Found at the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic No. 280 / 1996 Coll.
The finding of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic of 9 October 1996 on the application for annulment of the provisions of Article 22 (4) of Act No. 72 / 1994 Coll., which regulates certain co-ownership relations with buildings and certain ownership relations with apartments and non-residential premises and complements certain laws (Law on Housing), as amended by Act No. 273 / 1994 Coll., and the provisions of Section 7 (3) of the Czech National Council Act No. 102 / 1992 Coll., which govern certain issues related to the publication of Act No. 509 / 1991 Coll., amending, supplementing and adapting the Civil Code
Valid
The Constitutional Tribunal found
Text versions:
20.11.1996
280
FIND
Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic
On behalf of the Czech Republic
The Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic decided on 9 October 1996 in plenary on the application for annulment of the provisions of § 22 paragraph 4 of Act No. 72 / 1994 Coll., governing certain co-ownership relations with buildings and certain ownership relations with apartments and non-residential spaces and supplementing certain laws (Law on the ownership of flats), as amended by Act No. 273 / 1994 Coll., and § 7 paragraph 3 of the Czech National Council Act No. 102 / 1992 Coll., adjusting certain issues relating to the publication of Act No. 509 / 1991 Coll., amending, supplementing and adapting the Civil Code,
as follows:
1. On 1 November 1997 the provisions of § 22 paragraph 4 of Act No. 72 / 1994 Coll., as amended by Act No. 273 / 1994 Coll.
2. The proposal to repeal the provision of § 7 (3) of the Czech National Council Act No. 102 / 1992 Coll. is rejected.
Reason
The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the decision of the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic ("the Ministry ') of 15 November 1995, No 316 / 4-60 / Kr, which rejected the request to grant consent to the sale of armed forces' flats in houses owned by the town of Kroměříž. In the refusal of consent by the Ministry (Article 22 (4) of Act No. 72 / 1994 Coll., as amended by Act No. 273 / 1994 Coll.), the Ministry sees, on the one hand, a breach of the constitutional right to self-government under Articles 8 and 104 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution) and, on the other, the right of ownership guaranteed by Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as the Charter). He also asked the Constitutional Court not to reject a constitutional complaint because of the failure to use all the procedural means provided by the Law on the Protection of the Law, within the meaning of § 75 (2) (a) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court. That proposal justifies the fact that this complaint, with its content and the proposal to abolish the provisions of the laws cited, affects the rights of all municipalities in the Czech Republic which are owners of houses with apartments of armed forces, which, as a result, significantly exceeds the complainant's own interests.
On 21 February 1996, the Constitutional Court called on the appellant to complete a constitutional complaint in order to fulfil the conditions required by § 75 (2) (a) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll. In an annex to its submission of 22 March 1996, the City of Kromeriz submitted to the Constitutional Court a copy of the Chief of the Military Housing and Construction Administration of Brno No 55911 of 23 January 1995 addressed to the Municipal Office in Kromeriz, in which it is stated that a measure was adopted by the Ministry limiting the issue of consent to the conclusion of a contract of transfer of ownership to armed forces' homes, with the exception of crews which are cancelled and the apartments are released for the benefit of the civil sector. In addition to that submission of 22 March 1996, the complainant attaches the City of Vyškov of 19 March 1996 and the City of Přerova of 21 March 1996. The expression of the two cities also owning houses with armed forces apartments points to the fundamental importance of resolving the possibility of disposing of these flats in the further management of the municipal housing fund. The constitutional complaint is also accompanied by a communication from the Deputy Mayor of Hodonín of 20 March 1996, which contains the view that the qualification of flats according to § 8 of the ČNR Act No. 102 / 1992 Coll. allows them to be privatised without the consent of the Ministry (the provision in question regulates the legal regime of flats which have the character of service apartments temporarily).
The Constitutional Court requested the statement of the Minister of Defence in accordance with § 42 (3) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll. on a constitutional complaint.
