The Constitutional Court found no 272 / 2005 Coll.

Paragraph 11 (5) of Act No. 229 / 1991 Coll., on the modification of property relations with land and other agricultural property, is deleted from the date of the publication of this finding in the Collection of Laws.

On 10 December 2004, the Constitutional Court received a proposal from the Regional Court in Mělnik, before which it was brought under sp. zn. 7 C 388 / 2003 the procedure for determining ownership of the "part of plot 458 / 21 - forest, the area of 0,5524 ha according to the condition in PK, according to the condition in the real estate register, p. 152 - civil amenities, and lots No 458 / 23 ', all in the k. Ú. and the municipality of Kokorín. In accordance with Act No. 229 / 1991 Coll., on the Treatment of Property Relations with Land and Other Agricultural Property, as amended, the Land Act claimed a group of eight persons to be issued. By Decision No 33530 / 2002 / PÚ / 919- 565 / Castle of 11 September 2002, the Land Office of Mělík decided that these participants were owners (co-owners) of those properties in the ideal shares defined in this Decision. The applicant, before the General Court, which is the National Heritage Institute, contends that this decision is factually incorrect. Among other things, the object of the castle Kokorina, which is designated as a building without the registration / registration number 152 in Kokorín and the municipality of Kokorín, the district of Mělík - civil amenities (hereinafter referred to as" the property in question "), is declared a national cultural monument by Decree No. 132 / 2001 Coll. of the Government. In this context, the applicant referred to Article 11 (5) of the Land Act, which precludes the issue of such property. This is the case where the decision-making procedure in this case will have to be followed in accordance with Article 154 (1) of the Civil Code and also apply the provisions of Article 11 (5) of the Land Act, according to which such property cannot be issued until the adoption of laws governing the administration and protection of cultural monuments. Since the appellant concluded in this connection that this provision is contrary to the constitutional order of the Czech Republic, in particular Article 1 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution) and Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as the Charter), it submitted, pursuant to Article 95 (2) of the Constitution and Article 64 (3) of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 320 / 2002 Coll. (hereinafter referred to as the Law on the Constitutional Court), a proposal for the annulment of that provision.

It justifies its proposal by the fact that the new laws governing the administration and protection of cultural monuments have not yet been adopted, since Act No. 20 / 1987 Coll., on State Monument Care, has been in force for over 13 years since the adoption of the Land Act. It also states that the Decree of the Government pursuant to Section 4 of the Soil Act (correctly Act No. 20 / 1987 Coll.) is de facto issued by individual administrative acts which, as a result, in the light of the provisions of Section 11 (5) of the Soil Act, open the way for certain persons within the meaning of the Soil Act by deleting certain assets from the list of national cultural monuments or by deleting them differently. On the other hand, they block the realisation of the restitution claim to other beneficiaries, without a certain time limit expressed by reference to the "uncertain event of the future," i.e. the adoption of new legal standards governing the management and protection of cultural monuments. Paragraph 11 (5) of the Land Act is merely a block, a postponement of the realisation of the existing restitution claim of the beneficiary, not a negative condition for the establishment and existence of such entitlement. Moreover, in the present case, the property in question was declared a national cultural monument only at the time of the administrative procedure.

According to the appellant, this legal situation leads to the creation of several sub-groups of restituents. They are those who have claimed their claims for the property which, at the time they were raised, was a national cultural monument and is still one. Furthermore, these are the persons for whom the required property has been removed from the list of national cultural monuments following the claim. Other groups are persons who, after claiming the claim, have been declared a national cultural monument. Finally, those persons who did not apply their claims precisely for the existence of Article 11 (5) of the Soil Act. On this basis, the appellant concludes that such a situation is a breach of the constitutional principle of equality between the legal entities. The exclusion of a group of beneficiaries from the realisation of their restitution rights under the circumstances will not stand. The right to mitigate property injustices must, in the state described above, be superior to the State's requirement for adequate protection of national cultural monuments by new legal standards.

