The Constitutional Court found No. 369 / 2012 Coll.

I. Paragraph 175 (1) of Act No. 99 / 1963 Coll., Civil Code, as amended, shall be deleted from the words "within three days' and from the words" within the same period 'by the end of 30 April 2013.

II. In the remaining parts, the motion to repeal Article 175 of Act No. 99 / 1963 Coll., Civil Code, as amended, is rejected.

1. In due time and in due course of the constitutional complaint, the applicant requests that the Constitutional Court annul the finding of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Prague of 11 November 2010 No 5 Cmo 270 / 2010-112. The proceedings for a constitutional complaint are conducted under point IV of ÚS 376 / 11. The application for annulment of that judgment also called for the annulment of § 175 of Act No. 99 / 1963 Coll., Civil Code, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as "o.s. '), in particular for the following reasons:

2. Regional Court in Ústí nad Labem - Branch Office in Liberec by judgment of 17 June 2010 No 37 Cm 419 / 2009-84 annulled the exchange order of the Regional Court in Ostrava No 32 Cm 76 / 2009-14 of 25 February 2009. Against this judgment, the applicant, Gorasan COMPANY LIMITED, Theklas Lysioti 35, EAGLE STAR HOUSE, 6th floor, P. C. 3030, Limassol, Cyprus, (in proceedings concerning a constitutional complaint by the appellant by the Constitutional Court registered under sp. v. IV. ÚS 376 / 11 intervener, hereinafter referred to as "the plaintiff '), appealed. In the appeal proceedings of the Supreme Court in Prague, the judgment of the Regional Court in Ústí nad Labem changed the branches in Liberec by leaving the exchange order of the Regional Court in Ostrava no. 32 Cm 76 / 2009-14 of 25 February 2009. In the view of the appellant, the Supreme Court in Prague in that judgment ruled, in particular, in breach of the provisions of Section 3 of Act No. 40 / 1964 Coll., Civil Code, as amended, in breach of the provisions of Sections 1, 2, 120 and 134 o. s. s., in breach of Articles 11, 36 (1) and 37 (3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as" the Charter'), in breach of the appellant's right to a fair trial. In this case (but not only in this case), the Supreme Court in Prague (but not only in this case), according to the appellant, does not decide impartially and interprets the law (mainly § 120 and 134 o. s. s.) deliberately completely erroneously, contrary to the wording and purpose of the law, contrary to the case law of the Supreme Court and contrary to the generally accepted principles of morality, justice and good morals.

3. According to the appellant, the exchange disputes in the Czech Republic are judged only by certain chambers which specialise in this matter and are governed solely by Act No. 191 / 1950 Coll., Exchange and Checkout Act, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as the "Exchange and Checkout Act") and § 175 o. s. and no other parts of the Civil Code, the Civil Code or any other legislation, including the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution), the Charter and the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms exist for them.

4. In order to illustrate the circumstances of the case at hand, the appellant states, inter alia, that FAST Finance, s. r. o., provided small loans to a large number of clients in approximately 2002. According to the contract, the loans were repaid in such a way that the loan provider's worker went out each week for instalments. However, during the repayment period, the loan provider stopped running for the instalments and sent a letter to the clients indicating that it had decided to change the method of repayment by sending the money monthly with a deposit. Although the client did not agree to change the contract, the provider stopped running out of repayments and therefore brought the debtor into default. After a certain period, the creditor submitted an application for a payment order to pay the amount due, including interest. Since debtors (clients) generally have no legal or economic education, they were unable to defend themselves and ultimately paid for everything, including the cost of execution. After the execution, when the executor confirmed to them that the entire debt had been paid, they considered the matter to be over and they no longer retained most of the documents on the matter. FAST FINANCE, s. r. o., waited several years (in the course of which it inferred notes to the plaintiff) and then several thousand exchange actions were filed. The vast majority of the defendants do not know what is going on and are unable to respond adequately and will write only in exchange objections that they have paid off the loan with the accessories and that they do not owe anything. The amount of about CZK 10,000 is not usually borrowed by rich and educated people. If someone borrows an amount of CZK 10,000, he does not even have sufficient knowledge of the law. After delivery of the exchange order, he has 3 days to obtain the lawyer and at the same time to pay him several thousand crowns as an advance. Even if some defendants succeed, there will be another problem. The loans were granted in 2002 and the actions were brought in 2008-2009. After so many years, the defendants usually don't have the necessary documents or remember exactly how the whole thing went; Thus, the lawyer does not have the necessary evidence to draw up the relevant objections - in addition, he usually has one to two days left. According to the appellant, the courts issue judgments in which they keep the exchange order in force, stating the rigidity of the exchange procedure and the rigidity of the law. If the Court of First Instance has already dealt with the matter and the exchange order has been annulled, the claimant has appealed and the Supreme Court has always changed the judgment of the Regional Court by leaving the currency order in force.

5. In this context, according to the appellant, the position of JUDr. Zdeněk Kovařík (judge of the Supreme Court in Prague and the leading expert on foreign exchange law in the Czech Republic), for example, is marked in the article "To prove the authenticity of the signature of the bill." Legal perspective, 2010, No 8, p. 267- 272, where the author, according to the author, fundamentally prefers the holder of the security, i.e. notes.

6. Moreover, according to the appellant, it must be borne in mind that the exchange law, as presented by the exchange and chequer law, was formulated in the second half of the 19th century and has since not seen major changes. This reflects the reality of the 19th century, when notes were used only in a relatively narrow circle of people who mostly knew each other directly or through common acquaintances. Today, the use of notes, other than those used in business relations, has also been extended to the use of blank notes by various non-bank persons, often dubious or fraudulent, when blank notes are used to obtain various unjustified or fraudulent profits and courts with their overstretched formality help them to do so.

7. In line with this general context, the appellant contends that the remitant and the plaintiff proceed in agreement and insufficiently to the notes - that is to say, the notes, where the appellant is mentioned as the debtor - were only made to avoid causal objections or to avoid paying taxes (which is why it appears to have transferred the bills to the Cypriot company).

8. The appellant considers that courts should decide impartially and not to defend the interests of the holders of securities, especially in the case of the plainly immoral, possibly even intentionally fraudulent conduct of the plaintiff and his legal predecessor. This is evidenced by the applicant's practice in the appellant's case. The delegate has never claimed to pay a contractual fine or any other claim. It did not even have any payable claim against the appellant and was therefore not entitled to supplement the security bill. Yet he added a blank note to the prosecutor. No one had informed the appellant of this fact, the note had not even been submitted to her at maturity, so she had no idea of its existence. In this situation, the applicant then brought an action and the court issued an exchange order for payment. While the applicant had several years to prepare the application and the whole procedure, the appellant has three days to oppose the exchange order; the court does not take account of the objections submitted later. Since the appellant did not sign the blank note in question, she did not know what it was about, and within three days she had to state everything she objected to the exchange order. This undoubtedly violates the equality of parties in the proceedings. Therefore, in its view, it is necessary to abolish § 175 ° S. and the exchange procedure subject to the general procedure in order to enable the defendant to properly oppose the application of the exchange claim.

9. In addition to the arguments relating to the principle of exchange proceedings - as has just been outlined in their management lines - the appellant (the complainant) still criticises the general courts for burdening it with the burden of proof on the authenticity of the signature on the exchange notes and that the letter expert's assessment on which they were based in the proceedings was of poor quality (the complainant in the constitutional complaint, for example, analyses in detail whether the expert's examination of comparable signatures was typical or not).

10. Therefore, for all the above reasons, the appellant proposes to issue to the Constitutional Court a finding which repeals the judgment of the Supreme Court in Prague of 11 November 2010 No 5 Cmo 270 / 2010-112 and also proposes, within the meaning of Sections 64 and 74 of Law No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as "the Law on the Constitutional Court '), a finding which repeals the provisions of Section 175 CS.

