The Constitutional Court found No 405 / 2002 Coll.

The words "from 500 000 CZK" in § 106 paragraph 3 of Act No. 50 / 1976 Coll., on Territorial Planning and Construction Regulations (Construction Act), as amended by Act No. 83 / 1998 Coll., are deleted from the date of the declaration of findings in the Collection of Laws.

On 22 January 2002, the Constitutional Court received a motion from the Chamber of 30 Ca Regional Court in Hradec Králové of 14 January 2002 to abolish part of the provisions of Section 106 (3) of Act No. 50 / 1976 Coll., on Territorial Planning and Construction Regulations (Construction Act), as amended ("the Construction Act '), by the words" from 500 000'. According to Article 95 (2) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution), the general court will do so if it concludes that the law to be applied in the resolution of the case is contrary to the constitutional law. The proposal, signed by the President of the Chamber by JUDr. Karl Kavalír, states that by decision of the Municipality of Pardubice of the City of Pardubice of 24.6.1999 No., OJ P / 147 / 99 / Pd, and by decision of the District Office of Pardubice of 16.7.2001 No. RRR / 3330 / 41 / 99 / Pu, Mrs H. B. was fined at CZK 500,000 for having committed the infringement referred to in § 106 (3) (b) as a natural person operating under the special rules. (c) the building law by using two rooms in the basement of the family house as a hairdresser's establishment, contrary to the relevant housekeeping decision. Against the latter judgment, the person appointed to the Regional Court in Hradec Králové brought an administrative action under the title of Part Two of the Fifth Civil Code.

First of all, the proposal underlines that Ms H. B. used these premises only for the purposes of the individual exercise of the craft trade of the hairdresser, which is confirmed by the hygienist's comments of 16.3.1999 No 1446-218 / 99-707, according to which it was a "place of business' with only one job. Although these rooms were co-located as a laundry, drying room and cellar, their construction technical arrangements were sufficient since the construction was completed to operate the trade in question, since there was an extension of the water supply of about 1 m in length in the given premises, as mentioned in the court proceedings, and no further modifications were made. If Paragraph 106 (3) (c) of the Construction Act expressly obliges the competent authority to impose a fine of CZK 500,000 to CZK 1 000 000 to a legal person or to a natural person operating under special regulations who uses the construction without or in contravention of the approval decision, then it is clear that the construction office cannot impose a fine of less than CZK 500,000 and therefore take into account the degree of public interest in the use of the construction in accordance with the approval decision, which may be very different. In a number of cases where the change does not require any building intervention or special equipment, the level of public-interest infringement is, in the view of the Court, minimal. The Court of First Instance therefore contests the annualisation of the fine, regardless of the method of infringement, its consequences or the property benefit of the offender. At the same time, it also points out that the amount of the fine does not allow account to be taken of the offender's property ratios or whether he is able to pay such a fine at all. In this case, for example, Mrs H. B. would have to work 14 years on the fine imposed. The fine is therefore fixed in a winding-up manner, since the administrative authority could in principle deprive it of all assets, including the house in which it operates.

Furthermore, the Regional Court states that this administrative penalty is not comparable to the penalties imposed under the criminal law, according to which it is also possible to choose between several penalties. Given that natural persons are at risk of being punished by the nature and degree of seriousness of the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention '), Article 6 (1) of the Convention, according to which everyone has the right to have his case dealt with fairly, should be applied to the case. This claim was not met in the light of the current legislation as it was not taken into account in the individual circumstances of the case. In view of this, the Regional Court has proposed to abolish the part headed by that provision.

The Constitutional Court has found that the application lodged complies with all the legal procedural requirements and conditions and nothing prevents the hearing and decision of the substance of the case. Therefore, pursuant to Article 69 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, invited the parties - the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of Parliament of the Czech Republic to comment on this proposal.

The Chamber of Deputies, through its President, stated in its observations that Article 106 (3) of the Building Act was amended by Act No. 83 / 1998 Coll. The draft of this law, submitted by the Government of the Czech Republic, was discussed by the Chamber of Deputies in the second parliamentary term as the House of Press No. 261. As is apparent from the explanatory memorandum to Sections 105 and 106 of the Building Act, the purpose of the relevant legislation was to increase the fines substantially when, in the comment procedure, some cities with experience in "building non-discipline 'supported it. There was no change in the proposed adjustment during the discussions in the Chamber of Deputies. According to the Chamber of Deputies, it was assumed that the law in question was in accordance with the Constitution, constitutional order and international treaties. Finally, the Chamber of Deputies points out that the petition proposal should be" from 500 000 CZK', so that the text of the law is correct even after the cancellation of its part by legislation and wording.