The Constitutional Court first assessed the fulfilment of the conditions under which it can decide on the application. The application was lodged by a legitimate appellant within the meaning of Paragraph 64 (3) of the Constitutional Court Act. The proposal also fulfils the condition of Paragraph 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court when the contested provision of Paragraph 11 (5) has not yet been amended. Similarly, Article 1 of the Constitution and Article 1 of the Charter fulfil this condition, which are provisions of the constitutional order with which Article 11 (5) of the Land Act is to be contrary. Similarly, the reasons for the termination of proceedings within the meaning of Section 67 of the Constitutional Court Act were not established. The condition of Article 95 (2) of the Constitution is also met, as it is necessary for the General Court to apply Article 11 (5) of the Soil Act in order to resolve the case, as the applicant relies on that provision on its application (closer to sub-sub III). That is why the Constitutional Court has called on the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic and the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, as parties to the proceedings, to comment on this proposal, pursuant to Paragraph 69 (1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court. At the same time, pursuant to Section 48 (2) of the Constitutional Court Act, the Constitutional Court asked the National Heritage Institute and the Ministry of Culture to comment. He also requested a court file in this case under point 7 C 388 / 2003 at the Regional Court in Mělnik.

The Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, in its observations of 19 January 2005, signed by the President of the House by PhDr. Lubomír Zaorálk, merely stated that the proposal was approved in a constitutional manner required by a majority of Members of the Federal Assembly on 21 May 1991, signed by the relevant constitutional authorities and duly declared. The Law under review was thus adopted within the limits of the Constitution laid down by competence and in a constitutional manner. In doing so, the legislature acted in the belief that the law adopted was in line with the Constitution. As regards the substance of the case, reference was made to the finding of the Constitutional Court, published under No 57 / 1999 Coll., which repealed a similar provision of § 8 (6) of Law No 87 / 1991 Coll., on extrajudicial rehabilitation, as amended. It is therefore up to the Constitutional Court to assess the constitutionality of the contested provision and to take the relevant decision.

In the opinion of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, sent to the Constitutional Court on 20 January 2005 by its President MUDr. Přemysl Sobotka, it is stated that the Soil Act was designed in a similar manner to Act No. 87 / 1991 Coll., on extrajudicial rehabilitation. Therefore, the contested provision of § 11 (5) of the Soil Act is a mirror image of the provision of § 8 (6) of the Act on extrajudicial rehabilitation, which was abolished by the Found No 57 / 1999 Coll. This is also the only reason which, according to the Senate, led the appellant to consider the unconstitutionality of the provision, without, of course, addressing beyond that framework the specifics of the Land Act, which could possibly justify another regime of restitution at national cultural monuments, or in the words of the Constitutional Court, to be "reasonable grounds for their exclusion from the normal regime of the restitution process' under the Land Act. At the same time, the Senate does not have compelling reasons and arguments to restrict the ownership of a group of former owners or their legal successors, so that the legislation in force does not appear to be a libel legislator, as the proposal goes against a provision that became part of the law when the Senate was not yet established. Nor has the Senate been able to deal with this provision in the debates on amendments to the Soil Act, since none of the amendments under discussion have yet touched on this provision. In addition to that statement, it states that the proposal submitted should lead to a deeper reflection on the legislative technique used, where the law" foresees' the legislator's future will to adopt related or contingent legislation, which, however, may not be implemented for various reasons. This raises the question of the acceptability of "lawmaker silence." It is, however, up to the Constitutional Court to examine and rule on the constitutionality of the contested provision.

In addition, the Constitutional Court requested comments under Section 48 (2) of the Constitutional Court Act from the Ministry of Culture and the National Heritage Institute. On behalf of the Ministry of Culture, the Deputy Minister of Culture JUDr. P. S., who drew attention to the different opinion of JUDr Vladimir Paul (on the finding No. 57 / 1999 Coll.), with which the Ministry of Culture completely identifies. According to the Ministry, Article 11 (5) of the Soil Act is therefore not unconstitutional, as it merely declares when a group of assets that have been put into the hands of the State can actually be restructured and discussed. Similarly, the Ministry points out in that different opinion that "the Constitutional Court has decided on a flat-rate basis on the basis of the legislature on which assets belonging to national cultural monuments will be issued under other provisions of the Law on extrajudicial rehabilitation, without respecting that the legislator has reserved for himself, or for the competence of the Government, a decision on the conditions under which the protection of the public interest will be granted '. Therefore, the Ministry of Culture does not find any reason to repeal Article 11 (5) of the Soil Act and proposes to await new arrangements for the protection of cultural monuments. In this context, it states that the Government has approved the substantive intention of the Act on the Protection of Cultural Monuments and Monument Care. Following this, in October 2001 a draft Act on the Protection of Cultural Monuments and Monument Care was submitted to her, which was then referred to the Chamber of Deputies. However, it returned it to the Government on 13 February 2002 for revision. According to the Ministry of Culture, it is now realistic that the draft new law will be submitted to the Government in the fourth quarter of 2006. Finally, the Ministry of Culture, in addition to Article 48 (2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, recommended that the Ministry of Agriculture should also request comments.

