Communication from the Constitutional Court No 402 / 2021 Coll.
Communication from the Constitutional Court on the adoption of the opinion of the plenary of the Constitutional Court of 7 September 2021 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS-st. 53 / 21 on the question of the timeliness of electronic submission by e-mail
Valid
Communication from the Constitutional Court
Text versions:
12.11.2021
402
COMMUNICATION
The Constitutional Court
On 7 September 2021, the Board of the Constitutional Court adopted, under sp. zn. Pl. ÚS-st. 53 / 21 in composition of the President of the Court, Pavel Rychetský, Judge and Judge Ludvik David, Jaroslav Fenyk, Josef Fiala, Jan Filip, Jaromir Jirsa (Judge Rapporteur), Tomáš Lichovník, Vladimir Sládeček, Radovan Sukánek, Pavel Šámal, Katřina Šitáková, Vojty Šiměmělek, Milada Tomková, David Uhlík and Jiří Zemánek, on a proposal from the Constitutional Court of the Constitutional Court under Article 23 of Law No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court of the Constitutional Court of the Constitutional Court of 20 May 2014 (N 101 / 73 SbN 639),
the following opinion:
I. The timeliness of electronic submissions made by e-mail must be assessed by the time when the submission occurs to the court, not by the time when the submission is sent to the court.
II. The moment when the submission is duly made shall be considered as the moment when the e-mail message becomes available to the court; it is not relevant for the assessment of the timeliness of the submission when the Court of First Instance was actually acquainted with it.
Reasons
Definition of the case
1. The present case directly concerns the fundamental right of access to the court within the meaning of Article 36 (1) and (4) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms ("the Charter '). The essence of the opinion is to resolve the question of whether the constitutional conformity assessment of the timeliness of electronic submissions made by e-mail is the decisive moment at which the submission is sent or the moment when the submission takes place in the electronic mail room (disposition) of the court.
Proceedings on constitutional complaints brought before the Constitutional Court under page I. ÚS 1179 / 20
2. The Constitutional Complaints will be lodged at the Constitutional Court on 21 April 2020 by the complainant seeking the annulment of the order of the Supreme Administrative Court (hereinafter referred to as "the NSS ') No 6 As 267 / 2019-21 of 19 February 2020 because he believes that he has violated his right to a fair trial guaranteed in Article 36 (1) of the Charter.
Recital of procedural developments and facts of the case
3. The Municipal Court in Prague (hereinafter referred to as the "Municipal Court") rejected, by order No 14 A 56 / 2019-50 of 4 December 2019, the complainant's application to supplement the judgment of the same court No 14 A 56 / 2019-26 of 23 October 2019. On 19 December 2019, an unfounded (blank) appeal lodged by the complainant against the above-mentioned order of the Municipal Court was lodged via a data box to the Supreme Administrative Court. By order of 6 As 267 / 2019-4 of 6 January 2020, the Supreme Administrative Court called on the complainant to pay the court fee and to remedy the deficiencies of the appeal within one month of the date of service of the order in question; the order was delivered to the complainant on 9 January 2020.
4. The Constitutional Complaints contested by the order of the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the Complainant's appeal under Paragraph 37 (5) in conjunction with § 120 of the Administrative Rules of Procedure. The Supreme Administrative Court concluded that the final day of the deadline for completing the complaint fell to Sunday 9 February 2020, so that the end of the complaint was postponed until Monday 10 February 2020. If the NSS was added to the appeal lodged by the complainant's lawyer by e-mail, until 11 February 2020 at the time of 02: 46, two hours and 46 minutes after the expiry of the time limit to supplement the complaint, and is therefore late.
Arguments of the complainant in the constitutional complaint
5. In a constitutional complaint, the complainant claims that the Supreme Administrative Court was wrong to reject his appeal on the grounds of the expiry of the deadline for supplementing it. The complainant submits that, in addition to the complaint, his lawyer added the guaranteed electronic signature on 10 February 2020 at 23: 42 and sent the e-mail on 10 February 2020 at 23: 44, 16 minutes before the deadline.
6. According to the complainant, the three-hour delay between sending an e-mail and milking an e-mail to the Supreme Administrative Court e-mail office was due to technical deficiencies in the transmission of an e-mail message which cannot be placed on its burden. According to the complainant, the reverse procedure would be a superfluous formality, since the law would give participants the opportunity to send submissions electronically, any risk of timeliness of submission, including errors and fault of state authorities, would pass on to the authorities who would have the minimum opportunity to influence the moment when the court accepts the electronic submission, which would lead to the uncertainty of the participants and possible arbitrage. The complainant identified as evidence the "e-mail sent '(whose copy / print- screen included a constitutional complaint) and the" guaranteed electronic signature attached to the appeal complaint of 10.2.2020' (in this context the complainant referred to the NSS file).
7. The complainant refers to the finding of sp. zn. II. ÚS 2560 / 13 of 20.5.2014 (N 101 / 73 CollNU 639). According to the complainant, the present case does not differ in fact from that dealt with by the Constitutional Court.
Statement on the constitutional complaint and reply of the complainant
8. The Judge-Rapporteur, pursuant to Article 42 (4) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 77 / 1998 Coll., called on the Supreme Administrative Court and intervener to comment on a constitutional complaint.
9. The Supreme Administrative Court, on behalf of which the President of Chamber Filip Dienstbier spoke, proposed that the Constitutional Court reject the constitutional complaint in question for obvious unfounded reasons or, where appropriate, to reject it. It stated that the submission of the complainant was made electronically by "simple 'e-mail without the guaranteed electronic signature of the report; only the annex to the report has been signed by electronic means. It does not appear from the file that the complainant has actually made the submission in question on 10 February 2020, as stated in its constitutional complaint. The date on which the submission took place in the court, above all, cannot be estimated from the date stated by the data provider (in the words" In Prague on 10.2.2020 ") or from the date and time of electronic signature of the e-mail attachment. This signature does not bear the so-called time stamp and is derived from the date and time on which the feeder's computer was set (in words on the signature" Date: 2020.02.10 23: 42: 24 + 01' 00 '). According to the record of verification of electronic submissions from the e-mail office of the Supreme Administrative Court, the report was sent to the post office on 11.2.2020 and the date of dispatch cannot be ascertained. According to the NSS, the date on the copy of the e-mail sent, which is annexed to the constitutional complaint, is derived exclusively from the date set in the user's device and cannot be indicative of the date of actual dispatch of the message.
10. The Supreme Administrative Court, for the purposes of its observations, requested the Department of IT of the Supreme Administrative Court and the Ministry of Justice, managing the central e-post office for the courts, to communicate the information available on the time of dispatch and milking of the complainant's submission in the present case. The information obtained shows that it is not possible to establish with certainty the date of the actual dispatch of the file from the complainant (simple e-mail, electronic signature of the annex without a time stamp, use of postal services of the provider, which does not guarantee the history of the message - so-called tradition - from the pre-shipment phase). The indication "Signature Time: 2020 / 02 / 11 00: 42: 24 + 2 '00' in the document" Signature Properties' (Annex 4 of the NSS IT Unit) is more likely to suggest the opposite of the complainant's claim, as it coincides in minutes and seconds with the complainant displayed by the e-signature time and the difference of one hour corresponds to a different time band setting in the complainant's computer from the system determining the e-signature property.
