What is Decree No. 329 / 2017 Coll.?

Decree No. 329 / 2017 Coll., on requirements for nuclear equipment project — Decree on requirements for nuclear equipment project.

When it became Decree No. 329 / 2017 Coll. effectiveness?

Decree No. 329 / 2017 Coll. became effective 01.11.2017.

Is Decree No. 329 / 2017 Coll. still valid?

Yes, Decree No. 329 / 2017 Coll. is still valid and effective.

How many times was it Decree No. 329 / 2017 Coll. amended?

Decree No. 329 / 2017 Coll. has 3 time versions of the text.

Decree No. 329 / 2017 Coll. - Decree on requirements for nuclear equip...

329

DECLARATION

of 26 September 2017

on requirements for a nuclear installation project

The State Authority on Nuclear Safety sets out, pursuant to § 236 of Act No. 263 / 2016 Coll., Atomic Act, for the implementation of § 24 (7), § 44 (4) (a) and (b), § 45 (4) and § 46 (8):

ČÁST PRVNÍ

GENERAL PROVISIONS

§ 1

Subject matter

This decree implements the relevant regulations of the Euraton1) and provides for:

(a) requirements for the content of the documentation for the authorised activity;

(b) a list of the safety functions to be performed by the nuclear installation and their categorisation according to its relevance to nuclear safety;

(c) the safety classes and criteria for the classification of selected equipment in those classes;

(d) the way in which protection is ensured in depth; and

(e) the content of the requirements for the project of a nuclear installation pursuant to § 46 (1), (2) (a), (b), (e), (g), (i), (k) to (m) and paragraph 3 of the Atomic Act.

Terms

§ 2

For the purposes of this decree:

(a) a condition, condition or event which is considered to be physically impracticable or which is highly unlikely to occur;

(b) the essential safety function of the safety function ensuring compliance with the principles of the safe use of nuclear energy pursuant to § 45 (2) and (3) of the Nuclear Act;

(c) the safe state of a nuclear installation, the state of a nuclear installation in which the fulfilment of essential safety functions is ensured in the long term;

(d) by normal operation, the state of the nuclear installation in which the limits and conditions are respected;

(e) abnormal operation of the state of a nuclear installation deviating from normal operation which does not result in serious damage to systems, structures or components having an impact on nuclear safety and after which the nuclear installation is capable of normal operation without repair;

(f) the operational status of a nuclear installation which is a normal operation or abnormal operation;

(g) emergency conditions the status of a non-operational nuclear installation;

(h) a basic project accident in which the correct operation of the safety systems ensures that the corresponding reference levels or exposure limits are not exceeded;

(i) a postulated initiation event, a deviation from normal operations which is random, anticipated and included in project bases and which may lead to abnormal operation or emergency conditions;

(j) extended project conditions for emergency conditions caused by scenarios more serious than the basic project accident taken into account in the design of nuclear installations;

(k) major accidents in emergency situations involving serious damage to nuclear fuel by serious damage and irreversible loss of the structure of the nuclear reactor active zone (the "active zone") or the nuclear fuel storage system due to fuel transfer;

(l) the basic project bases of the project basis, the respect or non-compliance of which ensures that there is no event more serious than the underlying project accident;

(m) a safety system designed for reliable performance of the essential safety function in abnormal operation and the basic project accident;

(n) the passive function of the system, design or component of the function or property of the system, design or component, the provision of which does not require activation, mechanical propulsion or the supply of media or energy from another system; and

(o) a safety limit of the limit value of the parameter characterising the state of the nuclear installation or any other expression of the safety, technical or administrative condition, the excess of which is a threat to nuclear safety, radiation protection or technical safety due to a malfunction of the system, structure or component.

§ 3

For the purposes of this Order, the following definitions shall also apply:

(a) a conservative approach in the way of assessing the impact of the uncertainty of knowledge, input data, methods and models used by the expert estimation or statistical evaluation of the result, so that the outcome of the assessment of the item under consideration also includes its least favourable plausible variants;

(b) a realistic approach to assessing the impact of the uncertainty of knowledge, input data, methods used and models by means of an expert estimate or statistical evaluation of the outcome of the assessment of the item in question, in which the result constitutes its most likely option;

(c) a safety margin expressing the difference between the criterion of acceptability established by a conservative approach and the safety limit;

(d) environmental qualifications the ability of the system, structure or component to meet the requirements laid down in its technical specification for its function in the working environment and in conditions triggered by the properties of the territory for the location of nuclear equipment (hereinafter referred to as the "property of the territory");