It is the duty of the Constitutional Court to first examine whether the legislation to which the application relates has been approved within the limits of the Constitution laid down by competence and in a constitutional manner (Section 68 (2) of the Constitutional Court Act). However, this can only be done if the constitutional arrangements on the basis of which the legislation under review was adopted are in force. Paragraph 11 (5) of the Soil Act applies in the original version adopted by the Federal Assembly of the CSFR on 21.5.1991 on the basis of the Constitutional Law on the Czechoslovak Federation in force at that time. This Constitutional Law was repealed by Article 112 (2) of the Constitution on 1 January 1993. It was therefore no longer necessary for the Constitutional Court to address the question of the fulfilment of these two conditions.

As regards the assessment of the content of Section 11 (5) of the Soil Act in relation to the constitutional order of the Czech Republic and its international obligations, the Constitutional Court concluded that the proposal to repeal that provision was justified. It was led by the following considerations.

Paragraph 11 (5) of the Land Act, which states that "Real estate declared a national cultural monument may not be issued until the adoption of the laws governing the administration and protection of cultural monuments. ', follows similar provision of § 8 (6) of the Law on extrajudicial rehabilitation abolished by sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 25 / 98 of 10.3.1999 [Collection of finds and resolutions of the Constitutional Court (hereinafter referred to as" ECR'), Volume 13, Found No. 38; published under No 57 / 1999 Coll.]. This provision stated that "A matter declared a national cultural monument will not be published until the Czech National Council and the Slovak National Council adopt a new law on the administration and protection of cultural monuments." Both provisions differ only in wording when one talks about "laws," the other about "law," to be adopted by both national councils. However, in the light of Article 9 of Constitutional Act No. 143 / 1968 Coll., on the Czechoslovak Federation, it is clear that this understood the laws, the adoption of which fell within the exclusive legislative competence of the Republics and which were decided separately by the national councils. The Constitutional Court also did not find any differences which should lead to other conclusions because the law on out-of-court rehabilitation should have been "cases', whereas the Land Act is a national cultural monument such as" real estate '. The fact that, in the latter case, the concern of exporting such a monument outside the territory of the State is generally not taken into account, of course, but the issue of the regime for the protection of cultural monuments was not the subject of this procedure.

The application for annulment of Paragraph 11 (5) of the Land Act is essentially based on a summary of the reasons for the annulment of the Constitutional Court's decision No 57 / 1999 Coll. The Constitutional Court found no grounds for deviating from its legal opinion in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 13 of the Law on the Constitutional Court. In this previous finding, the Constitutional Court stated that the Act of the Czech National Council No. 20 / 1987 Coll., on State Monument Care, provides in § 4 that the determination of what must be regarded as a national cultural monument is carried out by the Government by its regulation. Paragraph 9 sets out the special obligations of the owner of the cultural monument, Section 13 provides for the pre-purchase right of the State on these matters and Section 15 (3) provides for the procedure in cases where the owner fails to take care of the national cultural monument. The latter provision also allows for the expropriation of property in certain cases. Paragraph 42 (2) of the transitional provision provides that national cultural monuments declared under the former legislation are to be considered as national cultural monuments under this law. These provisions apply at present as well as the implementing decree of the Ministry of Culture of the Czech Socialist Republic No. 66 / 1988 Coll., implementing the Act of the Czech National Council No. 20 / 1987 Coll., on State Monument Care, as amended, according to which a central list of cultural monuments is maintained, which also states that a certain cultural monument is declared "national."