11. According to the NSS, the factual assumptions for the application of the conclusions of the finding sp. zn. II. ÚS 2560 / 13 (with reference to point 34) are not fulfilled; the difference in time data on the signature of the annex and the sending of the message, which are all derived from the setting of the consignor's device, makes the assessment of the complainant's claims impossible to be sufficiently credible. The Supreme Administrative Court also contradicts the correctness of the conclusions of the finding, sp. zn. II. ÚS 2560 / 13, when it comes to the equivalence of e-mail communication with other forms of submission which the procedural rules allow. According to the NSS, the availability and credibility of the information necessary to assess the legal requirements imposed on the timeliness of the submission cannot be ensured, contrary to submission by the holder of the postal licence or data box system, when choosing this communication. It is more appropriate to compare e-mail communication to the service of "private delivery service" or civil assistance of any third party. According to the NSS, the legislator knew why, only when filed via the postal licence holder, it provided an advantage consisting of the possibility of transmitting (not necessarily its milking) and the last day of the legal period.
12. Side participant (Prague 14 City Office) It informed the Constitutional Court that it would not exercise the rights of an intervener in proceedings concerning a constitutional complaint. The complainant did not send a reply to the NSS's comments within the deadline.
Presumption of proceedings on a constitutional complaint
13. The constitutional complaint was lodged by an authorised person in time (§ 72 (3) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended) and is not inadmissible within the meaning of § 75 (1) of the same Act; The complainant is duly represented by a lawyer (Section 30 (1) of the Constitutional Court Act, as amended by Act No. 83 / 2004 Coll.) and the Constitutional Court is competent to discuss a constitutional complaint.
Grounds for bringing a question to the full court
14. When deciding on the above-mentioned case, the First Chamber came to a different opinion on the assessment of the issue of the timeliness of electronic submission by e-mail to the Court than the second Chamber at the time, in the decision of the second Chamber, in the second part of the decision of the Second Chamber. The facts of the case and the legal conclusions expressed in the decision sp. zn. II. ÚS 2560 / 13 (III. 1) will be described below. the different legal opinion of the referring First Chamber (III. 2) will then be explained.
II. ÚS 2560 / 13
15. The facts of the case sp. zn. II. ÚS 2560 / 13 can be summarised as follows: The complainant lodged a blank appeal. The Supreme Administrative Court called on the complainant to complete the complaint within one month of the date of service of the order in question (i.e. from 2.5.2013). Since the end of the deadline was due on Sunday, 2 June 2013, the end of the deadline was moved to supplement the appeal complaint on Monday 3 June 2013. In the contested decision, the Supreme Administrative Court concluded that it had received an electronic e-mail with the guaranteed electronic signature at 00: 26: 56 on 4 June 2013 and therefore rejected the complaint. The complainant argued that the reply to the appeal had already been lodged at 23: 38 on 3 June 2013.
16. The second Chamber then concluded that the refusal by the Supreme Administrative Court of the appeal constitutes a breach of the complainant's right to a fair trial within the meaning of Article 36 (1) of the Charter. It stated that, in view of the ever-deepening electronics of the judiciary, which is manifested in the area of communication, it is necessary to accentuate a material element whose purpose lies in the preference of a substantive and meritative assessment of the matter before its procedural termination where the nature of the matter does not expressly prevent it. Such a premise, according to the second Chamber at the time, is the presence of Article 90 of the Constitution, according to which the courts are primarily called upon to provide the protection of rights in a legally established manner; At the same time, it pursues the objective of ensuring that the judiciary does not turn into a mere "settlement," that is to say, it favours the pursuit of a legal and / or factual assessment of the problem, as far as possible, so that the protection of (not only fundamental) rights is exercised.
17. In point 32 of the decision in question, the second Chamber stated that "by timely delivery on that level, it is necessary to understand the situation in which the action of the participant, although made in the form of an electronic submission by means of an e-mail box, may occur to the court several minutes after the midnight day following the expiry of the relevant period, was actually taken before the expiry of the period, i.e. the e-mail was sent not later than 23: 59 on the last day of the period '. Moreover, according to the second Chamber, the court does not normally know such a procedural act before the beginning of the working time, and therefore the distinction as to whether the transmission of the relevant submission (delivery to the court) took place just before midnight of the last day of the period, or just a few hours, or even minutes just after midnight of the following day, has no material material consequences. According to the second Chamber at the time, it cannot reasonably be assumed that, on the night following the expiry of the period, a court worker would normally apply to the e-mail box information system of the court for further handling of the file.
18. In addition, the second Chamber referred to the finding of point II.II of the ÚS 1911 / 11 of 29.3.2012, as amended by the amending order of 15.5.2012 (N 66 / 64 CollNU 749), according to which the law of the party to the proceedings gives the possibility for the procedural acts to be carried out by a public data network (with effects as if the submission had been made directly in court), it is not materially conceivable that any disturbances within the delivery mechanism should be taken into account. According to the second Chamber, Paragraph 37 (2) of the Administrative Rules allows the parties to make electronic submissions signed by electronic means under a special law [i.e. Act No. 227 / 2000 Coll., on electronic signature and on the amendment of certain other laws (Act on electronic signature), as amended] and the submission in this form does not require confirmation by written submission of the same content or presentation of the original. Although Article 40 (4) of the Administrative Code does indeed link the maintenance of the time limit to the taxiously defined methods of filing in which electronic submissions are not absent, it cannot be interpreted in such a strict manner as to prevent the maintenance of the time limit by means of an otherwise qualified form of filing, already for the subsidiary application of the provisions of the first and third parts of the Civil Code in the administrative justice system.
19. As regards the present case, the second Chamber concluded that the complainant's submission was received by the NSS less than 27 minutes after midnight on the day following the expiry of the deadline and it is therefore clear that the NSS had the submission at its disposal at the beginning of the working day of 4 June 2013. The corresponding ISNSS output (referring to the NSS file) shows that the download of the e-mail message and its annexes was only at 8: 30 and their processing in this system was not available until 9: 50. At the request of the Constitutional Court, the complainant submitted a copy of the report sent, which, except for the heading, coincides with the copy (copy) of the report in question, based on the NSS file. The header shall contain important information on who, to whom and, in particular, when the message was sent, as well as an indication of the subject matter of the report and of the annexes attached. The then second Senate stressed that it had no reason to believe that copies of the e-mail message and in particular the sending of the message (23: 38) were correct. The e-mail message was sent before midnight but was delivered to the e-mail office of the court only on 4 June 2013 at 00: 26: 56.
20. The nature of the finding sp. zn. II. ÚS 2560 / 13 can be summarised as follows: The timing of the electronic submission of the court by e-mail must be assessed according to the time when the submission of the court is sent. If the pleading of a party was sent at 23: 38 (within the time limit) and the court was sent at 00: 26: 56 (a few minutes after midnight the following day after the time limit), they should be viewed within the meaning of Paragraph 40 (4) of the Administrative Rules as material timely, even if formally late.
