The Constitutional Court found No. 349 / 2002 Coll.

1. Paragraph 50 (1) (f), (g), (3) and (4), § 51 (1) (f), (g), (3) and (4), § 52 (1) (f), (g), (3) and (4), § 53 (1) (e), (3) and (4), § 71 (4), § 72 (2), last sentence, § 134 (2), § 187 (2), § 187 (2), (2), § 94 (d), § 123 (3) and (4), § 124 (1) (a), (b), § 127 (3), § 127 (3), § 130 (2), § 185), § 187, § 187, § 3), § 187, § 83, § 3, § 1 (a), § 1 (b), § 132 (1), § 132 (a), § 1 (b), § 1 (b), § (b) and (b), § 2 (b), § 2, § 2, § 2, § 2), § 2,

2. Paragraph 15 (2) of the second sentence, § 26 (2) of the second sentence, § 30 (2) of the second sentence, § 34 (2) of the second sentence, § 68 (1) in the words "Ministry or", § 74 (3), § 99 (1) (c) in the words "Ministry or," § 106 (1), § 119 (2) and (3), § 121, § 124 (1), (2) and (3), § 125 (1), (2) and (4), § 126 (1), (2) and (4) of the Law on Courts and Judgments and on Judgments and Judgments, Article 127 (1) of the Law No 6 / 2002 Coll.

On 1 March 2002, the Constitutional Court received a proposal from the President of the Republic to abolish certain provisions of Act No. 6 / 2002 Coll., on Judgments, Judges, Addresses and Government of the Courts and amending certain other laws (Law on Courts and Judges) ("the Law '). In the reasons for the first part of its proposal, the President of the Republic focuses on the provisions of § 134 - 163 of the Act (and the subsequent provisions), which introduce as a new institute a mandatory periodic assessment of professional competence with the consequence of the possible termination of the judicial mandate. According to him, these provisions are in direct conflict with Article 1 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution), according to which the Czech Republic is a democratic rule of law based on respect for the rights and freedoms of man and citizen, as it believes that the principle of division of power is undoubtedly among the fundamental attributes of the rule of law. They also see these provisions as being contrary to Articles 82 (1) and (2) and 93 of the Constitution. The Judge shall be appointed President of the Republic without a time limit in his capacity if he fulfils the basic constitutional and other legal requirements, including professional competence. Furthermore, the Judge may no longer be appealed against his will, except by decision of the Board of Appeal. The legislator had in mind, by providing for an exception to the irrevocability of a judge in Article 82 (2), at least the same intensity as the criminal offence. Only serious infringements could be regarded as such. This guarantees the independence of the courts from both legislative and executive powers. However, the law allows the constitutional status of a judge to be jeopardised by the result of an additional assessment of his professional competence, without which he could not be appointed. In order to avoid the performance of the duties of a judge, a person who will not take sufficient care of his or her professional level in his or her decision-making activities is sufficient to protect disciplinary proceedings. In this context, the proposal for the obligation of a judge to continuously educate and enhance his expertise for the proper performance of his duties (Section 82 (2) of the Law), while the infringement of that obligation may be a criminal offence for which the judge may be dismissed. However, the breach of this obligation must be specific, its impact must be reflected in the decision-making activities of the judge and, by its intensity, it must therefore jeopardise confidence in independent, impartial and fair judicial decisions (§ 87). In the course of disciplinary proceedings, a causal link must also be established between such infringement and its effect (a threat of trust). Moreover, while disciplinary proceedings have a wide range of sanctions, graduated according to the severity of the offence, the assessment of competence itself knows only one penalty, namely loss of office.

The newly introduced procedure - assessment of the competence of judges - will be conducted on a flat-rate basis with all judges. In this context, it is still beginning to determine whether the assumptions are made to establish that the judge is competent (not). This (no) competence is assessed on the basis of abstract, vague wording and decision-making activities of a judge of unrelated aspects (§ 136). The law thus presupposes the causal link between the negative assessment and the decision-making activities of the judge. In other words, the finding of an inadequate capacity to organise the activity of the judicial department and the minimum publication, scientific and pedagogical activity is automatically linked to the decision-making activities of the judge and may lead to the termination of the function of judge. If it is based on the concept of a law which provides for the President of the Courts to be a body of state administration of the courts, that is to say a part of the executive power, the state administration of the courts shall be given the competence to assess the competence of the judge. The power of the executive may therefore initiate proceedings against the judge to examine his professional competence, as a result of the possible termination of the Constitution by a guaranteed unlimited mandate, without the judicial decision-making activity being the basis for initiating it. The reservations of the President of the Republic are further directed against the intervention in the principle of the division of power envisaged by the Constitution. It considers that this principle is infringed, inter alia, by the scope of the powers of the Minister of Justice in the area of assessment of the competence of a judge, which it further lists with the conclusion that such scope gives the executive authority a disproportionately broad power to influence the decisions of judges.

In the grounds for the second part of its proposal aimed at those provisions by which the law entrusts the exercise of the administration of state courts to that extent to the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Courts, who are also judges, the President of the Republic contests their opposition to Article 82 (3) of the Constitution, which provides for the incompatibility of the function of judge with any public administration function. It states that certain activities and the way in which the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Courts are appointed and removed imply that they are a public administration function, and that the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Courts are thus partly part of the executive power. Thus, there may be serious concerns about the threat to their independence in the performance of judicial activities, in particular if their stay as President and Vice-President of the Court depends on the decision of the executive representative. It refers to the provisions of Paragraph 106 (1) of the Act under which the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Courts may be dismissed from their duties if they fail to fulfil their duties properly. This condition for appeal is, in his view, very generally expressed and may lead to the exercise of the leisurely executive powers in the appeal of the representatives of the judiciary. As the President of the Republic further states, he is aware that in some European countries, the courts are held by judges' presiding courts. However, our Constitution does not allow the merger of the function of judge with the performance of any function in the public administration and it is for the legislator to decide whether it will allow the merger of such functions. The Constitution in Article 82 (3) explicitly mentions activities which are incompatible with the function of judge. At the same time, it allows the law to extend the scope of incompatible activities further. However, the Act adopted in Paragraph 74 (3) circumvent the scope of incompatible activities by excluding the functions referred to therein from the regime of this prohibition (even through legal fiction). In this case, the Constitution is defined by law. However, the legal rule of lower legal force, i.e. in this case the law, cannot eliminate the range of activities given by the legal rule of higher legal force - the Constitution. At the end of this part of the proposal, the President of the Republic also challenges the possibility of a temporary assignment of a judge to the Ministry, which he also considers to be incompatible with the principle of division of power and the role of judge.

Another contested provision of Paragraph 160 (3) of the Law, which provides that the conduct of the Supreme Court in matters concerning the assessment of the competence of judges is not public, considers that it is contrary to Article 96 (2) of the Constitution, Article 38 (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms ("the Charter ') and Article 6 (1) of the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (" the Convention'), which establish the principle of public hearing of the case. It considers that there are no grounds for breaking the principle of public conduct in court proceedings before the Supreme Court, whose decision is a decision in the matter and is final. The decision will have a major impact on the life of the individual. Article 6 (1) of the Convention lays down the conditions for the possible exclusion of the public. However, none of these conditions is fulfilled in the contested provision. The Act thus limits the element of public scrutiny of the course of legal proceedings in breach of the Convention.

