What is Full text of Act No. 313 / 2009 Coll.?

Full text of Act No. 313 / 2009 Coll., Act No. 143 / 2001 Coll., on the Protection of Competition and on the Amendment of Certain Acts (Act on the Protection of Competition), as resulting from subsequent amendments — Full text of Act No. 143 / 2001 Coll., on the Protection of Competition and on the amendment of certain laws (Law on the Protection of Competition), as resulting from subsequent amendments.

When it became Full text of Act No. 313 / 2009 Coll. effectiveness?

Full text of Act No. 313 / 2009 Coll. became effective date not available.

Is Full text of Act No. 313 / 2009 Coll. still valid?

Yes, Full text of Act No. 313 / 2009 Coll. is still valid and effective.

Full text of Act No. 313 / 2009 Coll. - Full text of Act No. 143 / 2001 Coll., o...

313

PRESIDENT OF THE GOVERNMENT

announces the full text of Act No. 143 / 2001 Coll., on the Protection of Competition and on the amendment of certain laws (Act on the Protection of Competition) as follows from the amendments made by Act No. 340 / 2004 Coll., Act No. 484 / 2004 Coll., Act No. 127 / 2005 Coll., Act No. 361 / 2005 Coll., Act No. 71 / 2007 Coll., Act No. 296 / 2007 Coll. and Act No. 155 / 2009 Coll.

THE LAW

on the protection of competition

Parliament has decided on this law of the Czech Republic:

ČÁST PRVNÍ

PROTECTION OF COMPETITION

HLAVA I

INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS

§ 1

Preliminary provisions

(1) This Law provides for the protection of competition in the market for goods and services ("goods') against its exclusion, restriction, other distortion or threat (" disturbances').

(a) agreements between competitors (§ 3 (1)),

(b) misuse of the dominant position of competitors; or

(c) the merger of competitors.

(2) In addition, the Act provides for the procedure for applying Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (hereinafter referred to as "the Treaty ') by the authorities of the Czech Republic and certain matters relating to their synergies with the Commission of the European Communities (hereinafter referred to as" the Commission') and the authorities of the other Member States of the European Communities in the procedure under Council Regulation (EC) on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (hereinafter referred to as "the Regulation ') and Council Regulation (EC) on the control of mergers (hereinafter referred to as" the Merger').

(3) Competitors who, by virtue of a special law or a decision given under a special law, provide services of general economic significance (1c) shall be subject to that law only if its application does not make it impossible to provide such services.

(4) This law shall apply mutatis mutandis to proceedings in the case of competitors whose conduct could affect trade between Member States of the European Communities pursuant to Article 81a 82 of the Treaty.

(5) This law also applies to the conduct of competitors abroad which distorts or threatens to distort competition in the Czech Republic.

(6) This law shall not apply to the negotiations referred to in paragraph 1, the effects of which are manifested exclusively on the foreign market, unless the international agreement to which the Czech Republic is bound results otherwise.

(7) Furthermore, this law does not apply to the protection of competition against unfair competitors (2).

§ 2

Definition of certain terms

(1) Competitors under this law are natural and legal persons, their associations, associations of such associations and other forms of grouping, even if such associations and groups are not legal persons if they participate in or may influence their activities, even if they are not entrepreneurs.

(2) The relevant market is the market for goods which, in terms of their characteristics, price and intended use, are identical, comparable or interchangeable in the territory in which the competitive conditions are sufficiently homogeneous and clearly distinct from neighbouring territories.

HLAVA II

COMPETITION AGREEMENTS

§ 3

(1) Agreements between competitors, decisions of their associations and concerted practices (hereinafter referred to as "agreements"), the object or effect of which is to distort competition, are prohibited and invalid (4), unless such or special law provides otherwise, or the Office for the Protection of Competition (hereinafter referred to as "the Office") authorises an exemption from the prohibition by implementing legislation. Agreements which have a negligible impact on competition are not considered prohibited.

(2) Agreements prohibited under paragraph 1 shall, in particular, prohibit agreements the object or effect of which is to distort competition because they contain provisions on:

(a) direct or indirect determination of prices and, where appropriate, other commercial conditions;

(b) restrictions or controls on production, sales, research and development or investment;

(c) the distribution of the market or sources of purchase;

(d) that the conclusion of a contract is to be linked to the acceptance of further transactions which are not, in substance or according to commercial practices and principles of fair trade with the subject-matter of the contract;

(e) the application of different conditions to individual competitors in the same or comparable transactions which disadvantage certain competitors in competition;

(f) that the parties to the agreement will not trade or otherwise cooperate economically with or otherwise cause harm to non-competitors (group boycott).

