The Constitutional Court found No. 356 / 2005 Coll.

Paragraph 1 (h) of Act No. 590 / 2004 Coll., on the withdrawal of another salary for the second half of 2004 to representatives of state power and certain state bodies, judges, prosecutors and Members of the European Parliament elected in the Czech Republic, shall be deleted from the date of the publication of this finding in the Collection of Laws.

By a proposal delivered to the Constitutional Court on 2 March 2005, the appellant sought annulment of:

(a) Part of Act No. 427 / 2003 Coll., which provides for an exceptional measure for 2004 to determine the amount of the salary and certain reimbursement of expenses associated with the performance of the duties of representatives of the State and of certain State institutions, Members of the European Parliament, Judges and Prosecutor, the amount of the additional salary of those persons for the first half of 2004 and amending certain related laws, namely in the part concerning one half of the additional salary of the Judge of the District, Regional and Supreme Court, the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court for the second half of 2004 [Paragraph 2 in relation to the provisions of § 1 (h) of Act No. 427 / 2003 Coll.],

(b) Part of Act No. 590 / 2004 Coll., on the withdrawal of another salary for the second half of 2004 to representatives of state power and certain state bodies, judges, prosecutors and Members of the European Parliament elected in the Czech Republic, namely § 1 (h) of this Act.

The Constitutional Court, having examined the terms of the application, found that, in the case of sub (a), the application for annulment of part of Act No. 427 / 2003 Coll., had already been brought before the Constitutional Court under sp. zl. ÚS 43 / 04 (ref. In this part, the Constitutional Court, by order of 14 April 2005 No. Pl. ÚS 9 / 05-9, in addition to the oral hearing, therefore rejected the application of the Municipal Court in Brno, within the meaning of Paragraph 43 (2) (b), in conjunction with § 43 (1) (e) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended ("the Law on the Constitutional Court '), as inadmissible.

The Constitutional Court therefore only addressed in the further proceedings the proposal referred to above sub (b), i.e. the proposal to abolish § 1 (h) of Act No. 590 / 2004 Coll., to withdraw another salary for the second half of 2004 to representatives of state power and some state bodies, judges, prosecutors and MEPs elected in the Czech Republic. This proposal was made by the appellant pursuant to Article 64 (3) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, after having concluded, in the context of his decision-making activities in the case under sp. zn. 34 C 18 / 2005 pursuant to Article 95 (2) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution), that the provisions of Article 1 (h) of Act No 590 / 2004 Coll., to be applied in the resolution of the case, are contrary to Article 1 (1) in conjunction with Article 82 (1) of the Constitution and Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as the Charter).

In Case No 34 C 18 / 2005, the Municipal Court of Brno is decided on an action by a judge of the same court, in which the claimant claims to the Czech Republic - City Court of Brno to pay another salary for the second half of 2004, amounting to CZK 47,000, based on the fulfilment of the conditions of § 4 of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., on the salary and other formalities associated with the performance of the duties of representatives of state authority and certain state bodies and judges, as amended. However, he was not paid another salary for the second half of 2004 in the payout period of 15 January 2005 as a result of the measures taken under Law No 427 / 2003 Coll. and No 590 / 2004 Coll. due to the second half of 2004.

By withdrawing another salary for the second half of 2004, the appellant considered that there had been undue and repeated interference with judicial independence. Law No 427 / 2003 Coll. has resulted in the removal of half of the additional salary due for the first and second half of 2004, 2005 and 2006, with the use of a salary base of the amount obtained in accordance with the special legislation on 31 December 2003 (i.e. "salary freeze ') in those years. According to § 1 (h) of Act No. 590 / 2004 Coll., the judges were subsequently removed another salary (second half) for the second half of 2004.