In the final part of the grounds for the proposal, aimed at the provisions relating to the Judicial Academy, the President of the Republic, with a renewed emphasis on Article 1 of the Constitution, the principle of division of power, as well as the constitutionally guaranteed independence of the courts and judges (Articles 81 and 82 (1) of the Constitution), expresses the belief that independence from executive powers must be sought not only in the decision-making activities of the courts in the narrow sense but also in the overall capacity to influence the executive decision-making activities of judges. The judge is responsible for his or her professional level and is obliged to continuously educate and deepen his or her expertise for the proper performance of his or her duties (§ 82). However, it should only be up to him how he will achieve this. It is hardly compatible with the principle of division of power and the independent exercise of the judiciary, so that judges are required to educate themselves in an institution whose composition and content are directly or indirectly too efficient in their hands. The ability of the Supreme Court to provide this education on a comparable scale is unrealistic given the existing personnel, budget and technical capacities of the Supreme Court. Lifelong compulsory training of judges is thus under practically executive control. In the proposal, the President of the Republic points out that, although it considers it right for the Ministry of Justice to allow judges to be trained, it is therefore appropriate that the Judicial Academy should be set up, but in his view it is not possible for judges to be obliged, at periodic intervals, to take part in the training specifically and in fact exclusively in this institution.

In conclusion, the President of the Republic summarises that, in a state governed by the rule of law, the division of state power must be based on a system of brakes and balances, but the legislation adopted distorts this system, by the disproportionate influence of the power exercised by the judiciary. The task of the executive in the intentions of the Constitution is to ensure the functioning of the judiciary in the material, personnel security of the administration of the courts, the preparation of future judges for the performance of their duties and to ensure a sufficient number of them. However, the law adopted does not respect the balance of power, and the degree of influence of the power of the judiciary may, in his view, jeopardise the independence of justice as one of the pillars of a democratic rule of law. It therefore proposes the adoption of the following provisions of the Law on Judgments and Judgments: § 15 (2), second sentence, § 26 (2), second sentence, § 34 (2), § 54 (1) (f) and § 123 (3) and § 125 (2) (3) and § 53 (1) (e), § 99 (1) (c), "to the Ministry or," § 106 (1) and § 71 (4), § 72 (2) last sentence, § 74 (3), § 82 (2), § 94 (d), § 99 (1) (c), "to the Ministry or", § 71 (4), § 71 (4), § 72 (2), § 74 (3), § 82 (2), § 94), § 99 (d), § 99 (1), § 2), § 2), § 12 (2), § 2) and § 2 (2 (2 (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2), (2), (2), (2), § 2), § 2)

The Constitutional Court requested, in accordance with the provisions of Section 69 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, the observations of the parties to the proceedings - both chambers of Parliament of the Czech Republic.

The Chamber of Deputies, in its observations of 9 April 2001, signed by its President, Prof. Ing. Václav Klaus, CSc, after recap of the contested provisions, states that the main objective of the judicial reform, which began with the adoption of key standards concerning, in particular, the safeguarding of the conditions for the implementation of the judiciary, is the rapid, fair and uniform judiciary. However, such an idea can only be based on the high expertise of judges as a basis for the good performance of the judiciary. Therefore, the Lifelong Learning Programme of Judges at the Judicial Academy was adopted by verifying the professional competence of the Judge (by the way, the duplicate regulation was also adopted by the prosecutors) through the Judiciary Board (the Council). From the point of view of the Council's composition, judges elected (possibly designated by a lot), judges of the competent court and legal practitioners are represented here. Each judge is first assessed by the person who has the most information on his knowledge of legislation, case law, etc., the President of the court responsible. Where the professional competence of a judge is assessed as unsatisfactory, proceedings shall be held at the second stage of the proceedings before the Supreme Court. However, in no way is the work of a judge evaluated in the light of the veracity of its decision-making, so it is not possible to talk about undue interference in its action and decisions.

The Judge may be the judge referred to in Article 93 (2): The Constitution has been appointed a citizen who fulfils the basic preconditions given directly by the Constitution, namely integrity and higher education law. Further assumptions and procedure are left to legal regulation. In accordance with that provision, the special law may lay down further conditions and procedures for examining the assumptions needed for the function of judge. However, assessment of the professional capacity of a judge to perform his duties is certainly not a prerequisite for appointment, as this is only after a certain period of time has elapsed since he took up the judicial duties at the competent court.

In essence, the Law on Courts and Judgments has taken over the original rules on the administration of the courts, where the Ministry of Justice has the status of a central authority and defines other administrative bodies - the Presidents of the courts concerned. The task of the administration of the courts is, on the one hand, to create conditions to ensure the proper performance of the judiciary in the organisational, personnel, financial and economic aspects, on the other hand, to exercise supervision within the limits of the law on the proper performance of the duties of the competent court. However, the exercise of state administration must in no way interfere with the independence of the courts. According to the previous regulation, the Minister of Justice was given the opportunity to appoint the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Courts, with the exception of the President of the Supreme Court. In the Law on Judgments and Judgments, the method of appointment is maintained, and in addition the duty of the Minister of Justice to discuss such appointment with the judicial board of the competent court whose office the judge is to be appointed is laid down.

The temporary assignment of a judge to another court or the Ministry of Justice or the Judicial Academy shall in principle be subject to the consent of the assigned judge (as under previous legislation) and the duration of the secondment shall be limited by law.

Article 38 (2) The documents are provided with certain procedural rights of the party to the proceedings, i.e. the right to public consultation, where exceptions to this principle may be permitted only by law, which may also exclude the public completely. A party has the right to be present at the hearing, even if it has been declared public under the law of the proceeding. However, this right may also be restricted by law or, where appropriate, by a decision under the law. This principle is also contained in Article 6 (1) of the Convention, according to which the press and the public may be excluded either for the entire or part of the process when it is required to protect the private life of the participant, or to the extent deemed absolutely necessary by the court, and in Article 96 (2) of the Constitution, where it is stated that the hearing before the court is essentially oral and public, but the law may provide for exceptions from that principle. At the same time, the Law on Courts and Judges in § 163 states that the provisions of Part One and Part Three of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply mutatis mutandis to proceedings concerning the professional competence of a judge before the Supreme Court, unless otherwise provided for in that law. It follows that the civil law of the Institut also knows and uses the exclusion of the public. It can be concluded from this that the provisions relating to the conduct of the Supreme Court in the field of the assessment of the professional competence of judges cannot be considered unconstitutional.

The establishment of the Judicial College by the Law on Courts and Judgments aims, in particular, to increase the expertise of judges as a guarantee of a quality judiciary. Therefore, the Lifelong Learning Programme in the Judicial Academy gives all judges the opportunity to acquire such knowledge and skills within their profession to be able to fulfil Article 1 of the Constitution, namely trust in law. In the rule of law, a citizen must have a guarantee that by legal means he will achieve justice and the satisfaction of the claims which he legally owns. Therefore, judges are increasingly required to know the laws and other laws, case-law and the ability to apply them in decision-making.

