The Constitutional Court found no 289 / 2024 Coll.
Findings of the Constitutional Court sp. zn.
Valid
The Constitutional Tribunal found
Text versions:
01.10.2024
289
FIND
The Constitutional Court
of 31 July 2024
sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 39 / 21 concerning the repeal of certain provisions of Act No. 111 / 2006 Coll., on aid in material distress, as amended
On behalf of the Republic
The Constitutional Court decided under sp. zn. Pl. Pl. ÚS 39 / 21 on 31 July 2024 in plenary composed of the President of the Court of Josef Baxy and judges and judges of Lucie Dolanská Bányai, Josef Fiala (Judge Rapporteur), Jaromír Jirsy, Veronica Christian, Zdenek Kühn, Tomáš Langáš, Jiří Nábán, Katřina Ronovské, Jan Svatona, Pavel Šámal, David Uhlíř, Jan Winter and Daniela Zeman, on the proposal of the group of 17 Senators, represented by Dr. PhDr Pavel Uhlem, Ph.D., Ph.D., lawyer, seat of Kořenský 1107 / 15, Praha 5 - Mechoch, on the annulment of § 48 (4) in the words, "
as follows:
I. Paragraph 50 (2) to (6), § 51a and § 75 (e) in words "or reductions pursuant to § 51a" of Act No. 111 / 2006 Coll., on aid in material distress, as amended, shall be deleted from the date of the declaration of findings in the Collection of Laws and International Treaties.
II. The remainder is rejected.
Reasons
Application for revocation of individual legal provisions and their wording
1. By a proposal pursuant to Article 87 (1) (a) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as "Constitution") and Article 64 (1) (b) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, a group of 17 Senators (hereinafter referred to as "the draftsman"), the Constitutional Court proposed that the heading marked by the provisions of Act No. 111 / 2006 Coll., on aid in material need, as amended (hereinafter referred to as "the Law on aid in material need") and Act No. 251 / 2016 Coll.
2. The text of the contested provisions is as follows:
(a) Paragraph 48 (4) of Act No. 111 / 2006 Coll., on aid in material distress, as amended by Act No. 327 / 2021 Coll., in the bold section indicated: "(4) Benefits are not subject to enforcement unless otherwise specified."
(b) Paragraph 50 (2) to (6) of the Act on aid in material distress, as amended by Act No. 327 / 2021 Coll., including footnote:
"(2) The municipal authority of the municipality with extended jurisdiction shall inform the relevant regional branch of the Labour Office of any infringement pursuant to § 51a (2) (a) and (b), the time of their commission and the administrative penalties imposed on them by law.
(3) The municipal authority of the municipality with extended jurisdiction shall inform the relevant regional branch of the Labour Office of the fines imposed by it and not paid in due time for the offence referred to in § 51a (2) (c) to (f), if found 80) that, within the last 12 months of its commission, the perpetrator has committed at least 2 other offences pursuant to § 51a (2) and the time of all such offences.
(4) The municipal authority of a municipality with extended jurisdiction shall inform the competent regional branch of the Labour Office of the fines imposed by it and not paid in due time for the offence referred to in § 51a (2) (c) to (f) and the time of its commission, also if they have reason to believe that the fine is inoperable by a procedure other than that referred to in § 51a and that at the same time there are serious doubts as to the ability of the offender to remedy; the reasons for the procedure referred to in this paragraph must be justified in such a way that the procedure can be reviewed.
(5) Where the authority of assistance in material distress receives from the municipal authority with extended scope the information referred to in paragraph 2 and, in the case at hand, the procedure provided for in Paragraph 51a cannot be applied, it shall inform the municipal authority with extended scope without delay and not later than 20 days from the date on which it received the information referred to in paragraph 2. Similarly, the body of assistance in a material emergency shall proceed in cases where the procedure provided for in Paragraph 51a is initiated, but the procedure provided for in Paragraph 51a will no longer be applicable after the change of facts, and in cases where the procedure under Paragraph 51a starts, but the penalties may not be applied without delay.
(6) The municipal authority of the municipality with extended jurisdiction shall refrain from recovery of the fine imposed by it from the moment it has made the notification referred to in paragraphs 2 to 4 until it receives the information referred to in paragraph 5.
80) § 12 of Act No. 251 / 2016 Coll., on certain offences. '
(c) Paragraph 51a of the Act on aid in material distress provided for in the heading "Reductions to the living allowance and housing supplement for penalties for infringements," including footnotes:
"(1) Reductions may be made from the subsistence allowance and the supplement to the housing allowance to cover the final fines imposed for offences referred to in paragraph 2 committed by a natural person who is not a young person (81) and who is the beneficiary of the subsistence allowance or the supplement to the living allowance or the person jointly assessed with him, provided that no more than 3 years have elapsed since the final imposition of the fine and no more than one year82). The provisions on the inaccessibility of the dose of execution do not apply in this case.
