the end of the second reading is considered normal. There have been several cases like this in the last month alone. If space is created between second and third reading to get to know what is voted on, there is no problem.
71. In the final speech, the appellant insisted on her argument expressed in the proposal. As an intervener, the Government, through the present Minister of Justice, Pavel Blazek acknowledged that the legislative process suffered from defects, but left the assessment of their constitutionality to the Constitutional Court.
72. Since the President of the Chamber of Deputies, acting as a participant, did not take part in the ordered oral proceedings, she sent the court observations drawn up by the referring Member James Michalek. The Constitutional Court sent such observations to the parties and to the interveners. It followed the same approach in the case of written evidence of his speech at the oral hearing sent subsequently by the witness to the Court. Witness Vlaková then submitted to the court the written evidence of her speech directly in the Chamber.
73. The Court of First Instance assessed the evidence made individually and in summary, taking into account the facts and arguments contained in the file. The factual findings made in this way are contained in a further part of the statement of reasons for this finding.
Review of the procedure for the adoption of the contested legal provisions
74. The scope of the review powers of the Constitutional Court is laid down in Article 87 (1) (a) of the Constitution and Article 68 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll. Pursuant to Article 87 (1) (a) of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court decides to repeal laws or their individual provisions if they are contrary to constitutional order. According to Article 68 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll., the Constitutional Court then assesses the content of the law from the point of view of compliance with constitutional laws and ascertains whether the law has been adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution established competence and in a constitutional manner.
75. The applicant has expressly requested from the outset a review of all provisions resulting from the amendment by Act No 253 / 2023 Coll. The Constitutional Court therefore had to examine whether this law had been adopted and issued within the limits of the constitutional competence and in a constitutional manner.
76. The Constitutional Court found that Law No 253 / 2023 Coll. was adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution of the established competence. The appellant did not raise any objections to this; its argument focuses on the shortcomings of the legislative process. The Constitutional Court therefore examined whether Law No 253 / 2023 Coll. was adopted in a constitutional manner.
77. The Constitutional Court has already expressed many times on the assessment of the constitutionality of the legislative process in the proceedings for the annulment of laws and other laws pursuant to § 64 et seq. of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended.
78. The case-law of the Constitutional Court stands at the starting point that an unconstitutional legislative act cannot emerge from the unconstitutional process [cf. the findings of the Pl. ÚS 7 / 22 of 13.9.2022 (317 / 2022 Coll.), paragraph 67; OJ 6 / 21 of 22.6.2021 (N 121 / 106 CollU 312; 301 / 2021 Coll.), paragraph 48; OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 671.
79. The Constitution defines only the basic framework of the legislative process. However, the requirements for the legislative process are not only relatively certain procedural rules (e.g. the regulation of the legislative initiative under Article 41 of the Constitution), but also some overarching principles such as the principle of democratic and rule of law (Article 1 (1) of the Constitution), the principle of free competition of political parties (Article 5 of the Constitution), the principle of majority decision-making or the principle of protection of minorities (Article 6 of the Constitution), which must be regarded in this context in particular by the parliamentary opposition [cf. sp. sp. zn.
80. In particular, the Rules of Procedure of the two chambers of Parliament shall be further detailed in the legislative procedure. Another source of so-called parliamentary law is the resolutions of the individual chambers of Parliament issued pursuant to Rule 1 (2) of their Rules of Procedure (so-called autonomous resolution). The established (and constitutionally consistent) practice of the Parliamentary Chamber and its bodies [see the findings of the sp. zn. These are, in particular, the Rules of Procedure of the individual chambers of Parliament, by which the various constitutional principles of the legislative process are effectively guaranteed and projected into practice, which determine the interpretation and application of the individual provisions of the Rules of Procedure [sp. zn. ÚS 77 / 06, paragraph 38.
