Communication from the Constitutional Court No 408 / 2021 Coll.
Communication from the Constitutional Court on the Opinion of the plenary of the Constitutional Court of 12 October 2021 sp. zn.
Valid
Communication from the Constitutional Court
Text versions:
19.11.2021
408
COMMUNICATION
The Constitutional Court
On 12 October 2021, the Board of the Constitutional Court adopted on 12 October 2021 under sp. zn.
the following opinion:
If the General Courts consider in the procedure for replacing the compulsory's will to transfer the replacement parcel free of charge to an authorised person under Section 11a of Act No. 229 / 1991 Coll., on the treatment of property relations with land and other agricultural property, (Land Act) on the basis of the judgment of the attached geometrical plan, they do not advance ultra vires but provide protection of the law under Article 36 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.
Reasons
Definition of the case and the course of the proceedings
1. The contested question concerns the procedure for replacing the compulsory's will to conclude a contract with the entitled person on the free transfer of the replacement plot pursuant to § 11a (1) of Act No. 229 / 1991 Coll., on the modification of property relations with the land and other agricultural property, as amended ("the Land Act '). The main point of view is whether, in such proceedings, the general courts have jurisdiction to decide on the division of the land.
2. Complainant Czech Republic - In its constitutional complaint, the State Property Office seeks the annulment of the order of the Supreme Court No 28 Cdo 979 / 2021-465 of 28.4.2021, the judgment of the Regional Court of Prague No 26 Co 199 / 2020-427 of 2.12.2020 and the judgment of the District Court of Mladá Byslavi No 8 C 232 / 2019- 378 of 18.6.2020, as it claims that they infringed its right to a fair trial under Article 36 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms ("the Charter '), the right to own property pursuant to Article 11 (1) of the Charter and the principle of legitimate expectations and legal certainty.
3. By the judgment under appeal, the District Court replaced the complainant's will (the defendant in the proceedings before the General Courts) with the intervener (the applicant) with a contract for the free transfer of land newly separated by a geometrical plan which is owned by the Czech Republic. According to the District Court, the intervener is a person authorised under Section 4 of the Soil Act and seeks the issue of replacement land for the land withdrawn, whose natural restitution is prevented by the obstacles foreseen in Section 11a (1) of the Soil Act. The District Court has assessed the complainant's previous practice in relation to an intervener as inefficient within the meaning of the case-law of the Constitutional Court [e.g. the finding of sp. zn. Since some of the land proposed for issue was partly affected by the planned public utility construction, which constitutes a legal obstacle to the transfer from State ownership within the meaning of § 11a (2) of the Land Act in conjunction with § 6 (1) (b) of Act No. 503 / 2012 Coll., on the State Land Office and on the amendment of certain related laws, as amended, the District Court decided to separate these parts of the land by a geometric plan which became part of the judgment. The land was thus newly created in the transfer. The Regional Court subsequently confirmed the decision of the District Court.
4. The Supreme Court then rejected the appeal as inadmissible. It stated that, according to settled case-law, the beneficiary may, in the event of a sluggish, arbitrary or discriminatory procedure by the State, claim before the court an action for the issue of a particular land. According to the Supreme Court, general civil courts have the power to decide on the division of land in a situation where the land is not suitable for issue in its entirety, but a part of that land separated by a geometric plan is already suitable for transfer. This conclusion is based on the established decision-making practice of the Supreme Court, which, despite the different legal opinion of the Constitutional Court in the decision-making process, is found in sp. zn. III. ÚS 3804 / 19 of 5.1.2021 found no reasonable reason to deviate from its consistent case-law (it refers in particular to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Case C-509 / 2021 of 27.4.2021, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Case C-2060 / 2010 of 11.12.2013 or the order of the Supreme Court in Case C-2669 / 2015 of 28.4.2016; caselaw cited The Supreme Court is available at www.njud.cz).