(2) The offences referred to in paragraph 1 are:
(a) the child's failure to register for compulsory schools83);
(b) failure to care for compulsory schools84);
(c) against public policy (85);
(d) against civil tries86),
(e) against property 87); and
(f) in breach of the obligations laid down by the generally binding citizens' decree (88) for the organisation, conduct and termination of publicly accessible sports and cultural enterprises, including dance entertainments and discos-tions, by establishing binding conditions to the extent necessary to ensure public order (89).
(3) The closeness referred to in paragraph 1 shall be decided by the institution of assistance in a material emergency which pays or last pays the benefit. The preference for deductions under this provision shall be those under Paragraph 51. After a reduction from the dose, if there is an unprovided child among the jointly assessed persons, the dose must remain at least at the minimum of its life-expectancy, for each uninsured child from the group of persons jointly assessed.
(4) The department of assistance in material distress shall immediately refer the amount deducted from the benefits referred to in paragraphs 1 to 3 to an account designated by the municipal authority with extended scope which it has imposed.
81) Paragraph 2 (1) (c) of Act No. 218 / 2003 Coll., on the Responsibility of Youth for Illegal Acts and on Judicial Affairs in Youth Matters and on the Amendment of Certain Laws (Law on Judicial Matters in Youth Matters), as amended.
82) § 40 of Act No. 500 / 2004 Coll., Administrative Regulation.
83) Paragraph 182a (1) (a) (1) and (2) of Act No. 561 / 2004 Coll., as amended by Act No. 178 / 2016 Coll.
84) Paragraph 182a (1) (a) (3) of Act No. 561 / 2004 Coll., as amended by Act No. 178 / 2016 Coll.
85) Article 5 (1) of Act No 251 / 2016 Coll.
86) § 7 paragraphs 1 and 3 of Act No 251 / 2016 Coll.
87) § 8 paragraphs 1 and 3 of Act No 251 / 2016 Coll.
88) Paragraph 4 (2) of Act No 251 / 2016 Coll.
89) § 10 (b) of Act No. 128 / 2000 Coll., on Municipality (municipal establishment), as amended by Act No. 313 / 2002 Coll. '
(d) Paragraph 12 (b) of Act No. 251 / 2016 Coll., on certain offences, as amended by Act No. 327 / 2021 Coll., including footnote:
"The criminal record kept by the Register of Penalties shall include final decisions on the offence by:
(b) Paragraph 4 (2), which consists of a breach of the obligation laid down in a generally binding order of the municipality for the organisation, conduct and termination of public accessible sports and cultural enterprises, including dance and discos-tions, by establishing binding conditions to the extent necessary to ensure public order (1).
1) § 10 (b) of Act No. 128 / 2000 Coll., on Municipality (municipal establishment), as amended by Act No. 313 / 2002 Coll. '
Arguments of the appellant
3. The appellant contends that the contested provisions provide the normative basis for otherwise unrestricted and inadmissible interference in the right to aid in material distress, infringing the principle of individual liability and introducing the principle of collective responsibility. As a result, they infringe the prohibition to deny the fundamental right on grounds of belonging to the genus and are disproportionate penalties.
4. The rights of assistance in a material emergency guaranteed in Article 30 (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as the Charter) may only be invoked in accordance with Article 41 (1) of the Charter within the limits of the laws implementing this fundamental right. According to the appellant, the scope of the law at the legal level is defined quite precisely in Sections 2, 3 and 5 of the Act on aid in material distress. Given that a constitutional law is provided for in the scope and conditions of the ordinary (sc. sub-constitutional) law, the definition contained in this law becomes part of the constitutional law in the material sense and enjoys, in accordance with Article 41 (1), the Charter of Protection at the level of constitutional order. The contested provisions do not change the legal definition of a material emergency, they do not change the range of recipients of benefits in a material emergency, they only allow the specified benefits of assistance in a material emergency to be used, in some cases up to 100%, to satisfy a claim arising from a criminal infringement procedure. They therefore allow a situation in which a particular person does not receive help in a material emergency. Thus, the contested provisions overrule the interest in the recovery of certain fines over the right to assistance in material distress, which the appellant considers to be inadmissible. Social law protected in Article 30 (2) The Charter is suppressed in order to achieve an interest that does not have constitutional protection. In some cases, the right to aid in material distress can therefore be completely emptied, which, according to the appellant, is an intervention in the right to human dignity.
5. According to the appellant, the contested measure allows not only the perpetrators of the offence to be deprived of the benefit of aid in a material emergency but also persons jointly assessed within the meaning of Article 2 (1) of the Law on aid in a material emergency. It is not only an indirect impact, but a direct impact on persons jointly assessed who have not committed an infringement, since their levy can also be used to pay the fine. Although this collective responsibility is limited in the interest of uninsured children, the dose is protected up to CZK 1,970 for children aged up to 6 years, up to CZK 2,420 for children aged between 6 and 15 and CZK 2,770 for children aged between 15 and 26. The average amount of the housing supplement for the whole family in May 2021 was CZK 8,587. Maintaining a housing supplement only for unprovided children in those amounts is a major economic intervention, provided that the entire family has to live on the reduced amount. In families where there are no dependent children, the benefit may also be deprived of an elderly or disabled person who is cared for by other family members. The contested regulation allows for immediate penalty for assistance in material distress also for a person who is clean, based on the action of another person for whom the affected person is not liable. This is thus an inadmissible collective sentence which infringes Article 3 (1) of the Charter, according to which fundamental rights and freedoms are guaranteed irrespective of their nationality.