(3) If the reason for the prohibition concerns only part of the Agreement, only that part shall be prohibited and invalid. However, where the nature of the agreement, its content, its purpose or the circumstances in which it took place shows that it cannot be separated from the other content, the whole of the agreement shall be prohibited and invalid.

(4) The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to agreements which:

(a) contribute to the improvement of the production or distribution of goods or to the promotion of technical or economic development and provide consumers with a fair share of the benefits resulting therefrom;

(b) not impose on competitors restrictions which are not necessary to achieve the objectives referred to in (a);

(c) do not allow competitors to exclude competition in a substantial part of the market for goods the supply or purchase of which is the subject of an agreement.

§ 4

Block exemptions

(1) The prohibition laid down in Article 3 (1) does not apply to agreements which cannot affect trade between Member States of the European Communities under Article 81 of the Treaty, but which fulfil the other conditions laid down by block exemptions adopted pursuant to Article 83 (1) of the Treaty for the implementation of Article 81 (3) of the Treaty by the relevant Commission or Council Regulations ("Community block exemptions") or by the exception in the field of agriculture (5).

(2) The Authority may also allow block exemptions for other types of agreements where it is demonstrated that the distortion of competition to which the block exemption would result is outweighed by advantages for other market participants, in particular consumers.

(3) By decision of an individual competitor, the Authority shall withdraw the benefit of the exemption provided for in paragraph 1 or 2 if, as a result of market developments, an agreement subject to such an exemption would not fulfil the conditions laid down in Paragraph 3 (4).

§ 5

Horizontal and vertical agreements

(1) Agreements between competitors operating at the same level of the goods market are horizontal agreements.

(2) Agreements between competitors operating at different levels of the goods market are vertical agreements.

(3) Mixed agreements between competitors that operate simultaneously at the same horizontal level and at different vertical levels of the goods market shall also be considered as horizontal agreements; in doubt, it is considered to be a horizontal agreement.

§ 6

repealed

§ 7

(1) If the Office finds in the proceedings in cases referred to in paragraphs 3 to 5 that a prohibited agreement has been concluded, it shall state this in the decision and shall prohibit the implementation of the agreement for the future by this decision.

(2) Instead of the decision referred to in paragraph 1, the Office shall decide to terminate the proceedings on condition that the parties to the proceedings of the Office jointly propose commitments in favour of the restoration of effective competition which are sufficient to protect competition and the fulfilment of which is to remove the defective situation and that the prohibited agreement did not result in significant distortions of competition. In such a decision, the Office may also lay down the conditions and obligations necessary to ensure that such commitments are fulfilled. If the Office does not find the proposed commitments sufficient, it shall communicate the reasons in writing to the participants and continue the proceedings.

(3) The parties to proceedings may propose to the Office, in writing, within 15 days of the date on which the Office served them with a written notification, in which the Office shall communicate the essential facts of the case, their legal assessment and the references to the main evidence thereof contained in the file (hereinafter referred to as "the notice of reservations'); the subsequent proposals shall be taken into account by the Office only in cases of special consideration. The parties to proceedings shall be bound by their proposal against the Office and between each other and, where appropriate, against third parties, and shall not, from the submission of the application to the decision of the Office referred to in paragraph 2, comply with the Agreement as originally adopted.

(4) After the termination of the procedure referred to in paragraph 2, the Office may reopen the procedure referred to in paragraph 1 if:

(a) the conditions applicable to the decision referred to in paragraph 2 have changed substantially;

(b) competitors act in breach of their obligations under paragraph 2; or

(c) the decision was made on the basis of false or incomplete documents, data and information.

§ 8 a 9

cancelled

HLAVA III

DOMINANT STABILITY AND REDUCTION

§ 10

(1) The dominant position on the market is that of a competitor or together more competitors (joint dominance), which allows their market power to behave to a large extent independently of other competitors or consumers.

(2) Market power referred to in paragraph 1 The Authority shall assess, on the basis of the value expression of the quantities of supplies or purchases on the market of the goods concerned (market share) achieved by a competitor or by a competitor with common dominance in a period which is examined under this law and by other indicators, in particular the economic and financial strength of competitors, legal or other barriers to entry for other competitors, the degree of vertical integration of competitors, the structure of the market and the size of the market shares of the closest competitors.