In this connection, the Municipal Court in Brno also pointed out that there has been no recent isolated interference in judicial independence. He referred as an example to Act No. 420 / 2002 Coll., which shortens the period of time for officials of state power and certain state bodies, judges and prosecutors to be paid in the event of temporary incapacity to perform their duties, and which provides for certain measures in sickness insurance (care) and pension insurance, which significantly shortened the period for which they are paid in the event of temporary incapacity to perform their duties, from the original 6 months for 20 working days, even the Institute considers the provision of full pay in the event of temporary incapacity to be one of the guarantees of the judicial liability. It also identifies as a further limitation of the level of pay of judges the consequences resulting from Act No. 425 / 2002 Coll., which provides for exceptional measures for 2003 to determine the amount of the salary and certain reimbursement of the expenses associated with the performance of the duties of representatives of the State and of certain state authorities, judges and prosecutors, and which determine the level of additional salaries for the first and second half of 2003. Pursuant to Article 1 of the Law, a salary base of 31 December 2002 will be used for determining the salary and other allowances and expenses associated with the performance of the duties in 2003 for the appointed representatives and judges, and the salary base has not increased in that year in view of the change in the regulations on the fees and the personal fee made for the ministerial staff with effect after 31 December 2002. Thus, although, in the normal course of events, the appellant considers that there should have been an increase in the salary of the judge as from 1 January 2003 as a result of a change in the regulations on the fees and the personal surcharge applied to ministerial staff, the ad hoc fee adopted by the law did not take place with the judges. The appellant also referred to the explanatory notes to the above-mentioned laws No 420 / 2002 Coll. and No 425 / 2002 Coll., which imply that the legislator pursued the objective of "maintaining the comparable position of individual groups' of persons, i.e. civil servants, representatives of state authority and judges, with the particular position of judges as regards the level of remuneration that the legislature appeared to be unfair and non-discriminatory. This procedure was described by the Municipal Court in Brno as unconstitutional, contrary to the judge's right to material security, which is one of the guarantees of his judicial independence. It pointed out that the legislator did not at a later stage comply with the requirement to maintain the" comparable position of individual groups' of persons mentioned in those explanatory notes because, inter alia:

- by amending Government Decree No 253 / 1992 Coll., on the pay ratios of employees of public authorities, certain other authorities and municipalities, as amended by Government Decree No 582 / 2002 Coll., with effect from 1 January 2003, there has been an increase in the scale of the salary charges by grade and grade for employees referred to in § 1 (2) of Decree No 253 / 1992 Coll.,

- the amendment of Government Decree No 251 / 1992 Coll., concerning the pay ratios of employees of budgetary and certain other organisations, as amended, by Government Decree No 583 / 2002 Coll., has taken place with effect from 1 January 2003, with effect from 1 January 2003, with an increase in the scale of the rates by grade and grade for employees referred to in Section 1 (2) of Government Decree No 251 / 1992 Coll.,

- amendment of Government Decree No. 79 / 1994 Coll., on the pay ratios of the employees of the armed forces, security bodies and services, customs authorities, members of the Fire Protection Corps and of the employees of certain other organisations (Staff Regulations), as amended, carried out by Government Decree No. 584 / 2002 Coll., with effect from 1 January 2003, there was an increase in the scale of the salary tariffs according to the grades and grades of the employees referred to in § 1 (2) of Decree No. 79 / 1994 Coll.,

- the adoption of Decree No. 330 / 2003 Coll., on the pay ratios of employees in public services and administration, with effect from 1 January 2004, increased the scale of pay tariffs by grade and grade for employees referred to in § 1 (1) of Decree No. 330 / 2003 Coll.

These inadmissible interventions continued in the following period, when, on the basis of Act No. 427 / 2003 Coll., in the then amended version, and Act No. 590 / 2004 Coll. was completely withdrawn from the judges' additional salary for the second half of 2004. The annual income of the judge is therefore not only stagnating, but even decreasing significantly, when in 2001 and 2002 the judge received a total of 14 salaries (12 months and 2 additional salaries), in 2003 it was 13 salaries (12 months and 2 half of two additional salaries) and in 2004 only 12 months and half of the additional salary. According to the appellant, a further salary cannot be regarded as bonuses to a normal monthly income of a judge, as this makes the calendar and payment periods inadmissible. Therefore, even if only one of the other salaries is withdrawn, the judge's statutory annual income is automatically reduced. Thus, the interests of judges are left to the legislature, although the aim of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll. was to establish firm rules for determining the level of salaries (even judges) so that they would not become subject to political calculations.