81. However, defects in the legislative process can only establish the unconstitutional nature of the law under consideration if it contravenes a standard resulting from constitutional order. The role of the Constitutional Court cannot be reduced to a review of hundreds of procedural errors in both the House and its governing bodies, without having any impact on the assessment of the material constitutionality of the rule of law (Clause 7 / 22, paragraph 118). The Constitutional Court has therefore repeatedly mentioned that it must be a 'direct and substantial breach' of the rules of the legislative process, while "reaching a constitutional legal dimension '. It is not the role of the Constitutional Court to be the guardian of the" mere "legality of parliamentary procedure [cf. the findings sp. zn. In the finding Pl. ÚS 6 / 21 (point 45) The Constitutional Court summarized that" it adheres to the principle of restraint and abolishes legislation exceptionally, unless its essential rules have been complied with in the legislative process and the errors reach constitutional legal dimensions'.
82. In the present case, the appellant raised two objections concerning the constitutionality of the legislative process. First, part of Act No. 253 / 2023 Coll. was adopted, in its view, on the basis of the label, namely the unconstitutional amendment of Mr Jakub Mikhalek. Secondly, the parliamentary debate was unconstitutionally restricted, as the debate at the third reading of the draft law was closed in a situation where speakers were still involved. The Constitutional Court also dealt with both objections in this order.
Legislative stickers
Legislative stickers in general
83. Legislative stickers are proposals that have been "glued" to the original draft law during the legislative process, but do not share the same subject and purpose with this original proposal (legislative proposal). There are therefore no related proposals in relation to the present Act on the matter and teleologically unrelated proposals, which are amendments only formally, seemingly, in fact a new draft law within the meaning of Article 41 et seq. Constitution [cf. Findings sp. zn. Routledge, 2024, p. 195; and Syllova, J. On the finding of the Constitutional Court on so-called stickers (abolishing the provision on compensation for bank clients). Legal outlooks, 11 / 2007, p. 409). The annex therefore constitutes a disguised legislative initiative (finding sp. zn. Formation of law in the Czech Republic: a truchlogame with a happy ending? Legal Rapporteur No 7 / 2006).
84. The stickers are an undesirable phenomenon in the legislative process. It bypasses or even exploits set parliamentary procedures. In fact, citizens are told that those who make laws themselves are paradoxically not governed by the laws (here, above all, by the Rules of Procedure). This weakens citizens' confidence in the rule of law.
85. Although the Constitution does not explicitly regulate the existence or the course of the triple reading of legislative proposals, including the submission of amendments (except in Article 47 of the Constitution) and, contrary to the constitutions of some other States, it does not expressly prohibit unrelated amendments (stickers), "adhesive practice" in its consequences and in specific cases may undermine certain basic constitutional principles, rules and values. It may, for example, jeopardise the democratic principle - unduly restrict the proper parliamentary debate to the proposal and allow sufficient room for expression to the parliamentary minority. It may also intervene in the division of power and constitutional guarantees of so-called brakes and balances within the powers of law and between the various powers (the Constitutional Court, in its sp. zl. ÚS 77 / 06, paragraph 71, draws attention to the circumvention of the right of the Government to comment on any draft law under Article 44 of the Constitution). Finally, it may constitute an inadmissible circumvention of the legislative initiative (Article 41 of the Constitution).
Existing case-law
86. The Constitutional Court addressed the stickers for the first time in the already cited finding of Pl. ÚS 77 / 06. In it, he has consistently interpreted the provisions of the Rules of Procedure concerning amendments and set limits on their use. It stated that the annex is an amendment which does not have a close relationship with the subject (content) or the purpose of the original draft law (paragraphs 66-70). At the same time, he identified four reasons for which the use of stickers violates constitutional principles and rules:
(i) Limitation of parliamentary and public debate on draft law
The finding stressed that the adoption of the draft law was to be the result of a discourse in which all the participants were given the opportunity to get to know the material in question in detail and to make their views known. In fact, a process that allows for an open debate between competitors, including minority views (paragraph 38), is appropriate. Transparent hearings of parties representing the public contribute to its identification with the product of the decision-making process, in this case the law. This is also the main reason for the preference of parliamentary legislation before adopting acts with the power of law within the executive body (paragraph 44). The parliamentary debate, according to the findings, must be protected already because it achieves public awareness (paragraph 55).