(3) If the indicators referred to in paragraph 2 do not prove otherwise, the dominant position shall not be deemed to have been taken by a competitor or competitors with a common dominant position who have reached a market share of less than 40% in the period under examination.

§ 11

(1) Abuse of a dominant position on the detriment of other competitors or consumers is prohibited. The abuse of a dominant position is in particular:

(a) direct or indirect enforcement of unfair terms in contracts with other market participants, in particular enforcement of transactions which, at the time of conclusion of the contract, are manifestly disproportionate to the consideration granted;

(b) tying consent to the conclusion of a contract on condition that the other Party also withdraws other transactions which are not related to the subject-matter of the contract in substance or according to commercial practice;

(c) the application of different conditions in identical or comparable transactions to individual market participants which are disadvantaged in competition;

(d) stopping or restricting production, sales or research and development at the expense of consumers;

(e) the long-term offer and sale of goods at excessively low prices which have or may have the effect of distorting competition;

(f) a refusal to grant other competitors access to their own transmission networks or to similar distribution and other infrastructure facilities owned or used by a dominant competitor on other legal grounds where, for legal or other reasons, other competitors cannot, without the co-use of such facilities, operate on the same market as dominant competitors who do not demonstrate that such co-use is not possible for operational or other reasons or cannot be reasonably demanded of them; The same shall apply mutatis mutandis to refusal of access to other competitors for an appropriate remuneration for the use of intellectual property or access to networks owned or used by a dominant competitor on a different legal basis where such use is necessary for participation in competition in the same market as the dominant competitors or in another market.

(2) Where the Office finds that a dominant position has been misused in the proceedings referred to in paragraph 1, it shall state that fact in the decision and shall prohibit such conduct for the future by this decision.

(3) Instead of the decision referred to in paragraph 2, the Office shall decide to terminate the procedure on condition that the parties to the proceedings of the Office jointly propose commitments in favour of the restoration of effective competition which are sufficient to protect competition and the fulfilment of which has been remedied and that the abuse of a dominant position did not result in a material distortion of competition. In such a decision, the Office may also lay down the conditions and obligations necessary to ensure that such commitments are fulfilled. If the Office does not find the proposed commitments sufficient, it shall communicate the reasons in writing to the participants and continue the proceedings.

(4) Obligations referred to in paragraph 3 may be proposed in writing by the parties to proceedings to the Office no later than 15 days after the date on which the Office served them with the communication of the reservations; the subsequent proposals shall be taken into account by the Office only in cases of special consideration. The parties to proceedings shall be bound by their proposal to the Office and to each other and, where appropriate, to third parties, and shall not, from the submission of the application to the Office's decision pursuant to paragraph 3, proceed in the manner which is the subject of the Office's reservations.

(5) After the termination of the procedure referred to in paragraph 3, the Office may reopen the procedure and issue the decision referred to in paragraph 2 if:

(a) the conditions applicable to the decision referred to in paragraph 3 have changed substantially;

(b) competitors act in breach of the obligations referred to in paragraph 3; or

(c) the decision was made on the basis of false or incomplete documents, data and information.

HLAVA IV

COMPETITION

§ 12

Definition of terms

(1) The merger between competitors takes place by mergers of two or more of the market of previously independent competitors.

(2) The acquisition of a company (7) by a contract, on the basis of an auction or otherwise, of another competitor or part thereof shall be regarded as a merger of competitors under this law. For the purposes of this Act, a part of an undertaking shall also mean that part of a competitor undertaking which can be clearly attributed to the turnover achieved by the sale of goods on the relevant market, even if it does not constitute a separate organisational component of the undertaking (7a).

(3) A concentration of competitors under this law shall also be considered to be the case if one or more persons who are not entrepreneurs but already control at least one competitor, or if one or more entrepreneurs acquire the opportunity to directly or indirectly control another competitor, in particular:

(a) the acquisition of participating securities, commercial or member interests; or

(b) by contract or other means enabling them to control another competitor.

(4) For the purposes of this Act, a check shall mean the possibility of exercising a decisive influence on the activities of another competitor on the basis of legal or factual facts, in particular on the basis of:

(a) the right of ownership or use of the undertaking of the controlled competitor or part thereof; or

(b) rights or other legal elements which give decisive influence to the composition, voting and decision-making of the authorities of the controlled competitor.