(e) nuclear material hermetically sealed with a fuel element;

(f) a fuel pool of fuel elements which is committed to the nuclear reactor as a whole and enables the handling of nuclear fuel as determined by the nuclear installation project;

(g) a fuel system by a nuclear device project designed by the assembly of fuel files and other components of the active zone necessary to control the reactivity and maintain the design structure of the fuel files in the active zone;

(h) a simple failure event that results in a loss of the ability of a system, structure or component to perform a specified function in which the functions of other systems, structures and components are maintained; subsequent failures in the same system which lead to the loss of the ability of one of its other structures or components to perform a specified function caused by a simple failure are considered to be part of this simple failure;

(i) a common cause disorder or failure of several systems, structures or components by acting on a common cause leading to loss of their safety function;

(j) by violating the fuel element in the hermeticity of the fuel element coverage which allows the radioactive substance to escape from the fuel element;

(k) the project limit of the acceptance criterion used to assess the capability of a nuclear installation or its system, structure or component to perform its function as envisaged by a nuclear installation project; the project limit is, in particular, the limit set by the legislation or, on the basis of it, the derived criterion of acceptability, which corresponds to a method of assessing the capability of a nuclear installation to perform its function as envisaged by the nuclear installation project;

(l) a stabilised sub-critical state of steady state of a nuclear installation achieved in abnormal operation and in emergency conditions by the operation of systems identified by a nuclear installation project in which the nuclear reactor is subcritical and, for as long as necessary for the application of measures to achieve the safe state of the nuclear installation, essential safety functions are ensured;

(m) a system of control and control of systems, structures and components used to measure the parameters of a nuclear installation, to evaluate and display them for the needs of operators of a nuclear installation and to control nuclear installations, including the launching and control of the interventions needed to ensure nuclear safety, radiation protection, radiation emergency management and security;

(n) a protective envelope system of systems, structures and components designed by a nuclear device project to prevent the spread of ionising radiation and the leakage of radioactive material from the nuclear reactor and to protect the nuclear reactor against the effect of the properties of the territory and the external threat;

(o) a divergent means of system, construction, component or organisational measures to ensure or replace a safety function in the event of loss due to a common cause disorder;

(p) an alternative means of system, construction, component or organisational arrangements for the management of extended project conditions in situations where, due to a common cause of failure, the safety function of the safety system and the function of the divergent device identified by the nuclear installation project may be lost when providing the essential safety function; and

(q) a block control centre where nuclear plant operators can oversee and control the operation of nuclear equipment with a nuclear reactor in operational conditions and in emergency conditions.

ČÁST DRUHÁ

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SAFE USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY PRINCIPLES

HLAVA I

GENERAL RULES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SAFE USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY PRINCIPLES

§ 4

Nuclear plant project safety objectives

(1) The nuclear plant project, including the nuclear plant change project, must meet the following safety objectives:

(a) preventing emergency situations;

(b) mitigate the consequences of emergency conditions if they occur;

(c) ensuring that the facts practically excluded are:

1. a radiation accident at which there is insufficient time to introduce urgent protective measures for the population ("early radiation accident"); and

2. a radiation accident requiring urgent protective measures for populations which cannot be restricted locally or in time ("major radiation accident"),

(d) the provision of nuclear safety, radiation protection, technical safety, monitoring of the radiation situation, management of radiological emergencies and safety in the management of radioactive waste and decommissioning of nuclear installations;

(e) taking into account the impact of the human factor on the function of the nuclear installation and its individual systems, structures and components having an impact on nuclear safety, radiation protection, radiation monitoring, radiation emergency management and security and human performance effects on nuclear equipment; and

(f) implementation of processes to ensure that the nuclear installation project is in line with the current state throughout the nuclear installation's life cycle

1. experience in the operation of nuclear installations;

2. international experience,

3. nuclear equipment with regard to ageing systems, structures and components; and

4th Science and Technology.

(2) The guarantee facility project must meet the technical requirements in the field of guarantees of the International Atomic Energy Agency resulting from international treaties, which are binding on the Czech Republic (2).

(3) The technical requirements referred to in paragraph 2 are technical requirements to ensure independent power supply and lighting or to build and modify it, enabling the International Atomic Energy Agency to carry out effective control in a guarantee facility.

