The Constitutional Court found No. 269 / 2010 Coll.

Paragraph 3 (4) of the Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., on the salary and other formalities relating to the performance of the duties of representatives of State authority and of certain state bodies and judges and Members of the European Parliament, as amended by Act No. 418 / 2009 Coll., as regards the Judge, is hereby repealed on 30 September 2010.

1. On 5 March 2010, the Constitutional Court received the application of the Municipal Court in Brno to repeal "Article 3 (4) of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., as amended by Act No. 418 / 2009 Coll., as regards the Judge, Part One, Article I of Act No. 418 / 2009 Coll., amending Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., on the salary and other formalities associated with the performance of the function of representatives of the State and of certain state bodies and judges and Members of the European Parliament, as amended, and Act No. 201 / 1997 Coll., on the salary and the amendment of Act No. 143 / 1992 Coll. This proposal was accompanied by a proposal for a priority decision on a proposal pursuant to Article 39 of Act No. 182 / 1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by Act No. 48 / 2002 Coll.

2. The appellant stated that before him, under sp. zn. 33 C 18 / 2010, an action is pending which the City Court judge in Brno seeks to pay the sum of CZK 2 596. Legally, this is a right to a salary within the meaning of § 28 to 31 of Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., as well as the salary and other formalities relating to the performance of the duties of representatives of State authority and of certain state bodies and judges and Members of the European Parliament, as amended (hereinafter referred to as "Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll. '). The claim is that for January 2010 he was not paid the full salary to which he would have been entitled without the reduction of the salary made by the provision of Part One Article I of Act No. 418 / 2009 Coll. By the contested provisions, the amount of the judge's salary between 1 January 2010 and 31 December 2010 was 96% of the salary under Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll. and under Article XLVIII of Act No. 261 / 2007 Coll., on the stabilisation of public budgets. As a result, the judge's salary was reduced by 4% for 2010. In resolving the case, in the context of the dispute referred to in Article I of the proposal, the appellant concluded, in accordance with Article 95 (2) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution), that the provisions set out in the proposed petition, which ultimately result in a reduction of the salary from 1. 1. 2010 to 31. 12. 2010 and which are to be used in the resolution of the dispute, are contrary to Article 1 (1) in conjunction with Article 82 (1) of the Constitution, where appropriate Article 2 (1) and Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. The appellant therefore made an application for annulment of the contested provisions pursuant to Paragraph 64 (3) of the Constitutional Court Act, as amended, hereinafter referred to as" the Constitutional Court Act'.

3. First of all, the appellant raised objections in the proposal concerning the shortcomings of the legislative process, before the general constitutional argument, before the constitutional argument for a particular assessment of the case, before the economic argument and described the development of pay restrictions against judges.

4. The applicant argued that the conditions for declaring a state of legislative emergency by the President of the Chamber of Deputies referred to in § 99 of Act No. 90 / 1995 Coll., on the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as the Rules of Procedure) were not met. He described the procedure that preceded the declaration of a state of legislative emergency and paraphrased the content of the Government of the Czech Republic resolution of 21 September 2009 No 1 231, decision of the President of the Chamber of Deputies No 58 of 21 September 2009 and the content of the explanatory report to the law which was subsequently adopted under No. 418 / 2009 Coll. He added - unlike the Government and the President of the Chamber of Deputies - that there was no threat of significant economic damage to the State pursuant to Rule 99 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, for which he put forward the economic reasons, in particular that "the saved amount represents 0,008% of the State budget's expenditure ', and thus, in his view in this case, the declaration of a state of legislative emergency was misused to circumvent the ordinary legislative process, since the anticipated savings in the State budget in such a relatively small volume could not meet the assumption of" considerable' threatening economic damage.

5. Within the framework of the general constitutional argument, the appellant recalled the existing case-law of the Constitutional Court concerning restrictions on the salaries of judges, in particular the decision of sp. zn. Pl. Pl. Pl. ÚS 13 / 99 of 15.9.1999 (N 125 / 15 of SbNU 191; 233 / 1999 of Sb. *), Pl. ÚS 18 / 99 of 3.7.2000 (N 104 / 19 of SbNU 3; 320 / 2000 Sb.), Pl. ÚS 16 / 2000 of 3.7.2000 (N 105 / 19 of SbNU 23; 321 / 2000 Sb.), Pl.