The legal situation of the beneficiaries under the Land Act is therefore such that this Act does not exclude them from the right to return the land, buildings and buildings belonging to the original agricultural estate if they have switched to the State or to other legal persons during the period from 25 February 1948 to 1 January 1990 in the manner referred to in Article 6 (1) of that Law. However, the Land Act provides for an obstacle to their claims in the form of a condition which is the adoption of a law governing the administration and protection of cultural monuments. This condition, in the view of the Constitutional Court, is formulated in a way that contradicts the requirements imposed on the legislation of a democratic rule of law for several reasons. There was a law of this kind at the time of its establishment. It can also be concluded with reference to the text repealed by Paragraph 8 (6) of the Act on extrajudicial rehabilitation that this condition means the repeal of Act No. 20 / 1987 Coll. and its replacement by a new law. However, from a legislative point of view, the existing law can be amended and thus adapted to the new conditions of development of society by successive amendments. There is therefore nothing forcing the legislature to repeal the original law and adopt a new law simply because it is provided for by another law, which is not directly related to the management of cultural monuments. It is therefore not certain whether the condition of entitlement will ever be fulfilled.

The contested § 11 (5) of the Soil Act also does not provide for any content elements according to which it is possible to determine whether the envisaged amendment has already been adopted by the condition of § 11 (5) of the Soil Act and how this can be assessed. It could be argued that this is any law governing the said material. It may even be a law concerning cultural monuments that are not covered by the Soil Act at all. The laws, which, since the soil law was effective, have, in some way, dealt with matters relating to the administration and protection of cultural monuments, have already been adopted. It is sufficient to mention Act No. 242 / 1992 Coll., which amends and complements the Act of the Czech National Council No. 20 / 1987 Coll., on State Heritage Care, as amended by the Act No. 425 / 1990 Coll., as amended by the Act No. 320 / 2002 Coll., as amended by Act No. 122 / 2000 Coll., as amended by Act No. 18 / 1999 Coll., and as amended by the Act No. 146 / 2001 Coll., which amends Act No. 20 / 1987 Coll. Other laws, such as Act No. 101 / 2001 Coll., on the Return of Illegal Exported Cultural Goods, as amended by Act No. 180 / 2003 Coll., or Act No. 71 / 1994 Coll., on the Sale and Export of Cultural Goods, as amended. However, such an inaccurately formulated reference provision alone would not constitute a problem.

At a time when, in a legal state based on respect for the rights and freedoms of a person and a citizen (Article 1 (1) of the Constitution), the possibility of applying a restitution claim to such indefinite circumstances arises from the point of view of protecting the rights of the beneficiaries under the Land Act. This must be seen as an unconstitutional state. The Land Act infringes the principle of law-making in the rule of law, according to which, if the condition laid down in the legislation is linked to the acquisition of the effectiveness of another legislation, it must be a fact which occurs and which the addressees learn in some way. In the present case, however, it is not clear whether Parliament, for various reasons (e.g. a conflict of requirements for monument protection and owners), which are not directly related to restitution claims, will manage to adopt the envisaged adjustment at all. Similarly, it is not clear how they should learn about the time when the period for claiming entitlement is opened. Therefore, it cannot be considered as a legislature's own discretion that it has not formally adopted a new law in the area of the administration and protection of cultural monuments, provided that Article 11 (5) of the Soil Act is so intended, but is a arbitrary and discriminatory procedure, when it is precisely this condition, moreover vaguely and contrary to the principles of law-making expressed in the rule of law, that there is a possibility of a restitution claim. The law, which is intended to eliminate certain property injustices, is, in fact, a reference to the known so-called "temporary nature" of the legislation that is causing injustice to the next generation of beneficiaries. For the sake of completeness, the Constitutional Court recalls that in the proceedings concerning the finding No 57 / 1999 Coll. The Ministry of Culture stated that the draft substantive intention of the Act on the Protection of Cultural Monuments would be submitted to the Government for consideration in June 1999. It now states in the new procedure that the submission of a draft new law can be expected in the fourth quarter of 2006, i.e. in the next parliamentary term.