The Senate expressed its views on the content of the proposal by the Regional Court in Hradec Králové through its President, doubting whether, in the present case, the infringement of Article 6 (1) of the Convention had actually taken place in accordance with the procedure set out in the submission. The infringement in question must be regarded as an administrative offence which is penalised by a fine within the specified range and is imposed in an administrative procedure conducted by the competent administrative authority. In the present case, it is clear that the administrative authority took into account the individual circumstances of the case as it imposed the lowest possible fine. It considers the use of a building without or contrary to the approval decision to be a serious violation of building discipline and therefore ranks it in the group of highest fines rates. Furthermore, the Senate points out that, if the Constitutional Court had complied with the proposal, the removal of the lower limit of fines in Paragraph 106 (3) of the Building Act would have undermined the systemic link and the introduction of an apparent inequality with the provisions of paragraph 2 of the same paragraph, where the lower limit of the fine would have been maintained for the facts listed here. Similarly, there is a system for differentiating the amount of fines by setting their lower limit for the offences of citizens against the building law contained in Section 105 of the Building Act. The Senate also notes that the amendment of the construction law aimed at consolidating discipline in the construction and use of buildings has, in the interests of this objective, limited the scope for administrative discretion but has not been completely removed.

The Constitutional Court also requested the opinion of the Ministry of Regional Development. By letter of 28 February 2002, No 2502 / 2002-51, the State authority expressed its opposition to the proposal of the Regional Court in Hradec Králové. On the one hand, it considers that the construction office has the scope to consider the degree of threat to the public interest or the seriousness of the infringement, possibly the consequences associated with it, and, on the other hand, in its view, Article 6 (1) of the Convention does not apply to the case at all, since it considers that it is impossible to assess whether the imposed lower limits of the fine are "fair 'or" unfair' in the context of an infringement. Paragraph 106 (3) of the Construction Act could be contrary to Article 6 (1) of the Convention if it prevented the review of the legitimacy of such "criminal charges' by an independent court. However, the review of the case in full jurisdiction does not prevent the contested provision, but the legislation of the administrative judiciary still in force. For these reasons, the Constitutional Court should not comply with the proposal of the Regional Court in Hradec Králové.

For information, the Constitutional Court also requested information from the Ministry of Local Development on the number and amount of fines imposed under the Construction Act on the basis of individual facts. The Ministry stated that it did not follow this data collectively and at least sent the data to the Municipality of Prague as an authority of appeal for 26 or (from 1 July 2002) for 22 urban areas. It emerged from these that in 2001 67 infringements and 34 administrative offences were dealt with in the appeal proceedings under the construction law, 12 of which constituted an infringement of the contested provision. In addition, similar data were sent to the Constitutional Court on fines imposed in Liberec, according to which legal persons and natural persons operating under special regulations were fined in 15 cases for 2001. None of them were charged for administrative offences under the contested provision and in 10 cases a fine was imposed on natural persons for the offence.

The Constitutional Court has requested cooperation from the Ministry of Finance in order to establish the level of corporate and natural persons' income over a period of one year. This stated in its communication that out of the total number of 221 237 legal persons who submitted a tax return in 2000, the total annual income (see Section 20 (2) of Act No. 563 / 1991 Coll., on accounting, as amended by 31.12.2001) had a total of 43,619 persons, a total of 50,090 persons, a total of 75 636 persons, and a total of 91 539 persons up to CZK 1,000,000; Of the total number of 964 723 natural persons-entrepreneurs in the same year, up to CZK 50 000 had a total of 185 368 persons, up to CZK 100 000 a total of 304 753 persons, up to CZK 250 000 a total of 519 757 persons, up to CZK 500 000 a total of 670 814 persons and up to CZK 1 000 a total of 793 187 persons (the intervals indicated start from CZK 0).