6. In the context of the constitutional argument put forward for a particular assessment of the case in question, the appellant pointed out in particular that there was no reduction in the salary of other persons whose salaries were paid from public sources, which resulted in the condition that the only group of persons whose salaries were paid from the State Budget, which had been reduced since 1 January 2010, were the constitutional officials listed in Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll. and the prosecutors. The reduction in salary for such a limited group of persons violates the principle of proportionality, which is particularly striking in relation to judges, not to mention that the financial savings on the spending side of the state budget are completely negligible in this situation. The 4% reduction in the salary of judges for 2010, in a situation where only a very limited group of people have been affected by this reduction, goes beyond the exceptional and very exceptional measures taken to address the state's difficult situation. The legislature has intervened in the pay ratios of judges by withdrawing so-called additional salaries since 1997; it has been regularly treating wage increases since 2002. Such measures lose the nature of the exceptional nature and the exceptional nature that the Constitutional Court accentuates as legitimate in dealing with the consequences of incidents such as large floods in 2002. In the appellant's view, there were no such exceptional circumstances as would justify interference with the judicial pay ratios. Finally, the appellant recalled the development of the freezing of judges' salaries since 2002 and recalled that a legislative process aimed at wage restrictions against judges has already been launched from 2011 to the future.

7. In the context of the economic argument, the appellant pointed out that adjusting the same ratios of the same professional categories is clearly illegitimate. The appellant stated that the salary of judges was only increased on condition that the average nominal monthly salary of individuals in the non-business sphere was increased according to the published data of the Czech Statistical Office for the preceding calendar year. In other words, if there is no increase in the average nominal wage in the non-business sector, there can be no indexation of salaries under Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll. It follows that the pay ratios of judges are not in any economic vacuum, but that these salaries are directly linked to the development of average wages in the non-business sphere, in other words, in the area of workers largely paid from public sources. Therefore, application of the indexation principle under Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll. can only occur if there is an increase in the average wage in the non-business sector. However, such an increase in the average wage is in the hands of the legislator for the most crucial part.

8. The appellant concluded that, in view of the above, it concluded that the provisions laid down in the proposed petition to be applied in the resolution of the dispute are contrary to Article 1 (1) in conjunction with Article 82 (1) of the Constitution, Article 2 (1), and Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, as the case may be.

9. By its submission to the Constitutional Court on 18 August 2010, the appellant added its argument that the legislature's intervention by the contested regulation was unsystemic and led to a breach of the principle of equality and proportionality.

10. In accordance with Article 69 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court called on the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic (the Chamber of Deputies) and the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic (the Senate) to comment on the proposal.