11. By order of 2 May 2012 No IV of the ÚS 376 / 11-23, the Fourth Chamber of the Constitutional Court came to the conclusion that, by applying Paragraph 175 (1) CS, in the words "within three days" and in the words "within the same time limit," the applicant's application for annulment of the contested provision, or only part thereof, had been brought to the decision of the full Constitutional Court pursuant to Article 87 (1) (a) of the Constitution.

12. The Constitutional Court requested file documentation and invited the parties to comment on the application for annulment of the contested provision.

13. From the requested file material of the Regional Court in Ústí nad Labem - branches in Liberec registered under sp. zn. 37 Cm 419 / 2009 he found that, with the exchange order No. 32 Cm 76 / 2009-14 of 25 February 2009, the District Court in Ostrava ordered the appellant to pay the claimants the exchange money of CZK 30 751 together with the six percentage annual interest from 9 April 2008 until payment, the exchange fee of CZK 103 and the reimbursement of costs of CZK 16 880,50.

14. The appellant raised timely objections to the exchange order in question (these objections were raised by the appellant itself, without the assistance of the lawyer). She stated that she never filled out or signed a bill of exchange for an amount of CZK 30 751. According to the appellant, that note is a fraud for the sake of a false signature. The appellant did not dispute the conclusion of the loan agreement with FAST Finance, s. r. o., but without any signature of the submitted blank note. He's still paying off the loan. As part of the objections, the appellant also requested that proceedings in the case be referred to the local competent court in Liberec because of its permanent residence in V..

15. By order of the Supreme Court No 4 Nd 305 / 2009-34 of 18 September 2009, the present case was ordered to discuss and decide the Regional Court in Ústí nad Labem - a branch in Liberec.

16. The Regional Court in Ústí nad Labem - a branch in Liberec decided by its judgment of 17 June 2010 No. 37 Cm 419 / 2009-84 by abolishing the exchange order of the Regional Court in Ostrava No 32 Cm 76 / 2009-14 of 25.2.2009 (operative part I). The applicant also undertook to pay the appellant within three days of the legal power of this judgment the costs of the opposition proceedings of CZK 23 445.80 to the hand of JUDr. J. B., the lawyer (operative part II). Finally, he stated that the claimant was obliged to pay within three days of the legal power of this judgment to the Czech Republic - Regional Court in Ústí nad Labem to pay the costs of the proceedings of CZK 2,870 (operative part III).

17. On the point itself, the Regional Court in Ústí nad Labem - a branch in Liberec, in its extensive reasoning, stated in particular that, according to the conclusions of the expert's opinion, the contested signature on the original of the note in question is most likely the author's signature. However, he found the appellant's objection to the authenticity of the signature of the bill to be justified. According to the Court, a categorical conclusion can be made beyond doubt whether or not the signature examined is a genuine, spontaneous signature of a person. In the present case, the expert did not make a categorical conclusion according to the Regional Court, despite the fact that he had found sufficient quality comparative material in his assessment.

18. Therefore, the Regional Court concluded that it had not been established in the proceedings that the signature on the exchange, in the contention raised by the plea of iniquity, of the signature of the bill questioning the authenticity and veracity of the bill as a private instrument, was certainly the true signature of the appellant. In this situation, the Court of First Instance found the appellant's objection to be entirely justified and, in view of that fact, the contested exchange order was fully annulled by the provisions of Paragraph 175 (4) EC.

19. If, according to the Regional Court, the appellant further referred in its objections to the fact that it had concluded with FAST Finance, s. r. o., a non-specified loan agreement without any signing of the submitted blank note, the Court considered such an objection to be vague and inconclusive, since, according to the Regional Court, the argument was not clear at all with the letter of intent. In this situation, when the defendant contested the authenticity of the signature on the submitted currency, it is clear from the rest of the objections that it did not in fact assert the specific function of the bill (whether payment or hedging) to a possible non-specified loan agreement concluded with Fast Finance, s. r. o., an entity which is also different from the applicant, neither did it claim nor specified the content of the causal relationship. Thus, the Regional Court considered the objection so conceived to be completely indefinite and indefinite, since it is not clear from that objection, according to the Court, what should be the subject of such an objection at all. For the sake of completeness, the Regional Court also stated in its decision that if further objections were raised in the context of the oral hearing of the appellant in the case on 10 December 2009, the Regional Court did not take into account those objections in the light of the provisions of Paragraph 175 (4) EC, since those objections were raised after the expiry of the legal three-day period of opposition.

20. In order to dismiss the applicant, the Supreme Court in Prague decided by its judgment of 11 November 2010 No 5 Cmo 270 / 2010-112 by amending the first-degree judgment when the exchange order of the Regional Court in Ostrava No 32 Cm 76 / 2009-14 of 25 February 2009 was left in force (operative part I). By Decree II, the appellant ordered the applicant to pay the claimant for the costs of the proceedings before the courts of the two stages of the proceedings of CZK 17 380 within three days of the legal power of this judgment to the hands of the applicant's legal representative. By Decree III, the appellant finally undertook to pay the Czech Republic, Regional Court in Ústí nad Labem - a branch in Liberec to pay the costs of the proceedings of CZK 2,870 within three days of the legal power of this judgment.

21. According to the Supreme Court - at least as it is based on the grounds of his decision - it can certainly be categorically stated whether or not the signature on the exchange is genuine. However, categorical conclusions regarding the authenticity of the signature are practically absent from renowned experts, according to the Supreme Court. The Regional Court clearly did not come out of the opinion it referred to as a whole. First of all, the assessment of the Court of First Instance can be ruled out that the expert's own assessment is consistent on the one hand, and the expert, according to the Regional Court, logically and convincingly justified his conclusion, but on the other hand, the Regional Court did not consider the expert's assessment to be conclusive, although there was only a slight degree of improbability of the appellant's signature. The Court of Appeal therefore does not share the view of the Court of First Instance that the defendant (the appellant), raised by the objection to the injustice of the signature, has defended the obligations imposed on it by the exchange order, since the signature on the currency is with a high degree of probability its signature. However, as regards the appellants' other objections, they were correctly assessed by the Regional Court as indeterminate or late, as a result of which they were innegotiable and incompetent to reverse the obligation to comply with the exchange order.

22. The Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, as a party to the proceedings in its observations on the proposal, took note in particular of the complainant's proposal. He also stated that, although the proposal formally requests the annulment of the entire section of § 175 o. s., the content of the submission shows that, according to the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, the constitutional dispute should be particularly the three-day period for the submission of objections to the exchange order. In addition, the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic pointed out in particular that none of the amendments concerning the provision in question [i.e. Act No. 519 / 1991 Coll. (effective as of 1 January 1992), Act No. 238 / 1995 Coll., Act No. 30 / 2000 Coll. and Act No. 7 / 2009 Coll.] sought a conceptual change in the regulation of the exchange (check) order. However, on 18 May 2012, the Government of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic submitted a draft law amending the Civil Code and certain other laws (House Press Number 686, the first reading of the draft law is placed on the agenda of the 40th session of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic starting on 5 June 2012), whereby the word "three" in the sense of the current version of § 175 (1) CS is replaced by the number "8", with the three calendar days' being too short - debtors cannot respond adequately to the currency (check) order issued. At the same time, the President of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic has given his assent to the abandonment of oral proceedings within the meaning of Section 44 (2) of the Constitutional Court Act.