Different legal opinion of the First Chamber
21. As a matter of fact, the items listed under point II.ÚS 2560 / 13 and point I.ÚS 1179 / 20 are almost identical. In both cases, the complainants lodged a blunt appeal, which the NSS subsequently set a monthly deadline for them to complete. In the first case, the complainant argued that the lawyer sent the complaint to the Supreme Administrative Court by e-mail at 23: 38 on the last day of the deadline; NSS administration occurred at 00: 26 on the following day. In the present case, the complainant contends that the lawyer sent the complaint to the complainant by e-mail of the NSS at 23: 44 on the last day of the deadline; NSS administration occurred at 2: 46 on the following day. A significant difference cannot be seen in different delays between the time of dispatch and the time of transmission of the application to the court, as the legal opinion of the second Chamber's finding is based on the claim that "the distinction between the delivery of the relevant submission (in fact its delivery to the court) took place just before midnight of the last day of the period, or a few hours or even a few minutes after midnight of the following day, has no factual material consequences' (see paragraph 32 of the finding). The irrelevant difference in the cases to be compared is that in case sp. zn. II. ÚS 2560 / 13 the guaranteed electronic signature was attached directly in the electronic submission (message), whereas in case sp. zn. I. ÚS 1179 / 20 the guaranteed electronic signature was accompanied by an annex to the electronic submission.
22. The first Chamber first concluded that there was a contradiction in the case-law concerning the assessment of the question of the timeliness of filing a court by e-mail. According to the first Chamber, the earlier case-law on the question in question was not in the finding of sp. zn. II. The ÚS 2560 / 13 was duly reflected and the different opinion expressed here was not sufficiently substantiated. At the same time, there is a later case-law that weakens the "power" and the persuasion of this finding. The contested finding often poses difficulties in the decision-making practice of the general courts (in this regard, for example, paragraph 21 of NSS judgment No 90 / 2019-31 of 27 June 2019, which explicitly states that "the NSS considers that further developments may be expected in the case-law of the Constitutional Court itself, since part of it is too benevolent and contradictory to the timeliness of electronic submissions with another court's case-law '; See also paragraph 11 of NSS judgment No 183 / 2018- 54 of 16.12.2019, paragraph 9 of NSS Resolution No 9 As 116 / 2017- 15 of 4.5.2017 or Resolution No 23 Cdo 3214 / 2017- 515 of 27.2.2018). Similarly, a part of the doctrine that denotes the argument of the Constitutional Court as inconclusive and strongly contrasting with the purposes of the time limits (see CAT, T. In: KÜHN, Z., CAT, T. and Kol. Administrative Rules of Procedure. Comment. Praha: Wolters Kluwer ČR, 2019, p. 305).
23. According to the First Chamber, the crucial moment for assessing the timeliness of electronic filing by e-mail is the moment of its milking into the e-mail office of the court (its disposition), not the circumstances of the dispatch. The finding of the second Chamber does not consistently distinguish between electronic submissions by e-mail and other forms of submissions foreseen in § 40 (4) of the Administrative Rules of Procedure and § 57 (3) of the Civil Code, but does not take into account the fact that lawyers, as persons professionally representing the parties, have a (mandatory) activated data box and can communicate with the Court safely and evidently through the data box information system. According to the first Chamber, the opinion of the latter Chamber denies the purpose of the time limits. At the same time, the "material approach 'without further overriding the right of access to the court without sufficiently considering the necessary effects on the legal certainty of the parties. On the other hand, the objective aspect of the matter - that is to say, whether the respondent acted in the spirit of the principle of vigilantibus iura scripta sunt - is important in communicating with the court.
24. The different legal opinion of the First Chamber can be summarised as follows: The timeliness of the electronic submission of a court by e-mail must be assessed according to the time of receipt of the submission to the e-mail office of the Court; the circumstances of sending an electronic submission via e-mail to the sender cannot affect the timeliness assessment.
The question put by the First Chamber for the examination of the full court of the Constitutional Court
25. For the reasons set out above, the First Chamber of the Constitutional Complaints in sp. zn. I. ÚS 1179 / 20, by order of 14.7.2021, suspended and, pursuant to Article 23 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, submitted the following questions to the plenary of the Constitutional Court: is it a decisive moment for a constitutional conformity assessment of the timeliness of the electronic submission of a court made by e-mail within the meaning of § 40 (4) of the Administrative Rules of Procedure and § 57 (3) of the Civil Procedure, or the moment when it becomes available to the court? Can the circumstances of the dispatch of such submissions affect the assessment of the question of its timeliness?
Assessment of the case by plenary of the Constitutional Court
26. In order to answer the questions put (V. 4), it is necessary to first summarise the constitutional basis on the fundamental right of access to the court and on procedural time limits as such (V. 1), further to draw up the relevant legal regulation (V. 2) and the development of the case law of the Constitutional Court on the question of the assessment of the timeliness of submissions (V. 3).
Right of access to court and purpose of procedural time limits
27. An essential part of the right of an individual to judicial protection protects the right of access to the court guaranteed in Article 36 (1) of the Charter and in Article 6 of the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The right to judicial protection referred to in Article 36 (1) of the Charter guarantees everyone that they can claim their right in a court under the "procedure ', whereby" [p] the refusal and the details are governed by the law' (see Article 36 (4) of the Charter). Therefore, the right of access to the court is not absolute and is subject to certain legal restrictions, which are incorporated in particular into procedural rules; However, none of these (legitimate) restrictions must be disproportionate and must not undermine the substance of the protected fundamental right (see the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 23.6.2016 in Baka v Hungary, No 20261 / 12, § 120; the decision of the European Court of Human Rights is available at https: / / hudoc.echr.coe.int /). From the point of view of the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, it is necessary that the individual conditions under which judicial protection may be sought should pursue a legitimate objective and be proportionate to that objective [point 27 of the Opinion of the plenary, sp. zl.
28. The procedural rules implementing the provisions of the Charter in question must be interpreted and applied by the General Courts and the Constitutional Court in such a way that the parties are not disproportionately treated, i.e. beyond the meaning and purpose of the rules which are applicable to them, and this does not in fact preclude the exercise of the right of judicial protection (see point 27 of the judgment in point IV of ÚS 410 / 20 of 16.6.2020; all decisions of the Constitutional Court are available at http: / / nalus.ujud.cz). The overriding formalism (or "procedural cynicism ') in the procedure of the courts is contrary to the requirement to ensure an effective and effective approach to the court (cf. European Court of Human Rights judgment of 12.11.2002 in the case of Bela and others against the Czech Republic, No 47273 / 99, § 50-51).
29. On the other hand, the rules on formal procedures and the time limits to be followed when an appeal or a request for judicial review is lodged are to ensure the proper administration of justice and the fulfilment of the principle of legal certainty; the parties have the right to expect the rules to be respected (see the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 15.10.2002 in case Cañete de Goña v Spain, No 55782 / 00, § 36). Compliance with the formalised legal procedures is necessary as it limits the court's desire and ensures equality of arms between the parties, effective decision of the dispute within a reasonable period of time and respect for the court (cf.
