The Constitutional Court found No. 410 / 2001 Coll.
The Constitutional Court found of 16 October 2001 on the application for annulment of Government Decree No. 445 / 2000 Coll., on the establishment of milk production quotas for the years 2001 to 2005
Valid
The Constitutional Tribunal found
Text versions:
20.11.2001
410
FIND
The Constitutional Court
On behalf of the Czech Republic
The Constitutional Court decided on 16 October 2001 in plenary on the proposal of a group of Members of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic to repeal the Decree of the Government No. 445 / 2000 Coll., on the fixing of milk production quotas for the years 2001 to 2005,
as follows:
On 31 December 2001, the provisions of Sections 4 (2) and 14 (2) of Decree-Law No 445 / 2000 Coll., on the establishment of milk production quotas for the years 2001 to 2005 are hereby repealed.
The remaining part of the proposal is rejected.
Reasons
A group of 28 Members of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the "Group of Members") submitted to the Constitutional Court a motion to repeal Government Regulation No. 445 / 2000 Coll., on the establishment of milk production quotas for the years 2001 to 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the "Regulation"). This Regulation was issued pursuant to Sections 2 (5) and 12 (3) to (5) of Act No. 256 / 2000 Coll., on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund and amending certain other laws (Act on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund).
The Group of Members notes that the contested regulation creates legislation on milk production and processing which is incompatible with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms ("the Charter ') and the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (" the Convention'), as well as the provisions of the ordinary laws, in particular Act No 256 / 2000 Coll. In the justification of its proposal, the Members state first of all that the penalty levy - introduced by the provision of § 13 of Act No. 256 / 2000 Coll. - makes the milk volume to become unsellable because its price would have to be increased to 215% of the minimum price. The essence of the penalty levy is that it is a levy paid by the producer, processor or sales organisation which produces, takes over the volume of milk from the producer for processing or to ensure disposal, if it exceeds its individual production quota of 115% (§ 13 (3) of Act No. 256 / 2000 Coll.) of the officially designated minimum prices (§ 10 of the Regulation: today 7.60 CZK). This individual production quota constitutes an individual supply quota and an individual direct sales quota. Under Act No. 256 / 2000 Coll. the producer does not have to apply for the allocation of the production quota.
The Group of Members is also convinced that the limitation of the quantity of production constitutes an unacceptable interference with the constitutional property right (Article 11 of the Charter), as it means expropriation which is not supported by the public interest and which takes place without compensation (paragraph 4 of that Article). The establishment of production quotas and their free distribution among current producers, as well as the possibility of free trade, are said to be hampered by existing and future producers who wish to invest in the development of dairy production, which the appellants also see as an unacceptable restriction on ownership. The Group of Members believes that the introduction of quantitative regulation on milk production limits the free market. It claims that milk supply does not exceed demand in the Czech Republic and denies the need to introduce such regulation of milk production and sales with a view to the accession of the Czech Republic to the European Union; states that the public interest is also to allow the use of a case of private ownership, which is argued by the concept of public interest in the primary public case-law (... "the public interest is given when a case is taken in order to meet the life needs of a larger entity..." - the opinion of the Supreme Administrative Court of the Czech Republic in the Bohemian ad. ad. no. 14224). It imports that the public interest in the restriction of the right of ownership of milk producers is missing in the present case, so it is a contradiction with Article 11 (4) of the Charter and Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention.
The Group of Members argues that the established mechanism of production quotas linked to overproduction penalties constitutes the introduction of a de facto price regulation which constitutes an unconstitutional discrimination against certain owners (producers) against those milk producers who do not request the allocation of production quotas.
The Group of Members argues that the production quota system also constitutes an inadmissible restriction on the right to engage in business and to engage in other economic activities (Article 26 (1) of the Charter). The law may only provide for qualification and similar conditions for them to carry out business or similar activities, but such restrictions cannot be applied to their own business process. Moreover, the intervention is so intense that it distorts the very nature of the right to do business. Quantitative regulation of production means limiting the liability of the entrepreneur and his freedom to decide on his business, which is allegedly contrary to the principles of the law (§ 2 of the Commercial Code). In the appellants' view, the system of production quotas can only be introduced by means of a law, not by a substatutory regulation (Article 26 (1), in conjunction with Article 4 (2) of the Charter), since the limits (restrictions) of the basic right are in the present case.
The Group of Members considers that the establishment of a production quota based on milk production in the previous year, namely in 2000 (Sections 3 and 4 of the regulation) does not even meet the requirement of equal access to all applicants (Section 12 (6) of Act No. 256 / 2000 Coll.) and does not respect the objective method of calculation, because it does not take into account the possible short-term decline in milk production for the producer concerned, which can cause various influences and facts. These effects are not even addressed when setting quotas for the years to come.
The group of Members also sees in the contested regulation a breach of the legal principle of openness to new producers (Section 12 (7) of Act No. 256 / 2000 Coll.), in the way in which existing individual production quotas are increased and new individual production quotas are distributed in increasing the sum of individual production quotas from the reserve (Sections 3 and 4 of the Regulation); they are said to exceed the limits given by Act No. 256 / 2000 Coll. Furthermore, as an unconstitutional inequality (Article 1 of the Charter), the appellants assess the handicaps of producers engaged exclusively in a permanent housing system, which, as a penalty, cannot be increased by an individual production quota (Section 4 (2) of the Regulation). This sanction is not supported by the law, in which the appellants also see the exceeding of the limits given by Act No. 256 / 2000 Coll. Finally, the right of the Ministry of Agriculture to notify the amount of the reserve in the Ministry of Agriculture Bulletin (Section 14 (2) of the Regulation) appears as an unconstitutional mandate for tertiary standardisation. Similarly, the appellants criticise the obligation of the producer to inform the processor or the sales organisation of its individual production quota and the obligation of the processor or the sales organisation to inform the producer of its fulfilment (Sections 11 (3) and 12 (5) and 13 (5) of the Regulation respectively); they are alleged to be obligations laid down by the Government Regulation (not by law), so that they are imposed contrary to Article 4 of the Charter.
The legal representative of the group of Members at the oral hearing before the Constitutional Court finally pointed out that it is not possible to argue so-called Community law in the case under trial, since the Czech Republic is not yet a member of the European Union.