In conclusion, The Chamber of Deputies states that the law was approved by a necessary majority of Members of the Chamber of Deputies, signed by the relevant constitutional officials, i.e. both the President of the Chamber of Deputies and the Prime Minister himself and the President of the Republic himself, has been duly declared, and it is expressed that the legislature acted in the belief that the law adopted is in accordance with the Constitution and our rule of law. It is up to the Constitutional Court to examine the constitutionality of the Act and to give a decision in connection with the constitutional complaint lodged by the President of the Republic and his proposal to abolish certain provisions of Law No 6 / 2002 Coll................................................................................

The Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, signed by its President, Dr Petr Pithart, states that the draft law on the courts and judges with which the Chamber of Deputies gave its assent on 30 October 2001 was referred to the Senate on 12 November 2001. The Organising Committee ordered the draft law to the Constitutional Committee on 13 November, which discussed it in the prescribed manner and recommended that the Senate reject the draft law by order No 68 of 28 November. After that, the Senate plenary discussed the bill at its 11th meeting of the third term of office on 30 November 2001 and approved the bill in the version referred to by the Chamber of Deputies by Resolution No 220.

When discussing the draft law on courts and judges, there were extensive debates in the Senate, both in the constitutional committee to which it was ordered as the only draft law, and in plenary. Since the Law on Courts and Judgments is based primarily on the philosophy of achieving a higher quality of judicial performance through a higher quality of expertise of individual judges, most of the contributions concerned the issue of complaints of the contested assessment of judges and of their lifelong compulsory education. However, the subject was not disputed by the legal norm of the objective pursued, but - measured by the maximum power of the judiciary in the system of division of power and independence between courts and judges - because of the means to be achieved.

While there was almost absolute agreement between the various senators that our judiciary should be brought to a qualitatively higher level, the views on achieving this goal have grown. On the one hand, on the part of the opponents of the law, objections were raised with regard to overestimating the requirement for the expertise of judges and concerns about endangering their independence through a mandatory assessment of the professional competence by the President of the Court as an office appointed by the Minister of Justice; the reservations also concerned "compulsory training 'under executive control. Doubts were raised over the setting of the judge's professional fitness system at all. According to some legislators, emphasis should be placed on the upbringing of a future judge before the subsequent mandatory catching up of expertise, or a person who has already proved himself in previous legal practice should be chosen as a judge. There were also numerous reservations concerning the exercise of state administration by persons in a dual position - the position of an official, the executor of a state administration subject to a central executive body, and the position of an independent judge of the executing judiciary. Opponents of the law questioned not only the unconstitutional nature of some of its provisions, but also its overall contribution to improving the situation in the judiciary when they considered that" not adopting the law would neither worsen nor improve in our judiciary. "

The arguments in favour of the law were based on the belief that the choice of legal regulation was an appropriate basis for further possible autonomy of the judicial system and, by its nature, a transitional step. Contrary to the concerns about the restriction of power, the advocates of the law offered the opposite view, based on the fact that the newly set-up judicial council, even as advisory bodies, restricted the presiding courts in the exercise of judicial administration. This was seen as a significant shift from the current adjustment. The advocates of the law also stated that the model that was chosen was not an unknown model in Europe, and expressed their belief that the pressure on the judicial profession that the Law on Courts and Judges has developed in a certain way is an appropriate instrument for the overall rise of the judiciary, without questioning the premise that the executive authority must serve the judicial authority. The members of the bill also saw the way in the system set up to achieve legitimate expectations of the standard conduct of judges in standard situations. On the issue of unacceptable interference in the independence of judges, by assessing their professional competence, the Senate also argued that "dependence on lack of expertise is worse for society than anything else '. The advocates of the bill have explained to the critics the lack of their own solution and impudence on this social issue.

In his decision, the Senate opted for arguments supporting the adoption of the bill, as referred to by the Chamber of Deputies, and did so by a ratio of 37 to 14 when vote 54 was held by 64 senators.

On the basis of the decision taken and taking into account the negotiations of the Senate bodies, the statement contains the following arguments in favour of the majority will of the Senate:

Article 82 (1) The Constitution provides that judges are independent in the performance of their duties. Their impartiality must not be threatened. Within the framework of the constant case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the independence and impartiality of judges and courts are linked to the necessity of their credibility. It is not enough for a judge to be impartial, but also to appear to the parties and otherwise to inspire confidence in the conduct of a fair trial (Pavlíček V., Høeběk J., Constitution and constitutional order of the Czech Republic. Volume I.: Institute of the Czech Republic, Prague: Linde Praha, a. s., 1994, p. 194). There is probably no doubt that the expertise of a judge, which is familiar in the form of a rapid and fair process, is one of the legitimate demands of the company. After all, even in the Constitutional Court, there have been views that the independence of the judge is seen in a set of assumptions, the strongest of which are the professional level and those characteristics that make the judge an integrated personality (Pl. ÚS 13 / 99, Pl. ÚS 16 / 2000).

Under Paragraph 82 (1) of the Law on Courts and Judges, the judge is responsible for his professional level in the performance of his judicial function. The appellant would consider it sufficient to protect the company from a judge who would not take sufficient care of his professional level, the imposition of one of the disciplinary measures (reprimand, salary reduction, removal from the office of President of the Senate and the possibility of appeal from the office of judge) in the context of disciplinary proceedings, and from this point of view, the withdrawal from the office of judge as the sole consequence of an unsatisfactory expert assessment by the judge appears to him to be unconstitutional. However, the Senate took the view that an appeal from the office of judge should not, in the event of his incompetence, be a "penalty 'imposed under disciplinary proceedings, but nevertheless a ground for his leaving the judiciary. Since disciplinary proceedings are, by nature, criminal proceedings, based on the principle of a criminal infringement of the duties of a judge (in addition, incompetence would be practically inconclusive and the liability of a judge would therefore be zero), the legislator has opted for a special procedure for assessing competence, enshrined in Part One, Title III, Part 5 of the Law on Courts and Judges. From this point of view, the alleged contradiction with Article 82 (2) of the Constitution seems impossible, as the Constitution leaves some freedom in this regard.

According to this statement, there can also be no omission of other facts concerning the issue. The assessment of competence shall be a three-stage evaluation, the evaluation body being either exclusively or majorically the judges themselves. The review of the negative assessment shall be carried out by standard procedural procedures. This is a special trial in front of a five-member Senate of the Supreme Court, which will result in a court decision. All of these should be sufficient to guarantee a fair decision on the professional competence of the judge.

As regards the incompatibility of functions within the meaning of Article 82 (3) of the Constitution, or the inadmissible influence of the power exercised by the judiciary through the officials of the administration of the courts, it cannot be seen that both the manner in which the administration of the judicial administration and the appointment of officials by the President of the Republic in the case of the President and Vice-President of the Supreme Court or the Minister of Justice in other cases have been passed as satisfactory and constitutionally conformal from the previous legislation in force. The legislature has never questioned the unequivocal maximum of the total separation of the conduct of the judiciary from the administration of the courts at all stages. However, functional posts, i.e. the functions of the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Courts, are not, by virtue of the law, administrative authorities, but the law confers a certain share in the performance of administrative activities on these persons, based on the assumption that they are fully aware of the questions of the court of which they are represented. Nevertheless, the Senate was aware of the need to increase the effectiveness of the brake and counterbalance mechanisms, and therefore approved a passage concerning the judicial councils in the Law on Courts and Judges without comment. Practically no decision by the President of the Court in the exercise of the administration of the Court of Justice should be taken under that legislation without the opinion of the relevant judicial board from 1 April 2002.