In this context, the finding pointed out that Parliament also reflects the idea of pluralism, which is the basis and mark of every free society. In the parliamentary debate and, naturally, in the work of the individual committees of Parliament, the opposition is taking the floor, thus applying a control that can be understood as one of the fundamental features of the rule of law. Often only in Parliament are they given the opportunity to express so-called weak interests, i.e. those of social groups that do not have such capacity to assert themselves. It is these characteristics of parliamentary debates that point to Parliament's particular role in balancing and integrating interests (paragraph 56).
(ii) Circumventing the legislative initiative (Article 41 of the Constitution)
By submitting a sticker, that is to say an amendment which does not have a close relationship with the subject matter or purpose of the original draft law, the rules on the legislative initiative referred to in Article 41 of the Constitution (point 73 of the decision) are circumvented. In fact, the amendment is a disguised new legislative initiative.
(iii) Infringement of the Government's right to comment on the draft law (Article 44 of the Constitution)
For similar reasons, the Government's right to comment on any draft law may be infringed by the adhesive (paragraphs 71-73).
(iv) Infringement of democratic rule of law (Article 1 (1) of the Constitution)
According to the finding, the use of stickers violates the division of power (paragraphs 47-48, 73). As the amendments lack a explanatory memorandum, they carry an increased risk of libel (paragraph 71). The finding also found that there was a breach of the requirements for clarity (predictability) of the law, since, as a result of the stickers of individuals in the legal order, "without using the IT tools, it becomes completely impossible '(paragraph 39). In particular, however, he stated that the infringement of the legislative procedure requirements in question would in future be seen as a" derogatory ground under Article 1 (1) of the Constitution' (paragraph 75).
87. The Constitutional Court is still based on that finding. The following caselaw consistently states that the annex is an amendment which does not have a "close relationship 'to the subject matter or purpose of the original draft law [the findings of the sp. zn. Col. ÚS 24 / 07 of 31.1.2008 (N 26 / 48 SbNU 303; 88 / 2008 Coll.); OJ C 369, 17.12.2013, p. Pl ÚS 1 / 14 of 31.3.2015 (N 64 / 76 CollNU 867; 115 / 2015 Coll.), paragraph 67; Pl ÚS 30 / 16, paragraph 40; Pl ÚS 17 / 22 of 21.2.2023 (90 / 2023 Coll.), paragraph 31. Although the Constitutional Court mentioned that the affiliation must be a manifestation of" extreme systemic arbitrage "(paragraph 40), it was not an amendment to the existing approach, since in the later finding of the Act on significant market power the Constitutional Court returned to the review" whether there is a close relationship between the content and the purpose of the original draft law and the content and purpose of the proposed amendment "(paragraph 31). The narrow criterion therefore applies in the case-law. No other criterion - for example, that only the" indirect "relationship between the amendment and the original proposal will suffice, or that they are not" significantly distant "- has ever contained the case-law.
88. It is also clear from the subsequent caselaw that the amendment is an adhesive only if it is not closely related to the subject matter or to the purpose of the original draft law. In the Found Pl. ÚS 77 / 06 The Constitutional Court did not find the close relationship of the amendment to the subject matter or purpose of the original draft law, which led it to derogate from the contested regulation. In subsequent findings, however, the Constitutional Court found a close relationship with the object or purpose and therefore it was not an attachment. In the case sp. zn. In Case Pl. ÚS 6 / 12, where the new local fee for slot machines was attached as an amendment to the amendment to the Act on the promotion of sport, the Constitutional Court found, on the contrary, a purposeful link in the promotion of sport by municipalities, since part of the proceeds from slot machines are used to support sport (point 60, in the light of which point 58 of the finding should be interpreted). In Case Pl ÚS 1 / 14, where the law amending the laws relating to the rectification of private law was accompanied by a transitional provision to the enforcement orders, the Constitutional Court, despite the express denial of the context in the purpose, found a link in the subject matter, since the amendment, like the Government's proposal, concerned the same law, i.e. the execution order (see, in more detail, paragraph 110 below).