23. The Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, as a party to the proceedings in its observations on the proposal, merely summarised the legislative process from which the amendments affecting § 175 o. s. In this situation, it is therefore impossible, according to the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, to express the opinion that the legislature was convinced of the compliance of the amended laws with the Constitution and the legal order of the Czech Republic. The assessment of the constitutionality of § 175 o. s. In conclusion, the President of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic gave his assent for the Chamber of Deputies to the abandonment of oral proceedings within the meaning of Section 44 (2) of the Constitutional Court Act.

24. In its reply to the observations of the parties, the appellant stated, in particular, that § 175 o. s., is applicable (except for a three-day period) to the "classic note." In the case of blank bills, the appellant finds the situation different in that the defendants often do not know why the bill was supplemented (if they even know it exists). Therefore, in the case of blank notes, it is not only the three-day period, according to the appellant, but also the concentration of the proceedings laid down in paragraphs 1 and 4 of the statutory provision under consideration; The defendant does not know anything about the currency and is to state in three days what he objects to the exchange order. For this reason, the appellant insists that the Constitutional Court annul the entire section of Paragraph 175 CS.

25. Since the oral hearing of the Constitutional Court in accordance with Article 44 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court has waived since it concluded that further clarification of the case could not be expected of it, and the parties to the proceedings had given their assent to the termination of the oral hearing.

26. The appellant seeks the annulment of Paragraph 175 CS, as amended. Paragraph 175.

"(1) Where the applicant submits in the original of a note or a check, the authenticity of which is not a reason to doubt and the other documents necessary for the exercise of the right, the court shall, on his application, issue an exchange (cheque) order requiring the defendant to pay, within three days, the amount and costs requested or to submit, within the same period, objections in which he must state whatever he objects to the order. The exchange (check) payment order must be delivered to the defendant's own hands. If the application for a payment order cannot be complied with, the court shall order the hearing.

(2) Paragraph 174 (4) shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(3) If the defendant does not object in good time or if he is returned, the conversion order shall have the effect of a final judgment. Any late objection or objection which does not contain a statement of reasons shall be rejected by the court. The opposition lodged shall also be rejected by the court if the defendant is not entitled to submit the opposition.

(4) If the defendant objects in good time, the court shall order them to be heard; However, objections raised later cannot be taken into account. In the judgment, the court shall state whether the exchange (check) order remains in force or if it is revoked and to what extent.

(5) If the defendant removes the opposition, the court shall stop the opposition proceedings by order; the negotiations need not be ordered.

(6) The appeal against the statement on costs alone shall be appeal. '

The following is to be noted:

27. It is clear from the recap of both the complainant's proposal (appellant) and the course of the proceedings before the General Courts that the operative part of this decision is the note or its procedural and substantive regulation. However, from the point of view of both historical and legislative terms, the bill - the regulation in the legal order of the Czech Republic in this regard is not an exception - is accompanied by a check, although its use is at present much less frequent and, moreover, somewhat narrower; the check is essentially used only as a means of payment. In spite of the above - even in the light of the dictation by the full court of the Constitutional Court of the statutory provision under review - this decision also affects (at least formally) the check. This is reflected in the overall concept of this decision, which is argued against the currency and its adjustment - it would not, moreover, be correct, even in the light of the application practice, to apply the Constitutional Court's conclusions made in this decision without further examination - however, the consequences of the Constitutional Court's reasoning have a reasonable impact on the adjustment of the check law, although this will not always be appriorously emphasised. The legislative solution chosen by the legislature is the parties to the possibility of a complete separation of both securities somewhat limiting.

28. As mentioned above, the appellant submitted an application for annulment of the provision cited together with a constitutional complaint pursuant to § 72 et seq. of the Constitutional Court Act. It is therefore based on the provisions of § 64 (1) (e) and § 74 of the Constitutional Court Act. In accordance with those provisions, the Constitutional Court had therefore first to examine whether the conditions for bringing such an application in the case of the complainant (s) were met. The appellant explicitly states in the constitutional complaint that, on the basis of the constitutional non-conformity of the provisions of § 175 CS, "While the plaintiff had several years to prepare the action, the defendant [understand the appellant - the Constitutional Court - noted] has three days to oppose the exchange order, and the court does not take account of the subsequent objections. Since the defendant did not sign the bill of lading in question, she did not know what it was about, and within three days she had to state everything she objected to the exchange order. This undoubtedly violates the equality of parties in the proceedings. Therefore, in my view, it is necessary to abolish Section 175 of the ADR and to make the exchange procedure subject to the general procedure so that the defendant can properly defend himself against the application of the exchange claim... If someone borrows an amount of [about 10,000 crowns], he may not even have sufficient legal knowledge of his lawyer, and, upon delivery of the exchange order, he has [three] days to [get an attorney] and at the same time to [get] several [thousand crowns as a deposit]." In the constitutional complaint of the contested decision (this is, of course, a constitutional complaint registered by the Constitutional Court under point IV of the ÚS 376 / 11), the relevant part of the statement of reasons states, inter alia: "The Court of Appeal does not therefore share the view of the Court of First Instance that the defendant, by objecting to the injustice of the signature, has resisted the obligations imposed on him by the exchange order. Otherwise, as regards the other claims of objection, the Court of First Instance correctly considered such claims as vague, possibly late, and as such, as a result innegotiable, ineligible to reverse the obligation to comply with the exchange order. 'The Supreme Court therefore follows the judgment of the Regional Court in Ústí nad Labem - a branch in Liberec, where the defendant, inter alia, stated in his decision:" If the defendant further referred to the fact that it entered into a non-specific loan agreement with FAST Finance, s. r. o., in its objections, without any signing of the submitted blank note, the Court considers such an objection to be indeterminate and innegotiable, when there is no clear argument with the exchange submitted. In a situation in which the defendant contested the authenticity of the signature on the currency submitted, it is clear from the rest of the objection that it does not in fact assert the specific function of the bill (whether payment or hedging) to a possible non-specified loan agreement concluded with Fast Finance, s. r. o., an entity which is also different from the applicant, and neither does it claim nor specify the content of the causal relationship. Thus, the Court considers the objection so designed to be completely indefinite and innegotiable, since it is not clear from the objection what should be the subject of such an objection.' In this connection, when the two courts speak of the defendant's objections - the appellants, they refer to the objections which the appellant (then legally not yet represented) sent to the Regional Court, responding to the lessons contained in the Regional Court's exchange order of 25 February 2009 No 32 Cm 76 / 2009-14. In particular, the appellant stated in them: "The defendant never filled out or signed on 18 December 2001 in the Dolní Pěstevy Blankobek on the exchange amount of CZK 30 751, whose very poor copy was sent to the defendant as an annex to the exchange order. The blank note submitted to the court is a fraud because it is a blank [o] shift in the overall falsified, not only because of a false signature, which I definitely deny... The defendant does not deny having concluded a loan agreement with FAST Finance, s. r. o., Hradec 9 / 768, Prague 1, without any signature of the above-mentioned blank note. In the annex, I send copies of postal vouchers to the court to prove that I repay the loan in question. '

29. According to settled case-law and literature (cf. for all Wagner, E. et al. Law on the Constitutional Court with commentary. Praha: ASPI 2007, p. 367 et seq., i Šiměl, V. Constitutional complaint. 3. Praha: Linde, 2005, p. 230 et seq., with the caselaw referred to therein), the appellant may propose only such a provision (its individual provision) to be repealed, the application of which resulted in a constitutional complaint, i.e. on the basis of which the contested decision of the public authority was issued. This condition is fulfilled in the view of the Constitutional Court, since, as is apparent from the quotations just made and from the nature of the proceedings before the general courts on which the contested decision arose, the provision of the law in question has been applied in the case and, according to the Constitutional Court's belief, its application is capable of intervening in the right to a fair trial - as has been done in the case of the appellant - for reasons which the appellant itself explicitly points out in the constitutional complaint and which will be discussed below.