30. It can be concluded that the prohibition of overextended formalism on the one hand and the requirement to maintain legal certainty on the other hand implies that the courts must avoid, when applying the relevant procedural rules, both excessive rigidity which could threaten material justice as a whole and excessive flexibility which would result in the removal of the procedural requirements laid down by law and the predictability of the procedure of the Court of First Instance (see the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 31 January 2017 in the Hasan Tun've and Others case against Turkey, No 19074 / 05, § 32-33).
31. As regards the function and importance of the procedural time limits in the rule of law, it follows from the case-law of the Constitutional Court that the purpose of the time limit is generally to reduce entropy (uncertainty) in the exercise of rights, to limit time the state of uncertainty in legal relations, to speed up the decision-making process with a view to realising the intended objectives (see point 25 of the decision-making decision-making point (b) (I) of 21 April 2020). The normative definition of the time for the exercise of rights may fall both within the field of substantive and procedural subjective rights [Findings sp. zn. II. ÚS 738 / 2000 of 11.9.2001 (N 134 / 23 CollNU 273)]. The time limits laid down shall be defined by the party to the procedure [cf. sp. zn. III. ÚS 236 / 99 of 13.1.2000 (N 5 / 17 SbNU 35)].
Relevant legal arrangements
32. Pursuant to Paragraph 37 (2) of the Administrative Rules of Procedure, a procedural document containing the action at the disposal of the proceedings or its subject matter may be made in writing, orally and in electronic form, where appropriate. If such a submission has been made in a different form, it shall be confirmed within three days by written submission of the same content or by the original, otherwise it shall not be taken into account.
33. In the present case, Paragraph 40 (4) of the Administrative Rules is applied directly, which reads:
"The time limit shall be maintained if the submission on the last day of the period has been forwarded to the court or sent to it by means of the holder of the postal licence or, where appropriate, by a special postal licence or by the authority which is obliged to deliver it, unless otherwise provided for by this law. '
34. In the present case, although there is no reason to apply the provisions of the first and third parts of the Civil Code in accordance with Article 64 of the Rules of Procedure accordingly, since the Administrative Rules contain a separate and complete regulation on the maintenance of time limits, the conclusions of the opinion may also be drawn on civil proceedings and on the content of the same provision of the Civil Code, which provides that:
"The time limit shall be maintained if, on the last day of the period, the action is taken in court or the submission is submitted to the authority which is obliged to deliver it. '
35. Article 42 (1) and (2) of the Civil Code also provides that written submissions shall be made in paper or electronic form by means of a public data network or by fax. A written submission containing an application made by telefax or in electronic form shall be completed within 3 days at the latest by the submission of the original or, where appropriate, by the written submission of the same text; where it has not been completed within the prescribed time limit, such submissions shall not be taken into account by the court. According to paragraph 3 of the same provision, in the case of electronic submissions, signed in a manner to which the specific legislation links the effects of the handwritten signature, no addition of the submission shall be required by submitting the original referred to in paragraph 2.
Development of the case law of the Constitutional Court on the assessment of the timeliness of the submission of the Court
36. The question of the timeliness of submissions was initially addressed by the Constitutional Court in particular in relation to submissions made by fax. Already in the sp. zn. I. ÚS 460 / 97 of 6.10.1998 (N 114 / 12 SbNU 137), he considered whether the Supreme Court had consistently assessed the timeliness of the notice lodged by the complainant's lawyer. In the present case, the first Chamber concluded that it could not be attributed to the parties to the proceedings that a demonstrably sent fax was not found in the register. Similarly, the findings sp. zn. III. ÚS 329 / 2000 of 23.11.2000 (N 176 / 20 SbNU 245), sp. zn. IV. ÚS 179 / 06 of 10.9.2008 (N 153 / 50 SbNU 355); Findings sp. zn. I. ÚS 1286 / 10 of 8.9.2010 (N 191 / 58 SbNU 695), finds sp. zn. I. ÚS 463 / 03 of 17.1.2006 (N 13 / 40 SbNU 109) or sp. zn. I. ÚS 548 / 03 of 30.5.2006 (N 107 / 41 SbNU 343). The findings quoted concerned cases in which it was disputed whether the submission of a court at all had taken place, or cases where the submission had not been found in the register.
37. In resolution sp. zn. I. ÚS 250 / 05 of 20.7.2005 On the contrary, the Constitutional Court examined the complainant's constitutional complaint, which claimed that the reply to the appeal was sent by fax on the last day of the deadline in time, but the NSS rejected her complaint as late as it had been completed on the following day (after the deadline) at 00: 28. The former First Chamber rejected the complainant's constitutional complaint as manifestly unfounded and concluded that it was decisive when the court and not when it was sent in order to assess the timeliness of the submissions via fax. The order in question is not contrary to the case law of the case-law referred to in the previous paragraph precisely because, in this case, the submission was "not lost 'in court, on the contrary, the moment when it was handed over to the court was built for sure.
38. In the case in which the finding of page I of the ÚS 578 / 06 of 14.3.2007 (N 49 / 44 of the SbNU 629) was issued, the complainant argued that the appeal was handed over to the competent court at 23: 08 on the last day of the deadline. General courts have, in his opinion, wrongly concluded that the request was not made until the following day, since the fax machine was not properly adjusted for winter time. The then First Chamber annulled the decisions of the General Courts because they did not deal with the evidence proposed. In this context, it should be noted that even this finding is not contrary to previous case-law, on the contrary, it confirms the ratio of resolution sp. zn. I. ÚS 250 / 05, namely that the operative moment for the assessment of the fax submission is the moment at which the court to which the general courts were to take evidence.
39. The Constitutional Court initially expressed its views on the submission made by e-mail in its Resolution sp. zn. III. The conclusion on the timeliness of the submissions within the meaning of Paragraph 40 (4) of the Administrative Rules of Procedure may be based only on the finding, in accordance with the third Chamber at the time, that the consignment was actually forwarded to the competent court at the latest on the last day of the legal period (to that court). In the resolution at that time, the Third Chamber confirmed the substance of the conclusion expressed in resolution sp. zn. I. ÚS 250 / 05 and against e-mail submissions.
40. The Constitutional Court, in its decision of 4 July 2011 (N 132 / 62 of the SbNU 79), made itself binding directly to the point at which the timeliness of the submission of the telefax and the submission made by e-mail without a guaranteed electronic signature should be assessed. In the present case, the general courts considered the appeal to be late, which was submitted to the Court on the last day of the time limit (at the time of fax at 23: 49-23: 51), since they were based only on the moment at which the fax was made known to the Court and stamped on the file (7: 10 days after the deadline). The fourth Chamber then concluded clearly that, if a party to the proceedings makes submissions by fax, it is in the interest of assessing the timeliness of the submission when the court took place; The Court of First Instance may, in accordance with Article 8 (2) of Regulation (EC) No 207 / 2009, require the Commission to take a decision on a case-by-case basis. According to the Fourth Chamber at the time, the submission of the party by telefax to the court shall be forwarded to the court at the time when the lodging by fax takes place at the premises of the court receiving the fax. With regard to submissions by e-mail, the Fourth Chamber stated that "all that was stated in relation to the fax submission also applies mutatis mutandis to submissions made by electronic means' (point 15 of the finding).