6. According to the appellant, the contested legislation creates a situation in which a person who commits an infringement and is at the same time a person in material need will feel the effects of the sanction significantly differently from another person. The administrative authority shall impose a penalty for committing an offence in which it shall take into account the usual circumstances, but thereafter a penalty which will be different and more pronounced by its effect or be executed on another person. This makes a different approach compared to a person who is not in material need. It is not legally possible for persons to bear the consequences of formally identical sanctions significantly differently on the basis of their wealth.
7. The appellant points out that pursuant to Article 323 (2) of Act No. 141 / 1961 Coll., on criminal proceedings of the Court (Criminal Code), as amended, the sentence of imprisonment may be repeatedly postponed for more than one year, in particular if the execution of the sentence could have extremely severe consequences for the sentenced or his family. On the other hand, the contested legislation allows the persons affected by poverty to face more invasive and human rights threatening the enforcement of the decision for an offence, i.e. a minor offence compared to a criminal offence. According to the appellant, the contested regulation constitutes a non-accesoric inequality by allowing interference with the right to aid in material distress in the case of few serious offences, whereas more serious offences (e.g. environmental offences) cannot have a similar effect.
8. A person in material need who has to saturation his basic living needs does not have many options to deal with the implementation of the reduction of the living allowance and the additional housing allowance. It can procure funds illegally, work on the so-called 'black', or be in debt. The first two are illegal, the third is legal, but it implies further problems in the future. The contested provisions therefore support the phenomenon of a social exclusion trap. The appellant refers to studies which demonstrate that a reduction in benefits for similar reasons leads to an increase in crime. If the purpose of the contested regulation is to reduce crime, the fact that the legislative solution adopted gives rise to exactly the opposite effect means that such a regulation cannot stand in the proportionality test.
9. The repeal of Paragraph 12 (b) of the Act on certain offences, as amended by Act No. 327 / 2021 Coll., is proposed on the grounds that this provision serves solely for the implementation of the contested provisions of the Act on aid in material distress, in itself without meaning.
Proceedings
10. The Constitutional Court assessed the procedural assumptions of the proceedings and found that the application had been submitted by the authorised appellant [Paragraph 64 (1) (b) of the Constitutional Court Act]. The Constitutional Court shall have jurisdiction in its proceedings. The proposal contains the statutory requirements and is not inadmissible within the meaning of Section 66 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as the Law on the Constitutional Court). The reason for the termination of proceedings under Section 67 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll., did not occur.
Observation of the party to the proceedings, notification of the Government and observations of the Ombudsman
11. The Constitutional Court, pursuant to Article 69 (1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, requested the observations of the two chambers of the party acting on its behalf [Paragraph 9 of Act No. 300 / 2017 Coll., on the principles of conduct and contact between the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, and on the amendment of Act No. 90 / 1995 Coll., on the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, as amended, i.e. the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, and sent the proposal to the Government (§ 69 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court) and the Ombudsman (§ 69 (3 of the Law on the Constitutional Court).
12. The Chamber of Deputies described in its observations the course of the legislative process leading to the adoption of the amendment to the Act on aid in material need (Act No. 327 / 2021 Coll., amending Act No. 111 / 2006 Coll., on aid in material need, as amended, and Act No. 251 / 2016 Coll., on certain infringements, as amended by Act No. 178 / 2018 Coll.), which added the provisions proposed for annulment to the Act. Similarly, the Senate gave a description of the legislative process leading to the adoption of this amendment.
13. The Government has informed the Constitutional Court that it does not intervene.
14. The Ombudsman entered the proceedings as an intervener and, in his observations, agreed with the appellant's view that the contested legislation unduly interfered with the constitutional guarantee of the right to aid in material distress. It recalled that, according to the Constitutional Court's finding of 20 May 2008 sp. zn. 2. assess whether the contested scheme does not affect the very existence of social law or the actual realisation of its essential content; 3. in the event of a negative response to assess the law by a more moderate test of reason; 4. In a positive response, subject the law to a stricter proportionality test, where it is examined whether intervention in the essential content of the law is justified by the absolute exceptional nature of the current situation. On the first step, the Ombudsman stated that the purpose of the right to aid in material distress was to ensure human dignity, that is, to safeguard the fundamental conditions for survival. When penalising a housing supplement and a living allowance in the execution procedure, it is not only a matter of reducing the comfort of life, but there is a possibility that the disabled will fall to the bottom of existence and, as a result, resort to illegal activity in securing the basic life needs of their family and their family. The legislator sought to protect the interests of uninsured children by providing that, after the collisions carried out, the benefit must remain at least at the level of the minimum of life for each child, thereby mitigating the impact of the contested treatment, but not enough to interfere with the very right to aid in material distress. The exemption concerns only a narrow group of beneficiaries of benefits. If there are no children in the group of persons assessed jointly, the fines imposed and not paid may be deducted from the total amount of aid granted in a material emergency. However, even in families with dependent children, the contested legislation does not preclude the deduction of unpaid fines from the housing supplement. This may result in a de facto emptying of the right to aid in material distress. According to the Ombudsman, the contested legislation is therefore unjustifiably interfering with the essential content of the right to aid in material distress and denies its substance (second step of the test).