11. The Chamber of Deputies, through its President, Ing. Miloslav Vlček, stated that the draft law adopted subsequently under No 418 / 2009 Coll. was submitted to the Chamber of Deputies by the Government on 21 September 2009 as the House Press 920. At the same time, the Prime Minister proposed that the President of the Chamber of Deputies declare, in accordance with Rule 99 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, a state of legislative emergency to discuss the draft law because of exceptional circumstances in which the State is in danger of significant economic damage, and that, under the provisions of Section 99 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, the draft law submitted should be dealt with in abridged negotiations in the context of the declared state of legislative emergency. Following this request, the President of the Chamber of Deputies declared a legislative emergency for the period from 21 September 2009 to 30 September 2009 by Decision No 58 of 21 September 2009. In the context of the declaration of a legislative emergency, the President of the Chamber of Deputies issued Decision No 59 of 21 September 2009, which decided that, pursuant to Rule 99 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, the House of Deputies would be dealt with in an abridged manner, ordering the House of Deputies to discuss the 920 budget committee and setting an inexcusable deadline for the submission of the resolution by 23 September 2009 within 24 hours. The Committee on Budgets discussed the 920 House Press on 23 September 2009, recommended that the Chamber of Deputies discuss it by 16: 00 by 25 September 2009, discuss it in the general debate and not discuss any part of it in detail in the debate. The Chamber of Deputies, pursuant to Rule 99 (4) of the Rules of Procedure, has confirmed the duration of the legislative emergency in order to discuss the House Press 920 before discussing the draft agenda of the 63rd session of the 5th parliamentary term in the vote No 2, when the 191 Member present was 182 Members, no one opposed. Furthermore, pursuant to Rule 99 (5) of the Rules of Procedure, in the vote of Order No 8, the Chamber of Deputies stated that there were still conditions for discussing the government bill in an abridged act, with 140 to 1 Members present. It is submitted that the Chamber of Deputies has negotiated the draft law in a state of legislative emergency, in compliance with the legal conditions. The Government stated in the House Press 920 that the proposed legislation corresponds to the constitutional and legal rules of the Czech Republic and does not contradict the international treaties by which the Czech Republic is bound. The European Union leaves the area of the salaries of judges to national law. The Committee on Budgets has recommended that the Chamber of Deputies approve the 920 without comment. In the second reading of the House Press 920, Members B. Sobotko and O. Fox submitted an amendment which did not concern the salaries of judges. In the third reading of the 920 House Press, the bill was passed by 182 votes in favour, against 2 votes, of 188 Members present. The Chamber of Deputies still held its 64th session after the Senate returned the bill to the Chamber of Deputies with amendments which did not concern the contested provisions. The Chamber of Deputies has re-approved the bill in the text in which it was referred to the Senate by 142 votes in favour, 3 votes against, of 161 Members present. The President of the Republic signed the Act on 13 November 2009 and the Act was published in the Collection of Laws under No. 418 / 2009 Coll. Finally, the view is expressed that the legislature acted in the belief that the adopted law is in line with the Constitution and our legal order. It is for the Constitutional Court to examine the constitutionality of the contested provisions and give an opinion.

12. The Senate, through its President, MUDr. Přemysl Sobotka, stated that, after approval in the Chamber of Deputies, the bill was delivered to the Senate on 25 September 2009, where it was discussed as Senate Press No. 173, in parallel with Senate Press No. 172, which was a bill amending certain laws in connection with the draft Act on the Czech State Budget 2010. Senate Press No. 173 was discussed in two committees, in a committee of constitutionally legal, which was a committee of guarantee, and in the Committee on Economy, Agriculture and Transport. The statement describes in detail the course of the negotiations in the committees, with the constitutional and legal debate being held in the committee on the salaries of judges, in response to the fundamental opposition of the Judicial Union of the Czech Republic and the request of representatives of the Judicial Union of the Czech Republic in relation to certain members of the committee to exclude judges from the proposed reduction of salaries. On these issues, the representatives of the petitioner also expressed their views and, after the debate, prevailed in the constitutional legal committee, so as not to interfere with the arrangements transferred from the Chamber of Deputies and to preserve the arrangements put forward by the Government, based on the 4% wage savings for the entire budget area in relation to the urgent need for financial savings in 2010. The amendments then responded to other issues in committee. The Committee on Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Transport discussed the draft law at its meeting on 5 October 2009 and in Resolution 221 recommended the Senate to approve the draft law under consideration as referred to by the Chamber of Deputies. The Senate discussed the draft law at its 12th meeting on 5 October 2009 and adopted Resolution 290, by which it returned the draft law to the Chamber of Deputies, as amended in the Annex; These were amendments which he recommended for the adoption of a constitutional legal committee. 65 of the 65 senators present voted for this resolution and no one was against it. The Chamber of Deputies then persisted on 4 November 2009 on its proposal and the law was declared in the Collection of Laws under No. 418 / 2009 Coll. As regards the appellant's objections to the fact that the conditions for declaring a state of legislative emergency in which the draft law can be dealt with in an abridged manner were allegedly not met, these objections do not concern the negotiation of the law in the Senate. In its observations, the Senate added that, at the time the draft law was discussed, it could not have assumed that a unifying principle would subsequently be violated in the Chamber of Deputies and could no longer take this change into account. It is concluded that it is entirely up to the Constitutional Court to assess the constitutionality of the draft contested provision and to rule. In its opinion on the amendment of the proposal, the Senate pointed out the premature nature of part of the appellant's argument, as it is in the opinion of the Senate rather linked to the intentions of de lehferenda.

