The Constitutional Court found no 284 / 2012 Coll.

Motion denied.

1. In the application submitted to the Constitutional Court on 22 June 2010 The Supreme Administrative Court has proposed, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 95 (2) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution), the annulment of Part 7 of Title II of Part III of Act No. 150 / 2002 Coll., the Administrative Rules as amended by Act No. 127 / 2005 Coll., i.e. as in force at the date of filing, i.e. Sections 101a to 101d of the Administrative Rules (hereinafter referred to as "p. '). In the contested law of the procedure for the annulment of a measure of a general nature, it found that there was a conflict with the principle of legal certainty arising from the concept of the rule of law under Article 1 (1) of the Constitution, as well as with the right of ownership, the right to business and the principle of equality between the parties to legal proceedings under Articles 11, 26 and 37 (3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as" the Charter'). It also found that the non-compliance with the right to a fair trial in the form of a right of access to a court pursuant to Article 36 (1) and (2) of the Charter and the right of local authorities to self-administration pursuant to Article 100 (1) of the Constitution.

2. During the proceedings in case sp. zn. At the same time, it decided that those complainants had the right to participate in the proceedings for the earlier application as interveners (Section 35 (2), second sentence, after the semicolon of the Law on the Constitutional Court).

3. The Supreme Administrative Court stated that the application in question under Article 95 (2) of the Constitution is in connection with its decision-making activities in Case No 1 Ao 1 / 2010-156. In this case, the appellant seeks the annulment of part of the measure of a general nature - amendment No 1 of the municipal town plan of Kamenice approved by the municipality's representative on 12 July 2005 and published in the general binding order of Kamenice Municipality No 2 / 2005 amending the general binding decree of Kamenice Municipality No 11 / 2000 on the publication of a binding part of the urban planning documentation of Kamenice. The appellant, in proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court, is the owner of the land concerned by the amendment of the zoning plan in question and objects to the infringement of its right of ownership and the right of business by not being able, as a result of that measure of a general nature, to implement specific buildings intended for business (or its business plan). The Supreme Administrative Court, which is to decide on an application for annulment of the contested part of that measure of a general nature, has concluded that the legislation laying down the procedure for the annulment of a measure of a general nature or of a part thereof to be applied in that case cannot be interpreted in a constitutional manner and must be repealed.

4. During the proceedings, the Constitutional Court found that on 11 April 2011 the Government of the Czech Republic submitted to the Chamber of Deputies a draft law amending Act No. 150 / 2002 Coll., the Administrative Rules, as amended, and certain other laws (Chamber of Deputies, VI. Election, Press No. 319). In paragraphs 51 to 55 of this legislative initiative, substantial amendments were proposed to the contested legislation, i.e. part 7 of Title II of Part III of the EC Treaty (Sections 101a to 101d). In view of this, the termination of the legislative process was pending in order to establish the legal situation of the contested provisions.

5. On 14. 10. 2011, Act No. 303 / 2011 Coll., amending Act No. 150 / 2002 Coll., the Administrative Rules, as amended, and some other laws were published in the Collection of Laws. This amendment substantially amended the rules of the procedure for the annulment of measures of a general nature and part thereof contained in Part 7 of Title II of Part III of the EC Treaty (see Act No 303 / 2011 Coll., paragraphs 55 to 60). The amendment to the Rules of Procedure by the Administrative Service of Act No. 303 / 2011 Coll. took effect on 1 January 2012. Article II (1) of its transitional provisions provided that, unless otherwise specified, the amended Rules of Procedure shall apply also to proceedings initiated before the date of entry into force of that amendment. For the pending proceedings before the Constitutional Court, the fact that Article II (9) of Law No 303 / 2011 Coll. provided for an exception to that rule was essential. It determined that the proceedings already initiated concerning the annulment of measures of a general nature or of a part thereof, in which no decision was taken by the date of entry into force of the amendment to the Administrative Rules in question, were to be completed in accordance with existing legislation.

6. Following that transitional provision, the appellant referred to the Constitutional Court with a proposal to allow an amendment of the proposal and to the Constitutional Court to issue an "interpretative" finding to determine that "the provisions of Part 7 of Title II of Part III of Act No. 150 / 2002 Coll., the Administrative Rules, as amended by Act No. 303 / 2011 Coll., were contrary to Articles 1 (1) and 100 (1) of the Constitution and Articles 11, 26 and 37 (3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms." The Constitutional Court granted this application and Resolution No. Pl. ÚS 34 / 10-52 admitted the amendment without having been able to deal more closely with the substance of the matter. The purpose of the procedure was therefore to determine whether "the provisions of Section 7 of Title II of Part III of Act No 150 / 2002 Coll., the Administrative Rules of the Court, as amended by Act No 303 / 2011 Coll., were in breach of Articles 1 (1) and 100 (1) of the Constitution and Articles 11, 26 and 37 (3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms'. It is therefore not decisive that only part of the provisions of Title II of Part III of the Treaty under appeal has been amended, since that transitional provision requires the application of that part of the administrative order as a whole. The petition is also directed against this part of the administrative order as a whole, even if the argument is made (see below) only against some of its parts.

7. The Supreme Administrative Court of the application in question pursuant to Article 95 (2) The Constitution shall, in the context of its decision-making activities, refer to a matter of timeliness or time limit for the submission of a request for annulment of a measure of a general nature, to the various opinions of its participants (see Case 1 Ao 1 / 2010, paragraphs 158 and 159). In the proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court, the appellant (Engineering Kamenice, a. s.) seeks the annulment of part of the measure of a general nature - amendments No 1 of the municipal zoning plan of Kamenice approved by the municipality's representative on 12 July 2005 and published by the generally binding order of Kamenice Municipality No. 2 / 2005 amending the generally binding order of Kamenice Municipality No. 11 / 2000 on the publication of a binding part of the municipal planning documentation of Kamenice. It is the owner of the land concerned by the change of the zoning plan concerned and objects to an infringement of its right of ownership and to the right of business by the fact that, as a result of that measure of a general nature, it cannot carry out specific buildings intended for business (or its business plan), and has been deeply convinced for several years that a change in the zoning plan has resulted in very significant interference with its subjective rights. However, the time-out between the change in the zoning plan and the proposal was known by the appellant in the proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court, but pointed out that the law (before the amendment of the administrative order) did not set any time limit. At this stage of the procedure, the Supreme Administrative Court concluded that the legislation to be applied in this case cannot be interpreted in a constitutional manner. Therefore, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 64 (3) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended, he made a proposal for the annulment of Part 7 of Title II, Part III, as a whole. Following the amendment of the administrative court order, he requested to be allowed to amend the proposal, which the Constitutional Court had complied with (see sub-6 above).

8. In the statement of reasons for its proposal, the Supreme Administrative Court first analysed the circumstances of the classification of an institution of a general nature into the rule of law and characterised the problems of the development of case law in terms of its formal and material concept. For the purposes of the proposal presented, he stressed that a measure of a general nature in domestic law is an administrative act only with a specifically (individually) defined object and generally designated addressees and not with specific addressees and abstract object. The specific definition of an article is a key feature which distinguishes general measures from legislation and brings it closer to an individual administrative act. The purpose of measures of a general nature is to specify obligations already under the law, but following the specific situation which is the subject of such a measure. The amendment to the contested provisions of § 101a to 101d s. s., as amended on 31 December 2011, the appellant referred to it as a piece and imperfect, nevertheless very important in terms of protecting the addressees of general measures. However, it considers it to be constitutionally unacceptable until 31 December 2011.