15. On the basis of that finding, the Ombudsman took the proportionality test. He considered that the objective of the regulation pursued was to encourage the perpetrators of the specified offences to avoid further offenses, which is, in general, a legitimate objective, but the contested regulation does not stand up to the criterion of suitability (the second step of the proportionality test), as it will lead to a sharpening of the problem it is facing. Beneficiaries of benefits of aid in a material emergency are those who have very low incomes and are unable to meet their own needs. The loss of income by withdrawing the awarded benefit will have to be dealt with in another way, most often in the form of disadvantaged loans, or even illegal activities. According to the Ombudsman, the contested legislation was not appropriately chosen as the same intention could be achieved in a more efficient manner. In the Act on aid in material distress (Paragraph 51 (6)), there are already exceptions to the prohibition on the enforcement of decisions on benefits of aid in material distress, the legislator could have chosen an adjustment that would be more addressed and would not have affected the whole amount of aid in material distress. Even in the final step of the proportionality test - the proportionality test - the contested legislation will not succeed because it also affects persons who have not committed specified offences, as well as the imminent damage in the form of the confiscation of the entire subsistence allowance and supplement to housing for several months is not proportionate to the possible preventive and repressive effect on potential offenders.
16. The Ombudsman pointed out that the appellant appeared to have neglected to propose the annulment of Section 75 of the Act on aid in material distress in the words "or the reduction provided for in Section 51a ', which would be obsolary in the event of full compliance with its proposal.
Oral proceedings
17. The Constitutional Court has considered, in accordance with Article 44 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, that there is no need to conduct oral proceedings in the case, as it would in no way contribute to a further, or even deeper, clarification of the case than it had from written submissions by the appellant, the party and the Ombudsman. The fact that the Constitutional Court does not consider it necessary to carry out the taking of evidence also justifies the failure of oral proceedings.
Assessment of the constitutional conformity of the legislative process
18. After the Constitutional Court found that the procedural conditions of the procedure were met and the application is admissible (Part III), it has made a substantive review of the contested provisions, in accordance with Article 68 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No 48 / 2002 Coll., first addressed the question of whether it was adopted and issued in a constitutionally prescribed manner and within the limits of the constitutional competence provided for.
19. The findings obtained from the observations of the participant and the Ombudsman are considered sufficient by the Constitutional Court to conclude that the contested provisions have been supplemented by Act No. 327 / 2021 Coll., amending Act No. 111 / 2006 Coll., on aid in material distress, as amended, and Act No. 251 / 2016 Coll., on certain infringements, as amended by Act No. 178 / 2018 Coll., issued within the limits of the Constitution of the designated competence and adopted in a constitutional manner. Neither the applicant nor the Ombudsman questioned the constitutionality of the adoption and publication of this law. The Constitutional Court has therefore carried out a substantive review of the constitutionality of the contested provisions.
A substantive review of the constitutionality of the contested provisions
20. The Constitutional Court respects the doctrine of self-restraint, that is to say the maximum effort to minimise interference in the activities of other public authorities, not including legislative power. The application of the reasonable test and the adequacy test is a suitable means of fulfilling it (see below). In line with this approach, it first focused on assessing the possible less invasive effects of the deregulation of the contested provisions (e.g. by limiting their effects to a limited number of persons, i.e. persons different from the infringer).
21. In the present case, it is the subject of a review of the constitutionality of legal regulation, which also allows certain benefits of assistance in material emergency situations to be imposed by means of fines for listed offences (such as offences against public order, civil cohabitation, property or certain offences involving compulsory education) committed by one of the persons jointly assessed. In order to pay the fines for such offences, the whole (except for dependent children, see the justification below) of the amount of assistance in material distress. The parents and their children, spouses or partners and persons who share the apartment together (cf. § 4 (1) of Act No. 110 / 2006 Coll., on Life and Existence Minimal, as amended) are typically considered to be jointly assessed. The legislation under consideration contains a regulation concerning dependent children who must remain at least life-minima following a dose reduction. In particular, the appellant contends that the contested legislation infringes the principle of individual liability and introduces collective responsibility, as well as that it outweighs the unconstitutional interest in the right to assistance in material distress. Similarly, the Ombudsman points out that the legislation under assessment has a disproportionate effect on the right to assistance in material distress.