Without amendments, the provisions of the Law on Courts and Judges were also approved by the Judicial Academy. In this context, it is necessary to see the important role of Section 129 (3) of the Law on Courts and Judgments, which allows the implementation to the same extent and with the same effects of vocational training and the Supreme Court. If there is an alternative in decision-making for a judge, his dependence in the offered education options at the Judicial Academy can hardly be seen. It should also be pointed out that the independence of the courts and judges is only guaranteed in relation to the performance of the judiciary. From this constitutional premise, it should be borne in mind that the State is directly obliged to create conditions for the independent exercise of the judiciary, thus ensuring the possibility of further training. In other words: the distinction between legal independence, in the sense of the constitutional principle, and psychological independence, which is to secure the former, must be regarded as a general starting point in dealing with judicial independence.

The conclusion of the observations is that it is entirely up to the Constitutional Court to assess the constitutionality of the contested provisions.

The Constitutional Court, in proceedings for the annulment of laws and other laws, assesses the content of the law according to the aspects contained in the provisions of Section 68 (2) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., in view of their compliance with constitutional laws and international treaties pursuant to Article 10 of the Constitution (in the sense of the amendment made by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll. with effect from 1 June 2002 in respect of their compliance with constitutional laws). Before entering into a formal discussion of the proposal, he also examined, within the meaning of the provision cited, whether the formal conditions for the adoption of the law had been fulfilled and the contested Act No. 6 / 2002 Coll., on the courts, judges, sitting and administration of the courts, and on the amendment of certain other laws (the Law on Courts and Judgments) was adopted within the limits of the constitutional competence and in a constitutionally prescribed manner.

In this respect, he found out from the shorthand report on the 35th and 39th session of the Chamber of Deputies, the 3rd term, that the Chamber of Deputies passed Law No. 6 / 2002, after due consideration at its meeting held on 30 October 2001, when 172 of the 180 Members present voted in favour of the proposal, one Member voted against the proposal. From the short-term report from the 11th meeting of the Senate, the third term of office, it was demonstrated that on 30 November 2001, 14 senators voted against the proposal, as referred to by the Chamber of Deputies, from 64 senators 37. After the adoption of Act No. 6 / 2002 Coll. was signed by the relevant constitutional authorities and properly published in the amount of 4 Collection of Laws which was distributed on 11 January 2002. This Act entered into force on 1 April 2002. The Constitutional Court therefore notes that Law No. 6 / 2002 Coll. was properly adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution laid down by competence and in a constitutional manner within the meaning of the provisions of § 68 (2) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., as amended, thus fulfilling the presumption that the Constitutional Court could deal with the draft proposal in substance.

It should also be noted at this point that the appellant, at the oral hearing before the Constitutional Court, proposed that the proposal submitted by him should be examined as amended by Act No 151 / 2002 Coll., which amends certain laws in connection with the adoption of the Administrative Rules of Procedure, which the Constitutional Court accepted. That law also amended some of the contested provisions, on whose substance the amendment did not change anything, merely took into account the establishment and future existence of the Supreme Administrative Court.

The proposal by the President of the Republic to abolish certain provisions of Act No. 6 / 2002 Coll. essentially relates to three basic headings.

The first group of provisions proposed for annulment concerns the assessment of the competence of judges. First of all, Part 5 of Title III of Part One of the Law on Courts and Judges, which provides for the procedure for assessing professional competence in the provisions of § 134 - 163 of the Act. It lays down, in particular, the periodicity of the assessment of competence, the person of the assessor, the aspects of the assessment of competence, the method of examining the decision-making activities of a judge by a special Chamber of the court in the event of a non-compliance, the composition of the Council of competence of the Judges set up by the Ministry of Justice and the proceedings before him in cases where the special Chamber of the Court of Justice also assesses the decision-making activities of the Judge as non-compliance and, finally, the proceedings before the Supreme Court on the application of a party to proceedings which does not agree with the Council's decision on competence. From Section 2 of Part 2 of Title I of Part One of the First Law governing the jurisdiction of the Judicial Councils, they are proposed to abolish the provisions of Sections 50 (1) (f) and (g), paragraphs 3 and 4, of Section 51 (1) (f) and (g) of Section 52 (1) (f) and (g), paragraphs 3 and 4 and Article 53 (1) (e), (3) and (4) which lay down, within their scope, the tasks relating to the assessment of the professional competence of judges. Section 3 of Title III of Part One of the Law in question, governing the jurisdiction of the public administration of the courts, proposes that the provisions of Sections 123 (3) and (4), 124 (4), 125 (3), 126 (3) and 127 (3) be repealed for the purposes of assessing the professional competence of judges, which provide for the powers of the Ministry of Justice and the Presidents of the various stages of the system of courts. In addition, the provisions of Paragraph 71 (4) and the last sentence of Paragraph 72 (2) of the Act are also proposed here for annulment of the provisions of Paragraph 72 (2) of the Act, which require the courts to take account of the higher degree of competence of the courts, part of the provisions of Paragraph 82 (2), imposing on the judge the obligation to make the assessment and assessment of his or her expertise and the provisions of Section 94 (d) of the Act, which provides that the judicial function ceases to exist on the date of the legal authority of the decision establishing his or her professional incapacity to perform that function. Finally, they are proposed for annulment under this heading: provisions on the communication of the assessment of the results of vocational training by the Judge of the Judicial Academy to the relevant persons and institutions (Section 132 (3) of the Law on Courts and Judgments), provisions on the transitional period for assessing the professional competence of judges appointed before the date of entry into force of this Act (Section 185 of the Law), and provisions on the design of lawyers and notaries for members of the Council of Professional Jurisdiction of Judges and their 3 alternates, and Article 188 of the Law). The above provisions of the Law on Courts and Courts are proposed to be repealed for their contradiction with Articles 1, 82 (1) and (2) and 93 of the Constitution.

In the context of the next thematic heading concerning the exercise of the administration of the courts of the State, it is proposed, first of all, to abolish the provisions of Section 4 of Part 1 of Title Even part of the First Law on Courts and Judges governing the organisation and activity of courts, the second sentence of Paragraph 15 (2), the second sentence of Paragraph 26 (2), the second sentence of Paragraph 30 (2) and the second sentence of Paragraph 34 (2), which provides that the chairpersons and vice-chairpersons referred to in the various degrees of the general courts shall, in addition to the decision-making activities, also administer the relevant courts to the extent provided for by the law. Further to the annulment of the proposed provision § 119 (2) and (3) of the Act cited, it is then expressly stated that the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the various grades of the General Courts are the authorities of the state administration of the courts and participate in it to the extent and under the conditions laid down by that law, the Presidents of Chambers and other Judges. The subsequent provisions of Sections 120 and 121 of the Law on Courts and Courts provide that the exercise of the administration of the State of the courts shall be carried out by the Ministry of Justice either directly or through the Presidents of those courts, which implement it to the extent provided for by that law and which may entrust that performance to the Vice-President and, where appropriate, the President of the Chamber and other Judges of the competent court. Paragraph 74 (3) of the Act provides that the functions of the President and Vice-President of the Court and certain other activities listed here are not to be regarded as public service functions. Section 3 of Title III of Part One of the Law on Courts and Courts governing the jurisdiction of the authorities of the state administration of the courts also proposes, for annulment, the provisions of Sections 124, 125, 126 and 127 which specifically specify the activities by which the chairmen of the various grades of the general courts exercise the administration, as well as the subsequent provisions of Section 128 of that law, governing the procedure of the administration of the judicial authority in the event of a breach of the duties of the judge in the performance of his duties. Further to the repeal of the proposed provision of Paragraph 106 (1) of the Law on Courts and Judges, the President and Vice-President of the Court may be removed from office by the person who appointed him if he fails to fulfil his duties properly. For annulment, the words "to the Ministry or 'and the same words in § 99 (1) (c) of that Act are also proposed in the provision of § 68 (1) of the Act cited, which allows a judge to be assigned to the Ministry of Justice and provides for a temporary waiver of the duties of a Judge in the event of such assignment. For the above provisions of the Law on Courts and Courts, the proposal considers that they are contrary to Article 82 (3) of the Constitution.