13. The contested provision of § 3 (4) of Act No. 236 / 1995, as amended by Act No. 418 / 2009 Coll., reads:

"From 1 January to 31 December 2010, the salary of a Member, a representative, a judge and a Member of the European Parliament shall be 96% of the salary under this Act and under Article XLVIII of Act No 261 / 2007 Coll. '.

Attacked article Part of the First Act No. 418 / 2009 Coll., amending Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., on the salary and other formalities associated with the performance of the duties of representatives of the State Government and of certain state authorities and judges and Members of the European Parliament, as amended, and Act No. 201 / 1997 Coll., on the salary and certain other requirements of the prosecutors, and on the amendment and addition of Act No. 143 / 1992 Coll., on the salary and remuneration of the on-call for duty in the budget and in certain other organisations and bodies, as amended, read:

"In Article 3 of the Act No. 236 / 1995 Coll., on the salary and other formalities connected with the performance of the duties of representatives of the State Government and of certain state bodies and judges and Members of the European Parliament, as amended by Act No. 425 / 2002 Coll., Act No. 309 / 2002 Coll., Act No. 427 / 2003 Coll., Act No. 626 / 2004 Coll. and Act No. 261 / 2007 Coll., the following paragraph 4 is added:

"(4) From 1 January to 31 December 2010, the salary of a Member, a representative, a judge and a Member of the European Parliament shall be 96% of the salary under this Act and under Article XLVIII of Act No. 261 / 2007 Coll. '.

14. Pursuant to Article 95 (2) of the Constitution, if the court concludes that the law to be applied in the resolution of the case is contrary to the constitutional order, it shall bring the matter before the Constitutional Court. This authorisation is further specified in § 64 (3) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, according to which the Constitutional Court may apply for annulment of the law or its individual provisions. The subject matter of a formal discussion of such a proposal shall be the fulfilment of Article 95 (2) The Constitution, in the sense that it must be a law to be applied in the resolution of the case, i.e. the law or its provision which is proposed for annulment, is to be applied directly by the appellant in the resolution of a particular dispute. The Constitutional Court found this condition fulfilled, as the appellant will examine the action for payment of CZK 2,596, the difference between the salary which the claimant would have had before the adoption of the contested provisions and after the contested provisions of the reduced salary.

15. In the context of the procedure for the application for annulment of a law or part of a law, the Constitutional Court examines whether the contested law has been adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution laid down by competence and in a constitutional manner (Section 68 (2) of the Constitutional Court Act). The appellant questions the constitutional conformity of the legislative process with regard to the discussion of the draft law, then adopted under No. 418 / 2009 Coll., in a state of legislative emergency in the Chamber of Deputies. As far as the Senate is concerned, the appellant raises no objections to the constitutional conformity of the legislative process. The Constitutional Court has verified that the Senate has not dealt with the bill in the abridged negotiations and the Senate has not addressed the issue of abridged negotiations at all.

16. The Constitutional Court, having regard to the above elements of the parties to the constitutional conformity of the legislative process, also focused on the appellant's objections regarding the consideration of the bill in the Chamber of Deputies. First of all, the Constitutional Court points out that, in the finding of the Constitutional Court sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 7 / 03 (N 113 / 34 SbNU 165; 512 / 2004 Coll.), "if the amendment of the legislative process, which is part of a simple law, does not express a constitutional principle, as well as its possible infringement of the derogatory ground, within the meaning of Article 68 (2) of Act No 182 / 1993 Coll., as amended, does not constitute a failure to comply with the constitutional procedure for adopting the law or other legislation '. This principle was followed by the Constitutional Court in other findings, in particular sp. zn.

17. In the present case, first of all, it cannot be fully agreed with the appellant that the legislator should measure the fulfilment of the conditions for declaring a state of legislative emergency in the form of a threat of significant economic damage with a draft of a specific law designed to avert the threat of significant economic damage. The decision on whether or not there is a threat of economic damage is not a decision on damage in the legal sense, but it is based on considerations on broader political consequences. The decision whether the State is in danger of significant economic damage within the meaning of Article 99 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, an assessment in relation to the extent to which the draft law submitted imposes significant economic damage in any analogy to the provision of § 417 (1) of Act No. 40 / 1964 Coll., Civil Code, to prevent or reduce impending damage, need not be included.