5. The Supreme Court does not agree with the view of the Constitutional Court, consisting of the interpretation of Paragraph 82 (3) of the First Law No. 183 / 2006 Coll., on the zoning and construction rules (Construction Act), as amended by Act No. 350 / 2012 Coll., hereinafter referred to as the "Construction Act ', according to which the decision of the Building Office on the division or consolidation of the land is not required if the conditions for the division or formation of the land are given by a regulatory plan, a decision of the Building Office or a decision pursuant to a special regulation; Note No 33 then refers to Sections 2, 3 and 11 of Act No. 139 / 2002 Coll., on land and land offices and amending Act No. 229 / 1991 Coll., on the treatment of property relations with land and other agricultural property, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as the Land Act). The Supreme Court interprets this provision in such a way that" a decision under a special rule' means a final judgment of the court on the replacement of a compulsory person's will to conclude a contract with the entitled person for the free transfer of the replacement parcel pursuant to Paragraph 11a (1) of the Soil Act. According to the Supreme Court, a special law within the meaning of Paragraph 82 (3) of the Construction Act is a regulation which allows a public authority to decide, at the same time as a new real estate case arises, on the right to property. The Supreme Court and the Land Act consider such a rule. A footnote note then gives the Supreme Court the character of an interpretative and indicative aid.
6. According to the Supreme Court, a decision pursuant to a special rule within the meaning of Paragraph 82 (3) of the Construction Act is also a decision by the court to abolish and settle the joint ownership. Similarly, according to the Supreme Court, the judgment on the replacement of the will to transfer land pursuant to § 11a (1) of the Land Act establishes in itself the property right to transferred land, and that judgment (not the Treaty) constitutes, within the meaning of § 17 (4) of Act No. 256 / 2013 Coll., on the cadastral property register (cadastral law), in conjunction with § 1114 of the Civil Code, the basis for the declaratory registration of the property register.
7. More generally, the Supreme Court also endorses its legal opinion by pointing out that the courts in civil proceedings under Section 7 (1) of the Civil Code are dealing with all disputes and legal matters arising from private law, unless they are to be decided by other authorities under the law. The competence of the civilian court is therefore of a general nature in private matters. In addition, the procedure for replacing the will to transfer land under Paragraph 11a (1) of the Land Act has a distinct restitution dimension under the Supreme Court and therefore all the provisions applied should be interpreted with respect to the meaning and purpose of the restitution legislation.
Arguments of the parties
8. The complainant's argument on the question covered by this opinion is mainly about the direct citation of the finding in sp. zn. III. ÚS 3804 / 19 of 5.1.2021, which is more detailed in Part III of this Opinion and whose legal opinion the complainant fully agrees with in her words. The complainant considers that the present case does not differ in fact from the case dealt with by the quoted finding. In this finding, the Constitutional Court clearly stated, according to the complainant, that neither the complainant as owner of the land nor the building office as competent authority for the territorial division procedure was allowed to be omitted from the division process. The complainant claims, referring to this finding, that the courts in restitution proceedings are not entitled to transfer parts of the land defined by the geometrical plan. If the contract for the transfer of land has effects only on bonds and the change of ownership takes place only through a constitutional contribution to the property register, the complainant also considers that the person entitled to request the transfer of the replacement land must be a judicial remedy through an action to replace the will.
9. In its observations on the constitutional complaint, the Regional Court stated that its procedure did not infringe the complainant's right to a fair trial, as it did not find any legal or factual errors in the decision of the District Court, and the Regional and District Court also sufficiently dealt with all the complainant's relevant objections. The District Court merely referred to the grounds for its contested decision.
10. The Supreme Court, in its observations on the constitutional complaint, proposes that the Constitutional Court reject it as manifestly unfounded and, alternatively, that the Second Chamber, if it does not agree with the conclusions formulated in the judgment in paragraph III. ÚS 3804 / 19 of 5.1.2021, submitted the case pursuant to Article 23 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, plenary of the Constitutional Court. The Supreme Court further reiterates the arguments set out in the contested decision and underlines its legal opinion that a decision pursuant to a special law within the meaning of Paragraph 82 (3) of the Building Act, which does not require a decision by the Building Office on the division of the land, means a final judgment of the Court of First Instance on the replacement of a compulsory person's will to conclude a contract under Paragraph 11a (1) of the Land Law on the free transfer of charge of the land in a situation where it is not suitable for the issue of the land to the beneficiary in its entirety, but its transferability is given to a separate geometric plan.