The last thematic heading to abolish the proposed provisions of the Law on Courts and Courts concerns the compulsory classification of judges in vocational training at the Judicial Academy. This is mainly about the abolition of the sentence of the second paragraph of Section 82 of the Law on Courts and Judges, which provides for the obligation of the judge to participate in vocational training at the Judicial Academy and to submit to the evaluation and assessment of his expertise and knowledge. Following that provision, in Section 4 of Title III of Part One of the Law on Courts and Judges governing the establishment, organisation and operation of the Judicial College, the words "classification of Judges' and, subsequently, paragraphs 131 (1) (a) and (b) and 132 (1) (a) and (b), in paragraph 2, the words" judges' and (3) are proposed to be deleted. These provisions are further specified by the obligation of the judge to participate in vocational training at the Judicial Academy, indicating the duration of the study, the manner in which the study is completed and the assessment of the results of the training of the Judge. The application submitted for these contested legal provisions alleges their contradiction with Articles 1, 81 and 82 (1) of the Constitution.

In the preamble to the Constitution and Article 1 thereof, as well as in the initial declaration to the Charter as well as in international treaties within the meaning of Article 10 of the Constitution, the Czech Republic is committed to the best principles of a democratic rule of law based on respect for the rights and freedoms of man and citizen (citation of Article 1 of the Constitution) and democratic values (Article 2 (1) of the Charter). In that State, pursuant to Article 2 (1) of the Constitution, the source of all state power is the people exercising it through the authorities of power legislative, executive and judicial. It can already be concluded from this initial statement that, in the very foundation of our constitutional system, the principle of the division of state power is enshrined, the principle based on the idea that in the nature of man there is a tendency towards concentration of power and its abuse, which has become a guarantee against the libel and abuse of state power and, in essence, a guarantee of freedom and protection of the individual, a principle which is the result and reflection of the historical, thought and institutional development on which, perhaps in the new ages, significant personalities such as John Locke and Charles Montesqieu, were involved, institutionally as well as the British Parliament and the British judiciary. It is not for the Constitutional Court to deal more closely with the evolution and causes of this principle in a situation that can be considered as already being the case. However, it considers it necessary only briefly to state that, in the very foundations of that principle, the belief enshrined in empirical knowledge is that human thinking and social events could never be attributed to a rational nature, because they also contained obvious irrational elements, and, moreover, the rationality of thinking was never fully covered with the rationality of the negotiations. As an expression of an existing state, the "government of all" is merely an ideological formula, often obscuring the opposite social situation. In a social situation characterised by the internal and external shortcomings of both individual and society, basic human needs can be met and, at the same time, at least maintained towards the goal of democracy, only through the conflict of balancing of individual interests. Thus, even in the area of justice, even a democratic state does not seek maximalist programs, and is therefore completely remote from the notion of a "judicial state" - a state authority, as has already been stated, is both legislative and executive, and therefore that state power can only be implemented in a democratic system if the conditions of the functioning of all its institutions are met - on the other hand, it is obliged to create institutional preconditions for what, in terms of justice, applies as a specific and unconditional element, namely the constitution and establishment of real independence of the courts, such as - for stabilization not only of their position, but also of the entire democratic system, in relation to legislation and executism - an important state-making, at the same time, but also of the polemical element. That real independence of the courts is a specific and indispensable attribute of the judicial authority, justified and also required by Article 4 of the Constitution, under which fundamental rights and freedoms are protected by judicial authority, as well as by Article 81 and 82 of the Constitution, according to which the judicial authority is exercised by independent courts on behalf of the Republic, and that judges are independent in the performance of their duties and that their impartiality must not be jeopardised by anyone. The specific feature and content of the judicial authority already stated cannot therefore be questioned, and therefore its basic functions are not compatible with the infiltration of any other State power, which was the premise set out in the Constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic by Law 121 / 1920 Coll. expressed in accordance with Paragraph 96 (1), according to which the judiciary is separated from the administration in all its seats, in the present Constitution, under Article 82 (3), according to which the function of judge is not compatible with the function of President of the Republic, Member of Parliament or with any public administration function. The principle of independence of the Court therefore has, as already stated, an unconditional nature excluding the possibility of an executive's independence. However, the contested legal regulation does not comply with this requirement.

In its proposal, the President of the Republic first attacks the provisions of the law relating to the periodic assessment and assessment of the competence of all judges, including those which are complementary to them. In particular, paragraphs 134 to 163 (Section 5 of Title III - Assessment of the professional competence of judges) and in relation to them § 50 (1) (f) and (g), paragraphs 3 and 4, § 51 (1) (f) and (g), paragraphs 3 and 4, § 52 (1) (f) and (g), paragraphs 3 and 4, § 53 (1) (e), § 123 (3) and § 188 (4), § 72 (3), § 74 (3), § 127 (3), § 132 (3), § 185, § 187 in the second sentence, § 94 (d), § 187 in the words of the Council for the professional competence of judges and Article 188 (4), § 124 (4), § 125 (3), § 127 (3), § 127 (3), § 187, § 187 in the second sentence of the Court of the Court of the Court of the Court of the Court of Justice and § 188 (3).

In order to assess the rationality of this part of the proposal, it appears necessary to provide an overview of the various provisions which, within the framework of the institution under examination, give the assessment of the professional competence of judges a legal right to the individual authorities of the state administration of the courts.