(5) The combination is also the creation of a competitor, which is jointly controlled by several competitors and which has long been performing all functions of a separate economic unit (the "jointly controlled undertaking ').

(6) To the extent that the establishment of a joint-controlled undertaking setting up a concentration pursuant to paragraph 5 aims or results in the coordination of the competitive behaviour of its competitors who remain independent on the market, such coordination shall be assessed in accordance with the criteria set out in Section 3.

(7) Two or more connections which are contingent upon each other and which are related in substance, time and staffing, are considered to be one single link.

(8) A bank's qualifying participation in a legal entity resulting from the repayment of the share issue rate by offsetting the bank's debt to that legal entity shall not be regarded as a concentration of competitors if that qualifying holding is held for the duration of the rescue or financial reconstruction of that legal entity for a maximum period of 1 year. It is also not considered to be a concentration of competitors where competitors that are providers of investment services acquire temporarily, for a maximum period of 1 year, the shares of another competitor for the purpose of selling them, unless they exercise voting rights associated with those shares in order to identify or influence the competitive behaviour of the controlled competitor. On a proposal from a bank or a competitor that is an investment service provider, the Authority may extend the period of 1 year if the applicant demonstrates that the purpose for which he has acquired participation in another competitor could not be achieved during that period for objective reasons.

(9) The transfer of certain powers of the statutory authorities of competitors to persons engaged in activities under special legislation, such as liquidator8) and the insolvency truster9) is also not considered to be a link between competitors.

§ 13

Communication from competitors subject to the Authority's authorisation

The concentration of competitors shall be subject to the authorisation of the Office if:

(a) the total net turnover of all merging competitors achieved in the last financial year in the Czech Republic market is greater than CZK 1.5 billion and at least two of the merging competitors each achieved in the last financial year in the Czech Republic market a net turnover of more than CZK 250 million, or

b) Net turnover achieved during the last financial year on the Czech market

1. in the case of a merger pursuant to Article 12 (1), at least one of the parties to the merger,

2. in the case of a concentration pursuant to Article 12 (2), the acquiree or a substantial part thereof,

3. in the case of a concentration pursuant to Article 12 (3), by the competitor under control; or

4. in the case of a concentration pursuant to Article 12 (5), at least one of the competitors establishing a jointly controlled undertaking

is higher than 1 500 000 000 CZK and at the same time the worldwide net turnover achieved by the next connecting competitor over the last financial year is higher than 1 500 000 000 CZK.

§ 14

Calculation of turnover

(1) Net turnover (10) of merging competitors means the net turnover achieved by individual competitors only in the activity which is the subject of their business. If competitors are not entrepreneurs, the net turnover is only the turnover achieved in the activity to which they were set up or normally carried out.

(2) Net turnover

(a) by all competing competitors;

(b) persons who will check on the merging competitors after the connection has taken place and persons who are controlled by the merging competitors;

(c) persons controlled by a person who will check on the merging competitor after the connection has taken place; and

(d) persons controlled jointly by two or more of the persons referred to in points (a) to (c).

(3) The share of turnover achieved by the sale of goods between the merging competitors and the persons referred to in paragraph 2 (b), (c) and (d) shall not be included in the common net turnover of the merging competitors.

(4) If only part of the competitor is merged, only the part of the turnover achieved by the merging part of the competitor is included in the net turnover.

(5) If there have been two or more connections between the same competitors over a period of 2 years, such links shall be considered as one.

(6) For bank11) and credit and other financial institutions, with the exception of insurance undertakings, the net turnover is the sum of the proceeds, in particular interest income, securities and equity, fees and commissions and profits from financial operations. In the case of insurance undertakings (12), net turnover means the sum of premiums written according to all insurance contracts concluded.

§ 15

Initiation

(1) The procedure for authorising a concentration shall be initiated on a proposal.

(2) In the cases referred to in Article 12 (1), (2) and (5), all competitors intending to merge with a merger are required to enter into or part of another competitor's undertaking by contract or establish a jointly controlled undertaking; in the cases referred to in Article 12 (3), it shall submit an application for the authorisation of a concentration by a competitor who shall be able to directly or indirectly control another competitor.