In his observations of 26 March 1996, the Minister of Defence first of all took a negative position on the possibility of interpreting the consent or opposition to the sale or lease of military units' apartments pursuant to Act No. 102 / 1992 Coll., or Act No. 72 / 1994 Coll. in the sense of intervention by a public authority. In the present proceedings, the addressee of the legal standard foreseen by the law sees the dispositive behaviour of the addressee, pointing out Article 11 (3) of the Charter under which ownership is committed, as well as Article 128 of the Civil Code governing the conditions of interference with property law. Consent to the transfer or lease of the armed forces' apartments is considered to be a statutory restriction on the right of ownership in the public interest (which is the security of State defence), while drawing attention to the fact that this does not take place for compensation. Therefore, in the context of the fulfilment of the conditions laid down in § 72 (1) (a) of Law No 182 / 1993 Coll. the Minister for Defence takes the view that the conditions of that provision in the case are not met. It also points out that, in the event of the success of the application for annulment of the provisions of § 22 (4) of Act No. 72 / 1994 Coll., as amended by Act No. 273 / 1994 Coll., and of § 7 (3) of the Act No. 102 / 1992 Coll. without adequate compensation of the legal and economic provisions, the possibility of providing professional soldiers (and civil servants) with an adequate housing standard (whereas the obligation of military administration as set out in § 28 (3) of Act No. 76 / 1959 Coll., on certain service conditions of soldiers, as amended). In the opinion of the Minister of Defence, the appellant's argument that it disagrees with the transfer of the armed forces' housing rights to self-government under Articles 100, 101 and 104 of the Constitution is rejected and only the consultation of the granting of consent to the transfer of the armed forces' apartments in the sense of the restriction of property law is accepted. The Minister of Defence, following an explicit request from the Constitutional Court, states in his observations that similar requests from municipalities and cities for authorisation to privatise the service housing fund were not submitted to the Ministry.
The Constitutional Complaint of the City of Kroměříž was lodged with reference to § 72 (1) (a) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., in its reasoning, it also contests, inter alia, the infringement of the right of the local authority to self-administration. In view of the content of the constitutional complaint, it can therefore be concluded that it was lodged with reference to § 72 paragraph 1 (b) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll.
The condition of a constitutional complaint made pursuant to Article 72 (1) (a) of Law No 182 / 1993 Coll. is the intervention of a public authority in breach of fundamental law or freedom. The question is whether or not the consent or opposition of the competent authority of the armed forces or of the competent Ministry to the transfer of ownership of the armed forces' premises pursuant to Article 22 (4) of Act No. 72 / 1994 Coll., as amended, can be considered as an intervention of the public authority pursuant to Article 87 (1) (d) of the Constitution and Article 72 (1) (a) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll.
The Court of Justice of the European Union may, in accordance with the provisions of the Law on the Constitutional Court, take the form of a decision, a measure or other intervention. The Ministry is a body of state administration (Article 79 of the Constitution, Article 16 of Act No. 2 / 1969 Coll., on the establishment of ministries and other central bodies of state administration of the Czech Socialist Republic, as amended) and as such a body of public authority (Resolution of the Constitutional Court of the CSFR sp. zn. I ÚS 191 / 92 published under No. 3 of the Reports of Resolutions and Finances, 1992). Pursuant to Article 244 (3) (c) of the EC Treaty, decisions of the administrative authorities are to be understood as decisions given by them in administrative proceedings, as well as other decisions which establish, amend or revoke the authorisations and obligations of natural or legal persons. In this context, the technical interpretation of that provision is underlined by the fact that "it is not important, as the administrative act is marked (decision, appointment, award, measure, agreement, order, measure, order, establishment, yield, confirmation, memo, notice, notice, order, statement, notice, consent, receipt, deletion and other). It is essential that the administrative office, through such an act of authoritarian and legal power, has intervened in a capable manner in the legal sphere of a natural or legal person. The substance of the act is always decisive and not its formal designation." (J. Bures, L. Drápal, M. Mazanec, Civil Code, Comments, 2nd edition, Prague 1996, p. 661).
In the present case, the Ministry's opposition of 15 November 1995, No 316 / 4-60 / Kr, which, pursuant to Article 22 (4) of Act No 72 / 1994 Coll., as amended, rejected the request to grant consent to the sale of the apartments of armed forces in houses owned by the city of Kromerij, to the issue of an act of administrative authority which was able to limit the ownership of the city of Kromerij in a way. From the point of view of its subject matter, the constitutional complaint therefore fulfils the condition required by Article 87 (1) (d) of the Constitution and Article 72 (1) (a) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll., as it goes against the final decision of the administrative body.