Contrary to the principle of the rule of law and the equality of legal entities, there is also a situation which has already been pointed out in the Act No 57 / 1999 Coll. The Constitutional Court has concluded here that what will be issued from national cultural monuments to authorised persons is actually decided by the government, which by its regulation can remove certain items from the list, or the declaration by the national cultural monument to limit or specify them. As current findings show, by extending the list of national cultural monuments, the government can also intervene in the ongoing restitution process and exclude some people from it "temporarily." An example of such a procedure can be the Government Decree No. 132 / 2001 Coll., on the declaration of certain cultural monuments for national cultural monuments. In Paragraph 1 (1) (a) (6), "Castle Kokorøín 'is declared a national cultural monument. According to Article 2 of this Regulation, it took effect on 1 January 2002. It was issued on 28.3.2001, at the time of the procedure for the restitution entitlement of a group of restituents who applied for its issue.

Thus, there was a situation which was not explicitly foreseen in the previous finding No 57 / 1999 Coll. but this difference does not change the validity of the underlying reasons for the finding in the present case. In this context, the Constitutional Court considers it necessary to state that it can only assess the constitutionality of the contested law, it is not for it to prejudge a future judicial decision, even if the procedure in this case gave rise to a specific check on the constitutionality of Section 11 (5) of the Soil Act. It will therefore be up to the General Court to assess whether, in this case, consideration is given to the fact that, during the restitution procedure, Government Decree No. 132 / 2001 Coll., which declared, with effect from 1 January 2002, the real estate to be subject to restitution, a national cultural monument or not, and how this affects the application of Paragraph 154 (1) of the Civil Code, according to which the judgment is in a decisive position at the time of its publication. The Constitutional Court's task is merely to rule on the constitutionality of the law to be applied in the present court proceedings, as it is invoked by one of the parties to the proceedings before the General Court, namely the defendant. The object of the proceedings is to determine the property ownership right, which is a national cultural monument, which, although not at the time of the opening of the proceedings, was, however, at the time of the creation of the property right of a group of defendants in the proceedings before the General Court. In the present case, the right to property was to be established by decision of the Ministry of Agriculture - Land Office Mělník, Decision No 33530 / 2002 / PÚ / 919-565 / Castle of 11 September 2002, which acquired legal authority on 24 January 2003, at the time when the property in question was declared a national cultural monument. Therefore, this circumstance, which is different in the case at hand from that in which the decision was made by the decision of the Court of First Instance No 57 / 1999 Coll., cannot affect the outcome of the proceedings, notwithstanding the above stressed circumstance, that even in the context of the procedure on the constitutionality of the law on a proposal from a court pursuant to Article 95 (2) The Constitution cannot be prejudiced by the Constitutional Court by the further procedure of the General Court in an incident case, and the less the result.

Government Decree No. 132 / 2001 Coll. was issued from the point of view of the form of legislation, but a de facto individual administrative act (one can talk about the measure), which, as a result of which the possible beneficiaries, concluded a path towards restitution of the castle Kokořín. In this context, the finding of point Pl. ÚS 25 / 98 has been stressed, and the appellant assumes that there are several sub-groups among the restituents, which consist primarily of those who applied their claims to the property which, at the time of the claim, was a national cultural monument and is still a national monument, and persons who, after claiming the claim, had been assigned from the list of national cultural monuments and, finally, persons who did not apply their claims precisely for the existence of the provisions of Article 8 (6) of Law No 87 / 1991 Coll. However, as a result of the Government Regulation No. 132 / 2001 Coll. a group of persons who have applied their claim to real estate was not a national cultural monument at the time of the claim (so that the blocking provisions of Section 11 (5) of the Soil Act did not apply to them) and were subsequently declared to them (a case pending by the general court which submitted the proposal). Without the amendment of the Land Act, on the basis of which the claim for the return of assets which were not prevented at the time of the submission was claimed, the exercise of the claim could have been prevented by government regulation or, on the contrary, the removal of the assets from the list of national cultural monuments could have allowed for restitution retroactively. There is therefore a question of how the rule of law and the equality of legal entities, including non-discrimination, combine with this regulation.