These measures took place at the time when the legislature was aware of the grounds for the Constitutional Court's finding No. 198 / 2003 Coll. (sp. zn. ÚS 11 / 02), with which the appellants identify themselves. In particular, it pointed out that the Constitutional Court's conclusion that the pay ratios of judges are to be stable in a broad sense, not a variable with which it calculates this or that of a government group, for example, because it appears to it that the fees of judges are too high compared to those of civil servants or to another professional group. Efforts for such equality deviates from the category of constitutionality, a political objective that does not support the constitutionally understood principle of equality. This principle finds, in the material sense, its boundaries in a statement that "the same must not be treated inequally, but at the same time the same must not be treated differently." The principle of equality cannot be understood as a nivulation in the result, but must be interpreted as guaranteeing the same starting chances. However, the principle of equality thus interpreted clearly failed the legislator. Even in this case, the changes in the legal arrangements relating to the pay ratios of judges exceeded the constitutional limits for accepting the "exceptional" act, as defined by the Constitutional Court's finding in sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 16 / 2000, published under No 321 / 2000 Coll., and it was necessary to base itself on the principle of the argument set out by the Constitutional Court in the sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 13 / 99, published under No 233 / 1999 Coll. In this context, the appellant pointed out the conclusion of the decision No. 198 / 2003 Coll., according to which, in very exceptional circumstances, the principle of equality in the field of restrictions on the remuneration of civil servants, constitutional officials and judges may be accentuated to the principle of comprehensively understood independence of judges, but this relationship of both principles does not generally apply once and for all and in all circumstances.

The appellant therefore takes the view that, even in this case, the contested legislation is contrary to Article 1 (1) of the Constitution, in conjunction with Article 82 (1) thereof, which implies the obligation of the State to guarantee both the judges and material independence, as a guarantee of impartial and fair decisions on the rights of persons. It also considers that the contested part of the Act is contrary to Article 1 of the Charter, which sets out equality in rights when it again relied on the opinion of the Constitutional Court, according to which, in the present case, the legislature has adjusted equally the ratios of the unequal professional categories in order to get closer to non-accession in consequence, which is illegitimate.

The Constitutional Court first assessed the fulfilment of the conditions under which it can decide on the application. The application was lodged by a legitimate appellant within the meaning of Paragraph 64 (3) of the Constitutional Court Act. As is apparent from the application, the application is based on the provision to be used in the resolution of the case, which, in the view of the General Court, is contrary to the constitutional order. The condition of Article 95 (2) of the Constitution is therefore fulfilled, as it is necessary for the General Court to apply Article 1 (h) of Act No 590 / 2004 Coll., as the applicant relies on that provision in its application. The proposal also fulfils the condition of Paragraph 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, when the contested provision of Paragraph 1 (h) of Law No 590 / 2004 Coll. has not yet been amended. Similarly, Article 1 (1) of the Constitution and Article 1 of the Charter, which are provisions of the constitutional order with which Article 1 (h) of Law No 590 / 2004 Coll. is to be contrary. Finally, the Constitutional Court found no grounds for the termination of proceedings within the meaning of Section 67 of the Constitutional Court Act.

That is why nothing prevented the Constitutional Court from calling on the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic and the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, as parties to the proceedings, to comment on this proposal under Paragraph 69 (1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court.

In its observations of 31 May 2005, the President of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, PhDr. Lubomír Zaoralek states that judicial independence as a legal institute has limits and cannot be understood absolutely. The judge is not isolated, but he exists within a particular system. A specific modification cannot ignore this system. In the first half of 2004, the austerity measures in the funds spent on the salaries of public service staff and administration made it possible to provide a further salary of not half as much as 10%. Given that representatives of state power and certain state bodies, judges and prosecutors were paid a further salary of 50% for this half-year, the only possible solution to express solidarity with public service and administration employees was to adopt a law which waives the right to an additional salary for officials of state authority, certain state authorities, judges and prosecutors for the second half of 2004. The purpose of the regulation was primarily to express a certain solidarity with public-sector employees and not to attack judicial independence. The President of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic further confirmed that Act No. 590 / 2004 Coll. was adopted after a properly implemented legislative process, signed by the relevant constitutional authorities and declared in the Collection of Laws. The legislature acted in the belief that the law adopted was in accordance with the Constitution, the constitutional order and the rule of law of the Czech Republic, and it is up to the Constitutional Court to examine the constitutionality of the law in the context of the submitted proposal and to give its decision.