According to Article 75 (1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, a constitutional complaint is inadmissible if the complainant has not exhausted all the procedural means provided by the law to protect the law. In the present case, it must be regarded as such the breakdown provided for in § 61 of Act No 71 / 1967 Coll., on Administrative Procedure (Administrative Order) and subsequently (§ 247 (2) o. s. s.) of the action against the administrative decision pursuant to § 247 et seq.
However, the complainant relies on Paragraph 75 (2) (a) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll.
The Ministry's decision of 15 November 1995 No 316 / 4-60 / Kr, which, pursuant to § 22 (4) of Act No. 72 / 1994 Coll., as amended, rejected the request for consent to the sale of the armed forces' apartments in the houses owned by the town of Kromerij, was received on 21 November 1995, with the legal power acquired by the futile expiry of the 15-day period for the submission of decomposition. The constitutional complaint was lodged with the Constitutional Court in person on 16 January 1996.
With respect to the one-year period required by Article 75 (2) (a) of Law No 182 / 1993 Coll., the second condition for accepting a constitutional complaint which does not meet the conditions of admissibility under paragraph 1 of the provision cited is that it is of significant importance to the complainant's own interests. This must be seen in the general scope of the decision in the present case, and the general scope itself is not sufficient. In the legal fact contained in the provision of § 75 (2) (a) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll. also the sign of substantial overcoming is enshrined in the meaning of the complainant's own interests. The assessment of its fulfillment depends on the accent placed by the Constitutional Court on the general consequences of the decision on the fundamental right or freedom in question.
In the present case, the Constitutional Court concluded that the provisions of § 75 (2) (a) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll.
The scope of the case under consideration stems, on the one hand, from the proposal to repeal the provisions of § 22 (4) of Act No. 72 / 1994 Coll., as amended by Act No. 273 / 1994 Coll., and § 7 (3) of the Act No. 102 / 1992 Coll., on the other hand, from the annexes to the amendment of the constitutional complaint of 22 March 1996. In the light of the letter of the head of the Military Housing and Construction Administration of Brno No 55911 of 23 January 1995, which states that the Ministry of Defence has adopted a measure limiting the issue of consent to the conclusion of a contract of transfer of ownership to the houses of armed forces, with the exception of the crews which are cancelled and the apartments are released for the benefit of the civil sector, the finding of the Minister of Defence, in its observations of 26 March 1996, does not justify the fact that the municipalities and cities had not been submitted to the Ministry for the privatisation of the service housing fund. Finally, the importance of exceeding a constitutional complaint is seen by the Constitutional Court, by its importance of the complainant's interests, in the importance of establishing the limits of a constitutionally permissible restriction on property law in a democratic rule of law based on respect for the rights and freedoms of man and citizen, and thus on the economic principle of the market economy.
In view of the conclusions reached by the Constitutional Court in the examination of the constitutional complaint in question, and in view of the fact that it was brought together with the constitutional complaint by the appellant, in accordance with Article 74 of Law No 182 / 1993 Coll., and the application for annulment of the provisions of the law, the Constitutional Court, pursuant to Article 78 (1) of the Act cited, suspended the proceedings on the constitutional complaint by order of 24 April 1996.
Pursuant to Articles 42 (3) and 69 of Law No 182 / 1993, the Constitutional Court sent the proposal in question to the Chamber of Deputies. In its observations of 4 June 1996 (Constitutional Court, registered on 10 June 1996), the President of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, PhDr. Milan Uhde confirmed, in accordance with the requirements contained in the provisions of § 68 (2) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., that the two contested laws were approved by the necessary majority of Members of the Czech National Council or the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic (Act ČNR No. 102 / 1992 Coll. on 5 March 1992, Act No. 72 / 1994 Coll.), they were signed by the relevant constitutional officials and duly declared. In the opinion of the President of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, it is stated that the legislature, when adopting the contested laws, has acted in confidence in their compliance with the constitutional and legal rules in force. It also states that the above laws have not been tampered with by the law of ownership because the condition of the written recommendation of the armed forces and competent ministries to conclude a lease agreement and the prior consent of the competent armed forces or competent ministries to conclude a transfer of ownership agreement was laid down by the law, which is considered to be consistent with the constitutional and legal order in force.