(3) Application for authorisation of a connection:

(a) may also be submitted before the conclusion of a contract establishing a concentration or before obtaining control of another competitor by other means;

(b) it must contain the justifications, documents certifying the facts relevant to the concentration and the formalities laid down in the implementing legislation (Section 26 (1)).

(4) The procedure for authorisation of a concentration shall be initiated on the date on which the application for authorisation of a concentration containing all the elements referred to in paragraph 3 was received to the Office. If the draft does not contain such elements, the Office may, on the basis of an assessment of the supporting documents received, issue only a written opinion as to whether the concentration is subject to authorisation under this law and the proposal should be supplemented.

§ 16

Procedure

(1) The Authority shall immediately notify the initiation of the procedure for the authorisation of a concentration in the Trade Bulletin and electronically through the public data network, setting a time limit for the submission of objections to that concentration.

(2) Following the initiation of the procedure, the Authority will assess whether the concentration is subject to its authorisation. If the Office is not subject to a concentration of authorisation, it shall issue a decision within 30 days of the initiation of the procedure. In cases where the concentration is subject to an authorisation by the Authority but does not result in significant distortions of competition, the Authority shall, within the same period, issue a decision authorising the concentration. If the Authority finds that the concentration raises serious concerns about significant distortions of competition, in particular because it creates or strengthens the dominant position of the merging competitors or of any of them, it shall notify the parties in writing within the same time limit and inform the parties that it continues the proceedings.

(3) If the Office has not given a decision on the application for authorisation of a concentration within the time limit referred to in paragraph 2 or has not informed the parties in writing that, for the reasons set out in paragraph 2, it has continued the procedure, the Office has authorised the concentration by the expiry of that period.

(4) The Authority may, under the conditions laid down in the Merger Regulation (13), request the Commission to carry out the procedure and to examine the concentration itself. Pending the Commission's decision whether to assess such a concentration itself, the Office shall suspend the procedure. If the Commission decides to consider such a concentration itself, the Office shall suspend the proceedings.

(5) If the Office notifies the parties in writing pursuant to paragraph 2 that it is continuing the procedure for the application for authorisation of a concentration, it shall take a decision within 5 months of the initiation of the procedure. If the Authority has not given a decision on the concentration within that time limit, it shall allow the concentration to expire.

(6) The Office may invite a party in writing to provide further information necessary for the decision to authorise a concentration or to provide further evidence of such facts. The period from the date of service of such an invitation to the party to the proceedings to the date on which that obligation is fulfilled shall not be counted against the time limits laid down in paragraphs 2 and 5. Where a decision of the Office on an application for authorisation of a concentration is annulled by the President of the Office or by a court, the time limits referred to in paragraphs 2 and 5 shall run again from the date on which the decision of the President of the Office or of the Court of Justice becomes final.

(7) The concentration may be registered only after the decision of the Office authorising the concentration has become final.

§ 16a

Simplified clearance procedure

(1) A simplified proposal for authorisation of a concentration, containing the elements laid down in the implementing legislation ("simplified procedure"), may be submitted in the case of a concentration where:

(a) none of the competitors involved are active on the same relevant market, or their combined market share is less than 15%, and none of the competitors are vertically downstream on the relevant market in which another of those competitors is active, or their market share is less than 25% on each such market; or

(b) the competitor shall have sole control over the joint venture in which he has so far participated in joint control.

(2) The Authority shall immediately notify the initiation of the simplified procedure in electronic form through the public data network and shall set a time limit for the submission of objections to the concentration; Paragraph 16 (1) shall not apply.

(3) If, in the simplified procedure, the Authority concludes that the concentration is subject to authorisation and that it needs additional information for its proper assessment, it will, within 20 days of the initiation of the procedure, send an invitation to the parties to submit a full proposal for authorisation of the concentration. the time limit for the decision pursuant to Article 16 (2) shall begin to run from the date of receipt of the complete application for authorisation of the concentration of the Office. Otherwise, the Authority shall, within the same time limit, issue a decision authorising a concentration, the justification of which shall only include the names of the merging competitors, the relevant market or, where appropriate, the sector in which the merging competitors operate and the fact that the decision was issued in a simplified procedure.

(4) If, within the time limit referred to in paragraph 3, the Authority has not issued a decision authorising a concentration, the Authority shall authorise the concentration by the end of that period.

(5) Unless otherwise provided by this law, the simplified procedure under the general provisions on assessment of concentrations shall be followed.

