Found No 42 / 2026 Coll.
Findings of the Constitutional Court sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 5 / 25 concerning the application for annulment of certain provisions of Act No. 24 / 2025 Coll., amending Act No. 65 / 2022 Coll., on certain measures relating to armed conflict in the territory of Ukraine caused by the invasion of Russian troops, as amended, and other related laws, in fact, on the abolition of certain provisions of Act No. 141 / 1961 Coll., on criminal proceedings (criminal order), as amended, and certain provisions of Act No. 40 / 2009 Coll., the Criminal Code, as amended
Valid
The Constitutional Tribunal found
Text versions:
24.03.2026
42
Found
The Constitutional Court
of 4 February 2026
sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 5 / 25 concerning the proposal for the annulment of certain provisions of Act No. 24 / 2025 Coll., amending Act No. 65 / 2022 Coll., on certain measures relating to armed conflict in Ukraine caused by the invasion of Russian troops, as amended, and other related laws, in case of the repeal of certain provisions of Act No. 141 / 1961 Coll., on criminal proceedings (criminal order), as amended, and certain provisions of Act No. 40 / 2009 Coll., penal code, as amended
On behalf of the Republic
In the Official Journal of the European Union, in the Official Journal of the European Union, in the Official Journal of the European Union, in the Official Journal of the European Union, in the Official Journal of the European Union, in the Official Journal of the European Union, in the Official Journal of the European Union, in the Official Journal of the European Union (Official Journal of the European Union), in the Official Journal of the European Union (Official Journal of the European Union), in the Official Journal of the European Union (Official Journal of the European Union), in the Official Journal of the Official Journal of the European Union (Official Journal of the European Union), in Journal of the Official Journal of the European Union (Official Journal of the European Union), p. 1, p. 1, p. 1, p. 1, p.
as follows:
Motion denied.
Reasons
Subject matter and content of the application submitted
1. In the present case, the Constitutional Court dealt with the abstract control of the constitutionality of the facts of the criminal offence for illegal activity for foreign power contained in § 318a of Act No. 40 / 2009 Coll., the Penal Code, as amended.
2. By a proposal under Article 87 (1) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution) and Article 64 (1) (b) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, a group of 24 Senators (hereinafter referred to as "the draftsman") seeks the repeal of the provisions of Act No 24 / 2025 Coll., amending Act No 65 / 2022 Coll., on certain measures relating to the armed conflict in the territory of Ukraine caused by the invasion of the Russian Federation, as amended, and other related laws (hereinafter referred to as "Lex Ukraine VII" or "Act No 24 / 2025 Coll."), amending Act No 141 / 1961 Coll., as amended by the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Criminal Code (i.e. Part Two of Article III and Part Five of Article VI of the Law of the Law of Ukraine VII).
3. The appellant states that the common denominator of the contested legal provisions is the amendment of the Criminal Code and the Criminal Code in connection with the introduction of the new facts of an unlawful offence for an illegal activity for a foreign power inserted in three variants in Section 318a of the Criminal Code. In the amended criminal legislation, in the event of cancellation in § 17 (1) (d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the words "illegal activities for foreign power ', in § 88 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure," illegal activities for foreign power under § 318a of the Code of Criminal Procedure' and, in § 33 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the words "illegal activities for foreign power (§ 318a) ', the words" illegal activities for foreign power (§ 367 (1) and (2) of the Code of Criminal Law (g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure), and the words "illegal activities for foreign power (§ 367 (1) and Article 368 (1). The Constitutional Court does not consider it necessary to reproduce here the full text of the contested provisions of the criminal law and considers it sufficient to mention only the text of the facts of the offence of unlawful activity for foreign authority (§ 318a of the Penal Code), which the legislator has formulated as follows:
(1) By withdrawing liberty for one year to five years, he will be punished.
(a) those who intend to jeopardise or harm the constitutional establishment, sovereignty, territorial integrity, defence or security of the Czech Republic or the defence or security of an international organisation whose interests the Czech Republic has undertaken to protect are engaged in activities for foreign power in the Czech Republic,
(b) he who distorts the sovereignty of the Czech Republic by following other intelligence means in its territory for the benefit of foreign power; or
(c) a citizen of the Czech Republic or a stateless person who is allowed to reside on its territory, who intends to pursue outside the territory of the Czech Republic activities for foreign power.
(2) By withdrawing liberty for two years to eight years, the perpetrator will be punished,
(a) where the act referred to in paragraph 1 has been obtained for itself or for other significant benefits, or where it has committed such an act to a significant extent; or
(b) if the act referred to in paragraph 1 causes significant damage or any other particularly serious consequence.
(3) By withdrawing liberty for five to twelve years, the perpetrator will be punished,
(a) if obtained by the act referred to in paragraph 1 for himself or for any other benefit of a large scale; or
(b) cause damage to a large extent by the act referred to in paragraph 1.
(4) By withdrawing liberty for eight to 15 years, the perpetrator shall be punished if the offence referred to in paragraph 1 is committed in a state of state or war.
(5) Preparation is criminal.
4. The draftsman first contradicts the constitutional conformity of the legislative process. It refers to a government bill approved on 12 June 2024, the purpose and purpose of which was to extend the timeframe for the temporary protection of persons fleeing armed conflict in Ukraine. It states that the Government did not foresee any increase in security threats in the explanatory memorandum to the Act and did not propose a change in the state's criminal policy. This subject and purpose, according to the author, are also derived from the scheme of the original draft law.
5. It also describes the course of the discussion of the draft contested law by the Chamber of Deputies (cf. House Press No. 727). It states that the government, through the Minister of the Interior, consistently stressed the subject matter and purpose of the bill expressed above during the first and second reading. In the first reading and even in committee discussions, namely in the Committee on Security as a Guarantee Committee and in the Social Policy Committee, the questions associated with the extension of the Penal Code did not discuss any other new facts of the crime. It points out that the constitutional legal committee did not comment on the draft law at all.
6. It states that the amendments to the criminal law relating to the introduction of the facts of an illegal activity for foreign power were only inserted in the draft law at second reading (note of the Constitutional Court: the amendment was already justified in the general debate, with Mr Exner's submission of the statement of reasons also in the detailed second reading on 22 October 2024). The amendment was circulated on 23 October 2024 (cf. House Press 727 / 3, Amendment 5055). The appellant reiterates that the amendment of the criminal rules has no connection with the Government's initial intention to adopt an adjustment linked to the extension of the framework for temporary protection.
7. The appellant points out that the same regulation concerning the new offence of illegal activity for foreign power contains a government bill (Amendments to the Criminal Code) of 13.11.2024, submitted to the Chamber of Deputies on 19.11.2024, which was first read and was ordered by the Constitutional-Legal Committee as a guarantee committee. On 15.1.2025, at the time when the Senate was now dealing with the draft law under consideration (see also paragraph 17 below), it decided to suspend the discussion of the relevant House Press No. 861 (note of the Constitutional Court: this draft law, which was already approved in the meantime without Article 318a of the Penal Code, was published in the Collection of Laws and International Treaties under No. 270 / 2025 Coll.).
8. The appellant further submits that, during the discussion of the draft law (House Press No. 727) at the third reading, held on 11 December 2024, the petitioner described the reasons for the amendment. It considers that there has been arbitrary extension of the object and purpose of Lex Ukraine VII. It points out that there was no comment on the amendment, either by the Government (Ministry of Justice) or by the NGO (Supreme Court as the Unifier of the case law). It also refers to the statement of the Minister of Justice responding to the professional criticism of the nature of the unlawful activity for foreign power and confirming the shortcomings of legislation (e.g. the vagueness of broad wording). The appellant considers that the reason for circumventing the ordinary legislative process was not, in view of the alleged accompaniment, the concern of time lag when adopting a change in criminal law, but rather the concern of the petitioner of the obligation to deal with the comments of the parties concerned. It refers here to the comments of the Supreme Court, which, when discussing the amendment to the Criminal Code and the Criminal Code (House Press No. 861), made negative comments on the proposed regulation and raised a number of shortcomings resulting from the possible adoption of a penal amendment. The appellant adds that at the time of the discussion of the draft law during the third reading on 18.12.2024, the Constitutional Court's finding of 4.12.2024 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 41 / 23 (427 / 2024 Coll.) was already known. It states that the petitioner responded to this finding through her representative, the Minister of the Interior, who significantly extended the originally declared meaning and purpose of the law and accentuated "the public interest in the effective protection of the constitutional constitution, sovereignty, territorial integrity, defence and security of the Czech Republic."
9. It then describes the course of the vote in the Chamber of Deputies and the course of the debate and the vote in the Senate. It states that the bill was passed by a relatively narrow majority.
10. With reference to the legal conclusions of the above-mentioned plenary finding of the Constitutional Court, the appellant states that Amendment 5055 is an unconstitutional adhesive to the original government bill. It considers that the contested provisions of the approved law were not the subject of the original government proposal and do not have a close relationship with its purpose and subject matter, without a broad consensus being reached on its adoption. It recalls that 'the submission of amendments does not fall under the constitutional right of individual Members to draft laws (legislative initiative law). Indeed, an amendment must be an amendment to an existing draft law, not an alternative draft law, to which the original draft law serves only as an object and purpose of an unrelated medium. "The contested provisions amending the Penal Code and the Penal Code were not, according to the appellant, adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution laid down by competence and in a constitutional manner.
11. It also draws attention to the shortening of speaking time during the third reading of the bill to twice 15 minutes. It considers that, in the case under consideration, there was no reason for this measure, since the negotiation of the draft law did not entail any House obstruction. The debate that takes place during the third reading indicates that it is meritorious. It also draws attention to the conclusion of the debate at third reading, although other Members have been enrolled in it, which it considers contradictory to Article 66 (1) of Act No 90 / 1995 Coll., on the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies (hereinafter referred to as the Rules of Procedure), and leaves to the decision of the Constitutional Court whether this unlawful termination of the parliamentary debate also infringes constitutional principles.