41. A clear conclusion on the need to assess the timeliness of the submissions by telefax at the time of the submission of the submissions to the Court was subsequently confirmed by the Constitutional Court in its sp. zn. III. ÚS 2509 / 08 of 11.2.2009 (N 23 / 52 SbNU 221). In the present case, the complainant claimed that the fax service was served on the last day of the deadline. The NSS rejected the complaint as late as it had been sent on the last day of the 23: 35 deadline, but the court did not take place until the following day at 00: 40. The third Chamber then concluded that, contrary to the submissions sent through the postal licence holders or another body which is obliged to deliver them, not the moment of dispatch, is decisive in assessing its timeliness. In a state of evidentiary need where the complainant's claim on the time when the fax was sent cannot be verified and the situation was brought to the attention of the general courts, the presumption of timeliness of the receipt of the complaint must be based on the presumption of timeliness.
42. It follows from the above overview that the case-law on the question of the timeliness assessment of submissions made by telefax and e-mail itself has so far been consistent in that, as the relevant moment for the assessment of timeliness, it marked the time of transmission (milking) of the court's submissions. The change in this case-law cannot be seen in the above-mentioned finding of sp. zn. II. ÚS 1911 / 11, referred to by the second Chamber at the time in the contested finding of sp. zn. II. ÚS 2560 / 13. Findings sp. zn. II. ÚS 1911 / 11 did not relate to submissions via e-mail or telefax, but to submissions made by means of the form of the e-mail office available on the website www.justice.cz. In the case at hand, the question at issue was not whether the complainant's lawyer had submitted a complete submission in substance or whether the incompleteness of the submitted submission was due to an error in the transmission of data through the public data network. The latter Chamber concluded that it was not materially feasible that any disturbances within the functioning of the electronic delivery system should be brought to the attention of the participant. If, in accordance with the second Chamber at the time, the party to the proceedings can be satisfied that the documents of the alleged content have been sent through the public data network to the competent court, the procedural documents contained therein may be negotiated even if the court has not been served in full.
43. In the sp. zn. IV. ÚS 2446 / 11 of 14.11.2011 (N 194 / 63 SbNU 239) The Constitutional Court confirmed the binding opinion on the issue of the timeliness assessment by e-mail (again). In the present case, the complainant should have sent the appeal by e-mail on the last day of the time limit at 22: 38; However, the General Courts rejected its submission as late as it had been stamped by the Registry indicating that the court had not taken place until the third day following the expiry of the statutory period. In its statement of reasons, the fourth Chamber concluded that the timeliness of submissions made by electronic means without a guaranteed electronic signature should be assessed on the basis of the time when the electronic report was delivered to the competent court and it is not decisive when the competent staff member of the administration became aware of it and what date of service was indicated therein. The then Fourth Chamber asked the court information system administrator about the date and time of delivery of the e-mail message; his communication showed that the e-mail report containing the appeal was delivered to the court not later than the last day of the 23: 24 deadline. Where there is doubt as to the timeliness of the submission made by electronic means without a guaranteed electronic signature and the moment of its milking is crucial to the decision, the court must take appropriate steps to establish the exact moment of milking; the information contained on the stamp by which it indicates the filing of the Registry to the court cannot be satisfied without further action.
44. The question of timeliness was further addressed by the Constitutional Court in relation to the submission made through the data box. In the find sp. zn. II. ÚS 3518 / 11 of 10.1.2012 (N 7 / 64 SbNU 69) concluded that in the data box information system, all data boxes which are fully available to the general courts were included. If the General Court, when assessing the timeliness of the submission sent through the data box, combined the moment when the data report was delivered to the court at the time when the authorised staff member entered the data box and, as a result, evaluated the submission as late, it infringed the right of the participant to access the court. In this sense, the finding in question was therefore consistent with the previous case law concerning the submission made by fax, e-mail and e-mail to the Ministry of Justice.
45. Subsequently, however, the second Chamber issued a cross-checked finding, sp. zn. II. To some extent, the first Chamber established the finding of spr. In it he found a timely opposition to a criminal order which was to be sent by e-mail, bearing the guaranteed electronic signature of the last day of the 19: 12 deadline, but did not reach the court due to a technical error on the part of the sender (lawyer). Subsequently, the lawyer forwarded the same lodging for sure again (but after midnight) and the court's opposition reached 00: 27. The conclusion of the finding is clear: If the submission was sent after midnight and after midnight the court also took place (both after the time limit), this formally delayed submission should be considered to be materially timely, if the sender showed on the last day of the deadline the will and attempt to do the procedural action in time, even if for reasons on his part it did not take place. The party of proof of the alleged intention to send an e-mail in time of the first Chamber stated that, although it is aware that the e-mail header is not conclusive evidence that the original e-mail was actually sent; the proceedings before the General Court of the original dispatch were not contested and the court did not deal with this circumstance. The conclusion of the then First Chamber in this sense "shifts" the material approach of the conflicted finding sp. zn. II. ÚS 2560 / 13, since in this case the complainant did not even claim that the submission by e-mail was received within the time limit, but argued that it was only willing to do so within the time limit. The First Chamber stressed that the case in question was examined by the opening of the right to open proceedings in the presence of a party to the proceedings under Article 38 (2) of the Charter, which partly brings the matter to a different light. For this reason, the first Chamber is now in conflict in particular with the earlier finding of page II of the ÚS 2560 / 13.
46. The question of the timeliness of court proceedings was subsequently dealt with several times by the Constitutional Court in several resolutions (see, for example, resolution sp. zn. III. ÚS 269 / 15 of 30.3.2015 or resolution sp. zn. III. ÚS 517 / 20 of 6.4.2020). In Resolution sp. zn. I. ÚS 137 / 15 of 18.3.2015, the then First Chamber dealt in detail with a constitutional complaint in which the complainant claimed that it had lodged an action against an administrative decision by e-mail on the day before the end of the deadline, but the administrative courts did not deal with the action, which was why the complainant submitted a proposal after two and a half years to determine the deadline for implementing the procedural act rejected by the administrative courts. The then First Chamber in the present decision pointed out that the views expressed in the findings of the case, sp. zn. II. According to the first Chamber at the time, the delay in bringing the action was due to the lack of care of the complainant for her own rights; the admission of the action would constitute a significant breach of the function and purpose of the Institute of Time-limits in view of the delay from the expiry of the period. In resolution sp. zn. I. ÚS 1903 / 16 of 21.6.2016 The Constitutional Court assessed the timeliness of a constitutional complaint lodged via telefax on the last day of the 23: 46 deadline (according to the heading of the telefax report) delivered to the Constitutional Court the following day at 03: 54. In the present decision, the Judge-Rapporteur described in detail the existing discrepancy in the Constitutional Court's case-law, but concluded that the submission of the plenary case pursuant to Article 23 of the Constitutional Court law is hindered by the fact that the complainant was not represented by a lawyer.