30. In addition to the above, the Constitutional Court refers in this context to its own caselaw [cf. mutatis mutandis, for example the finding of the Constitutional Court sp. zn. II. ÚS 3168 / 09 of 5.8.2010 (N 158 / 58 SbNU 345)], according to which justice must always be present in the process of interpreting and applying the law. This is true even though the ideas of justice are owned only by a man as a psychophysical, historical and social phenomenon, and only a man with regard to the complexity of his consciousness and historical continuity can construct, question or even gradually implement it. Nor does this change the fact that the ideas of justice have been used many times for the greatest crimes. If human history and social development had dominated the idea of identifying justice with destruction, the whole of human society would have fallen apart long ago. It can therefore be concluded that, although it is certainly not possible to define what is fair and what is not, the starting point is perhaps a gradual analysis confronted with the historical and social awareness already mentioned. Vladimir Cermak in such considerations, paraphrased [cf. Cermak, V. The question of democracy. 4) Values, standards and institutions. 1. Olomouc: Olomouc Publishing, 1998, p. 156- 157 (248 pp.)], for example, concludes that "[z] and the evident date of justice [can generally be considered as the principle of non-mine leader... '.

31. In the view of the Constitutional Court, these grounds must also be reflected in the assessment of the author's own active legitimacy. As can be seen from the above-mentioned recap, the expressly objected contradiction of the contested legal provision with the principle of equality of participants depends, in particular, on the three-day period (see also below). This conclusion also follows from the appellant's reply to the parties' comments, even though the principle of concentration as set out in paragraphs 1 and 4 of the contested provision is formally suspended, in particular in the context of the Blancoexchange. However, it does so in a way that, contrary to the principle of forcing the borrower to state everything that he objects to the order for payment, he again takes the view of the time limit - compare the appellant's dictator: "[While] in the case of a normal [exchange debtors] note, the position is different with the blank note. According to the [Exchange and Checkout Act], the remitent or his legal successor should properly submit the bill on due payment, but the practice is that the holder of the bill submits a flat-rate exchange claim and that practice is accepted by the courts by the application of the bill applied by the holder of the bill to be paid by way of an exchange claim. However, the defendant is in an unequal position by this procedure. [The defendants often do not know] the reason for the addition, the sum of the currency and the maturity of the bill. And in [three] days [they are to] lodge objections in which they must state everything they object to the order for payment, since] the objections submitted subsequently cannot be taken into account. 'The appellant contests, even though it was at least formally able to apply the objections in a timely manner, even if one of these objections was, according to the Court's assessment, in the proceedings for the maintenance of the exchange order in force (that is, the objection to the inequity of the appellant's signature on the currency in question). Thus, the Constitutional Court considered whether, even in this situation, the appellant could import the inconstitutionality of § 175 o. It concluded that it could import it. The opposite conclusion would not be sustainable for its overstretched formalism. It would mean that the appellant would be in a more procedural position if it had not even tried to comply with the requirements of § 175 CS. However, according to the Constitutional Court, such an approach would not only have dealt with the absurdity of the deluge circle of Title XXII of Joseph Heller, when also, strictly speaking, a constitutional complaint could be considered inadmissible under Paragraph 75 of the Constitutional Court Act, if it was not considered to be a" playful dispute, "or a" collusive case "- cf. 2., opl. Brno: Masaryk University, 2001, p. 391-392 (458 s.). Finally, such an approach, as a result, would mean limiting the control of standards itself; in the interests of the present case [i.e. not in the context of the abstract control of constitutionality under the provisions of § 64 (1) (a) and (b) of the Law on the Constitutional Court], the inconstitutionality of the period in question could, in addition to the competent Senate of the Constitutional Court in the context of the decision on a constitutional complaint, only the court should issue, for example, an exchange order for payment and instead act in accordance with Article 95 (2) of the Constitution. However, such a restriction on the possibility of initiating a constitutional review of the standards by the Constitutional Court, according to the Constitutional Court, does not support it either in the Constitutional Court Act or in the constitutional order of the Czech Republic, and it would be seen especially from the point of view of the author herself as Vladimir Čermák's obvious contradiction with justice. Therefore, if the Constitutional Court acceded to this restrictive interpretation, it would be far removed from the generally accepted legal ideas and found itself on the threshold of the life-stolen ivory tower.

32. The Constitutional Court also examined, in accordance with Article 68 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, whether the law (its individual provision), with which the appellant objects to the unconstitutionality of its provisions, was adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution laid down by competence and by a constitutional procedure. However, the contested provision was part of the original version of the 1963 Civil Code. The assessment of the legislative process in relation to the original version of the law would therefore mean assessing compliance with the constitutional provisions already in force at the time the law was adopted. It is based on Paragraph 66 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, according to which an inadmissible application is made if the constitutional law with which the contested regulation is in conflict, according to the proposal, has expired before the application of the Constitutional Court, so the Constitutional Court states that, in the case of legislation issued prior to the entry into force of the Constitution on 1 January 1993, it is entitled to review only their content compliance with the existing constitutional order, but not the constitutionality of the procedure of their formation and observance of the standard of competence [cf.]. For this reason, the Constitutional Court considered the procedure only in relation to amendments amending the original provision, namely Act No. 238 / 1995 Coll., Act No. 30 / 2000 Coll. and Act No. 7 / 2009 Coll. From the relevant Parliament's press releases and data on the voting process, he found that the amendments amending the contested § 175 CS have been adopted in accordance with the criteria laid down in Article 39 (1) and (2) of the Constitution, duly signed by the relevant constitutional authorities and published in the Collection of Laws; they have therefore been issued by the Constitution in the prescribed manner and within the limits of the Constitution laid down by competence.

33. The Constitutional Court dealt with the alleged contradiction of the contested provision with the principle of equality of participants within the meaning of Article 37 (3) of the Charter, which as such is part of the right to a fair trial. It has been established that the principle of equality of parties is enshrined in Article 96 (1) of the Constitution and is declared a subjective right in Article 37 (3) of the Charter. It is one of the fundamental principles that court proceedings must be characterised by. It expresses the fact that the parties to the proceedings (s) must be brought before a court of equal standing without any advantage from either party. The law must therefore ensure that all parties to the dispute have equal opportunities to exercise their rights; It must give all participants the opportunity to act in a real and effective manner in court proceedings, in particular to comment on the claims of the opposing party, as well as to make evidentiary proposals and so on (cf. Adequate finding of the Constitutional Court of 16 June 2011 sp. zn. III. ÚS 3379 / 10, available at http: / / nalus.ujud.cz). In fact, their subjective right to equal status in the context of legal proceedings is being realised through the uninterrupted implementation of procedural authorisations by all parties. If, by the legal standard, the conditions laid down for the implementation of the procedural authorisations of one of the participants are unduly shortened, the participant's fundamental right to a fair trial shall also be infringed.