The Constitutional Court first examined, in accordance with § 68 (2) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., as amended, whether the law in respect of which the appellant objects to the unconstitutionality of its provisions had been adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution laid down by competence and in a constitutional manner. In this respect, it is clear from the report of the 20th session of the Chamber of Deputies held on 13 February 1998 and Resolution No 256 of 13 February 1998 that the Chamber of Deputies, by a majority of the votes 151 to and none against (out of the 171 Members present), approved the aforementioned bill (House Press No. 261). From the report of the meeting of the Second Senate meeting held on 18 March 1998 The Constitutional Court also found that by order No 23 of 18 March 1998, by a majority of 55 votes (out of 70 senators present), when 7 votes were against, it also approved the bill. It is clear from this that the law was adopted and issued in a constitutionally prescribed manner and within the limits of the Constitution laid down in the powers laid down in respect of the categories laid down in Article 39 (1) and (2) of the Constitution.

After a substantive examination of the proposal and considering all the circumstances, The Constitutional Court decided that the contested provision of the law should be annulled.

First of all, the Constitutional Court considers it necessary to note that, as is usually the case, the very rule of conduct, which is the obligation of legal entities to use the construction only in accordance with the approval decision, is solely the constitutionality of the means (sanctions) chosen by the legislator to ensure such behaviour by the addressees of the legal standard. However, this will also be an assessment of the constitutional conformity of the rule establishing a legal obligation, even if it is called a secondary obligation. The Constitutional Court is fully aware of the weight of the arguments put forward by the parties, in particular the Senate, and, where appropriate, in the opinion of the Ministry of Local Development, which falls within the competence of the relevant issue, in which it is in principle that the infringement in question, i.e. the use of the building without or contrary to the approval decision, shows, in the public interest, a significant social danger, in particular due to the general failure to comply with the relevant building regulations (so-called building failure). In view of this, the rules on administrative penalties, in the case at hand, should have been established in a manner proportionate to the situation arising, not only in such a way as to increase the upper limit of the amount of the fine but, at the same time, to set its lower limit. The legislature essentially pursues a legitimate objective by laying down the minimum amount of the fine, as it makes it possible to distinguish the seriousness or danger of any type of infringement in a far more clear manner than would be the case only when setting the upper rate. The further impact of this step is that this limits the scope for administrative discretion of the competent national authorities, which has its positive consequences, for example, by unifying to a certain extent the amount of penalties imposed, or by limiting the scope for arbitrary or corruption affected by the conduct of administrative authorities, while this may appear prima facie to be a means of protecting against possible discrimination, but, on the other hand, by way of a more or less flat-rate harmonisation of the seriousness of the infringement, which leads to a reduction of the possibility for the administration to take account of the specific circumstances of the case, the person of the offender and his ratios, as the Regional Court of Hradec Králové also states in its proposal.

First, the Constitutional Court is obliged to fully agree with the view that Article 6 (1) of the Convention cannot, by its nature, affect this case. The subject matter of that provision is the guarantee of a fair, smooth and public procedure. If, in this regard, there is talk of the right to a fair trial, or of its content, the "equality of arms' of the parties to the proceedings, the right to participate and oral proceedings, the right to comply with certain rules on the acquisition and evaluation of evidence, etc. However, this is not about assessing the constitutional conformity of rules of a procedural nature, i.e. whether certain procedural rules comply with those principles, but about assessing a substantive law law which has nothing to do with the process itself. In other words, the content of a given constitutionally guaranteed right of an individual to power cannot be legislated against the" fair "regulation of a particular legal relationship and hence not even the" fair "amount of the fine. Therefore, a fair fine - from the point of view of this constitutional right - must be understood as a fine imposed in accordance with the law, in a procedure which respects the principles of a fair process.

Since the Constitutional Court is bound by the petition, but not by the legal qualifications contained in the proposal, it also addressed whether the contested provision infringed other than the proposed rights and freedoms under a constitutional law or an international treaty.