Constitutional conformity assessment of the timeliness of filing a court by e-mail
47. The above-mentioned evolution of the case law of the Constitutional Court shows a contradiction in the assessment of the timeliness of the submission by e-mail and therefore the need for the adoption of the opinion by plenary pursuant to Article 23 of the Law on the Constitutional Court. Plenum concluded that a cross-checked conclusion on the finding of sp. zn. II was needed. In accordance with previous established case-law, the ÚS 2560 / 13 is certain to overcome and establish, in accordance with the constitutional interpretation of Article 40 (4) of the Administrative Code and Article 57 (3) of the Civil Code, that the timeliness of the e-mail submission is in line with the constitutional interpretation of Article 40 (4) of the Administrative Rules of Procedure, and that Article 57 (3) of the Civil Code should be assessed at the time of transmission (milking) to the disposition of the court.
48. The material approach applied in the find sp. zn. II. ÚS 2560 / 13 is based on two key points: first, according to the conclusion of the second Chamber, the submission of the court by e-mail must be considered as timely if the e-mail provider sent the e-mail within the prescribed time limit. Secondly, in order to assess timeliness, it is the time at which the staff member of the court or of the judge is actually familiar with the submission.
49. According to the plenary, neither of these premises is sustainable in the so-called material approach. It will also be explained why the time limit for electronic submissions made by e-mail cannot be maintained at the time of dispatch of the submission as for other "privileged" forms of submission [V. 4 a)]. It follows that the assessment of the timeliness of the submission in the light of the moment of actual disclosure by the court is not consistent with the purpose of the procedural deadlines [V. 4 (b)]. The last part of the statement of reasons outlines how situations need to be handled when doubts arise as to the timeliness of electronic submissions made by e-mail [V. 4 (c)].
Assessment of the timeliness of the e-mail submission at the time of transmission of the submission to the court
50. The conflicted finding of sp. zn. II. ÚS 2560 / 13 states that, in view of the deepening electronics of justice, electronic submissions made by e-mail should be considered as timely if they were sent at the last moment of the deadline, i.e. e-mail was sent "not later than 23: 59 p.m. on the last day of the period" (see paras 31-32). In addition, the second Chamber states that "[a] s Paragraph 40 (4) of the EC Treaty actually links the maintenance of the deadline only to the taxiously defined means of submission in which electronic submissions are absent, it cannot be interpreted in such a strict manner as to prevent the maintenance of the deadline by means of an otherwise qualified form of submission [...] '(see paragraph 34).
51. Paragraph 40 (4) of the Administrative Rules provides that the time limit shall be maintained if the submission on the last day of the time limit has been submitted to the Court: (a) before the Court; (b) sent to him by means of a (special) postal licence holder; (c) submitted to the authority which has an obligation to deliver them. Paragraph 57 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure for the maintenance of the time limit, other than the time when the court is referred to, only links it to the surrender of the authority which is obliged to deliver it. From the point of view of maintaining the time limit within the meaning of the provisions cited, the moment of the actual transfer of the court should be understood as a standard, whereas the way in which the authority which is obliged to deliver them is a certain "privileged 'journey with which the benefit of the maintenance of the time limit is linked before it actually reaches the court, and it does not count the duration of the transport with the participant until the time limit for the submission. In order to answer the question referred, it is necessary to examine whether, in view of the fundamental right of access to the court, the submission made by e-mail must be understood as a standard procedure, linked up to the moment when the court is referred to it, or whether the submission is made through" the authority which has an obligation to deliver it' as a method linked to the moment of dispatch.
52. Standard forms of submission which cannot be subdued under the "privileged 'methods within the meaning of the above mentioned provisions are typically personal submissions. In the event of a personal submission, the AACC must, in fact, forward them to the Registry within the prescribed time limit. It is common for the Registry to be open only in specified official hours; If the filing agent fails to make the final day of the deadline within the specified official hours, he may no longer personally make the submission, even if he usually has several hours left until the end of the formal period (days or months). The latter may also entrust a third party with the task of personally submitting his submission to the court for him. Although the delegate may have a contractual obligation to refer the application to the court and, even if it may be held liable for its possible surrender against the respondent, the time limit of the respondent shall not be maintained unless the submission to the court is actually submitted within the prescribed time limit.
53. The standard method of submission, which is not linked to the maintenance of the deadline, should be treated mutatis mutandis by telefax (in practice almost unused), which produces temporal effects until it is delivered to an establishment operated by a court. As with the transmission of the submission via a third party, the sender uses the services of third parties - telephone companies. This is therefore a private legal arrangement for the way in which the State is not liable.
54. The body which is obliged to deliver the submission shall, first and foremost, be the holder of the postal licence. Although Paragraph 40 (4) of the Administrative Rules of Procedure explicitly mentions the holder of a postal licence in addition to the separate concept of the body which is required to deliver the service, it is possible to conclude, in the light of the wording of Paragraph 57 (3) of the Civil Code, that the holder of the postal licence does not separately indicate that the postal licence falls under that general term (see, mutatis mutandis, HROMADA, M. In: FREEDODA, K., SPOLÍK, P., LEVY, J., DOLEZÍLEK, J. et al. Comment. 3rd edition. Praha: C. H. Beck, 2021, § 57).
55. The legal benefit of maintaining the deadline for the use of the postal licence holder's services is justified. In the case of submission by the holder of the postal licence, as well as by a private third party, the donor shall transmit the consignment to the third body (transporter) in order to deliver it to the court under a contract concluded between the consignor and the carrier. Contrary to standard submissions via a third party, the rules for submission by the postal licence holder are governed by a law which details the conditions for the postal services business, the provision and operation of postal services and the rights and obligations arising therefrom [see Act No. 29 / 2000 Coll., on postal services and amending certain laws (Postal Services Act), as amended]. The fact that it is an obligation to supply the file governed by the law is essential for maintaining the deadline. Where a third party service provider actually provides postal services, even if it does not hold a (special) postal licence under the Postal Services Act, the period is not maintained unless the submission is submitted to the court on the last day of the prescribed period. In other words, such a third party cannot be regarded as having an obligation to service the file within the meaning of Paragraph 40 (4) of the Administrative Rules. The maintenance of the deadline by transmission to the postal licence holder is based on the legal guarantee that the provision of postal services will be governed by a special regime of appropriate quality (see for example the special arrangements for the conclusion of a postal contract (Section 5 of the Postal Services Act) or by the special arrangements for liability for damage incurred in the provision of postal services (Section 12 et seq. of the same Act)).
56. The same logic shall apply to other bodies which have a legal obligation to deliver submissions. In relation to persons whose freedom is restricted, those authorities should be understood, for example, by the Prison Service (cf. § 17 of Act No. 169 / 1999 Coll., on the execution of a custodial sentence and on the modification of certain related laws, as amended, and § 13 of Act No. 293 / 1993 Coll., on the exercise of custody, as amended), or by the Institute for the performance of security detention (cf. § 8 of Act No. 129 / 2008 Coll., on the exercise of security detention and on the modification of certain related laws).
57. However, a diametrically different situation arises with an electronic submission made by e-mail, which distinguishes itself from the submission made by the postal licence holder precisely by the absence of legal guarantee of the delivery method. If the sender sends the submission via e-mail, the data message shall be sent to the operator of his e-mail server to deliver it to the court in his e-mail box on the basis of the relevant contractual terms. The obligation of service on the part of the e-mail server operator is based solely on a private legal arrangement the quality of which is not specifically regulated by law; the State is not responsible for the operation of private email server operators. In this sense, e-mail submissions may be compared to submissions via telefax and through a third party who is not the holder of the postal licence or by another authority which is obliged to deliver the submission. The e-mail submission made in electronic form through the public data network is rather just another technical means of transmitting the data message from the sender to the recipient (the addressee).