34. However, even in these terms, the Constitutional Court first took into account that, in view of the constitutionally conformal interpretation of the contested provision, this priority takes precedence over its annulment [see, for example, the finding of plenary of the Constitutional Court of 29.9.2010 sp. zn. ÚS 16 / 08 (N 203 / 58 CollNU 801; 310 / 2010 Coll.)]. This procedure, based on the principle of minimising interference with the activities of other public authorities, was also taken into account by the Constitutional Court in the present case. The appellant, by its proposal within the meaning of Article 74 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, asks for the annulment of "Paragraph 175 of the Rules of Procedure [and the subordination] of the exchange procedure... of the general procedure so that the defendant can properly defend himself from the application of the exchange claim '. The protection of constitutionality - precisely because it is existentially linked, inter alia, to the minimisation of intervention - also addresses the interference itself (if no constitutional conformance is possible) whether the decision of the public authorities or the law (its individual provision) strictly [cf., for example, the finding of the Constitutional Court of 9 February 2011 sp. zn. IV. ÚS 1521 / 10 (N 15 / 60 SbNU 153) or the finding of the Constitutional Court of 8 October 1996 sp. pl. ÚS 5 / 96 (N 98 / 6 SbNU 203; 286 / 1996 Sb.)]. Therefore, the Constitutional Court had to consider whether this was a cited provision of the civil Code en bloc, which makes it impossible - that is, if at all and if so, why - to defend its rights to the foreign exchange debtor. In that regard, it could not respect the specific nature of the note and the exchange procedure, which, as far as possible (at least under existing rules), takes into account the characteristics of the note as a security - its circular nature. Its easy transferability represents one of its most typical (and also sought-after) properties (cf. For all this, for example Kovařík, Z. To prove the authenticity of the signature of the bill. Legal outlooks, 2010, No 8, p. 267- 272). After all, this property, together with its liquidity, stood at the very origin of the notes [cf. Kovarík, Z. The note and check in the Czech Republic. 6. Rework and supplement. Praha: C. H. Beck, 2011. p. 1 et seq. (642 pp.)]; thus, without the need to submit a more detailed historical analysis, it would not be appropriate, according to the Constitutional Court, to submit notes to a general civil procedure, since this would make this security a" debt note. "Moreover, the appellant does not elaborate its constitutional argument in this respect (even in its reply to the parties' observations). On the contrary, according to the Constitutional Court, the constitutional complaint can be interpreted in this context as (indeed the reply and the findings made from the file material of the Regional Court in Ústí nad Labem - the branch in Liberec sp. zn. 37 Cm. 419 / 2009 - cf. above - suggest) that the fact which led to the appellant's infringement of the fundamental right to a fair trial (or to participate in it) is the appellant's three-day period within the meaning of Article 175 (1) (c) of the Act of Appeal. In this context, according to the Constitutional Court, it follows from the above-mentioned parts of the reasoning of the judgments that the appellant sought to object in its objections to the absence of a claim in the context of a causal defence. However, the Regional Court stated in its observations that" [the defendant] pointed out in its objections the fact that it had concluded with FAST Finance, s. r. o., a more unspecified loan agreement without any signing of the submitted blank note, [but such a statement of objection] was considered by the Court to be indefinite and innegotiable when the argument in question did not show any clear controversy with the said note. 'With this assessment - that is to say, the objections are late and uncertain - the Supreme Court fully identified itself in its constitutional complaint of the contested decision: "The Court of Appeal therefore does not share the view of the Court of First Instance that the defendant, by objecting to the injustice of the signature, resisted the obligations imposed on him by the exchange order. In other words, [but] as regards the other contention claims, the Court of First Instance correctly considered such claims as vague, possibly late, and as such, as a result innegotiable, incompetent to reverse the obligation to comply with the exchange order." The fact described above raises the question - and the appellant specifically points out this in both the constitutional complaint and in the reply (cf. Her claim that she did not know what was going on at all, and in three days she had to state everything against the exchange order) - whether, in a situation where the exchange does not function only as an institution used by professionals, but instead is used in circumstances where, in particular, the foreign exchange debtor is a natural person who has not entered into the exchange relationship with the intention of professional or business, the three-day period is appropriate.

35. The Constitutional Court has dealt with the issue of time limits and their connection to constitutional guarantees repeatedly, including in the framework of procedures for the repeal of laws and other legislation; In this context, it should be recalled that it is the task of the Constitutional Court in this type of procedure to assess the constitutionality of the contested legislation or its defined parts, to assess whether the contested provisions can be interpreted and applied in a constitutional manner.

36. Therefore, as was apparent from the preceding parts of this reasoning, the Constitutional Court is faced with the task of assessing whether the three-day period gives the foreign exchange borrower, whatever his position in a particular exchange relationship, a real possibility for him to raise qualified objections - particularly in the light of the specificities of the exchange procedure, i.e. to state everything he objects to the order for payment. In order to answer this question, the Constitutional Court first of all considers that the purpose and purpose of the existence of a legal institution must be based on the deadline. In addition, the Constitutional Court has already stated that "[its purpose] is to reduce entropy (uncertainty) in the exercise of rights or powers, the timelimit of the state of uncertainty in legal relations (which in particular plays an important role in proving disputes), to speed up the decision-making process with a view to realising the intended objectives. These reasons led to the introduction of deadlines a thousand years ago" [cf. the Constitutional Court's finding of 17.12.1997 sp. zn. ÚS 33 / 97 (N 163 / 9 SbNU 399; 30 / 1998 Coll.)]. The scope of the constitutional review of the legal provisions which lay down the time limits was then defined by the Constitutional Court in the decision of the First Chamber of 6 June 2001 (N 84 / 22 of the SbNU 205; 279 / 2001 Coll.), where it stated that, in the context of the constitutional check, "it can only interfere with non-constitutional provisions or parts thereof, but it is not its task to reparate the consequences which occurred by the appellant not exercising its right within the prescribed period. The abolition of time limits violates the rule of law because it significantly interferes with the principle of legal certainty, which is one of the fundamental essentials of the current democratic legal systems. The deadline itself cannot be unconstitutional [according to the Constitutional Court]. However, it may appear this way in the light of specific circumstances. 'The non-constitutionality of the deadline can only be established in a dialogue with the specific circumstances of the case under assessment [cf. the finding of the Constitutional Court of 13.12.2005 sp. zn. ÚS 6 / 05 (N 226 / 39 CollNU 389; 531 / 2005 Coll.)]. The following circumstances under the Constitutional Court are:

1. Inadequacy (proportionality) of the time limit in relation to the time limit for the application of the constitutionally guaranteed right (claim) or, where applicable, the defined time limit for the limitation of subjective right. Here, the Constitutional Court refers to the finding of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 5 / 03 of 9.7.2003 (N 109 / 30 SbNU 499; 211 / 2003 Sb.) of the abolishing provisions of § 3 and 6 of Act No. 290 / 2002 Coll., on the transition of certain other items, rights and obligations of the Czech Republic to regions and municipalities, civil associations active in the field of physical and sports and on the related changes and the amendment of Act No. 157 / 2000 Coll., on the transition of certain items, rights and obligations from the property of the Czech Republic, as amended by Act No. 10 / 2001 Coll., and Act No. 20 / 1966 Coll., on the care of the property acquired by them, which constituted an undue restriction of property law pursuant to Article 11 of the Charter, as prohibited by Article 4 (4) of the Charter - in the present case was concerned by the law of the law of the law on the law on the law of the use of the land. At that time, the Constitutional Conformist Court considered, in the relevant context, a rule which would only impose such a restriction to the extent strictly necessary, but not a period of ten years.

2. Self-legislator when setting a deadline (its anchoring or cancellation). In this respect, the Court of First Instance referred to the Constitutional Court in Case SA.P.ÚS 2 / 02 - the finding of 9.3.2004 (N 35 / 32 SbNU 331; 278 / 2004 Sb.), in which it referred to the annulment of the provisions of the Civil Code cited therein, by which the legislator intervened in the legitimate expectation of a precisely defined circle of entities only one day before the expiry of the period in which the acquisition of property would take place.

3. The constitutionally unacceptable inequality of two groups of entities resulting from the abolition of a certain legal condition for the exercise of the right for its unconstitutionality, with this abolition for the group of entities concerned as a result of the expiry of the time limits, as a result of the expiry of the time limits, no longer opens up the exercise of the right without further possibility - in addition to the additional removal of permanent residence for the application of the restitution entitlements and the related adjustment of the time limits: the finding of point 3 / 94 of 12.7.1994 (N 38 / 1 SbNU 279; 164 / 1994 Coll.)