The preamble to the Constitution implies the intention of citizens of the Czech Republic to base themselves on the principles of the rule of law. Article 1 The Constitution explicitly refers to the Czech Republic as a democratic rule of law based on respect for the rights and freedoms of man and citizen. The respect for the rights and freedoms of an individual is undoubtedly also one of those principles of the rule of law, as the preamble to the Constitution, which can be derived from one of the fundamental rules of the functioning of State power, which is the principle of proportionality (proportionality) and the prohibition of abuse of law, as the Constitutional Court has, after all, concluded in a number of its findings. This principle is based on the premise that intervention in fundamental rights or freedoms, even if not provided for in their constitutional arrangements, may take place in the event of a collision between them or in the event of a collision with another constitutionally protected value, which is not the nature of the fundamental right and freedom (public good) - cf., the finding of the Constitutional Court of 9 October 1996 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 15 / 96, the Collection of Finances and the Resolution of the Constitutional Court ("the Reports of the Decisions'), Volume 6, Found No 99; published under No 280 / 1996 Coll. However, in such cases the purpose (s) of such intervention must always be assessed in relation to the resources used, the criterion for this assessment being the principle of proportionality (proportionality in the wider sense), which may also be called a prohibition of excessive interference in rights and freedoms. This general principle includes three principles or criteria for assessing the admissibility of intervention. The first is the principle of eligibility for purpose (or suitability), according to which the relevant measure must at all be able to achieve the intended objective of protecting another fundamental right or public good. It is also the principle of necessity, according to which the use of only the most respectful - in relation to the fundamental rights and freedoms concerned - is permitted by several possible means. The third principle is the principle of proportionality (in the narrow sense), according to which the damage to the fundamental right must not be disproportionate in relation to the intended objective, i.e. measures limiting fundamental human rights and freedoms, if there is a conflict of fundamental rights or freedoms with the public interest, the negative consequences of which exceed the positive effects which constitute a public interest in those measures (cf. the finding of the Constitutional Court of 13 May 1997 sp. zl. ÚS 25 / 97, ECR 11, p. 53, published under No 159 / 1998 Coll.). This point is based on the consideration of empirical, systemic, contextual and value arguments (see the finding of the Constitutional Court of 9.10.1996 sp. zn. ÚS 15 / 96, published above; according to this finding, an empirical argument can be understood to be the actual seriousness of a phenomenon which is linked to the protection of a particular fundamental right; a systemic argument means considering the meaning and including the fundamental right or freedom in question in the system of fundamental rights and freedoms. The context argument can be understood as a further negative impact on the limitation of one fundamental right due to the preference of another; the value argument represents consideration of the positive effects in the collision of the fundamental rights in relation to the accepted hierarchy of values).

In accordance with those conclusions, In particular, the Constitutional Court examined whether the intervention in the legal sphere of an individual could be considered to be an intervention in the constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms and concluded that a fine - under certain circumstances - could constitute, first and foremost, an intervention in the fundamental law under Article 11 (1) of the Charter. The fines, as constitutionally permissible for the withdrawal of assets - unlike taxes and charges - are not explicitly mentioned in Article 11 of the Charter; However, the situation is somewhat different in the case of an arrangement for the protection of property rights under Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as the Additional Protocol), according to which States may adopt laws which they consider necessary to adjust the use of property in accordance with the general interest and to ensure the payment of taxes and other charges or fines. It can be concluded from this that fines, as well as taxes and charges, fall within the scope of the legal regulation of Article 11 of the Charter and Article 1 of the Additional Protocol respectively and constitute, in principle, a permissible interference with the individual's right of ownership, which is, however, true provided that the principles of the rule of law as set out above are respected (see also Article 4 (4) of the Charter). In addition, it should be noted that the fine can be considered an intervention with the constitutional legal dimension if it interferes with the property situation of an individual with considerable intensity. This factor will be addressed by the Constitutional Court in the context of the application of the principle of proportionality (see below).

In this context, the Constitutional Court would like to point out that, in relation to Article 1 of the Additional Protocol, it is referred to mutatis mutandis in: Frowein, J., Peukert, W.: Europäische Menschenrechts-Convention, EMRK-Kommentar, 2nd edition, E. P. Engel Verlag, Kehl, 1996, p. 824 et seq.; according to these authors, the imposition of cash penalties is the right of each State, but this does not mean that the order of respect for property in the field of cash fines will not be applied here; On the contrary, it is possible to examine whether they have been imposed against the principle of prohibition of abuse of rights or proportionality. As regards taxes which, together with fines, constitute one set of cases (see above), the German Federal Constitutional Court expressly referred to them as a violation of property law (Eigentumsverletzung); see Isensee, J., Kirchhof, P. Handbuch des Staatsrecht, Band VI, C. F. Muller, Heidelberg, 1989, p. 1072.