The Constitutional Court requested observations on the application for annulment of the contested regulation by the party to the proceedings - Government of the Czech Republic (as the body which issued the contested regulation - Paragraph 69 (1) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended). He also requested comments - pursuant to § 48 (2) in conjunction with § 49 (1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court - from the Ministry of Agriculture and the State Agricultural Intervention Fund. Finally, pursuant to Article 69 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended, the Constitutional Court sent the application to initiate proceedings to the Ombudsman and invited him to inform the Constitutional Court within 10 days whether he was entering the proceedings. Since the Ombudsman did not do so, he did not become an intervener.
In its observations, the Government of the Czech Republic proposes that the Constitutional Court reject the motion of a group of Members entirely. It states that the relevant regulation issued for the implementation of Act No. 256 / 2000 Coll. creates in the Czech Republic a market regulation of milk production and sales comparable to that introduced by the European Community in all Member States. This is needed for future membership of the Czech Republic in the European Union. After all, the Czech Republic has undertaken to implement EC law in Czech law by the European Agreement establishing an Association between the Czech Republic, of the one part, and the European Communities and their Member States, of the other part (published under No 7 / 1995 Coll.). It recalls in this context the fundamental features of the Community regulation of milk production in the Member States of the European Communities. These are based on centrally established national production quotas (individual Member States), on which individual quotas are then allocated to individual farms. The aim of the regulation is to stabilise the agricultural sector in which the rules on the protection of competition are not, according to the Government, applied (Article 36 of the EC Treaty). In its observations, the Government explicitly refers to Council Regulations 3950 / 92, 1255 / 99 and 1258 / 99. In particular, it stresses its authorisation to support a particular form of agriculture under Section 2 (5) of Act No. 256 / 2000 Coll. The appellants claim that they are only attacking the regulation and not Act No. 256 / 2000 Coll., although the substance of the objections is actually directed against that law. As regards the alleged infringement of property rights, the Government states that the Convention does not prevent States from adopting laws which they consider necessary to regulate the use of property in accordance with the general interest. The Government does not see any contradiction between the contested regulation and the articles cited in the Charter, since, with reference to the finding of the Constitutional Court No 231 / 2000 Coll., it assumes that price regulation does not prevent anyone from doing or operating any other economic activity, since everyone has the freedom to decide whether to do business in a given area under the circumstances. The possibility of limiting the quotas for producers operating exclusively under the system of permanent fixed housing is imported by the Government from § 2 (5) of Act No. 256 / 2000 Coll., which gives entitlement to support certain forms of agriculture, in the case at hand, so-called organic farming.
For all the reasons set out above, the Government of the Czech Republic proposes that the proposal to repeal Decree 445 / 2000 Coll. be rejected.
In particular, the Ministry of Agriculture (hereinafter referred to as "the Ministry ') states that the main objective of the milk production quota system is to stabilise the milk market and protect all its participants (producers, processors and consumers) from negative market fluctuations. This stabilisation is said to be necessary in view of a relatively long production cycle, when the supply response to change in demand is very late. The framework for the introduction of milk production quotas follows from Section 12 of Act No. 256 / 2000 Coll. and was respected by the Government in its regulation, both formally and in terms of content.
To the objection that production quotas contravene certain basic rights enshrined in the Charter, the Ministry states that the system of milk production quotas does not restrict the right of ownership or the right to do business freely. It is said that the present regulation does not jeopardise the right of ownership to existing articles (milk production facilities, dairy cows) or the right to dispose of such property. Any producer who, as a result of increased demand, will be able to increase milk production or wish to start milk production, will be able to request the allocation of a new quota or increase the existing quota from the reserve, or may obtain a contractual transfer from another producer. The system of production quotas is also not supposed to disturb the free market, as every milk producer can freely choose its customer and every processor of its supplier and customer of finished products. In addition, if there is real demand for milk from processors or consumers (which may be the only rational reason for entering the market or increasing production), the new producer has the possibility to obtain a new quota or increased quota. The condition that only milk producers not operating in a permanent housing system may apply for a quota from the reserve demonstrates the public interest in developing production for those producers who provide animals with the so-called welfare usual in all developed countries. In fact, the system of permanent fixed housing is not in conformity with the EU's common agricultural policy. However, in the framework of the allocation of the reserve, all applicants meeting the animal welfare condition have the same possibilities for increasing or allocating the quota.
The Ministry argues that the contested regulation does not infringe the right to do business freely, since the production quota system must protect the market against "the entry of speculators" and that it merely prevents a situation where there is no real demand for milk supply, which is also justified from the point of view of the entrepreneur himself (producer). On the objection of producer inequality, the Ministry stated that, naturally, for producers who did not apply for a quota and who did not join the system, the quota system is at a disadvantage because otherwise the quotas would lack meaning. However, equality must be understood as freedom of choice, where everyone has the possibility to submit or not to apply for the allocation of quotas, and can maximise their profits when involved in the quota system. The advantage conferred by the quota system is allegedly comparable to the subsidies and to the repayable financial assistance provided by the State under the various programmes and, therefore, if the introduction of quotas were to be seen as a breach of equality, these programmes would necessarily be unconstitutional.
As regards objections against the regulation of penalties for exceeding the quota, the Ministry stated that it was an essential element for the production quota system, since "stabilisation could not be achieved without penalising the producer who exceeded his individual milk production quota '. The quota system allows producers to increase their quota and consequently production. A levy of 115% on the minimum price should the individual production quota be exceeded is allegedly equivalent to the penalty applied in the EU. It is therefore neither price regulation nor double prices.
In order to establish the minimum price, the Ministry has indicated that this instrument does not in any way prevent the increase of quotas or the entry of new producers into the market and is neutral in this respect. It is said to be important that it acts as a safety net in the event of a price drop on the market. It is therefore a proven tool for market stability.
The Ministry further argues that the contested regulation is an expression of compliance with the long-term international obligations of the Czech Republic towards the EU and that it is based primarily on Council Regulation No 3950 / 92, as amended by Council Regulation No 1256 / 99, and Commission Regulation No 536 / 93. This system operates on the principle that the EC Council sets out a specific national reference quantity of milk (national quotas) which are further reallocated by Member States to specific national producers. The quotas concerned shall be fixed for each period for nine consecutive 12 months. If national and individual quotas are exceeded, an additional charge of 115% of the milk price shall be applied, i.e. similar to the government's contested regulation. European arrangements also provide for national reserves and the possibility of transferring, transferring or leasing quotas.