§ 5

Facts to permit the design and operation of nuclear installations

The project of a nuclear installation shall take into account, in the framework of ensuring the resilience and protection of nuclear installations against hazards arising from the properties of the territory and from the occurrence of internal events and conditions,

(a) accidental failure of systems, structures and components,

(b) an internal event triggered by:

1. by virtue of the properties of the territory,

2. internal conditions,

3. the result of a malfunction of a nuclear installation; and

4. by error of the operators of the nuclear installation; and

(c) a scenario caused by a combination of the effects of the properties of the territory, internal events and abnormal operation or emergency conditions caused by such effects, including the interaction of all nuclear installations in the same territory to locate the nuclear installation.

Application of protection to depth

§ 6

(1) The nuclear installation project must, in order to ensure compliance with the requirements for the application of protection to the depth, lay down requirements for nuclear installations ensuring that:

(a) the use of depth protection for all nuclear-related activities;

(b) the creation of a series of back-up physical safety barriers that are inserted between radioactive substances and around nuclear installations;

(c) systems, structures and components and procedures for applying safety functions to protect the integrity and functionality of physical safety barriers at each level of protection to depth; and

(d) prevent a radiological incident through physical safety barriers.

(2) The role of the physical safety barriers must be provided by independent systems, structures or components which are:

(a) fuel element coverage;

(b) the pressure limit of the primary cooling circuit of the nuclear reactor ("primary circuit"); and

(c) a protective envelope system.

(3) In the case of nuclear installations without a nuclear reactor, the function of physical safety barriers must be ensured by:

(a) packaging files; or

(b) other systems, structures and components for:

1. the production, processing, storage and handling of nuclear material or other radioactive material; or

2. processing and storage of radioactive waste.

(4) The nuclear plant project must ensure, to a reasonably practicable extent, effective prevention in the context of ensuring compliance with the requirements for deep protection

(a) endangering the integrity and function of physical safety barriers;

(b) loss of function of one or more physical safety barriers as a result of an initiation event;

(c) loss of function of one physical safety barrier due to loss of function of another physical safety barrier;

(d) loss of function of the physical safety barrier due to errors in the operation or maintenance of the nuclear installation; and

(e) the loss of function of the last physical safety barrier in a major accident before the safety targets referred to in § 4 (1) (c) (1) are met.

(5) The nuclear installation project shall, in order to ensure that the requirements for the application of protection are met in depth, lay down technical and organisational measures to prevent and manage abnormal operation, basic project accidents and extended project conditions, including major accidents.

(6) The fulfilment of the requirement laid down in this Decree is reasonably feasible if the risk of a radiation accident resulting from the lack of ability of a nuclear installation to meet the stated safety objectives is reduced by this implementation, while at the same time there is no serious change in the reasons and conditions for the use of the nuclear installation.

§ 7

(1) The project of a nuclear installation may allow the operation of a nuclear installation in the event of a loss of the safety function of a physical safety barrier if the risk analysis for selected operational states of a nuclear installation, taking into account the existence of other physical safety barriers, is demonstrated to ensure nuclear safety, radiation protection, radiation monitoring, radiation emergency management and security.

(2) The nuclear installation project shall ensure that the system, structure or component failure and the loss of safety function at one level of protection at one level of protection do not reduce the effectiveness of safety functions in subsequent levels of protection to the extent necessary to correct or mitigate the consequences of the initiation event, in order to ensure compliance with the requirements for the application of the depth protection.

(3) A nuclear device project may only use systems, structures and components that, for the creation of systems of subsequent level of protection to depth from systems that have been previously passed level of protection to depth,

(a) are not infringed during the development of the response of the nuclear installation to an external or internal initiating event or scenario; and

(b) are separable from broken or inapplicable parts of the systems prior to the level of protection to a depth.

(4) If the procedures for managing extended project conditions in a nuclear installation project foresee the use of alternative systems and procedures involving the use of mobile devices, the nuclear installation project shall ensure the creation of connecting points on a nuclear installation that:

(a) are physically accessible under extended project conditions;

(b) allow for compliance with the rules on radiation protection for intervening workers; and

(c) ensure the intended use of mobile devices.

(5) The nuclear installation project with a nuclear reactor shall ensure, for the management of extended project conditions, reasonably feasible technical and organisational measures to achieve the resilience of the nuclear installation, that:

(a) a major accident which could lead to an early radiation accident or a major radiation accident is practically excluded; and

(b) a major accident which is not one of the practically excluded facts and which could lead to a radiation accident shall be managed in such a way that maximum protective measures are required under Article 104 (1) (a) and (b) (2) and (3) of the Atomic Act.