11. In its observations, the intervener submitted an argument in line with the contested decision of the Supreme Court, referring to the current constant caselaw in its favour and proposing the rejection of the complaint. In addition, the intervener requests reimbursement of the costs before the Constitutional Court.
Grounds for bringing a case before the Constitutional Court
12. In assessing the above-mentioned case, the Second Chamber reached a different legal opinion from that expressed in the decision on the division of the land in the procedure for replacing the will under the Land Act. ÚS 3804 / 19 of 5.1.2021 (all decisions of the Constitutional Court are available at https: / / nalus.ujud.cz). The facts and legal conclusions of this finding are summarised below by the Constitutional Court.
Supporting reasons for finding sp. zn. III. ÚS 3804 / 19
13. The facts of the case in point III. ÚS 3804 / 19 can be summarised as follows. Complainant Czech Republic - The State Property Office challenged constitutional complaints against decisions of general courts, before which the claimant sought to replace the complainant's consent with a free transfer of land into its possession as compensation for land not issued in restitution proceedings under the Land Act. The district court complied with the applicant on the ground that, despite its considerable efforts to issue replacement land, the applicant had not achieved, on account of its negligence and other misconduct on the part of the complainant. Since one of the parcels proposed for issue was not suitable for the transfer in its entirety, the district court decided to separate the parts of the plot by a geometric plan which became part of the judgment. The object of the transfer was thus the newly created land. It is this procedure that the complainant has made a comparison, since it considers that the courts did not have the power to decide on the division of the land. However, the Regional Court confirmed the judgment of the District Court and the Supreme Court rejected the complainant's appeal as inadmissible.
14. The finding in question states that the general courts did not have jurisdiction to decide on the division of the land, as a result of which they infringed the rights of the complainant for the protection of property under Article 11 (1) of the Charter and for the judicial protection under Article 36 (1) of the Charter. According to the cited finding, the general courts without any support in the law took the view that a decision pursuant to a special provision within the meaning of Paragraph 82 (3) of the Building Act was also a court decision replacing the plea of land transfer on the basis of the entitlement of the beneficiary under the Land Act. The word "under special legislation 'considers the finding to be a relatively indefinite wording, which must be interpreted even taking into account the reference to the special law (Land Act) in the footnote. Such an interpretation is to be carried out in accordance with other interpretative rules and cannot, as a result, be contradictory to the meaning of the interpreted provision or find itself outside the constitutional limits of the principle of division of power. Therefore, the reference to the specific legislation does not, according to the finding cited, allow any public authority to decide on the division of the land and does not in any way establish the jurisdiction of the judicial authority. The quoted finding therefore, although it does not, in its words, admit the very reference to the Land Adjustment Act itself to the normative nature, has also come to the conclusion that a specific legislation does not include the Land Act. If the court accepts the power in such a situation to decide to divide the land instead of the administrative office, it infringes the principle of division of power pursuant to Article 2 (1) and (3) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution), according to the said finding.
15. It is further stated in the cited finding that the General Courts unjustifiably considered the judgment replacing the complainant's will as a decision not under Paragraph 161 (3) of the Civil Code but as a decision on the acquisition of property law, thereby not respecting the legal limits laid down by the definition of the subject matter. If the courts have decided to replace the will to conclude a contract which they have found to be but has not been concluded under the Soil Act, they cannot, under the law thus defined, decide in fact (including the replacement of a decision by an administrative authority) as if it were an action for the establishment of property rights in the land.