For the initial allocation of the quota, the Ministry considers that the same method of calculation is used for all applicants, i.e. the same criterion. If there has been a failure of production in the reference period (i.e. 2000), Article 4 (3) of the contested Regulation will remember this. In addition, each body shall have the right to make use of any appeal under the administrative order. Similarly, the Ministry has argued as unfounded that the quota system does not take into account random short-term factors that may adversely affect milk production and referred to Article 6 of the Regulation.
The determination of the amount of the reserve pursuant to Article 12 (4) (c) of Act No 256 / 2000 Coll. is said to respect the contested regulation by the fact that the sum of all the allocated quotas and reserves must not exceed 3,01 billion litres of milk. Since the Regulation in question provides for a system of production quotas for 5 years and, at the same time, before its application, it is not objectively possible to determine the quantity of quotas to be allocated on the basis of applications under Article 3 of the Regulation, "it is necessary to leave the exact reserve for each quota year at the Ministry of Agriculture '. In this regard, the contested regulation is alleged to be secundum et intra legem.
The Ministry states that the obligation to provide information is laid down in Article 3 (1) of Act No. 256 / 2000 Coll. and is therefore imposed directly by law in accordance with Article 4 of the Charter. Thus, although it is not enshrined directly in Section 12 of that Act, which contains authorisation provisions for a government regulation, it is stated in the Act and "there is no doubt that it must also be applied to government regulations issued under that Act '.
For all these reasons, the Ministry considers that the proposal submitted is unjustified.
The State Agricultural Intervention Fund (hereinafter referred to as "SZIF ') states in its observations that the contested regulation is based on Act No. 256 / 2000 Coll. The production quota is defined in Section 2 (5) of that Act, and since production quotas may be subject to certain forms of agricultural support, the government is empowered by the SZIF to implement measures and to establish market arrangements to stabilise agricultural products and foodstuffs markets in order to minimise price fluctuations on the domestic market. This legal authorisation was fully respected by the Government by the issuing of the contested regulation and cannot therefore be an adjustment made contrary to the law. The quota system is not contrary to property law or to the right to do business freely, since it is for every milk producer and his free decision to apply for inclusion in the system and to produce on this basis the quantities of milk agreed on. In this form, the State merely creates the conditions for each producer to be sold and to receive an adequate minimum price. The introduction of this system therefore does not disturb the free market, but rather guarantees a balance between production and sales. It is also said to be a means of ensuring compliance of Czech law with Community law and also a public interest within the Czech Republic, as the quotation of milk is intended to eliminate price fluctuations affecting all Czech residents.
It is also alleged that there is no argument that double milk prices are being introduced by the contested Regulation, since it is for each producer to consider the appropriateness of the system. if it does not do so, it is not possible to import the inequality between it and the producer who did so. Finally, it can be added that the State has an interest in expanding bovine farming without permanent binding housing and therefore links the increase in the production quota and the allocation of new individual production quotas to the condition that the producer keeps cattle without permanent binding housing. It is therefore not a sanction, but a 'support for a particular type of cattle farming' corresponding to organic farming.
For all the above reasons, the SZIF has proposed that the proposal be rejected.
Even before the Constitutional Court dealt with the proposal formically, it focused on whether the procedural conditions for proceedings before the Constitutional Court were met.
In this regard, it notes that, pursuant to Article 64 (2) (b) of Law No 182 / 1993 Coll. a proposal for the annulment of another legislation or its individual provisions is entitled to a group of at least 25 Members. On the subject, the motion was signed by 28 Members of the Chamber of Deputies and is therefore a legitimate applicant.
The Constitutional Court also addressed the question of whether the contested government regulation was adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as "the Constitution ') by the designated competence and by the constitutionally prescribed method (§ 68 (2) of Law No 182 / 1993 Coll. in fine). In this respect, it stated that the constitutional authorisation for the issuing of regulations was given to the Government by Article 78 of the Constitution, according to which the Government is entitled to issue regulations for the implementation of the law and within its limits. The regulation shall be signed by the Prime Minister and the relevant member of the Government. In the present case, the Constitutional Court found that by order No 1166 of 22 November 2000, the Government approved the draft regulation on the establishment of milk production quotas and the conditions of their system for the years 2001 to 2005, when out of the 12 members of the Government present voted in favour of the approval of all 12 members. The regulation was signed by Prime Minister Ing. Zeman and Minister of Agriculture Ing. Fencl, the regulation was properly published in the Collection of Laws in the amount 124 under No 445 / 2000 Coll., came into effect on 1 January 2001 and expires on 31 December 2005.
In these circumstances, the Constitutional Court concludes that the contested Decree of the Government has been adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution established competence and in a constitutionally prescribed manner within the meaning of § 68 (2) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll. That is why the Constitutional Court was able to deal with it meritorically.
The Constitutional Court also addressed the issue of the legislative competence of the Government and the Ministry of Agriculture to establish a quota system. In this respect, he noted that quantitative restrictions on the production, supply or consumption of certain goods or the provision, brokering or acceptance of certain services under the fundamental right to freedom of choice of profession, the right to engage in other economic activities (Article 26 (1) of the Charter) can only be introduced by law in the Czech Republic - as in the setting of other conditions or restrictions - (Article 26 (2) of the Charter). The definition of the details relating to these restrictions or the specification of the framework conditions may be carried out by a statutory law, provided that it has been issued by the competent authority under the authority of the Constitution or the ordinary law. The Constitution makes a distinction between the right of the Government to issue regulations "for the implementation of and within the limits of the law '(Article 78 of the Constitution) and between the law of ministries, other administrative offices and local authorities" on the basis and within the limits of the law to legislate if they are empowered by law' (Article 79 (3) of the Constitution).
The system of milk production quotas is based on Act No. 256 / 2000 Coll. The Act defines the production quota (Section 2 (5)) and the financial penalties imposed on producers, processors or distributors in the event of overcompensation or production (collection, processing) without the quota allocated (Section 13). It also lays down principles for the allocation of production quotas (e.g. Section 12 (6)). The Act directly obliges the Government (§ 12 (1)) to establish, by its regulation, the conditions and principles for implementing further measures for the organisation of the agricultural products and foodstuffs market pursuant to § 1 (2) (b) and (c) and to establish, by its regulation, the production quotas and the conditions of the production quota system (§ 12 (3)). It is therefore clear that, in the issuing of the contested regulation, in addition to the constitutional authorisation of the Government, the authorisation (order) was also legally applicable.