12. From a factual point of view, the appellant contests the contested legal provisions with the principle of legality, at the level of nullum crimen sine interlocerta. He reiterates the criticism presented by the Supreme Court, recalls that the Minister of Justice has already announced an initiative to change the substance of the offence under appeal, and refers to the finding of 23 July 2013 sp. pl. Pl. ÚS 13 / 12 (N 126 / 70 CollNU 147; 259 / 2013 Coll.), in which the Constitutional Court, when it derogated from another provision of the Criminal Code relating to the punishment of drug crime, namely § 289 (2) empowering the Government to conclude the concept of quantities greater than small, argued, inter alia, a lack of law. The appellant points out that the indeterminity of the rule of law, which excludes the disclosure of its normative content by means of the usual interpretation procedures, makes the rule of law contradictory to the constitutional requirement of legal certainty.
13. Finally, at the end of the proposal, it explains the wording of the petition. It proposes the repeal of Part Lex Ukraine VII amending the Code of Criminal Procedure (Part Two, Article III) and the Code of Criminal Procedure (Part Five, Article VI) and, furthermore, the separate in-event amendment of the relevant parts of the Code of Criminal Procedure [Section 17 (1) (d) and Section 88 (1)] and the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 33, Section 318a, Section 329 (2) (g) and Sections 367 (1) and (2) and Section 368 (1). The appellant proposes to repeal the contested provisions with effect from the date of receipt of the Constitutional Court's finding and thus not until the date of publication of the finding in the Collection of Laws and International Treaties. It also asks for a preliminary hearing under Paragraph 39 of the Constitutional Court Act.
Observations of the parties, the intervener and the appellant's reply
14. The Constitutional Court has sent a motion to initiate proceedings to the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, the Government and the Ombudsman.
Observation of Parliament's chambers
15. The Chamber of Deputies (through the President) has described the course of discussion and approval of the contested law. It stated that the bill was submitted to the Government of the Chamber of Deputies on 12 June 2024 and sent to Members as Parliament Press No. 727 / 0 on 13 June 2024. The first reading took place at the 108th meeting on 25 June 2024. The bill was ordered to discuss the Security Committee as a guarantee committee as well as the Social Policy Committee. The Committee on Social Policy discussed the draft law and issued a resolution on 11 July 2024 with a recommendation to approve the draft law (cf. House Press No. 727 / 1). The Committee on Security discussed the draft law and issued a resolution on 6 September 2024 with amendments to be delivered to Members as Press 727 / 2. The second reading of the bill took place at the 115th meeting of 22 October 2024, when, in a detailed debate as Chamber Document No 5055, the amendment of Members M. Exner, V. Austuchana, P. Blažka, J. Bartoška, P. Žáčka, M. Zuny, J. Michálka and P. Letocha were read. All amendments tabled have been processed as Press 727 / 3. The third reading of the draft law started on 20 November 2024 and continued on 6, 11 and 18 December 2024, when Amendment 5055 was approved: of 177 Members present 100 voted in favour and 74 against. In the final vote on the bill as a whole, 177 Members and Members were opposed to 99 and 78. The bill has been passed. The bill was passed on to the Senate on 30 December 2024, which it ranked at its 5th meeting on 22 January 2025. The Senate did not adopt a resolution on the draft law (only an accompanying resolution was adopted). The law was delivered to the President of the Republic for signature on 30 January 2025. The President signed the Act on 6 February 2025.
16. Finally, the Chamber of Deputies stated that the legislature acted in the belief that the law adopted was in line with the Constitution.
17. The Senate (through the President) has taken stock of both the content of the proposal now under consideration and the content of the contested legal provisions. He also described the course of the discussion of the contested law (Press 35). The Organizing Committee ordered the draft law of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security as a committee of guarantee, and the Committee on Social Policy, the Constitutional Legal Committee and the Committee on Education, Science, Culture, Human Rights and Petitions. In terms of the content of the material now under review, it is important that the Social Policy Committee discussed the draft law on 14 January 2025 and adopted Resolution No 14 recommending the Senate to return the bill to the Chamber of Deputies (among other things) with an amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Code of Criminal Procedure in relation to the facts of the new offence of illegal activity for foreign power. The Senate dealt with the bill at its 5th meeting on 22 January 2025. Both opponents and supporters of the proposed legislation and individual parts of the draft law spoke in a multihour discussion. In its observations, the Senate stated that the revision now under review was perceived as problematic, as is also demonstrated by the vote on the proposal.
18. In the vote under Order No 5, out of 73 senators and senators present, 21 voted in favour of Senator M. Germans' proposal to approve the bill as referred to by the Chamber of Deputies, against which 27 were opposed, the proposal was not adopted. Then the vote was taken on the motion to reject Senator J. Mracek Vildumetz's bill. In the vote held under Order No 6, 74 of those present voted in favour of Prop 15, against 47, this proposal was also not adopted. Since none of the proposals were adopted, the President has launched a detailed debate to which no one has applied and, therefore, after that, a vote was taken on the amendments which were part of the selection resolutions. In the third order, the amendment concerning the deletion of an amendment to the Criminal Code and the Criminal Code in relation to the facts of the new offence was an illegal activity for foreign power. No amendment was adopted in the vote, so the Senate has not adopted a resolution on the draft law.
19. The Senate concluded that, when discussing the draft law, it acted within the limits of the Constitution laid down by competence and in a constitutionally prescribed manner, with the fact that it was entirely up to the Constitutional Court to assess the compliance of the draft laws with the constitutional order.
Government observations
20. On 26 March 2025, the Government adopted Resolution 208, which approved its entry into the proceedings before the Constitutional Court, proposed that the Constitutional Court reject the proposal and, at the same time, ordered the Minister of Justice, in cooperation with the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to draw up a detailed statement by the Government on the proposal.
21. As regards the appellant's procedural objections, the Government stated first of all that the constitutionality of the contested law cannot be called into question by the mere absence of a comment procedure. In this context, it referred to the discussion of the Government Bill (House Press No. 861), which ultimately differs from the author of the contested legislation only by the name of the offence (activity for foreign power instead of illegal activity for foreign power). It stressed that House Press No. 861 had undergone both a ministerial and an interministerial comment procedure, which also took into account the comments of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Prosecutor (e.g. the amendment to the Amendment to Section 88 of the Criminal Code). Therefore, the points of reference, including the Ministry of Justice, had an opportunity to comment on the contested legislation.
22. The Government explained that, in view of the deteriorating security situation in the Czech Republic and the associated increase in hybrid threats and the fact that it was not certain whether or not House Press 861 would be able to discuss and approve the current Parliament's 9-term parliamentary term, a group of Members (which included interior and justice ministers) took the position that it was necessary to ensure that the appellant's contested legislation was approved in the 9th term. For this reason, part of the legislation contained in the above-mentioned draft penal code amendment according to House Press No. 861 concerning the offence of illegal activity for foreign power was incorporated by means of Amendment 5055 into House Press No. 727. The Government pointed out that the amendment was inserted into the Chamber of Deputies' evidence system on 2 October 2024 and was applied at second reading, which took place on 22 October 2024, after the proposed legislation had undergone proper comment procedure.
23. The Government has refused that the contested legislation would constitute an unconstitutional annex. It pointed out that Lex Ukraine VII is a collection law that covers various measures related to the aggression unleashed by the Russian Federation in Ukraine, which also results from the name of this law. It added that the aim of all laws adopted, referred to as Lex Ukraine, was to regulate the various specific issues arising from the armed conflict in Ukraine. She again pointed out the deterioration of the international security situation related, inter alia, to the change in the methods by which Russia is waging a hybrid war against the Czech Republic and other European states as allies of Ukraine. The Government has expressed its belief that the contested legislation, incorporated in Lex Ukraine VII by Amendment 5055, is not an adhesive, since the amendment is closely related to the purpose and subject matter of the original proposal to which it was applied. The legislation has identified it as completely legitimate and highly necessary to ensure the sovereignty, territorial integrity of the Czech Republic and to protect its democratic foundations, as well as the life, health and property values of its inhabitants.
24. As regards the substantive objections made by the Government in reference to the previous case-law of the Constitutional Court, it pointed out that it was in principle not for it to assess the extent of the boundaries of criminal criminalisation of certain types of conduct, unless it is to duplicate or substitute the constitutional role of the legislature. She recalled that under Article 1 of Constitutional Act No. 110 / 1998 Coll., on the Security of the Czech Republic, the security interest of the State is protected by constitutional value.
25. On the basis of the uncertainties raised, the facts of the unlawful activity for a foreign power stated that it contained several specifically described characters which must be fulfilled simultaneously. This is a deliberate offence with a special intention, i.e. intended to jeopardise or harm the constitutional constitution, sovereignty, territorial integrity, defence or security of the Czech Republic or the security of an international organisation, to protect its interests.
26. The Government has also expressed its views on the various concepts contained in the facts contained in Section 318a of the Criminal Code. It stated that the term "foreign power" was already used in the criminal code for the crime of treason (§ 309), abuse of state representation and international organisation (§ 315) and espionage (§ 316). The term "illegality" merely confirms that the criminal offence is also a sign of illegality, i.e. that cases involving cooperation or the specific acquisition and transmission of information are excluded from the scope of this standard by a fully legal procedure such as § 10 of Act No. 153 / 1994 Coll., on the Intelligence Services of the Czech Republic (hereinafter "the Act on Intelligence Services") or by the Act No. 106 / 1999 Coll., on free access to information, as amended. The Government further stated that the concept of "activity 'appeared to be broad at first sight, but stated that it had to be interpreted in close connection with the subjective aspect, the intention of the legislature and the principle of subsidiarity of criminal repression (cf. Section 12 (2) of the Criminal Code), which also contained an aspect of sufficient social harm. According to the Government, the elements of the illegality, the connection with foreign power and the specific harmful intent fulfil the role of correction of otherwise indeterminate delineation of cases on which the facts would affect. It added that the intention of the legislator, which is to be affected by the conduct typically under this offence, was expressed in the explanatory report on the draft law discussed by the Chamber of Deputies as print No 861, which serves as an interpretative guide for application practice in the creation of case law. In the reference to commentary literature, the Government also defined other concepts of fact (damage and threat to constitutional constitution, sovereignty and territorial integrity).