9. In general, the appellant stated that most of the procedures on measures of a general nature relate to the territorial plans. The zoning plan was declared a general measure only by the new Act No. 183 / 2006 Coll., on Territorial Planning and Construction Regulations (Construction Act), effective as of 1 January 2007. Territorial plans issued pursuant to the previous Building Act No. 50 / 1976 Coll., on Territorial Planning and Construction Regulations (Construction Act), as amended, were considered as general measures based on the concept of their material concept as formulated in the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court No. 1 Ao 1 / 2005-98 and the Constitutional Court's finding sp. zl. ÚS 14 / 07 of 19.11.2008 (N 198 / 51 SbNU 409). The material concept of the amendment of the building law by Act No. 191 / 2008 Coll., amending Act No. 183 / 2006 Coll., on the zoning and construction rules (Construction Act), as amended by Act No. 68 / 2007 Coll., which, from 3 June 2008 in § 188 (4), amended the transformation of the content of legislation issued under the previous building law and their nature; it has been established that general binding regulations issued before 1 January 2007 defining the mandatory part of the planning documentation shall be considered as general measures. It is further noted in the proposal that the Institute of Measures of a General Nature was introduced into the legal order of the Czech Republic by Act No. 500 / 2004 Coll., the Administrative Code, while before the entry into force of the Administrative Regulation (1 January 2006) several measures of a general nature were introduced by Act No. 127 / 2005 Coll., on Electronic Communications and on the amendment of certain related laws (the Act on Electronic Communications), which at the same time entered into Title II, Part III, p. 7 on the judicial review of measures of a general nature. As regards the contested legislation, the appellant submits that the legislature has established the possibility for the addressees to appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court for a proposal to abolish measures of a general nature or part of it for conflict with the law, since a measure of a general nature may significantly interfere with the legal sphere of the addressees when determining their specific rights and obligations. The protection of these rights through legal proceedings is therefore significant, but the regulation itself shows a number of shortcomings arising from the lack of clarity of the preparation of the legislation itself.

10. The proposal, in view of the shortcomings in the overall adjustment of the procedure for the repeal of measures of a general nature, requires the annulment of the whole of Title II, Part III, Section 101a to 101d, p.

(a) in the absence of an unconstitutional deadline for the submission of a proposal for a review of measures of a general nature, or in the discriminatory setting of a time limit only for a particular group of entities (see sub 13 n. below);

(b) within a excessively short period of 30 days to decide on the application, for two reasons. One is the complexity and gravity of the matter and, for example, the length and complexity of the process of adopting measures of a general nature in the case of territorial plans (it does not claim that it cannot be decided within that period, it always seeks to comply). The second reason is the question of the equality of parties. While the appellant has an unlimited period of time to prepare and submit a proposal to abolish the measure, the respondent must, as a rule, respond to the extensive proposal within days;

(c) in the inadequacy of the concentration of the procedure for the annulment of measures of a general nature before the Supreme Administrative Court, although it is an agenda typical of the Court of First Instance. Moreover, the number of measures of a general nature which may be contested could lead to the overthrow of the Supreme Administrative Court. Last but not least, the concentration causes disproportionate costs for participants from the whole of the Republic to discuss in Brno. However, the appellant is aware that the organisation of the judiciary is a matter for the legislator, and even inefficient or unreasonable regulation does not justify its annulment, but considers the contested legislation to be manifestly disproportionate;

(d) excluding the participation of other persons in proceedings other than the appellant and the contender, although the abolition of measures of a general nature may have a major impact on all addressees of the measure.

11. The unconstitutional nature of the legislation due to the absence of a deadline for the application for a review of a measure of a general nature (ground 10 (a)) should consist of intervention in the principle of legal certainty, which, inter alia, takes the form of a requirement to set time limits for the application to the court. The appellant points to the finding of sp. zn. It further argues that, according to the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU, where no time limit is set by the legislature, the application cannot be postponed indefinitely and must be lodged within a reasonable period of time, otherwise there would be a breach of the principle of legal certainty and legitimate expectations of the parties to the legal relationship in question (judgment of the Court of Justice of 14 July 1972 in Case C-48 / 69 Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Commission, judgment of 14 July 1972 in Case C-52 / 69 J. R. Geiga AG v Commission, or judgment of 24 November 1987 in Case C-223 / 85 Rijn-Schelde-Verolme v Commission).

12. On the other hand, the appellant submits that the principle of legal certainty is not an absolute value and must be measured with other values, in particular the requirement of legality and the right of access to the court. Legality refers to the requirement of compliance of an act of a public authority with the law (the law). It pointed out that, in view of the presumption of legality of acts of public authorities and the rights and obligations of the persons concerned, which determine, amend or repeal the act in question, as well as the possibility of issuing further successive acts, the intensity of the requirement to ensure the legality of an act of a public authority falls with time and, on the contrary, the requirement for legal certainty, i.e. to ensure the consistency of the act in question. The legislator's task is then to find a reasonable compromise between the requirements of legality and legal certainty. Here the appellant recalled the judgment of the Court of First Instance - now the General Court - (Fourth Chamber, extended) of 6 October 2005 in joined cases T-22 / 02 and T-23 / 02 Sumitomo Chemical Co. Ltd and Sumika Fine Chemicals Co. Ltd v Commission, according to which "the extent to which the deadline is set is the result of choice between legal certainty requirements and legal requirements based on historical and social circumstances prevailing in the company at that time '. It also acknowledges that the General Court leaves the court or other authority to the full discretion of the legislature to set a time limit for bringing proceedings before the Court of First Instance or any other authority, it does not consider it competent to criticise the choice made by the legislature and, in itself, the failure to set a time limit does not consider it contradictory with the principle of legal certainty (paragraphs 82 and 83 of the judgment cited). At the same time, the case-law of the Court of Justice confirms that, in cases where no period of time is fixed by the legislature, the application cannot be postponed indefinitely and must be lodged within a reasonable period of time, otherwise there would be not only a breach of the principle of legal certainty, but also a legitimate expectation of the parties to the legal relationship (see, in relation to the Commission's authorisation to impose a fine on the Commission in Case C-48 / 69 Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd [1972] ECR 619, paragraph 49, or judgment in Case C-52 / 69 J. R. Geigy AG v Commission [1987] ECR 787, paragraph 21; in relation to the Commission's authorisation to challenge of unlawful State aid in Case C-223 / 85 Rijn-Schelde-Verolme v Commission [1987], [1987] ECR 4617, paragraph 21).

13. Thus, the right of access to a court within the meaning of Article 36 (2) of the Charter is not absolute and unrestricted. Its purpose is the possibility of real and effective protection from acts of public authorities. In addition, the appellant refers to the judgment of the ECHR in Freitag v Germany (application No 71440 / 01), where the ECHR stated that "the right to a court, one aspect of which is the right to access a court, is not absolute; is subject to restrictions, e.g. legal time limits. Where the right of access to a court is restricted by law or in fact, the court shall examine whether the restriction imposed has damaged the substance of that law, in particular whether it pursued a legitimate objective and whether there was a reasonable relationship between the resources used and the objective pursued '. Here the appellant concluded his argument by stating that the principle of legal certainty is part of the constitutional order of the Czech Republic and also results from the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (" the Convention'). It shall take the form, inter alia, of a requirement to set time limits for bringing an application to a court or other authority. In setting time limits, it is necessary to seek a reasonable and proportionate relationship between the principle of legal certainty and the requirement of legality and the right of access to a court; the unilateral preference of one of these values cannot be considered adequate and may be regarded as a breach of that value which has been suppressed. However, it did not exclude that, in exceptional circumstances, the principle of legal certainty in the form of the establishment of time limits may give way to the general requirements of justice (e.g. rehabilitation, restitution).

14. The Supreme Administrative Court also referred, in the statement of its application, to the legal opinion expressed in the Resolution of the extended Chamber in Case Sf. 1 Ao 1 / 2009 that, in the case of the procedure for the annulment of measures of a general nature or part of a legislature, there was no time limit to the application for review (in addition to the period implicitly resulting from § 101a (1), second sentence, p.), such a period could not then be "imputed ', since it would mean that there would be an unacceptable (non-legally established) limitation of access to judicial protection [it points to the finding of Sf. ÚS 83 / 06 of 12.3.2008 (N 55 / 48 SbNU 629; 116 / 2008 Sb), with the fact that it is an anti-constitutional limit of irrevocable constitutional final interpretation]; the proposal is limited only by the existence of measures of a general nature. The non-constitutionality of the absence of a deadline, according to the appellant, is evident from the initiative case sp. zn. 1 Ao 1 / 2010, in which the 2010 review proposal is directed against the amendment of the 2005 zoning plan, with the actual zoning plan adopted in 2000. It therefore considers that the relationship between the principle of legal certainty on the one hand and the requirement of legality and the right of access to the court on the other hand does not respect the requirement of proportionality and proportionality. No such reason can be found in the explanatory report on the draft electronic communications law or in the records of its discussions. Nor can this regulation be combined with the requirement of general justice or the need to remedy serious injustices. It therefore considers the absolute priority of the requirement of legality and the right of access to a court against the principle of legal certainty to be arbitrary.