37. Consequently, following these earlier arguments, which are still applicable now, the Constitutional Court notes that the period in question as such cannot be unconstitutional. It is up to the legislator to decide whether and what time limit it provides for the implementation of the law. This is not even disputed. However, even the length of the deadline cannot, in itself, constitute a ground for its annulment, according to the Constitutional Court. The conclusion on its (not) constitutionality can only be reached after an assessment of other contextual circumstances.

38. In line with the above considerations, the Constitutional Court therefore considered whether the three-day period was disproportionate, whether it constituted an unjustified inequality for several groups of entities and whether the legislator had set it arbitrarily. This, in the context of the appellant's constitutional argument, can already be concentrated in the assertion that the institutability of the bill and the exchange procedure is used entirely inappropriately (or abused) in cases of consumer relations (in particular, where there are economic operators providing funding to people in a difficult situation); In particular, consumers (cf.

39. The exchange proceedings and bills have their predecessor in Roman abstract contracts which gave the creditor the advantage of the strict law regime - strict iuris. This procedural regime did not allow the judge to take account of the circumstances and only examined the formal correctness of the contract concluded. It is therefore possible to refer also to the partial (general) statement of Zdeněk Kovařík [Kovařík, Z. 6. rework. Praha: C. H. Beck, 2011, p. 1 et seq. (642 pp.)], that the documents certifying the debt of the exhibitor have its origin in ancient times, although the author of the historical exchange exchange exchange course has been accentuating himself especially the Crusades' wars and the trade-related events, which, according to him, were at the birth of the bills - the charter's properties settled among traders since the 12th century. The specifics and characteristics associated with them (exchange liabilities are direct, abstract, unconditional, show considerable formal rigour) kept the note to today; This corresponds, moreover, to the current substantive regulation of exchange law in the Czech Republic (i.e. in particular the exchange and chequette law), which is based directly on the unifying Convention on the Single Exchange Act, the so-called Convention on Conflicts of Laws and the Convention on Exchange Fees (i.e. all three documents were signed on 7 June 1930 in Geneva), and the procedural regulation contained in the Civil Code, namely its provisions of § 175 CS, which, since the period of validity of the Civil Code (i.e. from 1 April 1964), has not been subject to more fundamental changes, even to the parties to the relevant period, which is still three days. In the explanatory memorandum 1 to the Exchange and Checkout Act [cf. House Press No. 528, National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1948-1954, the explanatory memorandum - I. General section] says in its opening passages:... "The Czechoslovak Republic is one of the States that signed the conventions. The Soviet Union also acceded to the conventions, which took over Geneva's exchange law already in 1937, and countries of popular democracy such as Poland and Romania. The notes continue to be used in international economic relations as a means of credit, a check as a means of payment. The adoption of the Geneva text facilitates international economic relations by eliminating the possibility of discrepancies arising from differences between national rules. Therefore, even though in our economy, which is used to construct socialism, the bill and the cheque have lost their former meaning in particular by introducing payment without cash, exchange and cheque relations with foreign countries need to be adjusted in the same way as in most foreign countries."

40. In the explanatory report on the Civil Code [cf. House Press No. 147, III. The National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic; 1960-1964, explanatory memorandum, Special section - Part Three (Procedure at first instance), Title Four - Order of Payment)), is found to be laconically in the form of an exchange order: "Since notes and cheques are still being used, particularly in business relations with foreign countries, the syllabus and the institute of exchange and check payment orders also take over with the concentration principle that applies here."

41. From this, in the view of the Constitutional Court - even taking into account the only informative nature of the parliaments [cf. Adequate view of the plenary of the Constitutional Court sp. pl. Pl. ÚSN. 1 / 96 of 21.5.1996 (ST 1 / 9 SbNU 471)] - it can be concluded that the exchange law was seen by the socialist legislator rather as a residue which was used almost exclusively in the field of foreign trade [Ondřej Hruda notes - cf. Three-day period for exchange objections - unusually hard experience. Trade law revue, 2011, No 8, p. 236 (234-238) - that the note was rather suffering from us]. Perhaps therefore, the wording of § 175 o. s.) was adhered to the three-day opposition period, which, for example, was known to Austria-Hungary (cf. § 557 (1) of Law No 113 / 1895), on judicial proceedings in civil matters of law (civil order), as amended by 31.12.1949. In addition, it may also be considered that the three-day period - if the country of the socialist camp understood the bill for overcame - was also a manifestation of a certain antagonism of the then bipolar world. Thus, if the legislature considered that the period in question was sufficient, it could not be regarded as arbitrarily determined, despite the suggested ideological burden; it was based on a historical tradition and its application was mainly foreseen in the activities of power and economic operators of the centrally planned economy.

42. However, while the particularly exchange procedural arrangements have undergone a significant development in the Western economies [cf., for example, the above mentioned comparative study by O. Chruda], the Czech adjustment has not changed. According to the Constitutional Court, the comparison with Austria is particularly beneficial, even given the historical and cultural proximity. The abovementioned civil order of the Court (published in Austria in BGBl, also under No 113 / 1895, in the short term referred to as "ZPO ') was amended in 1979 with the adoption of the Austrian Consumer Protection Act (Konsumentenschutzgesetz BGBl. No 140 / 1979, hereinafter referred to as" KSchG') by extending the deadline to 14 days (the amendment in question remained still in the framework of the ZPO - the current status of § 555 ZPO as amended from 1.8.2010). The extension was made in connection with a broader regulation of the use of notes in consumer relations - in addition to the rectadorian, the Austrian Consumer Protection Act requires that the exchange creditor agrees with the trader within the meaning of KSchG - cf. § 11 of this Act [it must be noted in this context that, for example, Act No 145 / 2010 Coll., on Consumer Credit and on the amendment of certain laws, the consumer protection in relation to the currency must be maintained by the creditor in order to maintain all the rights of the consumer resulting from the contract in which the consumer credit is agreed; On 22 August 2012, the Government of the Czech Republic discussed a draft law amending, inter alia, the arrangements for the use of notes and cheques under Act No. 145 / 2010 Coll.].

43. The path followed by the Austrian legislature is also completely conventional in other European states. J. Kotásek [Kotásek, J. The function of the bill and its use for consumer loans. For example, commercial law, 2002, No 2, p. 24 (20-27)] points out that even the German legislator did not take an indirect route in relation to consumer reflection in exchange relations to direct interference with the exchange law and chose to regulate the notes used by the consumer and the entrepreneur - including the Consumer Credit Act. If the measures referred to in the rules of law of Austria or Germany are compared by the Constitutional Court to those in the Czech Republic, then they must conclude that this is insufficient. According to the Constitutional Court, the opposition period within the meaning of § 175 ° S also contributes to the imbalance between the exchange creditors and the foreign exchange debtors, combined with the considerable rigour of the interpretation of the exchange and cheque laws [cf., for example, Radim Chalupa's sub-remarks concerning, in particular, the limited access of foreign exchange debtors to causal objections; proof of the reasons for the objection of the creditor's conscious behaviour to the detriment of the debtor, etc. - Chalupa, R. Abuse of the security note. Law - Journal of Legal Theory and Practice, 2011, No. 4, p. 19-34]. The three-day opposition period within the meaning of § 175 ° C is unconstitutional in dialogue with other elements of the legislation. Not only is the exchange substantive regulation highly formalised [that is, it requires a considerable expertise that cannot be expected fairly for a person without a legal education, although even many practitioners do not own - cf. Kotásek, J. The function of the bill and its use for consumer loans. Commercial law, 2002, No 2, p. 22-23 (20-27)] but is accompanied by an order procedure which is specific in itself, even compared to other orders. The application of exchange objections does not mean, inter alia, the revocation of the issued exchange order, or the substantive examination of the plea, as if it were not at all [cf., in the details of Kovařík, Z. To prove the authenticity of the signature of the bill. Legal perspective, 2010, No 8, p. 270 (267- 272)]. Thus, in conjunction with the unconditional concentration principle, the Constitutional Court is of the opinion that, in particular, consumers in the position of foreign exchange debtors are subject to legal and impacted pressure, which is not only inadequate, but does not result in the intended purpose - i.e. the speed of exchange proceedings. In fact, if an exchange debtor objects to which the law (or the judge considering it) does not admit the intended relevance and effect by the debtor, the exchange proceedings shall nevertheless be extended. Thus, in the view of the Constitutional Court, the positive legislation contributes to the provocation of a situation where the possibility of objecting within the meaning of § 175 ° S leads, as a result, in many cases only to "delay" the entire procedure without constituting a meaningful means of defence. If the opposition period would be reasonably extended, since the three-day opposition period associated with a very strict procedural procedure is also unique (not only in comparison with Austria) in the wider European context, from the point of view of the foreign exchange creditor, this change, given the speed at which the general courts are able to examine the debtor's objections (whatever the nature of the case), could not have any negative effect. On the contrary, the foreign exchange borrower would have real scope for a specific exchange relationship - and its role in it - to respond adequately.