In this context, the Constitutional Court states that it does not agree with the argument of a group of Members that the contested regulation deviates from the limits laid down by Law No 256 / 2000 Coll. and that it is contrary to Article 4 of the Charter that obligations may be imposed only on the basis of the law and, within its limits and limits, the fundamental rights and freedoms may be governed only by law. The Constitutional Court has already ruled, in Case 96 / 2001 Coll., that the constitutional definition of the derived standard of execution must respect the following principles:
- the regulation must be issued by an authorised body,
- the regulation cannot interfere with matters reserved for the law,
- the legislator's will to regulate above the legal standard must be evident (therefore the scope for the scope of the regulation must be opened).
In the case of the contested regulation, the Constitutional Court, for the reasons set out above, notes that all the principles cited for its publication have been maintained, since the contested regulation was issued by the Government as an authorised body, the Regulation does not interfere with the matters reserved for the Act (No 256 / 2000 Coll.) and the legislature provided for the definition of the content of the contested regulation (Article 12 of Act No 256 / 2000 Coll.) is sufficiently specific to be presumed by the legislature in the aforementioned sense. It can therefore be summed up that the contested regulation does not infringe the rule of law, since it only, on the basis of explicit legal authorisation, specifies the issue laid down in the fundamental features of the law itself. The opposite conclusion, which would require the imposition of any obligation directly and exclusively by law, would obviously lead to absurd consequences, namely the denial of the meaning of secondary (and, in some cases, primary) standards, as the definition of certain rights and obligations of the addressees of the standard is a conceptual part of each legal standard.
Therefore, neither the Constitutional Court found the illegality nor the illegality of the contested government regulation in this respect.
On the other hand, the Constitutional Court considers that a non-constitutional and illegal substatutory delegation determining the amount of the reserve notified by the Ministry in the Ministry of Agriculture Bulletin (Section 14 (2) of the Regulation). The text of the provision cited in this regard does not clearly determine who sets the level of the reserve. It can be concluded from the method of publication that the Ministry (Minister of Agriculture) does so. However, deciding on the amount of the reserve is an integral part of the milk production quota system in the Czech Republic. The Act provides that the system of production quotas for individual agricultural commodities is introduced by the Government of the Czech Republic by its regulation (§ 12 (3)), which is published in the Collection of Acts in accordance with the Constitution and Act No. 309 / 1999 Coll., on the Collection of Laws and on the Collection of International Contracts [§ 1 (1) (d)]. The Ministry is therefore neither legally nor under the Constitution. As the Constitutional Court ruled in the Found No. 96 / 2001 Coll., because "the legislator cannot delegate the scope of the regulation of relations designated by law to power, and thus in fact resign from its legislative obligation, the more so the executive authority cannot claim the right to such regulation itself with the appeal of a law which clearly has a different purpose and purpose."
The Constitutional Court therefore concludes that, for that reason, Article 14 (2) of the contested regulation is already contrary to Article 79 (3) of the Constitution.
Following an assessment of the legislative and competent aspects of the Government's regulation in question, the Constitutional Court continued to examine its substantive analysis, gradually from the point of view of the appellants' objections. Before that, however, several comments of a more general nature should be submitted.
A) The Constitutional Court is, pursuant to Article 83 of the Constitution, a judicial authority for the protection of constitutionality. Pursuant to Article 87 (1) (b) of the Constitution, it is entitled to decide to repeal other legislation or its individual provisions if they are contrary to the constitutional law, the law or the international treaty referred to in Article 10. It can therefore only assess the constitutionality (or legality) of the contested law and not its suitability or effectiveness in its decision-making activities. In the present case, too, in the case of the so-called abstract control of standards, the Constitutional Court addresses only the constitutional aspects of the contested regulation and does not express its suitability and effectiveness in terms of, for example, the existence of a free market and the like (see below).
B) The Constitutional Court further notes that it has taken an opinion on the issue of regulation already in Case 231 / 2000 Coll. In this finding, although it assessed the constitutionality and legality of Decree No. 176 / 1993 Coll., on the rental of an apartment and the remuneration for the use of an apartment, as amended, contained in the provisions on the regulation of the lease of apartments, some general conclusions contained in this finding can, in the view of the Constitutional Court, be applied mutatis mutandis to the case under appeal. In particular, the Constitutional Court recalls that, in the statement of reasons for that finding, it indicated that, when controlling the use of assets which may also consist of the regulation of the amount of rent, it is necessary to carefully consider both the existence of a public interest which justifies the application of guidance (control) measures and the choice of detailed rules for the implementation of such measures. State interference must respect a reasonable (fair) balance between the requirement of the general interest of society and that of protecting the fundamental rights of the individual. This means that there must be a reasonable (justified) relationship between the resources used and the objectives pursued.
C) Finally, the Constitutional Court states that, according to its established case-law - in accordance with its constitutional and legal definition - it is bound and cannot exceed the petit of the application in the procedure for the control of standards. In the present case he could therefore only deal with the constitutionality and legality of the contested government regulation and not with the constitutionality of other regulations, in particular Act No. 256 / 2000 Coll. Therefore, on the basis of the application submitted, the Constitutional Court could merely assess whether the contested regulation was contrary to the law, the constitutional law or the international treaty under Article 10 of the Constitution, but not anymore, whether the law itself - the complaint - was not contested - was not unconstitutional.
The first group of objections of the appellants [to the freedom of business and the admissibility of its restriction (Article 26 (1) and (2) of the Charter)]
Article 26 (1) Each Charter shall have the right to free choice of profession and to prepare for it, as well as the right to undertake and pursue other economic activities. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of that Article, the law may lay down conditions and restrictions for the pursuit of certain professions or activities.
In this context, the appellants argue, in particular, that the law can only lay down qualifying and similar conditions for business and other economic activities, not restrict the actual process of business in the form of effective price regulation, which is so intense that it distorts the very nature of the right to do business.