The President of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic MUDr. Přemysl Sobotka also commented on the proposal, which briefly explained the course of discussion of the law in question by the Parliament of the Czech Republic. He recalled that together with the draft Act, a draft law was discussed on the amendment of certain laws following the implementation of the reform of public finances in the field of remuneration, the content of which, with effect from 1 January 2005, was to abolish the Institute of additional salaries and similar transactions in relation to all persons to whom such transactions were granted (later Act No. 626 / 2004 Coll., on the amendment of certain laws following the implementation of the reform of public finances in the field of remuneration). The Senate returned the bill to the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic with an amendment (Chamber of Deputies. Fourth term. Press 679 / 4), which should have deleted from the draft law the provision for the withdrawal of additional salary to judges and prosecutors. Of the 60 people present for this amendment, 37 voted and 7 senators opposed. As this is a similar issue as in previous cases of withdrawal of additional salaries from judges, he referred to these proposals. In conclusion, it was for the Constitutional Court to examine and rule on the constitutionality of the contested provision.

Under Paragraph 44 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court may, with the consent of the parties, refrain from oral proceedings if it is not possible to expect further clarification of the case. Since both the participants, the appellant in the submission of 30 June 2005 and the party in the proceedings in the observations of the President of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic of 8 July 2005 and the President of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic of 30 June 2005, have expressed their agreement to abandon the oral hearing and the Constitutional Court considers that further clarification cannot be expected from the hearing, the oral hearing in the present case has been abandoned.

The Constitutional Court, in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 68 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, is required to assess whether the contested law, its individual provision, or any other legislation, or its individual provision, has been adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution laid down by competence and in a constitutional manner. It was found from the Parliament of the Czech Republic that the Chamber of Deputies approved the draft law at its 38th meeting on 23 November 2004, when 46 voted in favour of the draft law approved by the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, 117 of the 184 members voted against. 133 Members voted in favour of the original text of the draft law of the 184 Members present, with no opposition. The law in question was signed by the relevant constitutional authorities and was duly declared under No 590 / 2004 Coll. in 203 Collection of Acts, which was circulated on 29 November 2004, and according to its § 2, it became effective on the date of its publication, i.e. the date of circulation of the relevant amount of the Collection of Acts.

As regards the assessment of the content of § 1 (h) of Act No. 590 / 2004 Coll., in relation to the constitutional order of the Czech Republic and its international obligations, the Constitutional Court concluded that the proposal to repeal this provision was justified. It was led by the following considerations.

The Constitutional Court dealt with the issue of pay restrictions against judges in the form of withdrawal of the "additional salary 'in a number of its decisions. The detailed recap of this case-law is contained in the finding of the Constitutional Court No. 198 / 2003 Coll. [sp. zn. In this context, it should be stressed that:

a) Findings sp. zn. The Constitutional Court annulled part of the provisions of Section 1 of Act No. 268 / 1998 Coll., on the withdrawal of another salary for the second half of 1998 to representatives of state authority and certain state bodies, judges, prosecutors and members of the Securities Commission Presidium, namely the provision governing the withdrawal of another salary from judges for the second half of 1998. The underlying reason for the finding was the principle of judicial independence, in which the court also drew "material aspects." Another argument was the difference between the constitutional status of judges, on the one hand, and legislative and executive officials, in particular government, on the other.

(b) In a negative finding of 3 July 2000 No 320 / 2000 Coll., sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 18 / 99, ECR 19, p. 104 (proposal to abolish part of the provisions of § 4a of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., as amended by Act No. 287 / 1997 Coll., governing the withdrawal of additional salary to judges for the second half of 1997), the Constitutional Court stressed that judicial independence is one of the fundamental democratic values, which is undeniably supported by the material security of judges. In doing so, he considered it essential that other authorities of State power should not interfere in the salaries of judges, in any form, arbitrarily and repeatedly. However, for a decision-making case, the legislator's intervention did not show signs of insolence. According to the Constitutional Court, when assessing the constitutionality of the contested legal provision, it was not possible to look at the difficult social and economic reality in which the Czech Republic was located in 1997.

c) Likewise, on 3 July 2000, the Constitutional Court rejected the application for annulment of part of the provision of Section 1 of Act No. 308 / 1999 Coll., sp. zn. In doing so, it did not change the underlying basis for assessing the problem. He stressed that the salary of judges should not be a variable factor according to the immediate vision of one or the other government group. The withdrawal of the "additional salary 'was therefore regarded as an exceptional act which could only be justified for serious reasons which it considered to have had an impact on the financial difficulties of the State and only in relation to the complex of the austerity measures taken on salaries across the whole sphere of state officials and employees.