Penalties for persons different from the criminal
22. The two social benefits examined shall in principle contain an identical adjustment to which person from the group of persons the benefit jointly assessed. According to Article 21 (2) of the Law on aid in material distress in respect of the living allowance and, mutatis mutandis, Article 33 (8) of the same Act in respect of the housing supplement, if more than one person jointly assessed fulfils the conditions for entitlement to the benefit, the benefit in question belongs only once to a person designated under the agreement of those persons. If these persons are not assessed, the body of assistance in material distress shall determine which of these persons shall be admitted. In other words, the levy granted is "jointly 'for all persons so assessed and not for each of the persons so assessed separately. The amount of the benefit is dependent on all persons jointly assessed [Sections 23 (b) and 35 (b) of the Act on aid in material distress]. In fact, this benefit is used for all persons assessed jointly to meet basic needs of life and therefore its reduction or increase directly affects all those persons; However, it is legally one single dose.
23. The contested legislation provides for the possibility to withdraw this benefit in a material emergency for committing specific offences by one of the sets of persons jointly assessed, whether it is the person to whom the benefit has been granted or "only 'the person to whom it is assessed. This may result in a situation in which a person who is in material need and" jointly "with other persons receives one of the benefits of assistance in material need will be reduced or withdrawn without committing any infringement, only on the grounds that the person jointly assessed with him has committed an offence.
24. According to the original draft amendment to the Act on aid in material emergency, perpetrators of listed offences should not have been persons in material emergency, as provided for in Section 3 of the Act on aid in material emergency. This proposal was amended in the Chamber of Deputies at the second reading of the draft law to the text currently in force. The explanatory memorandum to the draft law exists only for its first form before the amendment, and according to it, it is the intention of the amendment to alert the recipients of benefits who commit listed offences "that they may lose their social benefits in the event of such offences. However, the proposal is not designed as a punishment, but instead aims to maximise the motivation and effectiveness of the problem recipient of benefits (point 1 of the general part of the explanatory memorandum)." Temporary withdrawal of benefits of assistance in material distress is intended to put pressure on these persons and encourage them to make more efforts to remedy and, in general, to start acting in a tolerable manner '(point 1.1. Although the draft has made changes in the course of the legislative process, according to the Constitutional Court, these changes have not changed meaning and the objective of the regulation has only led to a different way of achieving the same purpose. It can therefore be assumed from the explanatory memorandum that the purpose and purpose of the legislation under review is a preventive function, so that the recipients of benefits do not commit unlawful conduct, as well as an incentive function, to be incorporated back into society by acting in a welcome and legitimate manner.
25. However, such an contested regulation may primarily affect the offenders themselves. In principle, other persons who are jointly assessed with an offender have no possibility of influencing whether or not the benefit of assistance in material distress will be withdrawn to ensure their vital needs. They can only actively discourage offenders from committing offences and encourage them to behave in accordance with the law. These persons are thus affected by a reduction in the benefit of assistance in material distress, which was intended to cover their basic needs, only because another person jointly assessed with them committed an infringement.
26. In the finding of 24.8.2021 sp. zn. This amendment was also assessed by the Constitutional Court as incompatible with the constitutional order because it was set on a flat and unaddressed basis: "Binding the right to a housing supplement to the absence of a social exclusion site which does not have a personal (individual) basis is totally outside the scope, the ground plan 'of the conditions for the exercise of the right of assistance in a material emergency resulting from Article 30 (2) of the Charter and the possibility of its legal limitation within the meaning of Article 41 (1) of the Charter, thereby being a constitutionally inadmissible interference with the fundamental law, contrary to Article 1 (1) of the Constitution and Article 1 of the Charter.' Similarly, in the finding of 23.4.2008 sp. zn. The result is a situation where the vast majority of employees remain incapacitated for the first three days of their incapacity for work without any means, while their obligation to pay the premiums remains intact '. In both cases, the Constitutional Court criticised the" overall' impact of regulation, which was introduced due to a limited number of persons committing inappropriate or illegal behaviour.
27. While the legislator has limited the consequences of the contested provisions in such a way that the offence affecting the benefits of assistance in material distress cannot be committed by a minor, as well as in such a way as to leave the child with at least a minimum dose of life for each child not provided, this does not in any way justify a breach of the principle of individual responsibility, while at the same time not affecting other persons in a socially and materially vulnerable position.
28. According to the Constitutional Court, it is unacceptable that the immediate penalty for assistance in a material emergency of a person otherwise impeccable should be derived from the infringement of another person for whom the affected person is not liable. If Article 51a of the Act on aid in material distress allows reductions to be made in the living allowance and in the housing supplement, which are common to a person assessed jointly with an offender and for offenders, it infringes the principle of individual responsibility for fault and as a result the right to assistance in material distress guaranteed in Article 30 (2) of the Charter.