In addition, the Constitutional Court states, first of all, that it has already stated in Case 231 / 2000 Coll. that "price regulation does not prevent anyone from doing business or operating any other economic activity, since everyone has the freedom to decide whether or not to do business in a particular area under the conditions laid down therein '. In the case under appeal, the Constitutional Court further stresses that neither constitutional order nor international treaties on human rights and fundamental freedoms prohibit legislators from imposing restrictions on the quantity of economic production, distribution or consumption of goods. It is not inappropriate in this context to draw attention also to the fact that certain restrictions on the production and distribution of goods normally occur on an international basis, by checking the import or export of goods between States which contractually liberalise mutual trade (e.g. the relevant provisions of the EC Treaty or the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).
It is therefore essentially up to the Parliament of the Czech Republic (the legislature) to take into account the general interest in adjusting the situation in a particular economic sector when issuing ordinary laws. At the same time, the economic efficiency and social capacity of the adjustment should be primarily subject to political control. On the other hand, however, it must be consistently maintained that, as the Constitutional Court has already stated, sub-sub V. B), in any particular case, the existence of a public interest which justifies the application of guidance measures must be carefully considered, since State intervention must respect a fair balance between the general interest of society on the one hand and the protection of the fundamental rights of individuals on the other. This means that there must be an adequate relationship between the resources used and the objectives pursued. Otherwise, i.e. in the event of the ineffectiveness or inadequacy of the restriction in question, the relevant regulation would be in a manifest conflict with Article 4 (4) of the Charter, according to which, when applying the provisions on the limits of fundamental rights and freedoms, their substance and their meaning must be investigated. Such restrictions shall not be misused for purposes other than those for which they have been established.
However, the introduction of production quotas (for the production, marketing and processing of milk) by the contested regulation does not show the characteristics of an ineffectiveness or inadequacy. In fact, limiting the supply of milk and milk products (as one of the basic food groups) by setting production quotas - given the long-term milk surplus - is not a threat. As the Ministry and the SZIF correctly state in their comments on the proposal, the task of the production quota system is to protect the market against the entry of speculators and to create conditions such that each producer has sales and receives an adequate minimum price to guarantee a balance between production and sales. Nor is the determination of minimum milk prices (Section 10 of the Regulation) contrary to this public interest, the obvious objective of which is to stabilise the market in the event of a price decrease.
The Constitutional Court accepts the Government's view that the introduction of milk production quotas constitutes an approximation of Czech legislation to the legislation in the European Union and its Member States, caused by long-term overproduction of milk in Western Europe (see Europe - European Union - European Commission - Agriculture: Agriculture - Situation and Outlook: Dairy Sector, in: www.europa.eu.int / comm / agriculture / public / package / package / daughter / index _ en.htm # top). The regulation introduced by the contested regulation, as the government rightly states, essentially represents the transfer of the Community model (regulation) to Czech agriculture, both in terms of legal technical means (production quotas and overproduction penalties) and in terms of setting the quantity. The view of the Government that the Community regulation of milk production is based on the principle that individual quotas are allocated to individual producers on the basis of centrally established national production quotas of each Member State can be accepted. The contested regulation is therefore a step that brings agriculture in the Czech Republic closer to European conditions and thus facilitates to some extent the accession of the Czech Republic to the European Union. Moreover, the regulation in place means the fulfilment of a programme provision on the approximation of Czech law to Community law, as provided for and requested (albeit not explicitly) by Article 70 of the Europe Agreement establishing an association between the Czech Republic, of the one part, and the European Communities and their Member States, of the other part (No 7 / 1995 Coll.).
In this context, the Constitutional Court considers it appropriate to emphasise that it does not share the contention of the appellants (expressed during the oral hearing) that Community law is not relevant for the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic as a State outside the European Union when assessing constitutionality. This claim is inappropriately simplistic and schematic. Indeed, one of the sources of primary Community law is the general principles of law, which excel the European Court of Justice from the constitutional traditions of the Member States of the European Union. Their content are basic values common to all its members. The general principles of law fulfil the concepts of the rule of law, including fundamental human rights and freedoms and fair management within them. The Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic has also repeatedly applied the general principles of law which are not explicitly contained in the legislation, but are fully applicable in European legal culture (e.g. the principle of proportionality) - see sp. zl. The Constitutional Court thus applied to European legal culture and its constitutional traditions. In the light of the general principles of law, it also interprets constitutional regulations, particularly the Charter. Thus, primary Community law is not foreign to the Constitutional Court, but radiates - particularly in the form of general legal principles of European law - to a large extent into its own decision-making activities. To this extent, the decision of the Constitutional Court is also relevant.
It seems unacceptable that the introduction of milk production quotas constitutes a serious disturbance to the exclusion of the free market. A completely free market, free of all legal regulation, is not a fundamental and constitutional order required or guaranteed by the value of the organisation of Czech society. The right of an individual to it is not a fundamental right expressed by the Constitution, the Charter or the international treaties on human rights and fundamental freedoms. Even in the European Union, which declares the economy of the whole and within the Member States as a market economy at the highest level (Article 2 of the Treaty establishing the European Community), the regulation of agriculture is not regarded as a breach of this principle as other equivalent objectives, such as convergence of economic performance, economic and social cohesion, etc. Moreover, the regulation of agriculture by market rules expressly allows for the provision of primary agricultural law (Article 34 of the EC Treaty). In this context, the Constitutional Court repeatedly points out that, in its decision-making activities, it can only assess the constitutionality (or legality) of the contested legislation and not its suitability or effectiveness. The appellants' objection is therefore unfounded.
Therefore, the legislator may, of course only within the limits of the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental human rights and freedoms, as it considers, establish price or quantitative regulation of production in a particular sector of the economy, define or influence the type and number of operators active in such a sector, or reduce the contractual freedom in the application of production on the market or in the purchase of raw materials. The argument of a group of Members that the limitation of the possibilities provided for in the regulation of business or other economic activity concerns only qualification and similar assumptions may be considered to be a disproportionately narrow interpretation of the relevant provision of the Charter (Article 26 (2)). From Article 41 (1) The Charter is clear that economic, social and cultural rights, including Article 26 of the Charter, can only be invoked within the limits of the laws implementing those provisions. The nature of these rights is fundamentally different from the fundamental rights of others (typically civil and political rights), and the legislator's ability to determine their close conditions is therefore considerably greater and is in principle limited by the principle already cited in Article 4 (4) of the Charter.