The draft contested provisions of both laws lay down restrictions on the right of ownership of armed forces' homes in order to safeguard the housing needs of persons operating in departments guaranteeing state defence and the protection of public order. Thus, pursuant to Article 22 (4) of Act No. 72 / 1994 Coll., as amended by Act No. 273 / 1994 Coll., the transfer of ownership of the apartment of armed forces can be concluded only with the prior agreement of the competent authorities of the armed forces or competent ministries. According to the provisions of § 7 (3) of the ČNR Act No. 102 / 1992 Coll. of the lease of the apartment of armed forces can be concluded only on the basis of the written recommendation of the armed forces and ministries referred to in paragraph 1 (c) and § 8 of this Act.
As already mentioned, the proposal to repeal the provisions of § 22 (4) of Act No. 72 / 1994 Coll., as amended by Act No. 273 / 1994 Coll., and § 7 (3) of the Act No. 102 / 1992 Coll. is based on the objection to the violation of the constitutional right to self-administration under Articles 8 and 104 of the Constitution and the right of ownership guaranteed by Article 11 of the Charter.
Because Article 11 (1) The Charter has the same legal content and protection for all owners, in the context of the contested legal provisions, the appellant's argument regarding the right to self-administration under Articles 8 and 104 of the Constitution was found irrelevant by the Constitutional Court.
The constitutional framework for the possible restriction of ownership is contained in Article 11 (3) to (5) of the Charter. The restriction of the right of disposal of the owner by those statutory provisions cannot be placed under paragraphs 3 and 5 of the provision of the Charter, as it is not a tax and tax adjustment or protection of the statutory general interests against abuse of property rights. Paragraph 22 (4) of Act No. 72 / 1994 Coll., as amended by Act No. 273 / 1994 Coll., and § 7 (3) of Act No. 102 / 1992 Coll. must therefore be assessed in the light of Article 11 (4) of the Charter.
The limitation of the fundamental right or freedom in a democratic rule of law may take place in two cases (see the Constitutional Court's finding on sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 4 / 94).
In some cases, the constitutional arrangements of the fundamental right or freedom expressly empower the legislature to limit, under certain conditions or in the light of constitutional objectives, the fundamental right or freedom (e.g. Articles 12 (3), 14 (3), 16 (4), 17 (4), 19 (2), 20 (3) of the Charter) or determine its content (Article 41 (1) of the Charter). The Constitutional Area of this Procedure by the legislator is determined by the requirement of an examination of the substance and meaning of the restricted or defined fundamental right or freedom (Article 4 (4) of the Charter).
The restriction of fundamental rights or freedoms, even if their constitutional arrangements do not provide for a restriction, may occur in the event of a collision or in the case of a collision with another constitutionally protected value which is not the nature of the fundamental right and freedom (public good).
The constitutional arrangements for the status of an individual in society include the protection of individual rights and freedoms as well as the protection of public goods. The difference between them lies in their distributiveness. It is typical for public goods that the benefit of them is indivisible and people cannot be excluded from its consumption. Examples of public goods are national security, public order, healthy environment. The public good therefore becomes a certain aspect of human existence on condition that it cannot be conceptually, factually and legally broken down into parts and assigned to individuals as shares. (For the concept of public goods in economic literature, see e.g. P. A. Samuelson - W. Nordhaus, Economics, Prague 1991, p. 770 - 771, 982; legal literature, e.g. J. One, Right-Based Moralities, in: Theories of Rights, (Ed. J. Waldron), Oxford 1984, p. 187; R. Alexy, Recht, Vernunft, Diskurs. Studien zur Rechtsphilosophie, Frankfurt a. M. 1995, p. 239 et seq.)