Penalty of the Forger
29. In the previous part, the Constitutional Court concluded that the legislation under review was unconstitutional. Since, in the course of the procedure on the application, the possibility of applying a range-based statement which would only cancel the legislation under consideration in respect of a benefit for persons other than the infringer was considered, the Constitutional Court also addressed the constitutionality of the legislation affecting persons receiving a subsistence allowance or a supplement to housing without the benefit being determined to other persons jointly assessed (i.e. only to the recipient of the benefit itself). In that case, there are no other persons affected by the infringement (recipient of the benefit), so the legislation under review is not unconstitutional only for the reasons set out in the previous section. In addition, the Constitutional Court focuses only on the situation in which only the recipient of the benefit, i.e. potential offenders, receives the benefits in question.
30.
31. The Constitutional Court, aware of the differences between social rights and "classical" fundamental rights (contained in particular in the Title of the Second Charter), concluded that the methodology of the social rights review must be different from the "strict" proportionality test, the application of which significantly limits the legislature's consideration in the adoption of legislation to regulate the subject-matter of social relations [Sp. zl. Pl. ÚS 1 / 08 and the findings of 24. 4. 2012 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 54 / 10 (N 84 / 65 SbNU 121; 186 / 2012 Sb.) or of 22. 10. 2013 sp. sp. Pl. ÚS 19 / 13 (N 178 / 71 SbNU 105; 396 / 2013 Sb.)]. The Constitutional Court, as a methodological tool for reviewing the legislator's intervention in the area of constitutionally guaranteed social rights, has designed a so-called 'rational test' (rationality), which takes into account both respect for the legislator's relatively wide discretion and the need to rule out its possible excesses and consists of four of the following:
1. Definition of the meaning and substance of social law, namely its essential content.
2. Assessment of whether the law does not affect the very existence of social law or the actual realisation of its essential content.
(3) Assessment of whether legal arrangements pursue a legitimate objective; Therefore, whether it is an arbitrary fundamental reduction in the overall standard of fundamental rights.
4. Consider whether the legal means used to achieve it is reasonable (rational), although not necessarily the best, most appropriate, most effective or wisest.
If, in the second step of this test, the Constitutional Court concludes that the contested legislation concerns the very existence of one of those rights or the actual realisation of its essential content, it shall assess the admissibility of the intervention in that right by the proportionality test, otherwise continuing with the third and fourth steps of the proportionality test.
32. The proportionality test includes three criteria for assessing the admissibility of intervention (see for example the findings of 12.10.1994 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 4 / 94 (N 46 / 2 SbNU 57; 214 / 1994 Coll.), 13.5.1998 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 25 / 97 (N 53 / 11 SbNU 25; 159 / 1998 Sb.) and 13.8.2002 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 3 / 02 (N 105 / 27 SbNU 177; 0,05 / 2002 Sb.)]:
1. The suitability test, i.e. the answer to the question whether an institute restricting a fundamental right allows the objective pursued (protection of another fundamental right) to be achieved.
2. The need test (necessity), i.e. the comparison of a legislative instrument limiting fundamental rights with other measures to achieve the same objective, but not affecting fundamental rights or, in other words, the authorisation to use only the most respectful - to the fundamental rights and freedoms concerned - from several possible means.
3. A measurement test (proportionality in the narrower sense), i.e. an assessment of whether measures limiting fundamental human rights and freedoms do not exceed, by their negative consequences, the positive public interest in such measures.
33. The constitutional right to assistance in material emergency enshrined in Article 30 (2) of the Charter ("Everyone who is in material need has the right to receive such assistance as is necessary to ensure basic living conditions.") is implemented at a legal level by adjusting the living allowance institutes and the housing supplement. The limitation of the payment of these benefits, or the possibility of the reduction of fines and of those benefits which are not otherwise subject to enforcement, thus has the potential to intervene in the constitutional right to aid in material distress.
34. The first step of the test of rationality examines the meaning and substance of social law, namely its essential content. The Constitutional Court of 27 November 2012 sp. zn. The essential content of Article 30 (2) The Constitutional Court has already expressed its views in the decision of 23 January 2018 in sp. zn. I. ÚS 2637 / 17 (N 10 / 88 SbNU 133), which stated that "it implies an essential requirement for beneficiaries to have at all appropriate social care services (albeit not best) available to them and to be able to lead at least an elementary decent life, without automatic disintegration from society or loss of all personal autonomy ', in connection with the provision of social services. This conclusion can be modified in order to apply it also to the provision of benefits of aid in material distress and to conclude that the essence of the provision of benefits of aid in material distress is to ensure a level of physical security such that beneficiaries can lead at least an elementary life of dignity, without the" automatic "exclusion from society or the loss of all personal autonomy. It is also possible to refer to the reference finding sp. zn.