Following the finding that this could be an intervention in a constitutional guarantee of rights and freedoms, the Constitutional Court examined whether the intervention could be regarded as an intervention in accordance with the principle of proportionality. As mentioned above, the purpose of the legislation in question was to avoid violations of the construction rules. It should be noted that the escalation of repression, which can also be regarded as an increase in the minimum amount of the fine, may, to some extent, be an instrument which is capable of achieving this intended and legitimate objective, since the risk of a possible severe penalty reduces the "economic advantage 'of the infringement. For this reason, the Constitutional Court does not rule out that such intervention would not be eligible to fulfil its objective. However, as regards the other criterion, which is the principle of necessity, the Constitutional Court cannot say that the intervention does not fully correspond to that principle. It should be noted that a general non-respect of specific legislation by individuals may be due (excluding cases of wholly dysfunctional regulation) to a lack of penalties, where infringements are" paid' even at the risk of being imposed, and / or to a lack of action by public authorities whose competence is to check compliance with the law and impose penalties. In the first case, there is a clear need for an increase in penalties (here in particular the penalty rates), in the second case it is for the State, namely the executive authority, to take measures to ensure that the competent authority fulfils its functions. If the legislator has concluded that the amount of the fines to date is insufficient, it is fully within its competence to take appropriate action. On the other hand, a distinction should be made between the upper and lower limits of the fine. If its maximum level is insufficient, it can mean, regardless of how the administrative authorities work, that the law will essentially become unenforceable. On the other hand, no or "low" minimum fine limit alone can cause this situation unless the inefficient performance of public administration in both prevention and repression is associated. In particular, as regards the issue of repression, at least the same results as can be achieved by increasing the functioning of the administration, such as increasing control activity, adopting internal guidelines on the imposition of fines, can be achieved in the context of improving the functioning of the administration.

Therefore, if such a measure is not necessary and since it is not excluded that the fine constitutes an intervention in the constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms, namely property law, the Constitutional Court had to examine further whether such an intervention was actually involved in this particular case. The assessment of this issue is very closely linked to the principle of proportionality, since, as the Constitutional Court has indicated above, not every determination of a fine constitutes an intervention in fundamental rights and freedoms, but only one that interferes in property relations with considerable intensity, with the degree of injury resulting from this intervention being precisely one of the aspects of that principle of proportionality.

It should be recalled that the setting of a lower rate of fine by the legislator limits the administrative discretion of the competent authority, which may, however, constitute an obstacle to taking into account not only the actual gravity of the particular infringement but also the economic situation of the responsible body. This may mean that, in a particular case or in a group of cases, a fine - albeit at a minimum - appears to be extremely "unfair." In view of the relativity of that concept, it is necessary to consider the matter from the point of view of constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms, and from that point of view it is necessary to lay down rules which the legislator must respect when setting the lower limit of the fine. The basic criterion on which the Constitutional Court is of the opinion is the so-called substance criterion, according to which not every withdrawal of assets on the basis of fines, or fees and taxes, constitutes an intervention in property rights, but only one which fundamentally changes the property relationship of the entity concerned, i.e. it changes its overall ownership position by "destroying 'the very substance of the property. In particular, in the case of fines imposed on legal and natural persons operating under special rules, it should be assumed that such interference in the property would be excluded as a result of which the asset base for further business would be" destroyed. "In other words, fines of a liquidation nature are inadmissible. It should be noted that the fine at the level of liquidation constitutes, in principle, the" hardest' case of intervention in property regimes, which, moreover, may also lead to infringement of Article 26 (1) of the Charter; However, it is not impossible to draw a conclusion on the significant intensity of interference in property law, as well as on cases where the fine exceeds the possible proceeds so much that the business activity becomes essentially "useless' (i.e. merely intended to pay the fine imposed for a significant period of time). In the case of natural persons as entrepreneurs, since their private property and property intended for business is not separated (not assessed in accounting terms), in such cases there is a risk of serious impact not only on the person of the offender but also on other members of his household. Since more than 19% of natural persons and 19% of legal persons had a total annual income of up to CZK 50,000 and almost 70% of natural persons and more than 34% of legal persons had an income of up to CZK 500,000, it is clear that a fine of CZK 500,000 may not only be considered by the Regional Court in Hradec Králové but in a number of cases have a real liquidation character (around 19% of all companies have an annual income lower than 1 / 10 of the lowest amount of the fine). Therefore, in accordance with the foregoing considerations, it can be concluded that the determination of the lower limit of the fine in question constitutes such an intensive intervention in the individual's property situation that it also implies an intervention in its ownership law.