According to the legislation expressed in the contested provisions, the majority of which is systematically included in Title III of Part One of the Act, marked (which is not without meaning in the context) as State Administration of the Courts, monitors the competence of judges who are obliged to submit to the statutory assessment and assessment of their expertise and knowledge (§ 82 (2), Ministry of Justice (§ 123 (3)). To this end, they shall manage the assessment of the professional competence of judges and shall manage the examination of their decision-making activities (Section 123 (3)). In order to assess the professional competence of judges, the relevant Council (Criminal Law Council, Civil Law Council and Administrative Justice Council (§ 123 (4))) shall then establish. The President of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court, the Regional Court and the District Court, as the chairperson of the administration of the courts to which they are appointed (except for the President and Vice-President of the Supreme Court), the Minister of Justice, having the power to dismiss them on the basis of a generally, vaguely worded reason for "failure to fulfil obligations' (§ 103 (1), § 104 (1), § 105 (1), § 106 (1)), and these chairmen, apart from the Presidents of the District Courts, shall also assess that competence in relation to the assessment of the professional competence of judges (§ 124 (4), § 125 (3), § 126 (3), § 127 (3), and those chairons, other than the Presidents of the District Courts of the District Courts (§ 135). The points of view of which the competence of a judge is assessed shall be examined, inter alia, on the basis of an opinion drawn up by the competent court President and reports on the results of the training of a judge drawn up by the Judicial Academy (§ 136 (2)), managed by the Director appointed again by the Minister of Justice. The members of the Special Chamber carrying out the judicial review of the decision-making activities shall be appointed by the competent court President (§ 137 (2)), who (in cases of non-compliance with the assessment of the Judge by the Special Chamber, or, if he is himself with the report of the Special Chamber in which the decision-making activities of the Judge are assessed as satisfactory, disagrees), shall also submit a proposal to the Council to examine the proposal of the Judge, which shall be set up by the Ministry (§ 138, § 139 (1), and a part of its members and alternates from the civil servants, lawyers, notaries and experts in the field of criminal, civil and administrative law, on the proposal of the competent authorities (§ 139 (8). The Council may act and decide in the presence of at least seven members or their alternates and, in order to take a decision, the agreement of an absolute majority of the members present or their alternates (Paragraph 141 (2)) shall be required, which implies that its decision, given the composition of the Council (Sections 139 (4), (5) and (6)), may be adopted only by members, none of whom are judges. In this context, it should be noted that the very fact that the designated body is to meet and the other fate of the judge to decide so on by lawyers, prosecutors and notaries seems highly problematic in view of their possible motivation as a party or representative in the proceedings. Proceedings before the Council shall be initiated on a request made by the competent President of the Court (§ 144), who, in addition to the judge whose competence he is a party to the proceedings in question, as well as the Minister of Justice (§ 145 (1)). If one of these parties does not agree with the Council's decision, he may apply for the assessment of the competence of a judge before the Supreme Court (§ 153), he shall be a party to the procedure thus brought forward (§ 157), which ends with the decision of the Supreme Court.

In the opinion of the Constitutional Court, a disproportionate possibility for an executive's independence into the power of the court is already apparent from the list of individual powers of the executive authorities themselves (which are themselves in the relationships of authority and subordination). Such a broad and multi-faceted competence of executive officials in relation to the assessment of the competence of judges already appointed in their cumulation does not respect the principle of division of power and cannot be accepted in the light of the above constitutional values. The executive power, which, in relation to the power of the court, is merely to create assumptions material and organisational for its proper functioning, thereby obtains instruments that are capable, even indirectly, of influencing the independent decisions of judges. The fact that the final decision on professional competence is in the hands of the Senate of the Supreme Court, at that conclusion on the disproportionate power of the executive to intervene in the power of the judiciary, cannot in principle change anything anymore, as well as the fact that the newly set-up judicial councils elected from among the judges in the various courts are also legally expressed in order to assess the judges, since they have only advisory votes which the executive representatives are not obliged to accept. In this context, it must also be pointed out that, under the law, the Judicial Councils do not have an overarching body which could be a real representative of the judicial authority and a partner of the Ministry of Justice as a central body of the State Administration, or he or she was responsible for the administration and administration of the courts, as well as for the quality of the judiciary.

Article 81 already mentioned The Constitution provides that the judicial authority is exercised by independent courts on behalf of the Republic. Article 82 (1) The Constitution then provides that judges are independent in the performance of their duties and their impartiality must not be jeopardised. Thus, the independence of the judge, as well as the independence of the judicial authority, is connected and is in a cross-compliance relationship, including with the impartiality of the judge and the court. Independence and impartiality are inherent attributes of the concept of court. Its impartiality and independence is a value that benefits everyone, as it is one of the guarantees of equality and legal certainty in democratic society. Only an impartial court is capable of providing genuine justice to all and all, with one means of impartiality to the court guaranteeing judicial independence. The principle of judicial independence has already been addressed by the Constitutional Court in a number of its decisions, for example in the case of sp. zn. The purpose of these guarantees is to secure the position of a judge who requires his role in the process of impartial, fair judicial decision-making, in which, according to his promise, the judge is bound only by the rule of law and by his best sense and conscience (naturally still confronted by the fundamental values attached to man and justice). Anyone may also legitimately, in accordance with Article 6 of the Convention, expect independence and impartiality from the judiciary and from any judge entrusted with the protection of his rights. According to that standard, the requirement of an "independent and impartial court established by law 'in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights was also developed in such a way that, in order to fulfil the conditions of independence, the court could base its decisions on its own free opinion on the facts and their legal aspect, without having any obligation to the parties and public authorities and without its decision being subject to review by another body which would not be equally independent in that sense. In this context, it is also possible to mention international documents of the independence of the judiciary and judges, such as the basic principles of the independence of the judiciary adopted by the United Nations in 1985, as well as the positions of the Council of Europe on the judiciary, which are formulated in Recommendation 12 of the Council of Europe of 1994, highlighting the necessity of the independence of the judge in the decision-making process to act without any limitation, undue influence, external impetus, threats or interference, direct or indirect from any direction and for any reason and acting in the direction of executive and legislative need for the creation and strengthening of guarantees of the independence of the courts. These guarantees in our Constitution include, in addition to the principle of incompatibility of functions, the timelimit of the function of judge (Article 93 (1) of the Constitution), the non-translatability and its irrevocability, as enshrined in Article 82 (2) and (3) of the Constitution. Paragraph 2 of that provision provides that a judge may not be dismissed or transferred to another court against his will; the exceptions resulting in particular from disciplinary liability shall be laid down by law. In this context, it should be noted that a certain area provided by the legislator in the provision cited by the use of the term" in particular' should be interpreted strictly in accordance with the normal principle of legal law on the relationship and exceptions, precisely because it is used in the exemption session. It can thus be entirely agreed with the proposal that exceptions to the rule of irrevocability of judges may only penalise acts of an intensity comparable to those of the criminal offence expressly referred to by the Constitution. Such a nature, for example, is another legally stated reason which results in the removal of the function of judge, a condemning decision for an offence committed intentionally or a condemning decision for an unconditional custodial sentence for a criminal offence committed out of negligence, but cannot have an inadequate assessment of his professional competence, moreover, as highlighted above, influenced by a substantial part of the executive power.

Undoubtedly, it must be accepted that the professional competence of a judge, apart from his integrity, is an undeniable precondition for the proper performance of his duties and must therefore be emphasized. However, this must be attached primarily to the preparation of this profession. However, the act of making a provision for a judge without a time limit must already be taken into account in the belief that the candidate, in all respects - and in principle from the point of view of a substantial part of the aspects given for the assessment of the competence of judges in Article 136 (1) of the Law - will stand. Therefore, it is in the process prior to the appointment of a judge to his office that any quantity of possible requirements for judges should be concentrated, and it is here that the assessment of professional competence must be subject to the strictest criteria, which in the very beginning exclude the possibility of appointing a judge as an insufficiently competent person and one for which no further self-training guarantees are given (or even at the cost of changing the practice in the past, which would allow the appointment of only such a person for whom his moral, human and professional qualities have already been verified). However, such a person becomes a judge at the moment of his appointment and thus the necessary attribute of that function, acting in the form of a judge's independence, is being activated. The latter must not only be independent and impartial in the decision-making process, but should also be objectively perceived by the public. For this reason, the Constitutional Court considers that the mechanism under consideration for the subsequent and repeated assessment of the competence of a judge, which may lead to its appeal, is contrary to the constitutional guarantees of judicial independence. This seems to be because such an assessment - in addition to a methodically managed executive authority - is at all exposed to a judge whose competence, including professional, has already been addressed by the State. In the light of what has just been stated, the possible impact of any appeals on legal certainty at all for the reasons set out above cannot be overlooked in relation to those judicial decisions which have already been given by the appellate judge for incompetence.