35. The second step in the test of reason is to assess whether the law does not affect the very existence of social law or the realisation of its essential content. The amount of the living allowance and the additional allowance for housing is calculated in accordance with Sections 23 and 35 of the Act on aid in material distress. The living allowance shall ensure that the beneficiary has at least a statutory amount of living per month. The housing supplement is intended to ensure that the beneficiary has at least a statutory living amount after deduction of the justified housing costs. This is by default either an existential minimum or a minimum of life [with possible modifications - cf. § 24 (1) (e) of the Act on aid in material distress, as well as § 25 to 29 of the same law]. The amount of the existence minimum of the person is set in § 5 (1) of Act No. 110 / 2006 Coll., on Life and Existing Minimal, as amended, and pursuant to § 9 of the Law on Life and Existing Minimal, as amended by Act No. 261 / 2007 Coll., Decree of the Government No. 436 / 2022 Coll., on increasing the amounts of the life minima and existence minima, and amounts to CZK 3,130 per month. The amount of the living minimum of the individual is CZK 4,860 per month (Section 2 of the Law on Life and Existing Minimum, as amended). The revised benefits of assistance in material distress therefore ensure that the recipient of the benefit will have at least CZK 3 130 per month, which is intended to provide at least an elementary life of dignity, thus ensuring both the physical existence of man (nutrition, clothing, household facilities, shelter, heating, hygiene and health), as well as the possibility to cultivate interpersonal relationships and the minimum degree of participation in social, cultural and political life (see the find sp. zn. The declaration referred to in Article 1 (1) of the Law on Life and Existing Minority also corresponds to this purpose: "This Act sets a minimum of living income as a minimum of cash income (hereinafter referred to as" income ') of natural persons (hereinafter referred to as "person') to ensure nutrition and other basic personal needs and an existential minimum of income of persons which is considered necessary to ensure nutrition and other basic personal needs at a level which allows survival '. According to the Constitutional Court, in the light of the legislation under assessment, this purpose is met at the very limit of sustainability. Even if the housing supplement covers all the accommodation costs, it is only borderline conceivable that one can make do with the amount of an existential minimum of CZK 3 130 to ensure his needs to an extent that is not set aside from the company or loses his autonomy. In the find sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 54 / 10 The Constitutional Court has examined the so-called period of the period of the pension (the abolition of sickness benefits for the first three days of incapacity for work) and concluded that" a three-day loss of income undoubtedly constitutes a certain interference in the income of the persons concerned, but it is not (even with regard to other guarantees contained in social security law) an intervention which would immediately prevent the sick from achieving a material standard sufficient to lead a decent life'. In the present case, the revenue gap is potentially significantly longer (even for several months), while at the same time no other income guarantee is guaranteed, as was the case with the so-called gambling period. Interventions in the benefits under examination consisting of a de facto reduction or even temporary withdrawal (for persons whose livelihood is below a minimum of CZK 3,130 per month) must be considered an intervention in the essential content of the right to aid in material distress. Therefore, the legislation under review must be subject to the proportionality test.
36. The first step in the proportionality test is the suitability test, i.e. the answer to the question whether the legislation under review allows the objective pursued to be achieved. The purpose and purpose of the legislation under review was dealt with by the Constitutional Court in paragraph 24 of this decision. It is a preventive function so that the recipients of benefits do not commit illegal conduct and motivating them to integrate back into society. These objectives are legitimate, according to the Constitutional Court. At first sight, it seems logical that the recipients of benefits of aid in material distress will not want to commit offences, if this means de facto removing (even temporary) granted benefits of assistance in material distress. The result of the previous assessment therefore allows to conclude that the legislation under review leads, at least in theory, to the achievement of the objectives for which it was adopted.
37. The second step in the proportionality test is the need test (necessity), i.e. the comparison of a legal instrument limiting the fundamental right with other measures enabling the same objective to be achieved but not affecting fundamental rights, in other words, whether the legislator has used the most considerate of the multiple options offered. The Ombudsman pointed out that Paragraph 51 (6) of the Law on aid in material need already contains a mechanism for withholding benefits which have been wrongly awarded, from benefits normally paid or later granted. However, that provision provides that, after the rainfall has been carried out, the person must remain at least an amount equal to the existence minimum (for uninsured children equal to the life minimum). The Constitutional Court, like the Ombudsman, finds that this provision constitutes a way of reducing the benefits of assistance in material distress when fulfilling the conditions for such a procedure, but ensures that at least the minimum income of beneficiaries is maintained. It is thus clearly a more friendly approach to a constitutionally guaranteed right of assistance in material distress and, for this reason, the legislation under review has no longer complied with this step of the proportionality test, which is the reason for its derogation, and therefore it was not necessary to apply the third step of the test.
38. Paragraph 51a of the Law on aid in material distress has therefore failed in the second step of the proportionality test, as it infringes the right to assistance in material emergency guaranteed in Article 30 (2) of the Charter.