It is typical of fundamental rights and freedoms, unlike public goods, that they are distributive. Aspects of human existence, such as personal freedom, freedom of expression, participation in political events and the associated electoral right, the right to hold public functions, the right to associate in political parties, etc., can be factually, factually and legally divided into parts and assigned to individuals.
In the event of a collision, it is necessary to lay down the conditions under which a priority is given to one fundamental right or freedom and which other or certain public good is met. In this context, the maximum is that fundamental right or freedom can be restricted only in the interests of another fundamental right or freedom or public good.
The mutual consideration of conflicting fundamental rights and freedoms or public goods shall consist of the following criteria:
The first is the criterion of suitability, i.e. the assessment of whether an institute restricting a fundamental right allows the objective pursued (protection of another fundamental right or public good) to be achieved. The second criterion of mutual consideration of fundamental rights and freedoms is the need to compare a legislative instrument limiting fundamental rights or freedom with other measures to achieve the same objective, but not affecting fundamental rights and freedoms or affecting them in a less intensive manner. The third criterion is to compare the gravity of the two conflicting fundamental rights or public goods. These fundamental rights or public goods are prima facie equivalent. Comparing the gravity of conflicting fundamental rights and public goods (after meeting the conditions of suitability and necessity) is about considering empirical, systemic, context and value arguments. The empirical argument can be understood as the actual seriousness of the phenomenon which is linked to the protection of a particular fundamental right. A systemic argument means considering the meaning and including the fundamental right or freedom in question in the system of fundamental rights and freedoms. The context argument can be understood as a further negative impact on the limitation of one fundamental right due to the preference of another. The value argument represents consideration of the positive effects of conflicting fundamental rights in view of the accepted hierarchy of values.
A comparison of the gravity of conflicting fundamental rights also involves considering the use of legal institutions minimising the arguments supported by intervention in one of them.
In the event of a conclusion on the merits of the priority of one before the other of two conflicting fundamental rights or public goods, it is a necessary condition for the final decision to also use all possibilities of minimising intervention in one of them. This conclusion can also be derived from the provisions of Article 4 (4) of the Charter, namely that fundamental rights and freedoms must be investigated not only in the application of the provisions on the limits of fundamental rights and freedoms, but also by analogy in the case of restrictions on them as a result of their mutual conflict.
When examining the proposal for the control of standards, the question must first of all be answered whether the restriction of property rights under the provisions of § 22 (4) of Act No. 72 / 1994 Coll., as amended by Act No. 273 / 1994 Coll., and § 7 (3) of the ČNR Act No. 102 / 1992 Coll. falls under the compulsory restriction which the legislator empowers the constitutional regulation of Article 11 (4) of the Charter (and must therefore meet the conditions contained therein), or must be regarded as a restriction on the basis of a conflict with another Constitution of a protected public good (defence of the State and protection of public order).
The compulsory restriction of ownership, which must comply with the conditions of Article 11 (4) of the Charter, is of a double nature:
The first is the obligation to suffer the use of the property in an emergency or in an urgent public interest, to the extent necessary, unless it is possible to achieve the purpose of restricting the property right otherwise. (The legal arrangement of this first alternative of the compulsory restriction of property rights within the meaning of Article 11 (4) of the Charter is contained in Section 128 (1) of the Civil Code).
The second possibility of compulsory restriction of ownership pursuant to Article 11 (4) The Charter is such a restriction, the purpose of which is identical to the expropriation. [Legal amendment of this alternative to the compulsory restriction of ownership within the meaning of Article 11 (4) The Charter is contained in § 128 (2) of the Civil Code and § 109 (1) and § 110 (3) of Act No. 50 / 1976 Coll., on Territorial Planning and Construction Regulations (Construction Act), as amended. According to the cited provision of the building law: "the object of the expropriation is to achieve the transition or limitation of property rights to land and buildings, or to establish, abolish or limit the right of material burden to land and buildings," where the purpose of expropriation can be achieved only by limiting the right, the right cannot be withdrawn in full '.