27. In relation to the objective aspect of the violation of the sovereignty of the Czech Republic by someone for foreign power following the intelligence of the citizens of the Czech Republic on its territory, the Government stated that the concept of "intelligence 'had to be interpreted in the light of the legislation governing intelligence activities (cf. § 7 of Act No. 154 / 1994 Coll., on the Security Information Service, and § 7 of Act No. 289 / 2005 Coll., on Military Intelligence).
28. The Government added that the unconstitutional insecurity of the contested legislation could not be imported even from the subsequent statement by the Minister of Justice of that time that it would take action to regulate the offence. The Court of Justice of the European Union ("the Court of Human Rights'), in its judgment in Berardi and Mularoni v San Marino of 10.1.2019 No 24705 / 16 and No 24818 / 16, paragraph 54, concluded that a later clarification of the facts of the offence does not automatically mean that the previous legislation was incorrect.
29. It referred to the finding of 23 July 2013, sp. zn. In this finding, the Constitutional Court admitted that even in criminal law certain indeterminate terms are interpreted by judicial caselaw. This conclusion is confirmed by the subsequent case-law (cf. Resolution of 9 October 2018 sp. zn. II. ÚS 2980 / 17, paragraph 44), in which the Constitutional Court, in compliance with Article 39 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms ("the Charter '), accepted the maintenance of a" softer' standard, according to which the principle of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine 'is fulfilled not only by the wording of the law itself, but also by its synergy with the caselaw of the Supreme Courts. The ECHR also takes the same view on this issue, the case-law of which states that it is not a breach of the predictability of law, if it is possible to establish the content of a standard of criminal law which is substantive once the case-law has been established (see, for example, the judgment in the Kononov case against Latvia of 17.5.2010, paragraph 185, or the judgment in the case-law of the United Kingdom of 6.7.2021, No 41387 / 17, paragraph 60, where the ECHR found that "the progressive development of criminal law through judicial case-law is a well-founded and necessary part of the legal tradition of the Contracting States. Article 7 [Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as the Convention)] cannot be interpreted as prohibiting the progressive clarification of the rules of criminal liability through judicial interpretation'. The Government also draws similar conclusions from the Ashlarba judgment of 15.7.2014 No 45554 / 08, paragraph 33, and the Huhtamaki judgment of 6.3.2012 No 54468 / 09, paragraph 45. The Government has concluded that both the Constitutional Court and the ECHR are aware of the need to use indeterminate terms, which are subsequently completed by the case-law of the courts, and do not find a breach of the principle of legality in such a procedure.
30. Finally, the Government found that the contested legislation was not excessive even in the European context.
31. For these reasons, the Government proposed that the Constitutional Court reject the proposal.
Replication of the appellant
32. The appellant, in its reply to the comments sent, maintained its original argument. It reiterated that the contested regulation was part of the original legislative initiative linked to the House Press No 861 and, by means of an amendment, it was glued to the House Press No 727, with which it did not have a close relationship with the subject or purpose, since the original draft law under the House Press No 727 did not regulate any amendment to the criminal legislation.
33. The appellant objected to the Government's argument that the legislation under appeal was closely linked to the subject matter and purpose of the original draft law. With reference to the conclusions expressed in the Constitutional Court's finding of 4.12.2024 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 41 / 23, it argued that the relationship with the subject matter and purpose of the original draft law cannot be defined in an abstract, all-embracing manner. It also contradicted the need for the Government to rapidly incorporate the contested fact into House Press No 727. It stated that there was no urgent need for legislative change, since it was highly likely that the proposal under House Press No. 861 would be approved by the standard legislative procedure during this parliamentary term (cf. note under point 7). Moreover, the government has not used other instruments to ensure legislative change if it is considered urgent (i.e. a state of legislative emergency). The appellant also redefined itself against shortening the speaking time at third reading.
34. In view of the factual assessment of the contested regulation, it referred to the finding of 12.4.1994 sp. zn. It reiterated that the contested fact does not allow for an indication of the conduct of criminal law.
Communication from the Ombudsman
35. The Ombudsman informed the Constitutional Court that he would not exercise his right under Paragraph 69 (3) of the Law on the Constitutional Court and would not intervene in the proceedings.
Expression of NGOs
36. The Sua sponte also sent its observations to the Constitutional Court by the Institute H21, Zu., Iuridicum Remedium, z. s., and the Open Society, o. p. s., the Constitutional Court did not notify the appellant of this unsolicited statement because he did not continue to work with it [cf. Similarly to the finding of 15.5.2024 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 44 / 23 (213 / 2024 Coll.), paragraph 18].
Abandonment of oral proceedings
37. The Constitutional Court concluded that further clarification of the case could not be expected from oral proceedings and therefore, in accordance with Article 44 of the Constitutional Court Act, it decided on the case without its regulation.
Management conditions
38. The Constitutional Court is responsible for discussing the application for the annulment of the contested provisions of Lex Ukraine VII, or in the event of the motion for the annulment of the amended provisions of the Criminal Code and the Criminal Code. The appellant is actively authorised to submit the proposal. Although, according to the settled case law of the Constitutional Court (cf. Case 41 / 23 ÚS Pl. ÚS, paragraphs 37 and 39), amending legislation and its individual provisions generally do not have a separate legislative existence, as they become part of the amended legislation, if the absence of standard competence or breach of the constitutionally prescribed way of adopting the law is contested, the constitutionality of the amendment regulation (i.e. Act No 24 / 2025 Coll.) or its individual parts can be assessed from these aspects. The contested provisions of the Criminal Code and the Criminal Code are a valid part of the rule of law. The Constitutional Court was therefore able to proceed to a substantive examination of the application.
Review of the procedure for the adoption of the contested law
39. In accordance with Article 68 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court was primarily concerned with whether the contested legal provisions (i.e. Article III of Part Two and Article VI of Part Five of Act No 24 / 2025 Coll.) had been adopted and issued within the limits of the constitutional competence and the constitutionally prescribed manner. It then assessed whether the contested legislation (i.e. amended provisions of criminal law) was in line with the constitutional rules in substance.
40. The Constitutional Court found that Lex Ukraine VII had been accepted and issued within the limits of the Constitution of a defined competence. Moreover, the appellant raised no objections to this. Its argument - as is apparent from the recap above - focuses primarily on the alleged shortcomings of the legislative process. The Constitutional Court therefore addressed whether Lex Ukraine VII was adopted in a constitutional manner.
Deficiencies in the legislative process and their assessment - general considerations
41. The Constitutional Court has expressed itself many times in order to assess the constitutionality of the legislative process in the proceedings for the annulment of laws and other legislation under § 64 et seq. of the Law on the Constitutional Court and does not consider it necessary to recap the general points on which it is based in such a review. It is sufficient to refer to these grounds [cf., for example, the finding of 25.6.2025 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 11 / 25 (256 / 2025 Coll.), paragraphs 48 to 54] and to summarise in concentrated form that the defect of the legislative process is unconstitutional if:
1) contravenes directly the standard expressly enshrined in the constitutional order;
2) infringes the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies or of the Senate and, as a result of this defect, any constitutional standards or principles have been affected; while at the same time contradictory constitutional standards or principles do not prevail over the constitutional standard or principle that has been affected; or
(3) Although the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate have been formally observed, there will nevertheless be a particularly serious breach of a constitutional standard or principle in accordance with Parliament's procedure; and at the same time contradictory constitutional standards or principles do not prevail in the present case over the constitutional standard or principle that has been affected (cf. recital 55). _
42. According to the typology so drawn up, the Constitutional Court assesses the most severe contradiction with the standard which is directly enshrined in the constitutional order, and less strictly assesses the breach of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies or of the Senate, whereas the third situation described may lead to the intervention of the Constitutional Court only exceptionally [cf. the finding of 4.6.2025 sp. zn.
43. As regards the second of the variants referred to in paragraph 41, infringement of the Rules of Procedure may also lead to a breach of constitutionality in particular in three types of situations:
1) infringement of the legislative emergency rules [the findings of 1.3.2011 sp. zn.
(2) approval of the so-called adhesive [findings of 15.2.2007 sp. zn.
3) the limitation of the parliamentary debate by merging the debate to the unrelated draft laws (finding of 6.12.2012 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 1 / 12 (N 195 / 67 CollU 333; 437 / 2012 Coll.), in which there was no repeal of the law on this basis; 8 / 2018 Sb.), on 18.5.2021 (N 110 / 114 SbNU 17), on 17.1.2024 (N 227 / 87 SbNU 597; 8 / 2018 Sb.
44. In the present case, the appellant raised four (procedural) objections concerning the constitutionality of the legislative process. First, the contested part of Act No. 24 / 2025 Coll. relating to the amendment of the criminal rules following the introduction of the facts of a criminal offence for illegal activity for foreign power was, in its view, accepted as an attachment, i.e. an unconstitutional amendment. It also objected to the unconstitutional restriction of parliamentary debate by ending the third-reading debate by setting a firm time for the vote, even though other speakers were still enrolled. Thirdly, the speaking time was shortened during the third reading of the bill to twice 15 minutes. Last but not least, it argued that it could not comment on the amendment. In that order, the appellant's objections were also addressed by the Constitutional Court.