To argue that price regulation limits the company's liability for the results of its management (Section 2 of the Commercial Code), it should be noted that the legal autonomy of the producer - despite apparently strict regulation of milk production - remains. Even now, a milk producer can make a profit or suffer a loss according to the productivity of its work, its quality and external effects. It continues to be responsible for its production in the same way as other undertakings. Its position is not similar to that of an employer-led employee. Each state regulation of business or economic activity affects the business environment, the level of real-life revenues and profits and the risk of loss. In the case of strict regulation of milk production, it can certainly be concluded that milk production yields are relatively well foreseeable due to the fact that milk cannot be sold above a certain quantity. However, maintaining the substance of the milk production business does not alter the contested regulation.
Any restriction on business or the establishment of assumptions and conditions for them must have a certain purpose, must pursue a certain general interest. As already stated above, the "non-investigation 'constitutes the substance and the meaning of the basic law. The public interest, which is sufficient to justify State intervention in the milk market, including the regulation of the quantity of milk production, is to stabilise prices and thus the incomes of farms and private farmers, given the social, economic and ecological specialities of agriculture.
In this context, it cannot be borne in mind that the applicants claim that there is a balance between milk supply and demand in the Czech Republic. Annual milk consumption (of course in the form of various dairy products) amounted to 2.1 million tonnes in the Czech Republic, while production amounted to 2,789 million tonnes (see the Czech Statistical Yearbook 2000, Czech Statistical Office, Prague, 2000, p. 278 and 713). Moreover, the surplus, which is being amplified by rising imports, is largely exported abroad with great difficulty. These exports would have been consistently highly loss-making, and could have been made only temporarily, if not for public export subsidies.
In conclusion, the Constitutional Court recalls that (in principle) it is not called upon to assess the economic aspects of the necessity and necessity of limiting the business or determining the conditions under which it is possible to conduct business, given the need to ensure individual, often close to one another or even against one another public interests. The choice of restrictive (control) instruments and their level of application are primarily the responsibility of the legislator. Only Parliament, as a representative body, can take such action in our constitutional system. His responsibility for recognising the problems in the economy that demand regulation, the choice of instruments and their effects, which may sometimes be negative, is primarily political, and the Constitutional Court can only intervene in this case if it finds it unconstitutional. In the case under trial, however, the legislator by Act No. 256 / 2000 Coll. (which in itself was not subject to review by the Constitutional Court) defined clear empowerment rules and limits for the adoption of a regulation by the Government, and the Government respected that empowerment by the contested regulation. It can therefore be concluded that the Government Regulation in question does not contradict Article 26 (1) and (2) of the Charter.
Finally, as the Constitutional Court has already pointed out above (sub IV), it is not justified nor is the appellants' objection that any restriction of the fundamental right enshrined in Article 26 (1) of the Charter can only be implemented by law (and not by regulation of the Government), which is alleged not to comply with the regulation in question and is thus contrary to Article 4 (2) of the Charter. In the present case, the Government has respected the relevant principles for the issue of the contested regulation - on the basis of explicit legal authorisation - and this Regulation (with the exception of the provisions of Sections 14 (2) and 4 (2)) only details its material in more detail the legal authorisation cited, i.e. the issue already provided for by the law itself. It is therefore clear that the contested Regulation as a whole is not unconstitutional even in this respect. the limits of fundamental rights and freedoms in this case have been laid down directly by law (Article 4 (2) of the Charter) and the obligations arising from this Regulation are therefore imposed "on the basis of and within the limits of the law '(Article 4 (1) of the Charter).
For the sake of completeness, the Constitutional Court adds that, in the present case, the system of milk production quotas is not disproportionate even from a comparative point of view with regard to similar treatment of the milk market in the Member States of the European Union. Indeed, not only in these countries but also in other advanced democratic countries of Western Europe, there are comparable adjustments to the milk market and certain other agricultural products (see Council Regulation No 3950 / 92, Commission Regulation No 536 / 93). While they are often subject to relatively strong criticism for their cost and problematic competitive and structural effects, this criticism is not based on doubts as to the compatibility of the milk market's adjustment with both European and universal human rights standards.
The second group of objections of the appellants [on the nature of ownership, the admissibility and the conditions of its restriction (Article 11 of the Charter and Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention)]
Article 11 (1) Everyone has the right to own property. The ownership of all owners has the same legal content and protection. According to paragraph 4 of that Article, the expropriation or compulsory restriction of ownership is possible in the public interest, on the basis of law and for compensation. Article 1 The Additional Protocol to the Convention shall "have the right of any natural or legal person" to use his property peacefully. No one may be deprived of his property except in the public interest and under the conditions laid down by the law and general principles of international law. The previous provisions shall not prevent States from adopting laws which they consider necessary to regulate the use of property in accordance with the general interest and to ensure the payment of taxes and other charges or fines. ';
In essence, the appellants argue that limiting the quantity of milk production constitutes an unacceptable interference with the right of ownership, does not rely on the public interest and does not take place without compensation.
In particular, the Constitutional Court states that the limitation of the quantity of production of any product naturally constitutes a restriction on the right to use the product - as an object of ownership - produced in excess of a specified production quota, and therefore there is a form of restriction of ownership. In particular, it is a restriction or even a ban on the sale of such a product on the market at a price. However, such a restriction does not constitute an expropriation (which the appellants do not even claim), since the owner of the product can still - albeit to a limited extent - still have it, use it or even destroy it. Therefore, it does not transfer or transfer ownership of a product (produced over a specified quantity) to another person. The product becomes by regulation difficult to sell or not at all. However, entitlement to a certain price on the market is not part of the basic right of ownership. As regards the objection that the quota system constitutes a forced restriction on property rights, the Constitutional Court reiterates [see Section V. (B)] that it constitutes a form of control over the use of property, for which the existence of both the public interest which justifies the application of guidance (control) measures and the choice of detailed rules for the implementation of such measures must be carefully considered. State interference must respect a reasonable (fair) balance between the general interest of society and the protection of the fundamental rights of the individual. This means that there must be a reasonable (justified) relationship between the resources used and the objectives pursued. In the view of the Constitutional Court, as regards the contested regulation, the existence of a public interest (i.e. the stabilisation of the milk market), which is legitimising the introduction of the quota system, is given and the means chosen to achieve that objective (the quota system) are, from a constitutional point of view, entirely proportionate.