15. This argument against the timeliness of the review was supported by the appellant by other arguments which can be organised for clarity as follows:

(a) the unconstitutional absence of a deadline for the submission of a proposal in conjunction with the material concept of measures of a general nature (in the case of territorial plans, also under the amended § 188 (4) of the "new" building law) allows for an unlimited review into the past, thus the territorial plans of many decades old may be subject to review (published in the form of a generally binding decree at any time before 1 January 2007). It is therefore possible to interfere with the prohibition of retroactivity by applying the contested part of the administrative order to the process of adopting territorial plans before the entry into force of Act No. 500 / 2004 Coll., the administrative order.

(b) since the Supreme Administrative Court first examines the formal and then only material elements of a measure of a general nature, it is obliged to repeal the measure and "only" on the basis of a formal error which occurred several years before the application for review. Any procedural errors and issues of competence and competence should be resolved within a reasonable and reasonable time after the zoning plan has been effective. It underlines the need for restraint in interventions in relations that have occurred deep in the past [it mentions the finding of sp. zn. II.

(c) this may mean interference with both the constitutionally guaranteed right of ownership of property under Article 11 of the Charter and the right of business under Article 26 (1) of the Charter;

(d) at the same time, the possibility of the judicial abolition of measures of a general nature (in particular with a large distance from the time of adoption) may also be considered as interference with the right to self-administration under Article 100 (1) of the Constitution. The proposal does not seek to change the territorial plans, but it sees the difference between a change in the standard procedure provided for by the law with the participation of interested parties, in which the decision is made by a responsible political player (municipality) and by abolishing the territorial plan after many years by a supreme decision. Such disproportionate interference by the court, even in accordance with the law, is, in his view, contradictory to the right to self-administration;

(e) measures of a general nature shall be subject to standard review procedure by an administrative authority pursuant to Sections 94 to 99 of the Administrative Regulation, which may be initiated in accordance with Section 174 (2) of the Administrative Regulation no later than three years after their effectiveness. However, the amendment of Article 188 (4) of Law No 183 / 2006 Coll. excluded from the review procedure the territorial plans declared by general binding decrees (i.e. the territorial plans adopted before 1 January 2007). Thus, the legislature has created a paradoxical situation where part of the territorial plans cannot be examined at all in the administrative review procedure and the remainder within three years of their effectiveness. At the same time, however, judicial review of all plans is unlimited in time, although the outcome of judicial and administrative review may lead in both cases to the abolition of the zoning plan;

(f) there is no mention or justification in the preparatory work of this unlimited possibility of review, or a reference to the requirements of general justice (see sub-13);

(g) such legislation which, by means of a judicial decision, allows the right of ownership or the right to business of third parties to interfere and which at the same time does not provide for any time limit for the appellants to apply to the court, is manifestly incompatible with the requirements of the Convention. Here, the appellant points to the ECHR judgment in the Kirova case and others against Bulgaria (application No 31836 / 04, paragraph 32);

(h) the unconstitutional nature of the regulation of the deadline for the submission of the proposal also finds that omission by the legislator also results in a constitutionally unacceptable inequality between two groups of entities [refers to the finding of sp. zn. This is due to the wording of the second sentence of Paragraph 101a (1) (s) (bringing an action is limited by the legal deadline and, therefore, if the applicant is obliged to file an application for annulment together with the action, the application must be served by the court within the same legal period). The legislature therefore distinguishes between two groups of potential applicants for the annulment of measures of a general nature. the first group is persons who have been notified of an administrative decision for which a measure has been applied (these Articles 101d (1) and (1) s. s.), and the second group is persons who have either not initiated an administrative procedure or have, although they have not yet been notified of an administrative decision (these Article 101a (1) s. s. s.).

According to the Supreme Administrative Court, this is the resignation of the legislature to determine the period in question and the resulting absolute priority of the requirement of legality and the right of access to the court cannot therefore be regarded as a arbitrary breach of the principle of legal certainty which is contrary to the constitutional order of the Czech Republic. This creates an unconstitutional loophole [on this point the finding sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 15 / 04 of 30.11.2004 (N 180 / 35 SbNU 391; 45 / 2005 Sb.)], which according to the appellant is contained in § 101a s. The determination of the deadline for initiating the application for annulment of a measure of general nature or part of it is nevertheless a condition of the procedure applicable to the whole of the contested legislation. The alleged contradiction with the constitutional order could not be eliminated only by the abolition of Section 101a of the Rules of Procedure. Therefore, it was proposed to abolish the whole of Section 7 of Title II of Part III of the Rules of Procedure (paragraphs 101a to 101d), and subsequently (see Sub 6) the declaration of the unconstitutionality of this Regulation as a whole.

16. This general conclusion was supplemented by additional reservations to this adjustment. In particular, this is a manifest inadequacy of the legislation governing judicial review of measures of a general nature, which is reflected in several aspects; on the one hand, the period of 30 days for the decision of the court is wholly disproportionate to the complexity and gravity of the case and, in particular, in the case of territorial plans, the length and complexity of the process itself of taking general measures. The Supreme Administrative Court does not argue that it is not possible to rule within that time limit (in its decision-making activities it seeks to comply with that time limit) or that the time limit is imposed by the Court, but that short period has serious consequences on the rights of the parties and their equal status before the Court. For example, while the appellant has an unlimited period of time to draw up and submit a proposal to abolish measures of a general nature or part of it, the respondent must normally respond to the extensive proposal within days. The concentration of proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court (closer to sub-10.c) may also be considered disproportionate.

17. Finally, as it states "rather for illustration," the appellant also points to the legal exclusion of other persons from the proceedings other than the appellant and the defendant (see § 101b p.). As indicated above, the outcome of the procedure for the repeal of measures of a general nature or part thereof may have a significant impact on all persons who are the addressees of the measure (e.g. in the present case, it is proposed to abolish general regulations on industrial production which affect all territories regulated by the territorial plan). The legal exclusion of such persons from participation in court proceedings and from the possibility of defending their rights may be considered to be contradictory to the right of access to a court pursuant to Article 36 (1) and (2) of the Charter.

18. Finally, it was proposed to abolish part 7 of Title II of Part III of Act No. 150 / 2002 Coll., the Administrative Rules, as amended by Act No. 127 / 2005 Coll., i.e. as in force on the date of filing. This proposal was subsequently reformulated on the basis of the acceptance of the amendment of the proposal, as mentioned above (see sub 4 to 6), without any substantive argument being further amended or supplemented.