The intervention in question does not comply with the principle (criterion) of necessity and therefore another test is not necessary on the basis of the principle of proportionality in the strict sense. However, the Constitutional Court also addressed this issue and concluded that the measure was disproportionate to the intended objective of protecting the public interest. First of all, it must be assumed that the damage to the fundamental right which may be associated with this intervention is significant, as the economic existence of a large number of entities is threatened by the intervention itself, and the protection of property rights in the system of fundamental rights and freedoms is certainly among the most important. Although the Constitutional Court does not dispute the existence of a given negative phenomenon (i.e. non-compliance with the building rules) in general, on the other hand, the figures of the Ministry of Local Development do not indicate a significant extent of violations of the building rules, on the other hand, the Constitutional Court does not consider that the infringement, in particular in the cases described by the Regional Court in Hradec Králové, would constitute such a serious social problem, in the light of which such a fundamental interference in fundamental rights and freedoms would be justified. The Constitutional Court cannot, in principle, identify itself with such an approach, which is essentially based only on the escalation of state repression against individuals. As V. Knapp, for example, states (Law Theory, Prague, 1995, C. H. Beck, p. 36 and 37), "centuries of experience show, in particular in criminal law, that the infringement is not proportional to the tightening of sanctions, and that sanctions (particularly severe sanctions) lead to the creation of those deregulators or anti-legal systems that invent ways of avoiding the imminent penalty."

The Constitutional Court has no choice but to state that the fine may be compatible with Article 11 of the Charter and Article 1 of the Additional Protocol if it allows - at least to some extent - to take into account the property situation of the delinquent (cf. Peukert, lit. from above, p. 826). In addition, however, the second dimension of the phenomenon considered should also be taken into account. The determination of a fine within a given range means that, in principle, the same amount of the fine will be penalised by entities whose economic situation is completely different and thus the effects of the fine imposed will be quite different. whereas for certain entities the maximum amount of the fine may be negligible in relation to its management, for others and for the lowest possible fine it may mean liquidation, as demonstrated by the above figures. According to Article 1 of the Charter, people are free and equal in dignity and in rights. In the present case, although the contested provision treats all entities in the same way from a formal point of view, it significantly prevents a distinction between their property situation. Certainly not every real inequality creates an intervention in fundamental rights and freedoms; As stated by the Constitutional Court in its decision of 7.6.1995, sp. zn. This is usually the case when the infringement of another fundamental right, such as the right to own property pursuant to Article 11 of the Charter, one of the political rights referred to in Article 17 et seq. 'Given that, in principle, this is also a social inequality, it is necessary to examine whether it is an intervention of considerable intensity, since any setting of the lower limit of the fine may constitute a certain inequality, but not every one means inequality in the constitutional sense. However, as far as the intensity and proportionality of the intervention in question are concerned, the Constitutional Court has already dealt with this, and the above conclusions - even if assessed from a different perspective - are also valid here.

In view of the above, the Constitutional Court considers that the contested provision is incompatible with the principles of the rule of law under Article 1 of the Constitution and constitutes a contradiction with Articles 1 and 11 (1) of the Charter and Article 1 of the Additional Protocol. Therefore, the Constitutional Court had no choice but to abolish it under Paragraph 70 (1) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., as amended. The Constitutional Court admits that, as the Senate points out in its observations, the abolition of part of the provision in question may undermine the systemic link and bring about inequality with the provisions of Paragraph 106 (2) of the Construction Act in which the lower limit of the fine will remain, but the Constitutional Court is not entitled to abolish the provision as it is bound by the petition (except for its technical correction, as was the case here). However, this does not preclude the legislator from assessing, in the light of this finding, the constitutionality of the provision cited and possibly taking appropriate steps to amend it.