16. Summary, according to the contested legal opinion, the general courts cannot decide, under Paragraph 82 (3) of the Construction Act, in the procedure for replacing the will to transfer land under the Land Division Act. According to him, the procedure by which the explicit legal reference to a specific law is filled by the courts with other content and, according to him, the case is decided, thereby "merging" administrative and judicial proceedings into one is contrary to the principle of legality and division of power.
17. The Court of Justice Jiří Zemánek took a different view on the finding, according to which the argument of the majority of the Chamber does not concern the purpose of the restitution refund procedure, which leads - if more interpretative options are possible - to the choice of one of them which is more favourable to the fulfilment of the purpose of the restitution legislation, rather than to the purpose of thwarting it.
Question referred to the Second Chamber of the Constitutional Court
18. As a matter of fact, the cases conducted under Sections III and III of the ÚS 3804 / 19 and II of the ÚS 1778 / 21 are almost identical. In both cases, the person authorised under Section 4 of the Land Act sought a judicial decision replacing the complainant's consent, which in both cases is the Czech Republic - State Property Office, with a free transfer of land to his property as compensation for land not issued under the restitution procedure under the Land Act. In both cases, however, the land to be transferred was not suitable as a whole because of the public utility structure involved and the district courts therefore decided on the basis of Paragraph 82 (3) of the Building Act to separate part of the land by a geometric plan so that the newly separated land to be transferred was suitable. In both cases, the complainant denies the competence of the general courts for such a procedure.
19. For the reasons set out above, the Second Chamber of the proceedings on a constitutional complaint brought under sp. zn. II. By order of 7 September 2021, the ÚS 1778 / 21 suspended and, pursuant to Article 23 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, submitted the following question to the plenary of the Constitutional Court: Is it an unconstitutional interpretation of § 11a of the Land Act that the courts in the proceedings for the replacement of the will of the debtor for the free transfer of the replacement parcel to the beneficiary under the Land Act have the power to decide on the division of the land?
Assessment of the case by plenary of the Constitutional Court
20. The Plenum of the Constitutional Court has come to a different legal opinion from that expressed in the sp. zn. III. ÚS 3804 / 19 that a decision by the court on the division of the land in a procedure to replace the will to transfer the land under the Land Act would infringe the principle of division pursuant to Article 2 (1) and (3) of the Constitution, the principle of legality in the exercise of public authority pursuant to Article 2 (3) of the Constitution and Article 2 (2) of the Charter and the rights of the existing owner of the land for the protection of property under Article 11 (1) of the Charter and for judicial protection under Article 36 (1) of the Charter. On the contrary, the interpretations chosen in the cited finding would not have been obliged by the courts to grant protection to the rights under Articles 4 and 90 of the Constitution and would infringe the rights of the persons entitled to judicial protection under Article 36 (1) of the Charter [cf. the finding of sp. zn. III. ÚS 495 / 02 of 4.3.2004 (N 33 / 32 of the SbNU 303), the finding of sp. zn. III. ÚS 1389 / 13 of 31. 3. 2015 (N 65 / 76 of the SbNU 887), the finding of sp. Pl. ÚS 5 / 19 of 1.10.2019 (N 168 / 96 of the SbNU 144; 303 / 2019 Sb.), paragraphs 41-42, or the find sp.
21. The function of the courts in the material rule of law is, pursuant to Article 4 in conjunction with Article 90 of the Constitution, to provide protection for the rights of the individual. The latter act either directly or indirectly through legislation where fundamental rights represent a correction to their content, application and interpretation. The courts thus provide protection for fundamental rights not only directly, but also through interpretation and application of sub-constitutional standards in a way that takes account of the purpose of constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights. The task of a judge in the conditions of the rule of law is always to find a solution in a given procedural situation which would ensure the maximum realisation of the fundamental rights of the parties [cf. ÚS 2048 / 09 of 2.11.2009 (N 232 / 55 of SbNU 181), paragraph 17; the finding of sp. zn. IV of ÚS 763 / 05 of 11.4.2006 (N 82 / 41 of SbNU 79); the finding of sp. zn. I. ÚS 554 / 04 of 31.3.2005 (N 67 / 36 of SbNU 707); or finding sp. zn. I. ÚS 185 / 04 of 14.7.2004 (N 94 / 34 SbNU 19)].