19. On 21 March 2011, the Constitutional Court received a constitutional complaint against the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court No 1 Ao 2 / 2010-185 of 18 January 2011, which was made on page Pl. ÚS 21 / 11 (see Sub-2). In addition to the argument against the operative part of the judgment, the appellants propose the annulment of the part of the law on the basis of which the judgment under appeal was given, i.e. 101a to 101d s. s., and refer explicitly to the appellant's argument in the present proceedings in Case sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 34 / 10. They argue that, on the basis of unexpected changes and modifications to the urban plan of the municipality of Moravana, there has been an intervention in their legal certainty, ownership and business rights as a result of the failure to invest. It further argues that the fundamental constitutional deficiency of the judgment under appeal is that they could not, in the circumstances where their legal possibilities, legal status and interference with their rights, have been involved in this proceeding in any way. This violation of procedural rights is all the more serious in their view that the Supreme Administrative Court has been informed of the existence of third parties' rights. He responded to the form of their application (by the letter of the representative of the municipality of Moravana B.B. - see paragraph 44 of the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court sp. zn. 1 Ao 2 / 2010) by expressly stating that he would not take account of the letter. Such a procedure is incorrect according to the interveners and constitutes an intervention in their right to a fair trial, including the equality of the parties to the trial. In particular, in the present proceedings, the Supreme Administrative Court, by its judgment cited above, annulled general measures - amendments 4 (second part), 5 and 6 of the urban plan of the municipality of Moravana, which were approved by the resolution of the Municipality of Moravana No 3.9.-3.36.2009 on 25 June 2009. These changes were made at the initiative of the interveners in connection with the realisation of their investment projects on the site. In the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court, the proposal of the three owners of the property concerned by this amendment of the zoning plan was complied with by reason of interference with their ownership rights and of the procedure for approving the amendment of the zoning plan initiated by the interveners in the present case. In their proposal, the interveners also stated that the expansion of the industrial zone was carried out by the Zatsplatelstvo municipality of Moravana in 2009. The proposal to cancel this amendment to the municipal zoning plan was submitted on 10 May 2010 and the council of the municipality did not agree with it as a objector. However, after the 2010 elections, the newly elected council changed its position as a defendant in the proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court, agreed to withdraw the amendments to the zoning plan and joined it at the oral hearing on 11 January 2011. The interveners learned about the discussion of such a proposal in autumn 2010. They state that, at the request of one of the representatives of the Municipality of Moravana B.B., they provided information on their investments to that representative. The latter then referred on behalf of several persons, including complainants, to the Supreme Administrative Court with a communication on the consequences of the possible abolition of amendments to the zoning plan to third parties (see paragraph 44 of judgment No 1 Ao 2 / 2010-185). The letter was delivered to the court on 13 January 2011, which was after the oral hearing of the case, but before the Court took its decision on the substance of the case, which took place on 18 January 2011. Thus, at the time of the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court, the possible effects of its decision, including the rights of third parties, were known. This was confirmed by the Supreme Administrative Court in its decision (see paragraphs 44 and 67 of judgment No 1 Ao 2 / 2010-185), but it decided in favour of the protection of the rights of the appellants and thus intervened in the abovementioned fundamental rights of the interveners. Those in their extensive submissions are based on the fact that they were not parties to the proceedings, but consider the decision to be a form of other interference in their fundamental rights. In addition, they stress that current modern procedural theories are based on wiping out differences between participants and non-participants, when institutes such as amicus curiae and other informal instruments of interest penetrate Czech procedural culture and courts increasingly take account of the broader impact of their decisions on third parties. This trend was also to be subject to the Supreme Administrative Court, especially in view of the fact that the procedure it leads is typically a procedure which, by definition, has far-reaching effects on many people. The Court of First Instance had the opportunity to hear any persons concerned by testifying, to request documents from them, etc., but this did not happen. From this procedure, the interveners claim that the Supreme Administrative Court infringed the right to a fair trial, both formally by denying them the right of procedural participation in an incorrect, non-procedural and unlawful manner, and by acting in material terms in the interests of its procedural practice in a grossly unilateral manner, which takes into account only one of the possible interests involved in decision-making. Although they are aware of the different circumstances of a particular case, they also refer to the appellant's argument in the present proceedings in Case sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 34 / 10. At the same time, they object to the inconsistency of the Supreme Administrative Court as the appellant because, in their view, in the proceedings in the case sp. zn. 1 Ao 2 / 2010, it acted in accordance with the provisions of the Administrative Rules which had previously been challenged by the Constitutional Court in the case under sp. v. Pl. ÚS 34 / 10. Furthermore, the parties to the Supreme Administrative Court blame a number of errors in their own decision. However, they also point to his conceptually flawed approach in deciding on proposals to abolish measures of a general nature, which constitutes an intervention in the right to self-government, often prefers procedural objections which do not have a real relation to the content of the contested measure and do not distinguish the specificity of decisions on individual administrative acts and legislation. For all these reasons, the interveners referred to the Constitutional Court in the knowledge that the application for annulment of the relevant part of the administrative rule is already being dealt with in the case sp. zn. For the sake of completeness, it is noted that the legal representative of the participants had a look at the file of the sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 34 / 10 on 4 January 2012, at the time when the new legislation was already in force. No further procedural steps have been taken by the interveners in the proceedings. At the same time, they gave their assent to the appeal of the Judge-Rapporteur to refrain from oral proceedings.

20. On behalf of the Chamber of Deputies, its President, Miroslav Nemcová, spoke about the proposal, first to discuss the Administrative Rules of Procedure (House Press 1080). It stated that it had been discussed in three readings on 25 October 2001, 30 January 2002, 8 February 2002 and 15 February 2002 (after incorporating the amendments) and was approved on 15 February 2002 at the 46th session of vote No 589, when of the 157 Members present there was 103 Members for the proposal and 44 Members against the proposal. The Senate agreed to the proposal on 21 March 2002 and the President of the Republic signed it on 28 March 2002. The publication in the Collection of Laws took place on 17 April 2002.

21. As regards the contested provisions of the Administrative Rules themselves, the President of the Chamber of Deputies stated that it had been inserted into the Administrative Rules by Act No. 127 / 2005 Coll., on Electronic Communications and on the amendment of certain related laws (Act on Electronic Communications) (Part Twenty-first Section 171, paragraph 3). The draft Act on Electronic Communications was submitted by the Government to the Chamber of Deputies on 7 September 2004 (sent as House Press No. 768). The contested provisions were mentioned in the explanatory memorandum: "In the context of the strong requirement of the European Communities' right to establish the right of market operators to appeal against regulatory and other interventions (which take the form of administrative decisions, general measures and decrees in the draft law) in their rights to an independent body (court), and by repeating that requirement in consultation with representatives of the Commission of the European Communities, the amendment of the Administrative Rules to the Rules of Procedure is proposed in accordance with Article 87 of the Constitution on a provision enabling the Supreme Administrative Court to abolish measures of a general nature for conflict with the law '(paragraph 173). The Chamber of Deputies discussed the proposal in three readings on 23 and 24 September 2004, 14 December 2004 and 17 December 2004 (after incorporating the amendments). The proposal was approved on 17 December 2004 at the 39th session of vote No 500, when of the 181 Members present there it was for proposal 108 and against proposal 54. The Senate discussed the proposal and decided on 27 January 2005 to return it to the Chamber of Deputies with amendments. The Chamber of Deputies maintained its adopted text and approved the proposal at the 41st meeting of 22 February 2005, when, of the 167 Members present, it voted in favour of the draft 113 and against the proposal 35. The President of the Republic signed the Electronic Communications Act on 21 March 2005 and the publication in the Collection of Laws took place on 31 March 2005.

22. On behalf of the Senate, his President, Mr Přemysl Sobotka, commented on the invitation of the Judge-Rapporteur, who, in his observations, referred to the circumstances of the inclusion of the contested provisions in the administrative order according to the explanatory memorandum and referred to the conduct of the Senate proceedings. He stated that in voting No 16 of the 75 senators present, 59 and against 2 senators were in favour of returning the draft act on electronic communications. He also stated that the debate in the Senate (including its committees) in its content focused mainly on the proposal of three Minister of Informatics, the highlighted subjects (wiretaps, digitization and public multiplex, the relationship between the Competition Authority and the Czech Telecommunications Office). Only the Committee on Education, Science, Culture, Human Rights and Petitions, which considered it to be the central institute of the Electronic Communications Act, took further account of the Institute of Measures and its judicial review, but the proposed judicial review did not raise the issue of the effectiveness of the Administrative Court in relation to the effectiveness of the regulation of the Institute of General Measures in the Administrative Order (Act No 500 / 2004 Coll.). The President of the Senate considered it necessary to point out that the contested provisions of the Administrative Rules also relate to Articles 4 (2) (c) and 48 (2) (e) of the Rules of Procedure. He did not comment on the petition and left this question, as did the President of the Chamber of Deputies at the Constitutional Court.