44. In addition, according to the Constitutional Court, the reasonable extension of the opposition period completely conforms to the above-mentioned principles of the primacy of constitutional interpretation prior to the repeal of the provision of legislation under consideration, or to the principle of minimising the intervention of the Constitutional Court in the activities of other public authorities. If the Constitutional Court, when assessing the constitutionality, accuses the annulment of any other part of the provisions of Section 175 CS, or if it were to abolish all the provisions contained therein, that would give rise to the impartiality of the parties to the functioning of the entire exchange mechanism. In view of the formal nature and specificity of the exchange procedure already mentioned several times, the Constitutional Court also considers that establishing at least a partial procedural balance between the foreign exchange creditor and the debtor would not be possible in a permanent and procedural manner, even with the help of a constitutional interpretation or the support application of the general provisions of the Civil Code relating to the modification of time limits [cf., for example, the restrictive interpretation of the institution of waiving the time limit laid down in § 58 ° s., which is applicable even in the case of the opposition period in question - see also Kovařík, Z. Bulletin of the Advocate General, 2000, No 10, p. 17 (11-21)]. It is then the task of the legislature, not the Constitutional Court, to adjust the draft and exchange procedures in a manner appropriate to the needs of today. It is clear from the above that, according to the Constitutional Court, the establishment of a longer opposition period is only a means of bringing only a partial balance to exchange relations, and a change in the form of an extension of the opposition period should not be seen as a sufficient and definitive solution. On the just mentioned appeal to the legislature of the development of the use of the bill, it is noted that the current substantive and procedural rules (compare, for example, the civil law itself or the aforementioned law on consumer credit and the amendment of certain laws, even in the light of the above proposed amendment) have somewhat forgotten Aristotle's teaching on causality (from lat. causa) seeking the purpose of "everything" [compare Aristotle. Metaphysics. 2. Vyd. Praha: Petr Rezek, 2003, 579 s. s.]. The concept of the law is that of the case, which has become (although often implicitly) one of the fundamental ideas of modern civil codification and which can in some sense also be part of the bill - here the Constitutional Court has in mind the so-called "false accesorita" and "false subsidiarity" where the claim embodied in the hedge note (after all, the word link between the hedge note in a certain sense acts as an oxymoron) exists, regardless of the existence of the secured claim, and the fact that it is partly paraphrased under the Chalupa, R. Guarantee note. Praha: Linde, 2009, p. 49-51 (189 pp.). It is therefore a question of distinguishing between the causal (referring to its economic purpose) and the abstract, when the original purpose of the undertaking is not decisive. The facts relating to the complainant's (appellant's) proposal, which resulted in such proceedings before the Constitutional Court, are, in the view of the Constitutional Court, merely revealing the inadequacy in the whole scope with which the current legislation on exchange relations reflects the ability of the bill to act in its own way with or without the case; Even in the case of the appellant, the note of a clearly hedging nature (i.e. specifically causal) has become an inaccomplishment of the obligation almost (cf. the restriction in Article 17 (1) of the Exchange and Check Act) "abstract '. The way to resolve the suggested conflict is probably not - as is also the case with the suggested international comparison - the restriction of the features of the note that makes it an attractive security, but above all the introduction of effective mechanisms to prevent its abuse (see also below).

45. Thus, if, in the case-law cited above, the Constitutional Court has defined three fundamental aspects on the basis of which it assesses the conformity of the legal term set out by the law - that is, whether the legislator has set it arbitrarily, whether it is not disproportionate and whether it does not favour a group of entities as compared to another party in the exercise of the right as a result of an additional change of terms - then, in accordance with the above-mentioned conclusions, the Constitutional Court considers that the objection period in question has not been set arbitrarily; It was based on the historical continuity consistent with the previous legislation of its origin in the 19th century. Moreover, at the time of the creation of the Civil Code, the bill was used completely marginally compared to today, essentially only by important power and economic entities - so there was no reason to consider inadequacy in a three-day session. However, this does not apply to the current reality of the market economy, where the exchange is also applied among those who are fundamentally not in an equal position and who cannot - without it being fair to expect this from them - perceive the exchange relationship in its entirety and thus reflect any risks arising from it. The newly established reasonable period of time by the legislature will help to mitigate the disproportion described above, at least in procedural terms. Both the foreign exchange creditor and the foreign exchange borrower will have the real opportunity to exercise their rights before the court and thus, even in the case of the foreign exchange borrower, to protect their ownership. In fact, if the Constitutional Court stated in its caselaw that the purpose of the period is to limit entropy, for example, in the application of rights and to reduce uncertainty in legal relations, then, on the other hand, the said limitation on the exercise of rights, for example through the legislature of the prescribed time limit, must not lead to their denial or emptying, in particular, of fundamental rights and freedoms (see Article 4 (4) of the Charter) - in the case at hand, the period under consideration, by virtue of the evolution of social circumstances (contrary to Article 4 (4) of the Charter), it limits the said possibility of exchange debtors to defend their rights before the courts, thereby creating, in exchange relations, an unjustified inequality between exchange-rate debtors and exchange creditors creditors within the meaning of Article 37 (3).

46. As regards the last criterion, the assessment of whether that period does not make it impossible for a group of entities to exercise their right as a result of an additional change in terms of terms and conditions, that question, given the nature of the period under consideration, is out of the question, since that period did not entail any change in terms formally or in fact.

47. Any finding of a Constitutional Court in which the Constitutional Court concludes that the law or its individual provision is contrary to the constitutional order shall include the determination of the date on which the Law or its individual provisions are repealed. If, in the present case, the Constitutional Court were to proceed to the annulment of the period in question on the date of the publication of this finding in the Collection of Laws, there would be a situation in which the exchange (cheques) debtors would not be subject to any time limits in the submission of exchange (cheques) objections, which would constitute a breach of the legal certainty of their creditors and, as a result, the impossibility of implementing any exchange (cheques) relationship. The Constitutional Court has therefore decided - on the basis of the actual legislative and technical possibilities of the legislator, the need to extend the scope of the exchange debtors in particular for the application of adequate defence in the form of exchange objections and the legal certainty of the exchange (cheques) creditors - to proceed with the repeal of Paragraph 175 (1) (b) of the Act in the words "within three days' and" within the same time limit 'of 30 April 2013, even in the light of the above-mentioned draft law (House Press No. 686 - cf. paragraph 22 of this decision) amending the Civil Code and certain other laws. This proposal, as has already been said, foresees, inter alia, that the period in question will be extended from three to eight days. It is in the power of the legislator to put this bill into effect so that the three-day period in question is replaced by a new one.