As legitimate as the objective pursued by the legislation, which seeks to achieve a qualitatively higher level of the judiciary, is to be regarded as a non-respect of the basic constitutional principles, as it is designed in the contested provisions. In addition, it should be taken into account that the law, following its declaration of responsibility of judges for their professional level in the performance of their duties (§ 82 (1)), expressly imposes on them the obligation to continuously educate and enhance its expertise for the proper performance of their duties (§ 82 (2)), as well as the obligation to perform that function in accordance with the interest in the proper performance of the judiciary, while the alleged infringement of the duty of the judge is a criminal offence (§ 87) for which the judge and the disciplinary liability (§ 86) may lead to its appeal [§ 88 (1)]. It can therefore be concluded that, in order to achieve a situation in which persons who ignore their professional standards are excluded from the judiciary, the law has a means, namely a means, which is expressly foreseen by the Constitution as an exception to the principle of irrevocability.

The Constitutional Court is thus convinced that the contested mechanism for examining the professional competence of judges, as regulated by law, must be rejected and regarded as unconstitutional for reasons which infringe the principle of division of power and the subsequent principle of judicial independence. As stated above, it is of an unconditional nature, excluding the possibility of a method of assertion of executive power, as represented by it by a disproportionate and disproportionate share in the review of the competence of judges. For those reasons, the Constitutional Court complied with the proposal of the President of the Republic and annulled all the provisions of the Law on Courts and Judgments of professional competence concerning the provisions of Article 1, Article 2 (1), Article 81, Article 82 (1) and (2) and Article 93 of the Constitution, without having to examine separately or assess the constitutionality of the provisions of Article 160 of the Act, as the Institute of Evaluation of the Professional Competence of Judges must be abolished in view of the consistency of the various stages at which the evaluation is carried out, including those parts of the provisions which affect that institution.

On the basis of the principle of division of power, independence of judicial and judicial independence, the Constitutional Court, following what has already been mentioned on these terms, has also considered other parts of the President's proposal of the contested provisions relating to the judicial obligations of the judges to undergo periodic training at the Judicial Academy (§ 82 (2), second sentence). It is established by law as an organisational component of the State (§ 129 (1)) whose activities are supervised by the Ministry of Justice (§ 130 (4)). It shall be managed by the Director appointed and dismissed by the Minister of Justice, with the content of the educational activity, the classification of judges and the study programmes being determined by the Council of the Judicial Academy, appointed again by the Minister of Justice (§ 130 (2)), who, on a proposal from the Director of the Judicial College, shall also appoint and dismiss teachers to the Academy of Law (§ 133). It follows that it is again primarily power, represented by the Minister of Justice, which gives the law the right to determine the way of education for all judges, since, although the law also allows for vocational training through the Supreme Court (§ 129 (3)), it is an idea that the Supreme Court, in its current decision-making and other activities, could do so to the extent that the law provides for all judges in its specified time range (§ 131 and 132 of the Law) to be unrealistic. Such a situation, resulting from the legal regulation, as is being developed from above, where the way of education, including the definition of its content, remains effectively in the hands of executive power, cannot be accepted, as it is yet another expression of the principle of the division of powers of inadequate and inadmissible influence of power of judicial authority. In view of the nature of the power, it cannot be assumed without further delay that the executive authority, in the existence of a statutory authorisation granted to it, will also exercise those powers in a self-limiting and abstentive manner. In this context, it should be pointed out once again that the task of judicial authority, through judicial independence as a precondition for its proper exercise, is to protect the rights of citizens, including against the arbitrary or unjustified interference of the State, i.e. executive power. On the contrary, the possibility of influencing the nature of such protection, even in an external manner, in order to ensure the proper competence of judges could lead to the restriction of the independence thus understood under the legally designed conditions. This system of education, governed by fact from the centre of executive power, also does not provide for independent and free opinion-making the necessary and necessary assumption of the widest possible openness with the possibility of confronting different views from different sources (the choice of which should be left to the autonomous decision of the judge himself), including foreign sources. Such a system, also in the context of the legal way of termination of education and in relation to the judges' final work (§ 132 (2)), which is subject to evaluation (the result of which is likely to be based on the nature of the case by the judicial acceptance at the academy of the opinions presented), is one of the grounds for assessing the professional competence of the judge, which may give rise to a perceived dependence and lead to other undesirable consequences such as the loss of self-responsibility in the decision-making process itself.

In this context, it is necessary to respond more closely to the observations of the Chamber of Deputies, justifying the adoption of the contested law by the need for a new reform, which aims at a rapid, fair and unified judiciary, but which lacks a deeper dive in the problem of unity and unity, and at the same time reveals the lack of clarity of the nature and function of social phenomena and institutions at all. A closer analysis of any social phenomenon points to the presence in it of opposing forces which create functional tensions of both these correlation elements, a tension which is an indispensable condition for social development. In social events, the active principle of polarity creates tension, in addition to many other forms, also between the effort for unity and diversity. On the basis of the above, democracy is also based, which, although viewed as a difficult and problematic reality, is at the same time the most serious obstacle to disfunctional monorail. Therefore, even "real" unity can be achieved only by meeting diverse, specific areas of relevant aspects, one of which is directed towards unity, while others towards diversity. The source of real unity must therefore be sought primarily in conflict, as it is only because of the many often divergent views and attitudes that each person receives, as well as the consciousness of social belonging and also unity.

It is already a very close link with the present case, and the requirement of a single judiciary should be regarded as problematic in the suggested directions, both in its single education aspect and in the single decision-making aspect. Indeed, any unity can only fulfil a positive social function if those who are directed towards it are able to differ so that they can become more meaningful and effective in unifying themselves. On the contrary, the unfounded unity of the judiciary would also lead to undesirable effects in conditions in which each individual judge would be ordered to receive further education from a state-appointed source and, under pressure, the hypertrophy of the unification of each detail deprived of the conditions for a fair assessment of each individual case by respecting its uniqueness. The mechanical takeover of the already "united" would thus not only lead to an undesirable template, but would jeopardise the development of legal thinking itself. In the circumstances of the judiciary, it is therefore possible to accept the creation of a relatively unified opinion only in the context of the procedural procedures which do not exclude the conflict of views themselves.

To ensure legal certainty and respect for rights (Article 1 of the Constitution), the appropriate predictability of judicial decision-making is, in particular, the task of preparing future judges, and of finding appropriate methods to ensure the adoption of standard procedures in standard situations and the verification of knowledge not only of legislation but also of judicial case-law. In particular, the task is to guide the interpretation of the rules in terms of constitutional principles and the responsibilities of the judges themselves not only to know the case-law, but to develop it in a creative way, sufficiently responsive to changing social reality.