23. Pursuant to Article 68 (2) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll., the Constitutional Court ascertains, in proceedings for the annulment of laws and other laws, whether the contested law or other legislation has been adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution established competence and by the constitutional procedure. In the present case, however, this is part of the administrative court order which, during the procedure, was amended by certain provisions which were contested by the application. For the present case, it is essential that, pursuant to Article II (9) of Act No. 303 / 2011 Coll. (i.e. Amendments to the Administrative Rules), the proceedings already initiated with regard to the abolition of measures of a general nature or part thereof, in which no decision has been taken by the date of entry into force of the amendment to the Administrative Rules in question, shall be completed in accordance with existing legislation. The subject matter of the proceedings is therefore the constitutionality of the full part 7 of Title II, Part III, p. For the Constitutional Court, this indicates that the proceedings will inevitably be the subject of both the repealed but applicable provisions of this section and its provisions, which remain in force even though the amendment of the key elements of that section has been substantially affected. It is therefore necessary to comply with the requirements of Section 68 (2) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll., to their full extent.

24. It follows from the observations of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, and from the reports of shorthand (the Chamber of Deputies sent as an annex to the reply, at the Chamber of Deputies published on the Internet at http: / / www.psp.cz / sqw / historie.sqw? T = 768 & O = 4) that the Chamber of Deputies approved the draft act on electronic communications (containing the contested provisions of the Administrative Rules) at the third reading on 17 December 2004, when of the 181 Members present it was in favour of the proposal 108 and against the proposal 54 Members. The Senate returned the proposal with amendments on 27 January 2005, when out of the 75 senators present, 59 senators were in favour of returning the proposal and 2 opposed it. Subsequently, the Chamber of Deputies approved the proposal in its original version (i.e. the text approved before the Senate was referred to) on 22 February 2005, when of the 167 Members present it was for proposal 113 and against the proposal 35. The Act on Electronic Communications was signed by the relevant constitutional authorities and was duly declared under No 127 / 2005 Coll. in the amount of 43 Collection of Acts which was circulated on 31 March 2005 and, according to Part 27 of § 179, became effective "on the first day of the second month following its publication," i.e. on 1 May 2005. The Constitutional Court concluded that the contested provisions of the Administrative Rules were adopted by a constitutional procedure.

25. Similarly, the Constitutional Court concluded that the formal application complies with the requirements of Article 95 (2) of the Constitution and Article 64 (3) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended. In the proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court in sp. zn. 1 Ao 1 / 2010, the appellant seeks the annulment of part of the measure of a general nature - amendment No 1 of the municipal zoning plan of Kamenice approved by the municipality's representative on 12 July 2005 and published by the generally binding order of Kamenice Municipality No. 2 / 2005 amending the generally binding order of Kamenice Municipality No. 11 / 2000 on the publication of the binding part of the town of Kamenice. It is a question of the legality of a public act, in which the question must be answered whether the act (a measure of a general nature) has been issued with respect to the rules laid down in the constitutional order. The provisions 101a to 101d s. s. S. are to be applied immediately in the resolution of the case, and further action by the appellant in this procedure depends on the assessment of their constitutionality as amended on 31 December 2011. Therefore, the proposal was submitted by a legitimate appellant.

26. The Constitutional Court also added to the draft legal file sp. zn. 1 Ao 1 / 2010. Since the legal issues at issue and all the facts of the case were sufficiently clear from the paper documents, the Constitutional Court, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 44 (2) of the Constitutional Court Act, waived oral proceedings as it could no longer be expected to further clarify the case and the parties to the proceedings to the waiver agreed.

27. On that basis, after examination of the contested provisions 101a to 101d s. s. It was led by the following considerations.

28. The contested provisions of the Administrative Court are to be applied within the meaning of Article II (9) of Law No 303 / 2011 Coll. as follows:

(1) The application for annulment of a measure of a general nature or parts thereof shall be entitled to be abbreviated by those who claim that they have been subject to a measure of a general nature issued by an administrative authority on their rights. If, under the law, it is entitled to bring an action or another motion in the administrative justice system in a case in which a measure of a general nature has been applied at the same time, it may propose the annulment of a measure of a general nature only together with such a proposal.

(2) An application for cancellation of measures of a general nature or parts thereof, issued by a municipality or region, may also be made by the Ministry of the Interior.

(3) An application for annulment of measures of a general nature or parts thereof, issued by the county, may also be made by the municipality.

(4) The opponent shall be the one who has issued a measure of a general nature, the revocation or cancellation of which is proposed.

Participation of other persons in proceedings (§ 34) is excluded.

The Supreme Administrative Court shall have jurisdiction in proceedings for the annulment of measures of a general nature or parts thereof.

(1) When deciding, the court shall assess whether the measure of a general nature is compatible with the law, whether the person who issued it acted within the limits of his or her competence and whether the measure of a general nature was granted in a legal manner. It is not bound by the legal reasons for the proposal.

(2) If the court concludes that a measure of a general nature or a part thereof is contrary to the law, or that the person who issued it has exceeded the limits of its competence and competence, or that a measure of a general nature has not been granted in a legal manner, it shall abolish the measure of a general nature or part thereof on the date specified in the judgment. If the application is not reasoned, the court shall reject it. The Court of First Instance shall decide on an application for annulment of a measure of a general nature or parts thereof within 30 days of the date on which the application has reached the Court.

(3) Where, on the basis of a measure of a general nature which has been repealed, or on the basis of a part of a measure of a general nature which has been repealed, an administrative offence has been decided and the decision has become final but has not yet been implemented, the revocation of such measure of a general nature or part thereof is a reason for the recovery of proceedings under the provisions of the relevant procedural regulation.

(4) The rights and obligations arising from legal relations arising before the repeal of measures of a general nature or part thereof remain unaffected.

(5) None of the parties has a right to pay the costs. "

29. As mentioned above, the basic condition of the procedure for the specific control of legislation, where the appellant is a general court, is fulfilled. In the present case, the appellant (Engineering Kamenice, a. s.) in proceedings under sp. zn. 1 Ao 1 / 2010 before the Supreme Administrative Court seeks the annulment of part of the measure of a general nature - Amendment No 1 of the municipal zoning plan of Kamenice approved by the municipality's representative on 12 July 2005 and published in a general binding order of Kamenice No. 2 / 2005 amending the generally binding order of Kamenice Municipality No. 11 / 2000 on the publication of a binding part of the municipal planning documents of Kamenice. The case before the Supreme Administrative Court therefore concerns the question of the legality of a public act in which it is necessary to answer the question whether that act (a measure of a general nature) has been issued with respect to the rules laid down in the constitutional order and does not interfere with the constitutional rights and freedoms of its addressees under Articles 11 and 26 of the Charter. The contested provisions of the Administrative Rules are to be applied immediately in the resolution of the case, and further action by the appellant in the present proceedings depends on the assessment of the constitutionality of 101a to 101d s. s. The proposal was therefore made from this general point of view by a legitimate appellant questioning the constitutionality of the law to be applied in the current proceedings. On the other hand, the position of interveners in this proceedings is based on a constitutional complaint against a decision given in an earlier proceeding before the Supreme Administrative Court. However, only the contested provisions of Section 7 of Title II of Part III of the Rules of Procedure are the subject of the proceedings, not the framework of the future decision of the Supreme Administrative Court in Case No 1 Ao 1 / 2010 or the assessment of the constitutionality of the judgment in Case No 1 Ao 2 / 2010.

30. It is therefore essential for the procedure of the Constitutional Court that the present case does not constitute an abstract control of constitutionality, as the general courts are not entitled to such a proposal (Section 64 (1) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 83 / 2004 Coll.). It is therefore a specific situation in which the appellant is to apply the provisions of the Administrative Rules in the conditions of a particular case. Therefore, it is not an abstract assessment of the possibility of proposing the abolition of measures of a general nature without a time limit, when, moreover, this possibility has already been removed from the administrative order by its amendment. Nor is the question of the absence of a deadline of abstract importance, but of the assessment of whether it is constitutional and in accordance with the principle of legal certainty that the rule of law allows for a proposal to be submitted on 31 March 2010 to repeal a part of the zoning plan which was implemented in 2005 and which - as has been shown in the subsequent administrative procedure for the authorisation of construction - is preventing the implementation of a specific business plan by the appellant (in proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court). This is in the context of a situation where, in view of the definition of its legal nature at the latest on 19 November 2008, the territorial plans were recognised as being of a general nature (see the above found by the Constitutional Court sp. zl. This does not, of course, prevent the General Court from arguing as it does in the present case, and to avoid the wider constitutional circumstances of the case to be decided, as it does not prevent the interveners from supporting that argument from the point of view of their particular case in their proposal. However, only the contested provisions of the Administrative Rules are the subject of the proceedings, the Constitutional Court cannot in any way prejudge future decisions of the appellant or its own decisions on the constitutional complaint of the interveners.