58. It is important that the e-mail route may not be straightforward (i.e. from the e-mail server of the sender to the e-mail server of the court / state); e-mail can travel through several other email servers operated by other private third parties. In view of the timeliness of filing, the State can only be held liable for the operation of e-mail servers that operate e-mail boxes of courts; technical problems on the part of the provider or operator of e-mail servers cannot be influenced by the court (state).
59. The absence of appropriate legal regulation (which exists for "privileged" means that the appropriate quality of the submission by e-mail is not guaranteed. There may not be an obligation on private operators to deliver the submission, let alone to deliver it at foreseeable times. In the absence of a legal guarantee, there is also a problem of proving the exact time of sending an e-mail message. Since the State is not responsible for the operation of the e-mail server operators after which the e-mail message has been sent, it does not have direct access to demonstrable data on the time of dispatch (as is the case with the submission via the postal licence holder). On the contrary, the record of the verification of the electronic submission made to the e-mail service available to the court in the court file does not specify the exact time of dispatch, precisely because the information cannot be obtained without further proof (see below).
60. It follows from the above that the electronic submission made by e-mail differs significantly from the "privileged 'method of submission by the postal licence holder in that the quality of delivery via e-mail is not guaranteed by law. For this reason, submission by e-mail cannot be considered as one of the" privileged' ways of maintaining the deadline at the time of dispatch of the submission.
61. Assessment of the timeliness of the e-mail submission as a standard method of submission at the time of transmission of the e-mail submission to the court is not an excessive procedural condition which would unduly interfere with the right of participants to have an effective and factual approach to the court. The maintenance of the time limit for the moment of milking shall pursue the legitimate objective of ensuring the proper administration of justice. As explained above, the indication of the time at which the e-mail submission was sent to the court is not directly accessible, and its findings would therefore require, in each case, detailed evidence to be carried out only to maintain the procedural deadline, which would lead to a reduction in the effectiveness of the court proceedings as a whole.
62. The requirement to assess the timeliness of the e-mail submission at the time of its transmission to the court is appropriate because the parties have at their disposal several forms of submission which they can send to the court. Each legally foreseen method of administration has its advantages and disadvantages in terms of speed, availability or reliability. If the parties to the proceedings, or even their professional representatives - lawyers who can comfortably use the well-functioning data box system to serve email server operators whose quality is not guaranteed by law, it is appropriate that, in accordance with the principle of vigilantibus iura scripta sunt, they bear the consequences of any technical problems. The deepening electronics of justice cannot lead to an absolute right of access to the court, regardless of the substantial differences in different forms of filing. If the legal regulation does not guarantee the appropriate quality of the submission via e-mail, maintaining the deadline linked only to the time of sending the e-mail would jeopardise the proper administration of justice.
63. The Constitutional Court's Board therefore concludes that the finding of sp. zn. II. ÚS 2560 / 13 must be overcome in the sense that, in accordance with the constitutional interpretation of § 40 (4) of the Administrative Rules of Procedure and § 57 (3) of the Civil Code, the timeliness of electronic submissions made by e-mail must be assessed according to the time when the Court takes place and not the time when it is sent.
Assessment of the time of transmission of e-mail submission
64. If the plenary concludes that the timeliness of e-mail submissions is to be assessed at the time of their milking of the court, it is also necessary to take account of the cross-checked findings in section II. The ÚS 2560 / 13 will build what can be understood under such a moment. According to the second condition of the "material" approach of the second Chamber at the time, the e-mail submission must be submitted to the court before the staff member of the court or judge is actually acquainted with the submission. According to the plenary, however, it is not possible to assess the timeliness of the submission in the light of the moment on which the Court's staff actually acquaint themselves with it, since such an approach would lead to significant uncertainty for both the parties and the authorities. In fact, it is not always necessary to get acquainted with the submission at the beginning of the working hours of the court staff, which leads to uncertainty as to what time delay (the order of minutes, hours or days) between dispatch and delivery after the deadline is still materially permissible.
65. The question of the fact that the court is normally actually familiar with the submission made by e-mail only at the beginning of the working time reveals precisely the resolution sp. zn. I. ÚS 1903 / 16, which states that "if the proper exercise of the judiciary so requires, the judge is to carry out the necessary actions and other activities over the prescribed working hours, even at night or on days of rest, or in an ordered on-call. The judge must be prepared to carry out a certain activity in the exercise of the judiciary (to carry out the necessary action) at any time (at any time at which it must be carried out by law), since the judge is a judge 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and can be called upon at any time for the performance of his employment '(see paragraph 11 of the resolution). At the same time, however, it is possible to imagine the second extreme, where the court would proceed indiscriminately and would not have been introduced for too long (even at all). It could be argued by an ad absurdum argument that if, according to the material approach, the Court makes sense to assess the late submission, which was handed down to it several hours before the Court's staff member or the judge met him at the beginning of his" working time, "it should also make sense for the Court to assess the late submission in the order of several days if the Court's or the judge's staff had not taken any action on the matter for instance for a week.
66. It follows from the above that it is not generally possible to determine the exact moment when a judge (an assistant or an employee of a court) becomes acquainted with a specific submission; the parties cannot predict this moment at all. It is precisely the uncertainty of the threshold, when it is still necessary to consider a formal late submission as materially timely, that creates an unacceptable margin for arbitrary assessment of the time-limits by the court.
67. The expiry of the procedural period (as a time-limited section for the execution of a procedural act by a party) is merely a consequence of the passage of time. If something is clear and predictable, it is precisely that time flows in a certain familiar way. The merger of the assessment of the maintenance of the deadline with an indefinite moment (de facto familiarisation with the submission) denies the clear definition of the time period and thus denies the very meaning of the procedural deadlines. The emphasis on the strict assessment of the timeliness of the submission at the formal end of the deadline, defined by the precise time-limit, does not mean that the Constitutional Court would prefer formalistic "processing" to a substantive solution to the matter; is merely to preserve the nature of the procedural period as such.
68. If the subsequent activity of the court is not decisive for the expiry of the procedural period, it is also not relevant for the assessment of the timeliness of the submission whether and when the court will effectively deal with the submission. It is necessary to consider the moment when the submission becomes available to the court, which, in the case of an e-mail submission, is the moment when the e-mail message is delivered to the court's e-mail box or when the submission was detected on the first e-mail server for which the State is responsible. From that moment on, the party to the proceedings cannot influence the other fate of its submissions. The first e-mail server will typically be the competent e-mail server of the Ministry of Justice.
Procedure by the court in case of doubt on the timeliness of the e-mail submission
69. Furthermore, from the point of view of the requirements of the fundamental right of access to the court, it is necessary to state how the courts are to proceed in border cases where there is doubt as to the exact time of delivery of the e-mail submission. If the moment of receipt of an e-mail submission to the e-mail service is central to the decision in the present case, the court must, in accordance with the right of the party to access the court, take appropriate steps to establish the exact time of transmission. The Court cannot do so without proper proof of that precise moment if it leads, in fact, to the refusal of a party's access to the court for delay. The deepening electronics of the justice system allowing submission by e-mail are also associated with the obligation of the court to demonstrate the exact moment of milking even in cases of e-mail submissions, such as personal submissions or submissions made by telefax.