(d) On 11 June 2003, the Constitutional Court found no 198 / 2003 Coll., sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 11 / 02, annulled part of the provisions of Section 1 of Act No. 416 / 2001 Coll., on the withdrawal of another salary for the second half of 2001 and the fixing of additional salaries for the first and second half of 2002 by representatives of the State Government and certain state bodies, judges, prosecutors, members of the Securities Commission's presidium, representatives of the Ombudsman and members of the Banking Board of the Czech National Bank, providing for the withdrawal of another salary for the second half of 2001 judges and reducing the additional salary for the first and second half of 2002 to the amount to which they would otherwise be entitled.

In view of the circumstances of the present case, the legal opinion expressed in the finding of sub (d), as also referred to by the appellant, had to be taken as a starting point. This is where the Constitutional Court came to that conclusion on the basis of the assessment of other related legal adjustments. By Act No 425 / 2002 Coll., which provides for an exceptional measure for 2003 to determine the amount of the salary and certain allowances of the expenses associated with the performance of the duties of representatives of the State and of certain state authorities, judges and prosecutors, and to determine the level of additional salaries for the first and second half of 2003, which took effect on 1 October 2002, it was stipulated in Article 1 that a salary base of the amount reached on 31 December 2002 would be used to determine the remuneration and other allowances and expenses associated with the performance of the duties in 2003 for the appointed officials and judges. As a result of the change in the regulations governing the fee charges and the personal surcharge for ministerial staff with effect after 31 December 2002, the salary base did not increase in that year. Paragraph 2 of the Act contains a halving of the additional salary to the same persons due under the special rules for 2003. Paragraph 3 excluded, for the period from 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2003, the application of Article 3 (3) of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., on the salary and other formalities relating to the performance of the duties of representatives of State authority and of certain state bodies and judges, as amended by Act No. 309 / 2002 Coll. In the grounds for finding No 198 / 2003 Coll. (sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 11 / 02) The Constitutional Court referred to the wording of the explanatory notes on the draft of the two above-mentioned laws, which clearly show that the appellant was pursued by an objective of "maintaining the comparable position of individual groups' of persons, i.e. civil servants, representatives of state authority and judges, with the particular position of judges as regards the level of remuneration, which appeared to be unfair and non-discriminatory.

In the opinion of the Constitutional Court, the amendments to the legal regulation relating to the pay ratios of judges also exceeded the constitutional limits for the acceptance of the "exceptional" act by which the additional salary was withdrawn from the judges as defined in the previous decisions (cf. Once again, if, under very exceptional circumstances, the principle of equality in the field of restrictions on the remuneration of civil servants, constitutional officials and judges is to be accentuated before the principle of comprehensively understood independence of judges, such a session of both principles generally does not apply as once and for all. On the contrary, the pay ratios of judges in the broad sense are to be stable, not a variable with which it calculates this or that of a government group, for example, because it appears that the fees of judges are too high compared to those of civil servants or to another professional group. In other words, if it is possible to accept the application of the principle of equality at the top of that sense as regards the exceptional economically justified reduction of all salaries, the equality of all top of those groups (even as a target category) as regards the final level of pay cannot be accepted. Efforts for such equality deviates from the category of constitutionality, a political objective that does not support the constitutionally understood principle of equality. This principle finds, in the material sense, its boundaries in a statement that "the same must not be treated inequally, but at the same time the same must not be treated differently." The principle of equality cannot be understood as a nivulation in the result, but must be interpreted as guaranteeing the same starting chances.

From a comparative point of view in the advanced democracies of Western Europe, there is no case of pay restrictions against judges, so the issue is not confronted with doctrine or case-law (cf. three so-called Federal Constitutional Court judgments - Reports of decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, p. 26, p. 141n, p. 32, p. 199n, p. 55, p. 372n). It can be said that it is in the opinion that, in extreme situations, pay ratios could affect the independence of judicial decisions, but this is not taken into account in the current salaries of judges. At present, the debate is rather on the issue of possible wage savings in the executive sector, but even here the net consolidation of the budget is excluded as a possible general motive, it is only attributed to additional functions - cf. Wolff, H. A.: Die Gestaltungsfreiheit des Gesetzgebers im Besoldungsrecht. DÖV, 2003, No 12, p. 498 - 499). Comparable situations occur only in post-communist European countries. An example is the extensive case-law of the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland on matters concerning the constitutionality of the legal arrangements governing the salaries of judges, whether from the time of the so-called Small Constitution (see, in particular, Decision No P 1 / 94 of 8 November 1994, C 13 / 94 of 14 March 1995, P 1 / 95 of 11 September 1995) and from the period of the current Constitution (see Decision No P 12 / 98, P 8 / 00 of 4 October 2000, K 12 / 03 of 18 February 2004). In all those decisions, the Tribunal dealt with the constitutionality of the aspects of determining the level of the fees of judges from the perspective of Article 178 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, according to which the fees of judges must correspond to the dignity of their office and ensure that their duties are fulfilled. (The Federal Constitutional Court emphasised not only these circumstances, but pointed out the tasks and responsibilities of the judges associated with their office, as well as the need to obtain new candidates for the Office and the special risks associated with the Office of the Judge - Reports of decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, p. 26, p. 158).