18. In the present case, it cannot be overlooked that, when voting to confirm the state of legislative emergency, the significant majority of Members have always expressed themselves, that, during the negotiations of the Law in the Chamber of Deputies or in its committees, there was no significant minority, whose rights could appear to be shortened, and that even in the third-reading vote, even when voting after the bill was passed, it was a Senate vote for a significant majority of Members. In this particular case, the Constitutional Court, having regard to the principle of minimisation of intervention, has nodded the opinion of the Chamber of Deputies that "it has negotiated the bill in a state of legislative emergency with respect to legal conditions."

19. The proposal is justified as regards the alleged unconstitutionality of the content of the contested provisions.

20. The Constitutional Court has repeatedly addressed the issue of judicial fees in the past. He summed up his earlier case-law in the finding of the Constitutional Court sp. zn. As it is evident that the parties are aware of this case-law of the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court does not consider it necessary to recap it repeatedly in detail.

21. For the further development of the case law, the underlying starting point is the thesis set out in the Constitutional Court's finding, sp. v. Pl. ÚS 13 / 08: "the legislator's move, which (would) would not have suspended the rate of increase in the salary of judges, but even a partial withdrawal of the level of material security already achieved, could hardly have been addressed by the Constitutional Court in terms of democratic rule of law. In particular, this would be the case if such a fundamentally unacceptable restriction would prove to affect only or primarily the income ratios of the judges and not the income of other" servants' of the State. On that point, it is appropriate to expressly recall the conclusions of the Constitutional Court contained in its finding sp. zn. The following footnote 8 of the cited finding reads: "As regards the constitutionality of the subsequent legal withdrawal of part of the salary of the judges entitled before the adoption of this measure, the following basic generalising thesis may be inferred:

- the assessment of the constitutionality of the restrictions applicable to judges for a specific period of a particular year falls within the framework defined by the principle of judicial independence,

- the constitutional position of judges, on the one hand, and the representatives of the legislature and executive, in particular the government, on the other hand, is different, given the principle of division of power and the principle of independence of judges, which implies a different layout for legislators to pay restrictions on judges in comparison with those of such restrictions in other areas of the public sphere,

- intervention in the material security of judges guaranteed by the law must not be an expression of the legislature's indiscretions, but must be justified, based on the principle of proportionality, by exceptional circumstances, such as the difficult financial situation of the State, even if this condition is fulfilled, taking into account the differences in the function of the courts and officials of the legislature and executive, in particular the administration of the State; Such intervention must not give cause for concern if the restriction of the dignity of judges does not affect, for example, if it is not an expression of the constitutionally unacceptable pressure of legislative and judicial power.

The principle of an independent judiciary is one of the essential elements of the democratic rule of law (Article 9 (2) of the Constitution). The requirement of independent justice stems from two sources: the neutrality of judges as a guarantee of fair, impartial and objective judicial proceedings and the safeguarding of the rights and freedoms of individuals by a judge separated from political power. The independence of judges is guaranteed by the guarantees of a special legal status (which must include inconsistencies, irrevocability, integrity), the guarantees of organisational and functional independence from the bodies representing legislative and, in particular, executive powers, and the separation of the judiciary from legislative and executive powers (in particular, the application of the principle of incompatibility). From the point of view of content, judicial independence is ensured only by the binding of judges by law, i.e. excluding any elements of subordination in judicial decision-making. The Constitutional Court dealt with the fundamental components of the principle of independence of the judiciary in a comprehensive manner in the decision of the Court of First Instance in Case 7 / 02 Pl.

The legislature's own intervention in the area of material protection of judges, including in the framework of pay restrictions, must be placed under the framework protected by the principle of their independence for two reasons. The independence of judges is primarily conditional on their moral integrity and professional level, but is also linked to their adequate material collateral. The second reason for subjecting the prohibition of arbitrary interference in the material security of judges (pay restrictions) to the principle of their independence is to exclude the possibility, possibly oppression of legislative or executive decision-making powers. In other words, to exclude arbitrary interference in the material security of judges as a possible form of "penalising" judges by legislation and executive, and thus a form of pressure on their decision-making. "

22. The head of the Fourth Constitution regulates "power of justice." Article 81 The Constitution shall be exercised by independent courts on behalf of the Republic. Article 82 (1) The Constitution of Judges shall be independent in the performance of their duties. Their impartiality must not be threatened.