Legislative stickers
Algorithm of constitutional review
45. The issue of legislative stickers has been dealt with repeatedly by the Constitutional Court. In the finding, sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 41 / 23 summarised the existing case-law and stated that legislative stickers are proposals that were "glued 'to the original draft law in the course of the legislative process, but do not share the same object or purpose. It is therefore in relation to the present law on the matter and teleologically unrelated proposals, which are amendments only formally, seemingly, in fact a new draft law within the meaning of Article 41 et seq. of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court has identified legislative stickers as an undesirable phenomenon of the legislative process (cf. paragraphs 83 and 84 of the cited finding).
46. In this finding, the Constitutional Court formulated an algorithm for reviewing legislative stickers (paragraphs 106 et seq.), which is also fully applicable in the case at hand. In assessing the stickers, the Constitutional Court shall follow the following aspects:
1) The annex is an amendment which (1) does not have a close relationship (1a) for the purpose or (1b) for the subject matter of the original draft law, and at the same time (2) a broad consensus on its adoption has not been reached in the House.
2) Such an adhesive has to be assessed for the intensity in which it affects constitutional rules and principles, which will be different for the various stickers.
3) Following this, consideration should be given to whether other, contradictory constitutional values prevail over the violated constitutional rules and principles, for which it is appropriate not to interrupt the adjustment.
47. The Constitutional Court does not consider it necessary to reproduce this algorithm in detail and refers to the quoted finding sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 41 / 23. It merely summarises that (ad 1) the adhesive is only an amendment which cannot be found to have a close relationship with either the subject or the purpose of the original draft law. Therefore, if the amendment has a close relationship with at least an object or at least for the purpose of the original proposal, it will pass the test. What matters is not what laws concerned the original proposal and what amendments. For example, it would be an acceptable amendment proposing to insert a comparable amendment into a law other than the one originally intended to be amended, even if the amendment followed a different purpose. Similarly, it would be acceptable for an amendment which places a different amendment in another law if it pursues a comparable purpose. Furthermore, each supplement is automatically not unconstitutional. If a broad consensus is reached in the Chamber of Deputies on the need for an amendment, the Constitutional Court will never regard it as a non-constitutional attachment, even if it does not have a close relationship with the subject or for the purpose of the original draft law. A broad consensus means at least a majority that is comparable to the majority required to adopt a constitutional law. In view of the intensity of the breach of constitutional principles and rules (ad 2), the Constitutional Court takes the view that the affiliation is always circumvented by the legislative initiative (Article 41 of the Constitution) and always distorts the principles of the rule of law (Article 1 (1) of the Constitution), but takes into account that, despite the use of the affix, sufficient parliamentary debate can be maintained and the government can have sufficient opportunity to express itself to the affiliation. Finally, the Constitutional Court assesses whether conflicting constitutional principles, rules and values prevail over those affected by the adhesive (ad 3). In particular, the principle of legal certainty will be contradictory, but it may also be other constitutional values or principles, in particular concerning the material rule of law or the effective protection of constitutionality (Articles 1 (1) and 83 of the Constitution).
Application to the case currently under consideration
48. The applicant argues that Amendment 5055 is an unconstitutional adhesive.
49. The Constitutional Court accepted the review and first addressed whether the amendment by M. Exner and other Members was an adhesive. First of all, it is necessary to assess whether it is an amendment which is not closely related to the original draft law, neither in terms of object nor in terms of purpose.
50. If there is a close relationship with the subject, the Constitutional Court reiterates that it is not crucial whether the original and amendment amend the same laws. It is therefore not essential that the original proposal did not contain an amendment to criminal law and this amendment was brought about only by the contested amendment, but by what was the content of the original proposal and what is the content of the amendment. The original draft law moved in the area of administrative law and contained primarily rules relating to the residence of foreigners (especially citizens of Ukraine), whether based on the extension of temporary protection linked to the regulation in Union law or on the basis of a new specific national authorisation, the so-called special long-term residence. The foreign regime, i.e. the regulation of the rights and obligations of foreigners in the territory of the state, is also related to the original draft amendment of other regulations (cf. part of the second draft law concerning the amendment of Act No. 326 / 1999 Coll., on the residence of foreigners in the territory of the Czech Republic and on the amendment of certain laws, and part three and fourth draft law governing the status of foreigners in the fields of employment, social security and education). Lex Ukraine did not regulate and regulate the conditions of criminal conduct or criminal sanctions for that. The subject matter of Amendment 5055 is different; it is aimed at damaging the fundamental functions of the State. Amendment 5055 reflects the state's criminal policy, which protects society from the most serious types of social malpractice, regulates exclusively the material that has always been reserved for the criminal code. So, in substance, Amendment 5055 introduced a material in the present draft law governing a different area of social relations than Lex Ukraine had ever regulated and the draft law in its original version. In addition, it provides for criminal liability in general and therefore affects anyone, including citizens of the Czech Republic. Therefore, the content changes made through the amendment do not have a close link with the content of the original proposal, which dealt with the foreign regime applicable in particular to the citizens of Ukraine who were forced to leave their country as a result of an act of aggression by the Russian Federation.
51. As mentioned above, this in itself does not lead to the conclusion that it is an annex. The Constitutional Court therefore further assessed the relationship of the amendment to the purpose of the original draft law. The bill under review is amended by Act No. 65 / 2022 Coll., on certain measures relating to armed conflict in Ukraine caused by the invasion of Russian troops, as amended, and other related laws. This nearly four years of invasion has caused the biggest security crisis on the European continent since the end of World War II, to which European states have responded by numerous legislative and non-legislative measures. Their common purpose is to tackle the urgent problems linked to both this security crisis and the migration wave it has created.
52. The purpose of the amendment was formulated by the Minister of the Interior, V. Austrian, one of the authors of the amendment, in his observations during the first day of the third reading (i.e. on 20.11.2024), which stated that the amendment supplemented the legislation 'clearly relates to the fact that Russia attacked Ukraine. And at this point, based on information from the security community, we need to have a defined facts of a crime where someone is working in some way for foreign power. And please, let us not delude ourselves that it is most often someone other than the Russian Federation and that the objectively induced need to have this in the Code of Criminal Procedure is simply related to the Russian invasion. "The same argument was put forward by the Government in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court, according to which Lex Ukraine is a collection law concerning various aggression-related measures launched by the Russian Federation in Ukraine.
53. According to the Constitutional Court, the relationship between the purpose of the amendment and the purpose of the original draft law can be found precisely in the need to respond to the security crisis caused by the invasion of Russian Federation troops in Ukraine. The fact that it is a general fact of a crime not only aimed at the Russian Federation does not disprove this relationship. From the point of view of constitutional law, it is a natural consequence of the requirement for the universality of the law, and politically, it is a clear geopolitical consideration that other states can also pose a threat.
54. It is also important for the Constitutional Court that a parliamentary debate was held on this amendment in which the opposition had a real opportunity to express its views (see paragraphs 65 to 67 below). The amendment was not tabled surprisingly or "secret," seeking to avoid debate and minimise the possibility of intervening in its content in a parliamentary debate (cf. the statement of the Minister of the Interior during the third reading of 11 December 2024). Thus, the submission of the contested provisions as an amendment did not prevent the legislation adopted from being "the result of a discourse conducted across the political spectrum, namely a discourse in which all the participants (both the opposition and the public) were given the opportunity to get to know the material in question in detail and to comment on it in an informed manner '(Ref.
55. Amendment 5055 is therefore not an unconstitutional adhesive.
Determination of fixed voting time - comments on the amendment
56. The appellant further contends that, when discussing draft law No 24 / 2025 Coll., there was a restriction of debate and a firm inclusion of a vote on the draft law at third reading in breach of Paragraph 66 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, leaving it to the Constitutional Court to assess whether this procedure also infringes constitutional principles.
57. The Constitutional Court of the Chamber of Deputies and Videos verified that the third reading, which took place on 20 November, 6 December, 11 December and 18 December 2024, was completed at 12.30 on the basis of a proposal by Mr J. Cogan to set a fixed time for the vote and, therefore, to conclude the examination of the draft contested law (cf. vote No 53 at the 123rd session of 18.12.2024). 12 Members were enrolled at the end of the third reading debate.
58. The Constitutional Court has dealt with the violation of the Rules of Procedure of the end of the debate before all the speakers have spoken. He confirmed that the termination of the debate, when other speakers were enrolled, constituted a violation of Rule 66 (1) of the Rules of Procedure. In Article 66 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, Parliament has made it clear that the President will end the debate if there are no other speakers. Thus, unlike other countries (e.g. the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Poland or the Slovak Republic), the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies do not provide for the institution to close the debate by voting or the possibility to determine in advance the length of the debate (cf.
59. At the same time, it is clear from the precaselaw of the Constitutional Court that a breach of Paragraph 66 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, given by the adoption of the above procedural proposal and the subsequent termination of the debate presiding the meeting of the Chamber of Deputies, may also interfere with constitutional principles. For example in the find sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 41 / 23 (paragraph 170) The Constitutional Court emphasised that this provision is one of the possible details of Members' freedom to participate in the parliamentary debate and their equality arising from Articles 5 and 6 of the Constitution and Article 22 of the Charter. This conclusion was repeated by the Constitutional Court in the sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 47 / 23 (paragraphs 78 to 80).
60. Furthermore, in cases of limitation of parliamentary debate, the Constitutional Court assesses whether conflicting constitutional standards or principles prevail over a constitutional standard or principle that has been affected. The opposite constitutional principle to be taken into account is the principle of political decision-making based on the will of the majority expressed by free voting (Article 6 of the Constitution).