The principle of an independent judiciary is one of the essential elements of the democratic rule of law (Article 9 (2) of the Constitution). The demand for independent justice stems from two sources: the neutrality of judges, as a guarantee of fair, impartial and objective judicial proceedings, and the safeguarding of the rights and freedoms of individuals by a judge separated from political power. The independence of judges is guaranteed by guarantees of a special legal status (which must include inconsistencies, irrevocability, integrity), guarantees of organisational and functional independence from the bodies representing legislative and, in particular, executive powers, and separation of the judiciary from legislative and executive powers (in particular, application of the principle of incompatibility). From the point of view of content, judicial independence is ensured only by the binding of judges by law, i.e. excluding any elements of subordination in judicial decision-making. The Constitutional Court dealt with the fundamental components of the principle of independence of the judiciary in a comprehensive manner in the Act No. 349 / 2002 Coll. (sp. zn.

The legislature's own intervention in the area of material protection of judges, which includes pay restrictions, must be placed under the framework protected by the principle of their independence for two reasons.

The independence of judges is primarily conditional on their moral integrity and professional level, but is also linked to their adequate material collateral. This component of the principle of independence of judges was also enshrined in Recommendation No 94) 12 of 13 October 1994 of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers on the independence, effectiveness and role of judges, according to which "ensuring the adequacy of the position and remuneration of judges with regard to the dignity of their profession and workload '(Principle III, paragraph 1b). A similar maximum is also contained in Article 6.1 of the European Charter on the Statute of a Judge, adopted by participants in a multilateral meeting organised by the Council of Europe on 8 to 10 July 1998, according to which professional judges have the right to a salary to be set in such a way as to protect them from pressure to influence their decisions and, in general, to influence their conduct in finding a right which could jeopardise their independence and impartiality.

The reason for the second subordination of the prohibition of arbitrary interference in the material security of judges (pay restrictions) within the framework of the principle of their independence is to exclude the possibility, possibly the coercion of legislative or executive decision-making power. In other words, to exclude arbitrary interference in the material security of judges as a possible form of "penalisation" of judges by the legislature and executive, and thus the form of pressure on their decision-making.

The Constitutional Court consistently applied the aspects of the assessment of the constitutionality of salary restrictions against judges in Case 198 / 2003 Coll. (sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 11 / 02), in which it annulled part of the provision of § 1 of Act No. 416 / 2001 Coll., namely the provision governing the withdrawal of additional salary from judges for the second half of 2001 and reducing the additional salary for the first and second half of 2002 to half the amount to which they would otherwise be entitled.

The reasons which led the legislator to adopt Act No. 416 / 2001 Coll. are identical to those which also led it to accept a salary restriction against judges in Act No. 427 / 2003 Coll. and Act No. 590 / 2004 Coll. They were the legislature that claimed the plight of public finances and the proportionality of the level of pay of judges and other areas of the public sphere. According to the explanatory memorandum to draft Act No. 427 / 2003 Coll.: "The necessary savings in the funds spent on salaries of employees in public services and administration... will not allow the additional salaries provided for each half of the calendar year to be paid in full in subsequent years. For the reasons set out above, the draft law proposes not to increase the salary base for 2004, 2005 and 2006 for determining the amount of the salary and certain allowances associated with the performance of the duties of representatives of the State and of certain other persons, and to give them a half-salary in each half-year of those years (as well as public service staff).... The proposed regulation" continues the government's explanatory report, "is in accordance with the constitutional order of the Czech Republic." Similarly in the explanatory memorandum to the later Act No. 590 / 2004 Coll. (Chamber of Deputies. Fourth term. Press 679 / 0) states that... "pursuant to Act No. 427 / 2003 Coll., which provides for exceptional measures for the years 2004, 2005 and 2006 to determine the amount of the salary and certain reimbursement of expenses associated with the performance of the duties of representatives of the State and of certain state authorities, judges and prosecutors, the level of additional salaries of these persons for the first and second half of 2004, and amending certain related laws, the additional salary for the first half of 2004 will be paid to those persons at 50%, it is proposed that the additional salary for the second half of 2004 (regardless of the results of the staff meetings) be withdrawn... This ensures equal access to austerity measures for both groups, in conjunction with the freezing of 'salaries'. '