Conclusion
39. On the basis of the above, the Constitutional Court concludes that the contested Paragraph 51a of the Law on aid in material need is inadmissible in a democratic rule of law as it infringes the principle of individual responsibility for fault, fails the proportionality test and interferes with the right to assistance in material distress enshrined in Article 30 (2) of the Charter and has therefore annulled it. The contested provisions of § 50 (2) to (6) of the Act on aid in material distress, as amended by Act No. 327 / 2021 Coll., serve exclusively as procedural arrangements for the implementation of § 51a of the Act on aid in material distress; Without Article 51a of the Act on aid in material need, these provisions lack meaning, thus the Constitutional Court also annulled them. Article 71 (2) and (3) of the Law on the Constitutional Court regulates the legal consequences of the deregulation of these provisions, which means that no reductions can be made on the subsistence allowance and the additional payment for housing, even at a stage where the institution has already decided on collisions in a material emergency.
40. The appellant did not propose the annulment of Paragraph 75 (e) of the Act on aid in material distress in the words "or reductions pursuant to § 51a." According to its established case-law, the Constitutional Court is bound by the scope of the application and cannot step forward in its decision (ultra petitum) (see, for example, the order of 21.7.1994 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 16 / 94 (U 14 / 2 SbNU 227) or the decision of 13.12.1995 sp. zl. ÚS 8 / 95 (N 83 / 4 SbNU 279; 29 / 1996 Sb.)). In the decision of 31.10.2001 sp. zn. The validity of such a provision is, therefore, terminated on the basis of the principle of cessante ratione legis, cessat lex ipsa, the derogation carried out by the Constitutional Court is of only a registered, technical nature [see, mutatis mutandis, the finding of 18.8.2004 sp. zn. This section of Section 75 (e) of the Act on aid in material distress is based on Section 51a of the same Act and, with its abolition, it itself becomes obsolous (as the Ombudsman also stated). For this reason, the Constitutional Court also annulled § 75 (e) of the Act on aid in material distress in the words "or reductions under § 51a '.
41. Paragraph 12 (b) of the Act on certain offences, as amended by Act No. 327 / 2021 Coll., provides that the offence referred to in Article 4 (2) of the Act on certain infringements is to be recorded in the register of infringements by establishing mandatory conditions to the extent necessary to ensure public order in order to organise, conduct and terminate publicly accessible sports and cultural enterprises, including dance and discotheque. This offence is one of the offences for which fines imposed would be capable of being withdrawn under Section 51a of the Law on aid in material distress [Paragraph 51a (2) (f) of the same Act]. Its usability is thus linked to the unconstitutional § 51a of the Act on aid in material distress. Neither the explanatory memorandum nor the law itself on infringements directly results, except for the purposes of registration, in any other use of the records. The record of offences was introduced by Act No. 204 / 2015 Coll., amending Act No. 200 / 1990 Coll., on Infringements, as amended, Act No. 269 / 1994 Coll., on the Code of Punishment, as amended, and some other laws. According to the explanatory memorandum to this law, "at this stage, the creation of central registration is preferred, in a minimalist variant ', where only selected offences (variant II) will be registered. However, it can be assumed that if the record of offences in the proposed form is proven, it will be possible to gradually expand it by further offences (for example in the education and youth education sector), when specific legislation combines legal consequences by committing such offences (see above)... The aim of the introduction of a tightened penalty for criminal recurrence is to streamline the penalty for a serious infringement, which, in view of its repetition, achieves a higher degree of damage and therefore needs to be tightened accordingly." According to the explanatory memorandum to the law on certain offences (to the text effective from 1 July 2017), "the extent of the offences registered in the draft of this law corresponds to offences for which a higher administrative penalty (fine) may be imposed for the repeated commit." The law on certain offences does not foresee a higher penalty for repeated offences pursuant to § 4 (2), as is the case with, for example, an infringement against property under § 8 (5) of the same law. Although it does not appear from the cited part of the explanatory memorandum that the legislator is counting on the extension of registered infringements in accordance with Article 4 (2) of the law on certain offences, its approach cannot be considered unconstitutional if, for example, it is triggered by necessity and effectiveness in other situations.
42. The inconstitutionality of the Constitutional Court has not been found by the appellant under Paragraph 48 (4) of the Act on aid in material distress, as amended by Act No. 327 / 2021 Coll., in words, "unless otherwise specified." This provision is value-neutral and the "mere" genetic link with derogated provisions does not justify its abolition. The exception from the rule that aid benefits are not subject to the enforcement of a decision is not only related to deductions from the living allowance and the housing supplement (according to the repealed § 51a of the Act on aid in material distress), but also includes the previously modified enforcement of the decision, e.g. the decision on the obligation to return the benefit or part thereof (§ 51 (6) and (7) of the Act on aid in material distress, as amended by Act No 366 / 2011 Coll., in conjunction with § 54 (3) and § 78 of the Act on aid in material distress).
President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr.
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Regulation Information
| Citation | The Constitutional Court found no 289 / 2024 Coll., sp. zn. |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | The Constitutional Tribunal found |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 01.10.2024 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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