61. In assessing the conflict of the above constitutional principles, the Constitutional Court is based on the following arguments. In the find sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 41 / 23 The Constitutional Court stated (paragraph 174) that the legitimate objective of limiting the debate is to protect the principle of political decision-making based on the will of the majority expressed by free vote (Article 6 of the Constitution). In the find sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 30 / 23 The Constitutional Court stated (paragraph 118) that a breach of the Rules of Procedure may have a constitutional legal dimension, provided that, as a result, the parliamentary minority is not allowed to express its views on the content of the draft law. This starting point was also repeated by the Constitutional Court in the sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 11 / 25 (paragraph 68). The device used is appropriate if, without its involvement, the Chamber of Deputies would not have been able to approve the proposal, even if it had the necessary majority. In the find sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 47 / 23 The Constitutional Court assessed the conflict of the constitutional principles concerned, using the proportionality test, assessing that the adoption of a procedural proposal on a fixed time vote and the subsequent termination of the debate constitutes an appropriate and necessary means of enforcing the constitutional principle of political decision-making based on the will of the majority expressed by free voting (paragraphs 83 to 90). In the third step of this test, i.e. in the context of assessing the adequacy of the measure and answering the question whether it has intervened in the very essence of the constitutional principles of equality between Members of Parliament as representatives of the people and their right to participate in the House debate, the Constitutional Court stressed (paragraph 94) that "it is therefore essential that there has been an open debate between the advocates of competing views, including those of the minority representing these groups'. In this respect, the Constitutional Court recalls that the importance of parliamentary debate lies in the possibility of confronting views across the political spectrum, which is a guarantee of free competition between political parties and political forces under Article 5 of the Constitution and Article 22 of the Charter, and not in the unlimited application of the right of each individual Member (or Senator) to address it (Ref.
62. In the case under consideration, the third reading of draft law No 24 / 2025 Coll. took place on 20. 11. 11. 11. During the third reading, opposition Member H. Lang spoke with a speech of approximately 70 minutes and opposition Member R. Koten spoke with two speeches of approximately 60 and 45 minutes. After the Chamber of Deputies shortened the speaking time to 15 minutes and the number of speeches by an individual Member to two, the debate in two hours and ten minutes only made a number of factual remarks and a proper speech by opposition Member H. Vlaková of 30 minutes. The time limit for third reading under Rule 95a of the Rules of Procedure (Wednesday and Friday from 9 a.m. to 14 p.m.) was further shortened twice by approximately hourly speeches by opposition Member A. Babiš. At least some of these expressions can be considered obstructive.
63. As set out in detail in the decision on page 5 of the Rules of Procedure 47 / 23 (in particular paragraph 90), the Rules of Procedure and its interpretation did not allow the real-time obstructive methods remaining to be used to close the debate by the end of the parliamentary term, as foreseen in Section 66 (1) of the Rules. Without a resolution on a firm voting time, a majority of the House would not be able to assert its majority will, contrary to Article 6 of the Constitution. The adoption of a procedural proposal on a firm voting time and the subsequent termination of the debate in this context has provided minimal interference in the constitutional principles of equality between Members of Parliament as representatives of the people and their entitlement to participate in the House debate.
64. The Constitutional Court will further assess whether there has been an open discussion in the parliamentary debate between the advocates of competing views, including those of minority groups representing these groups, and whether this has been sufficient discussion, saving the rights of both government and opposition, the room for parliamentary and public debate and public awareness. The appellant does not contest Lex Ukraine VII as a whole, but even if there are possible constitutional defects in the legislative process, it proposes to abolish only its criminal part. The Constitutional Court therefore states that it only assessed the question of whether a parliamentary minority had the opportunity to make a qualified comment on the content of Amendment 5055, which, as has been explained in detail above, brought precisely to the contested law an amendment to the rules of criminal law.
65. As already follows from the recap of the proposal now under consideration and the observations of the Chamber of Deputies, Amendment 5055 was tabled at the end of the second reading on 22 October 2024. The Constitutional Court also found, from the stenograms and video recordings of the proceedings of the Chamber of Deputies, that the opposition Members, Mr Koten and Mr Masek, had expressed their views on this amendment during the second reading, albeit completely in the framework and with objections to the return of the motion to the Guarantee Committee during the detailed debate. At the Chamber of Deputies plenary, the material of this proposal was then addressed during the third reading. The Constitutional Court adds that a summary of all the amendments was circulated to Members on 23 October 2024, about a month before the beginning of the third reading. The Constitutional Court also stresses that the fact that a debate is held at the third reading, in which it can only be proposed to correct the effective date of the draft law, legislative errors, grammatical or written errors and adjustments resulting from the amendments tabled, or to propose a repetition of the second reading (Section 95 (2) of the Rules of Procedure), does not mean that the debate should be limited to precisely these issues or aspects. In other words, the Constitutional Court has thus previously admitted (cf. Pl. ÚS 11 / 25, paragraph 77) that even third reading is relevant for the assessment of the fulfilment of the constitutional requirement of the opposition's participation in the legislative process.
66. During the third reading, seven opposition Members expressed their views on the material of Amendment 5055 (i.e. not on other aspects of Lex Ukraine VII), namely: H. War (a total of five times), Z. Ožanova (a total of nine times), J. Masek, B. Peshtová, R. Vondráček (a total of two times), H. Lang and R. Koten, at the hearing of the Chamber of Deputies on 20 November 2024 and 18 December 2024. Thus, the opposition had the opportunity to comment on the amendment, with sufficient distance from its circulation to all Members who provided adequate preparation for a substantive debate, in which expert comments could also be used (e.g. H. War's speech referring to the above mentioned observations of the Supreme Court), which was also clearly used in fact. The Constitutional Court also took into account that Amendment 5055 was debated in the Guarantee Committee (Security Committee) on 7 November 2024. The debate within the parliamentary committees, also composed of representatives of the parliamentary minority, is an integral part of the legislative process (cf. sp. zn.
67. The Constitutional Court adds that, although the number of opposition speakers expressing themselves to the criminal material currently under appeal is at first sight not high, their expression must be placed in the overall context of the legislative process leading to the adoption of the law now under appeal. The third reading took place for a total of four days and lasted more than eight hours. It is clear from both stenographies and video records that the debate at third reading concerned most of the other areas of Lex Ukraine VII (e.g. renunciation of Russian citizenship as a condition for the acquisition of Czech citizenship - cf. the proposal to abolish § 7x and 7y of Act No. 65 / 2022 Coll., on certain measures in connection with the armed conflict in the territory of Ukraine caused by the invasion of Russian troops, dated 11.4.2025, held at the Constitutional Court under Sp. Pl. ÚS 15 / 25). The Constitutional Court failed to see that the third-reading debate had developed to a relatively large extent, with widespread general reservations concerning the position of the Ukrainian minority in the Czech Republic occurring in cyclitically through opposition representatives. The Constitutional Court stresses and takes into account that the opposition had sufficient time to comment on the contested criminal law provisions of Act No 24 / 2025 Coll. (see above). At the same time, the Constitutional Court has not overlooked that the obstruction, unfortunately, has become a notoriety since 2016 and a regular feature of the parliamentary debates (cf. sp. zl. Pl. ÚS 47 / 23, paragraph 56), as the appellant, who admitted (paragraph 30 of the proposal) that "the proposal to limit the speaking time may have arisen from the fact that virtually every meeting of the Chamber of Deputies is accompanied at least in part of its working days by obstructive multihour speeches and the need to limit the consideration of this bill in third reading could thus have arisen as a consequence of obstruction relating to another Parliament's press'. The main point is that the opposition had the opportunity to participate in the parliamentary debate and had the opportunity to be a full part of the legislative process. It also took advantage of this opportunity. It is true that the opposition devoted a large part of the debate to other aspects of the bill under discussion and speeches in which its representatives expressed general concern about the situation arising from Russian aggression, or Ukraine's migration. However, it is clear from the opposition's speeches that the content of Amendment 5055 was made known to individual Members, as there was also a sound of its substantive criticism. According to the Constitutional Court, it cannot now be concluded that a parliamentary majority would be burdened by the current legislative process under consideration by the constitutional deficit, consisting of the failure to secure the" participation rights "of the opposition. In the parliamentary debate, there was an open debate between the advocates of competing views, including minority ones.
68. The Constitutional Court also took into account that the very nature of the contested amendment was not in any way extensive. Although it is included in several provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is only related to one facts of the offence. The contested question was completely understandable, in fact limited to the alleged uncertainty of the facts of the crime in § 318a of the Penal Code, discussed in the Chamber of Deputies and in the public space and communication media. The Members had the opportunity to use the supporting documents from the comment procedure for the Government Bill, which was held as print 861. Paragraph 318a of the Penal Code was originally part of a government amendment to the Penal Code, which was already submitted to the Chamber of Deputies at the time of the parliamentary decision on the contested provision. The contested legislation, like the own press No. 861, has undergone the standard process of submitting the government bill to the Chamber of Deputies, has been the subject of a comment procedure and is accompanied by a explanatory report. The reasoning for the amendment essentially takes over the explanations and justifications of Article 318a of the Penal Code contained in the explanatory report on the Government amendment to the Penal Code. As mentioned above, Amendment 5055 was not presented surprisingly or "secret ', with an attempt to avoid the debate and to minimise the possibility of intervening in its content in the parliamentary debate, on the contrary, Members of the Parliament and the reasons for its submission were explicitly alerted (cf. the expression of the Minister of the Interior during the third reading of 11 December 2024). This is another factor reducing the intensity of intervention in constitutional rules and principles.
69. The Constitutional Court therefore concluded, as in the findings of the sp. zn. Together with the violation of Rule 66 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the constitutional principles of equality between Members of Parliament as representatives of the people and their right to participate in the House debate have also been affected. However, referring to the already mentioned proportionality test carried out in the sp. zn. In line with the cited finding (paragraph 90) and the finding of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 11 / 25, the Constitutional Court also considers that the device used in this way was a minimal interference in the constitutional principles of equality between Members of Parliament as representatives of the people and their entitlement to participate in the House debate, as the Rules of Procedure do not offer any other less effective means of achieving the objective pursued, i.e. promoting the political will of the majority. In view of the wide possibility for the opposition to comment on the part of Lex Ukraine VII now under review, inserted in the draft law by Amendment 5055, the Constitutional Court also considers the intervention of the above-mentioned constitutional principles protecting, in particular, members of the parliamentary minority to be appropriate. The process of the Chamber of Deputies in this matter was therefore in line with the Constitution, and despite the shortening of the third reading debate, it sufficiently balances the rights of both the parliamentary majority and the minority. As the Constitutional Court has already stated in the finding in the sp. zn.