22. Thus, if the court is faced with the question of how to interpret a legal provision, it must choose from the possibilities offered the one which, to the extent possible, implements the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the participants and, on the contrary, does not constitute a denial of justice in its consequences. It cannot be constitutionally conformable that an intexation that does not take into account the purpose of the provision in question, without submitting constitutionally acceptable reasons, does not respect established decision-making practice and creates new obstacles to finding a fair solution to the matter. If the plenary of the Constitutional Court had adopted such an interpretation, it would not have complied with its obligation to grant protection to the rights under Article 4 and 90 of the Constitution and would have infringed the rights of the parties concerned pursuant to Article 36 (1) of the Charter [cf. the finding of sp. zn. IV. ÚS 1835 / 08 of 15.10.2009 (N 215 / 55 of the SbNU 27), point 13; the finding of sp. zn. III. ÚS 495 / 02 of 4.3.2004 (N 33 / 32 of the SbNU 303) or the finding of sp. I. ÚS 89 / 02 of 21.5.2002 (N 60 / 26 of the SbNU 135)].
23. In addition to the general principles of constitutional conformity interpretation, the restitution dimension of the issue cannot be overlooked. The Plenum recalls that, following the change in social circumstances in 1989, the State, aware of the great injustices that were done, provided, by means of the restitution rules, the possibility of a partial remedy [cf. sp. zn. II. ÚS 504 / 04 of 8.6.2005 (N 118 / 37 of SbNU 511) or of a sp. zn. III. ÚS 495 / 02 of 4.3.2004 (N 33 / 32 of SbNU 303)]. The Land Act is also part of the restitution rules, the specific purpose of which is to mitigate the consequences of property injustices against owners of agricultural and forestry assets. The State cannot waive its legal obligations, on the other hand, it must act through its authorities in such a way that the property damage of the beneficiaries is mitigated as soon as possible [cf. the finding of sp. zn. IV. ÚS 1835 / 08 of 15.10.2009 (N 215 / 55 of SbNU 27), paragraph 10; the finding of sp. zn. III. ÚS 495 / 02 of 4.3.2004 (N 33 / 32 of SbNU 303)]. If the State Land Office (exercising the rights and obligations of the State), without justifiable grounds, makes it difficult to satisfy the claim of the creditor, which results in multiple years of delay, the creditor may, in accordance with the established practice of the Constitutional Court, as developed by the case law of the Supreme Court, seek the issue of specific land by the court in civil proceedings [cf. Sf. Sf. Sp. IV. ÚS 1835 / 08 of 15.10.2009 (N 215 / 55 SbNU 27), paragraph 10; Sp. Sp. Sp. then the judgment of the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court, sp. v. 31 Cdo 3767 / 2009 of 9.12.2009].
24. The purpose of restitution is an important principle in making decisions in any restitution case, all the more so when a person entitled without a justifiable reason makes it difficult to satisfy his or her claim to become incapacitated and, in the spirit of the principle, "the law wishes to the vigilante" (vigilantibus iura scripta sunt) seeks to exercise his or her rights by judicial means. The interpretation in relation to the justified most helpful, as a manifestation of the teleological method of interpretation, must then be respected - of course taking into account other interpretative methods - not only for specific restitution rules, but also for all other provisions which will be used in the decision of the restitution case [cf. Opinion of 29.5.2013 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 10 / 13 (N 96 / 69 SbNU 465; 177 / 2013 Coll.], paragraph 94; or Resolution of sp. zn. II. ÚS 2426 / 19 of 13.9.2019, paragraph 14].