The limitation of property rights pursuant to the provisions of § 22 (4) of Act No. 72 / 1994 Coll., as amended by Act No. 273 / 1994 Coll., and § 7 (3) of the Act No. 102 / 1992 Coll. is not linked to the state of emergency and the intended purpose of safeguarding the public interest cannot be regarded as urgent. Furthermore, this purpose is not identical to the expropriation purposes. For the reasons set out above, the restriction of property right under the provisions of § 22 (4) of Act No. 72 / 1994 Coll., as amended by Act No. 273 / 1994 Coll., and § 7 (3) of the Act No. 102 / 1992 Coll. cannot be assessed from the point of view of Article 11 (4) of the Charter (and therefore the conditions contained therein) and must be qualified from the point of view of the admissibility of the restriction of the fundamental right or freedom in the case of its or its collision with another fundamental right, or freedom or with a public good.
The criterion of suitability, i.e. the assessment of whether an institute restricting a certain fundamental right allows it to achieve the objective pursued (ensuring the residential needs of persons operating in the departments guaranteeing state defence and the protection of public order), is the provision of § 22 paragraph 4 of Act No. 72 / 1994 Coll., as amended by Act No. 273 / 1994 Coll., and § 7 paragraph 3 of Act No. 102 / 1992 Coll. meets.
The criterion of necessity, consisting of comparing a legislative instrument restricting the fundamental right, or freedom, with other measures to achieve the same objective, but not affecting or affecting fundamental rights and freedoms, do not comply with the contested provisions at a lesser intensity. The security of the housing needs of persons operating in the departments guaranteeing the defence of the State and the protection of public order can be achieved by other procedures than those provided for in § 22 (4) of Act No. 72 / 1994 Coll., as amended by Act No. 273 / 1994 Coll., or under § 7 (3) of the ČNR Act No. 102 / 1992 Coll. (e.g. by the Institute of Substantial Burden, by adapting suitable property in state ownership, by buying apartments for the purposes of housing of members of armed forces, etc.).
Since Paragraph 22 (4) of Act No. 72 / 1994 Coll., as amended by Act No. 273 / 1994 Coll., does not satisfy the conditions of the limitation of the fundamental right or freedom as a result of its collision with another fundamental right or freedom or public good, the Constitutional Court has concluded that it is contrary to Article 11 (1) of the Charter and has therefore decided to revoke it.
For the purpose of providing time to legislators and executives for the constitutionally conformal solution to the issue of housing security for members of armed forces, in accordance with the provisions of § 70 (1) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., the Constitutional Court moved the effective date of the operative provision of § 22 (4) of Act No. 72 / 1994 Coll., as amended by Act No. 273 / 1994 Coll., to 1 November 1997.
Since Article 74 of Law No 182 / 1993 Coll. is a condition for the application of the application of the amendment of the provision of the law relating to a constitutional complaint, as a result of which the fact which is the subject of a constitutional complaint arose, which in the case of Section 7 (3) of the Act No 102 / 1992 Coll. was not fulfilled, the Constitutional Court did not have to refuse the application of that provision under Section 43 (1) (f) of Law No 182 / 1993 Coll. In this situation, the elimination of the conflict in the rule of law resulting from the abolition of only one of the two legal provisions which are contrary to constitutional laws or international treaties pursuant to Article 10 of the Constitution is the task of a democratic legislator.
President of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic:
JUDr. Kessler v. r.
The judge of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, JUDr. Ivan Janů, made use of the right to give a different opinion on point 1 of the report on the hearing and to join it in the decision, stating its name under Section 14 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court.
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Regulation Information
| Citation | The finding of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic No. 280 / 1996 Coll., on the application for annulment of the provisions of § 22 paragraph 4 of Act No. 72 / 1994 Coll., which regulates certain co-ownership relations with buildings and certain ownership relations with apartments and non-residential spaces and supplements certain laws (Law on Housing), as amended by Act No. 273 / 1994 Coll., and § 7 paragraph 3 of the Act of the Czech National Council No. 102 / 1992 Coll., which govern certain issues related to the publication of Act No. 509 / 1991 Coll., which amends, supplements and regulates the Civil Code |
|---|---|
| Regulation Type | The Constitutional Tribunal found |
| Author | - |
| Collection | Code of Laws |
| Date of Promulgation | 20.11.1996 |
|---|---|
| Effective from | - |
| Effective until | - |
| Status | Valid |
The regulation text is for informational purposes only.
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