70. Once again, the Constitutional Court points out that the apparent violation of the rule laid down in Rule 66 (1) of the Rules of Procedure is not desirable in a democratic rule of law and can only be seen as a completely extreme solution. Once again, it calls on all Members across the political spectrum to pursue the reform of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies to ensure that the conduct of the Chamber of Deputies meets both the principles of Article 6 of the Constitution, both the principle of decision-making based on the will of the majority expressed by free vote and the principle of the protection of minorities, without having to violate its provisions.
Limitation of speaking time
71. Furthermore, the appellant considers - in her own words - the constitutional reduction of the speaking time of individual Members at third reading to be problematic to twice 15 minutes for each Member. The Chamber of Deputies acceded to this restriction on J. Cogan's procedural proposal (cf. vote 54 at the 123rd meeting of 18 December 2024).
72. Even in this objection, the Constitutional Court may refer to its own precaselaw (cf. Case 47 / 23 Pl. ÚS, paragraphs 60 to 73; in this case the limit was twice 10 minutes for one Member). The Constitutional Court, here, in reference to Rule 59 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, according to which the House may decide, at the present point, without debate, to limit speaking time, which may not be less than 10 minutes, and according to Paragraph 59 (2) of the same Law, it may also decide that the limitation of speaking time may not exceed two times, nor does it detract from established parliamentary practice and does not interfere with any constitutional principles. The Constitutional Court found no reasonable reason to deviate from these conclusions of its previous case-law in the present case, since it continues to consider that the limitation of speaking time for one Member to 15 minutes (and maiori ad minus) 'does not raise doubts as to compliance with the constitutional order or law, while providing sufficient opportunity for Members to comment on the present case' (cf. Cf. Opinion 47 / 23, paragraph 67).
Comments
73. The appellant argued that Amendment 5055 could not have been expressed by the usual points of comment, either government or non-governmental. The Constitutional Court considers that even this objection does not constitute a departure from the constitutional requirements relating to the legislative process. As stated by the Constitutional Court in the decision of 4.9.2018 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 21 / 15 (N 146 / 90 CollNU 369; 233 / 2018 Coll.), paragraph 54, the reference procedure is part of the procedure prior to the submission of a government bill or other legislation under the legislative rules of the Government, approved by Government Resolution 188 of 19.3.1998, and its failure to comply does not constitute a breach of the constitutionally prescribed procedure for the adoption of a law or other legislation. Moreover, the legislative rules of the Government do not foresee that an amendment to the Government's bill should be the subject of a reminder procedure and therefore there could be no breach of the law. At the same time, the Constitutional Court did not overlook (cf. above) that the legislation currently under appeal was subject to a standard reminder procedure in the preparation of a government amendment to the Criminal Code and the Criminal Code (House Press 861).
Conclusion
74. Although the legislative process leading to the adoption of the contested criminal law provisions of Act No 24 / 2025 Coll. cannot be considered impeccable, the Constitutional Court found that it was not appropriate to abolish the contested regulation in the present case because of the substantially reduced intensity of intervention of constitutional principles and rules. The Constitutional Court also explained why a formal defect in the legislative process consisting of a violation of the Rules of Procedure does not automatically constitute a reason for the deregulation of the legislation that has arisen from such a defective legislative process.
Substantial assessment of the proposal
75. The Constitutional Court subsequently made a substantive assessment of the application. First, he defined the general bases which he subsequently applied in the examination of the constitutionality of the facts of the criminal offence for illegal activity for foreign power in § 318a of the Criminal Code.
General considerations
76. The appellant contends that the contested legislation contradicts the principle of legality as a guiding principle of substantive criminal law (Section 12 (1) of the Criminal Code), but above all human rights safeguards, and therefore parts of constitutional order (Article 39 of the Charter and Article 7 of the Convention). This principle ensures that an individual can only be punished for such conduct as has been declared criminal at the time of the commit (nullum crimen sine kevypraevia), which, in case of doubt, will not be interpreted in an unconstitutional way to the detriment of the individual, in particular by analogy (nullum crimen sine kestrica). These guarantees contribute to ensuring the protection of the individual against possible state insolence (cf. Opinion No 27 of the Standing Court of International Justice of 4.12.1935, paragraph 52), the legitimacy and fairness of criminal proceedings, the achievement of the purpose of criminal law (general prevention) and the fulfilment of the division of power between legislature and courts. On the latter aspect, the Constitutional Court adds that, in its case-law, it also clearly stresses that it is in principle not for it to assess the extent of the boundaries of criminal criminalisation of certain types of conduct, if it is not to duplicate or substitute the constitutional role of the legislature. The facts of the offence are always a formal expression of such conduct, which is considered by a majority company in the legislative body to be so socially harmful that it must be declared as a specific type or type of conduct separately, and defined as a separate substance of the offence [cf. Case 46 / 18 ÚS 46 / 18 (N 104 / 100 SbNU 207; 312 / 2020 Sb.), paragraph 31 and the caselaw cited therein.]
77. However, the Constitutional Court considers it necessary to recall that it may, exceptionally, intervene in the legislature's competence to abolish the criminal law adopted by the United Kingdom if it would be unacceptably repressive, that is to say, if it would infringe constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights (cf., for example, the ECHR judgment in the Dudgeon case against the United Kingdom of 22.10.1981, No 7525 / 76, in which the ECHR declared that North Irish national law criminalising consensual sexual intercourse between same-sex persons infringes Article 8 of the Convention). At the same time, the Constitutional Court recalls the principle of subsidiarity of criminal repression, which it considers to be a constitutional principle of the functioning of public authority, even if not expressly enshrined in the constitutional order, interpreted by a link between Articles 1 (1) and 2 (1) and 2 (3) of the Constitution and Articles 2 (2), 4 (4) and 39 of the Charter (cf. Comment. 3rd edition. Praha: C. H. Beck, 2023, p. 194 and 195). The case law of the Constitutional Court confirms the legislative dimension of the principle of subsidiarity of criminal repression and considers it a rule limiting the intensity of criminal repression in defining the facts of criminal offences and laying down further general conditions of criminal liability. The principle of subsidiarity of criminal repression is a criminal political directive applicable to the legislator, and although it is generally not for the Constitutional Court to intervene in its implementation, its independence is conceivable in the role of a negative legislator, that is to say, in a situation in which an actively legitimate body objects to the unconstitutionality of the legislation in force [cf. points 21 and 22].
78. The appellant submits that the facts of an illegal activity for foreign power do not meet the requirements of certainty, clarity or predictability of criminal law. First of all, the Constitutional Court points out, in general terms, that although this aspect of the principle of legality (nullum crimen sine estaverta) is not normally expressed in human law documents, both at national and international level, it is considered to be a natural part of that principle [cf. ECHR judgment in Kokkinakis v Greece of 25.5.1993 No 14307 / 88, paragraph 52; from the case-law of the Constitutional Court, cf. As is apparent from the above, the requirement of certainty in criminal law is addressed to a legislator who has an obligation to define criminal conduct in such a way that an individual can identify and anticipate from it what he must not do or what he must do. At the same time, as a logical consequence of the principle of the general application of the laws, the caselaw of the ECHR acknowledged that the wording of the sub-provisions is not and may not always be accurate. One of the standard legal regulation techniques is the use of general categorisation as the opposite of an exhaustive case list. The ESLP stressed that the need to avoid excessive rigidity and to maintain contact with changing circumstances means that many laws are necessarily formulated using terms that are more or less vague. The interpretation and application of such provisions therefore depends on subsequent practice (cf. ECHR judgment in Cantoni v France of 11.11.1996 No 17862 / 91, paragraph 31).
79. Therefore, in view of the requirement of certainty and predictability of criminal law, the caselaw cited states that the disclosure of the content of criminal law can be ensured by means of a judicial interpretation (cf. Kokkinakis, paragraph 52), or also by the use of qualified legal advice and assistance, typically provided by lawyers (cf. Cantoni, paragraph 35). Thus, the breach of the principle of legality cannot automatically be derived from the fact that substantive criminal law standards contain indefinite or general concepts (cf. ECHR judgment in the Huhtamaki case against Finland, paragraph 45). Therefore, if the more general provision was later specified in caselaw, this does not mean, without further ado, that it was not sufficiently predictable or that criminal penalties did not allow (cf. This basis also reflects the recent case law of the ECHR, to which the Government referred in its observations. The Constitutional Court considers it appropriate to repeat the conclusion of the Norman case-law against the United Kingdom that "the gradual development of criminal law through judicial caselaw is a firmly rooted and necessary part of the legal tradition of the Contracting States. Article 7 of the Convention cannot be interpreted as prohibiting the progressive clarification of criminal liability rules by means of judicial interpretation '. This basis is also confirmed by the case law of the Constitutional Court, e.g. the finding of 30 May 2024 sp. zn. II. ÚS 527 / 23, paragraph 69. The Constitutional Court has in the past acknowledged that even the criminal law may contain concepts which require non-trivial interpretation [cf., for example, the finding of 28 November 2011 sp. zn. IV. ÚS 2011 / 10 (N 201 / 63 SbNU 339)], and in such a situation it is necessary to place a greater emphasis on the quality of the established practice which gives these concepts a specific filling. In the quoted finding sp. zn. IV. ÚS 2011 / 10 The Constitutional Court noted (paragraph 33) that predictability based on absolute and simple (to primitive) certainty of possible criminal penalties is not necessary in order to comply with the constitutional principle of nullum crimen sine klim. This is particularly true in cases where the uncertainty of legislation is given to areas which are affected and which are constantly changing; the law and, even more carefully than other areas thereof, the criminal law of the material must be able to respond flexibly and effectively to these changes.