§ 17

Assessment of connection

(1) When deciding on a proposal to authorise a concentration, the Authority shall assess in particular the need to maintain and develop effective competition, the structure of all links between the markets concerned, the share of the merging competitors in those markets, their economic and financial strength, the legal and other barriers to the entry of other competitors into the concentration of the markets concerned, the possibility of choosing suppliers or customers connecting competitors, the development of supply and demand in the markets concerned, the needs and interests of consumers, and research and development, the results of which benefit the consumer and do not prevent effective competition.

(2) The decision to authorise a concentration shall also apply to such restrictions on competition as the competitors indicated in the application for authorisation of a concentration and which are directly related to the concentration and are necessary for its implementation.

(3) The Authority will not authorise the concentration if it would result in a significant distortion of competition on the relevant market, in particular because it would create or strengthen a dominant position between competitors or one of them. If the combined share of the merging competitors in the relevant market does not exceed 25%, their concentration shall be deemed not to result in a significant distortion of competition unless the opposite is demonstrated in the assessment of the concentration.

(4) The Office may make the clearance of the concentration conditional on the undertakings proposed by the merging competitors before or during the opening of the procedure for authorisation of the concentration, but not later than 15 days after the communication of the reservations to the last party to the proceedings has been received. The Office shall take account of any subsequent proposals for commitments or changes in their content only in cases of special consideration if they are received by the Office within 15 days of the end of the period referred to in the first sentence of this provision. If the merging competitors propose such commitments during the first 30 days of the procedure, the period referred to in Article 16 (2) shall be extended by 15 days. If the merging competitors propose these commitments after having been informed by the Authority, pursuant to Article 16 (2), that the procedure is continued, the time limit for the decision under Article 16 (5) shall be extended by 15 days. Where the Authority makes the clearance of the concentration conditional on the fulfilment of commitments proposed by competitors, it may, by decision, lay down the conditions and obligations necessary to ensure that those commitments are fulfilled.

§ 18

Deferred execution of the concentration

(1) Before the submission of an application to initiate proceedings pursuant to Paragraph 15 (1) and before the legal power of the decision of the Authority authorising the concentration, the concentration must not be carried out by a competitor.

(2) The prohibition referred to in paragraph 1 shall not apply to the execution of a concentration which is to take place on the basis of a public offer of take-over of participating securities or on the basis of a series of transactions in listed securities resulting in the control being obtained from different entities, provided that an application for the initiation of proceedings pursuant to Paragraph 15 (1) has been made without delay and that the voting rights attached to such securities are not exercised; This shall be without prejudice to the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4.

(3) The Authority may decide, on a proposal from competitors, to authorise an exemption from the prohibition on the implementation of concentrations referred to in paragraph 1 if they or third parties otherwise suffer serious damage or other serious harm. The application for an exemption may be submitted by competitors at the same time as the complete application for a concentration authorisation pursuant to Article 15 (3) (b) or at any time during the procedure. The proposal shall be written, reasoned and shall imply the extent to which an exemption is requested. The Office may invite the parties to the proceedings in writing to provide further evidence for the decision granting the exemption or for such facts. The period from the date of receipt of such a call to the date on which that obligation is fulfilled shall not count against the time limits referred to in paragraph 4.

(4) The application for an exemption referred to in paragraph 3 shall be decided by the Authority without delay, not later than 30 days after its receipt. In deciding to authorise an exemption, the Authority shall take into account, in addition to damage and other damage, the consequences of the exemption on competition in the relevant market. If the Authority has not taken a decision within that period, the exemption shall be granted. The Office may also decide to grant an exemption in relation to certain acts covered by the application; in the rest, the Office shall reject the proposal. The Authority may lay down conditions and restrictions in the decision authorising the exemption in order to maintain effective competition.

(5) Where the Authority finds that the concentration has been carried out contrary to the Authority's final decision, it shall decide on the measures necessary to restore effective competition on the relevant market. To that end, the Authority shall, in particular, oblige competitors to sell their shares, transfer the merged undertaking or part thereof, or terminate the contract on the basis of which the concentration took place, where appropriate, to take other appropriate measures necessary to restore effective competition in the relevant market. The Authority may issue such a decision even if it finds that a concentration has taken place without a request for initiation pursuant to Article 15 (1).