In this context, it should be recalled that, for example, the tightening of quality requirements for the production of goods in business or other economic activities often constitutes a price disadvantage for the undertaking or operator of the products it produces or the raw materials and equipment it uses for production. However, such regulation is often needed in order to better ensure a broad pallet of still often under-protected important general interests. However, an objection to the restriction of property rights would undoubtedly be considered unacceptable in such cases.
As the Ministry rightly states in its statement, any producer wishing to increase milk production or to start milk production as a result of increased demand has the possibility, under the contested regulation, to request the allocation of a new quota or to increase the existing quota from the reserve, or may obtain a contractual transfer from another producer. It is therefore clear that the quota system does not constitute a fundamental and unjustified restriction on ownership, but is, in essence, an effective measure. This may, to a certain extent and in a certain way, be subjectively felt as a restriction on the right of ownership of milk producers; However, it cannot be overlooked that such a measure, in its final effect under clearly defined and pre-established conditions, objectively protects and develops producer ownership rights. The purpose of the quota system is to create the conditions for each producer to be disposed of and to receive an appropriate minimum price. However, the Constitutional Court clearly cannot give an answer to the question of whether the measure is optimal and economically most advantageous.
The logic of the newly introduced quota system is that, with the long-term overcompensation of milk supply over demand for milk (see Part VI), only the growing state subsidies guarantee "profitability" of milk production in the Czech Republic. Investments in such production represent, in particular, an attempt to exploit them in those circumstances. The impact of introducing a system of milk production quotas, produced from day to day, is essentially only potential. The penalty levy of a fixed amount derived from the minimum price of milk for the supply of production in excess of the individual production quota (Section 13 of Act No. 256 / 2000 Coll.) is a necessary instrument for which the State must have the necessary tools to enforce any - i.e. also quantitative - regulation of economic life. It is precisely the purpose of deterring producers from the right to prohibit or refuse to act. A State which, for important reasons of general interest, imposes restrictions on the quantity of production may also prohibit production in excess of that quantity. The violation of such a ban can undoubtedly penalise. Less affecting restrictions which only disadvantage or exclude milk production beyond or outside the set production quotas are permitted (arg. and maiori ad minus). Therefore, the imposition of penalties cannot be regarded as expropriation or as a compulsory restriction on property rights in the above sense. In addition, as the Constitutional Court has already stated elsewhere, the possibility of imposing a penalty levy on the SZIF is regulated in Act No. 256 / 2000 Coll., and not in the contested regulation. However, the law cited was not contested by the appellants, and the Constitutional Court was therefore not able to review it in the context of the abstract standard control procedure.
Nor has the Constitutional Court forgotten that the determination of milk production quotas (or any other goods) already manifests by nature the State's efforts to discourage potential investors from further - in this case quantitative - development of an economic sector in which there is no public interest. Such deterrence from investment can also mean changes in quality regulations, changes in tax (restrictive taxation) or even changes in the purchase of goods or services by public bodies designated to provide public services. Therefore, the deterrence from investments in milk production cannot be considered as a restriction of ownership to the resources the use of which in other economic areas could be taken into account by both existing and potential producers (taking into account the above circumstances). These funds can, in general, be used to develop a number of other sectors of the economy (including agriculture), the quantitative growth of which is not an obstacle to some important public interest.
From a comparative point of view, it is also necessary to refer to the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which expressed its views on the matter of limiting the fundamental right to property in connection with the application of Community rules on agricultural production. In the case of Hauer (44 / 79, in: P. Craig and G. de Bourca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 306 - 307), the ECJ pointed out that the provisions of Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention (on the right to property) do not exclude the right of the State to apply such provisions as the State considers necessary to regulate the exercise of ownership in accordance with the general interest. In the present case, the German authorities did not allow winegrowers from the German country Rhineland-Palatinate on its land, namely Council Regulation No 1162 / 76 on the adaptation of vineyards to market needs.
The third group of objections of the appellants [to apply the principle of equality and non-discrimination (Article 1 of the Charter)]
Article 1 The Charter is free and equal in dignity and in law. Fundamental rights and freedoms are inalienable, inalienable, unbiased and unbreakable. The principle of equality and non-discrimination is further specified in Article 3 (1) of the Charter ("Fundamental rights and freedoms are guaranteed to all without distinction of sex, race, colour, language, faith and religion, political or other thinking, national or social origin, membership of a national or ethnic minority, property, family or other status."). Reference should also be made to Article 4 (3) of the Charter, according to which "Legal restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms must apply equally to all cases which fulfil the conditions laid down. '
The appellants see a breach of the principle of equality in that a form of de facto price regulation is introduced by the milk production quota system, which introduces a double price for milk. The method of calculating the initial allocation of production quotas is not objective because it does not take into account factors which may have adversely affected milk production for a particular producer in the period 2000. Finally, the restriction resulting from Paragraph 4 (2) of the contested Regulation, according to which producers operating exclusively under the system of permanent fixed housing allocated to an individual production quota will neither increase nor be allocated a new individual production quota from the reserve, allegedly discriminate against a particular producer group, those operating exclusively under the system of permanent fixed housing.
The Constitutional Court recalls first of all that the issue of equality has already been addressed by the Constitutional Court of the CSFR, which was judged by the Court of First Instance (finding sp. zn. If a right has been granted out of equality, each individual is entitled to remove all de facto inequalities within the limits of his or her ability. However, this structure only applies if equality is considered absolute. The equality of relative, as all modern institutions mean, only requires the removal of unjustified differences. (...) Special standards may establish specific equality criteria for certain fields, which do not generally result from the application of the principle of equality, since the application of the principle of equality does not set such precise limits as to exclude any discretion of those who apply it. "
In the case of a case The Constitutional Court reiterates that the purpose of the production quota system is to create conditions for each producer to be disposed of and to receive an adequate minimum price. It is therefore clear that this system was not designed to favour or favour a group of milk producers, but rather to ensure a level playing field and protect both producers and consumers from unwanted large price fluctuations. The objection to the double price of milk is therefore irrelevant since the price of milk remains the same for all producers and the levy of 115% of the minimum or regulated price (Section 13 of Act No. 256 / 2000 Coll.) does not constitute a "double" price of milk, but a penalty for breach of the rules of the quota system. In other words, while respecting the rules laid down, all milk producers have a level playing field and precisely in order to achieve the objective of the quota system, which is market stability, the law (i.e. not the contested regulation) amended the penalties for infringement of the rules of that system.