70. In most cases, there will be no difficulties because the record of the verification of the electronic submission made to the e-mail service available to the court in the court file shows (per second) the exact time of delivery of the e-mail. However, it is possible to imagine a borderline situation where individual seconds will play a role in assessing the timeliness of submission; in such a case, the court cannot proceed mechanically and must, in cooperation with the relevant e-mail server operator of the court, determine when the first e-mail server for which the State is responsible was detected.
71. As the practice shows, finding the exact time of delivery of the submission to the first e-mail server for which the State is responsible may be crucial in cases of technical problems on the e-mail servers of the Ministry of Justice or the competent court. For example, in the case referred to above, NSS judgment No 10 Ads 90 / 2019-31, the complainant's lawyer sent an e-mail submission on the last day of the deadline at 15: 40: 04, but the e-mail server of the Ministry of Justice failed to deliver an e-mail because of a technical failure, and the submission took place only on the backup server at 15: 41: 14 on the same day; However, the submission was not delivered to the Registry until the following day at 15: 59: 18. The total time of delivery of e-mail thus lasted more than one day. Similarly, you can imagine cases where there is an unusually long delay between the time of sending the email and the time of delivery in case of overloading the e-mail box of the court or other technical defects.
72. In the event of technical disturbances on the part of the e-mail server operators for which the State is responsible, the above-mentioned rule for assessing the timeliness of the e-mail submission cannot be applied automatically at the time of transmission of the submission. As with other "non-privileged 'procedural arrangements, it is necessary to apply the rule that, in accordance with the fundamental right of a party to access to the court, any unforeseeable technical disturbances within the functioning of the filing system on the part of the State cannot be interpreted as late to the burden of the respondent.
73. The Court of First Instance often does not have to identify the technical problems on the part of the State when delivering the e-mail without further action, since, in accordance with the constitutional procedure explained above, it only assesses the date of milking, which at first sight does not even appear borderline. While it can be expected that the unforeseeable long-term technical problems of the servers operated by the State will not occur frequently, it cannot be ruled out, on the other hand, that the court will not be aware of a specific failure (technical defect) at the time of decision on the timeliness of the e-mail submission. In such cases, the party to the proceedings must proceed in accordance with the principle of vigilantibus iura scripta sunt and argue within a reasonable time and in a credible manner that the submission by e-mail was made in time and at the same time that the submission was not due to technical problems arising from the State. Technical problems on the part of the State may be detected by the respondent within a short time after sending an e-mail, since the receipt of the submission sent to the court by e-mail is communicated to the respondent in accordance with § 4 (8) of Decree No. 259 / 2012 Coll., on details of the performance of the file service, as amended, by a confirmatory e-mail message, which also contains the date and time of the receipt of the document, indicating the time and minute or, where applicable, the second. Therefore, if the delay between the time of dispatch and the time of delivery is unpredictably long, it is possible for the provider to find out and subsequently argue. It is then the duty of the court to take appropriate steps to ascertain safely the circumstances of the milking.
74. In addition, the technical problems encountered by the e-mail server operators for which the State is responsible cannot be demonstrated by a "simple" copy of the e-mail header, as was done, for example, in a cross-checked finding of sp. zn. II. It is generally known that the time of sending specified in the simple header of the e-mail is based on the set time of the user's computer; It therefore does not have the necessary redeemable value in this respect. The specified "path" of submission from one email server to another server can be shown by the original header of e-mail messages, which contains a list of technical details of the message with precise times, to which the message was delivered to the server and which is also not controlled by the computer settings of the sender, but by the time of individual servers. Therefore, the indicative value of such information is undoubtedly higher. If the participant claims that the e-mail submission was submitted to the court late because of technical problems on the e-mail servers for which the State is responsible, it is necessary that this claim be demonstrated in a credible manner, for example, by the original header of the e-mail message or by the communication of the operator / administrator of the e-mail server of the consignor or the operator / administrator of the e-mail server of the court; the copy / print-screen of the e-mail sent cannot be satisfied.
75. Finally, it is necessary to add, in view of the conflicted conclusions of the finding of sp. zn. II. ÚS 2560 / 13 (even the finding of sp. zn. I. ÚS 892 / 14), that the demonstration of technical problems on the part of the State is fundamentally different from the demonstration of the mere moment when e-mail submission is sent. If the moment of milking is decisive for the assessment of the timeliness of the submissions by e-mail, the circumstances in which the submissions existing on the part of the party concerned are sent cannot affect the assessment of the question of timeliness. The deadline does not depend on the intention and behaviour of the sender or on the technical problems of the operator of the e-mail server for which the State is not responsible. In order to assess the timeliness of the e-mail submission, it is not relevant whether the e-mail submission contains or does not contain a guaranteed electronic signature, since the connection of a recognised electronic signature or a time stamp to an e-mail only affects the authentication (verification of identification) of the provider but does not prove without further time when the submission was made. In other words, the consignor may electronically sign the submission at a certain time, but in fact it may send the submission at a different time. If, therefore, the e-mail service provider provides an e-mail service with a guaranteed electronic signature, it will not have to complete the original of the submission within three days within the meaning of Article 42 (3) of the Civil Code, but such a fact will not be decisive in assessing the timeliness of the submission.
76. The Constitutional Court concludes, therefore, that if the moment when the e-mail submission to the court is at the heart of the judgment in the present case is at the heart of the case, the court must, in accordance with the right of the party to access the court, take appropriate steps to establish that moment. If the participant claims that the e-mail submission was delivered late due to technical problems on the e-mail servers for which the State is responsible, it is necessary to demonstrate this claim in a credible manner. only a copy of the e-mail sent cannot be satisfied. If it is demonstrated to a sufficient degree that the e-mail submission was not submitted to the court in due time for reasons of technical defects caused by the operator of the e-mail server of the Ministry of Justice (or of the Court) which the party could not have foreseen at the same time, such a fact cannot be attributed to the party and the relevant submission cannot be rejected as late. Where the moment of milking is decisive for the assessment of the timeliness of the submissions by e-mail, the circumstances of the dispatch of such submissions on the part of the party to the proceedings cannot affect the assessment of the question of timeliness. The deadline does not depend on the intention and behaviour of the sender or on the technical problems of the operator of the e-mail server for which the State is not responsible. In order to assess the timeliness of e-mail submission, it is not even relevant whether the e-mail submission contains a guaranteed electronic signature.
President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr. Rychetský v. r.
Different opinions under Article 14 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, were taken by the judges Josef Fiala, Radovan Sukhanek and Pavel Šámal, and by Jaromír Jirsa for his reasons.
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Regulation Information
| Citation | Communication from the Constitutional Court No 402 / 2021 Coll., on the adoption of the Opinion of the plenary of the Constitutional Court of 7 September 2021 sp. zn. |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | Communication from the Constitutional Court |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 12.11.2021 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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