23. Inter omnes constat, that the independence of the courts, judges and the judiciary carries a wide range of components, namely "systemic, political and institutional conditions created for the exercise of a truly independent judicial power," i.e. the independence of the administrative and independence and the impotence of each individual judge, his ability to be resilient to any (political, media, civil pressure), "i.e. independence subjective (cf. J. Jirsa, L. Vávra, K. Janek, P. Meduna, Key to the courtroom. Prague 2006, p. 17). The power of the court then consists of the competence that is given to the courts, the community of those who have taken up a judicial function after the pledge, which is traditionally referred to as" the judiciary "or" the judiciary "and, finally, the individual judge himself. The attributes of judicial independence include dignity." A deep misunderstanding of the specific position of justice in society signals the fact that justice has so far been seen as only some kind of administration. Such a view is incorrect and has often had various negative consequences for the courts and judges. It should be pointed out that the courts are specific authorities of the State representing independent, constitutional principles of a firmly defined power... This must also be reflected in the social position of the judicial staff, especially the judges. "(cf. D. Burešová, Find the way to the true independence of the court, Socialist lawfulness No 3 / 1990, p. 121).

24. The guarantees of independence of judges are designed not as judicial privileges but for those whose rights have been established by the courts. To some extent, some of these guarantees limit the judge's legislative and executive or other "servants" of the state to a strict degree. Such guarantees include, for example, the incompatibility of the function of judge with a wide range of political, business or employment activities. The judicial situation in the Czech Republic - unlike most legal professions in the service of broader justice (lawyers, notaries, court executors) - has no independent representation. The Judicial Union of the Czech Republic is not a professional chamber and a public body, an interest authority bringing together all members of the judiciary, is a mere civil association with optional membership. Judges cannot be organised in a trade union, they are not subject to labour law, such as collective bargaining, strike, etc.

25. The contested provisions were adopted by the legislator in principle by a unilateral act, without the audiendi alterae partis. The possibility of representatives of the Judicial Union of the Czech Republic - as is apparent from the Senate's observations - did not express itself as a judge's state of mind but as a privately recommended character. The judges found themselves in a relevant position to show their will and defend themselves in a worse position than other professions, which were also intended to carry out salary restrictions, which resulted in them eventually remaining among those who actually managed to reduce their salaries. The Constitutional Court concludes that, in the event of exceptional circumstances, such as the difficult financial situation of the State, judges should not be so disadvantaged in the future and that the legislator should obtain a relevant opinion from the representatives of the judiciary, which should also be part of the explanatory memorandum.

26. The Constitutional Court could not but nod to the appellant that "a reduction in pay only in a limited group of persons violates the principle of proportionality, which is particularly striking in relation to judges, regardless of the fact that the financial savings on the spending side of the state budget are completely negligible in this situation." The Constitutional Court has taken into account this time that "a professional group, which has been involved in the reduction of public budget deficits in the long term, with the possibility of obtaining income other than salary '(cf. the different opinion of Judge Vlasta Formánková on the finding of sp. zn Pl. ÚS 13 / 08, available at http: / / nalus.ujud.cz), and could not have overlooked the following passage from the different opinion of Judge Eliška Wagner on the finding of sp. It seems to me that, in recent years, an unpopular professional group - judges, with an irreplaceable, specific position in the constitutional system, which results from a function that the judges perform, has become a sort of hostage to politics, an instrument in its populist actions, but which, as indicated above, have no real impact. The relevant (official) posts regularly indicate that the remuneration of some of the State's employees may also be a multiple of the judicial salaries because their salary, unlike the judges, may not only be fixed tariffs, but also other, either regular financial amounts (personal evaluations) and / or supplemented by one-off amounts (remuneration).' The Constitutional Court also took into account the argument from the different opinion of Judge Vladimir Kránek on the finding of Pl. ÚS 13 / 08, according to which" it is worth highlighting what the Constitutional Court has also repeatedly mentioned [and what was expressed in the recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (94) 12 of 13.10.1994], that "ensuring the adequacy of the position and remuneration of judges with regard to the dignity of their profession and the workload '. The protection of the dignity of judges can then also be established in the context of this, by not being subjected repeatedly and in the long term to the concentrated pressure of the executive (i.e. legislative power) to a gradual reduction of their - until legally guaranteed - material status and corresponding social expectations; The dignity of the judges does not prove that every time they lose a dispute with the executive (which is a tradition, because they do not have supporters), in a media-established sense of shame, they must, in the role of supplicants, hold themselves to hope that the Constitutional Court will help."