31. Constitutional structure of the status of judicial authority within the meaning of Article 95 The Constitution does not allow courts to act actively on proposals to review the constitutionality of laws where it is not necessarily necessary to resolve the matter to be decided. On the basis of the initiation procedure in case sp. zn. 1 Ao 1 / 2010, the applicant contests the overall modification of the procedure for the abolition of general measures, i.e. 101a to 101d s. s., in a version effective until 31 December 2011 and applicable within the meaning of Article II (9) of the transitional provisions of Act No 303 / 2011 Coll. According to that provision, proceedings initiated prior to the date of entry into force of this Act, in which it was not decided by the date of entry into force of this Act, i.e. 31 December 2011, shall be completed in accordance with existing legislation. However, the appellant is challenging only some provisions, with the fact that, as a result of their unconstitutionality, the whole of the provisions are unconstitutional. These deficiencies according to the applicant (see also sub-sub-10) consist of:

(a) in the absence of an unconstitutional deadline for the submission of a proposal for a review of measures of a general nature, or in the discriminatory setting of a time limit only for a particular group of entities (closer to sub-sub 13 n.);

(b) within an excessively short period of 30 days to decide on the application;

(c) inasmuch as the concentration of the procedure for the annulment of general measures at the Supreme Administrative Court is disproportionate, although it is an agenda typical of the Court of First Instance;

(d) excluding the participation of other persons in proceedings other than the appellant and the contender, although the abolition of measures of a general nature may have a major impact on all addressees of the measure.

32. As already stated, the General Court is entitled to such a proposal in the context of its decision-making activities (§ 64 (3) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended), if it concludes that the law to be applied in the resolution of the case is contrary to the constitutional order (Article 95 (2) of the Constitution). These rules must be interpreted in the light of the position of judicial authority in the system of state bodies and the principle of division of power and the role of the judiciary in that system, so that the court may, by this procedure, require a decision only in the case of those provisions of the law which are inevitably to apply in the present case. It is not only a hypothetical possibility of use or only a broader context, as this would essentially mean the right of the court to challenge any procedural provisions relating to the proceedings before the court, since there is always a certain chain of applied rules and de facto also the law as a whole [see, to that effect, Resolution sp. zn. Unlike the abstract control of constitutionality, the specific control of the constitutionality of the law is conducted in a narrow context of judicial decision-making of a particular case. The Constitutional Court may only enter it under strictly defined conditions, in the sole way, by decision on the constitutionality of the law to be used in resolving the matter. In the context of this scrutiny, the Constitutional Court may not intervene in an interim procedure and express its views on the subject in addition to the assessment of whether the conditions for consideration of the submitted application are laid down.

33. Therefore, in the procedure on the specific control of the constitutionality of the law, it is a prejudicious question to assess which provisions of the law are inevitably to be applied in the proceedings. In this respect, it is submitted from the document submitted that the proceedings are (after specifying the petition - court file sp. zn. 1 Ao 1 / 2010, No l. 27 to 29) the selected provisions of General Decree No 11 / 2000 on the publication of a binding part of the municipal planning documents of Kamenice, as amended by the generally binding order of Kamenice, No 2 / 2005, amending the generally binding order of Kamenice, No 11 / 2000 on the publication of a binding part of the municipal planning documents of Kamenice. In particular, the appellant challenges the regulations of the zoning plan concerning the ban on the construction of large sources of air pollution in the municipality and the definition of flood areas, including the territory in which the State should be the promoter of a newly built hall for HCM technology for continuous casting of rod alloys. In the proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court, the appellant expressly states in the application that he is aware of the conclusions of the Supreme Administrative Court's case-law, namely that in judgment No 1 Ao 1 / 2005-98, that court set out an algorithm of five steps. It is noted that this algorithm, according to the Supreme Administrative Court, is derived from § 101d (1) and (2) s. s. (in its original version) and consists of five successive steps: first, a review of the administrative authority's competence to issue general measures; Secondly, in the examination of the question whether the administrative authority did not go beyond the legal limits (ultra vires) when issuing measures of a general nature; third, in the examination of the question whether a measure of a general nature has been issued by a legal procedure; Fourthly, in the examination of the content of a measure of a general nature in terms of its non-compliance with the law (material criterion); thirdly, in the review of the content of a measure of a general nature in terms of proportionality (criterion of proportionality of legal regulation). The Court of First Instance shall proceed from the first step to the next, stating that if it finds, for one of the steps of the algorithm, a reason for the annulment of the contested measure of a general nature, the application of further steps is no longer covered. From the point of view of the subject-matter of the proceedings, it should be noted that the appellant, in the proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court (see the case file in question, no. 11), states that in its case it will be in particular the fourth and fifth steps, namely the contradiction of the contested parts of the measure of a general nature with the law and, above all, the disproportionate nature of the content of the measure (question of proportionality of intervention). This is therefore not a situation in which a measure of a general nature is contested because of procedural errors, although it is content-friendly, which, according to the appellant, is a fundamental problem in terms of respect for the principle of legal certainty. In the initiating procedure, therefore, the intervention in the rights for reasons of content and proportionality is contested, not merely because of the breach of the rules on its acceptance. The arguments raised by the interveners in this regard (see sub-paragraph 19) on the general case-law practice of the Supreme Administrative Court, including its five-step algorithm in assessing measures of a general nature, can therefore only be assessed in the proceedings concerning their constitutional complaint.

34. It does not appear from the file that, in the initial case of participation in the proceedings, another person (§ 101b s. s. s. s. s. s., in the original version) would have been in vain in the context of the concentration of the procedure for the annulment of general measures at the Supreme Administrative Court (§ 101c s. s. s. s. s., in the original version), or that the defendant could have committed harm to his rights as a result of the deadline for making observations on the application (objection to sub 10.b), when he made observations on the application during one week (see on page 36 above). In the light of the circumstances of the case, it is not necessary to consider the time limit for the decision (Paragraph 101d (2) of the EC Treaty in its original version, now 90 days). Similarly, there is no situation of double position between the various appellants (without a deadline and with a deadline - see sub 15.h) within the meaning of § 101a (1) s. s. (analogy to § 74 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll.). The proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court also do not concern review proceedings pursuant to § 174 (2) of the Administrative Code (in relation to § 188 (4) of the Building Act - see sub 15.e, since in the present case it is a problem of judicial review, not a review procedure under Section VI (or § 94 to 99) of the Administrative Order (objection to sub 15.e). In this respect, the Constitutional Court notes that, in these parts, the proposal, taking into account the time of its submission, appears to be an indirect support for the reasons for the successful application of the government's proposal to amend the administrative order in the legislative process (see, by way of illustration, Document No 319, Chamber of Deputies, VI. electoral period, paragraph 13 of the explanatory report to the amendment of the administrative order) and for the use of these grounds to support the argument on the non-constitutionality of the absence of a deadline for the application in the event of a judicial review of measures of a general nature. While the existing legislation will be applied with a number of objections, these above-mentioned (and mostly amended) provisions are not to be applied in a particular procedure.