25. The case law of the Constitutional Court in relation to the liquidity of the public authorities when issuing land under the Land Act concluded that, by limiting the rights of beneficiaries, intervention in their legitimate expectations may also be possible to satisfy their restitution claim through a replacement plot (e.g. points 53 and 76 of the aforementioned sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 35 / 17). The Constitutional Court also held that persons whose claim is justified within the meaning of the Land Act are legitimate expectations that, in view of the existence of a claim under the Land Act, they will become the owner in the application of specified land as property rights within the meaning of Article 11 (1) of the Charter (cf. point 16 of the abovementioned decision, sp. zn. III. ÚS 1389 / 13).
26. The finding of sp. zn. III. ÚS 3804 / 19 for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of general courts in restitution proceedings is based on the application of Paragraph 82 (3) of the First Construction Act, which reads as follows: "A decision on the division or consolidation of land shall not be required where the conditions for the division or formation of land are laid down in a regulatory plan, a decision of the Building Office or a decision pursuant to a special legislation33)." footnote 33 refers to Sections 2, 3 and 11 of the Land Adjustment Act. According to the General Courts, "a decision under a special rule 'may also be a decision to replace a will in accordance with the Land Act, according to the found sp. zn. III. ÚS 3804 / 19 not.
27. Courts in civil proceedings under Paragraph 7 (1) of the Civil Code shall discuss disputes and other legal matters arising from private law, unless they are dealt with by law and decided by other authorities. As the Supreme Court points out in the contested decision, the jurisdiction of a civil court in private matters is therefore of a general nature - it is always given except where the law provides for the power of another authority. The established decision-making practice of both the Constitutional and the Supreme Administrative Court shows that the legal relationship between the person entitled and the obliged person when the property is issued under the Land Act is included among the private law cases [Found sp. zn. III. ÚS 495 / 02 of 4.3.2004 (N 33 / 32 SbNU 303); the finding of sp. zn. IV ÚS 1835 / 08 of 15.10.2009 (N 215 / 55 SbNU 27), paragraph 10; or judgment of Special Chamber No. Konf 64 / 2009-7 of 5.8.2010; and judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court sp. zn. 7 As 2 / 2003 of 17.9.2003]. The established decision-making practice of the general courts makes use of the competence of the General Court to decide on the division of land in private law disputes, for example in decisions on the abolition and settlement of co-ownership under Section 1143 of the Civil Code (cf. Judgment of the Supreme Court, sp. zn. 22 Cdo. 586 / 2017 of 26.4.2017; or the Supreme Court judgment, sp. zn. 28 Cdo 4144 / 2018 of 22.1.2019). This conclusion has also been addressed several times by the Constitutional Court (see resolution sp. zn. IV. ÚS 940 / 21 of 18.5.2021, resolution sp. zn. I. ÚS 1391 / 19 of 21.5.2019 or resolution sp. zn. I. ÚS 2159 / 10 of 6.9.2010). As the Supreme Court points out, if the court were to decide on the abolition and settlement of the joint ownership of the land bound by the administrative decision, it would have intervened in its jurisdiction, since the decision would have been linked to an earlier decision which would in fact predetermine to a large extent the contents of the judgment (judgment of the Supreme Court, sp. cited in footnote 22 Cdo 586 / 2017 of 26.4.2017).
28. Reference to Act No. 183 / 2006 Coll., on Territorial Planning and Construction Regulations (Construction Act), as amended, made in the Found sp. zn. III. The ÚS 3804 / 19 is completely impossible, since the provisions of the building law used cannot be applied outside the scope of the building law, which (within the meaning of its § 1) deals with the regulation of zoning and building management, construction requirements, expropriation purposes, land inputs and buildings. The authority of the construction office to decide the division of the land and the exceptions thereto can only be applied to legal relations regulated by the building law. However, the building law cannot be applied for the purpose of determining or restricting the jurisdiction of the courts in civil proceedings.
29. The Plenum of the Constitutional Court does not find, contrary to the opinion expressed in the sp. zn. III. ÚS 3804 / 19 no relevant reason for applying the Construction Act to determine the jurisdiction of courts in private law or restitution proceedings. Moreover, it is not possible for the general courts to have jurisdiction in the settlement of the joint ownership of the land on the basis of the attached geometrical plan and not in the procedure for replacing the will to transfer land under the Land Act.