27. In the finding of the Constitutional Court sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 1 / 08 (N 91 / 49 SbNU 273; 251 / 2008 Coll.), the Constitutional Court signed up for the methods of the history of legal, legal and legal philosophy as auxiliary to legal sciences. In this case, too, the argument can be accepted from the point of view of these disciplines.

28. According to Article III (1) of the Second Constitution of the United States of America of 17 September 1787, "Judges of the Supreme Court and of the Lower Courts shall remain in office for life, if they behave well; for their service, they shall receive compensation within the specified time limits which may not be reduced during the duration of their service. ';

29.In the finding of 11.6.2003 sp. zn. In similar terms, the Constitutional Court stated that... "the pay ratios of judges in a broad sense are to be stable, not a variable, with which it calculates this or that of the government group, for example, because it finds that the fees of judges are too high compared to the salaries of civil servants or to another professional group. In other words, if it is possible to accept the application of the principle of equality at the top of that sense as regards the exceptional economically justified reduction of all salaries, the equality of all top of those groups (even as a target category) as regards the final level of pay cannot be accepted. Efforts for such equality deviates from the category of constitutionality, a political objective that does not support the constitutionally understood principle of equality. This principle finds, in the material sense, its boundaries in a statement that" the same must not be treated inequally, but at the same time the same must not be treated differently. "The principle of equality cannot be understood as a nivulation in the result, but must be interpreted as guaranteeing the same starting chances."

30. The Constitutional Court notes that even out of the frequency of its caselaw referred to above, it is clear that, contrary to the salaries of the other "servants of the State ', the judicial salaries of the other" servants of the State' are subject to restrictions only for a long period of time and with the following intended prospects. The measures in relation to them then do not appear to be exceptional and proportional, but as a targeted process aimed at returning the judicial salaries to lower levels, and thus to remove the legislative and executive errors made in the past in establishing rules for calculating the judicial salaries in the mid-1990s. Such non-enlargement, in its consequences, is bound to lead to the descent of the judicial state within the middle class, its income degradation in relation to other legal professions and to diminish its necessary social prestige.

31. "That our office is in the fold, I think it is necessary to prove. Our republic has so little concern for its institution, that it is already the year affected by tika kríza. Immediately after the coup of our public, he hires our legal factors, considered it self-evident that the authority and independence of the supra musia, even defended and consolidated by all means. But after the Slovak language: the Republic does not match the equimerne nor so sudcom nor with the political office," he wrote in 1933 the first President of the Supreme Court of the Czechoslovak Republic, the later professor of civil law, the Minister of Justice and the post-war Czechoslovak representative at the Standing International Arbitration Court in The Hague, Vladimir Fajnor (1875-1952) (cf. V. Fajnor, Reform of the Office. Legal horizon No 11 / 1933, p. 361). In addition, the Constitutional Court adds that the legislator should not omit aspects of legal ethics to rule out arbitrarily.

32. In resolution sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 13 / 10 of 27.5.2010 (available at http: / / nalus.ujud.cz), the Constitutional Court stated, inter alia: "The system of government of one party, when justice belonged to this party, lasted too long. This way of seeing justice still survives in some heads. It still survives the concept of a judge not as a representative of the judiciary, but as a civil servant loyal to the state, of a state dependent and paid in the way that the current whim of a ruling group... independence and impartiality of justice... is not its prerogative, but is a prerequisite for its functioning for the good of the whole society, especially in times of" discomfort. "

33. The Constitutional Court then concluded, for the reasons set out above, that the conditions for the reduction of the salaries of judges had not been fulfilled in this case and, in the light of its caselaw cited above, concluded that the contested provision was contrary to Article 1 (1), in conjunction with Articles 81 and 82 (1) of the Constitution, and therefore decided pursuant to Article 70 (1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court by repealing that provision on 30 September 2010.