Furthermore, it must be seen that the creation of a production quota system does not discriminate against those who do not participate in it. The objection of inequality or discrimination in this respect is unfounded as the distinction between producers is based on the choice of the body concerned in the present case. It has the possibility of applying for or not using an individual production quota. The quota system therefore corresponds to the principle enshrined in Article 4 (3) of the Charter that the legal restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms "must apply equally to all cases which fulfil the conditions laid down '. Given the de facto impossibility of producing milk outside the production quota system - in view of the non-marketability of the milk, the purchase of which by the State would be burdened by a penalty levy - the distribution of production quotas is a mechanism similar, for example, to the activities of entrepreneurs linked to the definition of the quantitative scope of their business. From a constitutional point of view, it is essential that the rules of the quota system are general, accessible and predictable and, therefore, the objection to inequality is unfounded.
However, it is clear from the nature of the matter - as has already been mentioned - that the creation of a system of milk production quotas must somewhat "discourage" the entry of new operators into this sector. The aim of the production quotas is to stabilise production to a certain maximum, which in fact means a certain reduction in the current situation. Unrestricted access to the sector could undermine any effect of production quotas. The purpose of limiting production is therefore to discourage entry into the sector as well as future investments where there is a public interest in its restriction. A certain disadvantage for potential future producers towards the current producers is a natural and irreparable characteristic of all restrictions on the quantity of production and cannot be seen as a breach of the constitutionally guaranteed principle of equality, because - as has already been said - equality in modern constitutional systems cannot be understood as an absolute but relative category. Therefore, the Constitutional Court could not attest to the appellants' objections that the contested regulation contradicts Article 12 (7) of Act No 256 / 2000 Coll., according to which "The system of production quotas will allow new entrants to enter the market and ensure that the operators entering the market have the same possibilities of obtaining production quotas as those already operating on the market within the framework of the distribution of the reserve but up to a maximum of the current annual quota '.
The allocation of individual production quotas between individual farmers according to their production in the previous calendar year (Section 3 (1) et seq. of the Regulation) cannot in practice be fully in line with the principle of equality - the infringement of which the appellants object - enshrined in Section 12 (6) (a) of Act No. 256 / 2000 Coll., if that principle were understood in an absolute (abstract) concept. For example, it can be considered that in 2000 some producers did not have to produce too much milk because they had mostly heifers and calves in the stable for various reasons, their holdings could have been affected by natural disasters or diseases, etc. However, most of these cases are remembered by the formula for calculating the individual supply quota set out in Annex 1 to the contested Regulation. Therefore, certain inequalities could arise if the producer supplied only a limited quantity of milk for a certain period of time as a result of natural effects or an uneven state of bovine animals from an age or other perspective. However, this inequality cannot be regarded as unconstitutional, even because any legally regulated method of determining an individual production quota could, in a particular case, lead to a subjectively perceived unfair outcome. However, if the legislation were to remove these cases, there would be another - and equally serious - danger of a certain risk of "elimination of hardships" in the allocation of production quotas. Therefore, there is no possibility to see the illegality (and illegality) of the contested regulation.
As regards producers active exclusively in the system of permanent housing, the Constitutional Court considers that the preference for organic dairy farming under the Specific Act (No 242 / 2000 Coll., on organic farming and amending Act No. 368 / 1992 Coll., on administrative fees, as amended) cannot be regarded as non-constitutional discrimination in the distribution of new production quotas or the increase of existing ones. The legislator has the right to resort to it precisely for reasons of public interest, which is undoubtedly an improvement in animal behaviour (see also the Ministry's statement on animal welfare). This is certainly the right and acceptable activity. State aid may, for example, take the form of subsidies or other forms of public aid. The legislator therefore has the right to make such a preference in connection with the distribution of further production quotas or their reduction in the law without doubt.
However, this cannot - beyond the rule of law - be done by the government only when issuing a statutory implementing act.
The Government of the Czech Republic is therefore wrong - in this context - if it claims that § 2 (5) of Act No. 256 / 2000 Coll. empowers it to favour a form of agriculture as it does in § 4 (2) of the regulation. This provides that the individual production quota allocated shall not be increased or a new individual milk production quota from the reserve for producers operating exclusively under the permanent holding system. The provision cited in Paragraph 2 (5) of Law No 256 / 2000 only states that "A production quota may be made conditional on the granting of a form of agricultural aid." This means that the purpose of the legal provision cited clearly lies in allowing a positive preference for a form of agriculture (typically organically oriented) by state aid, subject to the condition of inclusion in the production quota system. At the same time, however, it is clear that the wording of the provision cited does not give rise to the legal authorisation of the Government to exclude certain producers from the possibility of increasing the existing or allocating a new production quota as provided for in Article 4 (2) of the contested Regulation.
This provision therefore clearly does not respect the reservation of the law and is therefore contrary to Article 4 (1) and (2) of the Charter.
For all the reasons set out above, the Constitutional Court annulled Article 4 (2) of Decree 445 / 2000 Coll. for the contradiction with Article 4 (1) and (2) of the Charter and Article 14 (2) of the same regulation for its contradiction with Article 79 (3) of the Constitution.
In accordance with Articles 58 (1) and 70 (1) of Law No 182 / 1993 Coll., the Constitutional Court annulled those provisions on 31 December 2001 in order to give the Government sufficient time to provide the necessary measures and adjustments.
The remainder of the application for annulment of the contested regulation was rejected by the Constitutional Court.
President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr. Kessler v. r.
Pursuant to Article 14 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, the judges JUDr. Pavel Holländer and JUDr. Antonín Procházka took different views on the reasoning of the decision.
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Regulation Information
| Citation | The Constitutional Court found No 410 / 2001 Coll., on the application for annulment of Government Decree No. 445 / 2000 Coll., on the establishment of milk production quotas for the years 2001 to 2005 |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | The Constitutional Tribunal found |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 20.11.2001 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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