48. Moreover, the Constitutional Court calls on the legislature to take into account not only the need (albeit primarily) to provide adequate procedural defence (and protection) to foreign exchange debtors, but also to consider the appropriateness of certain consistency and internal consistency of civil proceedings as such. The legislator - or more precisely and more generally, the legislator - should, in the view of the Constitutional Court, look not only at the formal consistency of the legislation it has created with the existing legal order, but should also act in such a way that it is indeed an individual who represents the centre of the existence of a society organised in a democratic rule of law. Therefore, with regard to individuals, whether with or without legal education, the legislator should base its search for an adequate deadline within the meaning of Section 175 CS on the rules of the time limits already in force and on the rules of civil law used and not impose new time limits which are unknown to civil proceedings for any reason. Indeed, the tendency not to impose unnecessary burdens on existing legislation by solutions not yet used is a sign of a culture of legislative technology. In the light of the above considerations, it is not only uninteresting to refer again to the Austrian legislature, which, when recalibrating the Austrian Commercial Code (with effect from 1 January 2007), not only left the content of the legal standard - if it was possible - without any change, but even tried to maintain to the greatest extent possible the scheme of the original legislation [in this respect, it is possible to borrow the philosophical and ethical equation of Josef Čapek from his essay Kulhavý pilgrim, when according to him even the trees - although each one of them is and wants to be individual - he still holds the characteristics of the species; Straighten up the Chapek, J. Smiley Pilgrim: (what I saw in the world). Praha: Dauphin, 1997, p. 64 (152 pp.)].

49. Finally, the Constitutional Court would also like to recap and emphasise - as has already been pointed out - that the appellant herself, although calling for the annulment of § 175 o. s. This can also be inferred from the author's paraphrased reply to the observations of the participants. According to the Constitutional Court, the current version of § 175 o. s. The legislature, through it, embodies a specific type of civil procedure, with some specific features (compared to the other arrangements contained in the civil court order) which are acceptable precisely because of the purpose pursued by it, including in that part of the reply explicitly contested by the concentration of proceedings. In this context, the Constitutional Court recalls, in particular, that even if the court does not accept the issue of an exchange order and the other documents necessary for the exercise of the right, the court shall, on its proposal, issue an exchange order in the first sentence of Paragraph 175 CS.: "If, in the original form, the claimant submits a note or a check, whose authenticity is not in doubt, the concentration of the proceedings shall also be applied in this situation, but according to Article 118b (c) of the Rules of Procedure, the Court shall, in the same way, be the question - and there is again the period under consideration - when. The provisions of Section 175 CS are purely procedural provisions, which, therefore, are completely excluded from the repeated formal rigour of substantive exchange arrangements, cannot take into account the circumstances under which a specific exchange relationship arose. Moreover, if the appellant defines itself explicitly in the context of her reply against the blank exchanges, it does not fully reflect that, at the time of the applicant's application for an exchange order, there is no longer only a currency with the required legal requirements; the fact that it was created, for example, by the gradual addition of an exchange note, may be relevant in the context of the claims of the foreign currency debtor (cf. Article 10 (1) of the Exchange and Checkbook Act), not in the concentration of proceedings itself, whether in the terms of § 175 (s) or under the terms of § 118b (s) (to the concentration of proceedings within the meaning of § 175 (s)) (cf. The Constitutional Court has already stated, for example, in its finding of 26. 3. 2009 sp. The exchange and checkbook laws themselves then require that both the foreign exchange and their own notes contain the term" exchange, "not, for example," blank notes. "It is also not necessary for an application to issue an exchange order to flow from (or from the note itself) why the bill was issued.

50. Therefore, according to the Constitutional Court, no other component of the provision cited (or concentration of proceedings) shows, at least for the time being, signs indicating the need for its annulment by the Constitutional Court.

51. In the previous paragraphs of this finding, the Constitutional Court has made sufficient declarations - in particular on the basis of a reasonable international comparison - that the current tensions associated with the notes are mainly due to their inappropriate use (abuse), in particular to entities for which knowledge of specific and highly rigid exchange arrangements cannot be reasonably required. In this context, the legislative abbreviation "consumer 'may be used to describe them repeatedly and in the legal order used. The Act No. 634 / 1992 Coll., on Consumer Protection, as amended, hereinafter referred to as the Consumer Protection Act, means a natural person not acting in the course of his business or in the context of the independent exercise of his business. Paragraph 1 of the above-mentioned KSchG, when defining the consumer, is based on its negative definition against the counterparty - the entrepreneur. The consumer in the Austrian legal order is therefore defined (or derived) by the entrepreneur, by referring the definition of the consumer to a specific legal relationship between him and the entrepreneur - cf., Rummel, P. (Hrsg.) Kommentar zum Allgemeinen bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch: mit EheG, KSchG, MRG, WGG, WEG 2002, BTVG, HeizKG, IPRG, EVÜ. 2. Band, 4. Teil, 3. Aufl. Wien: Manz, 2002, zjm. KSchG thus states, inter alia, that it concerns legal acts involving, on the one hand, a person in whom the legal act relates to the operation of his business - that is, for consumer protection purposes, an entrepreneur and, on the other hand, an entity for which he is not currently in force (in the words of the law..." jemand, für den dies nicht zutrifft... ") - the consumer. The emphasis on this session is then set out in Section 11 of the KSchG (that is to say, in the provision which provides for the exchange relationship between entrepreneurs and consumers the condition of agreement between the entrepreneur and the foreign creditor and the mandatory clause" not on the series' - see above), not only the impossibility to inhabit such a note, but also the fact that the exchange creditor is the entrepreneur from which the consumer is derived. If the note does not contain the said rectadologist or if the entrepreneur does not agree with the person to be paid (cf. Article 1 (1) (6) and Article 1 (75) (5) of the Exchange and Check Act, respectively), this does not mean that such a bill is null and void, but a regressive claim against the entrepreneur arises to the consumer, with the exception of the KSchG expressly mentioned.

52. In short, this paraphrased Austrian legislation is, according to the Constitutional Court, inspiring not only for the appropriate definition of the consumer (which does not in its essence interfere with its definition in Section 2 of the Consumer Protection Act and can thus serve as an interpretative aid), but also by maintaining the consumer's objections to the full extent and, moreover, maintaining a possible exchange relationship "transparent 'for him, as it is in principle predictable from whom and to whom it will be paid. All of this is done in a way that does not, in principle, limit the parties to its characteristics as a security. The question is then whether, in line with the need to introduce the above mentioned mechanisms to prevent the abuse of drafts, in particular in relation to consumers, the Czech legislator should not choose a similar solution, particularly if the substantive regulation of Austria's exchange law comes from the same Geneva conventions (cited above) as the Czech ones.

53. The Constitutional Court therefore concludes that Article 175 (1) (a) of the Charter in the words "within three days" and "within the same time limit" conflict in particular with Articles 4 (4), 36 (1) and 37 (3) of the Charter, since it unjustifiably limits the possibility for foreign exchange debtors to defend their rights against an impartial and independent court, thereby introducing unacceptable inequality between foreign exchange debtors and foreign exchange creditors. This is why the Constitutional Court decided, pursuant to Paragraph 70 (1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, that this part of the provision is to be repealed with effect from 30 April 2013. In other parts, he rejected the application for annulment of Paragraph 175 of the Civil Code as manifestly unfounded [Paragraph 43 (2) (a), in conjunction with the provision of Paragraph 43 (2) (b) of the Constitutional Court Act].