89. Finally, even if the Constitutional Court finds that a specific amendment is a stickler, it must, according to the case law, consider whether other constitutionally protected values, in particular legal certainty, outweigh the reasons for its annulment (see already the finding of the sp. zn.
There is no reason to leave the case-law
90. The Constitutional Court found no reason to deviate from the existing caselaw.
91. The Constitutional Court failed to see that some of the shortcomings in the legislative process, which was highlighted by the Court of Justice of the European Union, were partly resolved by further legal or social developments. The amendment to the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies by Act No 265 / 2014 Coll. was intended to ensure a sufficiently informed debate on amendments and their justification by:
(i) extend the period between the second and third readings from 72 hours to 2 weeks,
(ii) have entered into a binding discussion by the Guarantee Committee, which shall assess the voting capacity of the amendments between second and third reading and shall take a substantive position on them; and
(iii) establish mandatory written or at least oral justifications for amendments. While at the time of the issue of the sp. zn.
92. Similarly, the requirement for clarity is weakened in today's digital era, when the main source of knowledge of the content of legislation is Internet sources, and the individual amendments to various laws are relatively simple and clearly inserted into the original text of the law. However, it may continue to be significant in some situations.
93. However, the principles on which the findings of the sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 77 / 06 stand remain relevant. As a result of the adhesive, in some cases there may be an unconstitutional shortening of the parliamentary and public debate on the bill. However much the amendment of the Rules of Procedure prevents such a consequence from being customary, it has not completely excluded that possibility. Similarly, the government's right to comment on the bill may be violated by the adhesive, although it is again true that the government will generally have sufficient time to comment on the content of the adhesive.
94. However, the annex always circumvents the law of the legislative initiative.
95. The legislative initiative shall have, in accordance with Article 41 (2): Only individual Members, their groups, the Senate, the Government or the authorities of higher local authorities. While the right to draft laws is enshrined directly in the Constitution, the right to propose amendments to the laws is enshrined only at the legal level in the Rules of Procedure. However, the application of this sub-constitutional right cannot defuse the content of the constitutional law.
96. Paragraph 63 (1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies provides that a Member may, in the debate, make proposals on the subject. These proposals are intended to relate "to a particular point '. Paragraph 63 (1) (4) of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies authorises Members to submit an amendment to delete, extend or amend certain parts of the original proposal.
97. Submission of amendments does not fall under the constitutional right of individual Members to draft laws (legislative initiative law). Indeed, an amendment must be an amendment to an existing draft law, not an alternative draft law, to which the original draft law serves only as an object and purpose of an unrelated medium. In the latter case, it is not about exercising the right of a Member to make an amendment, but about a disguised legislative initiative.
98. First of all, however, the affiliation violates the principles of the rule of law.
99. There is always an abuse of the right to make an amendment in order to circumvent the legislative initiative and procedure which would be linked to the submission of a proper bill. The prohibition of abuse is one of the principles of the rule of law [cf.
100. The rule of law also implies requirements for clarity and transparency of the legislative process. These requirements apply to the legislative process as well as to professional literature. Frederick Schauer refers to the requirement of clarity of the legislative process, which is linked to its public character and transparency. According to him, these principles should not only be a kind of brake on the deliberate abuse of the legislative process, but also serve as a defence against the otherwise well-meaning circumventing of its individual institutes (F. Schauer. Legislatures as Rule-Followers. In: Bauman R. W., Kahana T., eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 472-474). In this context, the legal theorist Jeremy Waldron, who is not a supporter of the judicial review of laws, underlines the principle of transparency as one of the fundamental conditions of legislative action. (J. Waldron. Principles of Legislation. In: Bauman R. W., Kahana T., eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 15-32). These principles are explicitly referred to in point 45 of the sp. zn. Praha: Oikoymenh, 1998). The annex, which constitutes a disguised legislative initiative, is contrary to the above principles of clarity and transparency of the legislative process.
101. The fact that stickers can significantly undermine the principle of rule of law and democratic rule of law also refers to Viktor Zoltan Kazai, according to which stickers conflict with the principle of the rule of law by not respecting the standards of the legislative process and their formal defects, as a result, opening the way not only to erosion of the material foundations of the democratic rule of law, but also to the advancement of the autocratic government (V. Z. Kazai. The Equilibrium of Parliament Law-making. Comparative Perspections on the role of courts in a democracy. London: Routledge, 2024, p. 195, 220).