Both the laws, i.e. both Act No. 427 / 2003 Coll., and Act No. 590 / 2004 Coll., were already adopted after the Constitutional Court decided on a similar question by finding No. 198 / 2003 Coll. Thus, although the Constitutional Court clearly formulated a maximum prior to the adoption of the Law, according to which the principle of equality in the remuneration of civil servants, constitutional officials and judges could not be accentuated to the principle of comprehensively understood independence of judges under very exceptional circumstances, thus defining the scope of constitutional conformity of the salary restrictions against judges, the legislature did not follow this maximum in the process of adopting Law No. 427 / 2003 Coll. and, on the contrary, referred to the earlier case law of the Constitutional Court on the issue of the salaries of judges in the form of finalms No. 320 / 2000 Coll.

In its capacity as appellant, the Government challenged the above-mentioned bases of Act No. 427 / 2003 Coll., by increasing the scale of the public sector employees' salaries with effect from 1 January 2003 (Government Regulations No. 582 / 2002 Coll., No. 583 / 2002 Coll., No. 584 / 2002 Coll. and No. 330 / 2003 Coll.), or by declaring Zdeněk Škromach, Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, in the second reading of the draft Act No. 427 / 2003 Coll. The Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Parliament on 24 September 2003: "For the next year, despite the problems that exist today, salaries will increase by more than 3.6%. So there will also be an increase in the budget and contribution sphere." (Tysnopisek Report on the 20th meeting of the Chamber of Deputies, p. 168). According to the table attached to the draft state budget for 2004 (Chamber of Deputies. Fourth term. Press No. 460 / 0), submitted by the Government of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic, then for employees in the central government, the actual amount of funds for salaries for 2002 was CZK 4,840 899 000, the budget for 2003 CZK 5,669 263 000, the draft for 2004 was CZK 5,916 963 000 (table 9), the actual amount of funds for salaries for 2002 represented CZK 8,755 060 000, the budget for 2003 10,319 286 thousand, the draft for 2004 was CZK 10,524 110 thousand (table 10), the actual amount of funds for salaries for 2002 26999 082 thousand CZK, the draft for 2004, the draft for 2004, the proposal for CZK 306,796 thousand CZK (table 11), in the so-other organizational components represented the actual amount of salaries for 2002 11 406 195 thousand CZK, the budget for 2003, the budget for CZK 299,66674 thousand, the budget for 2004, the draft budget for 2004, the draft for 2004, the draft for 2004, the draft for 2004, the draft for 2004, the draft of CZK 36,66,96,996 000 CZK 36,96,96,96,96,In addition, an annex to the government draft State Budget Act 2004 (http: / / www.psp.cz / cgi-bin / win / docs / prints / tmp / T0460j0.doc, under heading 3.2.6. Expenditure on staff salaries and other payments for work carried out), which states that public service salaries are increased by 4.2% compared to the approved 2003 budget in the draft budget for 2004.

Under these circumstances, it is difficult to accept the notion of "the necessary savings in the means spent on public service and administration salaries' in general, especially for the pay restrictions of judges, that the legislation under assessment lacks any argument of" exceptional circumstances' which would justify the priority of the principle of equality in terms of restrictions on the remuneration of civil servants, constitutional officials and judges against the principle of comprehensively understood independence of judges.

On the basis of the grounds thus set out, the salary restriction against the judges contained in Article 1 (h) of Law No 590 / 2004 Coll. must be regarded as a contradiction with Article 1 (1) of the Constitution in conjunction with Articles 82 (1) and 1 of the Charter. It was therefore decided that, pursuant to Paragraph 70 (1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, that provision would be repealed on the date of the publication of this finding in the Collection of Laws.