80. It is clear from previous considerations that the courts play a key role in finding the content of criminal rules. However, in the interpretation of criminal law, the opinion of the teaching can also be used, which can influence the subsequent judicial practice by force of its persuasion (cf. The condition of the judicial interpretation of the law thus indicated is to preserve the substance or meaning of the legislature of the designed offence, with the result that the outcome of the judicial interpretation is predictable, which means, above all, that the court will reach it using generally accepted interpretative methods. It can also be added that an important supporting document to determine the meaning and purpose of the law is the explanatory memorandum. The Constitutional Court normally bases its case-law on the explanatory notes in the interpretation of the law, although they are not legally binding acts [cf. the finding of 11.4.2023 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 25 / 22 (N 55 / 117 SbNU 237; 123 / 2023 Coll.), paragraph 25 and the caselaw cited therein].
81. The previous considerations can therefore be summarised in such a way that the constitutional requirement of certainty of the substantive criminal rule is fulfilled when the facts of the offence can be interpreted in a way that allows for a list of criminal offences. The Constitutional Court adds that it is based in its activities on the principle of constitutionally conformal interpretation and application of legislation. This means that in a situation in which a provision of legislation allows two different interpretations, one being in accordance with the constitutional order and one not, there is no reason to repeal that provision. In its application, it is the task of the public authorities to interpret it in a constitutional way [cf. e.g. the finding of 31.3.1999 sp. zn. ÚS 15 / 98 (N 48 / 13 CollNU 341; 83 / 1999 Coll.)]. It can be added that the mere fact that the Court has multiple interpretation options in the process of finding the content of a criminal law rule, of which it will then clearly choose one right, does not constitute a constitutional deficit of uncertainty of such a standard (cf. the ECHR judgment in Baldassi and Others against France of 11.6.2020 No 15271 / 16).
82. The Constitutional Court also states that the requirement to be certain of criminal conduct also includes the principle that the different categories of criminal offences should be properly defined and distinguished from each other (cf. Case 2258 / 14 ÚS II, paragraph 21). In this respect, the teaching refers to the characterisation of the facts of the offence, which must express the social damage of each offence, which must be defined by a sufficiently specific, clear and precise definition, which makes it possible to distinguish between them and to underestimate the specific fact which corresponds most to it.
83. It can be summarised that the initial preamble to the constitutional review of the legislative activity in the adoption of the new substance of the offence is respect for the division of power and the role of the legislative authority, taking into account the specific position of the Constitutional Court, which, in general, is not to assess the extent of the boundaries of criminal criminalisation of certain types of conduct. At the same time, the Constitutional Court admits that the rules of criminal liability, possibly also contained in generally formulated standards, are only specified by subsequent judicial practice.
Application to the case now under review - constitutionality § 318a of the Penal Code
Subsidiarity of criminal repression
84. On the first aspect, the Constitutional Court only briefly states that even the appellant itself does not dispute that the adoption of the facts in Paragraph 318a of the Criminal Code and the related amendment of the related provisions of the Criminal Code and the Criminal Code are a manifestation of the power of the legislator, who is called upon to determine criminal law policy and to classify certain types of conduct as a criminal offence in a formal nature.
85. The contested provision demonstrates the legislator's will that the negotiations defined here cannot be effectively tackled and cannot be effectively prevented except by means of criminal law. The explanatory memorandum to House Press No. 861, with which the government submitted the contested provision to the Chamber of Deputies in the framework of the draft amendment to the Criminal Code, as well as the justification for Amendment No 5055 (House Press No. 727 / 3), which, in all aspects of the justification for the introduction of the new crime, coincides with the explanatory memorandum to House Press No. 861. The two documents state that, according to the current regulation, only certain forms of cooperation with foreign power could be affected. They stress that the damage to the important interests of the State may also occur, for example, as a result of the enquiries of non-classified information, but this was only punishable by the provisions in force at the time of the drafting of the contested provision if, at the same time, the authority of the official or the unauthorised handling of personal data was misused. It also follows from both the explanatory memorandum and the statement of reasons for Amendment 5055 that cooperation with foreign authorities may not only involve intelligence activities aimed at obtaining and transmitting information, but may also take the form of preparatory action (e.g. building an agency network for foreign power, mapping decision-making processes in public administration), which may be followed by, for example, activities aimed at influencing the decision-making activities of public authorities or affecting the public by means of communications having the character of alarms, violent crime, etc. The explanatory memorandum, with the justification of Amendment 5055, concludes that the offences contained in the current criminal code which could affect such resulting conduct do not provide comprehensive protection for national interests against such activities carried out by foreign power or for foreign power and do not affect the very connection with foreign power in that intention. The explanatory memorandum, as well as the justification for Amendment 5055, provides a sufficient constitutional explanation of the considerations that the government, as a promoter of the proposed legislation, has been guided, thereby fulfilling the presumption that the legislator reflected in the principle of subsidiarity of criminal repression (cf. Sčerba, F. et al. Comments, p. 158).
86. In this context, the Constitutional Court also recalls its previous conclusions on the principles that defend democracy, which show that if the opponents of democracy and the values on which democracy stands are ready to attack it, the democratic regime must also be prepared to defend itself against these attacks (cf. the finding of 28 November 2011, sp. zn. IV, ÚS 2011 / 10, paragraph 25). The fact examined may also serve this purpose.
87. The Constitutional Court considers that the contested legislation is not unacceptably repressive and is therefore not unconstitutional in the aforementioned sense (see the Dudgeon case against the United Kingdom). As explained below, the Constitutional Court does not consider the subject matter under review to be impasse and thus contrary to the requirement of certainty of criminal law. At the same time, the Constitutional Court precludes, in this context, that the offence of illegal activity for foreign power under Article 318a of the Criminal Code would be applicable to cases of constitutionally protected freedom of expression under Article 17 (2) of the Charter; in particular, in relation to political speeches which, in the light of Article 22 of the Charter, enjoy particularly strong constitutional protection, which must correspond to the interpretation of criminal law. The Constitutional Court considers it premature at this point to be concerned about the misuse of a criminal offence for foreign power to prosecute persons under the "false" pretext of ensuring security protection. Any excesses in applying the facts are to be corrected in specific cases by general courts (Article 4 of the Constitution). Of course, the Constitutional Court will also be called on to correct individual excesses in specific cases reaching the constitutional dimension, as was already the case in the assessment of the fulfilment of the requirements, for example, of the facts of the offence of spreading the alarm in the judgment of 11.3.2025 sp. zn. I ÚS 1927 / 24 (N 54 / 129 CollNU 105).
88. The Constitutional Court adds that even in the case of the facts currently under consideration, the following practice will require the conditions for the criminality of illegal activity for foreign power to be interpreted in the light of the principles of criminal law, such as the already mentioned ultima ratio principle, but here seen in the application and not only in the above legislative dimension of subsidiarity of criminal repression [cf., e.g. the findings of 12.10.2006 sp. zn. I. ÚS 69 / 06 (N 186 / 43 SbNU 129) or of 11.6.2018 sp. The principle of application shall apply in particular in cases of criminal law as regards the qualification of a particular action, where the situation can be dealt with sufficiently effectively by means of legal standards other than criminal law, or where the specific act under consideration, in view of all the specific circumstances of the case, does not reach even the lower limit of social damage in order to be considered a criminal offence.
Certain substance of the unlawful activity for foreign power
89. The Constitutional Court recalls the conclusions of its settled case-law, which state that the interpretation and application of the sub-constitutional law, in this case § 318a of the Penal Code, is the role of the general courts [cf. e.g. the order of 22 December 2015 sp. zn. I. ÚS 2882 / 14 (U 21 / 79 SbNU 631), paragraph 9]. However, if the appellant contests the indeterminate nature of the contested legislation, the Constitutional Court must, in the light of the above-mentioned grounds, verify whether, through the interpretation of Paragraph 318a of the Penal Code, a result can be achieved that is compatible with the requirement of the principle of legality, i.e. whether it is sufficiently identifiable and predictable for the addressees of this standard what it cannot do. This procedure is closely linked to the definition of the extent of criminal repression and to the assessment of whether the criminal offence under review is not a manifestation of its inadmissible switching.
90. First of all, the Constitutional Court takes into account that Article 318a of the Penal Code contains terms (constitutional constitution, territorial integrity, sovereignty, defence and security of the Czech Republic or international organisation, in order to protect the interests of which the Czech Republic has committed itself), the interpretation of which will not cause any difficulty due to their numerous use in the Penal Code, including through their coverage in the reference commentary literature. Moreover, the same applies to the expression of foreign power contained in the facts of the crime of treason, the abuse of the representation of the State and of an international organisation, the espionage, the abuse of the authority of an official and the relations threatening peace pursuant to Articles 309 (1), 315 (1) and (2), 316 (1), 329 (2) (g) and 409 (1) of the Penal Code. Foreign power means any state outside the Czech Republic, regardless of the positions it takes towards the Czech Republic, what are the political, economic or diplomatic relations between them, or also the international organisation or body thereof, and it is completely irrelevant whether the Czech Republic is a member of them or what is its relationship with them (cf. Šámal, P. et al. Penal Code. Comments, p. 3916). The European Union, for example, may be a foreign authority, but it is quite clear that activities related to the representation of the Czech Republic with this international organisation will be excluded from the scope of Article 318a of the Penal Code, for example, because it would be a legal activity, not an unjustified one (and contrario criminal offence, abuse of representation of the State and international organisations pursuant to Article 315 of the Penal Code), similar to cooperation with intelligence services of foreign authority in terms of Article 10 of the Intelligence Act. At the same time, the nature of the crime under review is a sign of illegality, i.e. illegality.