102. Thus, the formal and material rationality of the legislative process is not only determined by the implementation of the proportionality test in the context of a substantive review of the contested provision (material review of the regulation), but also by the requirement to assess the consistency of the process of adopting the regulation with the constitutional order in its formal and material unity, as described in sp. zn. This unity creates the fundamental foundations of constitutionalism on which the democratic rule of law (N. W. Barber) stands and operates. The Principles of Constitutionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 85- 116). Without these constraints (transparency and rationality of the legislative process), the meaning of the legislative process would be completely emptied.
103. Stickers are a constitutional problem in many countries, such as Poland, Hungary, and France. Trends in foreign doctrine are aimed at more consistent control of laws and legislative procedures by constitutional courts in order to preserve the values of a democratic rule of law, such as the majority government, the protection of political minorities, transparency of legislative procedures for political minorities and the public, etc. Wojciech Sadurski considers the review of the legislative procedure to be a useful insurance policy for the democratic rule of law against illiberal developments and draws attention to the risks of an accelerated and content-based legislative process for both political minorities and the public (W. Sadurski. Poland's Constitutional Breakdown. Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015 / 2447 of 7 December 2015 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540 / 2011 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain fruit and vegetables originating in the People's Republic of China (OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 1). The fact that the legislative missteps of the ruling majority are strongly linked to authoritarian tendencies is also highlighted by Viktor Zoltan Kazai, who dealt with the case of Hungary (V. Z. Kazai, cited work, chapter 8). The same author then states in the case of France that, despite more than 40 years of constitutional review and several reforms to the Constitution and the Rules of Procedure, stickers in France are still a serious problem (there, p. 220).
104. In addition, expert literature encourages external actors such as constitutional courts to oversee parliamentary procedures, even in cases where the internal regulation of chambers of procedure itself contains a mechanism for checking possible stickers (V. Z. Kazai, cited work, p. 219, likewise F. Schauer, cited work, p. 476-478). The fact that Parliament's mere self-regulation mechanisms are not enough to address this issue is highlighted by Wojciech Sadurski. The Court calls the insistence on good legislative procedures and the protection of the rights of the parliamentary opposition as an effective strategy against interference in the functioning of the democratic rule of law [W. Sadurski. Judicial Review versus Populist Authoritarianism. 2024, 2 (2) Comparative Basic Studies (available from: https: / / www.elgaronline.com / view / jurnals / ccs / aop / article-10.4337-cccs.2024.0026 / article10.4337-cccs.2024.0026.xml)].
105. The Constitutional Court is in agreement with its current case-law and the doctrine cited above believes that the problem of stickers cannot be resolved without the cooperation of all the actors concerned. However subsidiary the role of the Constitutional Court is here, it cannot resign from its review role in this area either. Moreover, oral action has shown that the amendment of the Rules of Procedure is always politically complex and in practice difficult to achieve (as mentioned by both the players of the ruling majority and the opposition).
Algorithm of review of legislative stickers
106. In accordance with the existing case-law, the following aspects must be followed when assessing the labels:
- The annex is an amendment which (1) does not have a close relationship (1a) for the purpose or (1b) for the subject matter of the original bill, and (2) a broad consensus on its adoption has not been reached in the House.
- Such an adhesive has to be evaluated for the intensity in which it affects constitutional rules and principles, which will vary from one type of adhesive to another.
- As a result, consideration should be given to whether other, contradictory constitutional values prevail over the violated constitutional rules and principles, for which it is appropriate not to interfere.
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Regulation Information
| Citation | The Constitutional Court found No 427 / 2024 Coll., sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 41 / 23 on the application for annulment of certain provisions of Act No. 253 / 2023 Coll., amending Act No. 424 / 1991 Coll., on association in political parties and political movements, as amended, and other related laws |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | The Constitutional Tribunal found |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 19.12.2024 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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