It is common ground that continuous vocational training of judges is foreseen for this profession. That postulate also stems from the mentioned international documents. As already stated in another context, the obligation laid down by the Law is also laid down in Paragraph 82 (2) and the law provides that the judge is liable for his professional level. However, this responsibility, and this must be emphasised, is mainly due to the very nature of judicial independence, which is necessarily linked to it, and thus implies the commitment of each individual judge not only to fair and impartial decision-making, but also to predictable decision-making, built on a perfect knowledge of law and judicial caselaw, since what is typical of the principle of independence of the judiciary and also in the interests of the functioning of the democratic system is precisely the natural connection between that attribute and judicial responsibility, arising from Articles 90 and 95 of the Constitution and, in detail, expressed, for example, in Article 6 (1) of the Convention, imposing on a court an obligation corresponding to the right of each to be dealt with in a fair, in a fair, public and proportionate manner. However, liability and liability for this commitment must be borne by the judiciary itself.

It can therefore be concluded that the establishment of the Judicial Academy itself by law has a basis in view of the function it is to perform in the training of judicial practitioners and other judicial staff, but in relation to the continuous training of judges, it can only be seen as one of the possible, judges of the freely chosen resources. The Constitutional Court therefore annulled, for those reasons, all those provisions of the law which provide for the training of judges at the Judicial Academy as an obligation as well as those relating to the scope of that obligation.

The last heading of the proposed provisions [Paragraph 15 (2), second sentence, § 26 (2), second sentence, § 30 (2), second sentence, § 34 (2), second sentence, § 68 (1) in the words "to the Ministry or ', § 74 (3), § 99 (1) (c) in the words" to the Ministry or', § 106 (1), § 119 (2) and (3), § 120, § 121, § 124 to 128] relates essentially to the arrangements governing the administration of the courts. In assessing this part of the proposal, the Constitutional Court had to take into account that the proposal by the President of the Republic, whose petition the Constitutional Court is bound by, had not been challenged by the position of the Ministry of Justice as the central body of the state administration of the courts, nor had the powers of that authority been challenged, except for exceptions.

In assessing those provisions, the provisions of Paragraph 74 (3) of the Act, which states that the function of President and Vice-President of the Court is not considered to be a public administration function, temporary assignment to the Ministry, membership of the Council and the Council for the Professional Proficiency of Prosecutor, membership of the advisory bodies of the Ministry, the Government and the bodies of Parliament. For its assessment, the content of Article 82 (3) of the Constitution, which states that the function of judge is not compatible with the function of President of the Republic, a Member of Parliament or with any public office function; The law specifies which other activities are incompatible with the exercise of the judicial function. The Constitution thus sets out which functions are fundamentally incompatible with the function of judge, and its first sentence must be understood as a demonstrative list, the definition of which may be extended in accordance with the sentence of the second after the semicolon, but not narrowed as provided for in Paragraph 74 (3) of the Law. The legislature thus empowered to extend that list, but not to restrict it, is not to change the will of the legislator by issuing a rule of law which goes beyond that content and does not have its constitutional basis. Therefore, if the Constitution provides, as a rule of the highest legal force, for the incompatibility of the function of a judge with any function in the public administration, for which an activity must undoubtedly be regarded, for a substantial part, as the activities listed in the subsequent provisions of the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Courts (after all, Article 119 (2) and (3) expressly referred to as the bodies of the administration), then it cannot be concluded that that that provision is contrary to and, in conjunction with Article 82 (3) of the Constitution and any other provisions arising therefrom, which the status of the Presidents and the Vice-Presidents of the courts and their activities are more relevant. However, it should be pointed out here that the constitutional court only accepted the annulment of these provisions for those formal reasons and that, by the derogation provided for in Article 74 (3) of the Act, it did not intend to indicate that persons other than the judges should be entrusted to the administration and administration of the courts.

The principle of incompatibility of functions, expressed in the above-mentioned article of the Constitution, cannot then be infringed even by the fact that the law allows judges to operate in the authorities of executive or, where appropriate, legislative powers, as the contested provision of Paragraph 74 (3) of the Law does. That principle of incompatibility of functions is one of the other guarantees of judicial independence. It must be strictly observed as a constitutional principle and cannot be circumvented even by such a solution as contained in the provisions of Paragraph 99 (1) (c) of the Act, according to which a judge, specifically with the Ministry, is temporarily relieved of his duties during his time of office. Because its continuity is an essential feature of this function. Membership in the advisory bodies of the Ministry, the Government and the two chambers of Parliament must then also include the relevant performance of the tasks of these different elements of State power, thus contrary to the principle of division of power, despite the fact that the personal and extrajudicial links that take place in such activities inevitably increase the likelihood of a potential conflict of interest and thus render impartiality, in the form of the impartiality of judges, questionable.

Thus, for the reasons set out above, the Constitutional Court is in breach of Article 82 (3). The Constitution repealed the provisions of Paragraph 74 (3), as well as all the other provisions based on it, whether in substance or in a systematic manner, as listed above. In addition, it should be added that the annulment of Paragraph 106 (1) by the Constitutional Court, in addition to the reasons already set out above, led to a further, quite general and indefinite, principle of legal certainty not corresponding to the statement of reasons leading to the appeal of the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Courts. In this context, the Constitutional Court considers it necessary to state that the functions of the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Courts should be regarded as a career as a judge (as is the case with the appointment of the President of the Chamber), and therefore neither the President nor the Vice-President of the Court should be rebuttable except for the legally foreseeable reason and procedure for disciplinary action, i.e. by decision of the Court. Such a structure whereby the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Courts also carry out activities which are administrative in nature, without, for that reason, losing the quality of the status of an independent judge and therefore entering into the position of a civil servant whose significant definition is the relationship of subordination and respect for orders from servants, is considered to be an integral part of the principle of division of power arising from the requirements of the rule of law and the principle of institutional independence of the judiciary, such as Austria, Germany, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and the principle of the unimpeded exercise of the personal independent judicial mandate. At the same time, the Constitutional Court adds that the current state of the art, where the Ministry of Justice is the central body of the state administration of the courts and the judiciary itself does not have its own representative body at its level (which could be the authority called upon to take over the role of the Ministry in personnel matters, including the supervision of the professional level of the judiciary, and possibly in other areas of the administration and administration of the judiciary), does not, in the view of the Constitutional Court, sufficiently exclude the possibility of indirect influence of executive authority (e.g. through the allocation of budgetary resources and control of their use). However, from what has already been stated earlier, it is clear that the previous contested parts of the law have been abolished from the predominant part by reference to a failure to respect the principle of division of power. Therefore, in assessing this part of the draft contested provisions, the Constitutional Court itself had to follow that principle. It is not for the Constitutional Court to decide how the question of the administration of the courts should be dealt with, as this is the task of legislative power. However, this should consistently respect the separation of state powers when choosing the model of administration. In order to give the legislator sufficient space to adopt a new regulation of the administration of the courts, the Constitutional Court postponed the enforceability of that part of the finding, i.e. those provisions listed in point 2 of the operative part of the decision until 1 July 2003.

Different opinions under Section 14 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, were taken by the Judges JUDr. Vojen Güttler, JUDr. Jiří Malenovský, JUDr. Vlastimil Ševčík and JUDr. Pavel Varvarovský to decide.