The Constitutional Court has already dealt with the definition of the group of beneficiaries in the restitution rules, namely in the Act on extrajudicial rehabilitation and in the Land Act, in the finds sp. zn. On the question whether there is a reasonable legal reason to exclude certain entities from the scope of those who otherwise fulfil the characteristics of a certain restitution title, the Constitutional Court replied in a negative way when it stated that the framework of a possible restriction was given only by Article 11 (2) of the Charter, i.e. that certain things could only be owned by citizens of the Czech Republic. He concluded that the Charter does not empower the legislator to determine further conditions for the acquisition of ownership (whether under the restitution process or in general). For these reasons, the permanent residence condition was declared contradictory to Article 11 (2) of the Charter. The constitutional conditions in the form of the issue of the "new Act on the Management and Protection of Cultural Monuments" by the Czech National Council and the Slovak National Council were dealt with by the Constitutional Court in the Found No. 57 / 1999 Coll. He concluded from the analysis of the legislation on this section that it is not decisive to declare a particular real or movable item as a national cultural monument to what the ownership regime is. It is therefore a law which provides for certain restrictions and special arrangements for the owner in cases where he does not take proper care of the property. Despite the fact that the Act of the Czech National Council No. 20 / 1987 Coll. was issued in completely different social and economic conditions and some of its provisions were undoubtedly no longer applicable, the Constitutional Court considered that it gave the State sufficient resources to protect cultural values while respecting the rights of restituents. The obligation of the owner of the cultural monument (i.e. also national) to take due care of its preservation and maintenance is due to the provision of § 9 of the Czech National Council Act No. 20 / 1987 Coll., where also the extensive powers of the monument care bodies are established in relation to the owner who does not fulfil his obligations. In Section 13, the priority right of the State to purchase cultural monuments is established, etc. Thus, the Constitutional Court concluded in 1999 that there is no reasonable reason for their exclusion from the normal regime of the restitution process for national cultural monuments in the light of the Law on extrajudicial rehabilitation. Therefore, the regulation in force appears to be an arbitrary legislator who, without compelling reasons and arguments, discriminates against a group of former owners or their legal successors without overriding the interest in protecting public values.

The Constitutional Court has also reached the same conclusion in this case. As regards the assessment of the obstacle to the application of the restitution claim in Article 11 (5) of the Soil Act in conjunction with Article 1 of the Charter, it did not find any reason why it should deviate from the arguments at the time. On the contrary, it considers it necessary, in addition to the original argument, to emphasise that these persons are in an unequal position with other beneficiaries after the annulment of Paragraph 8 (6) of the Act on non-judicial rehabilitation to an even greater extent than before the declaration of the Found No 57 / 1999 Coll. These are not only other beneficiaries who may (may) claim restitution rights to real estate which were not covered by Paragraph 11 (5). In addition, since 1999, they have been in an unequal position with beneficiaries, to whom a similar obstacle (Paragraph 8 (6) of the Law on extrajudicial rehabilitation) was originally applied before it was abolished as unconstitutional. This is manifestly contrary to Article 4 (3) of the Charter, which provides that statutory restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms must apply equally to all cases which fulfil the conditions laid down. Here it is possible to refer to a similar situation, which, in relation to the abolition of the permanent residence condition in the Act on extrajudicial rehabilitation, was also required by the Constitutional Court to deal with in the Found No 29 / 1996 Coll. by the abolition of this condition in the Soil Act.

These grounds were considered by the Constitutional Court to be sufficient to comply with the application for annulment of the contested provision, without dealing with the issue of the constitutional acceptance of the legislature's silence, which was exercised in its observations by the President of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic. It merely notes that, in the present case, it is not from the point of view of the law-making theory of the so-called silence of the legislator but of its possible omission. Such omission in the present case can be described as a situation where the legislator did not bring the status of authorised persons in accordance with the Law on Land and Authorised Persons into line after the publication of the finding No 57 / 1999 Coll.

Since the legislature did not do so and the contested provision of Article 11 (5) of the Law on Soil was found to be in breach of Article 1 (1) of the Constitution and Article 1 in conjunction with Article 4 (3) of the Charter, it was decided to repeal it on the date of the publication of this finding in the Collection of Laws, in accordance with Article 70 (1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court without oral hearing, given the consent of the parties within the meaning of Article 44 (2) of the Law on Constitutional Court.