91. At the same time, the Constitutional Court admits that the basic facts, in particular in the variants contained in Article 318a (1) (a) and (c) of the Criminal Code, are formulated fairly widely, but can nevertheless be interpreted in a constitutional manner. The fundamental importance of finding the content of the facts of an illegal activity for foreign power according to the variants contained in Sections 318a (1) (a) and (c) of the Penal Code, based on a very abstract objective aspect, has two aspects: (a) a special (second) intention and (b) a requirement to pursue an activity for foreign power. Both aspects constitute the main limit of criminal liability for that offence and, in the view of the Constitutional Court, provide sufficient assurance of its certainty.
92. In relation to the special intention, namely to jeopardise or harm the constitutional establishment, sovereignty, territorial integrity, defence or security of the Czech Republic or the defence or security of an international organisation, the Czech Republic has committed itself to the protection of its interests, the Constitutional Court states, first of all, that the similarly formulated specific intention is part of the facts of the offence of the dissolution of the Republic, terrorist attack, terror, sabotage and abuse of the representation of the State and international organisations pursuant to § 310 (1), § 311 (1) and (2), § 312 (1), § 314 (1) and § 315 (2) of the Criminal Code. Thus, the interpretation of the special intention in § 318a of the Criminal Code can be based on applicable practice (even doctrine) concerning these offences.
93. The Constitutional Court did not, however, overlook the fact that the legislator links the subjective aspect of a criminal offence for illegal activity for foreign power with intent (both direct and indirect), and not only the damage to the protected interest but also its threat. However, even the design of the crime under consideration is not based on its inconstitutionality, because the specific intent of the perpetrator can or must be interpreted in a constitutional manner (cf. paragraph 88 above). Therefore, criminal liability could only be established in cases where the perpetrator intends to cause a specific and real activity, i.e. not merely abstract, threat or damage to the protected interest. In other words, the intent of the perpetrator must be to act which is actually liable to jeopardise or harm the protected interest, immediately and not only remotely.
94. In relation to the term "foreign power ', the Constitutional Court briefly states the following. From the point of view of interpretation, it is not a problem to define the content of the expression itself (cf. point 90 of this finding). It can also be concluded from the explanatory memorandum (House Press No. 861) that the legislature excluded the isolated activity of" lone wolves "carried out on its own without any connection, whether prior, continuous or subsequent, to foreign power. Similarly, teaching approaches the interpretation of the concept of foreign power; Its conclusions, confirming the need for some interference by foreign authorities to establish criminal liability under Article 318a of the Penal Code, consider the Constitutional Court to be possible, or constitutionally consistent, and therefore applicable in the future practice of decision-making by law enforcement authorities (cf. Ščerba, F. On the new offence of illegal activity for foreign law. Judicial review. 2025, No 4, pp. 189 and 190).
95. The interpretation of Article 318a of the Penal Code and its further precision can also be contributed by the scheme of the Penal Code. The Ninth Head of the Criminal Code, in which Paragraph 318a is included, provides criminal protection primarily in the event of interference against the Republic. This provision will need to be interpreted in a context, internally systematically, taking into account the interpretation of other offences included in this part of the Criminal Code. Last but not least, it is also essential for the Constitutional Court that illegality is also a sign of the nature of the crime now under consideration, which, outside the scope of Paragraph 318a of the Penal Code, precludes conduct which has its basis in the rule of law (cf. paragraph 90 of this finding).
96. It can therefore be summarised that the interpretation of Article 318a (1) (a) and (c) of the Criminal Code relating to the special intention and nature of the relationship between the offender and the foreign power, supported also by the systematic argument and the requirement of the illegality of the illegal activity, can result in the content of the illegal activity for foreign power sufficiently precise and limited in the two options under consideration, thereby ensuring that the requirement arising from the principle of zero crimen sine-certa is met. The Constitutional Court recalls that the principle of constitutional conformal interpretation prior to the deregation is based on the procedure for the repeal of laws or other legislation, according to which, in a situation in which a provision of law allows two different interpretations, one being in accordance with the constitutional order and the other being contrary to it, there is no reason to repeal that provision. In its application, it is the task of all state authorities to interpret the provision in a constitutional way, that is to say in the manner presented by the Constitutional Court in this [cf. the finding of 26.3.1996 sp. zn. ÚS 48 / 95 (N 21 / 5 SbNU 171; 121 / 1996 Coll.)].
97. The Constitutional Court adds that, in view of the requirement of certainty of the criminal standard, the interpretation of the second variant of the basic facts [Paragraph 318a (1) (b) of the Penal Code] does not give special difficulty, i.e. the violation of the sovereignty of the Czech Republic by the perpetrator in its territory for foreign power following other intelligence. Moreover, the term "tracking 'is also used in § 354 (1) (b) of the Penal Code (dangerous persecution), with its content explained by the expert literature as an act aimed at obtaining direct knowledge of the victim's whereabouts and what he is doing (cf. Sčerba, F. et al. Comments, p. 2920), and the general courts are also working with it without difficulty (cf., for example, the resolution of the Supreme Court of 23 September 2020 sp. zn. 8 Tdo 866 / 2020, paragraph 26). It is essential that the perpetrator makes use of intelligence in the monitoring of the crime. This concept is defined by the legislation governing reporting activities (cf. paragraph 27 above). Another condition for the establishment of criminal liability is the introduction of a consequence, i.e. a breach of sovereignty, to which the perpetrator's intention must also be directed. Paragraph 318a (1) (b) of the Criminal Code would therefore not be applicable if the perpetrator misused other intelligence sources for monitoring purposes, but would do so for personal or private reasons. Moreover, it would not be possible to talk about a breach of the sovereignty of the Czech Republic where monitoring would take place with the agreement or knowledge of the competent authorities of the Czech Republic (e.g. cooperation of intelligence services - cf. explanatory report to print No 861). Even for this variant of fact, it is necessary to demonstrate the existence of a link to foreign power in the above-defined sense. The wording chosen by the legislature shows that it will not be possible to subdue, under Paragraph 318a (1) (b) of the Penal Code, the monitoring situations of another without the use of intelligence or the situation of the monitoring of cases. In both of these cases, however, it would be possible - provided that such an activity was carried out for foreign power in the requested specific intention - to apply Paragraph 318a (1) (a) and (c) of the Criminal Code.
98. The criminal offence under Section 318a of the Criminal Code can be distinguished from other (related) offences by means of individual characters (i.e. specific intent, relation of the offender to foreign power, illegality or illegality of activity), the interpretation of which was dealt with above by the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court found no obstacle to the fulfilment of the characterisation or differentiation function of the facts of the offences in the event of a criminal offence for foreign power. Paragraph 318a of the Penal Code will also comply with this constitutional requirement derived from the principle of nullum crimen sine intercerta. At the same time, the Constitutional Court does not consider it necessary that, in proceedings for the abstract control of criminal law, Article 318a of the Penal Code should examine in detail the relationship between other (relatives) and other offences, namely, the possibility of one-off offences. This task primarily belongs to courts and other law enforcement authorities. The Constitutional Court may subsequently examine the outcome of this assessment in the proceedings on constitutional complaints.
99. Finally, in view of the above-mentioned general bases, the Constitutional Court states only briefly that the unpredictability of criminal law cannot be based solely on the different opinions of teaching. In view of the previous interpretation, the Constitutional Court does not consider the reservations which part of the teaching against Article 318a of the Penal Code has made to challenge the constitutionality of the material under review. For an example referred to by the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court states that it is completely absurd that criminal liability under Paragraph 318a of the Penal Code should be fulfilled, for example, by copying the overnight bus stops (cf. Jelinek, J. Above the first amendment to the Penal Code in 2025. The Bulletin of the Lawyer. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. It can also be added that the indeterminity of Paragraph 318a of the Penal Code cannot be imported only from an unusual structure of crime, which - as the only one in the Penal Code - begins with sanctions. The principle of legality does not imply any requirement that dictates to the legislator the way in which criminal law is formulated and structured.
Conclusion
100. In this finding, the Constitutional Court first addressed the constitutionality of the legislative process which resulted in the adoption of Act No. 24 / 2025 Coll. In doing so, he concluded that the contested criminal law section of Lex Ukraine VII was not an unconstitutional adhesive. The Constitutional Court further explained that the breach of the constitutional rules governing the legislative process cannot, in the case at hand, be even imported from the infringement of the Rules of Procedure, namely from the limitation of parliamentary debate at third reading by setting a fixed time for voting.
101. Subsequently, the Constitutional Court dealt with a substantive review of the contested legislation, in particular with regard to the fulfilment of the principle of legality (nullum crimen sine istécerta). For the reasons set out above, the Constitutional Court has not testified to the appellant's objections.
102. According to Article 70 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court therefore rejected the application for annulment of part 2 of Article III and part 5 of Article VI of Act No 24 / 2025 Coll., which amended the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Code of Criminal Procedure, and in case of annulment of the contested provisions of the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure as unfounded. As explained above by the Constitutional Court (point 3 of this finding), the common denominator of the contested legal provisions is the amendment of the Criminal Code and the Criminal Code in the context of the introduction of the new substance of the offence of unlawful activity for foreign power. The conclusion on the constitutional conformity of § 318a of the Penal Code necessarily also affects all the other appellants contested by the provisions which are closely linked to this crime.
103. The Constitutional Court did not decide on the application for a preliminary ruling (Section 39 of the Constitutional Court Act).
President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr.
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Regulation Information
| Citation | Found No 42 / 2026 Coll., sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 5 / 25 on the proposal for the annulment of certain provisions of Act No. 24 / 2025 Coll., amending Act No. 65 / 2022 Coll., on certain measures relating to armed conflict in the territory of Ukraine caused by the invasion of Russian troops, as amended, and other related laws, in the event of the annulment of certain provisions of Act No. 141 / 1961 Coll., on criminal proceedings (criminal order), as amended, and certain provisions of Act No. 40 / 2009 Coll., criminal law, as amended |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | The Constitutional Tribunal found |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 24.03.2026 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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