(6) The project of a nuclear installation must identify and evaluate reasonably practicable measures for the management of a postulated major accident that corresponds to a type of nuclear installation in such a way that:

(a) the damaged and melting active zone and the stored nuclear fuel or nuclear material to which it is handled are cooled and the smelting and melting zones are retained;

(b) the development of a subsequent fissile chain reaction is prevented; and

(c) the security objectives of the project have been met in accordance with Article 4 (1) (c).

(7) The requirement referred to in paragraph 6 shall also be fulfilled if the documentation of a nuclear installation project is demonstrated by a conservative approach that the occurrence of a major accident is practically excluded.

Requirements for selected devices and safety functions

§ 8

(1) In order to ensure compliance with the requirements of the selected installations, the nuclear installation project must establish technical specifications containing technical requirements for the design, manufacture, assembly, inspection and maintenance of the selected equipment, as well as requirements for:

(a) the reliable supply of the selected energy equipment in all states of the nuclear installation for which the selected equipment is intended by the nuclear installation project;

(b) the resistance of the selected equipment to the working environment;

(c) the resistance of the selected device to the load resulting from the properties of the territory;

(d) the reliability of the selected equipment in standby mode; and

(e) the level of quality assurance of the selected equipment.

(2) In order to ensure the performance of safety functions, the nuclear plant project must, in accordance with its categorisation, be integrated into systems, structures and components

(a) systems, structures and components with no impact on nuclear safety;

(b) systems, structures and components having an impact on nuclear safety that are not selected equipment; and

(c) selected equipment,

1. selected devices which are not safety systems; and

2. security systems.

(3) The nuclear installation project must, in order to ensure the performance of safety functions in accordance with their categorisation, separate the security systems according to the functions provided to:

(a) control and control protection systems (hereinafter referred to as "protection systems");

(b) performance systems; and

(c) support systems.

(4) The nuclear installation project shall specify the requirements for the systems referred to in paragraph 3 in such a way that:

(a) protective systems shall monitor the quantities or states of nuclear equipment relevant to nuclear safety and shall automatically cause interference with the performance systems intended to prevent hazardous or potentially hazardous conditions;

(b) performance systems have provided appropriate security functions since initiation; and

(c) support systems provide support functions for the safety function of protection and performance systems.

(5) The nuclear installation project shall specify the requirements for the systems referred to in paragraph 2 (a) which fulfil the passive function of the system, design or component which is a safety function of category I as referred to in Annex 1 to this Regulation, so that their structures and components are designed with immunity and in quality to ensure that their failure is a practically excluded reality, including where there is a project measure to manage a basic project accident caused by their failure.

(6) The nuclear equipment project must specify the requirements for the systems, structures and components referred to in paragraph 2 (b),

(a) which are intended to reduce the effects of failures or failures of selected equipment; or

(b) the failure of which may adversely affect the systems, structures and components referred to in paragraph 2 (c).

(7) The nuclear installation project shall specify the requirements for the selected equipment and for the systems, structures and components referred to in paragraph 2 (a). (b) identified by a nuclear device project to prevent and manage extended project conditions in such a way that:

(a) have the capacity and characteristics to fulfil their purpose; and

(b) their qualifications are ensured for the environment required to ensure their safety function for the time required.

(8) The requirements referred to in paragraphs 5 to 7 shall be set out in the technical specification referred to in paragraph 1 in accordance with:

(a) the importance of the safety function to which systems, structures and components contribute; and

(b) the effect of the loss of function and integrity of systems, structures and components on the performance of a security function.

§ 9

(1) The project of a nuclear installation shall include a selected installation or part thereof, which fulfils several safety functions, in the safety class corresponding to its safety function with the greatest impact on nuclear safety.

(2) The nuclear installation project shall ensure that the failure of the selected equipment does not result in the loss of the safety function of the selected equipment, which is classified in the higher security class.

(3) The nuclear installation project shall include among the selected design equipment and components of the support system which ensures the operability of the selected equipment.

(4) The design and components of the support system must be classified in the same security class as the selected equipment, the operation of which the support system ensures, provided that a simple failure of the structure or component of this support system causes an immediate loss of operation of the supported selected equipment.

(5) The nuclear installation project must ensure that the failure of the support system does not limit

(a) the performance of security functions by more than one of the backup parts of the security system; or

(b) performing the function of a divergent device providing or replacing the safety function of the safety system at risk of this failure.