§ 19

Repeal of the clearance decision

(1) The Office may revoke the decision authorising a concentration if it finds that it has authorised the concentration on the basis of supporting documents, data and information for which the completeness, accuracy and veracity of the case are the responsibility of the parties and which have been found to be wholly or partly false or incomplete, or the authorisation has been obtained by the parties to the proceedings having misled the Office or failing to comply with the conditions, restrictions or obligations which the Office has made conditional on the authorisation.

(2) The procedure for the annulment of the decision authorising the concentration may be initiated by the Authority within 1 year of the finding of the facts referred to in paragraph 1, but not later than 5 years after the occurrence of the facts.

HLAVA V

OFFICE

§ 20

(1) The competence of the Office is governed by specific legislation14). Office other than powers under other provisions of this law

(a) monitor whether and how competitors fulfil their obligations under this law or by decisions of the Office under this law;

(b) publish proposals to permit the concentration of competitors and its final decisions.

(2) In cases where the situation on individual markets indicates that competition is distorted, the Authority shall carry out an examination of competition conditions on such markets (hereinafter referred to as "sectoral investigations') and propose measures to improve them, in particular by issuing reports containing recommendations for improving competition conditions.

(3) In carrying out the surveillance referred to in paragraph 1 (a) and carrying out the sectoral investigations referred to in paragraph 2, the Office shall, mutatis mutandis, act in accordance with Article 21e, 21f and 21g and may initiate an ex officio procedure.

(4) Where an infringement of the obligations laid down in Articles 3 (1), 11 (1) or 18 (1) is found, the Authority may impose corrective measures designed to restore effective competition on the market and may set a reasonable time limit for them to be fulfilled. The imposition of a remedy measure does not preclude the parallel imposition of a fine pursuant to § 22 (1) (b), (c) or (d) and § 22a (1) (b), (c) or (d).

§ 20a

(1) The Authority has the power to apply Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty in individual cases where the conduct of competitors could affect trade between Member States within the meaning of Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty. To that end, it shall be entitled to:

(a) require the cessation of the infringement;

(b) order precautionary measures;

(c) making commitments;

(d) impose fines.

(2) The Authority may, by decision of an individual competitor, withdraw the advantage of the Community block exemption where agreements have, in a particular case, effects incompatible with Article 81 (3) of the Treaty in the territory of the Czech Republic or to a part thereof which has all the characteristics of a separate geographic market.

(3) The Office is hereby authorised to:

(a) request the Commission to provide copies of the documents necessary for the assessment of the case;

(b) consult the Commission on any case in which Community law is applied;

(c) to provide each other with the Commission and other competition authorities of the Member States and to use as evidence any factual or legal fact, including confidential information;

(d) request the Commission to include the case in the agenda of the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices;

(e) submit observations to the courts on questions relating to the application of Article 81 or 82 of the Treaty and request the competent court to send any documents necessary for the assessment of the case;

(f) conduct investigations at the request of the competition authority of another Member State;

(g) to submit its opinions on the procedures to be followed by the Commission under the Merger Regulation;

(h) to take decisions in cases where Regulations of the European Communities, adopted in accordance with Articles 83 to 86 of the Treaty, entitle the Office to take decisions;

(i) take corrective measures, the conditions and details of which have been determined by the Commission and when it has authorised the Member State to take the necessary corrective action pursuant to Article 85 (2) of the Treaty.

(4) The Office shall:

(a) to provide the Commission with all necessary information in order to carry out the acts entrusted to it by the Merger Regulation and the Merger Regulation;

(b) provide the Commission with the necessary assistance in the event of failure to allow or complicate an investigation under the Regulation or the Merger Regulation by a competitor;

(c) inform the Commission and the competition authorities of the other Member States in writing of the initiation of proceedings under Article 81 or 82 of the Treaty;

Citation	Full text of Act No. 313 / 2009 Coll., Act No. 143 / 2001 Coll., on the Protection of Competition and on the Amendment of Certain Acts (Act on the Protection of Competition), as resulting from subsequent amendments
Regulation Type	Declared full text
Author	-
Collection	Code of Laws

Date of Promulgation	07.09.2009
Effective from	-
Effective until	-
Status	Valid

Full text of Act No. 313 / 2009 Coll.

Full text of Act No. 143 / 2001 Coll., on the Protection of Competition and on the amendment of certain laws (Law on the Protection of Competition), as resulting from subsequent amendments

Contents