30. All the more so it is not possible to accept the importance of the finding of sp. zn. III. The ÚS 3804 / 19, when interpreting § 82 (3) of the Construction Act, attaches a footnote to the sentence of the first provision. The footnotes improve the orientation of the regulation and serve as an interpretative aid. In the interpretation of the provisions of the law, a remark in itself cannot be of restrictive importance nor can it establish binding rules of conduct (including the rules of interpretation), unless this is directly attributable to the law. The general provision in the law and its limitation only in the footnote does not correspond, according to settled case-law, to the recognised principles of the democratic legal states [cf. sp. zn. I. ÚS 653 / 99 of 29.8.2000 (N 123 / 19 of SbNU 155), the finding of sp. zn. I. ÚS 22 / 99 of 2.2.2000 (N 14 / 17 of SbNU 103) and the finding of sp. zn. II. ÚS 485 / 98 of 30.11.1999 (N 173 / 16 of SbNU 259)]. The Constitutional Court attests to the conclusions set out in point 22 of the sp. zn. III. OJ C 3804 / 19, that although the footnote cannot be ignored in the present case, the interpretation of the provision cited must be carried out in accordance with other interpretative rules and cannot, as a result, contradict the meaning of the rule of law. The interpretation currently chosen, expressed in the find sp. zn. III. However, the ÚS 3804 / 19 does not fulfil these interpretative requirements because, in the absence of due regard for other interpretative methods, it limits the scope of the wording of the "decision under a special law 'in Paragraph 82 (3) of the Construction Act to a decision of the Land Office under the Land Adjustment Act.
31. In answer to the question in question, it is not relevant whether the judgment of the court in the procedure to replace the obligation to transfer the land to a creditor under the Land Act itself constitutes a property right to transferred land and whether that judgment constitutes, within the meaning of Article 17 (4) of the cadastral law, the basis for the declaratory registration in the Land Register, or whether, on the basis of such a judgment, a contract between the obliged and the entitled person is still required to be concluded, and when that agreement constitutes the basis for this time the constitutional registration in the Real Estate Register. This difference is relevant exclusively at the level of sub-constitutional law; it does not play a significant role in assessing the constitutionality of the full powers of the general courts.
32. The Constitutional Court concludes, therefore, that it does not see as an unconstitutional conclusion such as that that the general courts in the procedure for replacing the compulsory's will for the free transfer of the replacement land to the beneficiary under the Land Act have the power to decide on the division of the land. If the courts, in such proceedings concerning the division of land under the judgment of the attached geometrical plan, do not advance ultra vires and do not infringe the principle of division of property pursuant to Article 2 (1) and (3) of the Constitution, the principle of legality in the exercise of public authority pursuant to Article 2 (3) of the Constitution and Article 2 (2) of the Charter, nor do they infringe the principle of division of land under Article 11 (1) of the Charter, and the principle of legality in the exercise of public authority pursuant to Article 36 (1) of the Charter, as alleged by the Opinion in Article III of the ÚS 3804 / 19. The choice of the opposite interpretation would lead to the denial of the right to judicial protection under Article 36 (1) and (2) of the Charter.
President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr. Rychetský v. r.
In accordance with Article 14 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, the judges Jaroslav Fenyk, Josef Fiala, Vladimir Sládeček and Radovan Suchanek took a different position on the opinion of the plenary.
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Regulation Information
| Citation | Communication from the Constitutional Court No 408 / 2021 Coll., on the Opinion of the Plenary of the Constitutional Court of 12 October 2021 sp. zn. Pl. ÚSN. 54 / 21 on the judgment of the Court of First Instance on the replacement of a compulsory person's will to transfer the replacement land free of charge pursuant to § 11a of Act No 229 / 1991 Coll., on the modification of property relations with land and other agricultural property, as amended, on the basis of the judgment of the attached geometrical plan |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | Communication from the Constitutional Court |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 19.11.2021 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
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