(6) The nuclear installation project shall determine the scope of the tests or calculation procedures to verify the characteristics of the selected installation throughout its project life in an environment consistent with its operational conditions and its design function under emergency conditions, for:

(a) strength resistance;

(b) functionality;

(c) reliability; and

(d) environmental qualification.

(7) The nuclear installation project shall determine which components, parts or parts of the selected equipment are important for the performance of the safety function and carry out their inclusion in the safety classes.

(8) The list of the safety functions to be performed by the nuclear installation and their categorisation according to its relevance to nuclear safety and safety classes and the criteria for the classification of selected installations in those classes are set out in Annex 1 to this Decree.

Project basis

§ 10

(1) Project bases must determine the values of the parameters relevant to the design of the nuclear installation and the resulting requirements for the resilience of the nuclear installation project, in particular:

(a) the parameters of the estimated state of the nuclear installation, including the status of the nuclear installation project after the post-estrated internal initiation event;

(b) the criteria for acceptance for the consequences of nuclear plant stocks envisaged by the nuclear installation project;

(c) the parameters of the impact of the properties of the territory, the seriousness of which results from the assessment of the territory for the location of the nuclear installation;

(d) the data of the plan for physical protection based on an analysis of the consequences of a deliberate attack by a transport aircraft against a nuclear installation; and

(e) data characterising safety functions provided by systems, structures and components of nuclear equipment.

(2) Project bases must specify:

(a) the load intensity category of a nuclear installation by the characteristics of the territory and the frequency of occurrence of such loads;

(b) the frequency category of the estimated nuclear installation states;

(c) qualification requirements for systems, structures and components;

(d) the category of consequences of the estimated nuclear status; and

(e) the acceptance criteria relevant to the categories of estimated nuclear status and the consequences of such status.

(3) When designing a nuclear installation, the basic project bases must be defined within the project bases.

(4) The basic project bases shall specify the requirements for reasonably practicable resilience of nuclear safety-related systems, structures and components. The intensity of this property of the territory shall be determined by assessing the property of the territory for the frequency of its occurrence, ensuring that the safety objectives are met.

(5) The resilience of the nuclear-safety-related systems, structures and components of nuclear equipment referred to in paragraph 4 must ensure that only accidental failures of nuclear-safety-related systems, structures and components of nuclear-related equipment are likely to occur for the determined intensity of the property.

§ 11

(1) The basic project bases must specify the basic external project events for the nuclear site. These basic external project events are the limit value of the load on systems, structures and components of nuclear installations by the properties of the territory and their combinations, at which the safety objectives of the nuclear installation project are met with high credibility.

(2) For the determination of the underlying external project event, all events generated by the property of the territory included in the assessment of the site for the location of the nuclear installation shall be taken into account.

(3) The intensity of the underlying external project event must be equal to the intensity of the assessed property of the territory with the frequency of occurrence every 10 000 years or less, except in the case of the properties of the territory for which, on the basis of the method used to assess the site for the location of nuclear installations, the other frequency of occurrence of the property of the territory and the corresponding acceptance criteria for loading with the intensity of the underlying external project event must be used.

(4) Basic external project events for the design and assessment of the resilience of selected equipment and systems, structures and components having an impact on nuclear safety necessary for the management of emergency conditions and radiation accidents of nuclear installations with a nuclear reactor with a heat output greater than 50 MW shall:

(a) for the determination of seismic resistance, be based on the postulated peak horizontal acceleration of the substructures of the construction structure which bears this system, structure or component with a minimum value of 1 / 10 of the gravitational acceleration value; and

(b) to determine the resistance to accidental falls of an aircraft or other object, to be based on the intensity of the effects of falling of such an object, the rate of fall on the area on which it may cause a basic external initiation event is higher than every 10 000 000 years.

Citation	Decree No. 329 / 2017 Coll., on requirements for nuclear equipment project
Regulation Type	Order
Author	-
Collection	Code of Laws

Date of Promulgation	11.10.2017
Effective from	01.11.2017
Effective until	-
Status	Valid

Decree No. 329 / 2017 Coll.

Decree on requirements for nuclear equipment project

Contents

ČÁST PRVNÍ

§ 1

§ 2

§ 3

ČÁST DRUHÁ

HLAVA I

§ 4

§ 5

§ 6

§ 7

§ 8

§ 9

§ 10

§ 11

§ 12

Contents

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