35. It also does not appear from the file that, in the initiating case, there is another person who would seek to take part in the proceedings under Article 34 of the EC Treaty. In this case, the applicant states (sub 17) that "rather to illustrate 'also refers to the legal exclusion of other persons from the proceedings other than the applicant and the defendant in accordance with the original version of Article 101b of the EC Treaty. This was not the case even for the interveners who raised their objections via a member of the Municipality of Moravana B.M. B. At this point, the Constitutional Court could, if necessary, agree with its argument, but it could, however, propose that the General Court should declare the inconstitutionality of this provision, under the condition of Paragraph 64 (3) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended. Otherwise, it is only for the persons concerned who would in vain call for their participation in the proceedings to lodge a constitutional complaint pursuant to Article 87 (1) (d) of the Constitution if they are not admitted to the proceedings. Even if the Constitutional Court in the present case came out of an extensive interpretation of the conditions for a particular check of constitutionality and, therefore, not only from the fact that the appellant of the declaration of inconstitutionality actually requires, but that it cannot be ruled out that such a person may seek to take part in the proceedings without cancelling or clarifying the wording of Article II (9) of Law No 303 / 2011 Coll. it would not be possible to open the way to the cessation of § 101b s. in the contested text. This is also indicated by the new version of § 101b, paragraph 4, p. As in the case of a deadline, the setting of the conditions for the participation of other persons in proceedings would have to be left to active interference by the legislator, which could consider all the consequences of the suspension of the application of Paragraph 101b p.s., in its original version. The new version of Paragraph 101b (4) of the Rules of Procedure cannot be seen without connection to the fact that the proceedings under Section 7 of Title II of Part III of the Rules of Procedure are transferred from the Supreme Administrative Court to the Regional Courts, which is also related to the possible participation of a large number of persons in proceedings. This question is addressed by the new provision § 34 (5) p. In the present proceedings, it is not appropriate, in the light of the wording of the Constitutional Court's proposal, to state that the transitional provision of Article II (9) is repealed to a certain extent, which would mean that part of the new regulation, including paragraphs 34 (3) and (5) of Article 34 (5) of the EC Treaty, would already be applicable when there is no real retroactivity problem.

36. Therefore, in the present case, the Constitutional Court could focus on the appellant's core argument as to the inconstitutionality of the whole legislation in the context of the absence of a deadline for the application to abolish measures of a general nature. It is clear that the lack of limitation of the design authorisation by setting a certain deadline is an immediate and inevitable problem that the appellant will have to deal with in the proceedings sp. zn. 1 Ao 1 / 2010. In view of the clarity of the rules, the appellant requires the Constitutional Court to issue an interpretative finding which will determine that "the provisions of Section 7 of Title II of Part III of Act No 150 / 2002 Coll., the Administrative Rules of Procedure, as amended by Act No 303 / 2011 Coll., were contrary to Articles 1 (1) and 100 (1) of the Constitution and Articles 11, 26 and 37 (3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms'.

37. In the present case, it must be noted with the appellant that the legislation, in a state to be decided on, does not allow such a constitutional conformal interpretation (see above its reasoning in paragraphs 3, 7 and 14). Therefore, this can only be an interpretation relating to a particular aspect of the interpretation of the Regulation, namely an interpretation excluding the subsum of a particular factual situation from the point of view of the object, place, time and subjects, such as the finding of sp. zn.

38. In the present case, it is a proposal to exclude the temporal effects of the contested provisions, since the lack of a deadline is, according to the appellant, intended to interfere with the law of a group of persons in terms of the requirements of legal certainty when the rule of law is to give priority to the principle of legality and the right of access to the court (see also sub 12 to 14). Although, in general, the Constitutional Court partially shares its argument with the appellant, it concluded in the present case that the arguments set out in paragraphs 11 to 15 above cannot be sufficient in the new legal situation following the amendment of the contested provisions of the Rules of Procedure by Administrative Law No 303 / 2011 Coll.. This argument had its authorisation before the amendment, but a new legal status was created as a result of the amendment. The proposal calls for a state of unconstitutionality in cases of proceedings pending by the end of 2011, but even in such a case (see also the argument of sub 35), a satisfactory solution cannot be reached in the light of the transitional provision of Article II (9) of Act No 303 / 2011 Coll. Even if the Constitutional Court concludes that the legislation to be applied in the case at hand was unconstitutional, this does not change the fact that this could not achieve the necessary remedy.

39. The basic starting point in this regard is that, in the Constitutional Court's legal opinion, the period of prima facie action does not without further notice and cannot show signs of unconstitutionality, which can then only be given to the "specific circumstances' of the case under consideration, in other words, the assessment of the constitutionality of the time limit is a contextual [finding sp. zn. These" specific circumstances', i.e. the aspects of the contextual assessment of the constitutionality of the deadline according to the previous case law of the Constitutional Court, are:

- the inadequacy of the time limit and, in relation to it, the time limits for the exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed right (s), or, where appropriate, the specified period of time of limitation of the subjective right. From that point of view, the Constitutional Court in the finding sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 5 / 03 of 9.7.2003 (N 109 / 30 CollU 499; 211 / 2003 Coll.) annulled the provisions of Sections 3 and 6 of Act No. 290 / 2002 Coll., on the transition of certain other items, rights and obligations of the Czech Republic to counties and municipalities, civil associations active in the field of physical and sports and on the related changes and amending Act No. 157 / 2000 Coll., on the transition of certain items, rights and obligations from the property of the Czech Republic, as amended by Act No. 10 / 2001 Coll., and Act No. 20 / 1966 Coll., on the care of the people, as amended legislation, which constituted a disproportionate restriction of property law, in connection with Article 11 (1),

- arbitrarily by the legislator when setting a time limit (its anchoring or cancellation). In this sense, the Court of First Instance of the Constitutional Tribunal of 9 March 2004 (N 35 / 32 SbNU 331; 278 / 2004 Sb.), which referred to the annulment of § 879c to 879e of the Civil Code of 9 March 2004 (N 35 / 32 SbNU 331; 278 / 2004 Sb.), which amended Act No. 219 / 2000 Sb., on the property of the Czech Republic and its acts in law, as amended by Act No. 492 / 2000 Sb., and some other laws, by which had entered into force in trust in the State, were only the final date before the end of that time, which the legislature entered into force.

- the constitutionally unacceptable inequality of two groups of entities resulting from the abolition of a certain legal condition for the exercise of the right for its unconstitutionality, and the withdrawal for the group of entities concerned, as a result of the expiry of the time limits, is no longer open to the exercise of the right without further possibility. It is based on the "specific circumstances" so understood, in the finds sp. zn. The Constitutional Court, by abolishing the provision setting out the beginning of the period for the application of the restitution claim, opened the possibility of its application also to those beneficiaries who, as a result of the condition of permanent residence, could not successfully exercise the original rights within the deadlines. In this context, the Court held that "these persons were therefore effectively excluded from the scope of the beneficiaries who could claim financial compensation and were therefore - compared with other beneficiaries - unconstitutionally disadvantaged and found themselves in an unequal legal position '.

40. On the basis of the above, it can first of all be concluded that the proposal is based on the allegation of the non-constitutionality of the non-limitation period for the submission of an application for annulment of measures of a general nature. However, most of the appellant's arguments (see sub-paragraphs 11 to 14) are based on the caselaw on the existence of a time limit and its length, not its absence. Legislation which does not limit the possibility of a motion to be put forward by a time limit is not in itself unconstitutional, as it does not have an unlimited opportunity to file a motion for annulment of the legislation in force or to declare the unconstitutional nature of the law to be applied in court proceedings (see, however, the three-year period for the proposal for annulment of the law in the Czechoslovak Republic of pre-Munich). Moreover, the assertion of the inconstitutionality of the applicable regulation would without further doubt lead to the conclusion that the principle of legal certainty, as understood by the appellant, should, after a certain period of time, take full precedence over the fundamental right of access to the court (thereby protecting subjective rights and freedoms) and the principle of legality (respect for legislation and their hierarchy).

41. This cannot be attested without further evidence, as there are circumstances which, on the contrary, could be interpreted in favour of the chosen solution, which may appear to be constitutionally acceptable in the context of the context assessment (see sub 39). This problematic situation also arose gradually as a result of the development of the case law of the Supreme Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court. The appellant rightly, as one of the indirect reasons for possible non-constitutionality, states the absence of time limits for challenging measures of a general nature, that the theory of material concepts of measures of a general nature should be enforced. This led to a situation where the territorial plans issued under the previous construction law (Act No. 50 / 1976 Coll., as amended) began to be seen as a measure of a general nature on the basis of a material concept, as formulated in the Supreme Administrative Court judgment No. 1 Ao 1 / 2005-98. The path to the judicial review on the basis of the material concept was confirmed by the findings of the Constitutional Court sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 14 / 07 (see above). Also the amendment of the new building law by Act No. 191 / 2008 Coll. on the basis of the parliamentary amendment in Article I (6) provided, with effect from 3 June 2008, that general binding regulations issued before 1 January 2007 defining a binding part of the territorial planning documentation are considered to be general measures - see Section 188 (4) of Act No. 183 / 2006 Coll., on zoning and construction regulations (construction law). It thus confirmed the way for their judicial review, whereas it excluded the review procedure under Section 174 (2) of the Administrative Regulation in this case. It is worth noting that the Government's proposal (Press No. 259, Chamber of Deputies, V. of Election) did not contain this provision, which indirectly illustrates the influence of fluctuating judicial case-law on the understanding of the nature of general measures in law. Furthermore, the consequences of changing legal opinion on the status of the bodies concerned in their subjective rights by the "older" territorial plans cannot be ignored in this context. This applies in particular to the central resolution of the enlarged Senate of the Supreme Administrative Court of 13.3.2007 No 3 Ao 1 / 2007-44, on the basis of which applications for annulment of administrative acts which were not general measures were rejected formally. This legal opinion has been re-amended on the basis of the already cited finding of sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 14 / 07 of 19.11.2008. Nor can it be ignored that doubts remain as to whether the territorial plans (so far in the binding part of the general binding decree) were to be subdivided into the concept of general measures in view of their relationship with their own territorial decisions.

42. In this legal situation, which has changed several times and which was also established by Act No. 127 / 2005 Coll. with effect from 1 May 2005 only, in view of the circumstances of the case, the principle of legal certainty cannot be clearly preferred to the possibility for the parties concerned to protect their subjective rights with the newly created possibility of bringing an application to the court for annulment of measures of a general nature. If the legislature, together with the establishment of a new legal institute, has given the possibility for the parties concerned, depending on the current formal or material concept of general measures over a period of 3 to 5 years (aspect of the protection of subjective rights), to challenge such measures (i.e. also territorial plans), this cannot be considered to be arbitrary, but also as an option to remedy the illegality (aspect of legality) in this area with a more distant past. This option has now been concluded, with each entity concerned still being able to challenge such a territorial plan by 31 December 2011 without being bound by the deadline. Finally, Article II (8) of the transitional provisions on the amendment to the Code of Administrative Procedure in Law No 303 / 2011 Coll. provides that, against a measure of a general nature which took effect before the date of entry into force of that Act, an application may be made for its annulment or cancellation of a part of it no later than 3 years after the date on which the proposal of the contested measure of a general nature became effective, even if the deadline for the submission of the application cannot be waived. If a period of three years is now set for the submission of such a proposal and the relative stability of the case-law can be established at the end of 2008, this time limit cannot be regarded as unconstitutional, arbitrary or non-discriminatory in the absence of the deadline for the submission of the proposal. This is a period of time which does not differ substantially from the currently selected period of 3 years pursuant to § 101b (1) and § 174 (2) of the Administrative Regulation. Similarly, pursuant to Article 72 (2) of the EC Treaty, the three-year period applies to the possibility of bringing an action for the protection of the public interest, as now conferred on it by Article 66 (2) and (4) of the EC Treaty to the highest public prosecutor and the Ombudsman. The same applies to the legal situation of the interveners, where the change of the zoning plan took place only in May 2009, and the repeal of these changes took place in January 2011, but not by decision of the municipality's representative in the context of the settlement of municipal policy issues, but by decision of the court which is based on the conclusion of the infringement.

43. It may be accepted that, with an increasing time interval from 1.5.2005 (the entry into force of the Electronic Communications Act), from 1.1.2006 (the entry into force of the new Administrative Order), from 3.6.2008 (the explicit transformation of the territorial plans from generally binding decrees into general measures) and from 19.11.2008 (the finding of sp. zn. However, in the case of a specific check on the constitutionality of the law, there is no room for such conclusion at this time point, as the extension of this period has already stopped.

44. In this respect, another objection which is indirectly related to the absence of a deadline for the submission of the application, i.e. an objection to the concentration of proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court, may also be considered. It is not only the usual conclusion that a judicial organisation is a matter for the legislator (Article 91 (2) of the Constitution). Here, the Constitutional Court considers it necessary to point out that, when establishing a new legal institute, a concentration which provides at least a certain possibility of establishing a single case-law cannot be regarded as being, in itself, unconstitutional. Moreover, its own experience of diverging legal views on the issues of interference and the definition of the nature of a measure of a general nature demonstrates the legitimacy of this temporary solution, which has now been abandoned by the repeal of Paragraph 101c.

45. However, even the opposite conclusion could not reverse its own decision on the illegality of the proposal. Neither the Constitutional nor the General Court can fill in the "gap 'where the legislator has not committed any time limit, which is finally stated by the appellant in his submission (see Sub-14). This is also illustrated by the judgment of the Court of First Instance - now the General Court - (Fourth Chamber, Extended) of 6 October 2005 in joined cases T-22 / 02 and T-23 / 02 Sumitomo Chemical Co. Ltd and Sumika Fine Chemicals Co. Ltd against the Commission invoked by the applicant (see sub-12). The above-mentioned facts and the timescale of the regulation and the opening dispute also lead the Constitutional Court to conclude that, in the present case, the principle of legal certainty cannot be clearly given priority to the undetermined addressees of measures of a general nature over the protection of subjective rights by measures of affected entities. It shall be entirely up to the legislator to determine or not the time limit for bringing proceedings before a court or other authority. He also filled this alleged gap with an amendment to the Administrative Rules of Procedure (Act No. 303 / 2011 Coll.) and a new version of § 101b (1) s. s. Since the impediment to the application of the new legislation is - as has been mentioned more than once - the transitional provision of Article II (9) of Act No. 303 / 2011 Coll., the path to the application of the new legislation (in addition note bene retroactively) could only be opened by cancelling this transitional provision. However, its annulment was not the case in the present proceedings, nor could the Constitutional Court prejudge a possible decision as to whether the new deadline corresponds to the nature of a measure of a general nature which is a legal act within the limits of an individual administrative act (where the time limits are far shorter precisely for reasons of legal certainty) and legislation (where the time limits are usually not given) and what the outcome of such proceedings could be. The appellant, referring to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the EU, states (closer to sub-paragraph 14) that, in cases where no time limit is set by the legislator, the submission of an application cannot be postponed indefinitely and should be made within a reasonable period of time, otherwise not only a breach of the principle of legal certainty and the legitimate expectations of the parties to the legal relationship in question would be infringed. Here, the Constitutional Court must state that this can be applied in particular where the rule of law for those who are to act in this way (but without a deadline) provides [for example, see sp. zn.

46. In this context, the principle of concentration contained in particular in Section 89 (2) of the Building Law on Territorial Management and Section 114 (2) of the Building Act on Construction Procedure cannot be waived in relation to territorial plans as a general measure. In view of what has been said in relation to the termination of a legal situation which has not been set by the deadline for the application for the cancellation of a zoning plan or part thereof, it is crucial for the assessment of the issue of constitutionality of the absence of a deadline that this situation has already been terminated in proportion to the three-year period currently laid down. In addition, it is important that, in view of the requirement to protect the subjective rights of private law against widely understood decisions of public authorities [Article 36 (2) of the Charter also includes the concept of general measures - in addition to this, the finding of sp. zn. IV. ÚS 2239 / 07 of 17.3.2009 (N 57 / 52 of the SbNU 267), point 20], sufficient time has been created for each territorial plan to be able to request such protection, taking into account that this protection cannot be adequately compensated in subsequent stages of the zoning or construction procedure (cf. Moreover, there is no follow-up in some types of management under the building law, as the measure of a general nature also represents the relevant territorial decision. For example, pursuant to Paragraph 77 (1) of the Construction Act, a territorial decision is no longer issued for the territory for which a regulatory plan is issued - 'to the extent that it replaces the relevant territorial decision'. In such a case, even a private person would not have any other means of protecting his or her subjective right (see also the find sp. zn. IV. ÚS 2239 / 07 (see above)).

47. On the basis of the assessment of the appellant's argument, the circumstances of the initiating case and the circumstances of the creation and development of legislation of general nature and case law in this section, the Constitutional Court concluded that the proposal was not justified and therefore decided to reject it under Paragraph 70 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court.